

**The Ramakrishna Mission
Institute of Culture Library**

Presented by

Dr. Baridbaran Mukerji

RMICL-8

16853

THE 'LIFE OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE
DUKE OF WELLINGTON.



(ST. MARY'S CHURCH, WALMER.)

By J. H. STOCQUELER, Esq.

Author of "The British Officer," "The Handbook of British India," "The Military Encyclopædia,"
"Travels in Persia, Turkey, Russia, Germany, &c.," and other works.

IN TWO VOLUMES, WITH NUMEROUS ENGRAVINGS.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
INGRAM, COOKE, AND CO., 227, STRAND.
1853.

R.M.
Ac.
C. 923.542
Date: WFL
St. C.
Clas.
Cat.
En. C.
Check.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

Vol. I.

THE favorable reception of the 'GENERAL ORDERS OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,' in a condensed form, induced the Compiler to request permission to publish, as a companion to them, the whole of his Grace's Dispatches relating to his various military services and commands. The permission was accorded by the Duke, in terms that excited every exertion to seek from official and other sources the authentic narrative of his Grace's professional services, as contained in his Dispatches and private correspondence.

The details of the victories and successes in the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington in India, have never been generally known: their importance having been absorbed by the events which were then occurring in Europe, and their celebrity eclipsed by the Duke's subsequent fame.

The Compiler has adhered to the orthography of Indian names in the Calcutta Gazettes, and in assimilating the English pronunciation to the sound of the Indian character, without any reference to more modern authorities. The orthography of the names of battles and towns in Spain and Portugal has been carefully revised; and Roliça, Vimeiro, &c., erroneously printed in the Gazettes, in this work are restored to the correct spelling of the country. Miñano's '*Diccionario Geografico-Estadístico*,' and Lopez's maps, have been the authorities for the spelling of Spanish names; and the '*Mappa de Portugal*' of João Baptista de Castro, for the spelling of Portuguese names.

The drafts of various dispatches and letters written in India are missing from the Duke of Wellington's papers; and the drafts of

some of those written in the Peninsula during the years 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1812, were lost by shipwreck in the Tagus. The Index containing the *Précis* of the letters having been fortunately preserved, many of the originals have been obtained by applying to the parties to whom the dispatches and letters were addressed, or to their representatives. Colonel Gurwood takes this opportunity of acknowledging the assistance he has received from the Duke of Richmond, Lords Bathurst, Clarendon, Liverpool, Combermere, Lynedoch, Hill, Cowley, Stuart de Rothesay, Sir Lowry Cole, Sir George Berkeley, and many others, who have laid open their collections in the most unreserved manner; and from Lords Palmerston and Glenelg, by whose permission he has frequently examined the archives of the Foreign and War Departments.

The drafts of the dispatches and letters subsequent to December, 1812, are complete according to the Index.

It is presumed that this compilation will afford, in many essential respects, as correct a history of the great military achievements of the Duke of Wellington, as can be offered to the present age. His Grace certainly must be the best authority for the details of what he knew, and of what he saw; and for that which did not come under his personal observation, he had the information of all those whose duty it was to report to him the results of his orders. No hypothetical statement of imaginary advantages, that might have been produced by different conduct, or different circumstances, is given, but, which is far better, the description of the real events, written as they occurred. The Duke of Wellington is therefore now presented to the world, for the first time, the recorder of his own brilliant career.

PRÉCIS
 OF THE
 COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS,
 AND PUBLIC HONORS
 OF
 FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Born	1 May, 1769
Ensign	7 Mar. 1787
Lieutenant	25 Dec. 1787
Captain	30 June, 1791
Major	30 April, 1793
Lieutenant Colonel	30 Sept. 1793
Colonel	3 May, 1796
Major General	29 April, 1802
Lieutenant General	25 April, 1808
General, in Spain and Portugal	31 July, 1811
Field Marshal	21 June, 1813

1794.

Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regt. to join the Duke of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at Ostend	June.
Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp	July.

1795.

As senior officer commanded 3 battalions on the retreat of the army through Holland	Jan.
Early in the Spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, including the 33rd regt., re-embarked at Bremen for England.	
On return to England, embarked in the command of the 33rd regt., on board the fleet commanded by Adm. Christian, for the West Indies	Oct.

1796.

But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being 6 weeks at sea, returned to port	19 Jan.
Destination of the 33rd regt. changed for India	12 April.
Joined the 33rd regt. at the Cape of Good Hope	Sept.

1797.

Arrived in Bengal	Feb.
Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival at Penang	Aug.
Returned to Calcutta	Nov.

1798.

Proceeded on a visit to Madras	Jan.
Returned to Calcutta	Mar.
The 33rd regt. placed on the Madras establishment	Sept.

1799.

Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 33rd regt. being attached to it	Feb.
Advance of the army on Seringapatam; Col. Wellesley moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy	10 Mar.
Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly; the attack and defeat of his right flank by the division under Col. Wellesley, and the cavalry under Major Gen. Floyd.	27 Mar.
Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam	3 April.
The army before the west face of that fortress: first attack on the Sultaunpettah Tope, by the 33rd regt. and 2nd Bengal Native regt. under Col. Wellesley	5 April.
Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade (94th regt.), 2 battalions of Sepoys, and 4 guns	6 April.
Siege of Seringapatam, until	3 May.
Assault and capture: Col. Wellesley commanding the reserve in the trenches	4 May.
Col. Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam	6 May.
A Commission, consisting of Lieut. Gen. Harris, Lieut. Col. Barry Close, Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor General for the settlement of the Mysore territories	4 June.
Commission dissolved	8 July.
Col. Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and Mysore	9 July.

1800.

Col. Wellesley named to command an expedition against Batavia, in conjunction with Adm. Rainier; but declines the service, from the greater importance of his command in Mysore . . .	May.
The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a Marhatta freebooter. Col. Wellesley takes the field against him . . .	July.
Defeat and death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare . . .	10 Sept.
Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trincomalee	Oct.
Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, or in the Red sea, in the event of orders from Europe to that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile attempt upon India	15 Nov.

1801.

A dispatch, overland, received by the Governor General, with orders, dated 6th Oct. 1800, to send 3000 men to Egypt . .	6 Feb.
The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor General directed the whole force to proceed to the Red sea; and appointed Gen. Baird to command in chief, and Col. Wellesley to be second in command	11 Feb.
In the mean time Col. Wellesley, having received from the Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the overland dispatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops	15 Feb.
Col. Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appointment of Major Gen. Baird to the chief command	21 Feb.
Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to Egypt; Col. Wellesley is ordered to resume his government of Mysore	28 April.

1803.

Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march into the Marhatta territory	27 Feb.
Advance from Hurryhur	9 Mar.
Arrival at Poonah	20 April.
The Peshwah replaced on the musnud	13 May.
Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British government in the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta States and Chiefs in the Deccan; similar authority being given to Gen. Lake in Hindustan	26 June.

The Marhatta War commenced	6 Aug.
Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur	11 Aug.
Siege and capture of Baroach	29 Aug.
Battle of Assye	23 Sept.
Siege and capture of Asseerghur	21 Oct.
Battle of Argaum	29 Nov.
Siege and capture of Gawilghur	15 Dec.
Treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar	17 Dec.
————— with Dowlut Rao Scindiah	30 Dec.

1804.

Surprise of a body of predatory Marhattas, who were routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near Munkaiscer	6 Feb.
A sword of the value of £1000 voted to Major Gen. Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta	21 Feb.
Visited Bombay	4 Mar. to 16 May.
Fêtes and address by the garrison and inhabitants	
A golden vase voted to Major Gen. Wellesley, by the officers of his division; afterwards changed to a service of plate, embossed with 'Assye'	26 Feb.
Returned to the army near Poonah	17 May.
Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations	25 May.
Resigned the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General	24 June.
Left the army for Seringapatam	28 June.
Address voted to Major Gen. Wellesley, on his return from the army, by the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam	6 July.
Received by the Governor General at Calcutta	12 Aug.
Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath	1 Sept.
The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th June, 1803, and resigned on the 24th June, 1804, renewed by the Governor General	9 Nov.
Returned to Seringapatam by Madras	30 Nov.

1805.

Resigned the political and military powers in the Deccan, and proposes to embark for Europe	24 Feb.
Addresses on quitting India :	
From the Officers of the division lately under his command	27 Feb.
Answer	8 Mar.
From the Officers of the 33rd regt.	28 Feb.
Answer	9 Mar.

Addresses on quitting India :

From the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam	4 Mar.
Answer	4 Mar.
Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras, by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency	5 Mar.
Appointed Col. Wallace, Major Barclay, and Capt. Bellingham to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan . .	6 Mar.
The Thanks of the King and Parliament for his services in the command of the army of the Deccan, communicated in General Orders by the Governor General	8 Mar.
Embarks in H. M. S. Trident for England	Mar.
Landed at Deal	11 Sept.
Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover, under Lord Cathcart	Nov.

1806.

Appointed Col. of the 33rd regt. <i>vice</i> Marquis Cornwallis, deceased	30 Jan.
On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district	Feb.
Returned to serve in the Imperial Parliament for the town and port of Rye	12 April.

1807.

Appointed Secretary to Ireland (the Duke of Richmend being Lord Lieutenant)	3 April.
Sworn of His Majesty's Privy Council	8 April.
Appointed to a command in the army under Lord Cathcart, in the expedition against Copenhagen	July.
Affair at Kiøge	29 Aug.
Appointed to negotiate the capitulation of Copenhagen	5 Sept.

1808.

Received the Thanks of Parliament for his conduct at Copenhagen, in his place in the House of Commons, and replied to the Speaker	1 Feb.
Returned to Ireland	20 June.
Arrived at Cork to command an expedition	7 July.
The expedition sailed for Coruña and Oporto	12 July.
Finally landed at the mouth of the river Mondego, in Portugal	1 to 3 Aug.
Affair at Obidos	15 Aug.
— at Roliça	17 Aug.
Battle of Vimeiro	21 Aug.
Superseded in the command of the army by Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Burrard	21 Aug.

By the desire of Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Dalrymple, the Commander of the Forces, he signed the armistice with Lieut. Gen. Kellermann, which led to the Convention of Cintra	22 Aug.
A piece of plate, commemorating the battle of Vimeiro, voted to Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, by the General and Field officers who served at it	22 Aug.
Commanded a division of the army under Sir H. Dalrymple . .	22 Aug.
Convention of Cintra	30 Aug.
Returned to England	4 Oct.
In Dublin	21 Oct.
In London	5 Nov.
Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra	17 Nov.
His evidence before it	22 Nov.
Returned to Ireland	20 Dec.

1809.

Received the Thanks of Parliament for Vimeiro, in his place in the House of Commons, and replied to the Speaker . . .	27 Jan.
Appointed to command the Army in Portugal	April.
Resigned the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland	4 April.
Arrived at Lisbon, and assumes the command	22 April.
The passage of the Douro, and the battle of Oporto	12 May.
By a decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, appointed Marshal General of the Portuguese army	6 July.
Battle of Talavera de la Reyna	27 and 28 July.
Created a peer, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera	26 Aug.
Visited Marquis Wellesley at Seville and Cadiz	2 Nov.

1810.

Thanks of Parliament voted for Talavera	1 Feb.
Pension of £2000 <i>per annum</i> voted to Lord Wellington and his two succeeding heirs male	16 Feb.
Appointed a member of the Regency in Portugal, in conjunction with Lord Stuart de Rothesay, then Mr. Stuart, His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon	Aug.
Battle of Busaco	27 Sept.
Took up a position to cover Lisbon in the Lines, from Alhandra on the Tagus, to Torres Vedras and the Sea	10 Oct.
Followed the retreat of the French army, under Marshal Massena, to Santarem	16 Nov.

1811.

Again followed the retreat of the French army to Condeixa, and	Mar. 5
from thence along the line of the Mondego, to Celorico,	to
Sabugal, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo	10 April.
Affairs with the French army on its retreat :	
at Pombal	11 Mar.
at Redinha	12 Mar.
at Cazal Novo	14 Mar.
at the Passage of the Ceira, at Foz d'Arouce	15 Mar.
at Sabugal	3 April.
Thanks of Parliament for the liberation of Portugal	26 April.
Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro	3 and 5 May.
Fall of Almeida	11 May.
Battle of Albuera	16 May.
Siege of Badajoz raised	10 June.
Concentration of the army on the Caya	19 June.
The army marched to the north	1 Aug.
Affair at El Bodon	25 Sept.
— at Aldea da Ponte	27 Sept.
License granted in the name of the King, by the Prince Regent, to	
accept the title of Conde do Vinheiro, and the insignia of	
Knight Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword, from the Prince	
Regent of Portugal	26 Oct.
Gen. Hill's surprise of Gen. Girard, at Arroyo Molinos	28 Oct.

1812.

Storm of Fort Renaud, near Ciudad Rodrigo	8 Jan.
Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo	19 Jan.
Created by the Regency a Grandee of Spain, with the title of	
Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo	31 Jan.
Thanks of Parliament for Ciudad Rodrigo	10 Feb.
Advanced in the British peerage by the title of Earl of Wellington	18 Feb.
Vote of Parliament of £2000 <i>per annum</i> , in addition to the title	21 Feb.
Siege and capture of Badajoz	6 April.
Thanks of Parliament for Badajoz	27 April.
Forts at Almaraz taken by Gen. Hill	19 May.
Siege and capture of the fortified convents at Salamanca	27 June.
Battle of Salamanca	22 July.
Charge of cavalry at La Serna	23 July.
The order of the Golden Fleece conferred by the Regency of Spain	1 Aug.
Entered Madrid	12 Aug.
Appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies	Aug.

Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Marquis of Wellington	18 Aug.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Marquez de Torres Vedras	Sept.
Marched towards Burgos	4 Sept.
Siege of the Castle of Burgos commenced	19 Sept.
Siege abandoned	21 Oct.
Retreat to the frontier of Portugal, to the	19 Nov.
Thanks of Parliament voted for Salamanca	3 Dec.
A grant of £100,000 from Parliament, to be laid out in the purchase of lands to that value, as a reward for his services, and to enable him to support the dignity of his peerage	7 Dec.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Duque da Victoria	18 Dec.
Visited Cadiz, and received by a deputation of the Cortes . .	24 Dec.

1813.

Appointed Colonel of the Royal Regt. of Horse Guards . . .	1 Jan.
Returned to Portugal by Lisbon, and received by the whole population	16 Jan.
Fêtes given by the Regency, and at San Carlos	17, 18, 19 Jan.
Letter on quitting the 33rd regt. as Colonel	2 Feb.
Elected a Knight of the Garter	4 Mar.
Advance into Spain in two columns: the left column, under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, by the north bank of the Douro; the right column to Salamanca	6 May.
Quitted Freneda for Salamanca	22 May.
Affair near Salamanca	25 May.
Proceeded to the left column, at Miranda de Duero	29 May.
Affair of the Hussar brigade at Morales de Toro	2 June.
Junction of the two columns at Toro, and advance of the army on Valladolid and Burgos	4 June.
The castle of Burgos blown up	12 June.
The Ebro turned at San Martin and Rocamundo	14 June.
Affair at San Millan	18 June.
Battle of Vitoria	21 June.
Promoted to Field Marshal (Gazette, 3rd July)	21 June.
Pursuit of the French army to France by Pamplona, and the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya in the Pyrenées; and by Tolosa, San Sebastian, and Irun	21 June to 26 June.
Thanks of Parliament for Vitoria	8 July.
Siege of San Sebastian	17 July.
The Regency of Spain, on the proposition of the Cortes, bestowed on the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo the estate of the Soto de	

Roma in Granada, 'in the name of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its sincere gratitude'	22 July.
First assault and failure at San Sebastian	25 July.
Advance of the French army under Marshal Soult, by Maya and Roncesvalles; the right and centre divisions of the British army concentrating near Pamplona	24 to 27 July.
Battle of Sorauren	28 July.
Retreat of the French army into France	30 July.
Affair at the Puerto de Echalar	1 Aug.
Re-occupation of the positions on the Pyrenees by the Allied Armies	2 Aug.
Second assault and fall of San Sebastian	31 Aug.
Affairs on the Bidasoa, and San Marcial	31 Aug.
Castle of San Sebastian capitulated	8 Sept.
Passage of the Bidasoa, and entrance into France	7 Oct.
Thanks of Parliament for the operations subsequent to the battle of Vitoria and San Sebastian	8 Oct.
Surrender of Pamplona	31 Oct.
The whole of the army descended into France; passage and battle of the Nivelle.	10 Nov.
Passage of the Nive	9 Dec.
Marshal Soult attacked the left and right of the British army, and was successively defeated	10 to 13 Dec.

1814.

Leaving 2 divisions to blockade Bayonne, followed Marshal Soult with the remainder of the army	Feb.
Affair at Helleste	14 Feb.
Battle of Orthez	27 Feb.
Passage of the Adour at St. Sever	1 Mar.
Affair at Aire	2 Mar.
The permission of the Prince Regent granted to the Marquis of Wellington to accept and wear the insignia of the following Orders	4 Mar.
Grand Cross of the Imperial Military Order of Maria Teresa.	
the Imperial Russian Military Order of St. George.	
the Royal Prussian Military Order of the Black Eagle.	
the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword.	
Detached 2 divisions to Bordeaux.	8 Mar.
Affair at Tarbes	20 Mar.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and the Parliament for Orthez	24 Mar.
Passage of the Garonne	4 April.
Battle of Toulouse	10 April.

Advanced in the British peerage by the titles of Marquis of Douro and Duke of Wellington	3 May.
Visited Paris	4 May.
Visited Madrid. King Ferdinand confirmed all the honors and rewards conferred upon him in His Majesty's name by the Regency and the Cortes	24 May
A grant of £400,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants	June.
Arrived in England	23 June.
Proceeded to pay his respects to the Prince Regent, then at Portsmouth with the Allied Monarchs	24 June.
His reception in the House of Peers on taking his seat as Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and Duke	28 June.
Returned thanks at the bar of the House of Commons, and addressed by the Speaker	30 June.
Appointed Ambassador to the Court of France	5 July.
Banquet given by the Corporation of London	9 July.
Heraldic honors bestowed	25 Aug.

1815.

Quitted Paris to assist at the Congress at Vienna	24 Jan.
On the return of Buonaparte from Elba, appointed Commander of the British Forces on the Continent of Europe; and from Vienna joined the army at Bruxelles.	11 April.
Put himself in communication with Prince Blicher, in command of the Prussian army on the Meuse	2 May.
Moved the allied army towards Nivelles, the French army, under Buonaparte, having crossed the frontier at Charleroi	15 June.
Battle of Quatre Bras	16 June.
Retired to a position to cover Bruxelles, on the border of the forest of Soignies	17 June.
Battle of Waterloo	18 June.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and Parliament for Waterloo	22 June.
Pursuit of the French army to Paris.	
Surrender of Cambrai	25 June.
— of Peronne	26 June.
Paris capitulated	3 July.
By his interference, prevented the column in the Place Vendôme and the Bridge of Jena being destroyed	6 July.
A grant of £200,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants	July.
Created Prince of Waterloo by the King of the Netherlands	18 July.
Appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies of Occupation in France	22 Oct.

1818.

Assisted at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle	Oct.
Appointed Field Marshal in the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Armies	Oct.
The evacuation of France by the Allied Armies	1 Nov.
Appointed Master General of the Ordnance	26 Dec.

1819.

Appointed Governor of Plymouth	9 Dec.
--	--------

1820.

Appointed Colonel in Chief of the Rifle Brigade	19 Feb.
---	---------

1821.

Attended George IV., King of England, to the field of Waterloo	1 Oct.
--	--------

1822.

Assisted at the Congress of Verona	22 Oct.
--	---------

1826.

Proceeded on an especial embassy to St. Petersburg	9 Feb.
Removed from the Government of Plymouth to be Constable of the Tower of London	29 Dec.

1827.

Appointed Colonel of the Grenadier Guards	22 Jan.
Appointed Commander in Chief	22 Jan.
Resigned	5 May.
Re-appointed	27 Aug.

1828.

Resigned the command of the army, the King having called upon him to serve in the office of First Lord of the Treasury	14 Feb.
---	---------

1829.

Appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports	20 Jan.
---	---------

1830.

Resigned the office of First Lord of the Treasury Oct.

1834.

Elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford Jan.

Intrusted by King William IV. with the whole charge of the

Government and the seals of the 3 Secretaries of State . . . Nov.

Continued Secretary of Foreign Affairs Dec.

1835.

Resigned April.

1841.

A member of the Cabinet, but without office 5 Sept.

1842.

Appointed Commander in Chief 15 Aug.

EXPLANATION OF INDIAN TERMS, TITLES, AND COUNTRIES,
WHICH OCCUR IN THE FIRST AND SECOND
VOLUMES OF THIS WORK.

- ACKBAR.** A journal, newspaper.
- ADAWLUT.** See *Sudder Adawlut*.
- AFGHANS.** A Mahomedan race, inhabiting the countries West of the Indus and the Sulciman Mountains.
- AMEER.** Chief or leader.
- AMILDAR, or AUMILDAR, AUMILS.** Native officers, uniting civil, military, and financial powers; employed in the collection of the revenue.
- ANNA.** The sixteenth part of a rupee.
- ARZEE.** Petition, memorial, address.
- ATTAVESY, The.** A country between the Taptee and the Damungunga rivers.
- BAEE, BAYE.** Princess or lady of high rank.
- BAJARY.** Millet.
- BALLA.** Above. Balla-ghaut, above the ghaut. Balla killa, the upper fort or citadel in a fortress.
- BANDY.** A cart or gig.
- BATTA.** Field allowance to the army in money.
- BAZAAR.** Market. One was always established in camp.
- BEKTEL.** See *Otter* and *Puun*.
- BEGUM.** Lady of high rank; widow of a prince.
- BHAUDER.** Title of courtesy of high respect; literally, Invincible.
- BERAR.** A country of the Eastern Marhattas, Ellichpoor the capital. It was formerly a jaghire of the Marhatta Empire to the Rajahs of the Bhoonslah family, residing at Nagpoor, but afterwards declared independent.
- BEYAH.** The ancient Hyphasis river beyond the Suttleje, on the south-east frontier of Punjab.
- BHEESTIES.** Water carriers, followers.
- BHEELS, The.** Supposed to be the aborigines of India, inhabiting the mountainous districts bordering on Candeish and the Northern Conkan. These wild and uncivilized people, who usually live by plunder and robbery, are governed by chiefs called Naiks, most of whom are now paid by the British Government.
- BHOONSLAH.** The family name of the Rajahs of Berar. The name and titles of the Rajah, in 1803, were Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah.
- BHOW.** A Hindu title.
- BRINJARRIES.** Grain dealers who supply armies with rice and grain, loaded in bags on bullocks.
- BUCCALL.** Shopkeeper in bazaars.
- BUCKSHEE.** Commander in Chief of an army, or officer holding that rank. Also a paymaster general.
- CAHUL, CAUBUL.** One of the capitals of the Kingdom of that name.
- CAMAVISDAR.** A Native revenue collector in Guzerat.
- CAMPOOS.** Brigades of regular infantry in Native armies.
- CANARA.** A fertile district below the Western Ghauts, between the provinces of Goa and Malabar.
- CANDAHAR.** A capital of the King of Caubul.
- CANDEISH.** A country between the Nerbudda and Taptee rivers.
- CARCOON.** See *Karkoon*.

- CARNATIC.** The country to the east of Mysore, between the Ghauts and the sea.
- CASTE.** The Hindus are born to different ranks and classes, which are so called.
- CHINNA.** A sort of grain, pulse.
- CHITS, or CHITTY.** Note or letter.
- CHOIRE CHITTY.** A written order or authority on paper.
- CHOKEY.** Sentry-box, watch-house for duties, or civil guard-house or police station.
- CHOULTRY.** A covered building for travellers or for troops.
- CHOUTE.** Tribute; a fourth of the revenue exacted as tribute by the Marhattas.
- CIRCAR, or SIRCAR.** The Government; also a province or geographical division of a Soubah.
- COAST, The.** Applied formerly to the territory subject to the Presidency of Madras.
- CONFEDERACY,** the Marhatta, as mentioned in this work. The alliance formed by Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, against the Peshwah, who sought and obtained British aid.
- CONICOPOLY.** A Malabar writer.
- CONKAN.** See *Konkan*.
- COOLIES.** Men and women of low caste, who carry baggage, &c., with armies. Porters, laborers.
- COORG, or KOORG.** A country in the Ghauts between Mysore and Malabar.
- COROMANDEL,** Coast of. The eastern coast of the peninsula of India.
- Coss.** A geographical measure, irregular, but generally equal to two miles.
- COSSID.** A courier or messenger.
- COULTHEE.** A grain for horses.
- COWLE.** Mercy, quarter, protection, solemn pledge or promise.
- COWLNAH.** Paper of protection, given usually in time of war; an agreement in writing, a proclamation.
- CRORE.** One hundred lacs, or ten millions.
- of Pagodas. About £4,000,000.
- of Rupees. About £1,000,000.
- CUMLIES.** Horse cloths, or rugs of horse-hair.
- CUSHOONS.** Brigades of infantry.
- CUTCH, or KUTCH.** A barren but strong country in the western part of Guzerat.
- CUTCHERY.** Court house.
- CUTTACK.** A country on the coast to the east of Berar.
- CUTWAHL.** Chief officer of police and superintendent of Bazaars.
- DAR.** When joined to another word, means the holder of an office, or an officer in charge of a post. See *Killadar, Soubahdar, Zemindar*.
- DAWK.** The post, as also the post manner of travelling in India, carried in palanquins by bearers.
- DECCAN, South.** Applied to the country south of the Nerbudda, and between that and the Kistna rivers.
- DELTA.** A country situated between the mouths of rivers, usually applied to that of the Ganges.
- DESHMOOK.** An officer in the Deccan receiving 10 *per cent.* upon the clear revenue of the district.
- DESSARAH, DUSSEERAH.** A great military festival among the Marhattas.
- DEWAN.** The principal Native minister, or chief of the revenue department.
- DHURMSALA.** A place at or near a village for the reception of travellers.
- DIVAN.** A council of a prince and his ministers.
- DOLL.** A yellow pulse or pea.
- DOOAB.** A country between two rivers which run into each other, particularly that between the Ganges and the Jumna, in Hindustan, and that between the Kistna and the Toombuddra, in the Deccan.
- DOOLIES.** Palanquins made light for carrying sick and wounded soldiers.
- DROOG.** A fortified hill or rock.
- DUBASH.** An agent. The Native at Madras who manages the money concerns of Europeans, and serves as interpreter. In Bengal this person is called *Banyan* and *Sircar*.

- DUFFADARS.** Inferior civil servants.
- DUFTER.** Record office.
- DURBAR.** Court of an independent prince; levee.
- DURRAH, of horse.** Corps of.
- ENAUUM.** Grants of land, rent free.
- FAKIR, FAQUIR.** A Mahomedan mendicant.
- FANAM.** A coin 45 to a pagoda. Madras currency 2*d.* to 2½*d.* each.
- , **GOLD.** A coin 3½ to a rupee. Silver and gold coins of the same denomination are generally of the value of 15 to 1.
- FOUJDARRY.** See *Phousdarry*.
- GARCE.** A measure containing 4800 pucca seers, of 2 lbs. each.
- GHAUT.** A pass through hills; a ferry over a river; a range of mountains.
- GHAUTS.** Ranges of mountains which separate the upper or table land in the Deccan and Mysore from the lower countries bordering on the sea to the east and west, and on the Taptec river to the north. The country above the Ghauts is called Balla-ghaut; the country below is called Payen-ghaut.
- GHEE.** A kind of butter made of buffalo's milk.
- GHURREE.** A gong or bell upon which time is struck; also a wall flanked by towers.
- GOA.** A Portuguese settlement on the Malabar coast.
- GODOWN.** Store or warehouse.
- GOLLAH.** That part of the camp where the brinjarries are stationed.
- GOLUNDAUZE.** Artillerymen of native troops.
- GOMASTAH of Brinjarries.** Agent or Commissioner.
- GOOROO.** A Mahomedan priest.
- GRAB.** A small two-masted vessel, chiefly used for coasting in the East.
- GRAM.** A kind of pulse or grain with which the horses and gun bullocks are fed in India.
- GUICKWAR.** The family name of one of the great Marhatta chiefs holding Guzerat. The name and titles of the chief, in 1803, were Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar.
- GUNNY BAGS.** Sacking in which rice is carried.
- GUZERAT.** Part of the Marhatta empire, of which it was formerly a jaghire under the Guickwar, who afterwards declared it independent. Baroda the capital.
- GWALIOR.** The modern capital of Scindiah.
- HAVILDAR.** A non-commissioned officer of Native troops, of the rank of serjeant.
- HINDUSTAN Proper.** The country so called between the Indus, the Ganges, and the Nerbudda, and bounded on the north by the mountains of Thibet and Tartary.
- HIRCARRAH, HURKARU.** Messengers employed to carry letters. They are generally Brahmins, and sent also to gain intelligence, and used as guides.
- HOLKAR.** The family name of one of the great Marhatta chiefs, formerly a jaghiredar of the Empire, but afterwards declared his independence; his territory in Malwa, and his capital Indore. The name of the chief, in 1803, was Jeswunt Rao Holkar.
- HURDRY.** A Marhatta fiscal term, house tax, levied on villages.
- HURGOORIES, or HUZOORIAHS.** Personal attendants of a chief, of his own tribe or caste.
- HYDERABAD.** The capital and seat of government of the Nizam's dominions.
- INDORE.** The capital of Holkar in Malwa.
- JAGHIRE.** A grant of territory from a sovereign prince to a subject.
- JAGHIRE DAR.** The holder of a jaghire, usually for life only.
- JAH.** Title of the Nizam and of Scindiah.
- JEMIDAR.** The junior rank of officer in the Native troops.
- JOWARRY.** A kind of Indian corn.
- JUNGLE.** Wood, high grass or reeds, waste country.
- KANARA.** See *Canara*.
- KANDAHAR.** See *Candahar*.
- KARKHANA.** Term applied to the cattle department of the army; and where the elephants are kept.

KARKOON, or CARKOON. A Native revenue officer under the collector. An agent.

KAUBUL. See *Cañul*.

KHAREETAH. A letter, dispatch.

KHELAUT. Robe or dress of honor with which princes confer dignities.

KILLA. Balla Killa, the upper fort or citadel of a fortress.

KILLADAR. The governor of a fort.

KISTNA. A large river dividing the Deccan from Mysore.

KONKAN, or CONKAN. The country between the Western Ghauts and the sea, near Bombáy, under the Peshwah.

KOORG, or COORG. A country in the ghauts between Mysore and Malabar.

KUR. When attached to a name, as Nimbulkur, Nepaunckur, &c., designates the chief of that family.

KURCH, Durbar. Court charges.

LAC. 100,000.

— of Rupees, at 2s., about £10,000.

— of Pagodas, about £40,000.

LASCAR. A native attendant on guns, magazines, &c.

MAHA. Great.

MAISTRY. Head artisan.

MALABAR. The country on the western coast of the peninsula of India.

MALWA. A country north of the Nerbudda, divided between the Peshwah, Holkar, and Scindiah.

MARHATTA EMPIRE. Founded by the celebrated Sevajee over a considerable race of people about the middle of the seventeenth century, afterwards divided into several independent governments; the Rajah of Sattarah, a descendant of Sevajee, still being chief, although only nominally governing through the Peshwah, the chief magistrate of the Empire. The principal chiefs of the Marhatta Empire in 1803 were,

The Rajah of Sattarah.

The Peshwah.

The Rajah of Berar.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

Anund Rao Quickwar.

MATROSS. A bombardier.

MAUND. A weight varying from 28 to 82 lbs. according to country.

MAUNKARRIES. Men of high caste, nobles.

MEER SUDDOOR. One of the great officers of Tippoo's government; his particular charge was the forts, &c.

MERCALL. A measure of 12 seers of 2 lbs. each. 24 lbs.

MOGUL. The title of the Mahomedan Emperors of Hindustan; one of the sects of Mussulman.

MOHUR. A gold coin varying in value, according to weight, from 12 to 14 or 15, and even 16 rupees.

MOODEE. Granary.

MOOLUCK-GHERRY, MULUK GEEREE. Collection, exaction, or kind of revenue, in Guzerat.

MOONSHÉE. Letter writer, tutor, secretary.

MOPLAHS. A race residing in Malabar Proper, descended from the Arabs who colonized on that coast.

MUCCUDUM, of Brinjarries, Conductor.

MUCKELKA. Agreement.

MUSNUD. Throne.

MUTTASEDDEE. Accountant, chief clerk or secretary of brinjarries.

MUTULUK. Deputy.

MYSOBE. A country south of the Deccan, conquered from the Native Hindu Rajahs by Hyder Aly, retaken from Tippoo Sultaun by the British, and restored to the ancient family on the fall of Seringapatam.

NABOB, or NAWAUB. Mussulman King or Chief: often a title of courtesy unattended with power.

NAGPOOR. The capital and the seat of government of the Rajah of Berar.

NAIG, NAIK, or NAIGUE. The lowest rank of non-commissioned officer in Native troops, answering to that of corporal. Naik is also a title of the chiefs of the Bheels.

NAIRS. A warlike race of Hindus, inhabiting the mountainous and jungly parts of Malabar.

NAMPERVERISH. Persons who are destitute.

————— **FUND,** for such as are destitute.

- NERBUDDA.** A large river dividing Hindustan from the Deccan.
- NERRICK.** Price-current of the market.
- NIMMUK-WALLAH.** Literally salt-eater. Eating salt in the East is a bond of faith and friendship among those by whom it is eaten together.
- NIZAM.** The Soubahdar of the Deccan, reigning over a large portion of territory between the Wurda, Godavery, and Kistna rivers. Capital at Hyderabad. The names and titles of the Nizam, in 1803, were Nizam and Dowlut, Asoph Jah, Soubahdar of the Deccan; he was succeeded in the same year by his son Secundar Jah.
- NOTCH, NOUTCH.** A dance, Indian fête.
- NULLAH.** A stream, watercourse.
- NUZZER.** An offering, a present made to a superior, a fine or fee.
- OOMRAH.** High rank of nobility.
- OTTER and PAUN.** Essence of the preparation of beetel nut, presented to visitors on quitting a durbar.
- OUGEIN.** The ancient capital and seat of government of Scindiah in Malwa.
- PADDY.** Rice in the husk.
- PAGODA.** Hindu temple of worship. A gold coin of about 8s. value.
- PARBUTTY.** Writer to the Patel.
- PATAN.** Name applied to the Afghan tribes.
- PATEL, POTAIL, or PUTTEEL.** The hereditary head manager of a village, and the medium of communication between a village and a government.
- PAYEN.** Lower, Payen-ghaut, the country below the Ghauts.
- PEONS.** Irregular infantry, armed with swords or matchlocks, employed chiefly in the defence of forts, and in the collection of the revenue.
- PERGUNNAH.** A district. The largest division of land in Zemindarry.
- PESHCUSH.** Tribute, fine, quit rent on the stipulated revenue.
- PESH-KHANA.** Chief agent, or manager to a Resident.
- PESHWAH.** Literally, the First. The chief magistrate of the Marhatta Empire, nominally under the Rajah of Sattarah, but usurping his authority. His capital and seat of government at Poonah. The names and titles of the Peshwah, in 1803, were Sreemant Bajee Rao, Ragonaut Rao, Pundit Purdhaun.
- PETTAH.** A suburb, or outwork of a fortified place, with wall and ditch.
- PHOUSDARRY, or FOUJDARRY.** The criminal court of law in Mysore.
- PINDARRIES.** Freebooters, who ravaged the countries of other nations.
- POLYGARS.** Natives who consider themselves independent: they inhabit forts, hills, and woods, armed with pikes and matchlocks.
- POONAH.** Formerly the capital and seat of government of the Peshwah.
- PUCKALIES.** Water carriers by bullocks.
- PUNDIT.** A learned Brahmin.
- PUNJAUB.** Five rivers; the country intersected by, between the Indus and the Sutleje.
- PURNEAH, or POURNEYA.** The celebrated Dewan of Mysore.
- PURWANAH.** A government or official order.
- RAHDARRY.** An order of route and supplies.
- RAJAH.** The Hindu title of a prince.
- RAJPOOT.** A high caste of Hindu soldiers, inhabiting the country Rajpootana.
- RANNEE.** Hindu princess. The wife of a Rajah.
- RAO, or ROW.** A title under the rank of Rajah.
- RATIH.** Daily allowance of provisions.
- RUPEE.** A silver coin, value about 2s. in the explanation of lac, but is sometimes 1s. 10d.: it varies in value all over India. Of this coin there are several kinds, viz., Chandore, Sicca, Pondicherry, Rajah, &c.; all varying in relative value.
- RUSSALAH, of horse.** A division or corps of, less than a Durrah.
- RYOT.** Peasant or laborer.
- SAHEB.** Master.

- SATTARAH.** The capital of the country so named. Though the Rajah of Sattarah was, as descendant of Sevajee, nominally the head of the Marhatta Empire, yet the real power had been usurped, and was exercised, by the chief magistrate, the Peshwah.
- SCINDE.** The countries bordering upon the lower Indus.
- SCINDIAH.** The family name of a great Marhatta Chief, jaghiredar of the Empire, but afterwards independent. His territory was in Malwa, and his capital Ougein. The names and titles of the Chief, in 1803, were Maharajah Aly Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. He had much increased the territory of his predecessors by conquest in Hindustan, and his power at Poonah by his influence over the Peshwah.
- SEBUNDY.** Irregular Native soldiers, country militia employed generally in the police and revenue.
- SEER.** A dry measure, rather more than a pint. Or 2 lbs. weight.
- SEIKS.** Independent tribes on the borders of the Indus.
- SEPOYS.** Native troops.
- SERINJAUMY, or SURINJAM.** Grants of Jaghires for personal expenses, or for raising troops. Charges of collection.
- SEVAJEE.** The founder of the Marhatta Empire in the seventeenth century, whose descendants were Rajahs of Sattarah.
- SEWARY, SOUARREE, SOIRRE.** Retinue, suite.
- SHEKAR.** A hunt.
- SHROFFS.** Native bankers. money changers.
- SILLADAR.** Horsemen bearing arms, and finding their own horses and equipment.
- SIRCAR.** See *Circar*.
- SIRDAR.** Chieftain, captain, headman, gentleman.
- SIRDESHMOOK.** See *Deshmook*.
- SIRLUSHKUR.** One of the principal officers of state under the Peshwah.
- SIRSOUBAH.** An officer under the Subah.
- SOUBAH.** A province.
- SOUBAH, SOUBAH DAR.** Governor general, prince over other rajahs or princes; used indiscriminately by General Wellesley and others, as applied to the Nizam. Viceroy or governor of a subah or province. Officer of Native troops.
- SOUCAR.** Banker, merchant, money lender.
- SUDDER ADAWLUT.** Supreme court of justice.
- SULTAUN.** Mussulman King, the title assumed by Tippoo.
- SUNGUM.** Literally the confluence of two rivers. As the British Residency at Poonah was situated at such a position, the Sungum means the Residency.
- SUNNUD.** Patent, authority for holding land or office. Grant or command of a prince or chief.
- SWAMIES.** Idols.
- SYRANG.** Formerly a superior non-commissioned officer of lascars, attached to artillery.
- TALOOK.** Lands and villages under the protection of a fort. District held under superior authority.
- TANDAH.** As applied to brinjaries, a body, a horde, an encampment.
- TANK.** Reservoir for water.
- TANNAH.** Police station.
- TAPPALL.** The Post.
- TATTOOS.** Small horses or ponies.
- TITLES.** Attached to proper names among Hindus, beginning with the lowest rank :
 1st. Rao or Row.
 2nd. Rajah.
 3rd. Wunt.
- Attached to proper names among Mahomedans :
 1st. Khan or Cawn.
 2nd. Bchauder.
 3rd. Jung.
 4th. Dowlut.
 5th. Moolk.
 6th. Oomrah.
 7th. Jah.
- TOPE.** A grove or thicket.
- TOSKEKHANA.** Department for keeping shells, jewels, &c.
- TUCKIAH.** Resting place; literally pillow.

TUNCAWS. Orders for the collection of the revenue.

VAKEEL, or VAQUEEL. Envoy, ambassador, agent.

VISIAPPOOR, or BEEJAPOOR. Formerly the most splendid Mahomedan capital of the Deccan, now in decay. It is situated in the country between the Kistna and Beemah rivers.

WHEEL. Called the perambulator, to measure distances; always used by Gen. Wellesley in India at the head of the column of march, to regulate the rate of it.

WYNAAD. A country to the south of Coorg, above the Ghauts, between Mysore and Malabar.

ZABETA. Rule, regulation.

ZEAFET. An entertainment, an extraordinary allowance on particular occasions, either in money or

provisions, as a reward to the troops.

ZEMINDAR. Landholder, government officer, charged with the finance department, superintendence of the land revenue.

ZENANA. The apartment of the women. Harem

ZEREEN PUTKA. The golden pennon; the standard of the Marhatta Empire, which always accompanied the Peshwah when he took the field in person, and was sometimes sent with another commander, when the Peshwah chose to remain at Poonah. The charge of the zereen putka constituted such officer commander in chief. Major Gen. Wellesley was anxious that this charge should be conferred on Appah Dessaye, with whom he was satisfied: and it would have indicated that the Peshwah was earnestly engaged in the prosecution of the war.

NAMES, AS WRITTEN IN THIS WORK, AND AS THEY ARE SOMETIMES WRITTEN IN OTHER BOOKS AND MAPS.

Bednore	Biddenoor, Bennoor.
Beejapoor	Viziapoor.
Binkenholy	Bunkinnola.
Burhampoor	Berhampore, Boorhaunpoor.
Calpee	Kalpee.
Canara	Karnara.
Candahar	Kandahar.
Candeish	Khaudes.
Casserbarry	Kasarbarec.
Cabul	Cabul, Cabool, Kabul.
Cheesekair	Chichkaira, Checchekhera.
Chinchore	Chinsurah.
Cuddapa	Kurpa.
Darwar	Dharwar.
Deccan	Dekan. Deckan.
Erroor	Enoor.
Ferdapoor	Furdapore.
Gutpurba <i>river</i>	Gulpurba.
Guzerat	Goujerat.
Gwalior	Gualior.
Kistna <i>river</i>	Krishna.
Konkan	Concan, Conkan.
Koorg	Coorg.
Naulniah	Nulnair.
Panowullah	Panowly, Poonowla, Poonawellee.
Perinda	Paraindah.
Peshwah	Peishwa.
Phoolmurry	Foolmerry.
Puttun	Moongee Pyctun.
Pahllood	Palode.
Rackisbaum	Rakshusbowan.
Toombuddra <i>river</i>	Tungbudra.
Umber	Amber.

The names of chiefs and towns are variously written, to signify the same persons and places. These, from the liberty observed in Indian orthography, the reader of Indian history will understand. The Compiler has adopted the most general spelling of such names, and has attempted to adhere to it; but not always, for when he had a doubt, he has left it as in the manuscript.

INTRODUCTION.

THE EARLY SERVICES OF FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, IN HOLLAND AND IN INDIA.

LIEUT. COLONEL the HON. ARTHUR WELLESLEY embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regt. in May, 1794, and landed in the month following at Ostend, to join the British army under H.R.H. the Duke of York, then in the Low Countries. The approach of the French army under Gen. Pichegru rendered it necessary to evacuate Ostend without delay; and the 33rd regt., with two other battalions, proceeded round by the Scheldt to Antwerp, where it remained encamped during the month of July. On the retreat of the army under the Duke of York from Alost into Holland, Lieut. Col. Wellesley took up his allotted station with his regiment, and joined in the retrograde movement on Breda and Bois-le-duc. The French army followed; and on the 14th Sept. there was a serious affair near Boxtel.

The British army afterwards continued to retreat towards Nimeguen, and took up a position on the right bank of the Waahl. While posted between the Waahl and the Leck, several affairs took place with the advance of the French army, in which the 33rd were engaged both in the attack on Tuyl, on the 30th Dec. 1794, and at Meteren and Geldermalsen, on the 5th Jan. 1795. Having crossed the Leck, the retreat was continued by Amersfoort, Deventer, and Coeverden, to Meppen, on the Ems. In these operations, Lieut. Col. Wellesley, as senior officer, commanded a brigade, consisting of 3 battalions, in the rear guard; evincing that zeal and intelligence which, in the opinion of Sir James Craig and several officers of merit and reputation, gave promise of future distinction. The campaign ended by the re-embarkation of the British army at Bremen, on the breaking up of the ice in the spring of 1795.*

On the return of the army to England, the 33rd regt. landed at Harwich, and was for a short time encamped at Warley. In the autumn it proceeded to Southampton, and Lieut. Col. Wellesley embarked with it for the West Indies, in the fleet commanded by Adm. Christian. After many delays from contrary winds the fleet sailed; but the expedition, having been about 6 weeks at sea during the most tempestuous weather, in which many of the vessels composing it were lost, was obliged to return to Spithead.

* Very few of the letters, and no copies, written during this campaign, have been preserved.

The 33rd regt. was landed, and quartered at Poole. Its destination having been changed for India, it was again embarked in the beginning of April, 1796; but Lieut. Col. Wellesley, in consequence of severe illness, was unable to leave the country. He, however, followed shortly afterwards, and joined his corps at the Cape of Good Hope, where he remained until March of the following year. He proceeded with the 33rd to Bengal, and arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of 1797. At the end of that year the regiment formed part of the expedition from Bengal under Gen. St. Leger, projected by the Governor General, Sir John Shore (afterwards Lord Teignmouth), to attack Manilla: but on arriving at Penang, where the other part of the expedition from Madras joined, fresh orders were received for the recall of the troops to their several Presidencies, in consequence of apprehensions entertained by Lord Hobart, Governor of Fort St. George, that Tippoo Sultaun might be induced, by the absence of the troops, to invade the Carnatic.

The 33rd regt. returned to Bengal; and Col. Wellesley soon afterwards went to Madras on a visit to Lord Hobart, previously to the departure of his Lordship for Europe. After an absence of 2 months, he returned to Calcutta, having rapidly examined the establishments at Madras, and other parts of the Carnatic.

The Earl of Mornington (afterwards Marquis Wellesley), having been appointed to succeed Sir J. Shore as Governor General of India, arrived at Calcutta on the 17th May, 1798, after having touched at the Cape of Good Hope, and at Madras, where he had remained a few days.

Lord Mornington had been for some time an active member of the Board of Control, and he had the advantage of being well acquainted with the general state of affairs in India. At the period of his departure from England, it was generally believed, and he was himself confident, that he should find India in a state of profound peace; and that expectation was fully confirmed by the reports which reached him upon his arrival at Madras, from the several authorities at the different Presidencies of India.

Internal tranquillity prevailed throughout the Company's possessions, and no apprehension was entertained of hostile designs on the part of any of the neighbouring states. In the absence of all appearance of danger from abroad, his Lordship's attention, upon his arrival at Calcutta, was principally directed to internal affairs. This state of tranquillity was not, however, of long duration: it was interrupted by the discovery of the hostile designs and treacherous conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and followed by the campaign of 1799.

It may be proper here to advert shortly to the circumstances which gave rise to the second Mysore war, as the commencement of Col. Wellesley's military career in India; the more so, as some of the publications, which profess to record the events of this period, have ascribed to the Indian government at home, and to the new Governor General, an inclination to take advantage of any pretext for reducing the power of Tippoo Sultaun, and for removing from India the French officers in the service of the Native Princes. This assumption is directly at variance with the general tenor of the public records. On the contrary, it appears

that one of the first acts of the new Governor General was to address a conciliatory letter to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 14th June, 1798 (*see the Dispatches of Marquis Wellesley*, vol. i., p. 59), in reply to an application received by Sir J. Shore at the moment of his departure, claiming restitution of Wynaad, and some other districts on the western frontier of Mysore, which Tippoo alleged had been erroneously transferred to the East India Company, under the treaty of Seringapatam in 1797.

Tippoo Sultaun's claims were referred to certain Commissioners, then employed in Malabar under the orders of the government of Bombay, for the investigation of claims of this nature; and upon their making a report in favor of the Sultaun's pretensions, those districts were immediately restored to him, under a proclamation by the Governor General.

This circumstance alone would be sufficient to demonstrate the pacific intentions of the British government at that period, in addition to which, the exhausted state of the Company's treasury, and of its credit in India at that moment, were also reasons to deter the Governor General from engaging in war, if it had been possible to avoid it; but the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the influence of France in India, did not then form any part of the policy, either of the Earl of Mornington or of the British ministry, or of the East India government at home.

Early in June, 1798, a paper was received by the Governor General, at Calcutta, containing a Proclamation by M. Malartic, the Governor General of the Isle of France, and of the French establishments east of the Cape of Good Hope, which announced the arrival of 2 Ambassadors with letters from Tippoo Sultaun, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance, for the purpose of expelling the English from India. This intelligence, which at first appeared incredible, was, in a few days, confirmed by a dispatch, received at Calcutta, from Lord Macartney, the Governor at the Cape of Good Hope, conveying a copy of M. Malartic's Proclamation; and it was further confirmed by the arrival of a ship from Mauritius, the captain of which deposed, upon examination before the Governor General, that he was on shore when the Proclamation was issued, and that he had witnessed the reception of the Ambassadors.

Gen. Malartic, having no regular troops to spare, invited all French citizens, so disposed, to join the standard of Tippoo: and it is a coincidence worthy of remark, that Tippoo's Ambassadors, with as many Frenchmen as they were able to engage for the Sultaun's service, had landed from *La Preneuse* French frigate, at Mangalore, on the 28th April, 1798; being the very same day on which Lord Mornington landed at Madras, when on his way to Calcutta.

Although Tippoo's hatred of the British nation, and his eager desire for vengeance, and for the recovery of the provinces which Lord Cornwallis had compelled him to cede to the Company and its Allies, in 1791, were well known; yet it appears that no suspicion was entertained, before the receipt of this intelligence from Mauritius, that he had actually adopted such decided measures of hostility. It was, however, soon afterwards discovered that he was engaged in similar negotiations with Zemaun Shah, and several other Native Princes, as well as with the French officers

in their service; and it was also ascertained that he had actually succeeded in engaging the French officers in the Nizam's service to enter into his views.

His Highness the Nizam, Soubahdar of the Deccan, had in his service a force of 14,000 well disciplined infantry, commanded by M. Raymond, with 124 French officers, eager partisans of the French republic, and who were on the point of erecting the French standard at his capital, Hyderabad. The strength and efficiency of this corps, and its position on a vulnerable part of the frontiers of the Company's territory, demanded immediate attention. By the judicious and prompt interference of the Governor General, a British detachment, commanded by Lieut. Col. Roberts, was secretly but expeditiously dispatched to Hyderabad on the 10th Oct. 1798; and on the 22nd of the month, under the orders of the Nizam, the whole of the French officers were compelled to surrender, without firing a shot. His Highness, being thus relieved from their control, concluded a new treaty of alliance with the British government, whereby he bound himself to exclude, not only from his army, but from his dominions, all Frenchmen or other adventurers from Europe; and likewise engaged to maintain at his capital a corps of British troops for the effectual security of the alliance. A treaty was also formed with the Peshwah, the nominal head of the Marhatta Empire, which secured the neutrality of that Chief, in the absence of any other stipulated advantage.

Lord Mornington obtained information of all the Sultaun's measures, and prevented their execution with that vigor which characterized his administration in India. After a very able minute in the Secret department, on the 12th Aug. 1798 (*see the Dispatches of Marquis Wellesley*, 1 vol. p. 159), in which he fully and satisfactorily stated the grounds and motives of his proceedings, he ordered Lieut. Gen. Harris, the Commander in Chief at Madras, to assemble the forces of the Company in the Carnatic. His Excellency, having written to Tippoo Sultaun on the 8th Nov. and 10th Dec. (*see the Dispatches of Marquis Wellesley*, vol. i., pp. 326 and 363), proceeded in person to Fort St. George, where he arrived on the 31st Dec. 1798, for the purpose of superintending and directing the preparations for war, in the event of failure in negotiation.

The 33rd regt. had in the mean time been placed on the Madras establishment, for which it sailed from Bengal on the 14th Aug., and arrived in Sept. 1798.

In November the greater part of the troops were assembled, and encamped at Wallajahbad, under the orders of Col. Wellesley, with whom the general superintendence remained until February following, when Gen. Harris arrived to assume the personal command of the army, which had proceeded to Vellore. The attention which Col. Wellesley had bestowed on the discipline and well being of the troops, and in practising them in combined field movements, with the admirable system he adopted for supplying the bazaars, which were kept constantly well provided, attracted general notice and approbation; and when Gen. Harris joined the army to take command, after receiving the reports of the heads of corps and departments, he was so pleased with Col. Wellesley's arrangements, that he conceived it to be an imperative duty to publish a general

order* conveying commendation of the merits of Col. Wellesley during his temporary command.

Soon after the arrival of the Governor General at Fort St. George, his Excellency again wrote to Tippoo on the 9th Jan. (*see the Dispatches of Marquis Wellesley*, vol. i., p. 394), recapitulating, at considerable length, the complaint, contained in the letter of the 8th Nov., with other details of the whole of the Sultaun's hostile proceedings, subsequently embodied in the Declaration of War. The Governor General requested that a reply might not be deferred for more than one day after this communication of the 9th Jan. should reach the Sultaun's presence, or dangerous consequences would ensue. No reply, however, having been received, and the difficulties inseparable from the equipment of so large a force having at length been overcome, the Governor General, on the 3rd Feb., dispatched his commands to Gen. Harris, to enter the Mysore territory with the forces assembled at Vellore; and to Lieut. Gen. Stuart to co-operate with the Bombay army from Malabar; while, at the same time, he gave intimation to the Allied Courts, and the British Admiral on the coast, that he now considered the Company at war with Tippoo Sultaun.

The army assembled at Vellore exceeded 20,000 men, whereof 2600 were cavalry, and 4300 Europeans. It marched on the 11th Feb., and on the 18th was joined by the British detachment serving with the Nizam, 6500 strong, under Lieut. Col. Dalrymple; with an equal number of the Nizam's infantry, including a portion of the sepoys lately under French, but now, according to treaty, under British officers, commanded by Capt. John Malcolm (the late Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Malcolm, G.C.B.), and a large body of the Nizam's cavalry under Capt. Walker.

The whole of the Nizam's force was under the superintendence of Meer Alum, his Highness's minister; and in order to give it the utmost degree of efficiency and respectability, it was deemed proper to add one of His Majesty's regiments of infantry to the Company's battalions serving with it, and to form the whole into a separate division. Meer Alum expressed a wish that the Governor General's brother should be appointed to command the Nizam's forces; and Gen. Harris felt the importance of selecting an officer who possessed his own confidence, and who was likely to enjoy that of Meer Alum. The 33rd was accordingly the regiment attached to the Nizam's contingent, as this force was denominated, and the general command of it was thus given to Col. Wellesley. This arrangement was very agreeable to the Nizam and to Meer Alum; and it contributed very much to maintain the good understanding between the Court of Hyderabad and the British government.

The forces assembled under the orders of Gen. Harris consisted of upwards of 30,000 men, and, in the words of the Governor General, 'an army more completely appointed, more amply and liberally supplied in every department, or more perfect in its discipline, and in the acknowledged experience, ability, and zeal of its officers, never took the field in India.' The army of the western Court, equal in excellence, under Lieut. Gen.

* Search has been made for this general order, and also for the orders issued by Col. Wellesley to the force assembled at Wallajahbad. No trace of them remains at the Presidency of Fort St. George.

Stuart, consisted of 6400 fighting men, of whom 1600 were Europeans; whilst a detachment of about 4000 under Lieut. Col. Brown, and another of 5000 under Lieut. Col. Read, marched to co-operate with the Commander in Chief, from the southern districts of the Carnatic and the Baramahl.

On the 13th Feb., the Governor General received a letter from the Sultaun, to which, on the 22nd, his Excellency replied; accompanied by a Declaration of the same date for himself and his allies, the Nizam and the Peshwah (*see the Dispatches of Marquis Wellesley*, vol. i., pp. 448 and 453).

The Bombay army, under Lieut. Gen. Stuart, marched from Cannanore on the 21st Feb.; Gen. Harris entered the Mysore territory on the 5th March, and commenced his operations by the reduction of several forts on the frontier.

Gen. Harris was not only invested with unrestricted military command, but was empowered to exert all the civil authority which would have belonged to the Governor General in his situation. He was further provided with a political and diplomatic commission, composed of Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, Lieut. Col. Barry Close, Lieut. Col. Agnew, and Capt. Malcolm, with Capt. Macaulay as secretary. This commission was not, however, entitled to act, except in obedience to the orders of the General.

On the 6th March, Tippoo Sultaun passed his own frontier, and attacked a detachment of the Bombay army near Sedaseer. This attack, though sustained by a body not exceeding 2000 men, was repulsed, and the enemy thrown into disorder, even before Gen. Stuart could collect the whole of his divided force. After this signal failure, Tippoo retreated precipitately to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until the 11th March, without making any further attempt to molest the Bombay army. He then moved to Seringapatam, and afterwards marched from thence to meet the Madras army under Gen. Harris.

The army under Gen. Harris was not ready to make its united movement upon Seringapatam until the 9th March. Many delays occurred from the British army being overloaded with equipment and materials for siege, in addition to the cumbrous baggage of the Nizam's army, a host of brinjaries, and the innumerable followers of the camp. The draught and carriage bullocks died in great numbers, and the arrangements necessary to remedy this evil compelled the army to halt on the 11th, on the 14th, on the 15th, and again on the 18th. On the 21st, it encamped at Cankannelli; and on the 22nd, 2 tanks of importance, which the enemy had begun to destroy, were secured at Achel.

This slow movement brought the army, on the 27th, only as far as Mallavelly; when, on approaching the ground of encampment, the army of Tippoo Sultaun was discovered at a few miles distance, drawn up on a height. The advanced piquets of the British army were attacked by the enemy, and, more troops being sent out to their aid, a general action ensued. The British army, under Gen. Harris, formed the right wing; and the Nizam's army, with the 33rd regt., under Col. Wellesley, formed the left. The right wing, having deployed into line, began to advance: an opening between 2 brigades tempted the Sultaun, and he marched against

it in person with a body of cavalry with much spirit; but he was unsuccessful, as the movement produced no disorder in the British ranks, which soon outflanked the enemy's left. In the mean while the division commanded by Col. Wellesley was formed nearly opposite the enemy's extreme right, which was strongly posted on the elevated crest of a rocky ridge. Gen. Harris having dispatched an aide de camp to Col. Wellesley, approving of the attack he had proposed, and also to Gen. Floyd to support it, Col. Wellesley advanced *en échelon* of battalions, supported by 3 regiments of cavalry; when a column of the enemy, consisting of about 2000 infantry, moved forward in excellent order towards the 33rd regt., which corps, reserving its fire, with the utmost steadiness received that of the enemy at a distance of about 60 yards; then quickening its advance, the enemy's column gave way and was thrown into disorder. Gen. Floyd, seizing this critical moment, charged them with his cavalry, and destroyed great numbers.

The army moved on the 28th March to Sosilay, where there is an easy ford to cross the river Cauvery. Tippoo Sultaun, being thus disappointed in the route which Gen. Harris took after the affair of Mallavelly, fell back on Seringapatam; and the British army arrived on the ground for the siege of that fortress on the 5th April. A new line of intrenchments had been constructed between the Dowlut Baug to the Periapatam bridge, and covered that part of the fort. Between these works and the Cauvery, the infantry of Tippoo Sultaun were encamped. Fronting the east, the right of the British camp was posted on high commanding ground, sloping gradually to the left flank, which was doubly secured by an aqueduct or watercourse, and by the Cauvery. From the left of the position, the aqueduct took an easterly direction till within 1700 yards of the fort, where it turned off towards the Sultaun-pettah tope. There were several ruined villages and rocky eminences in front that afforded cover, from whence the enemy threw rockets, which fell among the tents of the British camp. It became, therefore, indispensable to the quiet and security of the besieging army to dispossess the enemy of these posts, without loss of time. For this purpose the 12th regt. and 2 battalions of sepoy, with their guns, under the command of Lieut. Col. Shawe, of H.M. 12th regt.; and another division, consisting of the 33rd regt. and a Native battalion, under Col. Wellesley, were ordered to be in readiness at sunset on the 5th; and whilst Col. Shawe was to attack the posts at the aqueduct, Col. Wellesley was to make a diversion by scouring the tope.

Both divisions marched a little after sunset. The darkness of the night was very unfavorable to their advance. Col. Shawe seized a ruined village within 40 yards of the aqueduct: Col. Wellesley, advancing about the same time with one wing of the 33rd regt. to attack the tope, was, upon entering it, assailed on every side by a hot fire of musketry and rockets. This circumstance, joined to the extreme darkness of the night, the badness of the ground, and the uncertainty of the enemy's position, were inducements to confine the operations to the object of causing a diversion to Col. Shawe's attack, and to postpone any further attempt until a more favorable opportunity should occur; and Col. Wellesley, after the firing had ceased, returned to camp to make his report of the failure to the Commander in Chief.

Gen. Harris, finding that the village occupied by Col. Shawe was very much annoyed by the enemy's musketry from the aqueduct, to which the enemy had sent a reinforcement, and that the possession of the Sultaun-pettah tope was absolutely necessary to secure the camp, as well as to support Col. Shawe's post, ordered a new disposition on the morning of the 6th, to drive the enemy from their whole line of outposts, extending from the Cauvery to the tope. For this purpose he directed that 3 simultaneous attacks, under the orders of Col. Wellesley, should be made, covered by guns previously posted. The troops were paraded: and, at 9 in the morning, Col. Wellesley, with the Scotch brigade, 2 battalions of sepoys, and 4 guns, in addition to his former force, again advanced on the tope, which was soon carried; parties being detached to take the enemy in flank threw them into confusion, and obliged them to retire with precipitation. Precisely at the same moment, Col. Shawe quitted the ruined village and rushed upon the enemy; whilst Col. Wallace drove them out of a village on the right flank. Lieut. Col. Barry Close, who had accompanied Col. Wellesley on this service, soon came back; and, on entering Gen. Harris's tent, he announced, 'It has been done in high style, and without loss.' The posts evacuated by the enemy were immediately occupied by the British troops, who thus secured a strong and connected advanced line, extending from the Cauvery to the village of Sultaun-pettah, a distance of 2 miles; forming, in fact, a line of contravallation, principally by the aqueduct, at a convenient distance from the fort, and from the encampment of the army.

The notes and letters written by Col. Wellesley after this attack show the terms on which he was with his General; and at the same time substantiate a fact, not sufficiently known, that Gen. Harris himself conducted the details of the victorious army which he commanded.

The siege proceeded, when fresh overtures were made by Tippoo Sultaun. The advanced period of the season and the failure of provisions made it hazardous to delay the siege for an instant; particularly as the Governor General, in his letters to the Court of Directors, afterwards described in his own words: 'Towards the end of April fresh circumstances arose, which disposed me to think that, if the course of the war should favor the attempt, it would be prudent and justifiable entirely to overthrow the power of Tippoo: accordingly, on the 23rd April, I signified to Lieut. Gen. Harris my wish that the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaun should be reduced to the lowest state; and even utterly destroyed, if the events of the war should furnish the opportunity.'

On the 3rd May the breach appeared to be practicable, and preparations were eagerly made for the assault. On the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the attack were placed in the trenches before daylight, that the enemy might not observe any particular movement. The heat of the day, when the people of the East, having taken their mid-day repast, give themselves up to repose, and when it was confidently expected that the troops in the fortress would be least prepared to resist, was chosen for the hour of assault; the experience of former wars, and especially of that under Lord Cornwallis, having proved that the enemy was always found more watchful and alert at night than in the heat of day.

Two regiments and 10 flank companies of Europeans, 3 corps of grenadier sepoys, and 200 of the Nizam's troops, formed the storming party, consisting of 2500 Europeans, and 1900 Native infantry. Major Gen. Baird, who had solicited the command, divided this force into 2 separate columns, which, on mounting the breach, were to file off to the right and left. Col. Sherbrooke commanded the right column, destined for the attack of the southern rampart; and Lieut. Col. Dunlop commanded the left, to clear the northern rampart. The forlorn hope of each attack consisted of 1 serjeant and 12 Europeans, who were followed by 2 subalterns' parties; the party of the right column was commanded by Lieut. Hill of the 74th, and the other, of the left column, by Lieut. Lawrence of the 77th regts. Col. Wellesley remained in the advanced trenches in command of the reserve, to support the troops in the assault, in case it should be necessary.

At 1 o'clock the troops began to move from the trenches. The width and rocky channel of the Cauvery, though it contained but little water, its exposure to the fire of the fortress, the imperfection of the breach, the strength of the place, the numbers, courage, and skill of its defenders, constituted such an accumulation of difficulties, that nothing less than unbounded confidence in the force and courage of his men could have inspired a prudent general with hopes of success. The troops descended into the bed of the river, and advanced, regardless of a tremendous fire, towards the opposite bank. 'In less than 10 minutes from the period of issuing from the trenches, the British colors were planted on the summit of the breach.' Tippoo Sultaun, although advised by the most judicious of his officers, had neglected to cut a trench, so as to insulate the angle of the fort in which the breach had been effected; and the assailing parties, under Major Gen. Baird, Col. Sherbrooke, and Lieut. Col. Dunlop, taking the directions ordered, soon cleared the ramparts. The further details of this eventful enterprise are to be found in 'Lieut. Col. Beatson's Narrative of the operations of the army under Lieut. Gen. Harris, and of the siege of Seringapatam,' from which the foregoing are chiefly selected; and in which also will be found the translations of several State papers, unequivocally proving the systematic and unremitting ardor of the late Sultaun in his attempts to subvert the British power in India.

Gen. Harris, in his dispatch to the Earl of Mornington, the Governor General, announcing the fall of Seringapatam, reports,

'Of the merits of the army I have expressed my opinion in Orders, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose; and I trust your Lordship will point out their services to the favorable notice of their King and country.' (See *G.O.*, pp. 27, 28.)

In the abstracts it appears that the strength of Tippoo Sultaun's forces on the 4th May, 1799, consisted of 48,000 men, about 22,000 of whom were either in the fort or in the dependent entrenchments of Seringapatam; and that the army commanded by Lieut. Gen. Harris consisted of 8700 Europeans and 27,000 Natives, of which force 20,000 assisted at the siege.

It may be necessary here to mention that Col. Wellesley entered the fort immediately after the assault; and was one of the few present when

Tippoo Sultaun's body, which was still warm, was discovered in the sally-port gateway.

Major Gen. Baird having desired to be relieved, Col. Wellesley, being next on the roster, was ordered on the same night to command within the fort (*see Memoirs of the late Gen. Lord Harris*, pp. 419 and 420).

Col. Wellesley exerted himself to the utmost to prevent excess of every kind; cowle flags were hoisted in different parts of the town, and public notice given that severe examples would be made of any persons detected in the act of plundering the houses or molesting the inhabitants; for, although Gen. Baird had given protection to some of the principal families, and used every means in his power to restore order in the town, yet it could not be expected that the tumult and disorder, which were unavoidable in a city, so extensive, taken by assault, would immediately subside; nor was it until 4 men had been executed for plunder that perfect tranquillity was restored. These examples, and the personal activity of Col. Wellesley, who went himself to the houses of the principal families with safeguards, soon inspired a general confidence. The inhabitants, who had quitted the town during the night of the storm, and had slept in the open fields, returned quickly to their houses and occupations. In a few days the bazaars were stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandise, for which there was a ready and advantageous sale; and the main street of Seringapatam, 3 days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair than that of a town just taken by assault.

Gen. Harris, on the receipt of Col. Wellesley's letter of the 6th May, lost no time in carrying into effect the recommendation which it contained. He immediately directed a regular garrison for Seringapatam, and appointed Col. Wellesley to the command of it, as he felt satisfied that he could not confide the complicated and delicate duties of a civil and political, as well as of a military nature, required from the officer in charge of the capital, to any one better qualified to conduct them with advantage. These duties of necessity devolved upon the officer in command of Seringapatam, in consequence of the sudden and complete dissolution of Tippoo's government, the dispersion of all the public functionaries, and the helpless situation of the late Sultaun's family, then in the palace.

The authentic documents, relating to the appointment of Col. Wellesley to the command of Seringapatam, must exculpate the Commander in Chief from the charge of unduly favoring Col. Wellesley to the prejudice of Gen. Baird; a charge which has been cast upon that honorable and distinguished officer, Gen. Harris, in 'The Memoirs of the late Gen. Sir D. Baird,' where copies are given of the letters of remonstrance of that officer to the Commander in Chief, on the appointment of Col. Wellesley to the command of Seringapatam, as well as on his former appointment to the command of the army of his Highness the Nizam. The original letters remain in the possession of the family of the late Lord Harris; and, on comparing these original letters with the copies published, it appears that, in the latter, some passages have been omitted, which in a great measure contain in themselves a refutation of the partiality and injustice of which Gen. Baird improperly complained. In these memoirs, also, the judg-

ment, justice, impartiality, and duty of the Commander in Chief and of the Governor General have been reflected upon, for the purpose of establishing a grievance and an insinuation, which the facts and results do not warrant; and to which Sir D. Baird, had he been alive, would never have given countenance. The impropriety of publishing these letters of remonstrance, which are so inconsistent with subordination and discipline, becomes more manifest, when it is seen in 'The Memoirs of the late Lord Harris,' p. 423, that Gen. Baird requested permission to withdraw his intemperate appeal, and which Gen. Harris, from personal regard, allowed to pass without further notice.

The complete subjugation of Mysore was the immediate consequence of the fall of Seringapatam and the death of Tippoo Sultaun. A commission, composed of Lieut. Gen. Harris, Lieut. Col. Barry Close, Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, was appointed by the Governor General in Council, to carry into effect his arrangements for the settlement of the conquered territories (see the *Dispatches of Marquis Wellesley*, vol. ii., p. 10). Capts. Malcolm and Munro were appointed secretaries to the Commission. The arrangements for removing the family of the late Sultaun were particularly confided to Col. Wellesley, who had been confirmed as Governor subsequent to the capture. 'The details of this painful but indispensable measure,' said the Governor General in his instructions, dated 4th June, 1799, 'cannot be intrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Col. Wellesley; and I therefore commit to his discretion, activity, and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by the other members of the Commission.' (See the *Dispatches of Marquis Wellesley*, vol. ii., p. 18.)

On the settlement of the Mysore territory by the Commission, the provinces which fell under British protection and authority became a distinct command; and Col. Wellesley was confirmed in it by the Governor General, receiving his orders from, and reporting direct to, the Supreme government at Calcutta. He availed himself of the intelligence and experience of all those who had served under Tippoo Sultaun, and replaced them in their former posts; their chief security for retaining which, rested on the correct discharge of their several duties. His active superintendence, discernment, impartiality, and decision, in the arduous and important duties of the civil, as well as of the military administration of the command, were such as to have fully warranted his brother's judicious selection; and he soon deserved and obtained the gratitude of the conquered people.

The tranquillity of Mysore was, however, interrupted by the celebrated Dhoondiah Waugh, one of those adventurers who have so often subverted empires and founded dynasties in the East. This freebooter had formerly committed various depredations on the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, who, having secured his person, compelled him to conform to the Mahomedan faith, and afterwards employed him in military service; but, either detecting him in some treacherous project, or suspecting his fidelity, the Sultaun confined him in irons in Seringapatam. After the assault he was

released, with several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the British troops, and immediately fled, accompanied by several of Tippoo's disbanded army. He proceeded to Bednore, and laid that rich country under severe contributions, which he exacted with unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating, throughout the province, the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder. His band being considerably increased, a light corps of cavalry and Native infantry, under Lieut. Col. Dalrymple, moved against him from Chittledroog; and another light corps, under Col. Stevenson, advanced into Bednore in another direction. Dhoondiah crossed the Toombuddra, followed by these corps, and suffered considerable loss; but he effected his escape into the Marhatta territory; and the pursuit ceased, as the Governor General had strictly prohibited any violation of the Marhatta frontier.

Col. Wellesley, in chief command, visited the different provinces of the late conquest, making roads and communications, and organizing the civil as well as the military establishments.

In May, 1800, whilst occupied in the important command of Mysore, Col. Wellesley received a proposition from his brother, Lord Mornington, to be united with Adm. Rainier in the charge of an expedition which the Governor General, in obedience to the King's orders, had planned against Batavia. The correspondence will best elucidate the motives which induced Col. Wellesley to decline this service.

Dhoondiah having re-appeared at the head of a very numerous body, with which he ravaged the Mysore frontier, Col. Wellesley proceeded in person against him, and defeated and destroyed him.

After the death of Dhoondiah, Col. Wellesley was appointed to command a force assembled at Trincomalee, with a view to the conquest of Mauritius. Orders from Europe having, however, directed a force of 3000 men to be sent to the Red sea, Col. Wellesley, with the force assembled at Trincomalee, proceeded to Bombay, on his way there, to receive further instructions. Having been prevented, by sickness, from accompanying the expedition to Egypt, by the permission of the Governor General he resumed his former government of Mysore.

In the autumn of 1802, events occurred at Poonah, which were followed by the war in the Deccan in 1803. Major Gen. Wellesley commanded the force assembled at Hürryhur to march against the Marhatta chiefs; and it has been considered expedient to introduce the dispatches relative to the war in the Deccan by a brief geographical and historical description of the country which was the seat of it.

Hindustan Proper is that part of India north of the Nerbudda river; the Deccan is that part between the Nerbudda and the Kistna; and south of the Kistna are the Carnatic, Malabar, and the newly conquered territory of Mysore.

A predatory and formidable race, the Marhattas, had long subdued a great extent of country, both north and south of the Nerbudda, or held the different states composing it under regular tribute. The greatest length of what were termed the Marhatta territories, from Delhi on the northern extremity, to the river Toombuddra on the southern, is 970 miles; and the extreme breadth, from east to west, where they stretched

across the peninsula, from the Bay of Bengal to the Gulf of Cambay, is 900 miles. This immense tract of country contained the provinces of Delhi, Agra, Ajmeer, Malwa, Guzerat, Candeish, Baglana, Beejapoor, the Konkan, Berar, Cuttack, and part of Dowlutabad. Some of these provinces are very fertile and populous, yielding abundance of the finest grain, thronged with towns and villages, and enriched by a busy internal commerce. The whole population of the Marhatta dominions was computed at about 40 millions, composed of different nations of various tribes, of whom nine-tenths were Hindus, and the rest Mahomedans.

Fortunately, however, for the neighbouring states, the power of this immense Empire was, soon after its foundation, divided amongst 5 Princes or Chiefs; who, although nominally united in one general confederacy, under an acknowledged superior, the Peshwah, had, nevertheless, not only separate but rival interests; and were in the constant practice of supporting against each other their private and individual views. Had it not been for this disunion, their collective military strength, consisting of about 200,000 cavalry and about 100,000 infantry, would have been extremely formidable.

The principal founder of this extensive Empire was the celebrated Sevajee, descended from the Rajahs of Chittoor, the most ancient of the Hindu princes. He had succeeded to his father, the Rajah of Sattarah; when, after various successes, obtained over the veteran armies of the Mogul Emperor, Aurungzebe, and the disciplined forces of the Portuguese, he founded the powerful monarchy consisting of the various Marhatta provinces. On his death he was succeeded by his son Sambajee, whose infibecile son and successor, Sahojee, delegated the whole of his authority to Bellajee, his minister. Gaining a complete ascendancy over the mind of his master, Bellajee was appointed Peshwah, or chief magistrate of the Empire; and he so firmly established the power of his family, that his eldest son, Bajee Rao, became his successor in that office without opposition. Bajee Rao, possessing a more adventurous ambition than his father, usurped the government; and the Rajah of Sattarah and his descendants, who regularly succeeded to the titles and dignities of nominal sovereigns of the Marhatta dominions, were actually kept in a state of imprisonment in their palace at Sattarah; whilst Bajee Rao, as Peshwah, having secured the fidelity of the several military chieftains, fixed his place of residence at Poonah, established a Court there, and invested himself with all the regal insignia.

The military chieftains, however, soon viewed the conduct of the Peshwah with envy; and, encouraged by his example, they successively established their jaghires into independent principalities, but still acknowledged him as the representative of the Rajah of Sattarah. Thus the nominal Marhatta Empire became afterwards divided, at different periods, into 5 separate independent states, under the following Princes and Chiefs.

1st. **BAJEE RAO**, the second Peshwah, holding the hereditary dominions of the Rajah of Sattarah, in whose name he and his descendants governed. His grandson, Bajee Rao, second Peshwah of that name, succeeded to the musnud of Poonah in 1796.

2nd. **RAGOJEE BHOONSLAH**, the first Rajah of Berar, who had been Buck-

shee, or Commander in Chief, received from the Rajah of Sattarah the province of Berar in jaghire, as a reward for his eminent services; but having in his own hands the power of asserting his independence, he converted his jaghire into a separate state, admitting only the political authority of the Peshwah. He died in 1749. Ragojee, his grandson, and fourth Rajah of Berar, succeeded his father in 1788.

3rd. RANOJEE SCINDIAH commanded the body guard of the Peshwah, the first Bajee Rao; and on the conquest of Malwa had part of that province granted to him in jaghire, which, with the whole of Candeish, was afterwards formed into a powerful state by that distinguished warrior. Madajee, his fifth son and successor, increased his territory by possessing himself of the person of the Mogul, Shah Alum; and taking the cities of Delhi and Agra, with their surrounding districts, the principal part of the valuable province of the Dooab, between the Jumna and the Ganges; and before 1794, actually extending his sovereignty over the provinces of Sirhind and Jallingdoor, on the banks of the Byah or Hyphasis river. His seat of government was at Ougein, in Malwa; but, like his nephew and successor, his Court was generally in his camp. Dowlut Rao Scindiah succeeded his uncle, Madajee, in 1794.

4th. MULHAR RAO HOLKAR, another military officer in the service of the Peshwah, Bajee Rao the first, received also a portion of Malwa in jaghire. He likewise established his independence, at Indore, and founded a considerable state. His nephew and successor, Tuckajee, died in 1797, leaving 2 legitimate sons, and 2 illegitimate: one of these last, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, became the active and enterprising chief in the war which followed with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who had possessed himself of the person of Kunder Rao, nephew to Jeswunt, and pretended to govern in his name.

5th. The GUICKWAR had also contributed, in an eminent degree, to establish the fame of the Marhatta arms; and had obtained, in consequence, some valuable grants in jaghire. He afterwards asserted his independence, and usurped the fertile province of Guzerat, which remained in his family.

The Marhatta Empire, as established by Sevajee in 1680, had thus undergone a complete change; for it had become only a nominal confederation of the 5 powerful chieftains, the Peshwah, the Rajah of Berar, Scindiah, Holkar, and the Guickwar; but, in fact, all independent of each other, yet all acknowledging a sort of honorary fealty to be due to the descendants of Sevajee, on the throne of Sattarah; and respecting the office of Peshwah, as the legitimate executive authority of the Empire. In the intercourse between this chief magistrate and his nominal authority, every form of respect was observed; and on the succession of a Peshwah, he received the dress of honor from the Rajah of Sattarah, before he entered on the administration of his government.

By this arrangement of political power, and the forms with which it was administered, the Marhatta Empire, in its foreign as in its domestic relations, was considered as a confederation of Princes, of which the Peshwah was the acknowledged organ, all negotiations with foreign states being carried on through him: although, since the death of Bajee Rao, first of that name, no Peshwah ventured to conclude any treaty with

a foreign power, affecting the general interests of the Empire, without the express concurrence of all the principal chieftains. On the other hand, the Peshwah always exercised the right of contracting engagements with other powers, when involving only his own interest and those of his subordinate military tributaries, without any reference to the other powerful chieftains, who, on their part, uniformly exercised a similar right: thus each of them formed alliances, and made war and peace, as it suited his own particular views.

Madajee Scindiah had been indebted for the success of his enterprises in Delhi and the Dooab to his military establishment, planned, formed, and disciplined by M. de Boigne,* a native of Savoy, who entered his service in 1784, and raised 18 battalions of regular infantry, which he officered by European adventurers, chiefly French, and formed them into brigades: these, with a body of cavalry, and a train of well appointed artillery, he disciplined on the European system. M. de Boigne afterwards augmented his regular infantry to 38,000, his cavalry to 8000, and his artillery to 120 pieces of iron, and upwards of 150 pieces of brass ordnance. On quitting India, he was succeeded in his military command, authority, and titles, by M. Perron,† a native and subject of France. To this officer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah confided the government of his northern provinces, whilst he devoted his attention to the politics of the Deccan, and to the maintenance of that ascendancy over the Peshwah and court of Poonah, which his predecessor had so effectually established. In the exercise of this ascendancy, it was manifestly the main principle of his policy, under the influence of M. Perron's advice, to obstruct the interests and views of the British government by every secret means, and to encourage the introduction of French officers, both into his own army and that of the Peshwah.

The absolute control and direction of the councils of Poonah, by Scindiah, were, however, viewed by Holkar with a jealous animosity, which his inability, for a time, to prevent seemed to embitter and increase. In order, therefore, to put his army on a footing that might enable it to contend with Scindiah in the Deccan, or at least to bear some proportion to his vast military establishment, Holkar sought also for European officers to discipline and lead his troops; and as at that time there were a greater number of itinerant adventurers from France than from any other country in Europe, who found their way to India, it consequently happened that three-fourths of the Europeans introduced into his service were Frenchmen. Thus the infantry establishments of the armies of Holkar, as well as of Scindiah and the Peshwah, were, in the year 1800, principally officered by Europeans, three-fourths of whom were natives of France.

It may be necessary here to remark that the Marhatta territories of the Peshwah, Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, were bounded to the east and

* M. De Boigne returned to Europe with immense wealth, which he expended in princely charities at Chamberry, in Savoy, where he died in 1830. His enterprising career and subsequent honorable retirement form a singular and interesting memoir.

† M. Perron returned to France in 1806, but was not very well received by Napoleon: he died wealthy, in May, 1834.

to the south by the dominions of the Nizam, Soubahdar of the Deccan, who reigned over the whole of the country between the Kistna, Godavery, and Wurda rivers; Hyderabad being his chief city, and seat of government.

Although the Court of Poonah had acquiesced in the justice and necessity of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, the Peshwah, being under the entire control of Scindiah, did not fulfil the conditions of the treaty of alliance, concluded with him by Marquis Cornwallis; and Scindiah not only maintained a secret correspondence with Tippoo, during the whole progress of the last Mysore war, but, even after the fall of Seringapatam, certain emissaries from Poonah attempted to excite the family and remaining officers of the deceased Sultaun to resist the final settlement of Mysore. Marquis Wellesley, however, on framing the settlement, omitted not to offer a considerable portion of territory to the Peshwah, on the condition of his reviving the alliance between the Marhatta Empire and the British government, on a basis calculated to render it secure and efficient. But this proposition, together with others of a like nature, which were also at the same time made to Scindiah, were explicitly rejected; and, consequently, all the extensive territories of Mysore, formerly conquered by Hyder Aly, were divided between the British government and the Nizam, excepting a portion of the ancient Kingdom, which was restored to the Hindu Rajahs.

The unfriendly, if not hostile disposition thus manifested by Scindiah towards the British government, and the increasing strength and influence of M. Perron's army, then stationed on the most vulnerable part of the British possessions in India, induced Marquis Wellesley to form alliances which might tend to lessen the influence of Scindiah, in the event of a rupture. With this view, in the beginning of 1802, he concluded a subsidiary treaty and defensive alliance with the Guickwar, chief of Guzerat; and no time was lost on the part of the Governor General in exerting every effort of policy to prevent a French influence in the Deccan, which might subsequently extend its authority over the whole of the Marhatta chiefs. Accordingly, overtures were made, in June, 1802, to the Peshwah by the British Resident at Poonah, for forming an alliance: the Peshwah, however, declined to accede, not only to the specific terms, but even to any admissible modification of them. This arose entirely from the known wishes of Scindiah on the question of an alliance with the English; for although that chief was then absent in Malwa, carrying on hostilities against Holkar, yet his opinions and views continued to rule the councils at Poonah.

Holkar, in the mean time, having changed his plan of operations, crossed the Nerbudda, and was, actually, but a few days' march from Poonah, at the head of a powerful army, for the evident purpose not merely of destroying Scindiah's ascendancy at that Court, but of usurping himself the whole authority of the Peshwah, and converting it into a useful instrument for his own aggrandizement.

Scindiah immediately dispatched a force under Suddasheo Bhow, to co-operate in the defence of Poonah; when, after some fruitless negotiation, a general action took place near Poonah, between the hostile armies, on

the 25th Oct. 1802, in which the combined forces of the Peshwah and Scindiah sustained a complete defeat; and the Peshwah fled to the maritime province of the Konkan, leaving his country to devastation and plunder, and the capital of the Marhatta Empire to rebels and usurpers. On the morning of the 25th Oct., after his defeat, the Peshwah sent his minister to the Resident at Poonah, soliciting the aid of a British subsidiary force, and expressing a desire of forming a general defensive alliance, founded on the principles of that concluded between the English and the Nizam in October, 1800. These propositions were acceded to by the Resident; and an agreement was immediately concluded with the Peshwah, which was ratified by the Governor General on the day he received it at Calcutta. The ratification was returned, accompanied by an assurance from Marquis Wellesley, that it was the determination of the British government to employ every justifiable means for the restoration of the Peshwah's authority. Judging it also to be a fit opportunity to endeavor to extend this alliance to the other members of the Marhatta Empire, Col. Collins was sent as plenipotentiary to Scindiah, in order to propose terms on which he might be included in the engagement just contracted with the Peshwah.

When Holkar found the Peshwah had effected his retreat to the strong fortress of Mhar, in the Konkan, he placed the son of Amrut Rao on the musnud of Poonah, and invested the father with the office of prime minister; Holkar assuming the command of the troops of the state, and administering the government in Amrut Rao's name. Amrut Rao was the adopted son of Ragobah Rao; and, as such, brother to the Peshwah, whose authority he was thus, unwillingly, forced to assume.

The Peshwah in the mean time had removed to Severndroog, from whence he embarked for Bassein, where a treaty of alliance was concluded on the 31st Dec., 1802, between the Company and his Highness, by Lieut. Col. Barry Close, the Resident at his Court.

The restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah, under the exclusive protection of the British power, was very essential, as it would necessarily supersede any preponderating influence at the Court of Poonah, by either Scindiah or Holkar, who were known to have had personal and interested views on the supreme magisterial authority of the Empire.

The Rajah of Berar had also always maintained pretensions to the supreme authority of the Marhatta Empire, founded on his affinity to the reigning Rajah of Sattarah; and, convinced that the permanency of the defensive alliance, lately concluded at Bassein, between the British government and the Peshwah, would preclude all future opportunity of accomplishing the object of his ambition, the Rajah of Berar was equally concerned with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the subversion of that alliance.

Although the views ascribed to these chieftains were manifestly incompatible with the accomplishment of their respective designs, the removal of an obstacle which would effectually preclude the success of either chieftain, in obtaining an ascendancy at Poonah, constituted an object of common interest; and, sensible that the combination of their power afforded the only prospect of subverting the alliance, they apparently agreed to compromise their respective and contradictory projects, by an

arrangement for the partition of the whole power and dominion of the Marhatta states.

In this position of the Marhatta powers, it became indispensably necessary, as a measure of precaution on the part of the British government, to assemble a strong army of observation on the southern frontier of the Marhatta dominions, for the security of the British possessions, and those of the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore; for, according to the habitual custom of the Marhattas, the military chiefs attached to the cause of Holkar would undoubtedly attempt to overrun and plunder the territories of their neighbours. The government of Madras, aware of the necessity of this precaution, without waiting for the instructions of the Governor General, judiciously assembled, in November, 1802, an army of 19,000 men at Hurryhur, on the north west frontier of Mysore, under the command of Lieut. Gen. Stuart. The government of Bombay also prepared for service the disposable force of that Presidency; and, at the request of the British Resident with the Peshwah, the subsidiary force at Hyderabad was held in readiness to take the field.

The Governor General lost no time, at this critical period, in forwarding instructions to Lord Clive, and to the Residents at the several durbars of the Marhatta chiefs. These instructions, with the correspondence of Lord Clive and Lieut. Gen. Stuart, the Commander in Chief, elucidate the preparations made for the advance of a division of the British army to Poonah, and the subsequent war in the Deccan.

Able and zealously supported by Lord Clive and Mr. Duncan, the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, the Governor General had been particularly happy in his selection of officers of ability and reputation, as the Residents at the several durbars of the Native Princes; and to those only who are unacquainted with Indian history will it be necessary to mention the names of some of the distinguished diplomatic agents whose combined talents, at this eventful period, assisted the military successes of Generals Lake and Wellesley, in the extraordinary aggrandizement and successful administration of the British empire in India by Marquis Wellesley.

The Residents at the different Courts, south of the Nerbudda, in 1803 and 1804, were Lieut. Col. Close, with the Peshwah at Poonah; Lieut. Col. Collins, at Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp; Major Kirkpatrick, with the Nizam at Hyderabad; Mr. Webbe, first at Mysore, and afterwards appointed to the durbar of the Rajah of Berar, but who died in Scindiah's camp at the end of 1804; and Major Malcolm, who accompanied Major Gen. Wellesley to Poonah, and, on the removal of Mr. Webbe to the court of Nagpoor, became Resident at Mysore. The Hon. Mount-Stuart Elphinstone, Mr. Wilks, and Major Munro, employed at this period in the Deccan and Mysore, were also conspicuous in that galaxy of worth, which shone in the government of India under Marquis Wellesley.

THE OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.
HOLLAND AND INDIA.

THE OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

HOLLAND AND INDIA.

To the Adj. Gen.

Camp at the Esplanade, Antwerp, 12th July, 1794.

I WRITE, by Gen. Dundas's directions, to request you will make me acquainted with the wishes of H.R.H. the Commander in Chief respecting the stores and heavy baggage of the 33rd regt. Those articles are at present in the transports which brought the regiment from Ireland, and I shall be infinitely obliged to you if you will let me know whether they are to be landed, or to remain in the ships that brought them, or are to be removed from them into other ships.

To the Adj. Gen.

Camp, 10th Sept. 1794.

Ten men went this morning from the 33rd regt. to the artillery park to act as drivers. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inform H.R.H. the Commander in Chief that, until that time, I could not find 10 proper men who would consent to quit their regiment.

To the Adj. Gen.

Tiel, 21st Oct. 1794.

With the bearer of this I send a man of the regt. de Rohan, who made his escape from the enemy the day before yesterday. I am sorry to inform you that, notwithstanding the orders given to the subaltern of the piquet at Ochtan, both by the captain and me, he, in the absence of the captain, who was gone to visit the right piquet near Tiel, suffered a boat to cross the river and bring this man over. At the same time that, in order to account for the man's coming in this way, I have thought it my duty to state this circumstance to you, yet I have every reason to believe that the disobedience of orders is to be attributed to misapprehension; and I hope that, if you should have occasion to mention it to H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, you will do me the favor to represent it to him in the least unfavorable point of view. As part of the 11th dragoons marched last night into Ysendoorn, one of the quarters occupied

16853.

by the 33rd regt., and as there was not sufficient room for both parties, I have moved 2 companies of the 33rd into Echteld, another village occupied by the regt., about a mile distant from Ysendoorn, and have left 2 companies (150 men) commanded by Capt. Farrington in the latter.

To Major Barne, 7th light dragoons.

Aschendorf, 20th Feb. 1795.

I have been desired by Lord Cathcart to communicate to you his lordship's position on the west side of the Ems. Lord Cathcart is at Weener. He has posts along the banks of De Dollart to Nieu Schanz, Oude Schanz, and Bellingswolde, thus resting his left upon the Marais de Bontange. He has patrolled to a considerable way in his front, and has not fallen in with the enemy. At his lordship's request, it is my intention to establish a post at Heyde, and on the road to Bontange Fort, as soon as the floods will permit me to get to the river; that post will render your right perfectly secure, and will give me a better opportunity of communicating with you. When it is established, or when Lord Cathcart will communicate to me any change in his position, I will let you know.

I have reason to believe that Major M'Kenzie, and part of the 78th, arrived at Laten last night.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Fort St. George, 3rd Oct. 1798.

I consider that sending away the prisoners is an object of the greatest importance; that an opportunity so good will not offer again for some time; and, therefore, that there is nothing which so well deserves your attention and exertion. Lord Clive has spoken to me upon the subject, and seems very anxious to send them away, but the difficulties of clearing and preparing the *Osterly* have been misrepresented and magnified. It

Lord Clive to the Earl of Mornington.*

Fort St. George, 22nd Sept. 1798.

I cannot express to your Lordship the satisfaction I feel in the arrival of Col. Wellesley. I find him so easy in his manners, and friendly in his communications, that I cannot doubt but that the more I have the opportunity of cultivating his intimacy, the more I shall rejoice at the presence of a person so nearly connected with your Lordship, and so entirely possessed of your views and intentions.

The information which Col. Wellesley has communicated to me, of the very moderate terms of satisfaction which it is your Lordship's intention to demand of the Sultaun, has relieved my mind from much of the solicitude which the appearances of an immediate rupture had excited.

We have intelligence from Major Doveton of the Sultaun having raised a forced loan, for the purpose of discharging the arrears due to his troops; and of an irruption of banditti into Dindigul from Mr. Hurdis, which appears to be of a predatory nature. It, however, excites attention from the circumstance of all communication between Tippoo's ryots and those of the Company having been lately prohibited.

Lord Mornington to Lord Clive.* (Extract.)

Fort William, 14th Nov. 1798.

I am extremely happy to learn that your Lordship continues to approve the conduct of my brother. It does not become me to say with how much safety you may repose implicit confidence in his honor and discretion.

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. i., pp. 267 and 345.

was reported to him that — said she could not be ready till the 26th; and — told me that she could be ready on the 20th; and you know that, when the laboring oar is to fall upon him, he is not over sanguine. I wish you would have some inquiries made into this business; at all events, press Lord C. (as I have) to endeavor to have the *Osterly* got ready.

If the fleet should be detained 2 or 3 days beyond the usual time, it is better than that the prisoners should stay. The advantages of sending them away are seen by those whose aim, one would almost believe, is to throw impediments in the way of every thing that is to be done for the public service at the present moment; and, accordingly, endeavors are made to prevent the possibility of their going.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Arcot, 27th Dec. 1798.

I have been out this morning to see the 25th light dragoons, and I think I never saw a finer regiment in my life. It is a pity that they are not all mounted. Cotton* only wants 40 horses to be able to bring into the field 400 men; and as the 2 regiments of Native cavalry which are here have more horses than they have men to ride them, I should think that it would be better to give their supernumerary horses, which are trained, than any of the young horses which may come from Hyderabad or the Malabar coast.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Camp, 5th April, 1799.

I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favor to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines and show it to me. In the mean time I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

Upon looking at the tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that, when you get possession of the bank of the nullah, you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

* Gen. Viscount Combermere, G.C.B., &c

Gen. Harris to the Governor General in Council.* Camp near Vellore, 2nd Feb. 1799.

Having had leisure since my arrival here to inspect the division of the army which has been since its formation under the orders of the Hon. Col. Wellesley, I have much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that the very handsome appearance and perfect discipline of the troops do honor to themselves and to him; while the judicious and masterly arrangements in respect to supplies, which opened an abundant free market, and inspired confidence into dealers of every description, were no less creditable to Col. Wellesley than advantageous to the public service, and deservedly entitle him to my thanks and approbation.

The other divisions of the army are under orders to take up their respective stations in the line; and as soon as they join, and when the officers of the several departments of ordnance and stores and of supplies have been fully provided with their cattle and carriage, I shall be able to state, for your Lordship's information, the probable period of our being ready to move towards the frontiers of Tippoo Sultaun.

* See the Wellesley Dispatches. vol. i., p. 423.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Camp, 6th April, 1799.

I find that by moving Malcolm's corps to the rear a little, and by an arrangement of my posts on my right and rear, I shall be able to protect Meer Alum, the brinjaries, the park, and the cavalry, from any attempts that may be made by horse and rocket boys, which alone seem to me to be destined to annoy us in that quarter. I shall now go out and see what support I can give to my post at Sultaun-pettah, and will report to you on my return.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Camp, 7th April, 1799.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you think the guards for the outposts can now be reduced a little, as, between foraging parties and outline piquets, we have not men enough left to give a relief. The outline piquets were not relieved this morning for want of men. You were talking yesterday of looking at these posts this afternoon, and if you have an inclination I will go with you at any hour you may appoint. I think I can show you a situation where 2 embraasures might be opened in the bank of the nullah with advantage, and that would add to the strength of the post.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

7th April, 1799, 3 P.M.

A body of horse, of about 7 or 800, has passed, and is getting round by my right and your rear. They keep clear of our piquets, and are most probably a reconnaitring party. They have some few straggling footmen with them, but I have seen no infantry.

Extract from the private diary of Lieut. Gen. Harris, in the Mysore country in the year 1799, between the 4th and 8th April.

4th April. Commissioned Gen. Baird to form a party of not less than the flank companies of his brigade, supported by the piquets, to beat up a tope in front of the ground the piquet was on, and said to have had parties of men with arms assembling on it. It appears to me, from the report, they are only intended for rocketing; but our beating them up, instead of their attempting us, will have the best effect; for if our intelligence is true, his whole army are in a complete state of terror; of course we should keep it so.

5th April. Marched to Seringapatam, rocketed a little on the march. Took up our ground nearly for the siege. Concluded the arrangements for detaching Gen. Floyd to Gen. Stuart. Formed parties for the attack of the post occupied formerly by the Bombay troops, and the tope of Sultaun-pettah. Lieut. Col. Shawe to command the detachment for the Bombay post; Col. Wellesley that of the tope, as being composed of his own people. Remained under great anxiety till near 12 at night, from the fear our troops had fired on each other. Lieut. Col. Shawe very soon reported himself in possession of the post; but a second firing commenced, and as he had previously sent to know what had become of the 2 Native battalions, I could not be satisfied but that, in the dark, they had mistaken each other. It proved that all the firing was from the enemy, H. M.'s 12th regt. scarcely firing a shot the whole night. Near 12, Col. Wellesley came to my tent in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope. It proved that the 33rd, with which he attacked, got into confusion, and could not be formed, which was great pity, as it must be particularly unpleasant to him. Altogether, circumstances considered, we got off very well. Gen. Baird's expedition of last night so far answered our expectations, as he fell in with a small party of the enemy's horse and cut up 8 or 10 of them, which will tend to prevent their plaguing us with rockets, I trust. He missed his road coming back, although one would have thought it impossible; no wonder night attacks so often fail.

6th April. Determined to make another attack on the tope; Lieut. Col. Bowser's and Haliburton's corps with the Scotch brigade (supported by the 25th dragoons and 2nd regt.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Camp, 7th April, 1799.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that the foragers are coming in fast, well loaded with forage, and I have therefore ordered the battalion to stay where it is, ready to turn out, but (as battalions are now scarce articles) not to move till further orders. The body of cavalry has passed our right flank, and seems inclining rather to its left. It appears more like a line of march than a body intended for a *coup de main*, as there are with it bullocks and baggage of different kinds. At all events, it can do our right no harm, as, excepting by the high road which Malcolm's corps will cover as soon as it shall have moved, no cavalry can approach us.

P. S. I see the cavalry has come more round our right, and I have therefore ordered the battalion on to the high road, whence it will afford protection to the foragers coming in, as well as to the rear of our camp, should they be inclined to molest it.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Camp, 7th April, 1799.

I have drawn back the battalion, as the foragers are come in, and the cavalry have disappeared. As soon as Schoey's brigade shall have taken up its ground, we shall have 4 field pieces, at least, bearing upon that road, when I shall have an opportunity of looking at it again. I will let you know whether they will be sufficient, or what will.

I have 14 six pounders, of which 8 are out of the lines at the outposts and piquets.

Native cavalry, on seeing the Sultaun's cavalry appearing from the fort) were destined to assist in this service, and, with scarcely any opposition, carried it.

Sunday, the 7th. Yesterday evening walked down to the advanced post with Baird and Macleod. Found it very strong against so contemptible an enemy as we have to deal with; and such as may, with a little trouble, be made very strong against any. How fortunate thus to find a good parallel prepared to our hands! The fort fired a great deal yesterday, with no other effect than furnishing shot to us. A long line of cavalry seen coming out of the fort about 12; reported at 3, by Col. Wellesley, to have come more round our right; and that he has therefore ordered the battalions we spoke of when looking what they were about, on the road which leads to Periapattam. Our foraging party coming in fast; but this cannot be their object, and they would move more rapidly than they have done. Great many of us much fatigued. Beatson, among the rest, very much relaxed and weak. Our duties pretty severe; but if the whole is not pressed on with vigor we shall fail; for no doubt there will be more difficulties to overcome than we yet foresee.

Monday, 8th. Visited the post taken possession of by Col. Wellesley on the 6th inst. Found it a continuation of the nullah which makes Shawe's post, but not so favorable in that part for keeping hold of. Directed a burnt village on a rise above the nullah to be made the right-hand post, by barricading the streets and cutting down the walls to 6 feet, thickening them next the fort, and putting a banquette within. Brisk cannonade from the fort. Col. Close brought Dallas and Hart to speak about the bullock drivers, &c.

[In the memoirs of the late Gen. Sir D. Baird, a conversation is related as having taken place between Gen. Harris and Gen. Baird, on the parade on the morning of the 6th April, respecting the command of the second attack on the Sultaun-pettah tope. Although there is little doubt that both Gen. Harris and Gen. Baird were capable of feeling and acting in the manner represented, Gen. Harris, however, makes not the slightest mention of it in this his minute private diary, and Col. Wellesley does not allude to it in his several letters to Gen. Harris on that and the following days, and, until many years afterwards, never even heard of it. It is very possible, therefore, that the editor of the memoirs has been misinformed, or has been induced to insert, as an historical fact, what was probably only ephemeral camp gossip, previous to the attack.]

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Camp, 7th April, 1799.

Since I returned home, I have received a report from the outposts in Sultaun-pettah, that some infantry had passed this evening in the same direction in which the cavalry passed this morning; and there are some persons in this camp who say they saw guns pass likewise. I have not yet received a report from my piquets in my front; when I do, I will let you know what it is. At all events, I am prepared for him, if his attack is directed against this flank of your line, whether it be made by day or by night. I do not intend to relieve the outposts until after it is ascertained whether or not he intends to make his push here: if he does attack us here, he will probably attack the outposts at the same time; and, in that case, we must depend upon your line for the support of our posts.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Camp, 7th April, 1799.

The Field officer of the day was at the piquet in my front till sunset; saw cavalry pass, but no infantry, or guns.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

3rd May, 7 A.M.

We did all our work last night, except filling the sand bags, which could not be done for want of tools: I shall have them filled in the course of this morning, and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford; and it is not intended to do any thing to it until the night before it is to be used.

Lieut. Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis, I believe, on the left of the breach. He found the wall, which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, 7 feet high, and the water (included in those 7 feet) 14 inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieut. Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept up upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our working party was in front of the 5 gun battery, from which alone we could fire, as we repaired the other. Lieut. Lalor is now on duty here with his regiment, but if you wish it, he will remain here to-night, and try the river again.

P. S. I have not heard any thing of the 12 pounders ordered to a new situation by the G. O. of yesterday.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

5th May, 10 A.M.

We are in such confusion still, that I recommend it to you not to come in till to-morrow, or, at soonest, late this evening. Before I came here, Gen. Baird had given the treasure in charge to the prize agents. There is a guard over it, and it appears to be large.

As soon as I can find out where the families of the great men are, I shall send guards to take care of them. At present I can find nobody who can give me any information upon the subject. I have here now the 12th, 33rd, and part of the 73rd, and the 2nd of the 5th, 2nd of the 9th, and 2nd of the 7th. These troops ought to be relieved this day as early as possible by 2 regiments of Europeans and 3 of sepoys.

P.S. There are some tigers here which I wish Meer Alum would send for, or else I must give orders to have them shot, as there is no food for them, and nobody to attend them, and they are getting violent.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

12½ P.M.

I wish you would send the provost here, and put him under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is vain to expect to stop the plunder. I shall be obliged to you, if you will send *positive* orders respecting the treasure.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

Things are better than they were, but they are still very bad; and until the provost executes 3 or 4 people, it is impossible to expect order, or indeed safety.

There are, at this moment, sepoys and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and Gen. Stuart's in the town. It would surely be advisable to order the rolls to be called constantly, and to forbid any people to leave camp.

For a few days likewise it would be very advisable that the officers of

G. O.

Camp at Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

The Commander in Chief congratulates the gallant army which he has the honor to command, on the conquest of yesterday. The effects arising from the attainment of such an acquisition as far exceed the present limits of detail as the unremitting zeal, labor, and unparalleled valor of the troops surpass his power of praise. For services so incalculable in their consequences, he must consider the army as well entitled to the applause and gratitude of their country at large.

While Lieut. Gen. Harris sincerely laments the loss sustained in the valuable officers and men who fell in the attack, he cannot omit to return his thanks in the warmest terms to Major Gen. Baird, for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the assault, and for the humane measures which he subsequently adopted for preserving order and regularity in the place. He requests that Major Gen. Baird will communicate to the officers and men, who, on that great occasion, acted under his command, the high sense he must entertain of their achievements and merits.

The Commander in Chief requests that Col. Gent, and the corps of engineers under his orders, will accept his thanks for their unremitting exertions in conducting the duties of that very important department; and his best acknowledgments are due to Major Beatson, for the essential assistance given to this branch of the service by the constant exertion of his ability and zeal.

The merit of the artillery corps is so strongly expressed by the effects of their fire, that the Commander in Chief can only desire Col. Smith to assure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command that he feels most fully their claim to approbation.

In thus publicly expressing his sense of their good conduct, the Commander in Chief finds himself called upon to notice in a most particular manner the exertions of Capt. Dowse, and his corps of pioneers; which, during the present service, have been equally marked by unremitting labor, and the ability with which that labor was applied.

On referring to the progress of the siege, so many opportunities have occurred for applause to the troops, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit; but the gallant manner in which Lieut. Col. Shawe, Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, Lieut. Col. Moneypenny, Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. St. John, Major Macdonald, Major Skelly, and Lieut. Col. Wallace, conducted the attacks on the several outworks and posts of the enemy, demands to be recorded. And the very spirited attack led by Lieut. Col. Campbell of H. M.'s 74th regt., which tended so greatly to secure the position our troops had attained in the enemy's works on the 26th ult., claims the strongest approbation of the Commander in Chief.

The important part taken by the Bombay army, since the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which led to its honorable conclusion, has been such as well sustains its long established reputation. The gallant manner in which the post at the village of Agrar was seized by the force under Col. Hart, the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there, the vigor with which every attack of the enemy on the outposts of that army was repulsed, and the spirit shown in the assault of the breach by

the army should suspend the gratification of their curiosity, and that none but those on duty should come into the town. It only increases the confusion and the terror of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we cannot expect that they will return to their habitations.

P. S. I hope the relief is coming, and that I shall soon receive your orders respecting the treasure.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Seringapatam, 6th May, 1799.

Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers.

It is absolutely necessary that you should immediately appoint a permanent garrison, and a commanding officer to the place; till that is done, the people will have no confidence in us, and every thing must be in confusion. That which I arrange this day, my successor may alter

the corps led by Lieut. Col. Dunlop, are points of particular notice; for which the Commander in Chief requests Lieut. Gen. Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and troops employed.

Lieut. Gen. Harris trusts that Lieut. Gen. Stuart will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and assistance received from him during the present service: in the course of which he has ever found it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty from the warmest feelings of his private friendship.

G. O.

Seringapatam, May 8th, 1799.

Lieut. Gen. Harris has particular pleasure in publishing to the army the following extract of a report, transmitted to him yesterday by Major Gen. Baird, as it places in a distinguished point of view the merit of an officer, on the very important occasion referred to, whose general gallantry and good conduct, since he has served with this army, have not failed to recommend him strongly to the Commander in Chief.

‘If, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Col. Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack.’

Return of the corps and regiments which assisted in the siege and the assault of
Seringapatam:

EUROPEANS.		NATIVE INFANTRY.				
Corps of Madras engineers		BENGAL.		MADRAS.		
Detachment of Bengal	} Artillery.	1st batt.	} 10th regt.	1st batt.	1st regt.	
1st batt. }		2nd do.		2nd do.	2nd do.	
2nd do. }		1st do.		} volunteers.	2nd do.	3rd do.
Detachment of Bombay		2nd do.			2nd do.	5th do.
H. M.'s 12th regt.	} Infantry.	3rd do.	} —	1st do.	6th do.	
— 33rd do.		BOMBAY.		2nd do.	7th do.	
— 73rd do.		1st batt.		1st do.	8th do.	
— 74th do.		} 2nd regt.	2nd do.	2nd do.	9th do.	
— 75th do.			1st do.	1st do.	} 11th do.	
— 77th do.		} 3rd do.	2nd do.	2nd do.		
— Scotch brigade			1st do.	4th do.	1st do.	} 12th do.
— regt. de Meuron		1st do.	5th do.	2nd do.		
Bombay regt. of European infantry			The Pioneer corps.		The Pioneer corps.	

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of corps composing the army before
Seringapatam, from the 4th April to the 4th May, 1799:—

	Officers.	Europeans.	Natives
Killed . . .	22	181	119
Wounded . . .	45	622	420
Missing . . .	—	22	100

to-morrow, and his the next day; and nothing will ever be settled. A garrison which would be likely to remain here would soon make themselves comfortable, although it might be found convenient hereafter to change some of the corps sent in: but these daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in the inhabitants; and the camp is at such a distance, that it is impossible for the officers, or soldiers, or sepoy, to get down their dinners.

I shall be obliged to you if you will order an extra dram and biscuit for the 12th, 33rd, and 73rd regts., who got nothing to eat yesterday, and were wet last night. In hopes that you will attend to my recommendation to send a garrison in to-morrow, I shall look out for a place to accommodate one or 2 battalions of Europeans and 3 or 4 of sepoy.

To Lieut. Col. Doveton, Paymaster of Stipends. Seringapatam, 18th July, 1799.

The bearer hereof is Gholam Aly, the Meer Suddoor, who, with his son Gholam Mohid u Deen, is going to reside at Vellore under your protection. The Commissioners of the affairs of Mysore have provided for them both by pensions.

Of all the servants of the late Sultaun, I believe, there was no one more attached to him than the Meer Suddoor; and there is no one who has rendered more effectual service to the Company and to the countries which have come under their government and protection than he has. After the fall of Seringapatam, and that the family of the Sultaun and the great sirdars had surrendered themselves, he had the good sense to see that the best thing that could happen for all parties, was that the country should be settled as speedily as possible; and by exerting his influence over the killadars of the different forts, without making any private bargain for himself, he had the honesty to contribute, as much as lay in his power,

G. O. by the Governor General.

Fort St. George, 15th May, 1799.

The Rt. Hon. the Governor General in Council, having this day received from the Commander in Chief of the allied army in the field the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam on the 4th May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander in Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army, which achieved the conquest of the capital of Mysore on that memorable day.

His Lordship views with admiration the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned, the unequalled rapidity, animation, and skill with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success.

Under the favor of Providence, and the justice of our cause, the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence that the war in which we were engaged would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honorable issue.

But the events of the 4th May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor General in Council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India to a degree of splendor and glory unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world.

The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial advantages which it promises to establish, in restoring the peace and safety of the British possessions in India, on a durable foundation of genuine security.

The Governor General in Council reflects with pride, satisfaction, and gratitude, that, in this arduous crisis, the spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with those of our countrymen at home; and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found, in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame, and power.

towards a settlement which he conceived to be for the general good. I anxiously recommend him to you; and I am convinced the longer you know him, the better you will like him.

16853.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 31st July, 1799.

I have the honor to enclose lists of the pensioners, made out according to their different classes, and the places at which they have chosen in future to receive the amount of their pensions. I take the liberty of recommending that copies of these lists may be sent to the commanding officer of each station at which any pensioner may have chosen to reside, with orders to the paymaster at each station to provide for the payment of the pensions therein stated by the usual means.

I have likewise the honor to enclose a list of persons who appear to have claims to be considered, and who are not included among those provided for by the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore. I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will send your orders respecting these persons.

By a reference to 'the statement of pensions and gratuities granted to different persons, &c. &c.' your Lordship will perceive that 1200 canterai pagodas annually is the sum allotted for the mosques in the Fort. The expenses attending those mosques appear to be 2294 pag. 5 fans. annually, by a paper marked No. 10. I have not yet given orders that any sum should be issued to them, and I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will send me your orders upon this subject.

In consequence of the powers I received from the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore I have granted pensions, as contained in the paper, marked No. 11, to the families of Meer Sadook, Reza Saheb, Boorcham u Deen, and the Savanore nabob, and have divided them as therein stated. They are included in the list of pensions payable at Seringapatam, and I hope to receive your Lordship's approbation of them. I have likewise divided the pension granted by the Commissioners to the family of Seyd Saheb in the name stated in the same paper.

The paper, marked No. 12, contains a statement of the payments from the sum allotted for the family of the late Tippoo Sultaun and Hyder Aly. The additions which I should propose to make to them are stated at the bottom of that paper, for which I request authority from your Lordship. The expense of the tombs for the months of May and June has been only 306 rupees; hereafter it will be as stated in the enclosed paper, No. 12.

I enclose a letter from Capt. Macleod relating to some persons who had been omitted in the list of nanperversh which he had given to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore. Their names are at the bottom of the list of nanperversh, and I hope your Lordship will approve of my having extended to them the bounty of government, till I could receive your orders upon the subject.

To Lieut. Col. Doveton, Vellore.

Seringapatam, 1st Aug. 1799.

In conformity to directions I have received from the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, by order of the Governor General I have granted a

pension of 400 pagodas *per annum* to the family of the late Reza Saheb (the Binky Nabob). It is to be paid in monthly payments at Seringapatam to the mahal, until Ibrahim Saheb and Mahomed Saheb are 25 years of age, when 150 pagodas *per annum* are to be paid to each of them, and the remainder to the mahal and to their 2 sisters.

To the Resident at Hyderabad.

Seringapatam, 31st July, 1799.

I have the honor to enclose you a list of the names of pensioners formerly in the service of the late Tippoo Suldaun, to whom pensions have been granted by the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, by order of the Rt. Hon. the Governor General in Council, and who, having chosen to receive their pensions at Hyderabad, have received from me certificates accordingly.

I take the liberty of recommending them to your protection, and requesting you will take the necessary measures for providing for the regular payment of their pensions.

List of pensions granted on Hyderabad.

Names of the pensioners	Annual pensions for life, in star pagodas.
Noor ul Apsar Khan	700
Meer Hussein	140
Seyd Ashant Aly Khan	83½

The pensions are to be paid quarterly: the pensioners have received one quarter each, or to the 31st July.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 19th Aug. 1799.

I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship, that, out of the fund allotted for the family of the late Tippoo Suldaun, a pension of 20 canterai pagodas *per mensem* may be allotted to the mother-in-law of Schuckur Oolla, the wife of Zemul ab Deen Jaher. She received this sum from the late Suldaun.

I have the honor to enclose a statement of the numbers of the family still remaining in Seringapatam, and an estimate of the carriage which will be required to take them from hence. It does not appear possible to furnish it till the army quits the field.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

26th Aug. 1799.

I have received Col. Agnew's private and public letters, and I am much obliged to you for the additional mark of your favor and confidence in allowing me to appoint my own staff. Col. Agnew will communicate to you what I have written to him upon this subject.

Before I left Seringapatam, Col. Scott desired me to request your permission for him to go to England, in a letter which I wrote to you. I have this day informed him that you have left the army, and I have given him leave to go to Madras. I have also desired him to make his application to you in the regular form through Capt. Young.

I wish you joy of the successful termination of every thing here.

Instructions for Capt. Malcolm proceeding to Oustara.

Camp, 27th Aug. 1799.

You will march to-morrow morning with your battalion, and the field pieces attached to it, towards Oustara by a route which will be shown to

you by some hircarrahs which Purneah will send with you. 500 of the Rajah's infantry, and 250 of his cavalry, are gone before you, and you will be accompanied by an amildar of Purneah.

You will get possession of the fort of Munserabad on the other side of the Hemavutty, and give it over to the Rajah's people.

There are other places in the district of Oustara and Bul country, at present in the possession of the polygar of Bullum, which you will likewise deliver over to the Rajah's people, and you will do every thing in your power to establish his authority in those districts. Wherever you find arms or military stores you will destroy them.

Purneah's people will have provided boats for the passage of the river Hemavutty by the time you reach it. You will take particular care to prevent your men from plundering, and you will pay attention to the orders of the Commander in Chief, contained in a letter to Col. Stevenson, a copy of which is enclosed.

Additional, for Capt. Campbell, 74th regt.

There is a place called Ey Goor, at the distance of about 4 or 5 coss from Munserabad, which is the residence of the Rajah. You will be pleased to destroy it, and hang all persons either in it or Munserabad that you may find in arms.

To Capt. Malcolm.

Camp, 10th Sept. 1799.

I have received your letter of the 8th inst., and Col. Harness and Capt. Barclay have communicated to me those which you wrote to them on the

G. O.

Head Quarters, 11th Sept. 1799.

The Commander in Chief, being about to proceed to the Presidency, in obedience to the orders of the Governor General in Council, appoints Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley to command the troops serving above the ghauts.

G. O.

Camp at Hooley Honore, Wednesday, 11th Sept. 1799.

The 1st Native brigade gives the adjutant for the day to-morrow.

The army to cross the Buddra to-morrow, and encamp between the two rivers.

The general to beat at 5, the assembly at 6. At that hour the 19th light dragoons will cross at the lower ford of the Buddra, leaving their guns on this side, in this line; and the 2 Bengal battalions will cross at the upper ford, leaving their guns. Lieut. Davis will send a man to each corps to conduct them to the crossing place. Four boats will be allotted to the dragoons, 4 to the 2 battalions, and 4 to the bazaars.

The European regiments will be prepared to cross to-morrow, if possible. The guns and stores will likewise be prepared to cross.

The Native details on the duty of the advanced piquets to join their corps at general beating; and the European detail to be relieved as usual.

G. A. O.

11th Sept. 1799.

The field officer of the day to superintend the crossing of the river to-morrow, and to report from time to time any particular occurrence.

Two companies of the 1st Native brigade to be kept in readiness on the east bank of the river, as a working party, to assist in crossing the guns when they may be ordered over.

G. M. O.

Camp at Hooley Honore, Thursday, 12th Sept. 1799.

The guns and stores to be sent down to the upper ford, which Capt. Tomkyns has pitched upon as the fittest for their crossing at.

The arrack carts belonging to the Commissary of provisions department to be sent to the same ford, to follow the guns across.

The European brigade to strike tents and march down to the lower ford, and cross there.

7th. In consequence of what you have stated in all of them, I have been induced to detach the light infantry of the 73rd and 74th regts. from camp to assist in your expedition; as from your statement of the nature of the country, as well as from the information I have been able to obtain of it here, it does not appear to be well suited for the operations of cavalry.

I am sorry that you will not have the assistance of the Koorg Rajah, or of the Bombay army, or of the troops from Shimoga, as you propose: but I trust that the reinforcement now sent will accomplish all the objects of the expedition. These are, to get possession of Munserabad, and not to hunt the polygar, as you seem to imagine.

You will halt in your present position, until the reinforcement above-mentioned reaches you. In the mean time I beg that you will see that boats are prepared for the passage of the river, that scaling ladders are made, and long bamboo forks (two for each ladder) to place them up against the walls of the place.

You will, of course, obtain all the information you can of the nature and strength of Munserabad, of the ditch, whether wet or dry, of the means by which the place is watered, of the road from Munserabad to a place called Ey Goor, the residence of the polygar, on which side of Munserabad it is, of the road leading to Munserabad from the river, &c.

You will be so kind as to send a person to Seringapatam, who will conduct Capt. Campbell, of the 74th regt., to the spot where you are encamped. As I imagine that Capt. Campbell is senior to you, he will take the command of the detachment, and you will hand over to him the instruc-

M. A. O.

12th Sept. 1799.

Two companies of Europeans and 2 of Native infantry to relieve the working party at the river immediately.

The army to cross the Tungha to-morrow morning. The *general* at 5, and the assembly at 8.

Lieut. Davis, of the pioneers, will be so kind as to take care that 4 boats are brought across from the Buddra this evening; which, with 2 large boats expected from Shimoga, will carry across such baggage as must go over in boats.

The dragoons to go over first, as this morning; the European infantry next; 3rdly, the Native infantry; 4thly, the guns, stores, and provisions department.

A detachment, equal to 2 companies of European infantry and 2 companies of Native infantry, to be in readiness to assist the guns, stores, and provisions department in crossing, as this day.

The field officer of the day to superintend the crossing of the river.

Capt. Cunningham will be so kind as to fix upon a place on the Toombuddra at which the grain belonging to the grain department and to the brinjaries, and the baggage of the head quarters line, can be passed in boats. He will arrange to have the boats at the place which he will fix upon, and will have it pointed out to Major Corner and the baggage master.

Head quarters and the grain department will cross the Toombuddra to-morrow, and encamp with the line.

Capt. Barclay will arrange the elephants in such manner as that some of them may be in readiness to pass over the tents in the head quarter line; others to pass the tents of the army over the Tungha, as fast as the troops cross the river.

E. O.

12th Sept. 1799.

If the rivers prove fordable to-morrow morning, a detail, equal to a company of Native infantry, to be sent to assist in drawing the arrack carts over the Buddra, which were prevented from being taken over today by the swelling of the river; and if the rivers continue unfordable, those carts to be sent down to the place where the boats ply on the Toombuddra, to be sent over in them.

tions which I have given to you, and all my letters. I have no doubt but that you will give him every information and assistance in your power.

To Capt. Campbell, 74th regt. Hullihall, in the province of Soonda, 1st Oct. 1799.

I have received great satisfaction from the reports you have sent of your proceedings in the command with which I entrusted you; and I am convinced that had it been necessary to use force to get possession of the fort against which you were sent, its strength would not have kept your troops out of it.

I beg you will inform Capt. Malcolm that I was happy to find that the preparations for passing the river, for escalading the fort, and for bursting open the gates, were in such forwardness when you joined him; and that I cannot but applaud his having called for assistance when he thought it necessary to carry the object entrusted to him, even although his share of the credit to be gained might thereby be diminished.

To Lieut. Col. Harness, 74th regt. Camp, 4 miles from Hullihall, 6th Oct. 1799.

I beg that you will be so kind as to desire Capt. Mackay to order 60 of the Hon. Company's draught bullocks to be taken from the place where they are grazing to Seringapatam, where they are to remain in readiness to bring off treasure to the army. The person who goes to Seringapatam in charge of the bullocks will receive orders to report himself to the paymaster.

To Lieut. Col. Harness. Camp, 4 miles from Hullihall, 6th Oct. 1799.

I enclose you the extract of a letter from the Sec. of gov., which I beg that you will be so kind as to communicate to the parties concerned. When I return to camp, I will arrange the establishment of servants for the departments left under the orders of Major Corner and of Capt. Mackay.

G. O.

Camp at Shikarpoor, Friday, 20th Sept. 1799.

The European brigade gives the adjutant for the day to-morrow. The Europeans to have 2 drams to-day.

The army to march to-morrow morning by the right: baggage on the right. The *general* to beat at 5, and the assembly an hour after. H. M. 19th dragoons to form the advance. The details coming on the duty of the advanced piquets, and those on that duty to move as usual. 24 pioneers to move in front of the cavalry. 100 pioneers are to proceed in front of the army, according to instructions which Lieut. Davis will receive from Col. Wellesley. These will be accompanied by one company of Native infantry, under the command of an European officer, who will call upon Col. Wellesley this afternoon for instructions.

All the bamboos belonging to the spare tents, in charge of the Commissary of stores, and all the ridge poles of the private tents in the lines, are to be sent forward with Lieut. Davis.

The Commanding officers of regiments and the Commissary of stores will be so kind as to make such an arrangement of the bamboo coolies as that a sufficient proportion of them may be sent with the bamboos which each is to furnish. These must be sent in charge of a non-commissioned officer, a little before assembly beating, to the right of the line, where they will be delivered over to Lieut. Davis.

All the artificers belonging to the regiments of infantry, and those in the departments of the Commissary of stores and Commissary of provisions, are likewise to proceed in front of the army with the pioneers, and are to be sent to the right of the line before assembly beating, and given over to Lieut. Davis, with returns, stating their description and numbers. Lieut. Davis will send to the Commissary of stores for all the rope which can be spared: this the Commissary of stores will deliver to him.

By your letter, and some I have received from Capt. Barclay, I perceive that the brinjarries have been sent, across the Werdah with a very considerable supply of rice. 300 bags from the grain department will, therefore, be sufficient for the present, and I beg that you will not send more, notwithstanding what was ordered in my letter from Soopah of the 4th inst.

To Major Munro, Collector in Canara. Camp in the province of Loo, 8th Oct. 1799.

I have received your letter, and, as I had some hand in sending you to Canara, I am much concerned that your situation there is so uncomfortable to yourself. It is one of the extraordinary and unaccountable circumstances attending the commission at Seringapatam, that my brother and I should have imagined that you were desirous of being appointed Collector at Canara; that we should have been seriously angry with Kirkpatrick, who, it appeared, had proposed an arrangement for you, of which you did not approve, and which had occasioned your refusal of the appointment for which you wished; and yet that, after all, we should have done you an injury, instead of a benefit, (as well as one to the service,) which we intended. I acknowledge that, knowing my own wishes in your favor, and being very sensible of my brother's, I cannot but attribute what has happened to yourself. One word from you would have stopped the arrangement, and there is every reason to believe that provision would have been made for you elsewhere. It is, perhaps, not now too late. I have written to my brother upon the subject; and I hope that he will make an arrangement suitable to your wishes. Whether he does or not, I hope that you will believe that your cause has not failed for want of zeal on my part.

This country, into which I have come to visit my posts on the Marhatta frontiers, is worse than that which you curse daily. It is literally not worth fighting for. Hereafter, it will be necessary to communicate with it from Canara; and I have desired the amildar to make a good road from Soopah towards your borders. I am told that Seedasheeghur is not more than 60 miles by the road from Soopah, my most western post; that in the war of 1780, a detachment of Matthews' army advanced upon Soopah by that road. I wish that you would desire one of your people to communicate with the amildar of Soonda respecting this road, and that you would have a good one made from Seedasheeghur to meet it.

The drubbing that we gave to the Marhattas lately has had the best effects; and although all the robbers are in motion to cut each other's throats, they treated us with the utmost hospitality, and have sent back our people whom they had driven away.

To Major Disney.

Camp near Shikarpoor, 17th Oct. 1799.

I have received all your letters, for which I am much obliged to you.

By the orders of the government of Fort St. George the nerrick of exchange for Porto Novo pagodas is one for 3 Arcot rupees, at which rate they are received by the troops serving under this Presidency, when they are issued to them; and it is the general rate at which they are exchanged in the bazaars in this part of India. If government were

inclined to alter it, I am afraid that they would find it difficult, if not impossible; and yet I do not think it probable that they will attend to any request which I may transmit from you, to give the sepoy's of your corps a compensation equal in amount to the difference between the sum at which the Porto Novo pagodas are paid to them, and that at which they are current by the orders of government in the bazaar at Nuggur. I know of only one remedy, which is, that you should apply to the government of Bombay for compensation for a loss, which it appears is incurred in consequence of the money being issued at an advanced rate of exchange by their orders.

You will be so kind as to send a guard to the paymaster of the Bombay army below the ghauts for the pay of your battalion. You will allow Ram Rao's vakeel to do what he pleases with any grain that may be in Nuggur. I shall be at Nuggur in the course of a few days, and I shall then have the pleasure of talking to you upon the subject of your letter of the 16th inst.

To Lieut. Col. Harness.

Camp, 28th Oct. 1799.

I received your letter respecting the grain in the grain department last night, and I will delay to order the committee to sit upon it till I return to camp. Lieut. Campbell arrived this morning, and Col. Campbell is rather better.

I shall be with you on the day after to-morrow.

G. O.

Camp at Benkeypoor, Thursday, 31st Oct. 1799.

The officers commanding at Mundragoor, Soopah, or any other post in the province of Soonda, will send their reports to the Hon. Col. Wellesley, through Capt. Macfarlane, and will obey such orders as they may receive from him; those commanding at Chandergooty, Anantpoor, Cowleydroog, or any post in Bednore, west of the Toombuddra, will send their reports through Major Disney, of the Bombay establishment, and will obey such orders as they may receive from him.

When any officer in either province has any thing to communicate which he thinks it essential should be known quickly, he will communicate it to Col. Wellesley directly, as well as to Capt. Macfarlane, or Major Disney, respectively. Those two officers will communicate with each other, and will lose no time in transmitting to Col. Wellesley the reports which they may receive from the posts under their orders.

Col. Stevenson will take the command of the cavalry encamped at Hooley Honore.

Capt. Barclay is appointed Dep. Adj. Gen.; Capt. Cunningham, Dep. Qr. Mr. Gen. to the troops in Mysore; and Capt. West, aide de camp to Col. Wellesley, from the 26th Aug.

Col. Wellesley has been informed, that when the sepoy's are sent out on safeguards, they force the inhabitants of the villages to give them provisions of different kinds, and money; and that, abusing the trust which is reposed in them, they suffer certain persons to carry away from the villages what they please without paying for it. Thus it appears that a safeguard, instead of being a benefit, is distressing to the village into which it is sent; and that the sepoy's are forgetful of the first principle of a soldier, which is fidelity to the trust reposed in him.

It is essentially necessary that the practices complained of, and above noticed, should be put a stop to forthwith; and Col. Wellesley gives notice that, whenever the inhabitants of any village complain that the safeguard requires provisions of any kind, or money, the whole guard will be punished; and the excuse that either the provisions or the money had been offered will not be allowed, as to take either is positively forbid.

In order to prevent safeguards from suffering some individuals to plunder the villages, although they may strictly guard it against others, notice is given, that if any village is plundered when a safeguard is in it, and it does not appear in the clearest manner that it was not in the power of the safeguard to prevent it, the whole of the guard will be punished for a neglect of their duty.

Col.

To Major Disney.

Camp at Bellor, 9th Nov. 1799.

I have received your letter of the 4th inst., and the order issued by Col. Sartorius which you enclosed. As it is not certain whether you will not be obliged to march, I think you will do well to retain the field establishment belonging to your corps. I have written to Col. Sartorius upon this subject, and have communicated to him my opinion and the grounds of it; and I have no doubt but that he will agree that your field establishment ought to be kept for the present. But the reason which induces me to recommend that you may keep it (viz., that you may be ready to move if necessary) is a sufficient one for not employing any of the persons belonging to it at a distance from your corps; and I therefore recommend that the persons only who will be furnished by Ram Rao may be employed at Anantpoor and Cowleydroog.

I am concerned to find that you should imagine that any of the ordnance or stores have been made away with. I wish that, as soon as possible, you would ascertain what quantity of ordnance and military stores there are in Nuggur, and on the outworks, lines, &c., and that you would make out a return of them. Of these you will take charge for the present; but as your garrison is not sufficiently large to enable you to put the necessary guards wherever there is ordnance or stores, I recommend that you should remove into the fort whatever of either is valuable, at present, on the outworks or on the lines. Ram Rao will receive orders to assist you with some of his sebundies to enable you to place guards in such parts of the lines as you may think necessary; but as these sebundies are raised to enable him to collect the revenue and to keep the country quiet, it is very desirable that you should not call upon him for the assistance of any of them, excepting you find it absolutely requisite.

It is intended that the servants of the Hon. Company should take charge of all grain and provisions, &c. (garrison stores) that may be in the garrisons occupied by their troops, as soon as the paymaster (who, on the Madras establishment, is likewise garrison storekeeper) can make the necessary arrangements for receiving them. You will inform Ram Rao of this, and give him directions not to suffer any of either to be taken out of the stores, until Mr. Gordon's people can take charge. To give the

Col. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will have this order translated, and read to their men at 4 different parades; and that, whenever safeguards are sent out from their corps, they will order their adjutants particularly to recall it to the recollection of the sepoy.

It is likewise necessary that the adjutants should take down the names of the villages to which safeguards are sent, and of the sepoy sent to each, in order that when a complaint is made it may be easy to know what persons were guards in the villages.

G. A. O.

31st Oct. 1799.

The army to march to-morrow morning, by the right; the *general* to beat at 5, and the assembly at 6 o'clock. H. M. 19th dragoons to form the advance. The details coming on the duty of the advanced piquets; those on that duty and the pioneers to move as usual.

The baggage must follow the line, and keep on the road; and Col. Wellesley begs that the commanding officers of corps will give particular orders to their followers not to go upon the cultivation. The baggage master must keep them off it. Quarter masters, &c., to meet Capt. Cunningham on the right of the line, a little before assembly beating.

commanding officers of garrisons charge of the garrison stores immediately, although it would probably be the best means of securing them, would throw great responsibility on them, and would give them unnecessary trouble.

To Major Disney.

Camp at Ooscotta, 15th Nov. 1799.

I have received the orders of the Commander in Chief to send the 1st batt. 1st (Madras) regt. to the Carnatic; and, as it will be necessary that its detachments should accompany it, I have to request that you will make the following arrangement for their relief.

You will be so kind as to order a company of the battalion under your command to Cowleydroog to relieve 2 companies of the 1st, stationed there. These 2 companies, the detachment which has been withdrawn from Hyderghur, and is at present, as I imagine, at Nuggur, and the detachment at Anantpoor, must march under the command of Lieut. Mackay to Chittledroog, where they are to remain till joined by the main body of the battalion which is coming from Soonda. Anantpoor must, for the present, be kept by some of Ram Rao's peons.

As Capt. Macfarlane will now be left with only one battalion in the province of Soonda, it is very desirable that it should be as complete as possible. I therefore beg that you will send one company of your battalion to Chandergooty to relieve the detachment of the 1st of the 8th (Madras) regt. which is there. You will order Lieut. Lucas to proceed with his detachment by Bonawassi, Jerrah, Budnaghur, Mundragoor, Turrikerra, to Hullahall, where he will join his corps.

G. O.

Camp at Ooscotta, Saturday, 16th Nov. 1799.

The army to march to-morrow morning by the left: baggage to follow the line. The *general* to beat at 5 o'clock, and the assembly at 6.

The details coming on the duty of the advanced piquets to move in advance. The Native details on that duty to form the rear guard. 30 pioneers to move in advance with the piquets; a non-commissioned officer and 12 with the park, and the remainder at the head of the line.

Quarter masters, &c., to meet the D.Q.M.G. on the left of the line, a little before assembly beating.

The 1st regt. of Native cavalry, Capt. Balfour's company of artillery (with the exception of a detail which he will furnish to the guns of the 74th regt. and to the 3rd Bengal volunteers), will proceed according to instructions which will be given to the commanding officers of those corps.

When elephants or camels are detached with any corps or individuals, the officer in charge of them is to give to the commanding officer of the corps, or the person with whom they are detached, a return, stating the number and names of the elephants, the number of camels, the daily allowance of grain and other articles to each, the number and names of the servants attached to each, and their monthly pay.

The elephants and camels are to be under the charge of the officer commanding the corps with which, or the individual with whom, they are detached, who will be so kind as to take care that they receive the daily allowance appointed for them, and will pay the servants their monthly wages. On the 1st of every month he will transmit to the officer appointed to take charge of the Hon. Company's elephants and camels a return of the numbers of each, and of the names of the elephants, of the numbers of servants attached to them, and an account of disbursements for grain and other articles and servants' wages for the preceding month.

The subordinate agent for the carriage of camp equipage in charge of the elephants and camels having been authorised to give them, besides their daily allowance, such other articles as in his judgment may be absolutely necessary, the officers commanding corps, and individuals with whom elephants or camels may be detached, will give them whatever they think necessary for their preservation, and will send an account of what they shall have given on the 1st of every month, along with the account of disbursements for their usual and regular allowance.

To Major Disney.

Camp, 17th Nov. 1799.

It is not in my power to give you any intelligence which would enable you to judge whether your situation would be permanent or otherwise: a large part of my army is ordered into the Carnatic, which induces me to believe that we are none of us settled. At the same time an order is sent to the commanding officer in Canara, to put under my orders another battalion of Bombay sepoy, which are to be in Soonda. I have written to the commanding officer in Canara to beg that he will send them there from the northern part of the province. If all remains quiet, I think that you have a prospect of remaining where you are, if you like it.

Your news from Anantpoor induces me to wish that you would have there a company with a European officer. I am aware that this will weaken you at Nuggur, but that is of little importance at the present moment. I am going to Seringapatam.

To Major Disney.

Camp, 17th Nov. 1799.

As some money and some tents are coming from Chittledroog for the 1st of the 8th (Madras) regt., under an escort of the 2nd of the 3rd, it would be very convenient if Lieut. Lucas of that regt., proceeding from Chandergooty to join his corps, were to halt at Jerrah until this escort comes there. Jerrah is about 4 or 5 coss from Chandergooty; and I shall be obliged to you if you will order Lieut. Lucas to halt there with his party until an officer of the 2nd of the 3rd arrives, who will deliver him over 1500 star pagodas, and some tents for the use of his corps. When he shall have received them he will move on by the route formerly pointed out.

To Major Disney.

Camp at Hassen, 18th Nov. 1799.

I shall be obliged to you if you will concert measures with Ram Rao so as to catch some of the plunderers who, it is reported, have appeared near Anantpoor. I am informed that they are Marhattas from the Savanore country, but it is immaterial from whence they come; if any of them are caught, they are to be hanged.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 26th Nov. 1799.

It is very true that I have been called upon by Gen. Stuart to send

G. O.

Camp at Seringapatam, Monday, 25th Nov. 1799.

The 2nd batt. 12th regt. to march out of garrison to-morrow morning, and to encamp near the 2nd of the 9th.

The detachment of artillery, with the guns attached to those battalions, and the recovered Europeans and Natives going to the Carnatic under the orders of Major Mouro, are likewise to cross the river tomorrow and to be ready to march off on the next day.

One battalion of Bengal volunteers will go into garrison to-morrow, the other on the next day.

The Town Major of Seringapatam will send a detail for the guards to Lieut. Col. Gardiner, and the battalion going into garrison to-morrow will furnish them.

Col. Wellesley has great pleasure in making known to the army the satisfaction which he has derived in observing the discipline and good order of the 2nd batt. of the 9th and the 2nd batt. of the 12th, at the review of those corps yesterday and this morning. Although the shortness of the time which the commanding officers of those corps have had leisure to attend to their discipline, and the duties upon which they have been employed, might have been a reason why they should not be in the best order, the attention which has been paid to them has prevented the necessity of using it. Col. Wellesley will undoubtedly report to the Commander in Chief the state in which he has found these corps.

your battalion below the ghauts, which, in that case, is to go to Goa; but, as I have written to say that I cannot spare it from Bednore, I have reason to believe that you will remain there. Whether you bring your family to Nuggur from Cundapoor or not, considering that you will certainly either remain at Nuggur or go to Goa, can be a matter of but little inconvenience to them.

To Lieut. Col. Close, Resident at Mysore.

Seringapatam, 2nd Dec. 1799.

I enclose you sunnuds for pensions for the killadar of Chittledroog, the family of Hussein Aly Khan, Abdul Mahomed, the brother of Abdul Kuddars, about whom there are orders in the letter from Col. Kirkpatrick, which I showed you; and the nanpervish about which I spoke to you. Insert the names of the places at which the pensions of the killadars are to be paid.

I have besides made out sunnuds,* and have given orders for the payment of the following pensions up to the 30th Nov. They stand upon the 'Family fund.'

Ibrahim Saheb's family	3600 rupees	annually.
Ameen Saheb's family	600 star pags.	..
Zemul Ab Deen Jaher's widow	200 star pags.	..
Meer Kawder Aly	400 star pags.	..
Turbent Aly Khan's family	400 star pags.	..

For all these, orders have been received from the Governor General.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.

Seringapatam, 4th Dec. 1799.

My public communications with the Adj. Gen. and the government have made you acquainted with the manner in which I have been going on here. You left me but little to do, and we are now quiet and prosperous every where.

I hear that you sail shortly for England with Mrs. Harris and your family. I beg that you will do me the favor to present my best respects to her. I shall never forget the many marks of favor and kindness I have received from you, for which I again return my thanks. Wherever you go, I shall always be glad to hear of your happiness; of your success, there is no doubt.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 7th Dec. 1799.

The estimate of the monthly expense of a battalion is 4000 star pagodas. This is rather above the mark; but it is better to have too much than too little. Mr. Gordon shall make arrangements for placing a servant in Soonda, to whom this money may be paid.

I have settled every thing for the reception of the Bilghy Rajah in the fort, and I will take charge of him whenever Purneah* shall send him.

I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Purneah to write to his amildar at Hooley Honore, and direct him to send forward to Seringapatam the vakeels of the 1st of the 1st, and the 1st of the 8th, and line,

* Purneah had been Dewan (minister) under Tippoo Sultaun; and Col. Wellesley, on the capture of Seringapatam, reinstated him in authority.

who are coming there with the abstract of these corps. I enclose you the sunnuds for these sirdars.

To Lieut. Col. Harness.

Seringapatam, 8th Dec. 1799.

I have received and am much obliged to you for all your letters. I recollect perfectly the paragraph in my instructions to Col. Campbell, a copy of which you have sent me; and I have given orders upon the subject of provisions for the 74th, which will be transmitted to you this day. They should have been issued before now, only that I imagined that you had a supply for 20 days of every thing excepting of arrack, and I knew that you would be able to get plenty of that at Bangalore, by means of the persons belonging to the provision department, who had been detached from the army with you.

Col. Campbell gives a good account of himself; but still I wish, for his sake, that he would go to the Carnatic in order to ensure his recovery.

I have written to the Military board on the subject of your tents. It will be necessary that you should have prepared an estimate of the materials, &c., which will be required to repair the tents which the committee have reported unserviceable; as, by my letter to Col. Campbell of yesterday's date, you will perceive that I have stated to him and to the Military board the necessity of repairing them in case your corps should be moved. We have not a single tent in store at Seringapatam. I have desired the Commissary of supply to be prepared at Bangalore to answer your indents for every thing that you will want, and I imagine that he will have made his arrangements before the papers can be returned from Fort St. George.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 9th Dec. 1799.

I have just received your letters upon the subject of some Coir cordage at Nuggur, which you will be so kind as to take charge of, and do the best you can to place it where it will be safe, and not damaged by the wet. I have written to Col. Hart again to urge him to send a battalion into Soonda; and I have taken that opportunity of requesting that, in his arrangements, he will leave you in the command of the corps which is to be stationed at Nuggur. The order whereby the Bombay troops are put in cantonments does not affect your field establishments, as I stated to you upon a former occasion.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 15th Dec. 1799.

I enclose you an extract of a letter from Col. Kirkpatrick, which will account for the excess of the nanpervish compared with Macleod's list. There is no such person in Macleod's list as 'Jybea Ama,' as you will perceive by a reference to it, and there is in mine. The difference in the amount of the pensions between Macleod's list and mine is to be attributed to the alteration of the periods of payment. When I came to give the sunnuds, I consulted the paymaster respecting the 9 payments in the year, and found it to be so inconvenient to him, that, after having ascertained the annual amount of each pension, I thought it better to divide it into 12 payments, according to our system.

The annual amount, however, is precisely the same as it would have

been if the pension had been paid in 9 payments, although the amount of each payment is different. The addition which I made to the list is the cause of the difference in the annual amount of the whole.

As I told you before, I am not so certain about the list of nanpervish as about the other pensioners, as some were granted by order of Col. Kirkpatrick, of which I never had a return. The best method of proceeding would be to keep a certain latitude for them. I intend to include Shah Abbas in the 'Family fund,' as we settled when I saw you last.

I shall do as you desire respecting the Bengal troops when they march. In the mean time I write to Col. Stevenson this day respecting the conduct of the battalion at Chittledroog.

I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from Col. Sherbrooke respecting the conduct of the amildar at Chenapatam. In my opinion, the rule of proceeding between officers and amildars is, to take the most serious notice of the conduct of the former, when it appears to have been such as to deserve the complaint of the latter, and never to pass over any disrespect from the amildars to the officers. Upon that principle I removed the officer from Anantpoor, of whose conduct complaint was made.

It is a mistake to suppose that the amildars in the country are uniformly attentive to the officers, either passing with detachments or travelling. They are generally so, I allow; but I have had some serious and well-founded complaints of their behaviour, which I have not brought forward; and Purneah can let you know that I had some reason to complain of one of them in a case which went to the starving of the people who were with me in Soonda.

We well know the character of the natives of this country; when they are likely to be supported, they are the most tyrannical and impudent of men, and there is no falsehood which they will not tell in support of, or as an excuse for, their conduct. The unpleasant situation in which officers are who travel through the Tanjore country ought to be a warning to us here to avoid the error into which the gentlemen there have fallen, and to take the most serious notice of any attempt at disrespect made by people in authority. The case is just this: an officer of rank is travelling; he sends for the amildar to speak to him, who refuses to attend to him. Without entering into the other subjects of dispute, or other circumstances which ought to have gained for Col. Sherbrooke the greatest respect and attention, such as his having an hircarrah and a purwannah from Purneah, his acquaintance with the amildar, to whom, as commanding officer of Seringapatam, he had given a cownamah, there is enough in that statement to draw upon the amildar the displeasure of the government, if it is to proceed in these kind of disputes according to the only rule which, in my opinion, can ensure for the officers who are obliged to travel the conveniences which they have a right to expect, and for the amildars good treatment. I have no object upon this subject excepting tranquillity in future; and I therefore recommend that, whatever complaint may be made of the officer, the amildar, who has shown an inclination not to be quite so civil as he ought to be, may be removed to some situation not immediately on the high road to Madras.

I have received a letter from Col. Hart, in which he enclosed me an order which he has given to a battalion of sepoys to march to relieve the 1st of the 8th in Soonda. I had, in consequence, yesterday written to Capt. Macfarlane, to order him to begin his march towards Chittledroog as soon as he should be relieved. But, from what you say in your letter, I have this day written to him to desire that he will halt at Hullihall till he shall hear further from me; and I have directed him to endeavor to ascertain the truth of the intelligence which you have received. The 4th regt. of cavalry has already arrived at Bangalore, the 1st at Chittledroog, the 2nd at Sera; the 4th could be up with them before they could be ready to begin any operations. They ought, however, to be all together, and to be near the south Marhatta frontier, according to my former proposition.

In consequence of a letter from Col. Oliver, an extract of which I enclose, I wrote to government for an allowance for the destruction of tigers in the neighbourhood of Chittledroog, similar to that given in the Baramahl. I enclose you the copy of the answer. I have received orders to discharge the bullocks and departments, which I have completed.

Your man has been with me with a statement of the quantity of timber which he wanted. I diminished it to that which he thought would be sufficient to complete the buildings which you told me you intended to begin immediately. Even that, the stores could not at this moment supply. However, we shall have more very shortly. He has got the carts and bullocks to bring the earth for the wells, and, I believe, is going on.

I have established the zabeta for the shops in the fort, as fixed by Macleod. It is to be paid annually, and, when Symons comes, we can make an arrangement for its collection, and for that of the land-rent of the island after the present year. The shops in Ganjam are rent free till the 4th May, 1800, by agreement.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 16th Dec. 1799.

I enclose the copy of my letter to government upon the subject of the settlement of the accounts of the 'Family fund.'

To the Sec. of Gov., Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 16th Dec. 1799.

I have the honor to enclose you an account of certain sums which have been drawn for, and expended by me, in consequence of orders from the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore.

These expenses fall upon the fund provided by treaty for the support of the family of Tippoo Sultan, and are rather below the estimate given in to the Commissioners: those for the 'Ratib' particularly have fallen considerably, and will fall still lower: those for the tombs have increased nearly to the amount of the estimate: they were low at first, because the people who belonged to the tombs had fled, and those only who were present were paid; and latterly they have been higher, as the whole of the establishment have been present. The increase of 38 rupees per month for Janie u Deen and Surur u Deen will, I hope, be allowed.

It will be necessary that the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council should

decide upon the manner of settling the accounts of this 'Family fund' in future. There can be no doubt but that they ought to go through the hands of one person, otherwise the state of the fund, from which there are so many small drains, can never be ascertained. And as the disbursements fall neither upon the civil nor military fund, that one person ought to send his accounts to government, under the head of 'Accounts of the fund provided by Treaty for the family of the late Tippoo Sultan.' The person who naturally ought to be at the head of the fund, who ought to draw for what may be wanted from the Treasury, to make all payments from it, and to account for the whole of it, is Lieut. Col. Doveton. As long as any part of the family remains at Seringapatam, I can settle with him the accounts of disbursements which I may make, and receive the money from Lieut. Col. Doveton, or from the paymaster, for bills which Lieut. Col. Doveton might be enabled to draw upon the Treasury. In the same manner he ought to pay the amount of all the pensions from the fund. He might either send bills or remit money to Hyderabad and to Seringapatam, which, with Vellore, are the places at which the pensioners have chosen to receive the amount of their pensions. If the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council should approve of this plan, and will give the necessary orders to Lieut. Col. Doveton, I will make arrangements for the settlement of all the accounts of the pensioners and others without loss of time. The manner in which I propose to do it is as follows: I propose to obtain from Mr. Gordon an account of all sums which he has paid on account of the 'Family fund,' whether to pensioners or in consequence of orders from the Commissioners in Mysore, or from me. To have the amount debited upon his books to Lieut. Col. Doveton, who will pay Mr. Gordon by an order on the Treasury. He will likewise pay the Resident at Hyderabad the amount disbursed by him.

Lieut. Col. Doveton will then send up the accounts under the different heads of 'Pensions at Seringapatam;' 'at Vellore;' 'at Hyderabad;' 'Payments on account of the mahals and younger Princes,' and 'Tombs,' and extraordinary payments made in consequence of the orders of the Commissioners. The vouchers for the expenses up to the end of this year must be the bills of those who paid; and the receipts of those who received the money, and the whole will answer the debit at the Treasury against Lieut. Col. Doveton.

As it appeared to Lieut. Col. Close and to me that Shah Abbas, who is married to Tippoo's daughter, and who is pensioned in consequence thereof, ought to be upon the 'Family fund' instead of upon the Rajah, we have removed him to the former. His pension is 291 $\frac{3}{4}$ star pagodas *per annum*. I have likewise granted pensions upon the fund since I sent you the list, in consequence of former orders, dated 24th Aug., from the Governor General, as follows:—

Turbent Aly Khan's family	. . .	1400 rupees <i>per annum</i> .
Meer Kawder Aly	1400 ..

Upon examining a letter from Capt. Malcolm to Ibrahim Saheb, Tippoo's brother, I find that the pension, promised to him by order of the Commissioners, is 3400 star pagodas, instead of 3500 canterai. I therefore

propose to increase his pension 1750 rupees. The whole will make 5570 rupees more than appeared in the statement which I sent to you on the 29th of Nov.

No provision has yet been made for the payment of the expenses attending the mosques in the Fort, amounting, according to the estimate, to 2293 canterai pagodas *per annum*.

It does not appear that this expense falls properly upon the Rajah, or upon the fund provided for the family, and I shall, therefore, be glad to receive the orders of government respecting it.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 17th Dec. 1799.

I have received a letter from Col. Hart, dated the 14th inst., in which he informs me that he has ordered the 1st batt. 4th (Bombay) regt. into the Bednore country, where it is to be under my command, instead of the 2nd batt. 4th regt., which, on the 11th inst., he had ordered from the northern part of Canara into Soonda. This last is now to proceed to Goa.

Col. Hart informs me that you are appointed Major of the 1st of the 5th; and as I am very desirous that you should remain at Nuggur, I beg that you will order that battalion into the place, and send detachments of it to relieve the parties of the 1st of the 4th posted in Cowleydroog, Anantpoor, and Chandergooty.

You will be so kind as to deliver my orders to the commanding officer of the 1st of the 4th to march to Hullihall, in the province of Soonda, without delay. He is to move from Nuggur by Anantpoor, Shikarpoor, Anawooty, Jerrah, Budnaghur, Mundragoor, to Hullihall. In Soonda he will relieve the posts occupied by the 1st of the 8th (Madras) regt., according to orders which I have already given to Capt. Macfarlane, which will be communicated to him.

As it is very desirable that no time should be lost in moving the 1st of the 4th into Soonda, I beg that you will desire the commanding officer of that corps not to wait for its detachments, but to proceed with the body of the regiment, and leave them to follow him by the route above mentioned. The 1st of the 4th is to take its guns and artillery men attached with it.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 17th Dec. 1799.

I have received from government a copy of their letter to you of the 10th inst., and I lament that it did not arrive before I sent that, a copy of which went to you yesterday. By the letter from government to me, as well as that to you, it appears that they were not aware of the letter written to me by Col. Kirkpatrick on the 24th Aug., which I have considered as sufficient authority for granting the pensions asked for in my 2 letters of the 31st July and 19th Aug. I shall this day send to Webbe a copy of Col. Kirkpatrick's letter.

The 2nd of the 12th, and 1st of the 2nd, are to be in Seringapatam. The 1st of the 8th, and 2nd of the 9th, go to Hyderabad; the 1st of the 1st to Chittledroog. The 77th is ordered into Mysore from Malabar, and a battalion of sepoy from Canara country into Bednore. It shall go into

Soonda, where, with 2 battalions, we shall be very respectable. I have written (privately) to the Adj. Gen. to inform him that I should not move the 1st of the 8th, until I heard something more of the intelligence which you sent me the other day.

I have just heard from Sir W. Clarke that he has got one regiment of Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoys at Goa, which, being upon the back of the Kolapoore man, will make him cautious how he offends us.

I enclose you the copy of a letter received from Uthoff, by which you will perceive that we have but a small chance of establishing the tappall to Poonah.

To Lieut. Col. Harness.

Seringapatam, 18th Dec. 1799.

You must excuse me for not answering your letters regularly; but the truth is, that I have not time always to write to every body to whom answers are due, and I am obliged to begin by those which are most pressing. Capt. Aytone has my permission to go to Krotenguy for the time that you mention.

I am glad to find that your quarters are so good, but, as the 77th are ordered into this country, I do not imagine that you will occupy them for any length of time. I should have written to Col. Campbell to apprise him of this circumstance; but, as his state of health is so bad, and I know him to be affected by any circumstance which alters the situation of the regiment, I have thought it better to communicate it to you, and to leave it to you to apprise him of it, when you think you can do so without injury to himself. I cannot too strongly press upon you the necessity of advising him to go to the Carnatic. I should write to him again upon this subject, only that it might be considered a bore, and might do more harm than good.

I have written to the Military board about your tents, and I hope that I shall get the money for them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 19th Dec. 1799.

I enclose a paper which I have received from Bombay about the elephants which had formerly been in the possession of Seyd Saheb. Your works are going on. I have some more timber for your man, and I have sent him some trees, and shall have some more for him shortly.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 20th Dec. 1799.

I enclose you an extract of a letter received this day from government. Let me know in what manner I shall proceed with your house. It appears to me that the best way would be to order your servant to complete your offices according to your plan, and to repair the roof of the palace by means of the native maistries, and to order payment of his bill. If you approve of this, it shall be done. I will order the wardrobe for the women, and we can settle the mode of payment hereafter.

Col. Pater has informed me that he has received complaints from his regiment at Sera that they can get no grass there, and that the horse-keepers are obliged to go to a great distance for grass. It will probably be in the power of Purneah to apply a remedy to the first; but as to the

second, I see none, excepting to remove the regiment to a better station. I wish that government would reconsider my proposition to post the cavalry in one place on the bank of the Toombuddra, to put one battalion of Native infantry into Hurryhur, and 3 between Nuggur and Soonda. That frontier is not now secure from insult, and, in my opinion, will be insulted, should the Kolapoor man succeed against Goklah.

You mentioned some time ago that Purneah would bid for the gram contract when it was offered. In case you should not have observed that the Military board has advertised it in the newspaper, I mention it to you.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 21st Dec. 1799.

I have just been down at the Laal Baug, and I find that your works are going on well. Your man had begun a wall close to the watercourse, and if that should at any time hereafter let any water through, your wall would suffer and probably come down. I have therefore desired him to cut away half the thickness of the wall which he has begun, to leave about a foot distance between the watercourse and your wall, which may answer for a channel for the water which will ooze through, and to add to the other side of the wall the thickness which he takes from that on the side of the watercourse. The foundation of the whole proposed range of offices is laid, and the walls about 2 or 3 feet above the ground. It is unfortunate, for the sake of both Gordon and you, that he should have built his house in the garden, as it prevents either house from being private. What I should propose would be to wall off that part occupied by him, to have a common entrance where he now drives in his phaeton, which might be made in such a manner as that you would not interfere with one another. If you wish it, I will have this done before your return, and, as walls are not very handsome, I will cover those which must be near your house with a creeper.

I have received your letter of the 19th. I wrote to Webbe about the bridge, and sent the estimate. I have sent you some plaintain trees, and shall have others for you when the season for cutting arrives.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 22nd Dec. 1799.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst., from Mallavelly, by the hands of Mahomed Yaseen, formerly nanpervverish. By the letters from government it does not appear that I have any authority to grant any further pensions, and I therefore think that you had better give this man a sunnud. It seems that your letter upon this subject was written before you received the last intimation from government.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 24th Dec. 1799.

I have received your letter of the 20th inst. Mine of the 17th inst. will have acquainted you that I intend that you should remain at Nuggur with the 1st batt. 5th regt., to which corps I understand from Col. Hart you are appointed, and that the 1st batt. 4th regt. should march into Soonda. It will be necessary, therefore, that this last corps should be complete in camp equipage and in the means of carrying it, and you will supply whatever deficiencies there may be of either from the 1st of

the 5th. In case it should be convenient to you to detain at Nuggur the followers of the 1st of the 4th, and the commanding officer of that corps has no objection, I have none, to your sending with the 1st of the 4th the followers of the 1st of the 5th, provided there is no public inconvenience in changing them from one corps to the other.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 24th Dec. 1799.

I enclose you a letter from Capt. Munro, and I shall be obliged to you if you will return it to me.

A reference having been made to government by Capt. Graham nothing can be done in the business of which he complains till their decision arrives. I have not written to Capt. Munro, nor shall I. You will probably be near him, and will instruct him as you think best. I was at your house yesterday; you have many people employed, but your work does not advance. I understand that they do not work during many hours in the day, and I have therefore desired Mr. Piele to speak to your dubash upon the subject. I am afraid that, by their idleness, the work will be more expensive than we expected, and that they will bring us to disgrace.

I enclose you the copy of a letter from Capt. Mackay. I do not yet know how many bullocks are added to each karkhana in consequence of the arrangement which I made some time ago; but if any of the calves to which he alludes are of a size and age fit for work, it will be desirable to have them transferred to Capt. Mackay as soon as possible.

I intend to go to Mysore the day after to-morrow to see the Rajah.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 26th Dec. 1799.

I have spoken to Barclay respecting Seyd Saheb's camels; he still thinks that they were not bought, but he says that, even if they were, they are now dead, and there is an end of them. He also says that they might be set off against the elephants which Kawder Bodeem has got. I have lately recommended to government to dispose of all the camels; and it might be proper, instead of paying Seyd Saheb, to send him the number which we received from him: of this, however, you are the best judge.

There is to be a Native corps from the Bombay establishment at Hulli-hall in Soonda, another at Nuggur, and another European corps at Chittle-droog. It appears to me, that the best way of paying the first would be

G. O.

Camp at Seringapatam, 25th Dec. 1799.

Col. Gardiner, with the troops under his command, will march to-morrow morning according to instructions which he will receive.

It is essentially necessary that on the march through the Mysore country the greatest attention should be paid to the preservation of the property of the inhabitants. That for this purpose safeguards should be sent to the villages, and such other measures should be adopted as in Col. Gardiner's opinion will tend to this desirable end. The order published on the 31st Oct. last must be read to the Bengal sepoys at 3 different parades; and when safeguards are sent out, the rules laid down therein must be observed.

In case the assistance of the country is at any time wanted for the conveyance either of public or private baggage, it must be required from the amildars in moderation, must be paid for regularly, and the assistance received must not be carried further than is absolutely necessary.

for government to order the collector in Canara to make issues to the Bombay paymaster in Canara upon his receipt. Munro and the paymaster can then settle whether the advances shall be made in cash below the ghauts or by bills upon his amildars in Soonda. I have written to Hart upon this subject, and he thinks that this plan will answer.

The best method of paying the Bombay troops at Nuggur and at Chittledroog will be by means of our paymaster. He makes advances to the commanding officers of corps upon their receipts, and they settle their abstracts, accounts, &c., with the offices at Bombay. It will then be necessary to provide a sum at Nuggur, amounting to about 3000 pagodas per month, and another at Chittledroog, amounting to about 6000, in addition to what we receive there at present from Purneah's amildars. If you approve of all this, let me know it, and I will write to government upon the subject.

Munro has paid Macfarlane 3000 Behaudry pagodas, for which the latter has given his receipt. I have desired Mr. Gordon to send Munro a bill upon the Paymaster Gen. at Madras for that sum. Macfarlane's receipt will go back to him, as Mr. Gordon has got his abstracts with a receipt to them.

I have just received your letter of the 24th. You are the best judge what ought to be done with the amildar at Chenapatam. Col. Sherbrooke complains of him, and it appears by the man's own account that he had no reason to complain of the Colonel. As he had a gentleman with him who understands the language, there could be no doubt of his having refused to go to Col. Sherbrooke. This the amildar now denies; but I observe a probability that it is true even in the excuse which he makes: viz. that he had not received orders to advance and meet him. Col. Sherbrooke is not a man who requires all the extraordinary attentions described in your letter, nor, if he did, is it probable that any of the amildars would pay them; but it is proper that he and all the officers passing the road should receive civility, and therefore it is that I wish that this amildar may receive a check for his conduct, which will be an example to others. Of this we may be very certain, that the officers will not bear incivility, and therefore it is better for all parties that the Natives should understand at once that they are to be attentive to travellers. You must be as sensible of this as I am, and whatever you will do will be right.

I gave Butcha Rao a letter yesterday to send Capt. Deas, with 100 horsekeepers and 4 gram kettles, which he has procured. The Bengal volunteers have marched, and are to go to Madras, to be embarked there for Bengal. I enclose the copy of an order which I issued yesterday, and I hope that we shall have no complaints of them.

It would be very desirable to have an order given out, stating the number of coolies which an officer may call for from a village, the distance which he may be allowed to take them, and the amount which he is to pay to each. If you will speak to Purneah upon the subject, and let me know his opinion and yours, I will issue orders which will prevent complaints (if possible) in future.

We can make the payment on the beginning of January without the assistance of the lac of canterai pagodas which you gave to Mr. Gordon.

He, however, will require your assistance in January, as he did in this month, for the payments at Bangalore and Chittledroog, and Mr. Gordon will let you know to what extent. Let us know, as soon as possible, if Purneah should not be able to lodge money at these places, as, if he cannot, we must send it from hence.

After the capture of Seringapatam, and before the country was given over to the Rajah, some brass swamies, which were in the toskehkhana, were given to the brahmins of different pagodas by order of Macleod and the General. The prize agents require payment for them, and say that, if they are not paid for, the Committee will charge the value against them. This amounts to about 500 pagodas. Butcha Rao, to whom I have spoken upon the subject, says that, as they were given to the brahmins by order of the General, and before the country was given to the Rajah, it is not proper that he should pay for them. I have desired him to give the prize agents a receipt for the swamies, and, as it appears that they are to be paid for, you will be the best judge, whether by the Rajah, by the Company, or by the General

To Lieut. Col. Close.

✓Seringapatam, 28th Dec. 1799.

I was at your house the day before yesterday, and had a long conversation with your servant. I find that your works are going on, although slowly, yet that he has made such contracts as will prevent the delay from creating any very great expense. I shall go to Laal Baug whenever I have time.

I went yesterday to Mysore, and was happy to find the Rajah so much improved. It gave me great satisfaction also to see the progress which has been made in building the palace and the works of the old fort. These are strong proofs that the conveniences and prejudices of the family are not unattended to. I will not do any thing in regard to this nanpervish, till I hear further from you.

I have written to Campbell a long letter about the nerrick of exchange, in which I have endeavored to explain the principles of the whole system of shroffing, against the evils of which his regulations are to guard. From what I am going to mention to you, however, I am afraid that, if the nerrick at Bangalore is permanently fixed, I must loosen my system here, and must allow the exchange to fluctuate. In all the conversations which you and I have had upon this intricate subject, we have agreed that the shroffs derived a profit only by fluctuation. It is therefore clear that in Seringapatam there is no, or but little, profit; and that there would be no shroffs here if they did not find one elsewhere, or that they would combine to force me to allow the exchange to fluctuate. I have lately made inquiries upon the subject, and I find that the great shroffs here have houses at Bangalore, at Sera, and at the principal places on the Malabar coast, and they make their profit by the fluctuation at those places.

Seringapatam is a place of great security, where there is much trade, and, of course, exchange of money. In order to have this security, the shroffs forego the advantages which they would derive upon the fluctuation in the exchange, and they have all the advantages of the fluctuation at places at no great distance, where the exchange is not fixed. But fix

that exchange, and there is an end of their means of livelihood; and, of course, they must either abandon the trade entirely, or force me to allow a fluctuation in the place where they carry it on.

I doubt whether the destruction of our fixed nerrick at Seringapatam will not be an inconvenience to the country, as well as to us; and therefore nothing ought to be done which can endanger it. Let me know your opinion upon this subject. There is no reason, however, why Campbell should not now alter the nerrick, so as to make it more convenient to Purneah. One of the principles resulting from the position that the shroff's profit is made by fluctuation is, that, if the exchange is fixed, it is immaterial what proportions of gold, silver, and copper are exchanged for one another. The Company's exchange, therefore, is as convenient as any other, and as near the standard relative value of the 3 metals; and as the nerrick was to be fixed, and was readily adopted by the shroffs in Seringapatam, in the same manner, if the exchange is allowed to fluctuate from month to month in any place, provided the shroffs can know in one month what value relatively to each other the different coins in use will bear in the next, it is immaterial to them what that value is. By means of their correspondents and connexions in other places, they will be prepared for, and will gain by, it.

What I should recommend would be, that Campbell should fix a reasonable nerrick, and inform the shroffs that in 15 days that shall have effect; and then fix another, which he must likewise communicate to them, and inform them that that must have effect in the following month. Thus he will free himself from a part of the grievance felt, at the same time that his operations will not affect us here. I shall not relieve your cavalry for some time.

To Col. M'Kenzie.*

Seringapatam, 29th Dec. 1799.

I have for some time omitted to answer your last letter, although I have done what you desired. I have made many inquiries respecting the manner of assisting to forward the views of your relation, and have made application that he should be appointed to the situation which he is particularly desirous to obtain. I found, in the first place, that that situation was not vacant, nor was not likely to become so: in the next place, that, if it was vacant, it was one to which the first men in the medical profession in this country looked, among others, I believe, the head surgeon of the army, under whose directions Mr. M'Kenzie has served lately. Under these circumstances there has been no ground to hope that Mr. M'Kenzie would be appointed to it; but I hope that he will get some situation which will be agreeable to him. I shall be obliged to you if you will desire him to let me know when anything becomes vacant which he may wish to obtain.

I hope that you will not go home, but that you will wait here to serve upon the staff. Although you are my senior, I have no objection to serving in the same army with you. There are now two vacancies upon the staff in this country which would just suit us, and, as the climate of the Carnatic would probably agree with you, I should wish to see you

* The late Gen. M'Kenzie Fraser.

here. I know that that idle fellow Munro wants to get you back to the Highlands of Scotland, but you must not mind what he says, and must remain in India till the conclusion of the war. As I believe that you are as rich as you wish to be, I would advise you to go home, if I thought it probable that you would be employed upon the staff on the service which, we have every reason to believe, is going on in Holland; but that will be over before you can arrive in England, and can take your *Athol brose* in the Highlands preparatory to your departure for the Continent, and therefore it is better that you should remain here.

You will have heard of Sherbrooke's departure for Europe: he has never had a day's health in India, and he therefore does right to go home. Your friend Moneypenny is here, and well. Remember me to all in the 78th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 30th Dec. 1799.

I enclose a letter which arrived yesterday for you, from the Rajah of Koorg, and one which came with it for me. I shall write a civil answer, and not enter into any one of the topics which he has started.

I sent you a letter yesterday from Uthoff, which I opened, as it was directed to you or to me. I now enclose the order omitted in a former letter. The Bengal troops have marched, and I have heard no complaints. I do not send after them your routes, as I hope they will be nearly out of the country before they can receive them. When you send me the papers, which you say is in your contemplation, I will consider them, and shall issue orders to the troops accordingly. I was at your house yesterday, which is getting on tolerably, but not very quickly.

P.S. I have written to Munro, to desire that he will give Macfarlane 3000 Behaudry pagodas in January.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 1st Jan. 1800.

I have this day received a letter from Capt. Malcolm, in which he states that, on account of the anxiety of the Nizam and Aristo Jah respecting the howdahs, which they had learnt had been purchased for them, you were desirous that they should be sent from hence as soon as possible. Until the army quitted the field, it was impossible to deprive the troops of the use of the elephants; and since my arrival at this place it has been necessary to have the howdahs cleaned, and in some degree repaired. This has been done; I have seen them upon the elephants this morning, and they set out for Fort St. George to-morrow; from whence I imagine that Lord Clive will give orders that they may be sent to Hyderabad.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 3rd Jan. 1800.

I have received a letter from Lambton, in which he informs me that he has had a conversation with Mr. Webbe, who told him that his plan for the survey of the Company's territories, and those of the Rajah, had the full concurrence of government; and that he had been referred to you for the establishment which he will find necessary to enable him to put his plan in execution. He tells me that he shall want some people for the carriage of his instruments, a draftsman, and a writer, and a young

man from the observatory, who will assist him in his calculations, if there should be one capable of so doing. As the tent which he will want is an observatory, and as he cannot procure such a one from the stores, he is desirous of being put on tent allowance. All this appears reasonable. Webbe desired Lambton to send for the instruments, which he was desirous of having from Bengal; so that nothing remains to be done but to arrange the little matters above mentioned, and to set him to work.

I have this day received a letter from Webbe, in which he says that, from considerations of expense, they are inclined to decline for the present to adopt any plan for building a bridge at Seringapatam. He has, however, written upon the subject to Bengal, where I observe that their ideas are not quite so economical, I believe, because they do not feel so sensibly the pressure for money.

I enclose an extract of Webbe's letter upon the subject of pensioners, and copy of an endorsement at the back of my letter of the 16th Dec. (a copy of which I before sent you). I understand this to be the arrangement proposed by government, and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether I have formed a correct notion.

The family here, and the pensions upon the 'Family fund,' are to be paid by the paymaster of the stipends at Vellore, *i.e.* Lieut. Col. Doveton; the mosques and tombs by the Paymaster at Seringapatam, chargeable to the Company; the pensioners residing at Seringapatam and at Mangalore (not upon the 'Family fund') to be paid by you, and are chargeable to the Rajah; the pensioners residing in the Carnatic and Baramahl to be paid by the Company's paymasters, and (I suppose) chargeable to the Company; Trimul Rao at Madras, chargeable to the Rajah.

In conformity to Webbe's desire, stated in the endorsement, I propose to send him a list of all the pensions which I have granted since the receipt of Col. Kirkpatrick's letter of the 24th Aug., divided into the different classes. These will be confirmed, and then the matter will be smooth. I likewise propose to transmit to Doveton the account of payments to the family here made by me. I will, however, send neither of these papers until I hear from you in answer to this letter. Webbe tells me that an order upon the subject of prize affairs is arrived from Bengal, and will be published here in a few days: he also says that an arrangement is made for Tanjore, by which the whole country is permanently annexed to the British Empire. He says that it will be carried into execution in a few days.

I enclose you a curious packet of papers which I have received from Cummer u Deen. I shall send him a civil answer this day, and inform him that you are gone to the frontier, where you will settle every thing with him.

The walls of your offices are raised to within about 4 feet of the height which it is intended they should be: it will take, however, 10 or 12 days to build them up, as the people cannot build more than about a foot and a half in a day, which must be allowed to dry and settle for 3 or 4 days before more can be added to it. In the mean time the doors and door-cases are nearly ready, as is the roof: so that I have hopes that the offices will be finished by the end of the month.

I have received a letter from Campbell, in which he says that you and Purneah settled the exchange at Bangalore. I conclude that he showed you my letter. If you are of the same opinion with me upon the subject of fixing permanently the nerrick of exchange in the principal places about Seringapatam,—and if, in consequence of leaving it subject to variation, the Rajah should suffer in his revenues,—would it not be possible and proper to make the people pay the carcar according to the exchange fixed at Seringapatam? This, it must be allowed, is as nearly according to the value of the different coins as it can be made.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 3rd Jan., 1800.

I have received your letters, in which you inform me of the arrival of the 1st of the 5th, and of the march of the 1st of the 4th without camp equipage. As there are no quarters or cover whatever for the troops at Hullihall, I am afraid that this corps will suffer for want of tents, however bad and unserviceable they may be; and I, therefore, think that you will do well to send them after them. If you want carriage, I will send you some from hence. The best thing to do will be to communicate with Lieut. Col. McDonald upon this subject, who, doubtless, will soon feel the want of his tents.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 7th Jan. 1800.

I, some time ago, addressed government upon the subject of certain wounded inhabitants of Seringapatam, and sepoys in the service of the late Tippoo Sultaun, who had received medical assistance, and had been fed since the fall of the place by order of the Commander in Chief. Some of them still remained in the hospital, and others were disabled by their wounds in such a manner as to render it very improbable that they would again be able to gain their own livelihood. Government, conceiving, as it appears, that these Natives were in the Company's service, desired that I would order an invaliding committee to assemble and examine and consider their cases; and that I should transmit their proceedings to the Commander in Chief. Having done so, it appears by the enclosed letter that government now intend that these invalids should be pensioned, and that the burthen should fall upon the Rajah. There are some of these invalids still in the hospital, and they, as well as others who do not require medical assistance, but who are entirely disabled by their wounds, receive three quarters of a seer of rice and one pice per day: I propose to keep them upon this allowance, until you can make a proper arrangement for them in concert with Purneah. I shall, to-morrow, transmit you a list of the names of those who will receive this allowance, and a copy of the proceedings of the invaliding Committee who considered their cases.

I enclose you copies of 2 letters from Capt. Macfarlane. If Goklah falls a prey to this Dhoondiah, I think it probable that the peace either of the Rajah's, or of the Company's territories, will be disturbed.

P.S. The 74th regt. are ordered to Trichinopoly, and the 77th are coming from Cannanore, on their way to Chittledroog, where it does not appear that there are any accommodations for them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 9th Jan. 1800.

I received your letter of the 6th last night. I perceive that your ideas and mine agree respecting the pensions, excepting in the case of those not upon the 'Family fund' residing in the Company's and the Nabob's territories. Your idea, where we differ, appears most correct. I have this day sent to Webbe the statement for which he wishes, and of which I enclose you a copy. It includes your friend at Mallavelly as a nanperverish. Tomorrow I shall transmit to Col. Doveton an account of the sums drawn by me from the 'Family fund;' and then I hope that I shall have done with this business.

I have ordered the detachment from Cankanelli, in compliance with Purneah's wishes. I enclose the copy of a letter from Capt. Munro. I have ordered him to remain where he is, or to take up such other position as will enable him to fulfil the original object of forming his detachment, as well as to protect the country from the depredations of the Soonahgul man.

As it is probable that Cummer u Deen will not now attack Punganoor, the two objects may not be incompatible. I am obliged to delay till tomorrow to send you the papers respecting the wounded inhabitants.

You will before now have received all the news. The French fleet have escaped and gone into Brest.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 10th Jan. 1800.

I enclose 2 letters from Capt. Munro; I have, in answer, warned him against committing himself with Cummer u Deen, against pursuing the Soonahgul man into the Nizam's territories, or suffering Cummer u Deen to come into the Rajah's. I have recommended civil, *unmeaning* communication, if even any should be desirable.

I have arranged for the wounded inhabitants and sepoys as follows; and I will keep my letter open to the last moment to send you lists of them. If you do not get them this day, you shall to-morrow. They have hitherto received three quarters of a seer of rice and 3 pice, or 30 cash, per day: the expense to the Company, about one fanam each. As they would be much better enabled to live by getting the fanam than by getting the rice and the pice, I have determined to give it to them.

They were nearly all examined by an invaliding Committee; from those which this rejected I have withdrawn the allowance, and have extended it to a few who are in the general hospital, who were so sick as to be unable to attend the invaliding Committee, and whose names do not therefore appear on its proceedings. The whole number is under 90, so that the expense will amount to about 2 pagodas per day.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 12th Jan. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 8th inst. Since I wrote to you upon the subject of tents for the 1st of the 4th, I have received the directions of the Military board to order a barrack to be built in Soonda for one battalion of infantry. I have given orders accordingly to the officer commanding in Soonda, and it is probable that he will not now want his tents.

I received much satisfaction from your reports of the state of the stores in Nuggur, and the other parts in the province of Bednore. I have transmitted them to the Military board at Fort St. George, and have communicated to them and to the Governor my sense of the diligence and attention with which you have made the surveys and reports. I have likewise recommended that a deputy commissary or a conductor might be appointed to assist you in the arrangement and distribution of the stores. As it is more than probable that government will appoint such a one, and a suitable establishment of artificers and lascars for the arsenal at Nuggur and in Bednore, it will be as well to delay the proposed repairs of the field pieces attached to the 1st of the 5th until the appointment is made, and the person appointed joins you. He will then communicate to you the forms of surveys, reports, estimates, &c. &c., required under the government of Fort St. George previous to the making of any repairs.

When the establishment for the garrison of Nuggur is fixed, you will be able to see whether it is possible to employ the man you mention as he wishes. I shall be glad to hear that an arrangement suitable to him can be made.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 13th Jan. 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Capt. Macfarlane. I have recommended to government that the 1st of the 8th may be left in Soonda till the event of the impending contest is known. I likewise enclose some papers received from Cummer u Deen.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 17th Jan. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 13th. Long ere this, you will have received the account of the wounded inhabitants and sepoys, and will have perceived that the temporary provision which I have arranged for them is not extravagant.

I saw a letter from Mr. Bowles some time ago, and I desired Capt. Barclay to inform him, that as I concluded he had reported himself to head quarters, he would do well to apply there for leave for himself, and for orders for his detachments to march, which, under the existing circumstances, I could not give him.

Your business at the Laal Baug is going on well. In a few days the cook room and the remainder of that side of the building will be covered in, and I expect that the whole will be finished by the end of the month. I have had a conversation with Butcha Rao about the roof of the palace, which will be begun in a few days: your doors, painting, &c., are going on well.

If possible to obtain it, Mr. Gordon will want, as soon as he can get it, about 17,000 rupees at Nuggur: I think you told me, in a former letter, that Purneah could give that sum there monthly. There has been some difficulty between Munro and Mr. Gordon respecting the payment of the Behadry pagodas, which the former advanced to Capt. Macfarlane.

Mr. Gordon sent him a bill for star pagodas upon the Paymaster Gen., calculating the exchange as ordered here by the General, and which is in fact the Company's exchange. Munro says that he cannot take it, as it is

not the exchange settled in Canara, which is 10 *per cent.* I have recommended that they should settle the matter, or rather that they should shove it off their shoulders on those of the Revenue board, and of Ben Roebuck, by Mr. Gordon giving Munro an order upon the Paymaster Gen. for the amount in Behaudry pagodas instead of in stars: I rather believe that this expedient will be adopted.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 23rd Jan. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 20th, and I have, in consequence, ordered to Nundydroog the 2 companies of the 5th regt., now at Bangalore, a troop of cavalry, 2 field pieces and artillerymen attached. I hope that they will be at Nundydroog on the 25th.

I have desired Major Cuppage to station Capt. Irton in Gonnair Polliam, and have left it to his discretion to weaken Capt. Munro to such extent as he might find necessary: under all the existing circumstances, however, I think it desirable that he should be strong. I have ordered Major Cuppage to draw in the post from Deonelly, and Lieut. Col. Tolfrey to relieve from Mudgherry that at Chinroydroog. If, however, it is clear that the post at the latter place will not be wanted, it will be best that it should be called to Nundydroog without waiting for the relief. Of this, being on the spot, you will be the best judge, and will make Major Cuppage acquainted with your wishes. When the whole force shall have arrived at Nundydroog, it will be a respectable reinforcement. If it wants an increase, we must add cavalry to it from Bangalore, until I can send more infantry from hence.

As 2 companies, and some cavalry, and 2 guns, will be at Nundydroog on the 25th, and you will probably find that sufficient for your purpose, I have not disturbed the post at Mudgherry; but I have written to Col. Tolfrey to desire that he will order the officer there to be in readiness to move at a short notice, if you should find it necessary to call for him.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 24th Jan, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 21st, with a duplicate of that of the 20th, and I am glad to find that the arrangements, which I communicated to you in my letter of yesterday, will meet your wishes. I have given Major Cuppage full power over the detachments, which are from Nundydroog, so that all will, I trust, go on well. I shall leave it to him either to detain or to send back the troop of the 4th regt. ordered from Bangalore. I have this day sent a supply of musket ammunition.

When you shall have settled matters with the Nizam's vakeel, there will be no longer any difficulties with the polygars on the frontier. Mr. Gordon will take the money at Nuggur, at the Seringapatam exchange.

The cook room and godown at the Laal Baug are covered in, and the remainder of the building is ready for the roof, which will be on, I hope, by the end of the month. Things are going on well inside of the palace; but I do not like the painting of the outer room above stairs. It wants ornament sadly, and looks very bare and unfinished, in comparison with the other highly ornamented apartments. Nothing has yet been done to

the roofs; but I had another conversation with Butcha Rao about it yesterday, and pressed him to commence upon it.

We have had much trouble in procuring dooley boys to send away the 74th regt. There are numbers of them in this country, as I am informed: but Purneah's people, instead of providing them, have sent to the 74th about half the number of coolies; and even of those that were sent from hence one half have deserted, and the remainder refuse to carry the doolies. The inconvenience of all this is, that the corps is delayed. If Purneah's people had said at first, either that they could not get people of the proper kind, or that they would not answer for them, I could have sent off some of our own dooley bearers who are here, and who were to have been employed in emptying our hospitals at Chittledroog, Sera, and Seringapatam. These dooley bearers must now be sent to the 74th; and the hospitals must remain full. It is very desirable that Purneah's people should give us all the assistance which the country can afford, and that they should not deceive us respecting the nature of it. I am afraid that it will be imagined at head quarters, either that I have not used all the exertion in my power, or that I am not inclined to move the 74th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 25th Jan. 1800.

I have received sad complaints from Col. Campbell about his dooley bearers, but I have applied a remedy by sending those belonging to the army, which I had intended should be used to carry the convalescents and wounded from our different hospitals. It was unfortunate that they deceived me by assurances that the country bearers would not disappoint us; as otherwise I should have had the 74th in march about 10 days ago. I have long objected to sending a regiment to Chittledroog, because there is no accommodation for them, and the station has been found very unhealthy; and I am afraid that the delay of the march of the 74th will be attributed to my wish to detain them at Bangalore, instead of to its real cause. This makes me feel the disappointment more than I should otherwise.

I enclose some papers which I have received from Capt. Mackay, and I shall be obliged to you if you will request Purneah to send orders to the amildars to assist our bullocks as much as they can. Mackay has sent a man to look at a feeding ground between this place and Periapatam, which, he understands, will answer for all the bullocks for some time. If it should be found to answer, he will remove them thither. I have lately written to government about them, and have recommended that they may be kept as an establishment; and that the cows, by which the breed is to be kept up, may be left in the hands of the Rajah's people.

I believe I informed you, some time ago, that while I was absent with the army, Col. Sherbrooke had altered the nerrick of artificers, and of all kinds of materials for building, at the instigation of Capt. Norris. My attention has lately been drawn to this subject by intelligence which I have received, that the government intend to put the troops in this country on half batta, and to give the officers the usual lodging money. As then they will have to build their own houses and quarters, the expense of building becomes an object; and, in the examination of the subject, a

system of engineering has come out, well worthy of the example set at Madras. I have not yet been able to remedy the mischief done in my absence, as we have the advantage here of the assistance of some Madras dubashes and maistries; but I have sent notice to these gentlemen that, if they do not settle the matter to my satisfaction in the course of a few days, I shall send away all the Madras people who are now in this place. With this, and a remedy for thieving, which, since the camp thieves have joined the old gangs upon the island, has increased to an immoderate degree, I have been much taken up lately; but I hope that I have made some progress in applying the cure. I conclude that you will be here in the middle of next month.

P.S. Butcha Rao has just been with me, and I find that some steps have been taken to collect materials for the roof of your house. I hope that considerable progress will be made in the repair of it before you return.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 26th Jan. 1800.

I enclose a letter from Capt. Mackay. I approve of his plan for collecting the bullocks in one place, and keeping them under his own eye.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 29th Jan. 1800.

I have lately received a letter from Capt. Macfarlane, in which he says that Dhoondiah and Kutraha Pundit had received directions from the Kolapoor Rajah to draw nearer to Kolapoor. This is attributed to his fears of the force coming from Poonah: Goklah had not moved from Savanore, but was preparing to do so.

A letter has been received by Col. Campbell, from head quarters, which proves that I was not mistaken in my conjectures respecting the opinion which would be entertained in consequence of the delay of the march of the 74th regt. I am glad to find that we are able to keep down the polygars so easily. Residence, with Purneah, is an essential article in any agreement that may be made with them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 31st Jan. 1800.

I am obliged to you for the account of your proceedings with the Hyderabad vakeel contained in your letter of the 28th inst., which I received this morning: I see plainly that we must still keep ourselves strong on that frontier; and accordingly I have made my arrangements for strengthening Major Cuppage, to such a degree, as to enable him to detach to the posts which it appears to be necessary to occupy to keep a sufficient garrison in Nundydroog, and to have a force ready to send out in pursuit of the robbers who are likely to disturb the country; but to do this, I am obliged to withdraw the troops from Severndroog, and to leave nothing there excepting a small guard. This I conceive to be of little importance at the present moment, and it will enable me to put under the command of Major Cuppage nearly 14 companies of Native infantry. These will be distributed as follows: 2 in Gonnair, 1 in Gorrybunda, 1 in Busla Gunta, 3 with Capt. Munro, 7 in Nundydroog. This, with one troop of cavalry, and 2 field pieces, besides what Capt. Munro has, will

be sufficient to answer all calls which may be made either for reinforcements or new detachments. It will be desirable to keep Capt. Irton at Nundydroog, in order to send him out in command of any detachments which it may be necessary to make from that garrison.

I hope that the 74th regt. has marched, and I am not very anxious about the immediate removal of the convalescents from the hospitals. I will not therefore take the workmen, who, I see, are so well employed at Mysore; and I will wait with patience until proper bearers can be supplied from the country.

Mackay's letter will have pointed out the place to which he wishes that the bullocks should be taken. I have completely succeeded against the artificers, and have made some progress against the thieves: at least, thieving is stopped here for the present. I have not received orders to carry into execution the plan for the court of justice. I have altered the ornaments of your room, and wait till it is finished to see whether any more extensive ornaments will be necessary: I will then assemble there the Committee which you propose.

To Lieut. Col. Harness.

Seringapatam, 2nd Feb. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 31st Jan., which has given great satisfaction. It rarely happens (particularly in this country) that it is in the power of an officer in command to please those who are under his orders; and when he is so fortunate, it is to be attributed as much to their good disposition as to any efforts he may have made for that purpose. I regret exceedingly, on public as well as private grounds, that the 74th regt. is removed from Bangalore; but you must have been long enough in this country to perceive that the public interest and convenience are not upon all occasions the cause of the public measures.

I do not think that your corps will be drafted, at least not for some time, although I have seen the resolutions of thanks from the Court of Directors, and their songs of triumph, the burthen of all of which is the prospect of permanent peace in India, and of course the consequent diminution of the military establishments and expenses. I think you are right in going to England, even if the 74th should remain here.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 3rd Feb. 1800.

I have no concern whatever about the dooley boys, excepting that the want of them created a delay in the march of a corps, and I feared that that delay would be attributed to a desire to detain them in this country. Government have placed great confidence in me; and I should be sorry to have any thing happen which might have the appearance of a job, as that would, in one moment, destroy the whole edifice.

I am afraid that it will be impossible to have the 77th removed to Bangalore, although I think that Chittledroog is at present an improper place for them. My sentiments upon this subject, and the grounds upon which I have formed them, are known at Madras.

Mackay will take the bullocks to the places which I mentioned to you;

G. O.

Camp at Seringapatam, 1st Feb. 1800.

Col. Wellesley was much pleased with the appearance and performance of the 33rd regt. this morning.

and it is certainly very desirable that a person from Purneah should reside with him. I have strongly recommended that the bullocks should be retained as an establishment in the Company's service; and have represented that to give them gram would be beneficial to them, and not add materially to the expense. It does add about 20 pagodas per month to the expense of each karkhana (of which there are 35), supposing the gram to be at 42 seers for a rupee; but it is now at 52 in this neighbourhood, and at 45 in the bazaar at Seringapatam. Every diminution of the expense which can be made will be an additional motive for keeping the bullocks, and therefore I am desirous of not making a bargain to take gram at the price contracted for the cavalry, as the contract may be monopolized as it has been hitherto; but I should prefer that Purneah should give it us as he has hitherto, at the rate of the country in which the bullocks may be. There is, however, no occasion for hurrying a decision upon this subject; and it will be as well to defer the further consideration of it until we meet. The same reason which induces me to wish to keep down the expense of gram for the bullocks, induces me to try to get the straw for them for nothing. It appears that in the distant countries there is no demand and no sale for it, and it therefore cannot be stated to be a grievance upon the people to take from them that which they cannot use, cannot dispose of, and must burn. It is but for a short time in the year, as I understand, that the bullocks want straw; and at that time I should propose that they should be sent to a particular place at a distance from any great town, cantonment, or garrison, where a certain proportion of the whole quantity of the straw produced might be collected for them in each village. This they might get for nothing.

Mackay tells me that Purneah has made an arrangement, nearly similar to the above, for the bullocks in the neighbourhood of the grazing ground in which they are now. He has in his hands the order for what is called the cirar's share of the straw, which in general rots. I approve highly of any arrangement which can be made which will give the people a fair price for their straw; and it is to be observed that the lower it is bought the better it is for them, provided it is sufficient to pay for the trouble of taking care of it, and to compensate them for it. As the straw is to be paid for, I agree with you that the whole of it must be forthcoming when wanted. The straw for the bullocks stands upon a different footing; and of this it is but fair that the ryots should have as much as they can use. Indeed, it is taken from them for nothing, only on the principle that they cannot make use of it.

I wish you joy of the conclusion of your negotiations with the Nizam's vakeel.

I shall send on Wednesday 20 elephants and 100 draught bullocks for Lady Clive's use. She leaves Madras in the first week in March, and I propose to go to the frontier to meet her. She will do well, in my opinion, to stop at Bangalore till the month of June, as April and May are very hot here. I have desired Grant to ask her to Dowlut Baug, the zenana of which, when a little improved, will accommodate her and her family admirably. Neither of the palaces would answer for a woman at all, as they are so much exposed.

I have already improved your room much, and I wait to see the effect of what has been done, when I propose to go there with Mr. Gordon; and if it wants further ornament, it shall have it.

I enclose a letter from Macfarlane. A fellow came here this day and informed me that he had come from the Marhatta country, as far as Toomkoor, with a gang employed by Dhoondiah to carry me off when I should go out hunting. He says that Dhoondiah proposes to collect a large gang in this neighbourhood, and to join them himself. In order to prove to him how little I fear his gang, I go out hunting to-morrow: but I have desired my friend to join his gang again; and I have promised him a reward, if he will enable me to lay hands upon them in this neighbourhood.

I have a letter from Stevenson, who, having employed some of Oliver's hirecarrahs, has got accounts that Scindiah had joined the Kolapoor man; that Nana had sent 50,000 horse from Poonah to join Appah Sahib; that Aristo Jah was discharging all the Nizam's horse, and sending them to Dhoondiah; that he was in secret communication with Scindiah; and that Scindiah had sent 10,000 *northern beggars* to Beeder to escort him from thence into the Marhatta country; that he had shut up the gates of Hyderabad, &c. &c., all about a cock and a bull!

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 4th Feb. 1800.

My friend was with Barclay again this morning, and repeated his story and assurances of its truth. He added, what he only hinted at yesterday, that the gang have some designs upon Mysore; and, upon the whole, it appears more like a plundering party than any thing else. As nothing could be more unpleasant than any accident to the family at Mysore, I have apprised the officer in command there of the intelligence which I have received, and have put him on his guard; but I have desired him to be cautious to do nothing which can in the smallest degree alarm the family. I was out hunting this morning, and West* thinks that he saw some people, about 20, on horseback. I acknowledge that I saw nothing of them. But if they were there, and my friend keeps true to us, I shall have them this night.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 5th Feb. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 2nd inst. Since I wrote to you yesterday I have heard from Capt. Stewart, who informs me that there had been for some days a bazaar report at Mysore that there was a vagabond party of cavalry belonging to Dhoondiah in the country; but he had given no credit, nor paid any attention, to it. He promises to take all the precautions which I pointed out to him.

My opinion is this: the man who gave me the information very probably heard the bazaar report, and thought that by adding my name, and informing me that my safety was in question, he should get a reward. But I conceive that the bazaar report does not add to, indeed I rather think it takes from, the degree of credit which might be given to the story. If it be true that there has been this bazaar report for several days,

* Capt. West, 33rd regt, aide de camp to Col. Wellesley.

it cannot be true that this man came with the party from Savanore, that he left them at Toomkoor, and that he arrived here only 2 days ago. Upon the whole, therefore, I think that the business has originated in a bazaar report, for which it is probable there is no foundation, as it does not appear that the country in this neighbourhood has been at all disturbed, which it would have been if such a banditti had come into it; or that the Rajah's people have received any information of their arrival, which it is certain would have been given to them. However, the man who gave the information is now out, and I am prepared for any that he may bring.

I have still some trouble with brickmakers; and in order to bring matters to rights I am afraid that I must give a monopoly: I have threatened it this day, from which I hope the best consequences. They have come down from 10 rupees a thousand to 6: I want to bring them to 5, which will answer.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 7th Feb. 1800.

Since you did me the honor to write to me on the 15th Jan., I have made inquiries from Mr. Cherry, late paymaster of the army, respecting the lac of rupees for which you state that I have credit in the public accounts of your Residency. It appears, by the enclosed extract of a letter from Mr. Cherry, that the credit ought to be carried to the account of the Paymaster general.

I return you many thanks for the garden seeds which you have sent me. I have heard of the arrival at Madras of the elephants and howdahs, which were seen by the Nabob, Lord and Lady Clive, &c. &c., and much admired. They were likely to leave Madras for Hyderabad in the beginning of this month, in charge of Capt. Hall. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know when you receive them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 8th Feb. 1800.

My friend came in this morning, and gave me information that a party of the people, about whom he had spoken to me before, was at Coorghelly, about 3 coss beyond Nunjuncode, and other parties in different villages and in the jungles between the two. That 4 sirdars (two of whose names are Imaun Khan and Kawder Saheb, the latter of whom had been a russildar, under the orders of Khan Jehan Khan) were, with their followers, their baggage, and, he believes, the treasure, at Nunjuncode, in a large house in the fort, inhabited by a musselmann, whose brother is one of the party. That this musselmann owner of the house is the man who formerly, when Dhoondiah was a prisoner, had charge of him, and paid him his allowance. That besides these parties there is one at a village about a coss from Mysore, called Ennechully, of 5 Marhattas; and there are 4 musselmann upon the island of Seringapatam, near the Chendgall ford. It is supposed that there are other parties in different villages, as by this man's story it appears that there is a tappall to these sirdars from hence.

I have made the following arrangements, and if there is any truth in the story I hope to have the sirdars in the morning. Capt. Robertson

rides over to Mysore this evening, and at about 12 this night will start from thence with 50 men; and in order that he may be able to surround the house completely, he will take with him from Mysore some officers who went there this morning on a party of pleasure. He takes with him the man who has given the information, and he will reach Nimpuncode before day, and will seize the sirdars. He then sends back a party to Enneclally, who it is hoped will catch the Marhattas, but as they have no regular place of abode, and nobody knows them, excepting the man who has given the information, and who is to return with this party, I do not expect that they will be taken. There is a thief here who knows the 4 muselmenn on the island, and is acquainted with their place of abode. I shall send a party towards morning to seize them. I think it probable that, if we get the sirdars, the people at Coorghelly and in the jungles will disperse and be off—in all events we could not expect to catch them, and therefore I do not send after them. My plan is to give orders that all the principal men may be kept separate. I shall have them examined separately, and send to government copies of their examinations, and the story of the man who first gave the information. The proper thing to do with them would be to punish them, but it is to be observed that we have no evidence of their evil intentions, excepting the story of one man, and that, as yet, they have not done any thing to disturb the peace of the country. It may be thought better to wait till they do something, which can give ground for punishing them on the spot—but to this I answer that it is difficult to obtain a knowledge of their motions, and that it is probable they would find out that I had heard of them, and would quit the country; and that they would certainly do so, or would conceal themselves so as not to be found out, if they should ever commit an outrage which would deserve punishment. Besides, if there is any truth in the story, I rely a good deal upon the contradictory accounts of themselves, which they will give when examined separately, to elucidate and confirm it; and it is not improbable but that the hopes of pardon may get for us another evidence. Upon the whole I have thought it best to endeavor to seize them immediately. The man is still positive and consistent, which is very extraordinary.

P.S. I relieve the party at Mysore early in the morning, so that we shall have in that quarter to-morrow a respectable force.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seerangapatam, 9th Feb. 1800.

We were successful last night in taking the people on the island, and those at Nimpuncode, and, by Capt. Robertson's account, I hope that he will have taken the Marhattas this morning. I expect the sirdars to-morrow, and after I shall have had them examined, I shall be able to form a more decided opinion respecting the business. I have formed

G. O.

Seerangapatam 9th Feb. 1800.

In consequence of Mr. Fleming's request, he has permission to proceed to the Carnatic, and Mr. Trevor is to take charge of the sick still remaining here.

Col. Wellesley cannot suffer Mr. Fleming to depart without expressing his sense of his unremitting attention to, and his humane and judicious treatment of, the numerous sick and wounded belonging to the armies which he has had under his charge, and Mr. Fleming may depend upon his stating it to government.

none from the examination of the persons taken upon the island last night

I am much at a loss to know how to form the detachment for Wynaad. We can spare nothing from Seringapatam, excepting the 2 flank companies of each of the European, and 2 of each of the Native corps. I have ordered a battalion, the 2nd of the 3rd, from Chittledroog, the 1st of the 12th from Paughur, leaving 2 companies to take care of that post and its dependencies, and 5 troops of the 2nd regt. of cavalry from Sera. We have here about 500 pioneers, and they shall accompany the detachment. I reckon that the whole will be ready to start from Seringapatam in the second week in March. I doubt whether that will be sufficiently early to enable us to conclude matters before the setting in of the monsoon; but it will be impossible to get the battalion from Chittledroog sooner than the end of the first week in that month, and even Tolfrey's battalion will not be here above one or two days before it. It is very desirable that Purneah should write to the amildars at Chittledroog and at Paughur, to desire that they will assist in procuring bullocks for the carriage of the tents of the 2 corps.

I reckon the detachment will be strong, as follows.

1 companies of Europeans	.	.	.	250	
4 flank companies of Sepoys	.	.	.		100
2nd of the 3rd.	800
1st of the 12th	500
Pioneers	500
5 troops 2nd regt. of cavalry	250
				<hr/>	
				250	2450

This will be sufficient, with guns and artillerymen, to eat the Pyche Rajah! I intend to proceed with the detachment myself. In the mean time every thing shall be prepared here for the arrival of the troops.

I shall answer your official letter to-morrow. Since writing the above, I have made arrangements for the carriage of the tents of the corps, and I hope that they will all be here in the first week in March. Tolfrey's, I am afraid, will be last.

To Major Disney

Seringapatam, 10th Feb. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 5th ult. enclosing an extract from the General orders at Bombay.

You will of course obey those or any orders you may hereafter receive from that government respecting your establishments, as I have no authority by which to order your doing otherwise; and as your accounts must finally be passed by the Auditor general of Bombay, he will be guided only by the regulations of that government.

I approve of your having permitted officers to join the corps to which they stand appointed by the late regulations under the Bombay Presidency, as they are relieved by others appointed to the corps under your command.

To the Resident in Mysore.

Seringapatam, 10th Feb. 1800.

I yesterday received your letter of the 6th, in which you inform me

that it is resolved to assemble such a force in Mysore and in Malabar as shall awe or eventually reduce the Pyche Rajah.

I accordingly issued orders for the assembly of a detachment at Seringapatam, which will consist of 5 troops of cavalry, 1 battalion and 8 companies of Native infantry, 4 flank companies of Europeans, 4 of Natives, 500 pioneers, 6 field pieces, with artillerymen and gun lascars attached. This detachment, of which I intend to take the command, will be ready, I hope, to move from Seringapatam by the 7th or 8th March.

I have written to the officer commanding in Malabar, and have informed him of the strength of the detachment which will move from hence, and of the period at which it will be prepared, and have suggested to him the necessity of employing the Bombay pioneers in that which will march from Malabar. I have also acquainted him with my opinion that the detachment should be as strong as it can be made with convenience. I have particularly desired that Capt. Moncrieff may come in command of the pioneers. I shall be obliged to you for any information that it may be in your power to give me respecting the object now in view.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 11th Feb. 1800.

I had not time to write to you yesterday, after the examination of the prisoners. Of course they all denied the truth of the charge which had been brought against them, and all declared that they have resided in the villages, in which they were arrested, since the fall of Seringapatam. There was much inconsistency in the stories of some of them, which may be attributed as much to the nature of a Native of this country, as to the want of truth in the story. The amildar of Nunjuncode, and 2 or 3 of the principal people from thence, and from Ennechully, where the Marhattas were taken, have been sent for. They will throw much light upon the whole business, and, in the mean time, all the prisoners are kept separately. The informer persists in his story, has identified the persons of most of the people arrested, and has repeated the charge before them.

A circumstance has occurred which shows how cautious we should be in receiving the evidence of a Native. There is a fakir upon the island, who of course knows that he exists under the Company's protection. He came forward and declared most positively, that 2 of the people, charged as being of the party, had been at his tuckiah ever since the fall of the place. Of course this declaration occasioned much doubt of the truth of any part of the information; but yesterday he sent word that he should come forward and tell the truth, if I desired it. Barclay will see him this day. I acknowledge that I have many doubts of the truth of every part of the information; but I am the only person here who has any.

I shall be prepared to march with the detachment at the time I stated to you in my public letter. I think that it would be very desirable to have one of the surveyors with the detachment, and I wish much that you would write to Mackenzie upon the subject. I should write to him, only that I am afraid he would think it an interference, on my part, in business in which I had no concern. Mr. Frazer is here, but he is sick, and going on leave to the Carnatic. If we have any body, therefore, it must

be Mr. Warren, and I do not know where he can be employed to greater advantage than in the Wynaad country. I have written to Colebrooke to desire him to send me some of his Native guides, who are more useful than any people I have yet seen, in exploring roads for our troops. They know to a nicety where we can go.

They are going on well with your house. Doctors differ about your principal room: I therefore think it better that just so much should be done to it as can be finished before you return; and if you should go away again for a month, it will be easy to add any ornament which you may think necessary. I think that will want but little; but that will depend much upon the mode in which you propose to close it in. For this I think that you will approve of the mode in which I am closing my rooms.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 14th Feb. 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Capt. Macfarlane. I imagine that you must have given Harponelly to the Nizam; and I conclude that Dhoondiah will have no scruple about attacking it.

The amildar of Nunjuncode was here yesterday with one of his muttasaddes, and they proved clearly, in my opinion, that all the principal people accused and arrested had been at Nunjuncode constantly for the last 6 or 7 months. It may be true that some of the inferior people had been in Dhoondiah's army, and it may also be true that a plan, such as that of which the informer has spoken, was talked of in his camp; but I doubt whether any of them came here with an intention of putting it in execution.

The old killadar of Seringapatam, Seyd Mahomed, came here last night, and told me that he had information that there was a man in the village in which he lived, who was raising men for Dhoondiah, and he produced a man who had given it to him. The person raising the men is the sirdar who was confined by Purneah in the fort of Anawootty when the army was there. I have landed the informer and his information over to Butcha Rao, and have desired him to report it to Purneah, and to make such inquiries as he might think necessary to ascertain the truth. Coupled with the intelligence from Capt. Macfarlane, I think all these rumours of men being raised in the country, &c. &c., are very extraordinary, and that they deserve the attention of this government. This story about Dhoondiah has come down now through 3 different channels, and they appear to be distinct from each other.

I am, however, convinced there is no truth in the information I first received; although, as I above said, some of the persons accused may have been followers of Dhoondiah, and may probably at this moment have some connection with him.

G.O.

Camp at Seringapatam, 13th Feb. 1800

Col. Wellesley had great pleasure in observing at the review of the 1st batt. 2nd regt., this morning, that great pains had been taken, and much attention paid to them, and that the corps is in high order. The system of discipline which it has practised is not that which is generally in use at the present day, although it appears that it is that ordered by authority for the troops serving under the Presidency of Fort St. George.

To the Sec. of Gov. Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 15th Feb. 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Lieut. Col. Montresor. In consequence of your letter of the 9th Jan., I proposed that the 77th should not be taken on the establishment of the government of Fort St. George until they were arrived in their quarters, and should have had time to discharge their Bombay establishment. The orders from the Military Paymaster Gen. were different, and the Paymaster was directed to take them on this establishment, and to pay them from the day on which they entered the Mysore country. It will therefore be necessary that he should be further authorized to pay their Bombay field establishment.

I have directed Mr. Gordon to prepare as follows for the detachment ordered for the field. He is to supply, for 300 Europeans, 3 months, arrack; and for 2500 Natives, one month's grain, at half allowance. I have thought it proper to order this last; as it is probable that the troops will be but ill supplied with bazaars, it will be difficult to collect immediately those who heretofore attended the camps. And it is probable that every thing will be destroyed in the Wynaad country before we enter it. I have likewise desired him to provide carriages for these provisions, and for about 350 loads of stores, of which I have sent an account to the Military board. Draught bullocks will not be required, nor will carriage for the tents, excepting a few bamboo coolies, &c., to bring them with the corps coming from the northward.

It will be necessary to appoint an officer to act as adjutant and as quarter master to the European flank companies, and one as adjutant to the Native companies; and, with the permission of government, I shall appoint an officer of each, belonging to the companies employed, to act in those capacities.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 15th Feb. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 12th inst. If Purneah should be desirous of going towards Chittledroog, he would do well to go there: in my opinion the oftener all parts of this country are visited for some time the better, and he will do right in visiting that part soon. I shall be glad if you come with the detachments; but as you come only out of compliment to me, you will do better to consult your own convenience. You will probably wish to be here when Lady Clive arrives in the country, and in that case it is much better that you should not come.

At all events I shall be glad to have Bishto Pundit or somebody belonging to Purneah, who will have influence in the country. I am obliged to Purneah for his attention in ordering 2000 loads of grain to be collected. I have ordered a month's grain at half allowance for the Native troops, to be got ready in case of accidents, as I am convinced that the first step the Rajah will take will be to destroy every thing in the country. It will be well if Purneah orders all kind of bazaar articles to be got together.

I am glad to hear that we shall see you so soon. I have not yet released all the prisoners; and unless something further appears in their favor, I intend to detain them for another day or two. Barclay has been most laborious in his investigation of this business, and has brought it to

light in a masterly manner. He has examined the dates and marches of the party as stated by the informant, and, what is very extraordinary, the account comes out right. The man first told his story, the number of marches he made, where he halted, &c. &c. Barclay then questioned him as to the time, and made him tell at what places he had seen each new moon; and his answers have corresponded exactly with his marches and halts, and his arrival here. This is a strong mark of truth, particularly in a Native, who never knows any thing of time. He is now gone to bring more witnesses, and I hope that you will be here before I release the prisoners. I acknowledge that the proof of the *alibi* has much weight with me, and that I detain the people now only out of respect for the opinions of those who have made the investigation, and who do not agree with me.

P.S. I enclose advertisements about gram from the Military board.

To Surgeon Trevor, 33rd regt.

Seringapatam, 20th Feb. 1800.

I have received your note and the extract of a letter from Mr. Ewart which you enclosed. I don't recollect that the form of the returns or monthly report which you are required to send to Mr. Ewart, which was received from the Adj. Gen.'s office, contained any place for the name of the commanding officer of the regiment; and I know that there was no order to the commanding officers of regiments to sign and transmit reports to Mr. Ewart.

As, however, it appears that the want of my signature to your report has drawn from Mr. Ewart an insinuation that I am not satisfied with your general conduct, I think it but justice to you to state, that you have now been under my command for 7 years, that during that time the regiment has been employed in different parts of the world and various climates, and that upon all occasions your attention to your duty, your humanity, and your skill, have claimed and received my fullest approbation. I have also the pleasure to inform you, that having, at different times, had occasion to converse with the medical gentlemen on the staff of the armies in which we have been employed, they have uniformly given testimony to your good conduct; particularly that gentleman has, who is at present at the head of the medical department of the army in the Mysore country.

You have my permission to communicate this letter to Mr. Ewart, or to whom else you please.

To Col. Sartorius.

Seringapatam, 26th Feb. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from the Sec. of the government of Fort St. George.

I have received your letter of the 18th inst., and Lieut. Col. Close has communicated to me that which you wrote to him on the 17th. By both it would appear that the Pyche Rajah was in actual possession of the Cotiote district, whereas I had always imagined that you had posts in it, which, not being sufficiently strong to support the Company's authority, the Pyche Rajah had an influence in the country very prejudicial to British interests. If I should be founded in my conjectures that you have a post in Cotiote, I shall be glad if you will let me know it; and if you will be so kind as to make arrangements for posting the detachment

from Cannanore in conformity with the following plan, giving me information of the place where it is posted, and of the nature of the communication between that place and the Wynaad country. The first object in forming both detachments is to establish the Company's authority in Wynaad, which is now held by the Pyche Rajah. It appears to be your opinion that, as soon as he is pressed by the detachment from Seringapatam, he will move into Cotiote, where his influence is still extensive, and where his former successes would give him reason to hope for success in future. But if it be true that you have a post in Cotiote, and that the Pyche Rajah, instead of being in possession of that district, only exercises an influence there, I should hope that the detachment of the Bombay army would be strong enough to support itself against him, until I could reach him from Wynaad; and that you would find no inconvenience, and that there would be no risk, in placing your detachment so that it would intercept him on the route which you may imagine he follows to his proposed retreat at Cotiote. If, then, my conjecture is well founded, I beg that you will do me the favor to order the detachment to move forward to Cotiote, that you will place it so that it may either stop the Rajah, or may induce him to take a longer and more difficult route to his place of retreat. If, however, the Rajah should remain in the Wynaad country, contrary to your expectation and to mine, it will be necessary that the detachment from Cannanore should be prepared to move into that district likewise.

If you should have no posts in Cotiote, the plan must be different, although the object will be the same, and must depend upon the strength of your detachment compared with that which the Pyche Rajah can produce in Cotiote, upon the nature and state of the roads, and of the country through which it must pass in order to reach the border of Wynaad. If the detachment should run any risk in entering the Cotiote country, it will be best that it should enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut; as it is very clear that, if the Pyche Rajah is so strong in Cotiote that the Bombay detachment cannot enter it with safety, the Seringapatam detachment will not be able to drive him out of both Wynaad and Cotiote in this season, and that the absence of the Bombay detachment may risk success even in the former. I therefore propose that the Bombay detachment should enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut, if, as you say, the Rajah is in possession of, and strong in Cotiote, instead of remaining upon the borders and straitening him in the latter. All this, however, depends upon a comparison of your strength and his: you will perceive that my plan is, that your detachment should move through Cotiote towards, or, eventually into, Wynaad, if possible; but if that should not be possible, as the possession of Wynaad is, in the first instance, the object, it should move into it by the Tambercherry ghaut.

As the season is advancing, I cannot sufficiently express the anxiety, which I am convinced you feel, in common with me, that your detachment should move as soon as possible. The Rt. Hon. the Governor General having resolved to get possession of Wynaad, and, with this view, having ordered detachments to be prepared in Malabar and Mysore, it is not economy to spare money in fitting them out. Of this you will be

convinced, and I beg therefore that you will spare no expense to equip the troops with their provisions, stores, carriage, &c. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know when your detachment will be ready to move; the route which, according to either of the foregoing plans, it will pursue; and such other information as it may be in your power to favor me with. My detachment is already collected and prepared to move. I have posted camel hircarrahs upon the road towards Cannanore as far as they can go, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that your letters may be given to them.

To Major Disney.

Serlingapatam, 27th Feb. 1800.

You will doubtless have heard that a detachment has been collected at Serlingapatam, and another at Cannanore: their object is to force Wynaad from the Pyche Rajah. The plan which I have formed for this purpose is to enter the district from this side with my detachment, and that that from Cannanore should enter it by Cotiote; but from letters which Lieut. Col. Close and I have received from Col. Sartorius, it would appear that the Pyche Rajah is in possession of, and in force in, Cotiote; and if that should be the case, it will be necessary that the Cannanore detachment should enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry pass.

When I had the pleasure of seeing you at Nuggur, I recollect that you told me that you had served in Cotiote during the war in that district; and I rather believe that your corps occupied a post in it until the late war in Mysore broke out. I shall be very much obliged to you for any general information that you can give me of the nature of the Cotiote country, and the strength in that district of the Pyche Rajah. I wish particularly to know whether there is any post of our troops in it at present, its strength, and its position relatively with Wynaad on one side and Cannanore on the other; whether there is any road or communication between such post (if there is one) and Wynaad, or in general between the Cotiote and Wynaad districts; the length of this road, and the name of the pass in the western ghauts through which it comes.

I shall likewise be obliged to you for any information that you can give me respecting the Tambercherry pass. It is said here that the rains set in in Wynaad in the month of March. Have the goodness to communicate to me your observations upon this subject, and to keep the contents of this letter to yourself.

G. O.

Serlingapatam, Saturday, 1st March, 1800.

The commanding officers of corps will be so kind as to give particular orders respecting the preservation of cleanliness in their lines. Every morning all dirt must be removed to a distance in front of the encampment beyond the quarter guards. The privies must be made in one particular place at a distance from the tents. The quarter masters of European corps, and quarter master serjeants of Native corps, are responsible for the cleanliness of the encampment; and the D. Q. M. Gen. will be so kind as to notice and report any neglect in this particular which he may perceive.

A captain of the day to mount in camp, to whom all extraordinaries are to be reported, and who will report verbally to Col. Wellealey. This tour of duty to commence at morning parade on halting days; and the captain on duty must remain in camp, and in case he should notice any neglect of the orders for the preservation of cleanliness, he will report it.

An adjutant of the day to attend at the Dowlut Baug at 12 o'clock daily for orders, which he will issue afterwards at his tent in camp, where the other adjutants are to attend on the drum beating.

To Major Munro.

Seringapatam, 2nd March, 1800.

Since Col. Close's return to Seringapatam, I have had some conversation with him respecting the thieves in Soonda. It has appeared to him and to me, that the only mode by which you can expect to get rid of them is to hunt them out. In the province of Bednore we employed some of the Rajah's cavalry; with the support of our infantry, some thieves were caught; some of them were hanged, and some severely punished in different ways: the consequence has been, that lately that country has not been visited by them; and most probably a similar operation in Soonda would have a similar effect. I have spoken to Purneah on the subject, and I find that he can assist with about 250 or 300 horsemen, without inconvenience: these, divided into 2 or 3 small parties, supported by our infantry, would give a proper *shekar*; and I strongly advise you not to let the Marhatta boundary stop you in the pursuit of your game when you shall once have started it. Two or three fair hunts, and cutting up about half a dozen, will most probably induce the thieves to prefer some other country to Soonda as the scene of their operations. Let me hear from you upon this subject, and, if you approve of the plan, I will make all the arrangements for putting it into execution.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 3rd March, 1800.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of 28th Feb., and have to inform you that all field establishments are included in the orders which state that field-allowances are discontinued.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 4th March, 1800.

I enclose letters just received from Madras, which I beg you will return to me when you shall have read them. It appears that government is very anxious that the object of the detachments should be obtained, but still I conceive that our letters will have the effect of stopping operations till the next season.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 7th March, 1800.

I have received your letters respecting the arms. The whole number

G. O.

Camp near Seringapatam, Sunday, 2nd March, 1800.

The commanding officers of Native corps going on detachment having expressed a desire that the families of the sepoys should be left at Seringapatam, a place will be allotted for them on the island.

The commanding officer of each corps will leave with the families of his men a trusty non-commissioned officer, upon whom he can depend, to pay each family the amount which the sepoy to whom it belongs may choose to leave for them. He will give to Mr. Gordon, the Paymaster, an account of the whole sum which the sepoys of his corps will leave to their families, which Mr. Gordon will pay to the non-commissioned officer left in charge of them.

This sum will be in lieu of an equal sum which would have been to be paid to them; and of course the officers commanding troops and companies will be obliged to give a receipt for the full amount of their abstracts.

G. O. C. C.

6th March, 1800.

The Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council having been pleased to resolve and order that, whenever the officer commanding in Mysore shall be senior to the officers commanding in Canara and in Malabar, he shall be vested with the general command, under the Governor in Council, of all the forces employed in either of those provinces, the officers now commanding in Canara and Malabar are accordingly ordered and directed to put themselves under the command of Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

of serviceable captured English arms is about 1600, and of these about two thirds have already been delivered to the troops. There are 13,485 repairable English arms, and these we can either repair for Purneah, or we can deliver them to him, and he can have them repaired for his troops. If you approve of this plan, let me know it, and I will write to the Military board, and recommend that I may be permitted to issue to Purneah 1000 stand of the repairable arms. It will also be necessary that I should take their opinion respecting the issue of the accoutrements.

To the Sec. of Gov., Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

I enclose copies of 2 letters from Col. Sartorius, that dated the 5th inst. being an answer to one which I wrote to him on the 26th Feb., a copy of which I likewise enclose. By this and by other information, it appears that the Pyche Rajah is in possession of Cotiote, as well as of the Wynaad country.

In order to put in execution the orders of government to get possession of Wynaad, these methods have been proposed. It was first proposed that the detachments of the Bombay army should penetrate through Cotiote, while that from Mysore should enter from the eastward; but it appears that the influence and strength of the Pyche Rajah in Cotiote is much greater than that of the Company, and that a detachment, such as that proposed to be assembled by Col. Sartorius, cannot pass through without the risk of being destroyed. As, under the circumstances of the present moment, it is impossible to collect a larger detachment and equip it in time, I am obliged to relinquish that plan, by which alone the Pyche Rajah can be completely subdued. Col. Sartorius then proposes that he should collect his detachment at Cotaparamba, on the western borders of Cotiote; that it should remain there until the detachment of this army shall have penetrated Wynaad; and then that a combined attack of the 2 detachments shall be made on the Cotiote district.

I am not acquainted with the nature of the Wynaad country; and I am not certain that the combined operations of the 2 detachments, as ordered by the government, will not be necessary to get possession of, and establish the Company's authority in, that district. The season is so far advanced as to render it very probable that even that object can scarcely be effected before the rains set in, and it is certain that both objects cannot. Col. Sartorius proposes that, in case it should be found that the detachment of this army cannot alone get possession of Wynaad, he should embark his troops, re-land them at Calicut, and move into Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut; but I must observe, that the length of time which would elapse between the period at which the want of his assistance might be felt, that at which he would receive information of this want, and that at which he would be at the proper place to afford his assistance, would be so great as in all probability to render it useless.

Upon the whole, then, considering the weakness of the Bombay detachment compared with the strength of the Pyche Rajah in Cotiote, I have determined not to attempt to move it through that district; and considering the lateness of the season, and the orders of government, I propose to desire Col. Sartorius to collect his detachment at Calicut and to enter

Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut, while I shall enter it from this side. By Col. Sartorius's letters it appears that he will be prepared to leave Calicut towards the end of this month, or in the beginning of the next; and I propose to march from hence about the 20th, my detachment having been collected and prepared to move since the 26th of last month. The information regarding the weather which I have received from many quarters, but which, by Col. Sartorius's letters, does not appear to be well founded, is, that it begins to rain in Wynaad in the middle of this month, that the showers increase, and become more frequent, gradually, till the middle of April, when the rains become violent, and the rivers and nullahs fill.

If this information be well founded (and the early period at which the rivers fill, in comparison with the Cauvery, is a proof that the rains are early in Wynaad), there will be a further question whether the expedition ought to be undertaken at all, if the equipment of the Bombay troops is to be delayed beyond the end of this month. Upon this subject it will be necessary to receive the orders of government, on the advantages to be derived from prosecuting the expedition in this season; and that we shall obtain a knowledge of the country; and that we shall be enabled to establish at Wynaad a post, from whence we can complete the subjection of the Pyche Rajah early in the next season. The Company's affairs cannot well be worse than they are in Cotiote, and therefore no evil is to be apprehended from the Rajah seating himself there during the rains.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

I have made arrangements for sending to Paughur 2 companies of the 1st of the 8th, who, I hope, will keep matters quiet. I do not know on what day the Bombay troops will be collected at Calicut, but I rather believe at about this time, and they will be prepared to march on the 7th or 8th April. I propose that my troops should cross the rivers tomorrow, and march to the Delaway tank on the next day, that is to say if I am well enough, as I had an attack of fever yesterday which kept me in bed all day.

We have been perfectly quiet here since I wrote to you. The Court martial sentenced the 4 men to be hanged, but as I have not the power of putting the sentence in execution, excepting in a case of emergency, which, when they had finished their proceedings, did not exist; and as the men tried were not at the head of the riot, I have had them well flogged, and sent about their business. Besides, I do not conceive that the connexion between the 4 men tried and the gang at Caryghaut appears so clear upon the face of the proceedings as it was in fact, or as I expected it would. It is very certain that the gooroo was at the head of the business. Return the Court martial.

To Major Disney.

Seringapatam, 11th March, 1800.

I have received your papers regarding the Cotiote war, and I am much indebted to you for all the information which they contain. I now return those which you have desired to have. I am very desirous to be

made acquainted with your operations previous to the 18th March, their object, and the road and means by which you got to your position on the Reacherrum ghaut. It appears to me that the disasters with which you met are to be attributed to two causes, 1st, your want of provisions; 2ndly, to your having advanced into the country without making a good and clear communication with your rear.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 11th March, 1800.

I enclose a memorandum relating to gold mohurs and soolacky rupees, which I have received from Mr. Gordon. He proposes to coin 100 of each, in order to prove the truth of the paper.

Upon considering Sartorius's letter to Lord Clive, and the slight dependence to be placed on 1500 coolies pressed and detained by a guard, I have determined to increase our supplies of provisions to such extent as may be practicable between this and the time of our departure.

To the Sec. of Gov., Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 12th March, 1800.

Col. Sartorius has transmitted me a copy of his letter of the 8th inst. to the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council. As from that it appears that he is obliged to depend for supplies for his detachment on 1500 coolies 'pressed and detained under a guard,' I have thought it proper to order that the quantity of rice and arrack to accompany this detachment may be increased to such extent as may be found practicable, between this and the day on which I shall march. This will add to my encumbrances, and I have therefore ordered the flank companies of the 77th regt. from Chittledroog to join me. Col. Sartorius has proposed to draw from Goa 4 companies of sepoy, but I have desired him not to increase his numbers, unless he is certain of being able to feed his troops.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Capt. —, who commands the pioneers on the Bombay establishment, and who has been much employed in Cotiote. It does not appear possible to bring a detachment through that district till we are in possession of Wynaad.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 14th March, 1800.

Abdoo Ghoffar's son called upon me this morning. I had before examined my papers and made inquiries respecting him, and I find that he is not included in the list of persons of the Binky Nabob's family, for whose use the pension of 400 star pagodas *per annum* is granted. It will therefore be proper that some provision should be made for him; and as the Binky Nabob's widow and his family are on the 'Family fund,' it will be right that this branch of the same family should be upon it likewise. Will you write to government upon the subject?

I have been a little out of order these last two days with a cold, but I am getting better. M'Intyre will furnish Purneah with some arms, ammunition, and flints, for the expedition against Kistnapah Naig.

P.S. Did you recollect to mention to Purneah the carpenters at Nuggur for Grant's cots? He will likewise want the assistance of the village coolies (paying for the same) to carry them over to Chittledroog.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seingapatam, 16th March, 1800.

We are in want of the dooley bearers, and I shall be obliged to you if you will have them sent over.

I have had a conversation with Mr. Gordon about money matters, and it appears that we begin to want a little, and I believe that we shall be obliged to call for some from the Presidency. I intend to ask Munro to pay the Bombay corps at Nuggur for this month, which will relieve us a little. We shall then want about 20,000 pagodas at Chittledroog, as much at Bangalore, and about 30,000 here. If the coinage succeeds, we shall have money enough for 2 months; but in the mean time, until all the bad, or rather useless, money is recoined, we are in distress.

I enclose part of a letter from Sydenham, by which you will perceive that the road plan is not entirely abandoned.

P.S. Will you be so kind as to return Sydenham's letter?

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 17th March, 1800.

Having received the answer from the amildar of Sera regarding the carts of the persons named in the agreement of the Belgewars and Sonars, I yesterday gave the parties counterparts of their paper signed by myself; at the same time I called for the 2 men, who I before told you had refused to come into the agreement, informed them of the answer received from Sera, and desired that they would give security for their behaviour, and that they would no longer disturb the peace of the place. This they positively refused. Last night and early this morning parties of Pariah people and cook boys went about the streets armed with clubs, and threatened the bazaar people in case they should open their shops: of these, 4 were caught in the Fort in the fact. This morning a large body assembled at the Caryghant, and another at the Chendgall ford, who plundered the country people coming with their goods, broke the chatties of those bringing milk, and stopped all communication with the country by the lower fords. The bazaars in the Fort and Ganjam were shut.

Under these circumstances it became necessary to take some serious and decided steps towards restoring peace and confidence. I ordered a small party of Europeans out from the garrison to cross at the Chendgall ford; a small party of sepoy from camp to the Caryghant hill, as the largest mob had put themselves at the choultries at the bottom of it; and a party of cavalry into the Lockany, to assist in case they should make off *unhurt* before the infantry should reach them. Notwithstanding repeated messages, and that the cavalry was within 100 yards of them for near an hour, they remained till the infantry got on both sides of them, within pistol shot. The infantry fired: 2 of them, and the 2 head men whom I had sent out, were killed, and 2 wounded. The whole dispersed, and the communication is going on, and all is as quiet as if nothing had happened.

A Native General Court Martial is now sitting to try the fellows who were taken in the fort, and I intend to hang 2 of them if they should be sentenced, as I imagine they will. The people concerned were mostly gentlemen's servants, and horsekeepers, and soldiers' cooks: I dare say set on by the higher classes in the service of the officers. It is fortunate

that the attempt has been made whilst I have been here, and I dare say it will not be renewed during my absence, or ever again.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter just received from the Sec. of government. I shall be glad to have a little conversation with you relative to the disposition of the troops, particularly of the 2nd regt. of cavalry. I should go over to you to-morrow morning, only that I am not well enough; but perhaps it might not be inconvenient to you to come here. Send me back the enclosed letter.

P.S. I think that we might employ some of our troops to advantage in clearing the Bissolee ghaut. I have some thoughts of going down to the Malabar coast, to have a little conversation with the gentlemen there. Will you turn over in your mind whether my going through the Koorg country can have any effect upon your negotiations with the Rajah? Perhaps it may be convenient to you to meet him at the time when I should wish to go into Malabar. that is in about 10 days, when I shall have got a little strength.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 23rd March, 1800.

I intend to set out for Malabar on Tuesday, and, if you will give me leave, I will dine with you at Mysore to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp near Seringapatam, 26th March, 1800.

Mackay was here last night, and I had a long conversation with him upon the subject of gram and our bullocks. He produced a translation of the account which he had received from Purneah of the gram given to his bullocks; and certainly the prices therein charged are higher than the general price of the country, and than the average of the prices charged by the gram agents of the cavalry; and Capt. Mackay says that they are much higher than the prices on the spot where the gram was received. The Company's bullocks have been at Seringapatam, at Bangalore, Nundlydroog, Chittledroog, &c. &c., and Capt. Mackay has vouchers from the officers in charge of them at those different places, all of which give the gram cheaper than it is given by Purneah: all these, with the prices of gram in the different parts of the country, and the price charged by the gram agents, will be before Gen. Sydenham when he will have Capt. Mackay's accounts under his examination; and he will require some kind of certificate from Purneah that the price charged was paid to him by Capt. Mackay. If Purneah has been defrauded by those whom he employed to furnish the gram for the bullocks, and the prices cannot be lowered, the best method of settling the account will be to strike an average upon the whole quantity received since he first began to deliver it to our bullocks in the month of September, and to let it stand as an agreement made between you and me, or with Purneah, for the convenience of both parties. It was impossible last night to strike a correct average, but, from a rough calculation, it appears that it will run about 37 or 38 seers for a rupee. If you should see no objection to this, the

only matter remaining to be settled on this point is the number of *seers* delivered, upon which I imagine there is no difference. In September and October the cavalry were in Soonda, and got no gram: but since that period, in general the price has been about 40 *seers* for a rupee; and certainly the cavalry gram is not the cheapest.

The only point remaining to be settled is the manner of procuring gram for the bullocks in future. Mackay is very desirous still to receive it from Purneah; and if a stated price were once fixed, his giving it might be free from the detail and trouble of which you complain. But if you should be of opinion that it will be attended with inconvenience, Capt. Mackay does not think that he will find any difficulty in procuring gram, provided the sircar will relax the regulations, which restrict the sale of it to such a degree as almost to amount to a prohibition. I conclude that these restrictions are occasioned by the necessity of furnishing a quantity of gram for the Company's bullocks, and therefore, when that necessity no longer exists, there will be no objection to allowing the sale of gram to be as general and as easy as is the sale of any other commodity. At all events, it will be convenient that Purneah should continue to deliver the gram till the end of the month, and before then you will have had time to settle both as to the mode of payment for that already received, and as to the mode of procuring gram for the bullocks in future. Let me know when you shall have decided upon these subjects.

I have considered the proposition to deliver over entirely to the Rajah the stud of cows, and all the calves, and I have talked it over with Mackay. He seems to be of opinion, that if the bullocks are not occasionally recruited by drafts of fresh calves, the establishment will very soon fail entirely. I have no doubt but that for *purchase* it will at all times be possible to procure bullocks fit for the draught, and probably equal to those already in the Company's service. But I know the nature of those to whom all propositions for expense to be incurred upon this subject must be submitted, and I should as soon expect that they would consent to a disbursement of a lac of pagodas as to one of 500 or 1000 pagodas a year for a convenient arrangement of this matter for the Rajah's government. I therefore foresee that the establishment of bullocks will fall to the ground, or the Company must keep the stud which is to support it, or both establishment and stud must be given over to the Rajah's government. As a Company's servant, I certainly should prefer to have an establishment and stud in the hands of the Company.

A more convenient arrangement for the Company would be that the stud should be in the hands of the Rajah, and that the Company should receive supplies from it; but it may be said, why is the Rajah to be fettered with a Company's concern? and we must therefore look to other means of taking care of it. We are in possession of the country from whence it is said the bullocks were originally brought, and the gentlemen in charge may not find it impossible to arrange matters so as to give an annual supply of calves without incurring expense, which appears to be the object. Under this arrangement, the cows will be given over to them; but I do not conceive that this or any other plan will ever answer

so well for us as to leave the stud in the hands of the Rajah, and to receive from it certain supplies.

I have been detained this day for tents, but I shall set out early in the morning.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 26th March, 1800.

Just before I received your enclosure I had received Mr. Smee's dispatch of the 22nd. I now send you that of the 21st, being Mr. Smee's letter to me, and copies of a letter from the Pyche Rajah. I likewise send a letter about the bullocks, which was going by tappall.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 26th March, 1800.

The particular restriction upon the sale of gram which Mackay mentioned, is an order from Purneah to sell no gram (or at least a very small quantity) to any person excepting to the sircar. As this order has not been given in the neighbourhood of the cavalry stations, I conclude that it has been in the neighbourhood of the places where the bullocks are, or have been, grazing, merely because he had engaged to furnish these with gram, and that he would be more certain of performing his engagement in consequence of the restriction. But it is clear that there will be no occasion for the restriction, when he will have nothing to do with the gram, and equally so that Mackay will not be able to get any unless it is taken off.

Capt. Mackay is aware of the road duties, and makes no objection to them. As soon as you have settled the average price with Purneah, let me know it, and I will write to Mackay to settle the account, and there will be no difficulty hereafter.

I assure you that I find no fault with Purneah's prices for gram; but as they differ from those of the country which have already gone before the person who is to pass the accounts, it is necessary that there should be

G. O.

Periapatam, 28th March, 1800.

An officer from the garrison of Seringapatam is to proceed to Sera, and to take charge of the European sick, and he will indent upon the stores for three private tents, besides his own tents, and upon Mr. Gordon for carriage for them. As soon as the doolies above ordered from Chittledroog arrive at Sera, he and Mr. Asst. Surgeon Gardiner, and all the sick and convalescents now at Sera, will proceed by Bangalore to the Carnatic. At Bangalore he will meet certain other convalescents, Europeans, who will be sent from the garrison of Seringapatam, of whom likewise he and Mr. Gardiner will take charge, and the whole are to be disposed of as follows:

Those belonging to the 19th dragoons and the 74th regt. are to be taken to Poonamalie, and given over to the officer in charge of the invalids and recruits of His Majesty's regiments. Those belonging to the 2nd batt. of artillery to be sent to the Mount; those belonging to the 25th light dragoons to be left at Arcot; those to the Scotch brigade at Vellore; those to the 12th regt. at Wallajahbad; those to De Meuron's regt. to be sent into Fort St. George.

After having performed this service the officer will join his corps at Seringapatam, and will bring with him the doolies and bearers; and Mr. Gardiner will report himself to and receive the orders of the Medical board.

On the 15th of April the sick and convalescents of His Majesty's regiments in Seringapatam are to be sent to Bangalore in charge of an officer, who will indent according to the regulations for such doolies as may be necessary for them, and for tents and carriage. This officer will deliver over charge of these sick and convalescents to the officer coming from Sera, with the sick from thence, and he will return to Seringapatam and join his corps.

Mr. Gordon will provide for victualling the details of Europeans proceeding, according to the above orders, from Seringapatam and Sera to their respective destinations in the Carnatic.

some certificate of the cause of the difference, or that the whole should be put together, and an average struck, and that the price should stand upon some original agreement made for the convenience of both parties.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Veerajundrapett, 30th March, 1800.

I arrived here this morning, in 4 marches, from Seringapatam, but they were very long. It is 40 miles to Periapatam, and 25 from thence. The Rajah came over from Nauknaar this morning, and I have been to see him. He received me well, but spoke but little. He complains of sickness, and has really got a fever, and Mr. Trevor, surgeon of the 33rd regt., is going to stay with him for a day or two. He received your letter immediately previous to my seeing him; and as his Persian moon-shee was not here, Ogg read and interpreted it. I rather think that, as he is really sick, you will do well to defer your journey and meeting with him for a few days. I shall desire Mr. Trevor to let you know when he recovers.

I have received from Col. Sartorius the copy of a letter written to him by the Commissioners in Malabar, in which they desire that at least the native part of the troops collected for the expedition into Wynaad may be suffered to remain in Malabar, until they shall have had time to consider of the propriety of making a requisition to employ them to the southward. At present I see no objection to suffering these troops to remain in Malabar; but there may be very strong objections to their being employed upon any wild-goose expedition that the Commissioners may point out. When the requisition comes, I shall be a better judge of the propriety of complying with it.

The country, from Sedaseer hither, is an almost continued jungle: I had scarcely room to encamp at Seedapoor. In the neighbourhood of this place, there is some cultivation; but this magnificent capital is about of the same extent, and has a similar appearance, to a country town in Ireland. I propose to get down the ghaut to-morrow, and to be at Cannanore on the 2nd April.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Stony river, 31st March, 1800.

After I had written to you yesterday, the Rajah sent to me to say that he would pay me a visit. He began by saying that he had intended to meet me at his frontier, but that I had not given him notice of the day on which I intended to leave Seringapatam; and that he had been so ill on the day when he heard that I was arrived at Periapatam, that he had not been able to quit his house. He then said that, as I was going to Cannanore, I should see the Bombay gentlemen, and should have an opportunity of conversing with them respecting him, and they would tell me whether he was such a man as he had been represented to be. I told him that I knew no person who had less reason to complain of misrepresentation; that in India, in England, and every where, his character was perfectly known and established, and that he did not do justice either to himself or to us in imagining otherwise. He then, from beginning to end, related the history of his connexion with Hyder, and with Tippoo, and with us; and he repeatedly said that the brahmins were his enemies.

He declared that, from the commencement of his connexion with the British government (which was founded on their mutual enmity to Tippoo) to this day, he had never done any thing relative thereto, without an order from them, or from their agents, which he could produce, and offered to do so for my satisfaction. I then took an opportunity of telling him that I had nothing to do with political matters; that he would soon see you, that you had been many years in this country, had a perfect knowledge of its affairs, &c. &c., and that you were not ignorant of the nature of his connexion with the Company; and I recommended to him to listen to what you should say to him as to the advice of his best friend. He said that, if he was sufficiently recovered, he would go with me to Seringapatam when I should return thither, of which he said he had informed you. After having stayed about 3 hours he went away.

It appeared to me that pains had been taken to induce him to believe that we (Madras people) were prejudiced against him; and that we listened to brahmins, against whom he appears to have an inveterate hatred, and who, he believes, have an equal one towards him. He repeatedly said that we could not be aware of the services which he had had it in his power to render to the Company, that we were strangers to him and his actions, and that it was natural that we should listen to those with whom we had been acquainted, and who, he knew, were his enemies. I am of opinion, however, that a little better acquaintance, more intercourse, and a little gentle treatment, will remove all these impressions. He speaks Moorish fluently; but Ogg says, with an idiom that belongs, he supposes, to his own language: he has more simplicity, and apparently more sincerity in his manners, as well as in what he says, than any Native I have ever seen. It struck me as remarkable in his conversation, that he should have urged repeatedly that he had orders for every thing he had ever done, either from the Company's government or their agents; particularly when I recollected that ——— had declined to ask him to give up the families which he had seized in Mysore, because they had been seized by his desire.

The Rajah was better this morning, and went to Nauknair when I came here. He had still, however, some fever, and the doctor accompanies him. I omitted to mention to you, in my letter of yesterday, that the amildar at Periapatam proposed to me that he should seize some bullocks, which had come in there with gram from the Koorg country; as (he said) some of the inhabitants knew them to have belonged to themselves, and to have been taken off by the Rajah of Koorg, I recommended him to take the orders of his sircar before he did such a thing.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Cananore, 3rd April, 1800.

I arrived here this morning, having been on the road one day longer than I expected. I found the weather exceedingly hot, and a want of water upon the road to refresh the followers and cattle obliged me to make 2 marches, where, under other circumstances, I should have made only one. We have, however, had rain nearly every night since I left Seringapatam.

I met here Mr. Smee and Capt. Moncrieff. The former has induced

some of the nairs, under his influence, Kydree Amboo at their head, to commence opening a road from Cotaparamba by Mananderry to Tutucullum and Canote, and another by Pyche to Montana: the latter will not be difficult, as Tippoo had made one on the same line formerly. It is intended, if possible, before the rains, to establish a post at Canote, and another at Montana, to connect them by a road directly across from one to the other, and by another road between them by Perrywell, which last requires only to be opened. Mr. Smee has no doubt but that the nairs will effect these objects; and in order to facilitate them, I have sent in the pioneers and 1200 of the coolies, which had been hired for the expedition. If the Pyche Rajah is disposed to make an opposition to this measure (which Smee and Moncrieff think he will not), it must then be given over; as all parties agree that the force in this country is not sufficient to carry it through. If it should be necessary to give over the plan, Smee does not apprehend that the Company's influence will be diminished in consequence of the failure; and as every yard of road which is made is so much gained towards effecting the great object, I have, upon the whole, thought it a measure which ought to be attempted. Excepting 30 men employed in guarding Kydree Amboo's house, not a sepoy will be engaged in the operation; so that, however anxiously I may look forward for its success, I do not conceive that the honor of the Company's arms will be engaged in it. As soon as the roads shall have been completed, or if it should be necessary to discontinue them, or, at all events, at the commencement of the monsoon, the coolies will be employed in carrying provisions to Cotaparamba, where I understand there are sheds and buildings sufficient to contain provisions for 3000 men for 2 months. If it should be possible to make posts at Montana and Canote, they must, in the first instance, be held by the friendly nairs till we can move forward our provisions, first for a garrison, next for the number of men, and for the time above stated.

It will be a curious circumstance, if without troops we should be able to effect objects which it was imagined the largest detachment which could conveniently be brought together could not undertake; but it is to be observed that they will be effected by the nairs themselves, with the assistance of our people, and not by our force.

I have heard from Col. Mignan that he had received a report from the officer commanding the post at Soobramany, stating that Kistnapah Naig had beat the Rajah's troops, and had taken Munserabad on the 24th March. As I have not heard from you, or from Col. Tolfrey, I conclude that there is no truth in the report; but if it should be true, we must only send off the flank companies of the 77th, now at Seringapatam, in readiness to march to Tolfrey's assistance, with orders to storm Munserabad. I enclose a copy of Col. Mignan's letter.

To Major Disney.

Cannanore, 4th April, 1800.

I have only this day received your letter of 31st March, and I am concerned that you should have been obliged to ask for leave of absence, which is granted. I have written to the government of Bombay, and have enclosed your letter and the papers which you sent me, and have recommended you to their favorable notice.

To Major Disney.

Cannanore, 5th April, 1800.

In a few days an officer will arrive at Nuggur to relieve you; and I shall be obliged to you if you will not quit your station until you hear further from me.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Cannanore, 5th April, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Tolfrey, and one of a translation of a proclamation which he has published. The account I received from Col. Mignan cannot be founded.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Mr. Hodgson, the collector of Cheral, to Col. Sartorius. It appears that he has heard of the son of Tippoo, about whom Col. Mignan gave me information, as being the cause of the desertion among his sepoy recruits. Since the receipt of this letter I have seen Mr. Hodgson, and have explained to him the present state of Tippoo's family, and the consequent impossibility that one of his sons, or even one of Hyder's stock, should be in or near the place which he mentions. In answer to this, he said that the person alluded to might not be one of Tippoo's sons, or might not belong to the family; but that there was no doubt that there was a man in the southern part of Canara who assumed that character, was collecting troops, and was well received, and respectfully treated, by the disaffected in those parts. I urged him strongly to have an eye towards him, and to keep you and me informed of his motions, which he promised. But he said, that, being unacquainted with Munro, in whose district the man was, he was fearful of sending any people into it. He said that Munro had an amildar in the country, and that it might be convenient if that man and he were to communicate upon these matters which arise occasionally. It will be well if you give Munro a hint upon this subject; and I hope that, before long, we shall discover something interesting regarding this impostor.

The Commissioners in Malabar will most probably have sent you a copy of their letter to Col. Sartorius, regarding the distribution of the troops which I had ordered, consequent to the directions from government to postpone the expedition. I have complied with their wishes regarding the Native part of the detachment as far as 6 companies; the other 2 will go to Cotaparamba to be in readiness to occupy our new posts in Cotiote, if they should be finished; or if not, they will remain at Cotaparamba as a further security to the stores, which, at all events, will be thrown in there during the rains. If we should want more Native troops in Canara, I must send them from Nuggur. The Europeans here join their corps at Mangalore and Goa. The 6 companies are to be in the southern part of Malabar, and will keep matters quiet there during the rains; and I am now making inquiries relative to the mode of penetrating into that part of Malabar from Wynaad or Mysore, should government think it proper to make a complete settlement of all matters in the province in the next season. Our road-making in Cotiote gets on well. I believe that it will be open as far as Mananderry this day, that is, if the rain and storm of last night has not impeded the work.

I have received a letter from Disney, who has lost his wife, and is at-

tacked by the liver complaint himself, and is so much out of sorts altogether as to have determined to quit the service and go home immediately. His command, which is, on many accounts, a very important one, will devolve upon a Lieut. in the Bombay army; and I assure you, that, considering the disturbance on the Marhatta frontier, the riches of Nuggur, and the general inclination of all manner of people to plunder, I am rather uneasy at the charge being in the hands of a person who must be so inexperienced. Under these circumstances, I am desirous of sending there Col. Montresor from Chittledroog, whom I do not know, but he bears an excellent character. I shall not do so, however, till I hear from you whether there is any objection to it.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Cannanore, 6th April, 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 3rd. I hear from Koorg that the Rajah is better, although still weak and unwell. I propose to go to Tellicherry to-morrow, and I shall probably return here on the 10th or 11th; and I think matters will be so forward in Cotiate as to allow me to depart for Mysore on the 15th. I shall let you know whether the Rajah will come with me either to Seringapatam or Periapatam; and I will stay with him a day or two in order to give you time to set out from Seringapatam, if I should find him disinclined to do either. If you were to set out about the 12th or 13th, and to come as far as Cuttee Mulwaddy, or Periapatam, at all events, it would expedite our meeting, and, I think, make it certain that the Rajah will come out to Periapatam at least. When I write to you, I shall send my letters in a separate packet.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Tellicherry, 10th April, 1800.

I received last night the accounts of Col. Tolfrey's defeat, and sent off expresses to make the following arrangement to remedy it. The flank companies of the 77th are on their march towards Chittledroog; and as they are nearest to the Bul country, and have all their equipments prepared, I have ordered them to Ooscotta. I have ordered from Seringapatam, arrack, provisions, and gram, and ammunition; and I have desired that the 4 companies of the 4th regt., under Major Capper, may be sent with these articles as an escort. I have no doubt but that the Europeans will settle all matters without difficulty; and from the accounts received, I am at a loss to guess from what cause they failed in forcing a barrier to which they could march in 3 columns, one of them in companies, and upon which they could bring their guns to bear. Col. Tolfrey has quitted Munserabad, and if he has not thrown into it a proper supply of provisions for the garrison, that fort will be lost, as it may be depended upon that Kistnapah Naig will occupy all the barriers between Munserabad and Ooscotta, which it will not be an easy matter to force, after what has happened; and I do not expect that the Europeans will reach Ooscotta till the 20th at soonest.

The post at Arrekeery, at which Col. Tolfrey failed, does not lie towards the Bissolee ghaut, but is situated on the right of the road from Ooscotta to Munserabad, and is apparently between the road and the Hemavutty. The co-operation from Canara, therefore, if it were possible,

would not answer for some time, at least not till the post at Arrekeery shall be forced, and the detachment from this side shall be prepared to force the post which Kistnapah Naig has on the Bissolee ghaut. But the fact is, that there is not a soldier either in Canara or Malabar who can be moved. There are 300 sepoys and 120 Europeans at Mangalore; of the latter there will be 400 more in about 10 days, when they will have reached that place from hence. I will order them forward to the Soobramany pagoda; and when the Bissolee ghaut comes to be attacked on our side, they can operate from theirs. There is nothing at Cannanore, nothing here, nor nearer to Mangalore than Calicut. They can march thither sooner than they can go by sea at this time of the year; and if they could move immediately, the rains would set in before they would arrive at the scene of operations. We must make the best of it, and depend upon the bayonets of the Europeans; but I acknowledge myself to be much disappointed and vexed at the failure of 1000 sepoys, and 1600 of the Rajah's troops, against not a larger number of ryots, in a country by no means difficult, and from which the same people were driven like sheep, and their fort taken from them, in September last, by a similar body of troops.

I went this morning to Cotaparamba, which is a neat little mud redoubt, about 9 miles from hence. It contains buildings which will hold a large quantity of provision and ammunition, with which, please God, they shall be filled in a few days. The road-making goes on well, and has not been interrupted. On the day after to-morrow, I shall occupy Pyche fort on the Montana road, and Mananderry pagoda on that leading to Canote, and I hope in a few days afterwards to be able to take possession of the posts which will be constructed at Montana and Canote. I propose to return to Cannanore on the day after to-morrow. Mr. Spencer comes here in the morning, which detains me till then, and I shall be at Seringapatam, I hope, on the 22nd.

P.S. Col. Montresor will join the detachment with the flank companies of the 77th, and will command it; and, after what has happened, I do not think that will do us any harm.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Tellicherry, 11th April, 1800.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 7th, and Col. Money Penny's. As I find that the preparations have been made for moving the Europeans from Seringapatam, I have ordered the flank companies of the 73rd, as well as those of the 77th, to join the detachment at Ooscotta; so that they will now have an ample force for every thing that it may be necessary to undertake. I quake for the fort at Munserabad. If there is any difficulty about removing the sick and wounded of Tolfrey's detachment, Ooscotta will answer to hold them till doolies can arrive.

I have received a letter from government, in which I am asked for my opinion whether Bangalore will answer for a cantonment for 2 corps of cavalry. I never thought it would answer for one, as I understood that there was a scarcity of wood, water, gram, and grass. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what you think of it, and whether

Chenapatam will not answer better for one regiment at least, if not for both.

According to my former plan, I have ordered the 2nd regt. to Chenapatam for the present. Before I left Seringapatam, Col. Pater desired I would apply to Purneah for leave for that corps to cut date trees, or other jungle wood, in the forest which runs from Chenapatam to Sultaanpett. If there is no impropriety in it, I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah upon the subject, and desire him to send orders to the amildar of that district. As these corps must draw every thing from Seringapatam when they are to take the field, all other things being equal, there is no doubt but that Chenapatam will be the most convenient situation; but I believe that it excels Bangalore in many respects; besides that, it is in the neighbourhood of the place from which the corps are to be equipped.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Cannanore, 12th April, 1800.

I have ordered a detachment from Mangalore to the Soobramany pagoda, which will consist of 400 of the 75th, and a detachment of the grenadier battalion, with one month's provisions; for which, however, they are not to wait, but to proceed with that quantity for which they have at present carriage. The remainder will follow, and I have sent carriage for it from hence.

In order to facilitate the communication between the detachment on the Mysore side and that in Canara, I have ordered, 1st, that the officer in command at Jemalabad may ascertain the road between his post and the Soobramany pagoda; 2ndly, that the postmaster in Canara may post many runners upon it; 3rdly, that the officer at Jemalabad may take care that all letters, between the detachments, may proceed as addressed. The tappall from Seringapatam to Mangalore has, since its interruption by Kistnapah Naig, run by Oustara, the Gamut Kull ghaut, and Jemalabad. I have therefore ordered Col. Tolfrey, 4thly, to post runners from his camp to Oustara; 5thly, to correspond with the officer in command at Jemalabad, and ascertain the distance from his post to Soobramany, and the length of time which the communication will take: thus the chain will be complete, and its length known. Col. Tolfrey, however, may want a few peons; and, to complete the arrangement, there ought to be a steady writer at Oustara, who would take care that the packets for the officer commanding the detachment on the Mysore side should proceed to him regularly. For this I must request your assistance with Mr. Cochrane. I hope that the detachment of the Bombay army will be at Soobramany on the 20th; but, as Arrekeery is to be forced in the first instance, and as Col. Tolfrey's re-inforcements will not have reached him before that day, the arrangements for attacking the post at the Bissolee ghaut will most probably not be made till towards the end of the month. I hope, however, that, after Arrekeery shall have been forced, it will not be necessary to attack the Bissolee ghaut.

I shall be with you in a very few days. I shall not stay in Koorg as I proposed in a former letter; nor, even if the Rajah should be inclined to come to Seringapatam, shall I wait for him, but push on and leave him with the gentlemen.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Stony river, 15th April, 1800.

I have received your letters of the 11th and 12th. Enclosed I send you a letter from the Rajah of Koorg, which, in my opinion, affords a symptom of an intention not to proceed to Seringapatam. I shall be at Veerajundrapett to-morrow, from whence I shall be able to give you more certain accounts of his plans. His man says he is really ill: the doctor left him a few days ago free from disorder, but weak and wanting appetite.

The account which you send me enclosed in your letter of the 12th differs so much from that which I received before of the position at Arrekeery, and is so little foundation for the opinions given of its impregnable strength, that I am at a loss to form any opinion upon the subject. It is clear that there are 3 principal entrances to the place, that no one of them can be distant from the other above 2 miles, and that the forest, as it is called, cannot be 6 miles in circumference. Guns were brought to bear with grape upon the barrier attacked, and it appears that more guns are asked for or expected, therefore the road cannot be very difficult; and, as a havildar is recommended for promotion, for having got over the barrier, I rather imagine that that must be assailable to determined troops.

We here imagine that the sepoys did not behave with their accustomed resolution, which was the cause of the failure; and I am the more induced to be of that opinion as Col. Tolfrey particularly praises the European officers and non-commissioned officers, and the Rajah's troops, but avoids mentioning the Natives in the Company's service. I have, therefore, great hopes from the Europeans which will join the detachment. But it is impossible to say whether the attack ought to be made in one body, or two, or three; and if successful, whether, at this season of the year, it would be proper to press matters farther than to carry the post at Arrekeery.

For this reason I have determined, if there should be nothing to detain me at Seringapatam, to join the detachment myself. I have but little doubt that, if one barrier is carried, the whole will be abandoned, or so feebly defended that they will fall without much difficulty, notwithstanding what Col. Tolfrey says; but it will be a question, whether we ought to push on to the Bissolee ghaut, which must be decided by the true state of the case, in regard to the distance, (which, by the by, is greater by half as stated by Col. Tolfrey than as given by Moncrieff, who has laid down the ghaut by survey, and Munserabad by different bearings,) the road, the thickness of the jungle, and the positions said to be held by the polygar. Arrekeery must be carried at all events, on account of the lateness of the season: the other operations may be postponed without disgrace.

I shall reach Seringapatam on the 19th in the morning. In the mean time, by this post, I order 100 pioneers to be got ready to move, and provided with cutting tools. I have likewise ordered the grape shot and other things, for which Col. Tolfrey has asked. The tappalls in Malabar are like every thing else there. They are managed by a gentleman in the civil service, who resides at Mahec, where he is Dep. Commercial

Resident. It was not easy to get an addition made to the number of runners.

I hear from the frontier, that Dhoondiah has not yet taken Gudduck ; but it was expected that he would attempt to storm it in 3 or 4 days after the 4th inst. He was settling the country, and even had collected from it some money. I have this instant received yours of the 13th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Veerajundrapett, 16th April, 1800.

I omitted to enclose the letter, No. 1, in mine of yesterday, from Stony river ; the letter No. 2 is just arrived. I am informed that the Rajah has a disorder in his bladder, which confines him to his bed at Nauknaar. I have desired his man to inform him that I will return to meet him when I hear that he is recovered. I received your letter of the 14th this morning. If I find on the road that you have left Seringapatam, I shall not hurry from Periapatam, as I proposed yesterday.

An officer is arrived at Hullihall in Soonda ; his name is Capt. Marshall. I this day write to the coast to inquire what kind of man he is ; and if he should not be fit for his station, I will send somebody to take charge of the post. I propose to desire Sir W. Clarke to have an eye to that frontier for the present, and to afford it relief, if necessary, as there are no troops in Canara to send to it if it should be desirable to reinforce it.

P.S. I have desired Sir W. Clarke to make an arrangement with Uthoff for running a tappall between Soopah and Goa. It appears that Uthoff will be able to settle it more easily than Mr. Cochrane, who is so far from the road.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 21st April, 1800.

The circumstance of the charge for working money I perfectly recollect, and it was as follows. The right wing of the army was encamped on the Muddoor, the Nizam's detachment at Allagoor, the left wing was expected at Sultaunpett, and arrived there with the heavy train on that evening. A large quantity of forage had been discovered on the right of Allagoor, and had been guarded by the piquets of the army under Col. Campbell of the 74th, and by those of the Nizam's detachment. In the evening, by order of the Commander in Chief, this forage was carried over to Sultaunpett for the use of the bullocks of the heavy train, by the 2nd batt. 11th regt. This enabled the train to get on, at least as was imagined at that time. It may be true, as Gen. Sydenham says, that the working money ought to have been paid by the bullock owners, but at all events the sepoys were entitled to it. Barclay recollects the circumstance perfectly.

I received last night a letter from Col. Tolfrey, from which I guess that he neither thinks his force sufficient to take Arrekeery, nor does he like his equipments, as he wants hand grenades, of which I believe there are none in India, certainly none at Seringapatam. I have therefore desired him not to attack the post till Col. Montresor reaches him ; and by a letter received from him last night, I hope that he will join the detachment on the same day, or at least one day after, the Europeans will

reach it. When I found that the Europeans were likely to join the detachment before Col. Montresor could reach it, I wrote to Col. Tolfrey from Tellicherry a letter, which I sent express, and desired him to attack the post as soon as he found himself sufficiently strong. When a man says that the largest equipment which, under the circumstances of the moment, can be brought together, is not sufficient to force a post such as Arrekeery, it is not very prudent to take upon oneself the responsibility of ordering him to attack it. And it would be particularly imprudent in me to do so, as, Col. Tolfrey having already failed, there is reason to believe that he would be very anxious to seize the first opportunity of revenging himself, and, therefore, that he would not object to the size and strength of his detachment upon light ground. As hand grenades, however, are upon the whole all that are wanting, I have no doubt but that Col. Montresor will find muskets and bayonets sufficient, and that he will succeed.

I shall write this day about the Postmaster at Nuggur.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 23rd April, 1800.

I conclude that there will be no impediment to the communication by the Candulgull ghaut as soon as the post at Arrekeery shall be carried, and therefore it is desirable that the peons should remain upon the road, and the writer at Oustara. I have written to the commanding officer in Canara, to tell him that this interruption of our intercourse is to make no alteration in the instructions which I before sent to the officer commanding the detachment at Soobramany, and that the Post office people are to be prepared to carry on the communication when it may be practicable. I have received a letter from Col. Sartorius, by which it appears that our road was advanced about 6 miles beyond Pyche on the 18th. Will you and your gentlemen dine with me on Sunday?

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 25th April, 1800.

By a letter which I have this day received from Col. Palmer, it appears that the emissary at Poonah, who has been given up to him, was sent there by Meer Mahomed, the brother of Hunnar Ulia Khan. This man is at present at Hyderabad; and it is very probable that you may have it in your power to induce him to state whether he sent Mirza Aly Reza to Poonah, and the object of his mission. The account given by the latter throws no light whatever upon the subject: all that appears is that he was sent to Poonah by Meer Mahomed with letters and a verbal message. Not only are we ignorant of the contents of the letters, but, what is more material, of the purport of the verbal communication. I shall find out in a day or two who Mirza Aly Reza is, when I shall write to Col. Palmer.

I am obliged to you for the account of the arrival of the howdahs, and I hope they were acceptable to those for whom they were intended.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 26th April, 1800.

I enclose an extract from a letter, which I have received from Lieut. Col. Mignan, which contains uncomfortable news. I have, before now, received news from this same man which has turned out unfounded; and

this fort is represented as so strong, and so difficult of access, that, if any part of the garrison was on the top of it, I am in hopes that it is still in our hands: I shall know it to-morrow. At all events, I have desired Col. Mignan to equip to take it if it has fallen; and in case he should have no howitzers at Mangalore, I am preparing some here, which I will send down.

The employment of the 75th at Jemalabad will have no immediate effect upon our operations in Bullum, as you may recollect; but if the fort has fallen, it will have serious consequences, indeed, upon our means of putting an army into the field upon our northern frontier (if that should be necessary), and upon the operations in the next season in Wynaad and Cotiote. I reckoned upon 2 or 3 battalions of the Bombay army for the former, and all that might be employed in the latter will be taken up at this siege, which probably cannot be vigorously carried on till after the monsoon.

I have received accounts this morning stating that the Nizam's killadar and amildar have left Harponelly and gone to Rydroog, the whole frontier is alarmed, &c. Cuppage has sent me a letter which he has received from the Gonnair polygar, in which he says plainly, if a certain arrangement is made of the country, 'I will do my best endeavors to regain my rights by arms or other means.' And the amildar of the district writes to Cuppage, that this polygar has got 4000 or 5000 Carnatic peons. Looking at the whole of our situation, I have determined that, if Jemalabad has really fallen, I will collect as many troops as can be spared from the garrisons, as the only means of deterring the fellows, by whom we are surrounded, from rising immediately.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 27th April, 1800.

I received a letter from Col. Mignan this morning, dated the 20th, by which it appears that he is not certain that Jemalabad is taken. He says that a soubahdar arrived on the 20th at Mangalore, from Soobramany, that he must have passed very near to Jemalabad, and that he heard nothing of what had happened till he met the 75th regt., which marched from Mangalore on the evening of the 19th towards Jemalabad.

I have inquired respecting Mirza Aly Reza, and I cannot find that any such person ever belonged to Tippoo's family, or that he is at all known here.

I have just received a letter from Col. Tolfrey, dated 25th, in which he says that Bishtoo Pundit had informed him that he had received a report from the amildar at Oustara, stating that the fort of Jemalabad had been surprised and taken, and the whole garrison put to death. There is another letter from Kistnapah Naig, in much the same terms as the last. I rather believe that Arrekeery will have been attacked on this day.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 1st May, 1800.

I did not write to you yesterday, when I had ascertained that we had entirely lost Jemalabad, because I concluded that you would have seen the letter which I wrote to the Sec. of government. The fort was taken, not by Kistnapah Naig, but by 150 of the recruits, who deserted from

Mangalore in March, and they were under the orders of the havildar, who deserted with them. Col. Cumine expected to take the lower fort without difficulty; and he has been ordered to attempt it: to take the upper fort will be a long operation, for which I have made arrangements for collecting troops, &c. &c. I have not given orders for collecting the troops to the northward as I intended, as really the measure appears to me to be one of some consequence. Government have had before them, since the 19th April, the orders for putting the cavalry in the field, the information upon which they were founded, and such other information as might render necessary a more formidable equipment. Upon these they have given no opinion; and, as it is not a measure of absolute necessity, I do not like to go any farther.

Mr. Cochrane was to arrange with Purneah about sending off to Gonnair 450 of the infantry now at Mysore. I expect to hear this evening or to-morrow morning of the success of the attack upon Arrekeery.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 7th May, 1800.

As I expected you back, I have not written to you for several days. You will have heard from Mr. Webb of our success at Arrekeery. By the last letters from Col. Montresor, it appears that he was about to march towards the Bissollee ghaut with the Europeans and part of the detachment, and to send Col. Tolfrey to Saylispoor, with his own corps and the Rajah's cavalry and infantry, to complete the provisioning of Munserabad. The polygar had occupied Arrekeery again, and had begun again to establish the barriers. Indeed they had not had time to destroy the jungle entirely, and until that was done it could not be expected but that the polygar would still remain in it if possible, and endeavor to re-establish himself there. The great object has been gained; he and his people have been made to understand that it is not so easy to keep out our troops as they imagined, and I am afraid that the further subjection of him must be delayed to some future period. I will write to Col. Montresor to desire that, if possible, he will clear out the jungle at Arrekeery; but it is really not worth while to lose any man for that object, as there are many polygar stations of the same kind on both sides of the Hemavutty, and it will be impossible to destroy them all at present. We have got possession of the lower forts of Jemalabad; but the holders of the upper fort have fired upon Col. Cumine's flag, and refuse to have any communication. I have adopted a plan for blowing up the lower part of the steps, so as to cut off all hope of relief; and then we shall be able to secure the blockade by a force which will be equal to the defence of the lower forts against the attempts which Kistnapah Naig will make upon them. Howitzers will not answer at Jemalabad; and I have therefore ordered there a 13 and a 10 inch mortar, which must go from Cannanore in order to amuse those in the upper fort during the rains.

Dhoondiah, it is said, has got possession of Dummul, in the same manner that he got Gudduck; and that with his whole force he was advancing to Havanoor in the Savanore country, about 2 coss from Oollull, but on the other side of the Toombuddra. The cavalry will be

collected by this time at Chittledroog; and I have given orders that they may march immediately to Hurryhur, with 8 companies of the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 4 field pieces, for which I have sent bullocks from hence. The 1st regt. will have their gallopers, and the 2nd regt. will have theirs in a few days, which I have vamped up for them: it is impossible to do any thing to those belonging to the 4th regt.

I have sent orders to occupy Hurryhur with a small detachment of this infantry and 2 guns, if necessary; to remain in that neighbourhood with the remainder of the force; likewise to occupy Hoonelly with infantry and guns, if necessary: when the river comes down here the boats will be collected.

When the rains set in, it will not be difficult to ascertain Dhoondiah's plans, and to take effectual measures to oppose him. He must determine upon an invasion of Bednore and Soonda, or of Harponelly, Anagoondy, and Chittledroog. If of the former, he will remain on the other side of the Toombuddra till it fills; if of the latter, he will cross the river early. Our boats at Hoonelly, and a little intelligence in the people employed on the frontier, will give us great advantages in opposing either plan.

At Purneah's desire, I altered the disposition of the infantry as proposed by you. He thought cavalry would answer better in Gonnair (and if his description of the country be correct, I agree with him), and infantry at Bullum, where, by all accounts, the cavalry has not been of much use. We have, therefore, drawn away from the latter 200 horse, which are ordered to Gonnair, making in the whole 500 horse on that side, and have sent the infantry into Bullum. I saw the corps, and had some of their cartridges changed, and other exchanges made at the arsenals, and they are gone well equipped.

I thought that collecting the army was a more serious matter than it appears at first, and I am glad that I have omitted to do it, although, as a military measure, it is certainly desirable. We are getting a grand equipment of field carriages from Madras, and I hope that all will go smooth.

To Major Munro.

Seringapatam, 7th May, 1800.

I am glad to find that your people in Canara are so free from the foul crime of rebellion. We shall not be able, in this year, to make an impression on Kistnapah Naig which will keep him entirely quiet; but on the 30th of last month he received a beating from Col. Montresor, who took from him his post of Arrekeery, which will at least give him reason to believe that it is not easy to keep our troops out of any place into which they are ordered to enter. The entire subjection of him depends upon the destruction of his strongholds; and for that, as we cannot expect much more fair weather, we have not at present a sufficiency of time.

Col. Montresor is now gone through to the Bipollā ghaut; but I do not expect from that, that we shall be able to re-establish the tappall upon the road; that, I am afraid, must still go round by Canara. Measures have been taken for collecting in Canara as many troops as Lieut. Col. Mignan will require: one battalion must come from Goa, if he

wants it, and another from Malabar. It would not do to withdraw every thing from Goa; for in that case how is Soonda to be assisted, if it should be attacked? Not from Mysore certainly, for we cannot get there during the rains. Not from Canara, where there are no troops; but from Goa.

Soonda appears a favorite place of yours, and it is extraordinary that you should not have provided for it in some way or other; and that you should not allow your amildars to assist the paymasters in procuring provisions for the forts which are to be kept.

I think that, upon the whole, we are not in the most thriving condition in this country. Polygars, nairs, and moplads in arms on all sides of us; an army full of disaffection and discontent, amounting to Lord knows what, on the northern frontier, which increases, as it advances, like a snowball in snow. To oppose this, we have nothing that ought to be taken from the necessary garrisons, and the corps we have in them are incomplete in men and without officers. If we go to war in earnest, however, (and if we take the field at all, it ought to be in earnest,) I will collect every thing that can be brought together from all sides, and we ought not to quit the field as long as there is a discontented or unsubdued polygar in the country.

To Major Munro.

✓Serlingapatam, 10th May, 1800.

I have again, this morning, received a letter from the commanding officer at Hullihall, stating that the paymaster's servant cannot get grain, and that he begins to feel a want in the bazaar.

I acknowledge, in general, the propriety of the refusal of those charged with the civil government to interfere with the purchases which it may be necessary to make on account of the military; but there may be cases in which such an interference may be not only proper, but absolutely necessary. If the paymaster's servant is dishonest, it may be possible that nothing more may be required than to turn him out; and an honest servant may be able to procure all he wants, notwithstanding

G. O.

Serlingapatam, 8th May, 1800.

A detachment of gun lascars, consisting of 1 tindal and 20 lascars, to proceed this afternoon from the garrison of Serlingapatam in charge of ordnance for Chittledroog.

The 73rd regt., Capt. Tomkyns's company of artillery, and 100 pioneers from the garrison of Serlingapatam, and the 77th regt. and Capt. Balfour's company of artillery from the garrison of Chittledroog, are to prepare to take the field immediately. These corps will indent upon the stores of the garrison to which they at present belong for camp equipage; and those at Serlingapatam upon Capt. Barclay, and those at Chittledroog upon Mr. Gordon, for carriage. Mr. Gordon will take measures for supplying those corps with one month's provisions. Lieut. Francke, deputy commissary of stores, and an establishment for 20 pieces of cannon. These gentlemen will indent upon the stores at Serlingapatam for tents, and upon Capt. Barclay for carriage.

The Commissary of stores at Serlingapatam will prepare to send into the field 8 field pieces, with their tumbrils complete, and 300 bullock loads of musket ammunition. The commissary of stores at Chittledroog will prepare to send into the field all the Company's light ordnance and tumbrils which may be in that garrison.

Col. Wellesley feels much concern that the bad state of health of Lieut. Col. Disney should oblige that officer to be desirous of leaving his station, and should deprive the public of his services, and Col. Wellesley of his assistance in the command at Nuggur. Lieut. Col. Montresor will relieve Lieut. Col. Disney, and will command at Nuggur until the pleasure of government is known, as soon as he shall have performed the service on which he is at present employed.

the neutrality of the sircar. But it may happen that the sircar, or his servants, are not neuter; and that (as it is stated in this instance) the amildar throws difficulties in the way of procuring the necessary supplies for the troops: in that case, surely the interference of the collector is necessary to check the improper conduct of his servant. As the frontier is disturbed, it may happen that the people are unwilling to part with their grain at any price; or there may be a real scarcity, which may induce the people to wish to keep it. But in either of these cases, it surely is necessary that the Company's garrisons should be provided; and in order to procure a provision, the authority of the civil government must be exercised.

There are other circumstances under which the interference of the civil government might be desirable in order to procure supplies: but I only allude to those which it appears have hitherto prevented us from making any store of grain in Soonda; and into them I wish you would make inquiry, and take such measures as you may think necessary to remedy the evil.

Government have approved of the measure of throwing grain into the garrisons in that country: they will require about 1000 loads; and all I can say upon the subject is, that, if the grain is not procured, I do not conceive that I am answerable for the consequences.

To Major Munro.

Seringapatam, 17th May, 1800.

You will be glad to hear that I have called away both the battalions of Native infantry from Goa; and I hope they will join the army, which is forming to the northward, by the end of the month.

I have attended to your suggestion regarding the interference of commanding officers of posts in the prices of grain, and I have this day issued an order, of which the enclosed is a copy. An officer of Chandergooty has contrived to drive away all the bazaar people; and if I find upon inquiry that this is to be attributed to his improper interference, I shall put in execution the threat contained in the order.

I hear from Mr. Gordon this morning, that your amildar in Soonda has given his servant some assistance; and the consequence is, that he has got some grain. I hope the assistance given has not been to enable him to get it at a low price, but to get it at any price the ryots may ask.

You will perceive, by my letters to Col. Mignan, that I am entirely of your opinion regarding the utility of providing against disaffection at all points: we shall do well if we can provide against those places where it manifests itself by acts of violence and rebellion. I have urged Col. Mignan to provide for a call which you may make upon him for troops, to be stationed at Vittell; and as he will not require so large a force for the blockade of Jemalabad as I expected, he will be able to furnish what you may require.

Col. Montresor has been very active and successful in Bullum. But I am of opinion that nothing has been done which can tend effectually to put an end to the rebellion in that country; and that the near approach of the rains renders it impossible to do that which alone, in my opinion, will ever get the better of Kistnapah Naig.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 18th May, 1800.

In regard to Munro's public letter I have to answer, that the moment I heard of the riot he mentions, I wrote to the commanding officer in Canara to desire that he would provide a force to check it; and I do not believe there will be any difficulty in sending to Vittell the number of troops which it appears Munro thinks sufficient. It is very true that the mortars were all at Cannanore at the time when Jemalabad was taken; but it is not true that there has been time to get them from thence. I have heard that they have left Cannanore; but as the northerly winds prevail at this season of the year, I do not believe that they are yet at Mangalore. Munro is mistaken also regarding the howitzer, which he says is fitting up at Mangalore. It has been at Jemalabad since the 10th.

I am sorry that Munro thinks that matters do not go on so quickly as they ought in Canara; but one fact proves that they have not been very slow there, which is, that the fort of Jemalabad was surprised on the 19th, a force was before it on the 21st, and the lower forts were retaken in a day or two afterwards. That the mortars and shells were in Malabar, that they are difficult to move, and that the winds are contrary, is no more to be attributed to Col. Mignan than the surprise of the place was.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Archingberry, 22nd May, 1800.

I am obliged to you for your account of the murder, which shocked me much. I hear from Col. Saxon that he has taken measures for the apprehension of the perpetrators of it, in case they should be on the island; and I have hopes that at all events they will be caught, and will meet with the punishment which they deserve.

We are within 3 miles of Chinna, have got on well, excepting the Company's carts, which already want repair. We likewise want some bullock drivers, coolies, spare bullocks, &c.; but I have threatened a muster at Nagmunglum, which I hope will bring out of Seringapatam all those who belong to us, and have remained behind.

I have received a letter of the 18th from Col. Mignan, in which he says that some fellows had plundered Buntwell in the neighbourhood of Vittell, and about half way on the road between Mangalore and Jemalabad. He had sent a force there, and there were hopes of being able to cut off the upper fort of Jemalabad entirely.

G. O.

Camp near the Caryghaut hill, Tuesday, 20th May, 1800.

The troops to march to-morrow by the right.

The *general* to beat at half past 4; the assembly at half past 5 o'clock.

The detail coming on the duty of the quarter guard of the 73rd to move 100 yards in advance.

The guns, tumbrils, store and arrack carts, to follow the line in the high road. The baggage to keep on the right flank, not to go ahead of the line, and to keep clear of all sown fields.

A non-commissioned officer and 12 pioneers to go on with the advance, and the remainder to move at the head of the guns. Quarter masters, &c., to meet the Q. M. G. on the right of the line a little before assembly beating. Orderly hour to be 1 o'clock on halting days, and 4 o'clock on marching days, when adjutants will attend at the D. A. G.'s tent for orders.

I have received a most distressing account of the state of the 1st regt. of cavalry: they had been very sickly; latterly some men have died; the whole regiment are much frightened and out of spirits, and about 20 sepoy, 9 of whom had been many years in the service, have deserted. I have desired Pater to halt them at Hurryhur, to put the sick under cover, and the whole regiment into the fort, if necessary. As Dr. Anderson thinks they will not recover either health or spirits till they reach Arcot, I am afraid that I shall be obliged to send them to the rear entirely, and eventually to the Carnatic.

Gen. Braithwaite tells me that he will be obliged to call for the 4th regt., and will send 4 troops of the 19th. I have informed him of this circumstance regarding the 1st regt., and I have asked for the whole of the 19th. With that, the 25th, and the 2nd regt., we shall still be strong enough.

P.S. The 74th regt. are ordered to halt at Wallajahbad.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Archingherry, 22nd May, 1800, 9 P.M.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major Browne. Jerrah is in Soonda, about 4 miles from the Werdah, and close to the Marhatta frontier: it is 12 miles from Chandergooty, where we have a post of one officer, and a company of sepoy, and there is another at Bilghy, 12 miles from thence.

To order the cavalry to cross the Toombuddra and the Werdah Jerrah will never answer. The distance would be very great; and the country is so jungly, that they could not act when they should arrive there. I have written to Sir W. Clarke letters in triplicate, to inform him of what has happened; and I do not doubt but that the party will move out of the Company's territories as soon as they hear that the battalion is coming up, which must now be far advanced on its march from Goa. To attempt any thing else will be useless till I approach nearer to the frontier.

The communication with our troops in Soonda is cut off, as the tappall necessarily passed through Jerrah. I have desired Major Browne to draw the troops from Bilghy, to destroy that place entirely, and to reinforce with them the fort at Chandergooty.

P.S. As I think it desirable that government should receive this intelligence as soon as possible, as it may quicken their decision regarding our operations, I sent it off this night by express.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 2 miles N. of Chinna, 23rd May, 1800.

I have this morning received a letter from the Adj. Gen., by which I am ordered to send to Ryacotta 2 companies of the 2nd of the 5th. This will weaken us at rather a vulnerable point, but it cannot be helped. There is nothing for it but to withdraw some men from Nundydroog, and form a little detachment for field service, with guns, under Cuppage, which might move about from place to place as it might be necessary. It is not yet certain that the 74th will come up; but if they do, they shall be halted somewhere in front of Bangalore, to give a countenance to our troops thereabouts until we absolutely want them in this country.

I get on well: our bazaar is not quite so numerous as I expected from the appearance of that which was placed on the north side of the river. I rather imagine that the dealers there find their situation very advantageous, and that they will still remain there; and, if they can, keep the exemption from duties which Purneah has been so kind as to allow the bazaar hitherto. As this was granted only that they might be at all times prepared to take the field with the troops, it will be proper to withdraw it now that these are in the field. If any of them are staying behind, with an intention of taking an unfair advantage of Purneah's indulgence, the discontinuance of it will bring them out to join us.

I desired Capt. West to write to Mr. Cochrane, to request that the runners might be again posted on the road between Bangalore and Sera; and that he would write to the Postmaster Gen. at Fort St. George, to desire that letters for the army and the northern garrisons might be sent, by that road, in a separate bag.

P.S. Upon looking over Cuppage's returns, I find that he can have a detachment of 4 or 500 men, with 2 guns, leaving his garrison well provided, and a good detachment in Goomnair, which, in case of disturbance, he would of course join.

I have desired Barclay to write to Cuppage, and desire him to put this measure in execution, if he thinks it will answer better than the present arrangement; and I shall, by this day's post, desire Mr. Gordon to prepare for it, and M'Intyre to send muskets and ammunition, which is all they can want.

Severndroog and Oustradroog are occupied by small parties from the 2nd of the 5th: will you be so kind as to speak to Purneah about placing in those 2 forts a few trusty peons, on whom he can depend, that they will give them up to us when we may require them? I have written to the commanding officer in the Baramahl, to desire that he will make a similar arrangement with Mr. Graham for occupying Anchitty Droog, Ratengerry, and Shoolgerry. I enclose a letter from Col. Pater: will you desire Purneah to give orders to the killadar to make the repairs to the fort of Hurryhur, and throw in there a supply of provisions?

To Officer commg. 2d batt. 2d Bombay regt. Camp at Nagmunglum, 24th May, 1800.

I have received intimation, from Sir W. Clarke, that you are on your march to join the troops about to be collected to the northward.

Information has been sent to me by Major Browne, who at present commands at Nuggur, stating that a party belonging to Dhoondiah, consisting of 500 men, belonging to a musselmann, who had been before an amildar, in Soonda, had taken and plundered a mud fort and village, called Jerrah. This place lies close to the Marhatta frontier, about 4 miles from the river Werdah, 12 from the fort of Chandergooty, where we have a post, and about the same distance from Sercy. You will pass by these last 2 places, and I know that there is a road from the latter to Jerrah, as well as from Jerrah to Chandergooty.

I shall be obliged to you if, when you have arrived at Sercy, you will make inquiries regarding the strength and position of the party at

Jerrah; and if you find yourself sufficiently strong compared with them, I beg that you will attack them without loss of time, and drive them out of the country. You will hang all of this banditti who may fall into your hands. After having performed this service, you will proceed upon your march as hitherto ordered.

I enclose a sketch of the country from Soonda to Shikarpoor.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nagmunglum, 24th May, 1800.

I have received a letter from Col. Pater, in which he says, that there are no provisions in Hurryhur. He has, however, thrown in there 5 companies of the 1st of the 8th, and 2 guns; but I am afraid the want of provisions will oblige him to withdraw them again. He likewise complains of want of gram. There is plenty in the country, and I have informed him that Purneah has taken all restrictions off the sale of every kind of grain. I suspect the gram agents do not exert themselves as they ought; but I have given them a brush through Col. Pater, and have informed him that the system under which they are agents has not been hitherto approved; and that, if the service fails for want of gram, after all that has been done to procure it, it is more than probable that another system will be adopted.

What do you think of government having given power to the gram agents to draw upon Madras for 4500 pagodas each, without saying one word to any of us in this country upon the subject; the monthly interest of which sum alone is sufficient to pay for the monthly expenditure of gram?

I get on famously, and expect the detachment from Bullum to-morrow. The 1st regt. must go to the Carnatic; nothing else can save them. I hope the Rajah of Koorg is not dead: we generally lose by the transfer of a government from one hand to another. The battalion is on its march from Goa. I reckon that it will have arrived at Hullihall by this time, and will be at Hoonelly as soon as I can. I have sent it orders to attack our friend at Jerrah.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nagmunglum, 24th May, 1800.

I think the plan of marking the calves a very good one, and I shall be glad if it is carried into execution.

Lieut. Col. Montresor's detachment is come in, but the Native corps

G. O.

Camp at Nagmunglum, Sunday, 25th May, 1800.

Weekly states to be sent in to the D. A. G. every Monday morning, at 9 o'clock on halting days, and an hour before orderly time on the days of march.

Frequent complaints having been made of camp followers taking straw and firewood from the villages without paying for them, Col. Wellesley requests that gentlemen will give particular orders to their servants, and the Commissaries of grain, of provisions, and of stores, to the bullock masters to pay for such straw and firewood as they require; and he gives notice that any person found taking them again for nothing will be punished.

Col. Wellesley has great pleasure in publishing to the troops, on the day of the arrival of the detachments under Lieut. Col. Montresor, the G. O. by government, on the successful attack of the post of Arrekeery, and in adding thereto a public testimony of his approbation of the conduct of this detachment, which he has taken frequent opportunities of laying before government.

are miserably weak. Lieut. Col. Tolfrey's battalion has only about 300 men for duty.

I have had another letter from Pater, by which it appears that he had had an interview with the amildar at Hurryhur, with whom he was perfectly satisfied. The amildar had expressed his readiness to do every thing in his power to assist the detachment.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nagmunglum, 26th May, 1800.

I have received from Major Cuppage rather a curious account of a fellow who is raising horse in that neighbourhood, with the knowledge of the amildar, and who has not communicated to him any thing upon the subject; I conclude that you have received the account, and therefore I do not send it to you.

I march on to-morrow. Purneah has sent some orders here to allow all provisions coming to camp to pass free of toll. I understood that he had given orders to that effect in all parts of the country; and if that is the case, it will be better that our brinjarries and bazaar people should not have these papers in their hands, of which it may be certain that they will make a bad use. If, however, Purneah prefers that they should have in their hands these papers, rather than give one general order to all his amildars, &c., upon this subject, it will be necessary that we should have more of them in camp. I shall not allow any of these orders to be given out, till I receive your answer to this letter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Belloor, 27th May, 1800.

I have received yours of the 26th and its enclosures. I had already heard of the march of the battalion from Goa, and have provided bullocks for them. I did not know of their want of money; but Capt. Munro's supply of that, and of bullocks to bring them through Soonda, will be very acceptable.

I enclose you a letter which I received last night, which agrees with Capt. Munro's account, rather than with that of Ram Rao, of the nature of the force which has entered Soonda. Ram Rao's cavalry will have driven them out, before the Bombay battalion will be near them. It does not come by the Budnaghur road, but by that of Soonda and Sercey, unless the officer commanding it should alter his route, upon hearing of the irruption of these vagabonds. Whether they belong to Dhoondiah, or are only robbers, it is clear that it is necessary that we should come to an understanding with the Marhattas, regarding that frontier.

I enclose you some papers which I received last night from Col.

G. O.

Camp near Belloor. Tuesday, 27th May, 1800.

A company of Native infantry consisting of 50 men, with an European officer, to form the rear guard to-morrow. The officer will see that all the public stores, as well as the bazaars and baggage, move off the ground early, and he will come up in their rear. The brinjarries are allowed to come on at their leisure.

Capt. Heitland will send a party of pioneers, on coming to the new ground of encampment on marching days, to clear the lines, and to make the communication from corps to corps perfectly easy. He will afterwards make a road from the ground where the provision department is pitched, into the high road by which the troops march.

Sartorius, by which it appears that Dhoondiah has been meddling in Malabar. I acknowledge that I should rather believe the truth to be that the letter to the Cheral Rajah was written by the Pyche; but whether it was or not, it is very clear that the name of Dhoondiah is made use of among all the Company's turbulent subjects to create disturbances, and it is therefore the more incumbent upon our government to get the better of him. I have received an excellent account of Hoonelly from Col. Pater, who desired Capt. Balfour of the artillery to visit it. He reports it to be in a perfect state of defence: guns, powder, shot, provisions, &c., well arranged and prepared. All appears to be so perfect, that I do not propose to put any of our troops into the fort, unless the killadar wishes it; and I shall be obliged to you if you will mention him to Purneah, as a man deserving encouragement. The boats are in great forwardness; and there is a large wooden boat at Hooley Honore, which I propose to have brought down to Hoonelly, as soon as the river fills.

I return you the bill for the cook rooms, which I have signed, and to which I have annexed a copy of the authority which I received from government to build them. If you will send the bill to Gordon, he will pay it.

The pension to Mahomed Aly is 250 star pagodas *per annum*, payable at Seringapatam on the 'Family fund,' and is in Class No. 1. He received the arrears of it from the 1st Jan. We agreed about Shah Abbas, as you say.

The guards at Severndroog and Oustradroog belong to the companies of the 2nd of the 5th, and they will soon be withdrawn. This is the reason why I am anxious that Purneah should place people in those forts on whom he can depend.

I write to Col. Sartorius this day; and I shall desire him, in case he perceives any symptoms of serious insurrection in Malabar, to begin to bring his forces together, in such manner as that they will be secure, and prepared to join one another when the season opens.

I conclude that Stevenson will have informed you of the attempts which have been made to seduce the sepoys to desert from the 2nd of the 3rd. A committee was assembled to examine into the matter, but they could make nothing of it, although Stevenson thinks that Dhoondiah has been endeavoring to raise men at Chittledroog, as it appears that Cuppage thinks that he has been making the same endeavor at his post and district. It certainly is very desirable, on many accounts, that our troops should be kept separate from the inhabitants at Chittledroog; and I accordingly desired Stevenson to turn over the subject in his mind, and to let me know whether it would not be possible to remove all the inhabitants from the fort, properly so called, into what I understand is the pettah, although it is equally surrounded by a strong wall, and that the former might be given up solely and entirely to the troops, who should have nothing to do with, and should not inhabit the latter. I do not know whether Col. Stevenson has entirely comprehended the meaning of what I wrote to him; but if he has, he appears to be of opinion that it will be practicable, and not difficult, to remove from the fort all the inhabitants.

I shall be glad if you will let me know what you think upon this subject, and whether there will be any objection to the arrangement on the part of Purneah. I understand that the inhabitants of Chittledroog are very numerous; that they are of the caste of the old Rajahs; and were, in general, heretofore, sepoy and peons in the service of the Sultaun. They refuse to take service with us in any manner whatever: at Chittledroog we can get neither recruits, servants, lascars, coolies, nor bullock drivers; and I cannot think that it will be very safe to leave in a fort with our troops a large number of fellows, such as these are described to be.

Upon looking over the authority from government, I perceive it goes only to repairs; but the building of the offices was allowed, I know, in a private letter from Webbe. Send the authority to the Paymaster, or not, as you think best.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp near Myasundruin, 28th May, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Major —— of the 77th to the postmaster in Mysore, in which he makes a complaint of his servant employed at Chittledroog. I am concerned that he should have to complain of any of the persons employed under the civil government.

In order to prevent the inconvenience which must arise at all times from an appeal to the head of the office, whenever there may be any reason to complain of any of the servants of the Post office, I have this day given out an order, by which I request that all complaints may be made to the commanding officer of the place at which they may arise. I shall be obliged to you if you will do me the favor to inquire into the circumstances stated by Major ——, and let me know the result.

It is the business of the servants of the postmaster to deliver letters to the person to whom they are addressed, and to demand and receive payment of the postage established by government. But it is not his duty to refuse the delivery of a letter, because payment of the postage of another has been refused: in that case it is his duty to complain, and accordingly he has been ordered to deliver to Major —— his letter. It appears, by Major ——'s letter to Mr. Cochrane, that he did refuse to pay postage for one letter, and that he refused to pay for another letter, as double, because it was written upon a single sheet.

It is necessary that he should be informed that, under the Post office regulations, it may be necessary that postage should be demanded for a letter on the public service from Bombay; but there is one circumstance always required in order that a letter should be free of postage, which is that it should be superscribed, *on the service*, and with the official signature of the person who may have wrote it: in that case, if it is written by, or addressed to, a person entitled by the regulations to write or receive letters on the service, it is free of postage. Major ——, as commanding officer of the 77th, is entitled to receive letters on the service; but I understand that this letter was not so superscribed, and therefore the postmaster's servant was in the right to ask for the postage, and Major —— ought to have paid it. I beg that you will inquire into this circumstance.

The regulations of government point out that the postage of letters is

to be increased in proportion to their weight, and therefore it may have happened that the postmaster's servant was right in asking double postage for a letter, although it was written upon a single sheet. You will also be so kind as to make this matter a subject of your inquiry.

Although I have written more upon this subject than its importance may appear to require, I cannot conclude without expressing my concern that any officer, particularly one of Major ——'s rank and standing and experience in the service, should have written to a civil servant of the government the concluding paragraph of the enclosed letter. As I am convinced that it was not sufficiently thought of, and that the threat to take possession of the letter would in no case whatever have been put in execution, I shall say no more upon the subject.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800.

I received yours of the 27th yesterday, and I immediately wrote to Col. Stevenson to desire he would inquire into the circumstances stated by —— . I also requested him to let —— know my opinion regarding the concluding paragraph of his letter to Mr. Cochrane. I have given out an order to the purport proposed by you regarding the disputes of the officers with the Post office people.

I arrived here this morning, and I shall halt to-morrow, as my cattle have suffered much from the rain and from the refusal of the people of the country to sell their straw. The protection which has been afforded to the villages has nearly ruined us; but I have pressed my hircarra and the amildar of this place a good deal upon the subject, and I hope to get on better. I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah upon the subject, and prevail upon him to write to the amildars in this country to desire that we may have straw, paying for the same at the rate fixed for that delivered to the cavalry; viz. 4 bullock loads for a rupee.

I am afraid that I shall not be able to allow Col. Tolfrey's battalion to go to Paughur; as, however weak it may be, we cannot spare it. I may, perhaps, be able to take out from Chittledroog one of the battalions which are stronger, and to put his in there; but as he will not be permanently fixed there, I do not think that his situation will be much mended by that arrangement, although I shall gain a strong instead of a weak battalion.

G. O.

Camp near Mysundrum, Wednesday, 28th May, 1800.

As it sometimes happens that the Post office regulations are not understood, and that differences arise between the officers of the army and the people employed in the post office department, the officers are requested, whenever they have any thing to represent respecting the people of the Post office, to make the same known to the commanding officer of the station at which the subject of complaint may arise, and the commanding officer will be so kind as to inquire into the matter, and decide upon it according to the Post office regulations of the government. On the other hand, the Post office servants will receive orders to make their complaints, should they have any, to the commanding officers of stations, who are requested to afford them this protection, and to take such steps as the nature of their representations may appear to require.

G. O.

Cuddapa, Thursday, 29th May, 1800.

The price settled for straw in this country is 4 bullock loads for a rupee, or 3 single fanams for a bullock load. The load is to be estimated by the quantity which the animal sent for the straw can carry.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq., Sec. to Gov.

Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800.

I have received a letter from Lord Mornington,* in which he offers me the command of the troops intended against Batavia, provided Lord Clive can spare me from this country. I have written to Lord Clive upon the subject a letter, which he will probably communicate to you; and I have left to him to accept for me Lord Mornington's offer or not, according as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period at which he would propose to depart from the coast upon this service. The probable advantages and credit to be gained are great; but I am determined that nothing shall induce me to desire to quit this country, until its tranquillity is ensured. The general want of troops, however, at the present moment, and the season, may induce the Admiral to be desirous to postpone the expedition till late in the year. In that case, it may be convenient that I should accompany him; but I beg, if you have any conversation with Lord Clive, you will assure him, that, if it should be in the smallest degree otherwise, I shall be very sorry to go.

It appears by Lord Mornington's letter to me, that the order for the attempt upon Batavia comes direct from the King, and that it is reckoned a matter of some importance in England. I think it probable that it will

* Lord Mornington to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Calcutta, 13th May, 1800.

The object of this letter is to propose to you a situation which I think it would be unjust not to submit to your option, although I entertain considerable doubts whether you will think it eligible, with a view to your individual interests; and I am still more apprehensive of the difficulty of reconciling it with the exigencies of the public service in Mysore, at this crisis. You will, however, exercise your own free judgment on the subject, and I have no doubt that you will decide in the manner most honorable to yourself and most advantageous to the public.

I have received instructions directly from the King, addressed to me in my individual capacity, empowering me to take measures for the purpose of endeavoring to induce the settlement of Batavia to accept his Majesty's protection on the same terms lately granted to the colony of Surinam, and some time past to those of Deinerara and Berbice. It is not the intention of ministers to attempt to reduce, or to retain, Batavia by force. Indeed, a sufficient force for that purpose could not be spared from India at the present moment. The plan is, therefore, to send to Batavia several ships of war, with a force sufficiently numerous to furnish an ostensible justification to the Governor General to surrender the colony into our hands.

The King has given me the power of selecting the persons who are to conduct this expedition; and I have thought it, on every ground, most expedient to place the principal conduct of the equipment and negotiation in the hand of Adm. Rainier. It will be necessary to join a military officer in the commission with him; and a conscientious sense of duty induces me to think that you are the most fit person to be selected for that service, provided you can safely be spared from Mysore for the period of the expedition, which I imagine may be 4 or 5 months, but probably cannot be longer. In proposing this service to you, justice requires that I should state to you its contingent advantages. I have every reason to believe that the warehouses at Batavia contain public property to a very large amount. This will necessarily fall to the Crown; and in the instructions for the expedition to Surinam, the whole property of the same description was reserved expressly for His Majesty's pleasure, no part of it being granted to the captors by the tenor of those instructions.

The instructions, however, are so expressed, as to admit little doubt that the King's intention was ultimately to grant a proportion, at least, to the captors, of the public property at Surinam. My instructions, with relation to this point, will be precisely the same as those given in England with respect to Surinam; and I

be made ; although not immediately, on account of the great want of troops, and the employment already cut out for those we have at command.

P.S. I have just received your letter of the 24th, and you will perceive that I have decided upon the offer in the manner that Lord Clive would wish. Lord Mornington, in his letter to me, seems to think that it will be advantageous to me, and, from the importance of the object, in England, one from which I may derive some credit ; but I feel all that entirely out of the question, and I leave to Lord Clive to decide according to his sense of the public convenience.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800.

I have just received a letter from Lord Mornington, by which he offers me the military command of certain troops intended to be sent on an expedition against Batavia, provided your Lordship can spare me from this country. I am fully aware of the advantages which may attend, and of the credit which may be gained by the attainment of the object proposed, in sending troops to that place ; but, under the present circumstances of this country, I cannot express a wish to quit it.

From the information which your Lordship will have of the time at which Adm. Rainier would prepare to go to Batavia, you will be enabled to judge whether it may possibly be convenient to the public service that

therefore conclude, that the expedition will be very advantageous to the naval and military commanders.

The importance of Batavia, especially when considered with relation to the illicit and contraband trade which has excited so much alarm in England, will certainly render the success of the negotiation creditable to the officers concerned in conducting it. No previous negotiation has taken place with Batavia ; and it is therefore possible, although I believe it to be, from all accounts which have reached me, highly improbable, that our flag of truce may not be favorably received, and that the whole plan may fail of success. Having thus stated the whole of this case to you, without reserve, I desire you to make your option, upon your own view of the question ; with this single reservation, that I am persuaded you will be aware of the necessity of postponing any decision upon it, until you have ascertained that Lord Clive can substitute in your present command, during your absence, a person completely satisfactory to him in every respect. For this purpose, I request you to write privately to Lord Clive, and to act according to his wishes.

On this part of the question, much will certainly depend on the season which the Admiral may choose for the enterprise. I cannot, at present, give you any information on that subject ; but I shall request Lord Clive to communicate to you the Admiral's intentions, by the earliest possible opportunity.

J. Webbe, Esq. to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Fort St. George, 24th May, 1800.

I showed you a note from Wilks at Seringapatam, mentioning the receipt of dispatches from hence for restraining the Dutch at Batavia ; and I think we agreed that an armament against that place would be impracticable, under the present circumstances of this government. Since my arrival, I find that orders are arrived from Bengal for equipping a naval and military force for that purpose ; the latter, however, not to exceed 600 Europeans, and 600 Natives. Lord Mornington proposes that you should command the military ; but no force is to be used, and the government of Batavia is to be persuaded to put itself under our protection, in the same manner as Surinam. This negotiation will be conducted by the Admiral, so that I fear you are likely to obtain neither fame, nor prize money. I have no doubt, therefore, that you will prefer your present independent and extensive command, to being stationed at Batavia ; and Lord Clive has made a most earnest request to the Governor General, that some other officer may be

I should accompany him. I beg, therefore, that your Lordship will give Lord Mornington an answer, whether I am to be employed on this service or not, according to your Lordship's view of the public interest and convenience, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast.

To the Earl of Mornington.

Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst., and I am very much obliged to you for the offer which you make me of sending me with the Admiral to Batavia.

I do not deny that I should like much to go; but you will have learned, before you receive this, that my troops are in the field, and it is therefore probable that Lord Clive will be desirous that I should remain in this country, until its tranquillity is ensured, and the troops can be sent back to their different garrisons. I have written to him upon the subject, and I have desired him to accept your offer for me, or not, as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral at what time he proposes to depart from the coast on this service. If he should not depart until late in the year, I think it more than probable that I shall be able to go with him. I do not know which of the services will answer best; but I am certain that it will be more easy to spare troops

appointed, as his Lordship would not know how to supply your temporary absence from Mysore. I hope this will be satisfactory to you.

The immediate consequence of this order is the countermand of the 74th; and the 12th is so sickly that it is again gone into quarters at Ponawally. So that, if the expedition goes on, we shall be under the unavoidable necessity of crippling your detachment. Lord Clive has however recommended, on the ground of our defective military force on the coast, that no detachment should be made from this army for the armament; and I hope that Lord Mornington will consent to convert it into a naval blockade. In the event of the expedition going on, his Lordship has requested that the European regiment may be partly drawn from Gou for the service in Mysore.

You are to pursue Dhoondiah Waugh wherever you may find him, and to hang him on the first tree. For this purpose you will receive immediate authority to enter the Marhatta frontier.

Lord Clive to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Fort St. George, 26th May, 1800.

You have been already apprised by Mr. Webbe that the Governor General has received His Majesty's commands to take measures, in conjunction with Vice Adm. Rainier, to induce the settlement of Batavia to accept the protection of Great Britain, upon terms similar to those which have been granted to the colony of Surinam. To effect this important object, it is intended to open a negotiation with the leading people in Batavia; and in order to give weight to the negotiation, it is proposed that a considerable portion of the Vice Admiral's squadron, accompanied by a land force under the command of a respectable officer, should be in readiness to blockade the principal Dutch ports in the island of Java.

The force allotted for this expedition is to consist of a detachment of artillery and 600 Europeans, to be furnished by this Presidency and Ceylon, and of the Bengal Marine battalion, now encamped in this neighbourhood.

By a private communication which I received last night from Lord Mornington, I find it is his Lordship's desire, that I should inform him how far I may think it advisable for you to quit your present command, for a few months, that you may be joined with Adm. Rainier in the conduct of the negotiation with Batavia, and take the command of the troops intended for embarkation. But in all events it is his Lordship's wish, that the option between the two situations should be left to the decision of your own choice.

Previous to my receipt of Lord Mornington's private letter, I had, in a dispatch

from the Carnatic and Mysore, towards the end of the year, than it is at this moment.

Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy ; but, from circumstances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this country of Canara and Malabar, that that man should be given up to us ; and I doubt not that before now you will have made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have information that letters have been received by most of them, either from him, or from others written in his name, calling upon them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company's government, or that of their allies ; and his invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance favorable to their views.

The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity ; and nothing will be more easy, if the Marhattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are not, it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to this object. I was aware that this was the case, before the troops were collected ; and although I was certain

of the 24th inst., fully stated to his Lordship my sentiments upon the inexpediency and danger of further weakening our present incomplete and divided army ; and I have not scrupled to give it as my opinion, that, in the actual state of affairs in the Carnatic and in Mysore, it will be most for the public good to attempt the attainment of the object of His Majesty's commands by a naval blockade only of the principal port of Batavia. But whatever may be the result of Lord Mornington's deliberation upon my dispatch, I have deemed it my duty to represent, that it is not possible for you to quit your present command, even for a few months, without the greatest detriment to the affairs of Mysore ; and I have made it my earnest request, that his Lordship will select some other officer for this service. In sending you, therefore, the offer of the command of the land forces about to sail to the eastward, I have no hesitation in recommending in the strongest terms, and in requesting you, if I may be permitted so to do, to remain in a situation which I have long felt, and still feel, that you fill with singular advantage to our own country, as well as to Mysore ; a situation in which, for the prosperous settlement of our new acquisitions, integrity and vigilance of conduct are indispensable ; and in which your acquired knowledge and experience, especially in the event of active operations, must give you the advantage over other men ; and in which I should find it not only difficult, but impossible, to replace you to my satisfaction.

P.S. I learn from Adm. Rainier that the detachment of H. M.'s ships, which he proposes to appoint for the service in question, will be ready in 3 weeks.

Lieut. Col. Close to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Laal Baug, 29th May, 1800.

I have now to intimate that I have just received a confidential communication from the Presidency, containing matter which quite alarms me.

In consequence of orders from home, a force is to be sent off from the coast to take charge of Batavia, and it is said you are destined to command it. How is this to be reconciled ? Is not Mysore a great charge, and is not the command of the troops in it, at the present conjuncture, particularly important ? Lord Clive, I understand, cannot bear the idea of your quitting this country ; and, concluding that the conduct of the service at Batavia cannot be viewed as equally important as your present charge, means to solicit Lord Mornington to forbear taking you from Mysore. I hope your inclinations go with his Lordship's intention on this point. I cannot prevail on myself to look forward to the various uncomfortable consequences that would follow your vacating the command here.

that it was the only mode of saving this country from being plundered, I did not like to put it in execution without Lord Clive's orders.

It was clear that, when an army should be collected to oppose a man who had an asylum in the Marhatta country, and who may therefore be reckoned a part of the Marhatta state, the government would be committed with that of the Marhattas; and our honor would require that we should go through with the business, until that man should be given up to us, or that we should have some adequate security for his good behaviour. If, then, the government of Poonah is inclined to give this man up to us, or to co-operate with us in his destruction, it may be possible for me to go to Batavia. If they should not, matters here will take a very serious turn, and no prospect of advantage, or of credit to be gained, shall induce me to quit this country. Besides the destruction of this Dhoondiah, there are other objects, which comparatively, however, are of a trifling nature. The attainment of these might be given in charge to other people, if it should be thought desirable to postpone the expedition to Batavia, until matters are settled on the Marhatta frontier.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Cuddapa, 30th May, 1800.

I enclose the letter from Major Cuppage, by which you will perceive how the matter stands, regarding the amildar. It appears, however, very clearly that he was mistaken, as he reported the matter to Purneah.

I received last night a letter from Lord Mornington regarding the offer of the command of the troops intended for Batavia. He seems to think it an advantage to me, and that some credit will be gained by it, as the object is a great one in England; but I have written to Lord Clive to desire that he will accept of it for me, or not, according as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast. A letter received this day from Madras, with instructions to enter the Marhatta country, has determined me not to accept of it in any event.

P.S. Have you heard any thing from Macleod, or Munro, or Graham, about money? that is the subject upon which I am most anxious at the present moment.

What do you think of ———, who, when the 25th dragoons were about to ascend the Pednaig Durgum pass, ordered them round by Rya-cotta? I expected them to join me at Sera: they will not now be there for a fortnight; and I cannot guess for what reason they were not allowed to proceed by the route first intended.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Cheylor, 31st May, 1800.

I had the honor of writing to you on the 29th inst., after I had received a letter from Lord Mornington* upon the same subject with that from your

*Marquis Wellesley to Col. Hon. A. Wellesley. (Extract.) Fort William, 6th June, 1800.

Lord Clive has pressed for your continuance in Mysore with an earnestness so honorable to you, that I think you cannot accept the command of the forces destined for Batavia; indeed, I suspect that you could not quit Mysore at present. Your conduct there has secured your character and advancement for the remainder of your life, and you may trust me for making the best use of your merits in your future promotion.

Lordship of the 26th. Since I wrote to you on the 29th, I have received your Lordship's instructions of the 25th, which I am proceeding to put in execution; and I beg leave to decline to accept the command of the troops destined to sail with the squadron under Adm. Rainier.

When I wrote to your Lordship on the 29th, I imagined that, under the present circumstances, it might have been desirable to postpone to send troops on this service, until a late period of the year, when it might possibly have been convenient that I could accompany them; but as it appears that the Admiral will be prepared to sail in 3 weeks, I cannot think of relinquishing the command with which your Lordship has intrusted me, at this interesting period, for any object of advantage or credit to be gained in another place.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp near Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

I conclude that you will have received a copy of the instructions which I received yesterday from government, dated the 25th inst., and therefore I do not enclose you one. By these I am authorised to enter the Marhatta territory.

Upon a consideration of the whole of our situation, it appears to me that the best thing I can do is to cross the Toombuddra immediately, with the troops which I shall have with me by the time I reach it, and I think that I ought to cross it below Oollull and the junction of the Werdah with it: I shall then be in the Marhatta territory, and on the same side of the river with Dhoondiah; and if I find it necessary, I may wait there till I am joined by the 25th dragoons and the money, and I can collect there boats which may be wanting to transport across the river brinjaries, &c., which will follow me. The advantage in my being across the river will be, that, when it comes down, there will be less to be crossed over than if I remain on this side of it; and by crossing between Oollull and the junction with the Werdah, I save the passage of that river, and the march through the northern part of Bednore; and I am in a better place for receiving every thing, than if I were to go up to Anawooty and Jerrah. I might certainly cross the Toombuddra at Hoonelly, and wait there, in our own territory, till I should receive every thing: but then I shall have the Werdah to pass after it will have filled; and, exclusive of the difficulties of the march through the Bednore country, the passage of that river will be found as difficult as that of the Toombuddra: therefore, at all events, it would seem proper to cross the latter below the junction, whatever may be the period at which it may be crossed; and the question is narrowed to this point, shall I cross it immediately and wait on the other side, or shall I wait on this side, till I am joined by every thing I expect? I acknowledge that I think I ought to cross immediately, but I shall be glad to have your opinion upon this subject.

I believe Ball Kishen Punt is the principal Marhatta personage in Savanore, and I ought to write to him. Would it not be advisable also to open a correspondence with Appah Saheb and Goklah, Bappojee Scindiah, &c. &c.? Let me have your opinion on these points.

I think of moving 2 heavy guns up to Oollull, in case I should find them necessary. I have bullocks for them. I made a famous march this morning of 14 miles in 4 hours.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Capt. Macgregor to Col. Pater: I have written to the latter to inform him that I have received repeated letters from you, in which you state that there is no impediment to the sale of gram, or any thing else, on the part of the sircar, therefore that the gram agents have only to offer a good price, and they will get what they want; and if they do not get it, they must expect that other means of procuring it will be adopted, which may not prove very agreeable to them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 2 miles S. of Cullumbella, 1st June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 30th May, from which it appears that you and I agree in one point, viz., that, till we cross the Toombuddra, we can do nothing effectual towards destroying Dhoondiah, or dispersing his force. You fear for our want of provisions, and I have the pleasure to inform you that I have every reason to expect to have really 10,000 brinjaries. I shall have besides 1200 loads of grain in a grain department; and, in the provision department, arrack, which I can make to last 4 or 5 months, but sheep only for one. Of this last we shall find the greatest want.

I do not believe that the Savanore country has been much laid waste: that part of it which I saw last year was in good order, and appeared well cultivated. Soonda is certainly supplied from it; and, from the price of grain there, even when I was in it, I should not imagine that article to be scarce in Savanore. We shall certainly have some party in the country in our favor, and, if that is the case, we may expect to draw some supplies from it. I fear, however, a want of gram for the cavalry: the agents are very remiss. The regiments have carriage only for 14 days. There will probably be but little gram in the Marhatta country; and it is, in general, an article so cheap and so common, that it will be difficult to prevail upon the brinjaries to carry much of it. I must, however, try that; and I must likewise endeavor to remove the dépôt now collecting at Chittledroog, from thence to Hurryhur, or to Oollull, if you should agree in opinion with me as to the propriety of crossing the Toombuddra immediately.

I see no prospect of co-operation with the Nizam's troops if they are to remain north of the Kistna. All these objects of ———, so incompatible

G. O.

Camp at Angeysamoodra, Sunday, 1st June, 1800.

All the draught cattle, with the country carts employed in the provision department, and all the hired carriage bullocks, are to be handed over to Lieut. Mackay, according to the order of government of the 10th May last.

All the hired bullocks in the service, with the troops in the field, are to be mustered at 6 o'clock in the morning of the 3rd inst.

As more of the country bearers are employed to carry each dooley than are allowed by the regulations of government, they are to be paid 12 pagodas for each dooley they carry, instead of 2 pagodas per man, according to the regulations; and at the rate of 2½ pagodas for a maistry or duffadar, for every 6 doolies. Mr. Anderson will be so kind as to pay them all, at this rate, for the time they have been in the service, and he will continue to pay them until a general distribution of doolies can be made to the different corps. As those hired at Seringapatam, for the present service, were taken into the service early in the month of May, they are to be paid for the whole month. The Paymaster will muster and certify the number of doolies carried by the country bearers, instead of the number of bearers employed, as according to the regulations of government.

There is nothing in this order to alter the mode of paying and mustering the Carnatic bearers employed in this service.

with one another, will at last ruin us. If he is in earnest about Dhoondiah, why is not the subsidiary force to cross the Kistna and to come near him? But the truth is, that, while he fears Dhoondiah on the one hand, he has some wild plan in view to the northwards, and, if we do not cross the Toombuddra, Dhoondiah will plunder the Doab, and —— will not be able to prevent it with his troops on the north bank of the Kistna; at the same time that they will, most probably, be too far removed from the scene of action to be able to give their assistance towards forwarding his northern plans.

I will push off a letter to Lieut. Col. Maclean, as soon as I shall have determined upon my plan after hearing from you; but I think our communication will be useless, as he is to remain on the north bank of the Kistna.

Your account of the horsemen in the Nundydroog district is unpleasant; but I think that the measures taken by Purneah to keep them in check will have its effect, particularly when Cuppage shall have his detachment in the field. The families of these musselmenn are a strong hold upon them, and they ought to be prevented from moving either with or without them. If there is any serious collection of them, would it not be proper to seize the horse of every man not in the Rajah's service, or who may not be licensed to keep one? To do this will require some previous arrangement to provide for their sudden seizure, and for the care of them after they have been seized; but I do not think it will be absolutely impracticable. My idea of Chittledroog is to separate the garrison and the inhabitants, so that the former shall not be liable to be surprised by the latter. This, I understand, can be done without removing the inhabitants from what I, improperly, called the pettah, but which is, in reality, the fort. If I find that that is the case, I do not intend to bear hard upon them; but, as Purneah agrees in the propriety of the measure, I shall request the amildar to remove them outside entirely, by degrees, and at their convenience.

I am glad to hear such good accounts from Bullum, as I was afraid, from Col. Montresor's account, that there might have been some difficulty in keeping the garrison in Munserabad during the monsoon. It appears, however, now, that they have got confidence in themselves.

I have got a long packet from Pater, with which it is useless to trouble you. It is just the old story of opposition on the part of the amildar, for which there are *secret springs* which are entirely unaccountable. The pith of it is in the enclosed letter. I have written to him again, to tell him that orders have been given to sell every thing to his detachment, and that he has nothing to do but to pay. I have got on well in every respect, and I have not received any complaints respecting my followers. We have been well supplied with forage, since I wrote last on that subject, for which the people pay the regulated price. The green forage is beginning to appear, and we shall then be nearly entirely independent of the dry.

P. S. I enclose the concluding paragraph of Pater's letter, which gives some consolation, notwithstanding the *secret springs*. I likewise enclose a letter, which was brought to me by mistake last night.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sera, 2nd June, 1800.

I enclose a correspondence with Col. Stevenson, upon the subject of ——— and the Postmaster. My opinion of this correspondence is just this: that I ought to put ——— in arrest, as soon as I shall have received Col. Stevenson's answer to my letter of this day, and then forward the whole correspondence to head quarters. As a trial will be the consequence of this measure, it may be doubted, as the issue is always uncertain, and as ———'s letter, however indecent, is so worded as in some parts to have two meanings, whether I ought to put him in arrest, and whether I ought not to confine myself to the transmission of the papers to Gen. Braithwaite; but the persons to whom I have shown ———'s letter are clearly of opinion that no Court Martial can pass it over, and, therefore, I am afraid that, if I report him without putting him in arrest, I shall receive from head quarters a censure for not supporting my own authority. No man is a competent judge in his own cause, and I shall, therefore, be obliged to you for your opinion upon this subject, if you will send it to me together with the enclosed papers, and either the original letter, written by ——— to Mr. Cochrane, or a certified copy, as soon as possible.

I enclose a letter from Capt. Macgregor to Col. Pater, upon which some inquiry may probably be necessary.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sera, 3rd June, 1800.

I am sorry to tell you that there are many complaints from the officers who have been here, of the behaviour of the amildar. It appears that he sends them insolent messages; that what they want, such as artificers, &c., he will not allow them to have without his orders, which he afterwards will not give; that he keeps provisions, meat, &c., at an enormous price. I give some credit to these reports, because they are confirmed by a very good young man, a Mr. Macgregor, of the 73rd, who was some time in the 33rd, and who I know is not very difficult to please, and would not make the report, if there was not some foundation for it. It will be proper that, at all events, he should be put upon his guard, as we cannot expect moderation from our young men here, if they are not civilly treated. The place appears in fine order and getting on, so that it would be unfortunate if he were removed from it.

I enclose you a Marhatta letter from Purneah to the amildar of Buswa-puttum, from which I fear that he misunderstood the arrangement we made with him. I intended, and so did you, that there should be perfect liberty to purchase gram every where for every body; and, so far from wishing that Gordon should buy it near Chittledroog, I particularly desired him to make his purchases at a distance, in order that he might not

G. O.

Camp near Sera, Tuesday, 3rd June, 1800.

Whenever a man is sent into the general hospital at Sera, or into any other general hospital, a list of necessaries, clothing, arms, and accoutrements will be sent with him to the surgeon from his regiment. For these, the surgeon in charge of the hospital will send a receipt, and he will be responsible for them when the man comes out of the hospital, or in case he should die.

To-morrow, being His Majesty's birthday, Capt. Tomkyns will fire a Royal salute at sunrise.

interfere with the cavalry in the field. I am afraid that our friend the Paymaster has disobeyed my orders, and that he has teased Purneah into giving him or his servant the enclosed letter.

I enclose the draft of a letter, which I have written to the amildar of Buswaputtum, in order, if possible, to avert the evil effects of Purneah's letter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Woodanally, 5th June, 1800.

Some of our dooley boys from the Carnatic have deserted, and others are likely to follow their example. I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah, and request him to give directions to his amildars to stop them, or any others of our followers, that may pass through their districts. One deserter stopped, and brought back to camp, will tend greatly to put an end to desertion. I am very anxious to receive your answers to my letters of the 1st and the 2nd. I have received Col. Stevenson's answer to the letter, a copy of which I enclosed to you, and he says that he does not think ———'s letter in question an improper one. This by no means alters the state of the case, unless I choose to avail myself of it, as being the opinion of an officer of rank upon the subject, and to let off ——— by referring all the papers to the Commander in Chief. In that case it is not unlikely but that Col. Stevenson may be as severely reprimanded for his opinion, as ——— will be for his letter. However, I do not feel myself by any means inclined to this mode of proceeding; and I only wait for your answer to my letter of the 2nd, in order to put him in arrest.

Col. Pater sent an officer to look at Oollull, who reports favorably of it, and of the killadar. They want, however, some ammunition and stores, which I will forward to them from Chittledroog.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Ayamungalum, 7th June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 4th, for which I am obliged to you. I shall immediately make my arrangements for crossing the river; but I am afraid I am too late for Savanore, as it is reported (but by Stevenson's hircarrahs) that Dhoondiah has got possession of that fort. Ram Rao wrote, on the 2nd, that he was still at Dummul.

I have written to Col. Maclean, and sent off my letter by camel hircarrahs. I have told him that my intention was to cross the Toombuddra as soon as I could have represented the necessity of his co-operations, and have proposed generally that he should cross the Kistna and proceed towards the frontier. I have promised that I would write further when I had determined upon my own plan of operations, and should have been

G. O.

Woodanally, Thursday, 5th June, 1800.

No straw or other sort of forage to be burnt on the ground before marching, nor any larger fires to be made in the camp than may be necessary for cooking victuals. The nearest guards to be answerable for apprehending offenders against this order, whom they will confine, and report to the D. Q. M. G.

Officers and heads of departments are requested to direct their servants, and the people employed under them, not to take more forage from the country than may be actually necessary for their cattle.

able to decide in what manner he could co-operate in them from a farther knowledge of the country, &c. &c.

In the mean time his crossing the Kistna, and moving up the Dooab, will place him in such a manner that he will be prepared for whatever may be found most proper.

I have written to Ball Kishen Punt, and have proposed a meeting with him. I stated generally in my letter the outline of Dhoondiah's history, as far as we had any thing to do with it; have told him that we were about to enter the Marhatta territory, where we expected to be treated as allies; and have promised that I should exert myself to prevent any injury to the country in consequence of our army being in it. I have also written to Appah Saheb to tell him that I was advancing to oppose Dhoondiah, and should be glad to communicate with him on our common object.

I will let you know about ——— when I hear the result of a message which I have sent to him this morning. The order which I have already given about the Post office is nearly what you propose, but I will alter it, and I will give out the order which you wish for, regarding the price of straw, &c., on the roads. I have not yet seen any of the heads of the brinjaries, although I have sent for them frequently: I conclude that Purneah has desired them to attend our camp. If he has not, I shall be obliged to you if you will request him to send them orders to that effect: at all events, I have written to Vincatjee to desire that he will collect them at Chittledroog, as soon as he can. The elephant belongs to the karkhana, but you may as well keep him with you, till we meet.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Chittledroog, 8th June, 1800.

I told you in my letter of yesterday that I had sent Capt. West to ———, to inform him that I conceived his letter to be highly disrespectful and improper; as such, that I called upon him to withdraw it, and acknowledge his sense of its impropriety in a form which I sent him. He had one hour to consider of this proposition: he declined to do as he was required, and he was in consequence put in arrest.

I sent by this post all the papers, and a statement of the case, to the Adj. Gen. Since I arrived here, a gentleman has come on the part of ———, to say that he was willing to withdraw his letter. I desired him to inform ——— that he was now in arrest; that he had had an opportunity of withdrawing his letter and acknowledging his error, which he had not taken; and therefore that all he had to say upon the subject must go to the Commander in Chief. I shall be able to make an arrangement of the garrison, which will preclude the necessity of hurrying the inhabitants out of the outer fort.

Dhoondiah has got possession of Savanore, and I must lose no time in getting to the river. I believe I must alter my plan, and cross it at Hurryhur, or even at Hoonelly, rather than at Oollull; as whilst I am on my road to the northward, he may cross the Werdah, enter and plunder Bednore, before I can get over the Toombuddra to stop him. My plan now must be to cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, and to move up by the route marked in Little's map to Deogherry, and across the Werdah upon Savanore. It will still be possible to cross my brinjaries, &c., at

Oollull, as, after the river is full, I shall not apprehend for their safety on this side of it; and from Savanore, I shall always have it in my power to protect their passage of the river, and their junction with me.

There is a man here, by name Govind Rao, who I think would be very useful to me, and I have requested him to prepare to accompany me with his 50 horse and some of his peons. He is afraid that Purneah will not be pleased at his coming, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah upon the subject. As I shall receive your answer to this letter before I shall be far from hence, if there should be any inconvenience in his being removed from Chittledroog I will send him back immediately.

I have got a cock and bull story from ——— about the amildar of Chandergooty having promised Dhoondiah to deliver up that fort, and a correspondence between Dhoondiah and Baddamy Bistnapah, a commander of 2000 horse in the Rajah's service. This I take to be our friend the Pundit in the Bullum country. There is likewise another story of the same kind, about an attempt to be made by 3 men to murder Purneah. From all which I judge that our friend ——— has got hold of his old intelligencers, and that the sooner I join him the better.

I hope Gen. Braithwaite will not order a Court Martial upon ——— till my hands are less full of business. I have hinted this in my letter, and I shall be glad if you will give him a line upon the subject. In that case, ——— shall cool his heels, or his head, at Chittledroog, till the campaign is over.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Chittledroog, 9th June, 1800.

Between the officers on the one hand, and the amildars on the other, you and I have much trouble. I have given out an order which I hope will prevent matters from going wrong in future, as they have hitherto, and in which I have endeavored to interest the service of those who are

G. O.

Camp at Chittledroog, Monday, 9th June, 1800.

All corps, individuals, and departments are to make out fresh indents on Capt. Mackay for the carriage of their tents, the stores, and grain, &c., in their charge. These indents are to be sent to Capt. Mackay early in this day, who will bring them to Col. Wellesley to be countersigned.

Repeated complaints having been made to Col. Wellesley, by the Resident, of the conduct of travellers on the roads from the great stations in Mysore to the Carnatic, pains have been taken to render their accommodation as good as circumstances will permit, but in vain. The bazaar people cannot be detained in the villages on the great roads where they expect to meet with Europeans and their followers, notwithstanding the advantage which they might expect from it, as they are beaten and ill used and their goods are taken from them without payment.

Col. Wellesley requests that gentlemen will give particular orders to their servants and followers upon this subject, which is one which goes to the comfort of every individual who may be obliged to pass on the road. Orders have been given to the inhabitants to sell at a reasonable rate every thing which they may have and which may be required; but even the exorbitancy of their demands ought not to occasion their being ill treated, or that their goods should be taken from them without any payment whatever. The prices of the two essential articles wanting for a traveller, viz. food for himself and his cattle, have been fixed. The wholesale price of sheep by the Company's regulations is, in all parts of the country, 1 pagoda for 3; and the price of straw is 1 rupee for 4 bullock loads.

After this order Col. Wellesley is hopeful that there will be no further complaints on this subject; and if there should be any grounds given for them, it is to be feared that travelling from place to place will be rendered quite impracticable.

likely to travel. The behaviour of the amildar at Sera was ridiculously rude to the officers by all accounts; however, the lecture to him will doubtless have its effect.

I expect to march from hence on the day after to-morrow; I wait only to see some of the brinjarries. I got on well in every respect, and I have anxiety only about money. Has Munro given no answer to Webbe's letter from Seringapatam, to desire him to send to Nuggur all he had?

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Chittledroog, 10th June, 1800.

I am afraid that there is some mistake regarding the duties. I hear that they still continue to levy them in the country; and 1000 grain merchants, not brinjarries, coming to our camp, were stopped, and are now detained near Paughur. No brinjarries in yet, and I wait only for them. The collection of grain in this country also by the Paymaster, contrary to orders, is a sad grievance and difficulty, but I hope to get over it all by perseverance.

I am very anxious to be across the river. It turns out now (at least so Govind Rao says) that Dhoondiah is not at Savanore, but gone towards Noolgoond, which I acknowledge I think most probable.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Chittledroog, 11th June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 8th; and you will have perceived, by mine of the same date, what steps I have taken with ——. He is in arrest, and all the papers upon the subject, among others Col. Stevenson's opinion, are gone before the Commander in Chief. I have heard from Cuppage regarding his success against his neighbouring musselmenn.

I have the power of ordering a General Court Martial, and I will order one, if you think it will answer, which can try all fellows of this kind, found in correspondence with a man against whom there is at present an army in the field. Two or three questions occur to me upon this occasion, upon which I beg to have your opinion. Is the Court Martial to be composed of European or Native officers? If of Native officers, which is the most regular composition, when Natives are to be tried, it is to be feared that they will not pass the sentence which the criminals deserve, and the expectation of which alone induces us to wish for a trial by a General Court Martial. They will not pass this sentence certainly, if they have not the assistance of a very good Judge Advocate; and the question is, is there a person in the Nundydroog district, or one who could be sent there at present, properly qualified for this service? Cuppage I believe is; but it may be doubted whether it will be proper that he should act in that situation. I believe there are a sufficient number of Native officers in the Nundydroog district to compose a General Court Martial.

If all these objections to a Native Court Martial operate to create a preference for one composed of European officers, it will be necessary that the criminals should be removed to Seringapatam, or to the army, to be tried, as there is not a sufficient number of officers in any other part of Mysore to compose one. There must besides be a good Judge Advocate; and, I think, I shall find no difficulty in procuring one at Seringapatam.

The inconvenience to be apprehended from the removal of the prisoners, either to Seringapatam or to the army, is, that their punishment will not be so speedy as it ought, or so notorious as might be wished in the country in which they have resided hitherto, and in which they have all their relations, friends, and accomplices.

I have written to the officer commanding in Soonda to desire him to drive that party out of Budnaghur, if possible. It will not answer to put either of the battalions coming through that district out of their road for a trifling object of that kind, more particularly, as it is in the power of the troops destined to remain there to perform this operation.

I have received a letter from Mr. Gordon, in which he tells me that Macleod has in hand one lac of Behaudry pagodas, which he will give us if he receives orders, and a guard is sent for it. I have ordered the guard to be sent forthwith from Seringapatam; and I shall be obliged to you if you will write to Macleod that the money may be given to Mr. Gordon's people, who will go for it. I march to-morrow.

P.S. I have heard that another party of people are stopped near Pau-ghur for duties.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 4 miles W. of Burumsagur, 13th June, 1800.

The brinjaries came to me at Chittledroog, and I gave them dresses, turbans, &c. &c.

I have ordered the guard from Seringapatam into the Coimbatore country for the cash, in order to lose no time; and I have desired the gentlemen at Seringapatam to apprise Macleod of this arrangement, and to desire him to send a person to meet this guard in the Guzzlehutty pass, who will conduct them to the place where they are to receive the treasure. There will be no European officer with this guard. I shall be obliged to you if you will give Macleod a line upon this subject. Macleod's account of his warfare is excellent.

I had received the accounts of the discontinuance of the bombardment of Jemalabad, and had given orders that measures should be taken for its immediate renewal. I believe, however, that the 75th have gone back to Mangalore, and that only a sufficient number of troops to ensure the blockade of Jemalabad have been left there. That need not prevent the renewal of the bombardment, as soon as all matters shall be prepared for it.

I conclude, from the extract from Lieut. Col. Mignan's letter to Major Munro, that it is not necessary that grain should be stored in any of the forts in Canara; but I will inquire more particularly into this subject. Some time ago I wrote to government, and forwarded a proposition from Lieut. Col. Mignan, that he should be permitted to destroy a number of forts which are on the sea-coast in Canara, which contained stores of different kinds, and which he could not afford troops to guard: I gave him orders to destroy the stores at all events, which could not be deserving of our attention, and it might have been unpleasant if they had fallen into the hands of even the well-affected inhabitants of Canara. Government have answered Col. Mignan's proposition, in a letter which I

received last night, of which the enclosed is an extract; and I shall be obliged to you if you will ascertain from Major Munro his means of occupying any of the posts in question. Most of them are upon the sea-coast; and, in my opinion, there can be no doubt whatever of the propriety of destroying them; but government are right to ask for all kind of information upon the subject, and in the mean time they must be guarded by somebody.

The same letter contained a paragraph from government regarding the disaffected in Mysore, and in the Company's territories, and an authority to try them by military process. This authority is certainly entirely distinct from that which I hold by Gen. Braithwaite's warrant, and which was in my contemplation when I wrote to you on this subject on the 11th inst. Under this authority from government, it might perhaps be possible to take the whole matter upon myself, having a report made to me in some kind of form of the true state of the case. But it appears to me that the best mode of proceeding under this authority will be to adhere, as nearly as the nature of the case will admit, to the forms of General Courts Martial, and under that notion I have framed the warrants, instructions, &c. &c., which are enclosed in a letter to Major Cuppage.

A. G. O.

Camp at Honore, Saturday, 14th June, 1800.

The troops to be brigaded as follows:

Col. Stevenson is to command the cavalry.

1st brigade of Cavalry	Lieut. Col. Torin	{ H.M. 19th light dragoons 1st regt. Native cavalry 4th regt. Native cavalry }	{ Capt. Foulis, Brigade Major.
2nd brigade of Cavalry	Col. Pater	{ H.M. 25th light dragoons 2nd regt. Native cavalry }	{ Lieut. Lewis, Brigade Major.
1st brigade of Infantry	Lieut. Col. Montresor	{ H.M. 73rd regt. 11.M. 77th regt. }	{ Capt. Winston, Brigade Major.
2nd brigade of Infantry	Lieut. Col. Tolfrey	{ 1st batt. 1st regt. 1st batt. 8th regt. 1st batt. 12th regt. }	{ Capt. Buchan, Brigade Major.
3rd brigade of Infantry	Major Capper	{ 2nd batt. 4th regt. 2nd batt. 2nd Bombay regt. 1st batt. 4th Bombay regt. }	{ Lieut. Scott, Brigade Major.

The 2nd brigade of infantry will be on the right, the 1st in the centre, the 3rd on the left.

The park will accompany either on the right or left of the 1st brigade, as may be most convenient to the road, but on the march it is always to follow it.

A brigade of guns is to be attached to each corps of the line.

A piquet is to mount daily, to consist of 2 subaltern officers and 50 rank and file from the 1st brigade, and 1 subaltern and 100 rank and file from each of the others, with a proportion of Native officers and European and Native non-commissioned officers. This piquet is to be commanded by a captain, furnished by roster from the line of infantry, and he is to encamp with it.

There is to be a field officer of the day, who is to post and be in charge of the piquets, and to whom all reports are to be made. The officers for this duty are to be taken from a roster, including all those of the rank of lieut. colonel and major, of cavalry and infantry. There is likewise to be an adjutant of the day from the infantry under the orders of the field officer; it will be his duty to parade the piquets. The piquets are always to fall in in the order in which the corps to which they belong stand in line. On halting days they will parade at sunrise in part of the park, and will be marched off by order from the field officer of the day. On marching days they are to be on the marching flank of the line a little before the beating of the assembly. The old piquet will, on marching days, form the rear guard.

To-morrow the piquets will be paraded and posted after the line reaches its ground.

Returns of the names, rank, and date of rank of the field officers and captains who are to take the duty of field officer of the day and captain of the piquets, to be sent to the D. A. G. on coming to the ground to-morrow.

These papers I beg you will peruse, and, if you approve of every thing they contain, I beg that you will forward them to Major Cuppage, and desire him to put the orders they bring into execution. You will easily perceive the difference in the warrant and in the other papers from those usually given for a General Court Martial; they are such only as are required by the nature of the case, and the only material one is in the number of members which will be assembled. All that can be said upon that is, that it is the largest number which can be assembled with convenience; and that, in fact, it is as equal to all purposes of justice, as if it were larger.

I hope that Lady Clive will stay some time at Bangalore. Desire Browne to give me timely notice of her departure, as it is absolutely necessary that I should have an officer of intelligence there, during the time that I may be in the field.

P.S. Upon considering the warrant and instructions enclosed to Major Cuppage, I am afraid that the officers will have some scruple of proceeding to trial on account of the deficiency of their numbers, &c. &c.; and that they will scruple about sentencing to death, as they will not have the number of members competent to pronounce it. But if you write to Cuppage upon the subject, I shall be obliged to you if you will desire him to quiet them by assuring the officers that, in case of any irregularity in their sentence, the responsibility will rest upon me, who must confirm it, and must order it to be carried into execution.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hurryhur, 16th June, 1800.

I have received your 2 letters of the 12th. Capt. Barclay wrote to Major Cuppage an opinion which I delivered, in case there was any evidence against the man in question. It has since appeared that there is; but, for many reasons, I should prefer his being tried. I send what you say respecting Mr. Ward of the 25th dragoons to Major Blaquiére, who will make inquiries into the circumstance. It is extraordinary that the bazaar man should not have gone to Major Blaquiére, or to Capt. Browne, to make his complaint, at the moment when cause for it was given.

I have likewise received your letter of the 13th. I desired Lieut. Col. Maclean to communicate my letter to Capt. Kirkpatrick and to Lieut. Col. Dalrymple. This fully explained my wishes and my own plans as far as was practicable at the moment: I shall, however, write to Capt. Kirkpatrick upon the subject.

I enclose you a letter from Lieut. Col. Palmer, which I received this morning, and which I shall be obliged to you if you will return to me deciphered. I beg also that you will send me a key of the cipher. The postscript of the letter is very satisfactory.

The river is come down, and I shall be obliged to cross every thing in boats. Of these there are scarcely any, and no materials here; notwithstanding

G. O.

Camp at Hurryhur, Sunday, 15th June, 1800.

All corps and departments to be held in readiness to cross the river at the shortest notice, which will be given as boats can be supplied to them.

Capt. Mackay will keep the elephants ready to carry the camp equipage over the river, of such corps, &c., as may be directed to cross

standing that nearly 2 months have elapsed since you and I spoke particularly to Purneah upon the subject, and explained to him the necessity of having boats at this place, at Hoonelly, and Hooley Honore. I besides desired Col. Pater to give his attention to this object: but he says that he never could prevail upon the amildar to do any thing in the business. This inattention in the amildar is a most serious inconvenience at the present moment, and may be attended with very unpleasant consequences.

I have to complain of him upon another subject. The fort of Arnee is about 6 miles from hence, and the Bhow's killadar of it the brother of the peiskear of Hurryhur. The two places were in constant communication. He allows this killadar to evacuate the fort, without giving any notice of this intention to Col. Pater, who was within 6 miles of him: when it was evacuated he apprized me of it, and, as I was at the distance of 16 miles from hence, I could not send people to take possession. I wrote to him, however, by express, and begged that he would send over some people to keep possession, till I came up: this he omitted. Dhoondiah's people are in the fort, and I must now take it by force. I cannot impute treachery to him; but he certainly wants ability, and zeal, and activity, and, therefore, ought not now to be at this important station.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hurryhur, 16th June, 1800.

Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received a letter from Capt. Kirkpatrick, in which he encloses sunnuds to all the Nizam's sirdars in this part of the country; and another from Col. Maclean. The latter informs me that he has not been joined by Saddoolah Khan, but that he has with him 1000 horse. His 2 corps are about 1400 men with 8 guns. Saddoolah Khan is at Copaul or at Bellary. The Kistna and Toombuddra are both full; Col. Maclean is employed in crossing the former, but he does not know whether Saddoolah Khan is in the Dooab or not.

I have written to him to desire that he will endeavor to communicate

G. M. O.

Camp at Hurryhur, Monday, 16th June, 1800.

Major Desse will send a return to Capt. Mackay stating the number of bullock loads of tents he has to send over the river, and Capt. Mackay will furnish elephants to carry them.

It is very desirable that some arrangement should be made, and as much regularity as is possible should be observed in the passage of the river. The commanding officers of corps should settle the order in which the sepoys and their baggage should pass, whether the battalion should go over first and then be followed by its baggage and stores, or that the baggage of each company should follow the company to which it belongs: but, at all events, it is desirable that the baggage and sepoys should not be passed over at the same time. It is also desirable that a particular spot should be appointed at which the boats should be landed, and an officer of the corps which, or whose baggage, they may be employed in crossing, ought to be at that spot to see that they are not overloaded, and that every thing is conducted with as much regularity as is practicable.

As the boats are forced by the current to a considerable distance below the place at which it may be expedient to load them, it will be necessary that a party on fatigue should be employed to draw them up the stream along-shore to the spot at which they are to receive their loads. An officer ought also to be appointed to superintend the unloading of the boats on the other side of the river; and a party on fatigue ought to be employed for that purpose, as well as to draw the boats up the stream as high as possible before they are sent back to this side.

When an officer commanding a corps shall have nearly got his whole corps and his baggage over the river, and that it is probable that he will have no further occasion for the boats, he will give notice thereof to Col. Wellesley, in order that another corps or department may receive timely orders to prepare to pass.

with Saddoolah Khan immediately, and form a junction with him. If he should be at Copaul, that will not be difficult, consistently with a compliance with the wish I expressed in my letter of the 6th, that the detachment should move up the Doab towards the frontier. If he should be at Bellary, and should not yet have commenced to cross the Toombuddra, it is not reasonable to expect any co-operation from him immediately; and I have, therefore, left it to Col. Maclean to move forward to the frontier or not, according as he may think it safe, from the intelligence which he will receive, apprising me of his situation. At the same time I have asked Heshmut Jung * for the grenadiers and the cavalry from Hyderabad, which I expect will be well forward before I am across the Werdah.

One Goa battalion joined me this day: the other was not to leave Hullah, I believe, till the 8th, and probably later. I have got a battalion and 4 guns, and a regiment of cavalry across the river. This day some fellows showed themselves in our front in the old way, but went off immediately.

Ball Kishen Punt was expected this night, and I hope I shall see him to-morrow. My idea is to give him charge, and to make him put tannahs in those forts, &c., which I may not think it absolutely necessary, for our own safety, to keep in our own hands. I looked at Arnee this morning; and I intend to attack that fort, or Rannee Bednore, as soon as I shall have had a conference, and shall have made my arrangements, with Ball Kishen. By the by, I forgot to mention to you that Grant has informed me that duties are levied upon gram coming to Seringapatam. Was there any thing settled upon that subject lately?

I propose to send a letter to Saddoolah Khan in the morning, to desire him to join Lieut. Col. Maclean as soon as he can.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Hurrybur, 16th June, 1800.

I had this day the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st inst., with its enclosures.

On the 6th inst. I addressed to Lieut. Col. Maclean a letter, of which I requested that he would lay a copy before you. This explained my wishes regarding that officer's detachment, as fully as it is in my power to state them at the present moment.

By a letter received from Col. Maclean this day, dated the 6th inst., I perceive that officer was about to cross the Kistna, which had filled. He also informs me that he had not been joined by Saddoolah Khan, or by a larger body of the Nizam's troops than 1000 horse. I have therefore desired him immediately to communicate with Saddoolah Khan, and to form a junction with the corps under the orders of that sirdar as soon as he can. The whole will afterwards advance towards the frontier.

* Capt. Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

G. A. O.

16th June, 1800.

A naig and 6 sepoys to be sent immediately to the ford, where the boats are working. He will receive charge of the boats from the officer who may be using them, at sunset, and will deliver them back to him in the morning; and will permit no person to make use of them, in the mean time, without Col. Wellesley's express order.

If the services of Lieut. Col. Dalrymple, and the grenadiers and cavalry mentioned in your letter, are not likely to be required in another quarter, I certainly think it desirable that they should be brought down upon Dhoondiah Waugh. My reason for wishing that large bodies of troops should be collected to oppose this man is, not that they are wanted to subdue him when he will be met, but because it will be necessary to form several detachments, each capable in itself of acting, in order completely to get the better of him. He is now encamped with the largest body of his troops at Savanore. He has parties on this side the Werdah; and nearly every fort and stronghold on both sides of that river are held by his garrisons.

I am employed in crossing the Toombuddra, which has filled. I have heard from Lieut. Col. Palmer of the success of his negotiation with the Peshwah.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hurryhur, 18th June, 1800.

I have been more concerned than I can express at the receipt of your letter of the 15th. The misconduct of these gentlemen undoubtedly gives you, as well as me, a great deal of trouble; but I declare that it gives me more anxiety than any thing in which I have any concern.

If I had heard of the circumstance which you mentioned to me at Seringapatam, previous to the appointment of the gentleman in question to his command, he certainly never should have been appointed; and he never should have gone to it, if, in the conversation which I had with him at Nagmunglum, he had not expressed himself much like a gentleman, and stated a determination to adhere to what had been settled by ——. I acquainted him with every circumstance which you told me, and, at the same time, informed him of my determination to remove him from his command, if I should hear the smallest complaint of his dubash. He promised that he would not have one; and I acknowledge I little expected to hear that there were grounds of complaints still stronger than they would have been, if the dubash had been at ——. He is a gentleman, a man of the world, and one who appears to look to his character. I write to him by this post, and you may depend upon it that he must either act as he ought, or he shall be removed from his command.

I acknowledge that, both as an officer and as a gentleman, I should be glad to see all those commands abolished; nothing can be more prejudicial to discipline, and nothing more disgraceful to the character and feel-

G. M. O.

Camp at Hurryhur, Tuesday, 17th June, 1800.

A man from each Native infantry corps to be sent immediately to the place where the boats are working on the river as orderlies to the D. Q. M. G., and to be relieved daily until further orders.

In order to insure the regularity of the attendance of the boat people, and to have at all times certain means of communication between the officer commanding the corps or the head of the department which may be crossing the river, and the amildar and Native servants of Hurryhur, the D. Q. M. G. is put in charge of them, and is to superintend the passage of the river. He is to have an orderly from each Native corps of the line.

It appears that the bullocks when taken over by the boats impede them so much, that Col. Wellesley is induced to desire that they may not be allowed to pass with them. He is further induced to give this order, as it appears that they will cross with more ease and safety to themselves, if driven across at any of the fords.

ings of a gentleman, than what goes on almost daily; but, as long as they are even more than tolerated by government, it is difficult for any man in a subordinate situation to draw a line, and these kind of unpleasant circumstances must constantly arise: but, from what you say, I hope ere long to see some arrangement made which will really abolish the whole.

The disputes between the officers and the amildars are equally irksome, and, I believe, owe their origin to the same circumstance. There is not, at this moment, a post by which I do not receive letters of complaint from some man or other. To enter into a detailed inquiry upon the subject is impossible, and to decide without inquiry would be unjust; and one is, therefore, reduced to an impotent exhortation to be upon good terms with the officers of the Rajah's government. We have never been hitherto accustomed to a Native government; we cannot readily bear the disappointments and delays which are usual in all their transactions; prejudices are entertained against them, and all their actions are misconstrued, and we mistrust them. I see instances of this daily in the best of our officers, and I cannot but acknowledge that, from the delays of the Natives, they have sometimes reason to complain; but they have none to ill use any man.

The river has risen, and we get on but slowly. I have not yet got over another regiment of cavalry. I expect some boats in the course of this night or to-morrow from Hoonelly. About 300 horse appeared in our front yesterday, but went off immediately after Pater opened his guns upon them.

Ball Kishen Punt arrived yesterday, and I had a long conversation with him. He told me that Appah Sahib and Goklah were pressed for money, and had gone towards Kittoor to procure some from the polygar; but they would doubtless advance upon Dhoondiah in co-operation with me, as soon as I should be prepared to move from the river. He said that, as we advanced, we should find plenty of grain, forage, &c., and that there was not a fort in the possession of Dhoondiah, Dummul excepted, into which we should not walk with the greatest ease. He was rather solicitous to know our object. I told him that we had none excepting to get the better of Dhoondiah, of whom we saw clearly that, as long as he existed and had power, the Company's territories would never be in tranquillity. I desired him to prepare to co-operate with us, and to cross the river with me. He has here about 300 or 400 horse.

Dhoondiah is still at Savanore with the largest part of his force; there are some troops on this side of the river Werdah, but I do not know what number, and I am not quite certain that the Werdah has filled. As soon as I find out the general number of troops on this side, and if the Werdah fills, I intend to advance Stevenson with the cavalry, and a corps of infantry, guns, &c., and hunt out every thing on this side of that river. I have desired Ball Kishen Punt to be prepared to throw people into Rannee Bednore, when we shall get possession of it.

I enclose a copy of a proclamation which I propose to issue. Ball Kishen Punt has seen it, and approves of it, and has even altered some of Ogg's bad Marhatta phraseology.

I have just had one of Pater's men with me, who swears that Dhoondiah,

with his whole army, is on this side of the Werdah; that all his sirdars have sworn to conquer or die; that Purneah, Badamy, Kistnapah, Ram Rao, Kishen Rao, and all the amildars, muttaseddees, &c., of the Rajah's government, and all the bramins are on his side; and that he is determined that his victorious standard shall fly on Seringapatam. I have recommended to Pater to confine this fellow, at all events till we are stronger on the other side of the river; whether for knavery or folly will be decided hereafter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I send you an affidavit taken by a brinjarry, regarding duties taken from him at Chindgherry. I made him swear to his story, in order that there might be no mistake about the matter. I have also the pleasure of enclosing you an extract of a letter, which I have received this morning, from ———, from which I judge, either that Ram Rao misunderstood what passed, or that it has been misrepresented. It is very desirable that the matter should be sifted to the bottom. I hope, however, from your last letter, that some general arrangement will be made which will wipe off at once and entirely all these commands.

We are getting on by degrees. All the cavalry are across the river, and every thing belonging to them. The Europeans, and every thing belonging to them, will be across early to-morrow, and I think every thing will be clear over in a few days.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I have received the honor of your Lordship's letter of the 14th inst., in which you desire to have my opinion regarding the extent of the military force which will be necessary for the new territory which your Lordship informs me will be assigned by the Nizam to the exclusive management of the Company for Mysore, Malabar, Canara, and Goa. It is difficult to give an opinion regarding the new territory, of which I have but little knowledge; but as your Lordship has desired it, I shall proceed to state what has occurred to me upon the subject.

The question which your Lordship has put to me involves considerations affecting the whole of our military system in this country. When the country proposed to be ceded to the Company is likewise to be defended, its inhabitants to be kept in tranquillity, and its revenue to be realized by means of the troops, it is impossible to expect to be able to effect these objects on the system of weak and dispersed garrisons, on which we have been acting hitherto. This must be changed: neither the new territory, nor the old, can be kept in awe by troops dispersed in forts, which they cannot quit with safety; and, therefore, the system which I should recommend would be to garrison those posts only which are abso-

G. M. O.

Camp at Hurryhur, Friday, 20th June, 1800.

As the orders of the 3rd June regarding European soldiers and others sent into hospitals may be misunderstood, they are explained as follows:

When an officer is left in charge of sick, whether belonging to his own corps or of any other, he is to have charge of their arms, &c., and is to draw their pay. When that officer is withdrawn from that station, and delivers over the charge to another officer or to the surgeon of the hospital, such officer, or the surgeon of the hospital to whom the charge may be delivered, will be responsible for whatever arms, &c., the men may have at the time.

lutely necessary to us, and to have at all times in the field, and in motion, 2 or 3 regiments of Europeans, all the cavalry, and as large a body of Native infantry as can be got together. This will be a real security, not only to the new territory and to Mysore, but to the Carnatic, Malabar, and Canara, and nothing else ever will. It will appear more clearly that this system is necessary in the new territory, when the nature of its inhabitants, and the governments to which they have been accustomed, are considered.

The whole of the country to be ceded by the Nizam is inhabited by petty rajahs and polygars, who have never been entirely subdued, and have never submitted to the species of government which must be exercised by the Company's servants. They have been accustomed either to the rapacity and corruption of Tippoo's government, or to the weakness of the Nizam's; but they are entirely unacquainted with the restraint of a regular authority, constructed upon the principles adopted by the Company's government. This they will resist; and they must be kept in awe, particularly at first, by a large and an active force. For this purpose troops in garrison will never answer; and supposing that your Lordship should adopt the system I propose, for having, at least for some time, a large detachment in the field, I shall proceed to estimate the number of troops which will be necessary in the garrisons which ought to be occupied.

The number of troops in Malabar is 2 companies of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, 3 battalions of the Company's sepoys, 3 battalions of sebundies, and 3 of Travancore troops.

The civil government of Malabar is now conducted upon such a system, that it is impossible to recommend that this force should be weakened; a partial alteration in any part of the civil or military government will not answer. Hereafter, when there shall have been time to settle that country, it may be practicable to diminish that force considerably. In Canara there are one company of artillery, one regiment of Europeans, and 4 battalions of the Company's sepoys; none of these battalions are complete; 2 of them are of the new 18th regt.; and since the loss of Jemalabad, I have been obliged to add to this force the flank companies of the Native corps which were at Goa. I do not think it would be proper to diminish it at present.

The violence of the monsoon in Malabar and Canara, which prevents the troops from keeping the field, will at all times operate as a reason for keeping more troops in the garrisons which may be in those countries, than would otherwise be necessary. The circumstance, which made it desirable that there should be a British force at Goa, no longer existing, the troops might perhaps be withdrawn entirely from thence for the present, or Goa might be made a station for one Native battalion. If that arrangement should take place, there will be required below the ghauts—

	Companies of artillery.	European regt.	Bombay sepoys.	Sebundies.	Travancore regt.
In Malabar.....	2	1	3	3	3
In Canara.....	1	1	4		
At Goa			1		
	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 2	<hr/> 8	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 3

As long as any of the inhabitants are suffered to remain in Seringapatam, there ought not to be a smaller body of troops than are there at this moment; but if the inhabitants were removed to the pettah, a very small garrison would keep it, excepting at the time when an attack upon it might be expected. As, however, the removal of the inhabitants must be a work of time, I shall estimate the garrison of Seringapatam at its present strength: 2 companies of artillery, one regiment of Europeans, 2 battalions of Native infantry.

There ought to be at Chittledroog at least one company of artillery, and 2 battalions of Native infantry. The province of Bednore will require one battalion of Native infantry, and the province of Soonda at least another. There ought likewise to be a battalion in the Nundydroog district. As Paughur is upon the frontier of the territory to be ceded to the Company, it may not perhaps be necessary that there should be a battalion there.

Thus the troops necessary for garrisons only in the Mysore country will be 3 companies of artillery, one regiment of Europeans, and 7 battalions of Native infantry; but if it should be necessary to have a garrison in the Paughur district, another battalion will be required. Excepting at Chittledroog, where I have left only one battalion, and at Paughur, where there are 200 men, I have been obliged to leave troops in the garrisons, as I have above estimated them. In the new territory there ought to be a battalion between Harponelly and Anagoondy, as those places are immediately upon the Marhatta frontier; one at Adoni; one, at least, at Gooty; one at Kurnool; one at Cuddapa; and one at Gurrumconda. Every other post or stronghold in the newly ceded territories, and those in Mysore, not occupied by the Hon. Company's troops, or those of the Rajah of Mysore, ought to be immediately destroyed, and particularly their means of affording water ought to be entirely annihilated. Thus the whole body of troops, which will be required only as garrisons, should your Lordship determine to accept the plan of having a strong detachment in the field, will be as follows:

	Companies of artillery.	European regt.	Bombay sepoys.	Sebundies.	Travancore regt.
Malabar	2	1	3	3	3
Canara	1	1	4		
Goa			1		
Mysore	3	1	7		
New Territory			6		
	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 21	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 3

It must however be very clear to your Lordship that nothing can be more weak than this distribution, if it is not strengthened and connected by means of a detachment in the field; and that, if you do not adopt this system, the garrisons must be considerably strengthened.

Supposing that your Lordship should adopt it, and that you will have for the detachments in the field 3 regiments of Native cavalry, 3 of European infantry, and 8 battalions of Native infantry, and 2 companies of artillery, I proceed to state what number of troops will be wanting, in order to make the number under my command (including those at Goa) sufficient.

	Companies of artillery.	European regt.	Bombay sepoys.	Sebundies.	Travancore regt.	Native cavalry
Wanting for garrisons } ..	6	3	21	3	3	
as above						
Wanting for the field	2	3	6			3
	<hr/> 8	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 27	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 3

Under my command at present—

	Companies of artillery.	European regt.	Bombay sepoys.	Sebundies.	Travancore regt.	Native cavalry.
Bengal artillery	2					
Const artillery	3					
Bombay artillery	3					
On the Bombay }		3	11	3	3	
establishment						
On the Coast esta- }		3	7			3
blishment						
	<hr/> 8	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 18	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 3

The deficiency of troops will be 9 battalions of Native infantry.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, left of the Toombuddra, 22nd June, 1800.

I have not heard from Lieut. Col. Maclean yet, but I sent him a duplicate of my letter, and orders to join himself to Saddolah Khan, by 2 messengers of his own, some days ago.

I am glad that you approve of the manner of the General Court Martial. I sent orders into Canara to try, by military process, all criminals of the same description.

The 2nd Bombay battalion is not yet arrived; and I felt some little anxiety about it, as it has been reported to me that all the cavalry, on this side of the Werdah, are gone towards Shikarpoor and Ondagurry, to interrupt its junction with me. They amount to about 700 men. I have sent Stevenson that way with 2 regiments of cavalry and their guns, and they will give a good account of the fellows, who, I now understand, instead of looking after this battalion, are employed in plundering the country.

Ram Rao's cavalry are at Shikarpoor, and I have written to Servitun Rao to request that they may be ordered to join themselves with the Bombay battalion, and may come with them as far as Hoonelly. From a parcel of blunders and surmises, and unnecessary precaution in the gentleman in Soonda, &c., this battalion, which left Goa on the 28th of last month, had not marched from Hullihall on the 12th of this, and I do not think it was likely to march till the 15th. It had not reached Chandergooty on the 20th.

Dhoondiah has certainly left Savanore; and he is, I believe, gone to Hoobly Darwar.

To Major * * * *, commg. H. M. — Lt. dragoons.

Camp, 22nd June, 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst., with its enclosures; and I am much concerned that any officer should have thought it proper, at such a time as the present, to trouble me with a complaint about 4 bundles of straw, into which it appears, by the papers you enclose, you had taken the pains of making the fullest investigation. I know no method in which I can investigate the matter further, excepting by a General Court Martial; and I certainly shall not take the officers of the

army from their more important duty, to give them any trouble upon a matter so little interesting to the public.

Upon the subject of the complaint itself, it is necessary that I should make a few observations. It is certainly very desirable, and it is intended, that every officer should benefit as much as possible by the resources of the country; but it never was intended that they alone should benefit, or that they should take advantage of the superiority of their means of acquiring what they may want, and that the public horses should not have a portion of what the country may afford. In my opinion you would have done no more than your duty, and Capt. — would have had no reason to complain, if you had given an order that all the straw that could be procured was to be, in the first place, for the public cattle, and that afterwards individuals might purchase what they should think proper.

I beg you will return to Capt. — his memorial and his letter, which are enclosed, and that you communicate such parts of this letter as you may think proper.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, left of the Toombudda, 23rd June, 1800.

I have crossed nearly every thing, and if the 25th dragoons were arrived, and the Bombay battalion in safety, I might advance to-morrow. I have nearly 4000 full brinjaries, and the quantity I before told you I should have in the grain department: there are besides quantities of other brinjaries coming on. The difficulty will be to make them cross the river and move on; and upon this subject I trouble you with a few lines. I had some thought of leaving an officer here who should take charge of every thing that might come forward for the troops, and who should send them across the river and on towards us; but the scarcity of officers with the corps, the difficulty of finding one qualified for the service, and the probability that there would be, as usual, a jarring between him and the Rajah's officers, have determined me not to adopt that plan, from which I could expect nothing but failure. It remains then that I must rely upon the exertions of the amildar at Hurryhur. The man who is here at present is, I believe, honest and willing; but he is totally incapable of understanding any arrangement, or of making any exertion to carry it into execution. Accounts have arrived of his mother's death, and he is confined to his house, and all business with him is at a stand.

It is therefore absolutely necessary that some person should be sent here, on whose abilities and exertions some dependence can be placed; and from what I have seen of all those in this part of the country, I see no man so fit for the charge as Servitun Rao. Purneah, however, is the best judge; and all I can say upon the subject is, that it is essentially necessary to the troops that it should be a person of intelligence and activity. To enter into complaints, at present, of their general inactivity, and of their disobedience of all the orders which I believe they have received from Purneah and from you, is useless. All that I can say about it is, that they certainly want a little looking after, in this part of the country; and I think it probable that, when you come this way, you will find some changes necessary.

I think it probable that I shall not march from hence till the 27th or 28th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hurrybur, 24th June, 1800.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Major Blaquiére, regarding the complaint of a bazaar man at Bangalore, about cumlies purchased by Mr. Ward.

Yesterday I sent a patrol to Arnee to reconnoitre the place, meaning to attack it this day, as soon as some ladders were made. It was evacuated last night; my troops are now in the fort, and I propose that it should be delivered over to Ball Kishen Punt this afternoon.

I hear that Dhoondiah is gone to the northward.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, left of the Toombuddra, 25th June, 1800.

I have received your letters of the 21st and 22nd, and I am glad to find that there is a prospect that the Court Martial will go on. It does not appear to me that 9 members are necessary.

The Court is one held under a civil authority, and is therefore the civil Court, in which the forms usual in military Courts are to be observed, and which is composed of military men; but it is not necessary that it should be composed of the number of members required by the Articles of War: provided that the forms of a military process are observed as required by government, it is a matter of indifference what number of judges there may be. If there should be any further difficulty upon the subject, I must proceed by a Court of inquiry, and give orders that the criminals shall be executed after the facts shall have been clearly ascertained by an examination of witnesses on each side.

I heard from Nuggur this morning. Ram Rao only received his orders to join me on the 23rd. Major Munro had not received any directions about the money, and, even if he had, he did not think that the garrison of Cundapoor could afford an escort for it. Major Browne was about to send one from Nuggur, in order to lose no time. Upon examining the true state of the case regarding the brinjaries, I find that I have not so many of them in camp as I ought to have. Many of their bullocks are

G. O.

Camp, N. of the Toombuddra, Tuesday, 24th June, 1800.

The corps, individuals, and departments will prepare their abstracts, and give them in to Capt. Robertson on the 1st of the month, in order that they may be examined, and that he may be prepared to pay them off at a short notice.

As there may be an uncertainty in the tappall, and as all the abstracts must be sent to Mr. Gordon at Seringapatam, it is recommended that duplicates of his abstracts should be kept by each individual.

Public guards are to be taken from the 2nd and 3rd brigades as detailed hereafter, and no more. As it is very desirable that the guards should be with their corps in the line of march, Col. Wellesley requests that the men may be sent to join their corps on marching days, previous to the beating of the assembly, except the person to whom they are given should have public treasure in his charge, and the following guards, viz. the Commissary of stores, the Paymaster, the Commissary of provisions' sheep guard, Capt. Mackay's guard, and the Provost serjeant's guard.

The commanding officers of corps and brigades are particularly desired not to allow any other men whatever to march among the baggage, or elsewhere, from the ranks of the corps to which they belong.

There are some horsemen and peons of the Rajah with this detachment, and others belonging to Ball Kishen Bhow. They have been warned not to approach the British piquets, or camp guards, and of course are not to be suffered to come near them. When they have occasion to pass near any of them, they are to send one man on foot to the officer commanding the guard or piquet, near which they may be desirous to pass, to inform him to whom they belong; and the officer, finding that they belong either to the Rajah of Mysore or to Ball Kishen Bhow, will suffer them to pass.

behind and at a distance. They complain much of impediments, such as that they are detained by demands of duties, &c., and that the amildars have got the greatest part of the rice of the country in their hands, which they are unwilling to part with at present, as they have reason to expect that the price of it will rise. It besides appears that the accounts of the number of their bullocks are very erroneous, and that they are counted over in 3 or 4 tandahs. I believe, however, that I shall be able to move from hence with a stock sufficient to last till I shall have cleared out every thing on this side of the Werdah; but it will not be safe to cross the Werdah, till I have a certainty of a larger quantity of supplies.

No tidings yet of the Bombay battalion, excepting that they had not marched on the 15th. The officer commanding in Soonda complains sadly of Major Munro's people, who absolutely refuse to give the smallest assistance in forwarding the equipments of this corps. Their demand cannot be very heavy, at least if they have not much more baggage than their friends, who arrived some days ago. They had literally nothing, excepting what was carried by 24 bullocks, and about 50 coolies; and the private baggage of all the officers goes upon 16 bullocks.

From intelligence received in a private letter from Col. Dalrymple of the 9th, I was in hopes that the grenadiers and the cavalry would have joined Lieut. Col. Maclean, but I now find they have not. If Lieut. Col. Maclean is joined by Saddoolah Khan, which I hope he will be, it will still do: if not, he will, I am afraid, be too weak. I have not yet heard either from Saddoolah Khan, or from Lieut. Col. Maclean, in answer even to my letter of the 6th; but as soon as I had reason to believe that the grenadiers and the cavalry would join him, I wrote to the latter to desire that he would move up towards Copaul.

Ball Kishen Bhow thinks that Dhoondiah will fly to the Dooab. I received from Goklah a letter, of which a copy was sent to you, by Capt. Greenlay, from Hullihall: the person who brought it is not yet arrived, and I believe will come with the Bombay battalion.

Stevenson has had some successes towards the frontier, but has not taken possession of Massoor, a strong fort about 3 coss from Shikarpoor. He has, however, driven to the northward all the cavalry, which were hanging thereabouts for the purpose of annoying the Bombay battalion. I have desired Servitun Rao to send his cavalry to join them; and, indeed, I think that that cavalry might be useful, at this place, in bringing forward our convoys, if I should not be able entirely to clear this side of the Werdah of all the enemy's horse. I shall be able to ascertain this in a few days, and will acquaint Ram Rao, if I should find it necessary to call for the assistance of his cavalry.

P. S. I enclose a letter which I have just received from the officer at Sera. I have desired Barclay to acquaint the young man that the wholesale price of sheep, as stated in the orders, is 3 for a pagoda; that, of course, when retailed in the bazaar, they must be dearer. When you go that way, you will be able to see how these matters stand at Sera. When I was there, they complained that, literally, the amildar would not allow their servants to buy butter, bread, or milk, in the bazaar. They did not mention this to me, but to some of their friends, and talked of the behaviour

of this man as a tyranny, which it was quite painful to be obliged to submit to.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, left of the Toombuddra, 26th June, 1800.

I enclose copies of letters which I have received from Appah Saheb and Goklah.

Goklah's vakeel arrived last night, and I had this morning an interview with him. He said that his master had received orders to attack and crush Dhoondiah; that he was then at Moorgoor, on the other side of the Malpoorba, with 10,000 horse, 5000 infantry, and 8 guns; that he wished to be joined by 3 of our Bombay battalions, which he said he heard were coming from Goa, and that he would then advance and destroy Dhoondiah without loss of time. I told him that it was impossible to detach to him the battalions in question, as they were either in this camp, or on the road to join me, and probably very close. It appeared to me, however, that, if he had the force which he said he had, he would have no difficulty, and would incur no risk, in crossing the Malpoorba, and approaching Dhoondiah's force, at the time when I should cross the Werdah, and approach him from this side. In this the vakeel acquiesced, and promised that, when I should give him notice that I was going to cross the Werdah, Goklah would cross the Malpoorba, for which he would make all the arrangements immediately; and that when I should be at Savanore he would be at Darwar. He then began a long story about his differences

G. O.

Camp, N. of the Toombuddra, Thursday, 26th June, 1800.

The troops to march to-morrow by the right. Baggage on the right, and not to advance beyond the head of the infantry.

The *general* to beat at 5 o'clock, and the assembly an hour afterwards.

The cavalry, with the exception of the 2nd regt., to form the advance under the orders of Col. Stevenson.

The details coming on the duty of the advanced piquets with 2 guns to follow the advance under the field officer of the day; and the details now on that duty, with the field officer of this day and 2 guns, to form the rear guard.

The heavy carriages in the park, those in the department of the Commissary of stores, and those in the department of the Commissary of provisions, will move on the great road.

The line, and guns, and tumbrils attached to corps, will move on a road which will be made parallel thereto, and on its left.

The carriages in the park, and those in the department of the Commissary of provisions, will draw out into the road before the beating of the assembly.

The new piquets to be assembled to-morrow on the left of the road, in front of the park, and to be prepared to follow the cavalry.

The line of cavalry and infantry, in the countermarch which it will make to-morrow, will proceed by the rear and left of the park; and Capt. Colebrooke will take care to show his guides the manner in which the line is brought to the left of the store carriages, without crossing, or interfering with them on the high road.

The 2nd regt. of cavalry, with its guns, will move on the right of the baggage.

50 pioneers to precede the park and heavy carriages, and to take care that the road is sufficiently wide for the boats. 20 pioneers to accompany the 2nd regt. of cavalry, the remainder to be with the advance, and the line in such proportions as Capt. Heiland may think proper.

The 25th light dragoons will, from its present ground, move along the high road until it reaches the rear of the left brigade, when it will halt, until passed by the 1st and 4th regts. of cavalry, which it will follow.

When impediments occur to oblige any corps or carriage to stop, so as to occasion a considerable interval, a long roll is to be beat as a signal for halting, which is to be passed by corps to front and rear of the column. When such impediments shall have been removed, taps are to be passed as a signal for moving on again.

An orderly drummer is to be held in readiness in each corps and in the park, during a march, whose business it shall be to pass all such signals with the necessary promptitude.

with Appah Saheb; said that Appah Saheb had not received orders from Poonah to attack Dhoondiah, and that I might depend upon it he neither could, nor would, make any effort towards a co-operation in my designs. I asked him whether, in case Appah Saheb should co-operate to destroy Dhoondiah, it would at all affect the intended co-operation of his master? He said not in the least; that to put down Dhoondiah was the first object and the most urgent; and that, after that was effected, it would not be difficult for Goklah to put in execution his own designs, and the orders, which he had and might hereafter receive from Poonah, regarding Appah Saheb.

It appeared to me to be very desirable to ascertain from this vakeel to whom the administration of this country belonged, whether his master had any claim to it; and whether he was likely to be dissatisfied in consequence of the arrangements which I had made, and according to which I propose to act, viz. to hand over to Ball Kishen Bhow all the forts which should fall into our hands, and to give over the country to his management. Questions were put to him leading to these points, and he said that the administration of the country belonged to the family of Purshe-ram Bhow, that his master had no claim to it, and that the arrangement which had been made was perfectly satisfactory to him, and by no means likely to affect his intended co-operation. He added, that when Dhoondiah should be driven out, if we remain neuter, he should have no difficulty in getting possession of the country, if he should be so ordered from Poonah. Upon the whole, the conversation with this man was very satisfactory, and proved three things clearly: 1st, that Goklah is very desirous, and will co-operate with us in the attack upon Dhoondiah; 2ndly, that, although at enmity with Appah Saheb, his co-operation will have no effect upon him; 3dly, that he will be perfectly satisfied with the arrangement made, and proposed to give over the country to the management of Appah Saheb and his dewan.

The difference between Appah Saheb and Goklah seems to be more like one originating at Poonah than any thing personal between the parties: the vakeel said that orders had been received to sequester a part of his (Appah Saheb's) country, which he said was a secret. At all events, he said, that the obedience to that order would be deferred till Dhoondiah should be driven out of the country.

I march to-morrow to Rannee Bednore. I have just received your letter regarding Lieut. Mackay's bullock muttaseddee; and he writes, by this post, to desire that he will keep the bullocks at grass at such place as may be most convenient to the ryots, and by no means to interfere in the business of the country, or with their cultivation.

I am quite confounded by the intelligence that we shall have no money from Capt. Macleod; we shall really be quite aground in August, if I do not get a lac of pagodas somewhere.

To Major Munro.

Camp, left of the Toombudda, 26th June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 22nd inst., and its enclosure; and I am obliged to you for the intelligence which you give me, that a lac of Behaudry pagodas, for the use of the troops in this country, was likely to leave Cundapoor on the 23rd inst. From a conversation which I had

with Mr. Webbe at Seringapatam, early in the last month, I had reason to expect that this sum would have been at Nuggur some time ago. I sent orders to the officer commanding in Soonda to drive the party which had got possession of Budnaghur out of that post. He would have done this before now, according to the former orders which his predecessors received from me, only that he has found it impossible to move even a small detachment of the troops under his orders, for want of the common assistance which the country can afford. This, he informs me, the amildars have refused to give; and I am waiting here at this moment for a battalion of Bombay sepoy, which are detained at Hulliball, in Soonda, for want of a few bullocks, which cannot be provided without the civil government.

If the officer commanding in Soonda should be enabled to detach a force to get possession of Budnaghur, I do not propose to have a post there; and I conceive that it will be expedient to raise as many more peons as you can get in Soonda. The number of troops allotted to that province, by government, was one battalion; and although it is certainly much exposed, I have no means of increasing that force at present.

To the Sec. of Gov.

Camp at Rannee Bednore, 27th June, 1800.

I marched here this morning. Upon my arrival with the cavalry and the advanced piquets, the former were fired upon from the fort. I instantly determined to attack it; and the attack was made by the advanced piquets, consisting of 50 Europeans and 150 Natives, under the command of Lieut. Col. Moneyenny, and the leading battalion, the 1st of the 1st of the line.

Col. Stevenson placed the cavalry round the fort, in such manner, that the retreat of the garrison was cut off; and Lieut. Col. Moneyenny conducted the attack with such vivacity, that the place was escalated without the loss of a man.

This example, it is to be hoped, will have a good effect hereafter, in deterring other killadars from attempting to defend weak posts against the Hon. Company's troops; particularly when compared with the fate of the neighbouring fort of Arnee, which, having surrendered, received cowl, and suffered no injury from having the British troops in its neighbourhood.

I beg you will make known to the Commander in Chief how much pleased I was with the conduct of Col. Stevenson and Lieut. Col. Moneyenny, and of the officers and troops under their orders.

G. O.

Rannee Bednore, Friday, 27th June, 1800.

Col. Wellesley received much pleasure from observing the vivacity with which the attack of the fort of Rannee Bednore was conducted this morning, under the orders of Lieut. Col. Moneyenny. To this is to be attributed the immediate success of the attack without any loss on our side, although it appears that the fort contained a large garrison. Col. Wellesley is much indebted to Col. Stevenson for the judicious manner in which the cavalry were placed round the fort, by which the retreat of the garrison was cut off, as well as for his assistance on all occasions. Col. Wellesley will have great pleasure in communicating to the Commander in Chief his sense of the conduct of the officers and troops who made the attack.

Capt. Lock will withdraw his party from the fort of Rannee Bednore at 6 o'clock this evening, and will give it over to Ball Kishen Bhow's people; and a small flag will be hoisted, after which hour all plunder is to cease. Capt. Lock will clear the fort of the camp followers before he leaves it, and will place there a small safeguard.

The troops will halt to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Rannee Bednore, 28th June, 1800.

I arrived here yesterday, and instantly attacked the fort with my piquets, and the 1st of the 1st. The garrison consisted of 500 men, who fired upon our cavalry as they approached, and the greatest part of them were put to death. We did not lose a man.

Col. Stevenson goes off to-morrow towards Mussoor and Shikarpoor, to clear every thing down that way, and to bring up the Bombay battalion if it should have reached that quarter; by the time that he will return, I hope that I shall have been joined by a sufficient number of brinjaries to enable me to go forward.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Rannee Bednore, 29th June, 1800.

I have received from Lieut. Col. Maclean an answer to my letter of the 6th inst., dated the 15th; on that day he had not made much progress in crossing the Kistna, and he did not expect to be in readiness to advance from that river till the 1st July. He proposed, however, to join Saddoolah Khan immediately, and to move up to Kanagherry. He expected that Col. Bowser, with the cavalry and the flank companies, would march from Hyderabad, and he had received orders to have boats in readiness that these troops might pass the Kistna with ease; but in case they should not have reached the river, by the time that he should be prepared to advance from it, he did not propose to wait for them. Lieut. Col. Maclean says, that by all accounts Saddoolah Khan's detachment is not half so strong as it is stated to be by Heshmut Jung; and, indeed, he says himself, in a note to Lieut. Col. Maclean, that one-third at least of the stated numbers might be subtracted.

I received a letter from Lieut. Col. Dalrymple yesterday, dated the 13th, in which he says that the march of the cavalry, and of the flank companies, had been postponed: but it does not appear by his letter that it is determined that they should not come at all. I have therefore still hopes that they will come.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Rannee Bednore, 30th June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 27th, and I beg that you will tell Purneah that I am much obliged to him for the readiness with which he has complied with my request regarding Servitun Rao. I hear that Ram Rao is arrived at Hurryhur; but the unfortunate death of the old lady at Benares has put a stop to all business, and I shall not see him for 3 or 4 days more. The passage of the river also has been a good deal obstructed since I left Hurryhur; but I write to Ram Rao this day upon the subject,

G. O.

Camp at Rannee Bednore, Monday, 30th June, 1800.

As the difficulties in bringing forward the supplies of grain for the cavalry are such as to render it probable that that article will run short of the demand and consumption, the officers commanding regiments of cavalry are recommended to begin immediately to accustom the horses to eat either jowarry or chinna. These grains are produced in all parts of this country; particularly the former is to be found almost everywhere. The grain agents, therefore, are authorised to purchase them instead of grain, and they are to be given to the horses of the cavalry, in the same proportion as that which has been always given to them.

Col. Wellesley requests that officers commanding regiments will give particular orders to their followers to abstain from plundering straw, grain, &c., in the villages which

and I hope that we shall get on better. The road between this and Hurryhur is open; indeed I understand that Dhoondiah has not a man on this side of the Werdah. Stevenson is gone with some infantry, and the 2nd regt. of cavalry, to Mussoor, to possess himself of that post; and then I expect that I shall have cleared out every thing from this side of the river. Dhoondiah has been at Hoobly, where he made a contribution of 10,000 rupees; he then went to Misserycotta, of which he had not got possession on the 28th. Goklah, it is said, had crossed the Malpoorba, and was come forward to Jeygoor, with an intention of fighting; but this I doubt. After getting Misserycotta, I think Dhoondiah will either make a dash at Hullihall, which is about 12 coss distant, or he will move upon Goklah.

What a pity it is that I cannot move on for want of grain! My troops are in high health, order, and spirits; but the unfortunate defect of arrangement in the poor man at Chittledroog, previous to my arrival, has ruined every thing.

I had at one time nearly 4000 loads in camp; if I had been able to reach the river one day sooner, I should have been across before it filled. The delay in crossing was one of about 10 days; during that time we were feeding upon the brinjarries, as we did not draw a grain from the country, which reduced the full bags in camp to about 2000, and about as many more, they say, on the road. Then comes the delay in filling, travelling, passing the river, &c.; and it becomes absolutely impossible to say at what time we shall have a sufficiency to cross the Werdah, although all the brinjarries swear that there are large quantities of rice coming on to us. All this delay would have been avoided, if, when I wrote on the 10th May, measures had been taken to make them all fill, and to collect them together; but instead of that, until I wrote on the 5th June to know what had been done, no steps were taken, and I was 4 days at Chittledroog, before I could even see one of the naigs. How true it is that in military operations time is every thing!

The 3 troops of the 19th not having been ordered on is a mistake of —, or —. The former swears that the interpretation of his letter is, that the dragoons were to come on with the army to Chittledroog. I acknowledge that it might bear that meaning, but it is not so clear as all orders and arrangements ought to be, and as they are in general. I write to — upon the subject this day.

P. S. I have just heard of some rice coming into camp from Shikarpoor. I hear from Bowser, on the 17th, that he was under orders to be in readiness to march with the cavalry and the flank companies.

which are in the neighbourhood of camp. If they persist in plundering, all the resources which might be drawn from this country will be completely cut off, and the Colonel will most undoubtedly make the most serious examples of any that may be caught plundering, and are brought before him.

A naig and 6 sepoy, from the 2nd brigade, to be sent immediately to the pettah of Rannee Bednore, to take post in any central place, and send frequent patrols to prevent people from plundering and carrying away the materials. Every person found doing so, to be made prisoner and sent to head quarters. This guard to return to the lines at night, and a similar one to be sent daily at *reveillè* beating, while the troops remain on this ground.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Rannee Rednore, 2nd July, 1800.

I have received a letter from Lieut. Col. Close, by which I perceive that Lieut. Col. Maclean had laid before you a copy of my letter to him of the 6th June; and that, on the 18th June, Lieut. Col. Bowser had marched from Hyderabad towards the Kistna, with the 3rd regt. of cavalry and the flank companies, and that it was your intention that they should be followed by a battalion of sepoy, if I thought it necessary. I am very much obliged to you for these reinforcements; and I certainly think it very desirable that Lieut. Col. Bowser should be joined by the battalion, which you propose should follow him.

I have heard from Saddoolah Khan, who was still on the right bank of the Toombuddra on the 20th June. He was making his arrangements, however, to cross it immediately, and promised to join himself to Lieut. Col. Maclean as soon as he possibly could.

I hope all these troops, and the detachment from Mysore, will be collected in the province of Savanore. I shall have some apprehensions that they will want subsistence, unless it should be in your power to send after Lieut. Col. Bowser a body of brinjarries with loaded bullocks. The Savanore country produces only dry grain, and that must be scarce at present, considering that large bodies of troops have been stationed in it for a considerable length of time. The province of Soonda produces but little grain, and that which I shall be able to draw from Mysore, by means of the brinjarries, will be scarcely sufficient for the body of troops now under me. It is, therefore, very necessary that some of the subsistence of the troops, which you send to my assistance, should be drawn from the territories of his Highness the Nizam, by means of brinjarries to be employed from that side. I have written to Saddoolah Khan and to Lieut. Col. Bowser upon this subject.

Since the capture of Rannee Rednore, Dhoondiah's troops have been withdrawn from this side of the Werdah. He is now near Darwar, with the greatest part of his army; and there are reports that he has beat Goklah, who has crossed the Malpoorba.

I enclose you an extract of my letter to the Adj. Gen., which gives an account of the capture of Rannee Bednore. I propose to move towards the Werdah to-morrow.

To Major Munro.

Camp, 3 miles S. of Havery, 3rd July, 1800.

I do not deny that I did believe that you were not quite so ready to assist my wants as you might have been, as I understood from Mr. Webbe that you had been desired to send to Nuggur all the money which you had in your treasury, and which was not immediately wanted for other purposes; and I therefore did not think it necessary to take any further steps to procure the money, than to desire the officer in command at Nuggur to have in readiness an escort to bring it to camp. I also thought, and from the complaints which have been received it appears to be true, that your servant in Soonda gave no assistance whatever to enable the battalions, marching through that district, to move. For want of money and every thing, one of them has not joined me yet; and, from

what I am going to tell you, you will perceive that it is probable that I shall not see it for some time.

Dhoondiah has beat Goklah ; and I am informed that a body of the troops of the latter fled to Hullihall with Chintomeny Rao, where they are at this moment. Dhoondiah followed them, and if the battalions had not marched before the 30th June, on which day was the action, it is probable that Dhoondiah will have kept such a watch upon Hullihall, as to have rendered it impossible for them to march since. I have no orders to take possession of any part of the country, and I have hitherto put the Bhow's people in possession of every part that has fallen into my hands. I have done this as much because I have no troops to spare for garrisons, as because it is a most desirable and necessary thing to me that the country on this side of the Werdah, towards the Rajah's frontier, should be settled, that I may draw from it its poor resources, and have my communication with Mysore unimpeded. I enjoy all these advantages at present ; and I am therefore desirous not to risk the loss of them, even for a moment, by asking you to come up to settle this country. The change of government would, I fear, have this effect ; and, besides, as I already told you, I have no order to take possession of the country in any manner.

I approve of your proposal to advance your peons to Hangal, or where else you please, when your amildars hear that I have crossed the Werdah. I will also apprise you when I shall have done so. It will be proper that I should tell the Bhow that I have desired them to enter the Savanore country, and to possess themselves of the districts on the borders for the general good.

It appears to me, that, when at Hangal, they will be able to assist me with some rice, of which I stand woefully in need : all that I have comes from the rice countries in Mysore, which are at a distance of about a month's march ; and you will perceive that to bring it to me will require a tolerably large number of brinjarries. If I could get a little at Hangal, it would be a great relief. Desire your amildars to let me know if they can give me any assistance whatever in rice ; from what country it is to come ; to what place I am to send for it ; the distance such place may be from Savanore ; and such other information regarding it as they can afford.

There is not a single paddy field in this whole country, but plenty of cotton-ground swamps, which in this wet weather are delightful.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Havery, 4th July, 1800.

I send you 2 papers regarding traitors, which I have received from Grant. I have heard no more of Goklah since yesterday.

G. O.

Camp at Havery, Friday, 4th July, 1800.

Frequent complaints are made that the horse keepers and grass cutters of the cavalry, who are sent for straw, do not pay for it.

Whenever it is necessary that straw should be given to the horses of the cavalry, a person, on whom the commanding officers of troops can depend that the straw will be paid for, must be sent with them. That person will be responsible that the straw is paid for. It is, however,

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp on the right of the Werdah, 6th July, 1800.

As I found that every thing became settled towards our frontier, I have advanced here, and I am making my arrangements for crossing this river. The brinjaries come on by degrees, and I hear of some on the other side of the Toombuddra, who appear to wait only to be forced to advance.

Goklah has certainly been beat and killed, and the circumstances of the affair are nearly as I stated them to you in my last letter. The majority of his troops, however, I am informed are still together, and can be brought forward. I have written respecting them to Chintomeny Rao, and to Bappojee Scindiah, and I hope that I shall still derive some advantage from them.

No accounts yet of the Bombay battalion. It is said that Dhoondiah is at Kittoor.

I have received from Col. Cuppage the proceedings of the Court Martial. Sheik Fereed is found guilty of treason, and is sentenced to be imprisoned to the end of the war! Hyder Beg is acquitted. I cannot approve of, although I have confirmed, these sentences, and I have desired Col. Cuppage to keep Hyder Beg in confinement. In future I must proceed by a Court of inquiry, which shall deliver an opinion whether the prisoner is guilty or not, as I find it is impossible to impress officers with an accurate notion of the extent and consequences of the crime of treason, and of the punishment which it deserves and meets in all civilised societies.

P. S. One of my people employed in Dhoondiah's camp has sworn, in the most positive manner, that he saw Lingo Punt, Goklah's vakcel, with Dhoondiah in the camp. If this is true, it may be the clue to the mystery of Goklah's crossing the Malpoorba, which he certainly did a very short

ever, not intended by government, is not necessary, and is exceedingly inconvenient to the army, that the horses of the cavalry, or that any horses, should be fed with straw. No country, however well supplied with dry forage, can afford the consumption of such a body of troops as this, if the cavalry horses eat straw; and Col. Wellesley is therefore hopeful that the commanding officers of brigades and regiments of cavalry, seeing the inconveniences which the whole will feel, from the continuance of a custom not necessary for the horses, will prevent it as much as is possible, and will take measures to force the grass cutters to bring in the quantity of green forage which will be sufficient.

G. O.

Camp, near Deogherry, Sunday, 6th July, 1800.

In the absence of Col. Stevenson, Col. Pater, as senior officer of the cavalry in camp, is to conduct the general duties of that corps.

A working party of 200 Europeans from the 1st brigade, and 200 Natives from the 2nd brigade, to be employed to-morrow under Lieut. Moncrieff. Lieut. Moncrieff will receive from the park, on his indent, such of the intrenching tools as are with the detachment, and he will distribute them to the men of the working party, in such proportions as he thinks proper. He will give them to the officers who will be sent with the working parties, and they will take care to note the men to whom they deliver each tool.

When the day's work is finished, the intrenching tools are to be returned to Lieut. Moncrieff, and, as it is impossible to replace them if they are lost, in case any are missing, the men who lose them will have to pay for them at the usual rates. Lieut. Moncrieff will report any deficiency of the intrenching tools, and to the men of what corps they had been delivered, as soon as possible after the deficiency shall have been discovered.

G. A. O.

Camp, near Deogherry, Monday, 7th July, 1800.

The 77th regt. will pass the river at daylight by the bridge. Capt. Mackay will take care that the elephants are sent to the 77th regt. to carry the tents down to the river, and the commanding officer of the regiment will make an arrangement of lascars that the tents may be carried by them over the bridge.

time after Lingo Punt left him. Lingo Punt has been the person employed between Dhoondiah and Goklah, and negotiated the delivery of the family of the former by the latter; and I do not doubt but that he was employed to try to negotiate with him before he came to me. Goklah, then, met with the fate which he deserved.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, right of the Weriah, 8th July, 1800.

I received your packet of the 4th last night. A man came to me some time ago, and made me an offer, similar to that which has been made at Hyderabad. These arrangements answer well there; but I think them unbecoming in an officer at the head of a body of troops, and I, therefore, declined to have any thing more to do with the business than to hold out a general encouragement. The proposer said, that there was a sirdar at the head of a body of horse, to whom if I would give a cowle, he would come away. I gave the cowle, but I do not expect, either that the sirdar will come off with his troops, or that the proposed deed will be put in execution. Government have authorized me to offer a reward for him, and I propose to avail myself of this authority as soon as he is at all pressed, and I find that his people begin to drop off from him. This will be, in my opinion, the fittest period. To offer a public reward by proclamation for a man's life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are very different things: the one is to be done; the other, in my opinion, cannot, by an officer at the head of the troops.

I have made my arrangements for crossing the river, and I hope that I shall have every thing over in a day or two. I have made a bridge which answers perfectly for foot passengers, and will answer equally for horses and cattle, when I shall have given it rather a better footing. I propose to leave this bridge here, and a number of boats which I have besides. For the care of these, and of every thing which will come up, I shall establish a post immediately on the river side, and I am now constructing a redoubt for their security. As soon as this work gets tolerably forward, I shall seize Savanore, where I understand there are but few people at present. I do not intend to advance from Savanore, until I shall hear that Bowser is tolerably forward, unless I should find it necessary, in order to prevent Dhoondiah from putting in execution any design, which might tend to give him more stability in the country, or in order to give assistance to our friends at Hullihall, if I find he presses them.

I propose to stretch out towards Hangal and Budnaghur, in order to clear the Soonda frontier, if the report should be true which I hear, that

G. M. O.

Camp, near Deogherry, Tuesday, 8th July, 1800.

No cattle whatever are to be allowed to pass the bridge until a second row of hurdle has been laid upon it, and permission granted.

As the price of rice has increased considerably in the bazaars, and it has been found that notwithstanding all the regulations, the sepoys and fighting men do not get any, but that goes to the followers, it is necessary to make a new arrangement, and what follows is to be observed until further orders.

Each fighting man, in which description gun lascars and pioneers are included, is to receive *gratis* half a seer of rice daily, till further orders, upon indent on the Commissary's grain. The indents for this grain are to be made out according to the usual form, pointed out in the regulations and in the orders of government of Dec., 1798, and are to be signed and countersigned by the officers as therein ordered.

the detachment sent against that place has failed in its attack. I can hardly believe it, however.

I have heard nothing yet of the Bombay battalion; and I am much afraid that, for want of money, they did not march before the 30th, and that Dhoondiah's position near them has prevented them from marching since that day. It is fortunate that I thought of ordering the provisions to be thrown into Hullihall in April. I understand that there was a sufficiency for 2 months for one battalion at the end of June.

What do you think of taking this opportunity of making peace with Kistnapah Naig? The officers who were in his country say that he was well disposed to accept any reasonable terms; and, as our prospects of being able to reduce him are very remote, particularly if Heshmut Jung's plan of increasing our territory is to be carried into execution, it appears desirable to come to a settlement with him, on almost any terms which he could point out, and for the observance of which he would give us security.

I write to Major Cuppage this day, and desire him to let me know what he wants at Nundydroog, and his wants shall be supplied as far as is possible. In the mean time, I desire Gordon to be prepared to answer a call for a store of rice there. The brinjarries drop in by degrees, and I get a little from the country: but I have determined that no more brinjarry rice shall go into the bazaar; and I have adopted a plan for issuing *gratis* to the troops, and have reduced the consumption of the rice of which I have the command to 50 bags *per diem*. At this rate I have, on this side of the Toombuddra, at least 50 days' stock; and my industrious followers must live either upon jowarry, of which there is an abundance every where, or they must be more industrious in procuring rice for themselves in a country which produces none, or their friends the brinjarries must come up more quickly. From Hangal, however, I expect to draw some rice, which is another reason for extending myself that way.

P.S. I have received the proceedings of a Court of inquiry upon Mahomed Ismael, late asoph of Chinroydroog, and I have given orders that he may be hanged, and his crime published in the district of Nundydroog. Bismillah Khan is to remain in confinement in Nundydroog.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, left of the Werdah, 10th July, 1800.

I have received letters from Hullihall up to the 5th July. The circumstances of the defeat of Goklah are nearly as they have been already represented to you, and a great part of his army are under the walls of that fort. The 1st of the 4th are still there, having been detained for money till the end of June, and having then found it impracticable to move. Dhoondiah was encamped 2 days ago at Gurry, about 4 coss beyond Darwar; and it is said that he intended to come this way, that he intended to attack Hullihall, and that he intended to move upon Noor-goond. I have got every thing over the river, excepting the 1st and 4th regts. of cavalry. My bridge answered for every thing, excepting for the followers of the cavalry. Horses, bandies, and even camels, crossed without difficulty; but the followers rushed upon it in such numbers from both sides, and were so little subject to regulation, arrangement, or order,

that they sunk several of the boats, and I have been obliged to take the bridge to pieces, before I could get over the 2 last regiments of cavalry.

I was in hopes that, hearing nothing of Kistnapah Naig, it might have been possible to come to an arrangement with him; but I see that it is not. Our good understanding with the Rajah of Koorg, which deprives him of the money which he used to get for defending Tippoo's country from the Rajah's plunderers, must be rather inconvenient to him, particularly as he always understood matters with the Rajah, and it was not necessary that he should incur any great expense on that account.

I have not been over at Savanore yet, but it appears to be, and I hear it is, in a ruinous condition, and so large, that it will not be possible to do any thing with it. We must, therefore, press to have Darwar, and Munro might at all events make his arrangements for sending grain to Hullihall. If matters should be settled, previous to the time at which it will be possible to send up grain from Canara, Munro will be no loser, as he will sell it at a large price. I doubt whether the Peshwah will be willing, or, if willing, whether he will have it in his power, to give over to us Darwar. If Dhoondiah is able to hold out at all, he will certainly receive support against us from the great body of Marhattas.

Ram Rao has been with me, and he yesterday went back to Shikarpoor, having made arrangements for sending some peons into the country on the right bank of the Werdah. I do not believe that Servitun Rao is come to Hurryhur, or that he is likely to come there; but it would certainly be very desirable that either he, or Ram Rao, should be permanently stationed at that place. Probably the latter would be of most service, as I understand that he is the head amildar of Nuggur, Hurryhur, &c. All the grain which Purneah can collect for us ought to be sent to Hurryhur, from whence it will be forwarded, with other grain from other parts.

The people who had possession of Jemalabad found means to make their escape over the rock. They left in the upper fort 4 men of the 2nd of the 3rd Bombay regt., being some of those who had been surprised there. These men they put in confinement on the day preceding the night in which it is supposed they escaped. Above 50 of them have been taken by parties sent in pursuit of them, aided by the people of the country; and Lieut. Col. Mignan informs me, that he had still hopes that he should be able to take Jerim Naik, the leader. He proposed to bring them all before a General Court Martial, and to hang those to whom death might be sentenced in different parts of the province.

P. S. I have no certain accounts about Budnaghur.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 5 miles S. of Savanore, 11th July, 1800.

I enclose you the copy of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Palmer. You will perceive the manner in which Appah Saheb stands at Poonah.

I am afraid that, having given over the country to Ball Kishen Bhow may have the effect of setting the Peshwah, or at least Scindiah, against us; although I believe that this is not the country which has been sequestered, but it is that of Tasgaum and Meritch. I have written to Col.

Palmer a letter, the duplicate of which I enclose, and beg you will forward by tappall, in which I explain the reason which induced me to give over the country to the Bhow, and the grounds which I have for believing that it is possible to remedy the evil, if it is one. In truth, the Bhow is but a bad manager, and is very unpopular in the country; but he has made no objections to the admission of Ram Rao's peons to whatever place I pleased. It will, therefore, be a matter of no difficulty to make an arrangement to transfer the country to whomsoever Col. Palmer may point out as the rightful owner.

It is said that Dhoondiah is coming down towards us; if he does come, I shall certainly dash at him immediately.

P.S. I do not place much reliance on the proposed attack of Scindiah's troops, but I write this day to their commanding officer.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Savanore, 13th July, 1800.

I was prevented from answering, yesterday, your letter of the 9th, by our march hither from the river, and by my preparations to attack Dhoondiah. I reconnoitred this place on the 11th, and I was induced to move to it, because I found that Dhoondiah was approaching us, as it was said, to engage us; and I thought that I should perform the operation better by being disencumbered of baggage, to receive which this place appears tolerably well calculated, and that I should derive some advantage from making the attack, if he should come within reach, instead of by halting upon the Werdah, to wait till he should attack me. He is now at Koondgul, about 22 miles from hence, and, if he moves any nearer, I shall certainly leave my baggage here, and attack him. The redoubt upon the

G. O.

Camp at Malacutty, Friday, 11th July, 1800.

A drummer from each battalion to be sent to the Provost serjeant at 3 o'clock this afternoon, to assist in flogging some people taken up plundering a village in front of the camp.

Piquets in waiting to mount in future, and to consist, until further orders, of a squadron from each regiment of cavalry, European and Native, and of the same details of infantry as already directed for the outlying piquet. They are to be under the immediate orders of the field officer of the day; and are to be held in readiness to fall in at a moment's warning.

The outlying piquets are not to turn out as a compliment to any officer; and when they are seen to turn, or fire a shot, the inlying piquets are immediately to fall in on their respective parades.

G. O.

Camp at Savanore, Saturday, 12th July, 1800.

Small union flags have been given to the parties of horse and peons, belonging to the Rajah of Mysore and Ball Kishen Bhow, which accompany the detachment, to be carried by them in order to distinguish them from the enemy; but when they approach a guard, piquet, or any part of the line, they are also to observe the rules laid down on the 24th June.

The officers commanding corps will take care that they are supplied with the regulated quantity of ammunition, an addition to which will be made when necessary. All that they have now above that quantity will be returned to the park. They will likewise give their men a particular caution regarding the care of their ammunition, and their reporting it to their officers when damaged. All spare balls are to be sent to the Commissary of stores, as soon as it shall be discovered that the cartridges belonging to them are become unserviceable.

The Native corps are to draw for 2 days' rice, and receive it this afternoon, which will complete them to the 16th inst. inclusive.

No soldiers are to be allowed to go into the fort; and all followers, who may have occasion to go in to purchase grain or straw, are to go in and come out at the gate in the rear of head quarters, where they will be examined by a guard.

Werdah is nearly finished, and I have left there the pioneers, and 2 companies of Bombay infantry, two 12 pounders, two 6 pounders, ammunition for the 12 pounders, &c. These people are to complete the work, and half the latter to be its future garrison. It is on a fine spot, which commands the banks of the river, and will give protection to all our cattle, brinjaries, &c., and confidence to the latter, which is a great object.

By Col. Palmer's letter, which I sent you the other day, you will perceive that, whatever may be the real intentions of Scindiah in this quarter, he declares that he has ordered the commanding officer of his troops to attack Dhoondiah Waugh. If that be the case, Dhoondiah Waugh is still in a bad way.

I have long regretted that such a body of troops as this should be assembled, and that they should have, in fact, no object before them. What you point out is certainly the right line of proceeding; but as I informed you in a former letter, I do not conceive that the Peshwah either will consent to our taking possession of Darwar, or that, if he did consent, Bappojee Scindiah would give it up to us. It then comes to this: if the Peshwah should consent to give us the place, and Bappojee Scindiah should withhold it, we must force it from him by means of a heavy train.

I have nothing here now but 2 iron twelves; but the eighteens are at Chittledroog, and I could easily get them up, if that plan is to be adopted; and, certainly, unless it is true that Dhoondiah means to fight, I do not see any other mode of bringing this warfare to a close. This place is, in fact, little better than a large plain, and our troops would walk into it at any time. It will, however, keep my baggage in security for a few days, if I should wish to attack him.

I am afraid that until we get Darwar, or some hold in the country, the plan of putting Munro into the management of the districts which have fallen into our hands will do us more harm than good; as, in fact, there would be an interval in which they would be under the management of nobody, or the people might resist Munro's management, and thus we should suffer all the inconveniences, for a time, of a contest in our rear. We get on now, and that is all; but if we come to have a contest in the rear, we must fall back to see the end of it.

The attack upon Budnaghur failed, God knows how! I propose to move upon Koondgul, and to clear that frontier, if Dhoondiah keeps at a distance; but if he comes near me, I think the best method of settling Soonda, and every other place, is to attack him. Munro talks of losing the revenues of Soonda (as if that was not foreseen and expected at the moment we took possession of it) on every occasion where there should be confusion in this country; and certainly confusion may be expected in this country for some years to come.

I recollect that, in different conferences which I had with you upon this subject at Nuggur, we agreed that this would be the case; I apprized government of it early, and yet they withdrew from it one of the battalions which alone could keep it in tranquillity, or make it deserving our attention. I have written to Ram Rao for 500 peons, which I shall find of great use.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sirhitty, 16th July, 1800.

On the 13th, after I had written to you, I learned that Dhoondiah had come from his camp at Koondgul, with his whole army and his guns, to within about 2 coss of mine at Savanore: this he examined for some time on a hill, and then returned towards Koondgul. I threw my baggage into Savanore on the morning of the 14th, and marched with 5 days' provisions, as light as possible, to Koondgul: he had gone off 6 coss to Carwah on the night of the 13th, as soon as he heard of my intended march; so that, between the morning of the 13th, on which he marched towards me, and that of the 14th, he had gone on the most moderate computation about 18 Sultauny coss.

He left a garrison of about 600 men in Koondgul, which I surrounded and stormed on the evening of the 14th, with but trifling loss. On the 15th I marched about 17 miles to the eastward to Luckmaisir, which place was evacuated; and on this day I have marched about 12 to Sirhitty, which place has been surrounded for the last 3 weeks by 4000 men belonging to the Dessaye of Dummul, and besieged in the cou ery manner. The siege has been raised, and I return to-morrow towards Savanore, in order to get my baggage, a supply of provisions, &c. Dhoondiah is in the jungles behind Dummul, and already his people have begun to desert him in numbers. His march to the front was merely to cover the retreat of his baggage, which was sent off to Carwah at the same time. As soon as I found that he was gone off to the eastward, I wrote to the chiefs of the remnant of Goklah's force, to request them to march immediately from Hullihall to join me at Savanore, as the road was clear for them: if they should comply with this requisition, I shall probably find them at Savanore on the day after to-morrow, and I shall then move forward again with all my baggage, &c.; and I hope to be able (with the assistance of Bowser, who will by that time be pretty close on his rear) to run down this fellow completely.

At all events, by this expedition, I have gained some objects of importance: I have established my superiority in the opinions of my own people, of his, and of the country. I have cut off one of his garrisons, and have taken from him one place of consequence, and I have raised the siege of another; and if the chiefs of Goklah's force attend to my requisitions, which, as their horses are starving at Hullihall, I hope they will, I shall be joined by that body of cavalry, which will, at least, enable me to move with all my baggage, and will probably enable me to cut the fellow off completely. When I found that he ran away from me at Koondgul, I took the opportunity of offering a reward for his person of 30,000 rupees,

G. O.

Camp at Luckmaisir, Tuesday, 15th July, 1800.

Col. Wellesley's thanks are due to Col. Stevenson for the disposition which he made of the cavalry yesterday round the fort of Koondgul; and to the officers and troops who attacked and carried that place; viz. Lieut. Col. Tolfrey, Major Powis, Capt. Balfour, of the artillery, and to Capt. Todd and the grenadiers of the 73rd regt. who escalated it in the most spirited manner. His thanks are also due to Lieut. Col. Turin for the assistance received from him. Col. Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander in Chief the conduct of all these officers and troops.

The detachment will march to-morrow in the same order as on this morning; whether by the right or left will be stated hereafter.

as I was heretofore authorized by government. This will give a spur to the negotiation at Hyderabad; and it is not impossible but that some of the hungry moor-men, who are leaving him, will think that they may as well have these rupees as not, and that at least they will endeavor to earn them: this will increase the confusion which, I understand, is in his camp.

P.S. I have written to Bowser to order him forward to Copaul, and eventually to Dummul. If I find that he is approaching upon my return to Savanore, I shall move this way immediately, and push Dhoondiah so as to secure Bowser's march. From all reports, however, of the diminution of his numbers, I have reason to believe that Bowser is fully equal to him. All has remained quiet at Savanore, and at the redoubt on the Werdah, I understand, since I marched.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Savanore, 18th July, 1800.

I wrote you, on the 16th, an account of the circumstances which induced me to march from hence, and of my proceedings from the 14th to that day. Nothing particular has happened since the 16th. I marched to Luckmaisir yesterday, and to this place this day; and what is very extraordinary, I saw fewer horse about us than I have seen on any day since I quitted the Werdah. Dhoondiah was yesterday morning at Unigury, somewhere between Darwar and Dummul. The remnant of Goklah's army, contrary to my advice, and even orders, had marched to Darwar; and I had intelligence yesterday, that on the night before they had marched from Darwar to join me at this place; but upon this intelligence I place no reliance whatever. I shall know the truth probably this day, and if it is necessary, I can march to-morrow with my whole force to their assistance. Dhoondiah keeps at the distance of about two marches from me, which clearly proves that he is not very easy. I have just received your letters of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, to which I am proceeding to reply. I have called upon Ram Rao for some peons to put into some of the principal places in the great communications with Hurryhur and with Bednore: but the country still remains under the management of Ball Kishen Bhow; and, for the reasons which I stated in my letter of the 13th, I think it will be better to allow it to remain so, at least, till we have a stronger hold of it.

By what has passed in the last 5 days, you will perceive that I can have no anxiety about Hullihall. If I had not the upper hand, I should certainly be reduced to the dilemma to which you allude, particularly if I attempted to keep a garrison in Savanore. But I have at present no such intention. I believe I told you that I had been obliged to take to pieces my bridge, so that my communication is now kept up by boats only: the redoubt is on the other side of the river, and guards them well, and gives

G. O.

Camp at Luckmaisir, Thursday, 17th July, 1800.

Col. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of Europeans will not allow their men to go out of their lines, without being dressed in their uniforms, except for any duty of fatigue, when they will of course have commissioned or non-commissioned officers with them, according to circumstances; or to play at long bullets, or any other game.

good cover to my brinjarries. Even if Savanore was a good post, it would not answer to cover my boats and brinjarries, as it is 7 miles from the river; and even at the present moment, the communication for unarmed people is insecure, from the straggling horse which are constantly about this camp: it would of course be much more so, if I had not established the post upon the river, and if I was not here myself. Upon the whole, then, I shall leave Savanore to be occupied by the first comer, except a body of peons can keep it for me.

I have heard from Bowser, but I really cannot tell, from his letter, at what time he was likely to march; I think, however, about the 10th. If he marches at that time, he may be at Copaul by the 25th, and before then I shall be within reach to cover him. I have, however, no apprehension for Bowser, but much for my Marhatta friends, who appear so little willing to obey orders, and so unable to defend themselves.

I shall make arrangements for the payment of the bullocks coming with the 19th dragoons: I shall make an arrangement, if possible, this day, for bringing forward Munro's amildars upon the frontier, and I will connect their operations, if possible, with my own. My next step must, of course, depend a good deal upon the necessity of going to the assistance of our allies, upon which I hope to be able to decide this afternoon.

I can say nothing about the bandies, excepting that it is the most scandalous affair that can have happened. We have not one at Chittledroog, and all that can be done is to get them on to Chittledroog, as well as we can.

The post at Montana has certainly been threatened, and I believe attacked; but unless they have been guilty of a gross neglect in Malabar, have disobeyed orders, and made a false report, the new post at Cotaparamba must be well supplied with provisions, and of course in perfect security. If the Pyche Rajah comes into Cotiote, or attacks one of these posts in reality, it will be certainly necessary to reinforce Tellicherry, if not with a view to the safety of that place, at least with a view to the ability of assisting the posts in advance, when they are attacked. There is now nothing at Tellicherry excepting a corps of moplah sebundies, consisting of about 100 men; and I should certainly look upon the loss of that place as a very serious misfortune.

I have a letter from Major Walker upon the subject of raising a body of nairs: he seems to think that Kydree Amboo is at the bottom of, what he calls, the unfounded fears in Cotiote, and that he wishes to be paid to keep that country quiet. If the plan of employing the nairs should be connected with this notion of Major Walker, it will require some consideration whether we ought to pay a tribute to Kydree Amboo for our tranquillity. The truth is, that the posts in Cotiote are fully sufficient to keep it in tranquillity, if Col. Sartorius can find means to reinforce Tellicherry, or Cotaparamba, so as to have a little party ready to take the field, and make a dash at any thing which the Pyche Rajah may attempt to collect together. It is now as easy to move troops through that country as through any other that I know of.

I have spoken to Capt. Mackay about his muttaseddee, and you will have no further trouble upon that subject. I will write to you again to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

I had received from Mr. Uthoff copies of the letters you enclosed. The wants of the troops in Soonda have been entirely relieved since he wrote. I have written to the commanding officer in Soonda to desire him to throw the rice (now in Sargaum) into Soopah, about which I conclude he also wrote to you. Gordon neglected to provide that garrison; and if it falls, I am sure I do not know how it is to be retaken till after the rains.

I have written to the amildar of Bonawassi to desire him to collect all the peons he can, and to drive the banditti out of Soonda; also to the commanding officer in Soonda, to desire him to assist this amildar, and to make another attempt upon Budnaghur in concert with him. If it should fail again, I must take an opportunity of stretching out that way, and the siege will, in the mean time, be converted into a blockade. The amildar is to advance and take possession of Hangal, to give protection to the inhabitants, &c.

I have not yet heard any thing of my Marhatta friends, and I therefore conclude that they remain in safety under the walls of Darwar. I expect to hear from them this evening, when I shall determine upon my next movement. Mr. Wilson's letter to Mr. Smee describes the business which I mentioned to you in my letter of yesterday. The advanced posts, I find from private accounts received by other hands, are really as well supplied as they were reported to me to be; and I have therefore no fear for them. A small corps collected at Tellicherry to move about from post to post in the triangle, of which we have the three angles, will in my opinion soon send the Pyche Rajah up the ghauts.

—— is giving Col. Stevenson some trouble about his allowance, which he receives from the amildar at Chittledroog. The service upon which the latter is now employed is not one likely to last very long, or one for which it is usual to deprive an officer of his command; and I am afraid that, if it was so, we should not find people so willing, as they now are, to quit their garrisons in order to take the field. Our friend here is really most useful to me, and I should not like to tempt him back to Chittledroog by stopping his allowance during his absence. Will you do me the favor to settle with Purneah that Col. Stevenson is to receive the allowance, and not ——?

I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about our carts and stores. I was very anxious about the gallopers, which, by the

G. O.

Camp at Savanore, Saturday, 19th July, 1800.

The great deficiencies of the carriage cattle, particularly in the camp equipage department, and the inconveniences to which gentlemen are put in consequence, as well as the sense of the convenience which the public service will derive from getting rid of this burthen, induce Col. Wellesley to request that such gentlemen as have the means of carrying their own tents will signify the same to Capt. Mackay. An approbation has been given, by authority, to a plan, already adopted in some instances, for the carriage of tents of officers, which Capt. Mackay will communicate to such officers as are able, and may be inclined, to relieve the public service upon the present occasion.

Parts of some of the tents are now carried upon camels, which will still be supplied for them, if officers should wish it. This plan goes only to procure good and convenient carriage for the parts of the tents now carried by bullocks, and to relieve the service from burthen, which weighs upon it at the present moment. Such gentlemen as are desirous still to have the use of camels, although they may carry parts of their tents, will signify the same to Capt. Mackay.

by, ought not to have been loaded by the Commissary stores: the latter, however, are in general to be left at Chittledroog; and I still hope that the gallopers will come in from the Toombuddra with the 19th dragoons.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

I have received your letters of the 7th and 12th, and I have written to your amildar at Bonawassi, to desire him to increase his peons as much as possible, to endeavour to drive the banditti out of Soonda, and to retake Budnapoor, in concert with the officer at Mudnapoor, to whom orders will be sent to make another attempt on that place. I have also desired the amildars, if the attempt on Budnapoor should fail, at all events to turn the siege into a blockade, and to advance and take possession of Hangal, and give protection to the inhabitants on the borders. If we cannot restore tranquillity to Soonda in any other manner, I must stretch out that way myself, which will certainly do the business effectually. I am prevented from doing so at this moment by the necessity of looking out for the safety of Bowser on one side, and of the remains of Goklah's army on the other. I have given Dhoondiah one run, and I have established an opinion of our superiority in our own people, in his army, and in the country in general. His people begin already to leave him. I have not time to write you the particulars.

To Major Isaacke.

Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

Licut. Col. Close will deliver to you a prisoner, by name Beem Rao, who is charged with having endeavored to seduce from the service of His Highness the Rajah of Mysore a rissalah of horse, in order that he might enter into that of Dhoondiah Waugh. Having been authorised by government to try by military process, and to punish with death, if necessary, persons who might be concerned in intrigues and endeavors to foment disturbances in the territories of the Hon. Company and of the Rajah of Mysore, I desire that you will forthwith assemble a Court of Inquiry, which is to consist of as large a number of officers as can be conveniently assembled, of which Court you are to be president; and that you will inquire into the circumstances stated against Beem Rao, by the examination of evidences against him, and of such as he may have to produce in his own favor. You will transmit to me the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and its report.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

I was joined last night by Goklah's cavalry, and expect to be joined this

G. O.

Camp at Savanore, Sunday, 20th July, 1800.

Col. Wellesley has great pleasure in communicating to the Native troops the subjoined orders, as an additional proof of the attention of the government which they serve to their wants and comforts.

G. A. O.

20th July, 1800.

A party of friendly Marhatta horse is expected to arrive in the vicinity of camp in the course of the night. Quarter guards of all corps are to be particular in observing the approach of horse, and to prevent them, whosoever they may be, from entering the camp before daylight to-morrow morning.

day by that under Chintomeny Rao. This materially alters my situation as it stood in regard to Soonda. In order to get the corps from Hillcah, it must now come to me; and, on its route, it may as well clear out Budnaghur, and all that country. I have sent orders accordingly; and if guns are wanted for Budnaghur, they will be furnished from a redoubt which I have upon the Werdah, which is about 7 miles from Bancapoor.

Send orders by express to your people, to use every exertion to supply the wants of the corps, and afterwards the same exertions to forward supplies to my troops. I wrote to Mungush Rao this day upon the subject.

P. S. I have just received your letter of the 15th, and I shall be obliged to you if you will delay the sale of your rice for a short time.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I was joined in the middle of last night by about 1000 of Goklah's horse: they marched from Darwar yesterday, and say that the remainder of the party, as well as that under Chintomeny Rao, are on the road, and will come in on this day. I have, therefore, no longer any uneasiness about them, or about that quarter, and look only to Bowser. We have had a terrible day and night's rain, which renders the roads in this country almost impracticable for any troops, excepting like those of Goklah: they are frightened out of their wits. This will prevent my marching to-morrow, but I hope on the day after to move forward in great style.

I have no fears whatever for Hullihall, which place, for this country, is strong at all times; but in this season nothing can hurt it, as it is almost covered by a large tank. I have, therefore, written to the commanding officer in Soonda to detach the 1st of the 4th to clear out Soonda about Budnaghur, and to get possession of that place; and if he finds that he cannot do so without guns, he is to make a requisition for them upon the officer commanding the redoubt on the Werdah. They will not be more than 2 marches from each other. After having given a good clearance to Soonda, this corps is to move to the redoubt, at which place I shall have occasion for it as a convoy for provisions, &c. My route will be by Luckmaisir, Sirhitty to Dummul, which place I shall storm, and then stretch out towards Copaul. I think that I shall be able to keep my rear open by means of this Marhatta cavalry, and you shall hear from me constantly.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, near Luckmaisir, 23rd July, 1800.

In 2 days at Savanore I was entirely destroyed. I lost, upon a moderate calculation, about half my cattle. I have, however, contrived to crawl here: I am in the midst of large villages full of cattle, which I am now employed in seizing and arranging to departments, and I hope to be able to move on to-morrow. Never surely was there anything so unfortunate; but I hope to remedy it in some degree. There is nothing so faulty as our bullock system, and its effects are now most severely felt. I assure you that we have never wanted forage at Savanore: it is true the cavalry, in the first 2 days, used all there was in the fort, notwithstanding

the orders to cut grass for the horses; but still forage was plentiful at the distance of 2 or 3 miles. There is, however, clearly so little interest in the preservation of the bullocks in the breast of the bullock men, that they could not be prevailed upon to go out these 2 or 3 miles to bring in forage; in some instances they were driven out. The weather became severe to a degree, and the consequence has been that we have lost half our cattle. We lost only 4 gun bullocks; and from yesterday's march I should imagine that the private cattle of the army, and those belonging to the bazaar people, are as well, if not better, than they were on the last day's march. I have some suspicion of dubash tricks, such as fictitious owners and maistrics in camp, the real owners being conicopolies in the office at Seringapatam; and if I find a real and clear proof of that transaction, I shall send the whole of it to Madras. Mackay swears that it is so.

Dhoondiah is gone to the Malpoorba, and I believe intends to take refuge with the Rajah of Kolapoor. I hear from Munro that there is a vakeel from that Rajah on his way from Goa to my camp, having left at Goa his fellow. I have written to Uthoff to desire him to dispatch the vakeel from Goa to inform his master that he must prevent Dhoondiah from crossing the Malpoorba; and that if he does not do so, he may possibly be treated as an enemy by the combined armies of the British, the Nizam, and Goklah. If he stops him at the Malpoorba, I think we shall give a good account of him.

P. S. I have got bullocks, and am able to get on again once more.

G. O.

Camp at Kalasa, Tuesday, 22nd July, 1800.

The distress which the detachment suffers from a waste, and consequent want, of forage makes it necessary that some arrangement should be made respecting the forage of the country.

It may frequently happen that it will be convenient, or may be necessary, to halt 3 or 4 days on the same ground. If the forage is wasted, the same distress may be expected again, for which there will be no remedy. The cavalry have grass cutters; and Col. Wellesley calls upon the commanding officers of corps of cavalry to make them do their duty, and furnish the horses with grass. It is positively forbidden to give straw to the horses of cavalry, excepting in a case of evident necessity, which must be stated in writing to Col. Stevenson, and which he will forward to Col. Wellesley, who will give orders that they may have the quantity of straw required. Commanding officers of regiments of cavalry will be responsible if, notwithstanding this order, their horse keepers and grass cutters are sent into the villages.

In addition to the troops for the duties of the piquets, a detachment of 1 havildar and 12 men is to be warned daily, and is to parade on the marching flank of the line on marching days, and in front of the park on others. This detachment is to be under the orders of Capt. Mackay, who will post it as a safeguard in such village as may be most convenient to the encampment, to preserve the forage for the public cattle. If there should be but one village with forage in the neighbourhood of the camp, Capt. Mackay will post his guard over such parts of the forage as he shall think sufficient for the public cattle. No person whatever is to take from the forage, over which Capt. Mackay will place his guard, excepting the bullock people belonging to the gun bullocks, and those belonging to the store, grain, and provision departments.

The heads of the store, grain, and provision departments will be so kind as to take care that the bullock people belonging to them go regularly for forage; and they will send with them trusty persons, to see that they pay for what they take, and that they commit no depredations in the villages.

It is a subject of common and daily complaint from the inhabitants of the country, that not only their straw is taken, but that their houses are pulled down for firewood. It is impossible, from this detachment, to place safeguards in every village; and Col. Wellesley must therefore request the assistance of the officers of the detachment to put a stop to a practice so injurious to the country, and eventually to the troops.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, near Luckmaisir, 24th July, 1800.

I have been able to move this day, and I hope to be at Dummul on the day after to-morrow, where I have ordered Bowser to join me.

Dhoondiah certainly wants to cross the Malpoorba, but he has no boats, and the river has overflowed its banks. Gen. Braithwaite has appointed Nundydroog, as the station at which Cuppage's corps is to be raised, and Bangalore for that of another person: it will be necessary to prevail upon him to alter that arrangement, and I shall be happy to assist in forwarding any view of Cuppage. In the mean time, as it is impossible for Cuppage to reside there at present, and as it is absolutely necessary for me to have somebody there, I have desired Mr. Read of the 33rd to go over and take charge of the place. He is a sensible man, and understands the language, and will answer well for a time; either till Cuppage is removed there, and able to take charge, or till the officer, in command of the corps to be raised at Bangalore, shall arrive. Cuppage has sent me some papers regarding stores and provisions for Nundydroog, which are so incomplete that I can make nothing of them, and I have been obliged to return them to him.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sirhitty, 25th July, 1800.

I arrived here this day, and was joined on the march by Chintomeny Rao and his party, which is called 3000 horse, but is in reality about 1500. Col. Bowser was at Kanagherry on the 20th, expected to be at Copaul on the 22nd, and I have ordered him to join me at Dummul to-morrow.

You will observe by my letters that I had, on the 1st July, ordered that a party, such as you proposed, should be assembled at Tellicherry, and I have no doubt but that they will clear out Cotiote in a short time; that is to say, if they behave like men. The success at Oustara is capital.

Bowser has not a grain of any thing. I have in camp for my own people 26 days' rice from the 30th July, and there are 1200 bags at Savanore, which will give Bowser a supply to the same period; but send on to us every thing that you can get together.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Dummul, 26th July, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I stormed and got possession of

G. O.

Camp at Sirhitty, Tuesday, 25th July, 1800.

A salute of 13 guns to be held in readiness to be fired on Goklah alighting at Col. Wellesley's tent this afternoon. A salute of 13 guns to be prepared immediately, to be fired on Chintomeny Rao alighting at Col. Wellesley's tent.

G. O.

Camp at Dummul, Saturday, 26th July, 1800.

Col. Wellesley cannot sufficiently express his satisfaction at the conduct of the troops engaged in the assault of Dummul this morning. The success, in so short a space of time, against a fort of such strength, which held out against the enemy for several weeks, will add to the reputation which the troops have already acquired in this country. Col. Wellesley will not fail to report their conduct to the Commander in Chief. His thanks are particularly due to Col. Stevenson, for his disposition of the cavalry; and to Lieut. Col. Capper, Major Desse, and Capt. Macpherson, of the 77th regt., who led the 3 attacks: also to Ensign Hooper, of the 73rd regt., who headed the party which entered the fort near the gate, and of whose conduct Major Desse reports most favorably; and to Capt. Heitland and his corps of pioneers. Returns of the killed, wounded, and missing to be sent to the Hon. Adl. Gen. this evening.

Dummul this morning. I attacked it in 3 places, at the gateway and on 2 faces, and carried it with a trifling loss, which was to be attributed chiefly to the eagerness of the soldiers to get upon the ladder, and it broke. It is a strong stone fort, well built, with a dry ditch. The ladders used were above 30 feet long, and, in my opinion, the fort ought not to have been attacked with them.

Bowser has not joined me yet: I know he is at Copaul, and I ordered him here. I shall not wait for him, however, but shall proceed on my march to-morrow morning.

To the Adj. Gen.

Camp at Dummul, 26th July, 1800.

The supplies of cattle received from the Marhattas having been sufficient to enable me to move forward, I marched yesterday to Sirhitty, at which place I was joined by Chintomeny Rao, with about 1500 horse, and on this day to Dummul. There were in the fort about 1000 men, to whom I offered cowle; and I gave them an hour to consider of the offer, till the line could come up. They declined to accept it, and the place was attacked, and carried, by escalade, by a part of the troops under my command.

The fort was surrounded by the cavalry under Col. Stevenson, and by the Marhattas under Goklah. It was attacked in 3 places: at the gateway, by Major Desse, with the piquets, supported by 2 companies of the 2nd of the 2nd; on one face, by Lieut. Col. Capper, with the grenadiers and light infantry of the 73rd and the 2nd of the 4th; and on the other, by Capt. M'Pherson, with the grenadiers and light infantry of the 77th, and the remainder of the 2nd of the 2nd Bombay regt. It was impossible to force the gateway, and the party, on that attack, entered the fort by escalade; and the other 2 attacks likewise succeeded nearly at the same time.

The fort is strong and well built, the wall about 30 feet high, with a dry ditch, in some places of considerable depth. It held out against Dhoondiah for several weeks. I cannot say too much in favor of the troops, who, by this exploit, have added to the reputation which they have already gained in this country. I must particularly mention to the Commander in Chief, however, Col. Stevenson, from whom I receive the greatest assistance upon all occasions, Lieut. Col. Capper, Major Desse, and Capt. M'Pherson, of the 77th, who led the 3 attacks, Lieut. Hooper of the 73rd, respecting whose conduct Major Desse has reported most favorably, and Capt. Heitland and his corps of pioneers. I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded on this occasion.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp at Dummul, 26th July, 1800.

I arrived here this morning, and attacked and carried the fort, with but small loss. I march in the morning towards Gudduck, and I beg that you will follow me as soon as you can. You shall receive further orders there, or before you reach it. I hope to be able to supply you with rice: some brinjaries are coming after me under an escort of Rajah's horse; if they should arrive while you are here, I beg that you will bring them on with you, but don't allow them to open their bags till you reach my camp, or receive further orders from me upon the subject.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 26th, 6 P.M., and I am much disappointed to find that my letters of the 24th were so long on the road; there is no remedy now, but that you should get on as fast as you can. You will march by the road as follows, and make your marches on the days hereafter mentioned. On the 28th you will be at Dummul, on the 29th at Gudduck, on the 30th at Selowty, on the 31st at Nargoond, on the 1st Aug. at Hoogurgoor, about 2 coss from the Manowly ghaut, where I understand that Dhoondiah intends to cross the Malpoorba. You will receive on your road constant instructions from me, and I beg to hear from you constantly. Here follows the route which I shall follow, and the distance which I shall be from you on each day. On the 28th to Kittoor Madenoor, distance from Dummul 10 coss; on the 29th to Noolgoond, distance from Gudduck 10 coss; on the 30th to Habal, distance from Selowty 7 coss; on the 31st to Soondooty, distance from Nargoond 6 coss. Of course this must be altered according to the motions of the enemy, but I will give you timely notice of any alteration, either in your movements or my own.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800.

As there is a probability that some days will elapse before I am joined by you, and it appears, by the state of your supplies, which I have received from you, that it is probable that you will be in want, I beg that you will keep with your camp the brinjarries, which I informed you, in my letter of yesterday, were on the road to join me. In case you should want rice, and there should be none in your bazaars, I authorise you to purchase it from the brinjarries, and to issue it to the fighting men of your detachment, at the rate of half a seer each *per diem*, which you will inform them they are to receive *gratis*. You will be so good as to keep the account of your purchases, and have the rice issued upon the regular indents; and the Commissary of grain of this detachment will settle the account with you, when you will join. You will observe particularly that the rice is not to be issued in this manner, if it can be purchased at all in your bazaars; and that, excepting to give it in this manner to the fighting men (Company's troops) of your detachment, the brinjarries belonging to me must not be suffered to open their bags, although they will remain with your camp.

I have sent orders to the brinjarries to come direct from Sirhitty to Gudduck, and I shall leave orders for them to wait here for you, if they should reach this place before you arrive.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp at Dummul, 27th July, 1800.

On the 24th July, I addressed you in duplicate, from Luckmaisir, to inform you of my intention to be at this place on the 26th, and to request you would march immediately on the receipt of my letter to join me here; but from your not having arrived, and having received no answer to my letters, I presume they must have miscarried. I took Dummul by storm yesterday. I march this day to Gudduck, on my way to the Malpoorba, and I beg you will follow me as soon as possible.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800.

I have been favored with your letter of the 18th inst. The success of the expedition against Dhoondiah, of which I gave you an account in my letter of the 16th, has had such good effects in the country, has brought forward so many of our Marhatta friends, and, if it has not decreased the numbers, has so considerably damped the spirits, of Dhoondiah's party, that I do not think it necessary to call upon you for the battalion which you were so kind as to say you will send me.

I purpose to supply Lieut. Col. Bowser's troops as I do my own, by an issue of half a seer of rice *per diem gratis*: I have, now in camp, rice for my own detachment to the 25th Aug.; and before Lieut. Col. Bowser joins me, I shall have an equal quantity for the troops under his orders. This country produces dry grain only, and it is not possible to feed the numerous followers of these large detachments with rice, which must be brought from the Mysore country, about one month's march, and across two rivers.

I yesterday took Dummul by storm, and I enclose you a copy of the account of the affair which I sent to the Adj. Gen. This place was evacuated as soon as the account of the fall of Dummul reached it. Dhoondiah has now no stronghold in this country, and his object is evidently to cross the Malpoorba: if the weather continues fair, and the roads should not be rendered impracticable for guns, I shall be at the river before he can cross it.

I shall take every opportunity of apprising you of the state of affairs in this quarter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, right of the Malpoorba, 31st July, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have struck a blow against Dhoondiah, which he will feel severely.

After the fall of Dummul and Gudduck, I heard that Dhoondiah was encamped near Soondootty, west of the Pursghur hill, and that his object was to cover the passage of his baggage over the Malpoorba at Manowly. I then determined upon a plan to attack both him and his baggage at the same time, in co-operation with Bowser. His detachment, however, did not arrive at Dummul till the 28th, and was two marches in my rear; but I thought it most important that I should approach Dhoondiah's army at all events, and take advantage of any movement which he might make. I accordingly moved on, and arrived on the 29th at Allagawaddy, which is 15 miles from Soondootty, and 26 from this place. I intended to halt at Allagawaddy till the 31st, on which day I expected Col. Bowser at Nargoond; but Dhoondiah broke up from Soondootty, as soon as he heard of my arrival at Allagawaddy, sent part of his army to Doodwar, part towards Jellahal, and part, with the baggage, to this place. I then marched, on the morning of the 30th, to Hoogurgoor, which is east of the

G. A. O.

Camp at Moondenoer, Monday, 28th July, 1800.

Working money due to the troops to be paid immediately; and, in future, when any working parties are ordered, the money is to be paid, as soon as the proper bills are presented to the Paymaster. The acting engineer is to certify on the backs of the bills any occurrence that may have arisen in the course of the work, or loss of entrenching tools, for which stoppages are to be made by the Paymaster, and carried to the Company's credit.

Pursghur hill, where I learnt that Dhoondiah was here with his baggage. I determined to move on and attack him. I surprised his camp at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, with the cavalry, and we drove into the river or destroyed every body that was in it, took an elephant, several camels, bullocks, horses innumerable, families, women, and children, &c. &c. The guns were gone over, and we made an attempt to dismount them, by a fire from this side: but it was getting dark; my infantry was fatigued by the length of the march; we lost a man or two; and I saw plainly that we should not succeed, and I therefore withdrew my guns to my camp.

I do not know whether Dhoondiah was with this part of his army, but I rather believe he was not. Bubber Jung was in the camp, put on his armour to fight, mounted his horse, and rode him into the river, where he was drowned. Numbers met with the same fate.

One tandah of brinjarries, in this neighbourhood, has sent to me for cowle, and I have got the family of a head brinjarry among those of several others. I have detained them; but have sent cowle to the brinjarry. I hear that every body is deserting Dhoondiah; and I believe it, as my Marhattas are going out this night to attack one of his parties gone towards Doodwar. They were before very partial to my camp.

I have a plan for crossing some Europeans over the river to destroy the guns, which I am afraid I cannot bring off; and then I think I shall have done this business completely. I am not, however, quite certain of success, as the river is broad and rapid.

P. S. I have just returned from the river, and have got the guns, 6 in number. I made the Europeans swim over to seize a boat: the fort was evacuated. We got the boat and guns, which I have given to the Marhattas.

To the Adj. Gen. Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Manowly, 31st July, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have had it in my power to

G. O. Camp on the bank of the Malpoorba, Thursday, 31st July, 1800.

The attack upon the enemy's camp yesterday is a subject which reflects great credit upon Col. Stevenson, who made the disposition of the cavalry, and Col. Pater and Lieut. Col. Torin, and the officers and troops under their command, who executed it. Neither the strength of the enemy's position, his numbers, nor the great stake for which he had to contend, could induce him to stand against the rapid and regular attacks which were made upon him; and from the success upon this occasion the most important consequences are to be expected.

Col. Wellesley requests the officers and men above mentioned will accept his thanks. He will not fail to represent to the Commander in Chief their conduct as it deserves, as well as the activity, and patience under fatigue and necessary want of all comforts, of the whole detachment.

Col. Wellesley is concerned to observe the length to which the soldiers have carried plunder. Under the pretence of taking plunder from the followers, they have committed acts of which every good soldier is to be ashamed, and which, if continued, will tend to the ruin of the army. They have plundered the sepoys, the servants, followers, and baggage of their officers. The bazaar people and hircarrahs, and messengers coming with letters to Col. Wellesley, and even their own servants and followers, have not escaped them. Under these circumstances it is absolutely necessary that this plunder should be stopped; and Col. Wellesley accordingly declares his determination to punish, in the most exemplary manner, any man who may be found plundering.

The Commanding Officers of regiments, and all officers and non-commissioned officers, are requested to take measures to prevent the men from going out of their lines, unless they are dressed as soldiers ought to be, and to put a stop to this species of plunder.

strike another blow against Dhoondiah. After I had got possession of Gudduck, having heard that he was encamped near Soondooty, and that he was endeavoring to cross his baggage over the river Malpoorba, at Manowly, I formed a plan of attacking him and his baggage at the same time, by the co-operation of the detachment under Lieut. Col. Bowser. He did not arrive at Dummul till the 28th, and was, therefore, 2 marches in my rear, but it was possible that Dhoondiah might wait at Soondooty, to cover the passage of his baggage, till Lieut. Col. Bowser should come within reach; and as it was important that I should be near the enemy to take advantage of any movements he might make, I marched on, and, on the 29th, reached Allagawaddy, which is about 15 miles from Soondooty and 26 from this place: at Allagawaddy I proposed to halt till the 31st, on which day I expected Col. Bowser to be at Nargoond.

As soon, however, as Dhoondiah heard of my arrival at Allagawaddy he broke up from Soondooty; one part of his army went to Doodwar, another to the eastward, towards Jellahal, and a third towards this place with the baggage; and I am informed that, upon this occasion, he was deserted by a large proportion of his troops. I marched yesterday morning, the 30th, to Hoogurgoor, to the eastward of the Pursghur hill, as a central situation, at which I was most likely to procure good intelligence, and there I heard that Dhoondiah had come here with his baggage. I determined then to move on and attack him. I arrived here with the cavalry at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and found the camp standing, and that we had surprised the enemy. I instantly attacked his camp with the cavalry only.

Lieut. Col. Torin attacked their left with the 1st and 4th regts., and Col. Stevenson and Col. Pater their front and right with the 25th dragoons and 2nd regt. of cavalry. The camp was strong, with its rear to the Malpoorba, covered by the fort of Manowly on the other side of it, and a deep nullah along its front and left. The 2nd regt. of cavalry, under these circumstances, was the only corps which got into it; but every person there was either killed or driven into the river. All the baggage, 2 elephants, many camels, horses, bullocks, &c. &c., fell into our hands. Numbers of people were drowned or shot in attempting to cross the river, and many prisoners, women and children, &c. &c., were taken.

Major Blaquiére, with 4 troops of the 25th dragoons, pursued to the eastward a party which appear to have been outside of the camp, and drove them into the river.

Upon the whole, the disposition of the attack of this camp was most ably made by Col. Stevenson, and well executed by Col. Pater and Lieut. Col. Torin, and the troops under their orders, who conducted themselves much to my satisfaction. Dhoondiah's guns had been passed over the river before we reached the camp, and when the infantry came up we made an endeavor to dismount them; but night coming on, and the troops having undergone great fatigue, I withdrew my guns to my camp.

It is not certain whether Dhoondiah was with this part of his army or not: if he was, he went off with the party which was pursued to the eastward, and was driven into the river by Major Blaquiére.

I have this morning received messages from the brinjarries to ask for

cowle, which I have granted. Among other families which have fallen into my hands, I have got that of the head brinjarry, and I hope soon to have the whole of that class of people on my side.

P.S. I have the pleasure to inform you that, since writing the above, I have got possession of Dhoondiah's guns, 6 in number.

There was a boat immediately under the fort, which Lieut. Fitchet and Lieut. Jackson, and some men of the 73rd and 77th regts., swam over the river to seize. The fort was evacuated, and I have brought away and have given over the guns to the Marhattas.

To Major Munro.

● Camp at Soondooty, 1st Aug. 1800.

I have received your letters of the 22nd and 23rd. I have sent orders to the commanding officers of Hullihall and Nuggur to furnish ammunition, in moderate quantities, on the requisition of your amildars; in any quantities you please on your own. Do not press Hullihall too much, as I know they are not well supplied there. Take what you please from Nuggur.

I have taken and destroyed Dhoondiah's baggage and 6 guns, and driven into the Malpoorba (where they were drowned) about 5000 people. I stormed Dummul on the 26th July. Dhoondiah's followers are quitting him apace, as they do not think the amusement very gratifying at the present moment. The war, therefore, is nearly at an end, and another blow, which I am meditating upon him and his brinjaries in the Kittoor country, will most probably bring it to a close.

I must halt here to-morrow, to refresh a little, having marched every day since the 22nd July; and on the 30th, the day on which I took his baggage, I marched 26 miles, which, let me tell you, is no small affair in this country. My troops are in high health and spirits, and their pockets full of money, the produce of plunder. I still think, however, that a store of rice at Hullihall will do us no harm; and if I should not want it, the expense incurred will not signify.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Soondooty, 1st Aug. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a letter which I have written to the Adj. Gen., which will give you the details of a success obtained over Dhoondiah Waugh. I have to add to the account that it has been obtained with but small loss.

The number of people drowned in the Malpoorba is astonishing; among others, I am informed, was Bubber Jung, who, I believe, is well known at Hyderabad: he leaped into the river, with his armour, and sank.

I have seen Lieut. Col. Bowser, who is at Hoogurgoor, within 5 miles of my camp. His not being with me upon this last expedition is to be attributed to the remissness of one of my messengers. I wrote to Col. Bowser to order him to Dummul, on the 24th, at daylight, as soon as I found that my supply of bullocks enabled me to move, and I sent a duplicate of my letter in the evening. Col. Bowser ought to have received both on the 25th, and would, in that case, have co-operated in the storm of Dummul and in the action of the 30th; but he did not receive either of my letters till the 26th, at night, and could not reach Dummul till the 28th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Soondooty, 3rd Aug. 1800.

The Marhattas were so slow in their motions to take possession of the fort of Manowly, that the enemy occupied it on the night of the 31st before they attempted to get in. They also appeared so unable to take away the guns, and so unwilling to remain opposite Manowly for their protection, that I determined to destroy them, and did so immediately. I marched here on the 1st, and have halted yesterday and this day to refresh a little, and get matters again into order. Dhoondiah has brought back from the eastward that detachment which he had made to that quarter, and the whole of his force is gone along the Malpoorba towards the jungles of Kittoor and Soonda. I follow him to-morrow. Bowser's corps, with an additional regiment of cavalry, and commanded by Col. Stevenson, proceeds along the Malpoorba, and is to follow his track: I shall go with my troops to-morrow to Bedkaira, the next day to Kittoor, and shall keep at the distance of about 15 miles from the river.

The Marhattas will be on the look out between me and Stevenson, and me and Darwar, and thus we shall sweep along that whole line from Darwar to the river, and Dhoondiah must either go into the jungles, or he must go to the southward of Darwar into the open country. If he goes into the jungles, we shall easily come up with his rear: if he takes to the plain, I shall cross upon him with my detachment. It is now impossible for him to get over the Malpoorba, unless that river falls more than is expected at this time of the year; and even if he does contrive to cross in consequence of the falling of the river, I hope to have means of stopping him on the other side.

The vakeel of the Kolapoor Rajah arrived yesterday; I had a conversation with him immediately, and made known to him very clearly my sentiments regarding his master. I told him that, if Dhoondiah entered his country, I should follow him, and that, if he assisted Dhoondiah, he was to understand that I should enter the country as an enemy. That the fort of Manowly had allowed Dhoondiah's army to encamp under the

G. O.

Camp at Soondooty, Saturday, 2nd Aug., 1800.

The carriage bullocks, to be mustered tomorrow morning at 6, are to be assembled at the following places: Those belonging to the park, in front of the park; those of the grain department, at the grain moodée; those of the provision department, at the provision moodée; those belonging to the camp equipage department, in the rear of the head quarter line; and those belonging to the grain departments of each regiment of cavalry, in the rear of the regiment to which they belong.

The bullocks are to remain in the station, now pointed out to them, until they shall receive directions from the Muster master, through the heads of their departments, to move away. Gentlemen and the heads of the different departments will take care that the bullocks are not removed from the station, now pointed out for them, till ordered by the Muster master and Capt. Mackay will make arrangements of the same kind for those belonging to the camp equipage.

G. O.

Camp at Soondooty, Sunday, 3rd Aug., 1800.

As much valuable baggage has lately been lost on marching days, Col. Wellesley requests that the officer commanding the rear guard will allow a reasonable time for the baggage to get off the ground and in front of him before he marches; and that he will see that none of it drops behind, and will wait a reasonable time upon the road to allow it to get into camp before him.

It is particularly recommended to all corps and departments to brand their public carriage cattle with the number or mark of the corps or department, besides the Company's mark.

protection of its guns, and had given shelter to the people who escaped from the Company's troops across the river Malpoorba, and had fired upon us. That the killadar must either have acted in consequence of orders from his master, or he must have disobeyed the orders he had received; that in the one case the Rajah must be considered as having committed an act of hostility against the Company, or, in the other, his killadar would deserve a punishment which it would be my duty to inflict, and I desired that he might be given up to me.

The vakcel said that the Rajah was sincerely desirous of being on the best terms with the Company; that he would positively prevent Dhoondiah from entering his country, and would assemble men for that purpose; and that the killadar of Manowly should be given up. He afterwards, in the course of yesterday, consented on the part of the Rajah to admit Baba Saheb (the younger son of Pursheram Bhow), with his army, into the country, in order to watch and prevent any attempt of Dhoondiah to cross the river. Baba Saheb was yesterday near Badamy; but I have written to him to ascend the river, and he and the Rajah's troops will certainly be able to stop Dhoondiah on that side.

It appears to me very clearly that the Rajah of Kolapoor is much afraid of our entering his country at all, on account of our connexion with the Bhow's family, as he thinks it probable that we should take their part in the quarrel subsisting between the two parties. In all the conversations I have had with the Bhow's people, I have urged them to make peace with the Rajah of Kolapoor, as the only means of re-establishing their power in this country, or of keeping out such people as Dhoondiah. To this idea they at first manifested strong objections; but latterly they have listened to it a little more, I believe in consequence of finding that I was not disposed to attend to their propositions to attack the Kolapoor Rajah; and yesterday, in the conference which I had with all the parties in order to arrange the expedition under Baba Saheb, I again urged them to make peace, and desired that both parties should write down what they had to say upon the subject. The Bhow, Lingo Punt, and the Rajah's vakeel, all then declared that they were persuaded it was the only measure which could save the countries, and that they would really do their utmost to bring it about.

I wrote to Col. Palmer upon the subject some days ago; and if we can only arrange this matter, and get Appah Saheb appointed sole zemindar, or jaghiredar, upon this frontier, which I also mentioned to Col. Palmer, we may hope to have matters in Soonda and to the northward of Mysore in tolerable tranquillity. Our friend Munro has sent an amildar into the countries right of the Werdah, who is playing the devil. I have, however, ordered him to the presence, and have proclaimed in the country that he has no authority from me. He is a kind of *rights of men* man, who has ordered the people to pay no revenue to any body, and of course is obeyed. One of the consequences of his orders is, that the peons put into the different villages and forts by the Bhow do not receive their subsistence: they have threatened to hang their havildars, and now plunder the country.

We have hitherto enjoyed the greatest of all blessings for troops, a

quiet rear, and a secure communication with our own country; and I am anxious, to a degree, that it should not be disturbed for any trifling object. I think that matters in Cotiote will soon take a favorable turn: Sartorius will certainly, by this time, have marched to the assistance of the advanced posts.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kittoor, 5th Aug. 1800.

I arrived here this morning upon the plan which I stated to you in my letter of the 3rd. Dhoondiah is gone quite into the jungles, and his head is beyond the sources of the Malpoorba. Stevenson is at a place called Eytegul, about 6 miles from hence, and will follow the tail of Dhoondiah to-morrow, part of which he may probably cut off. I halt here to construct boats, to make certain other arrangements which I am about to detail.

1st. It is very certain that, as Dhoondiah has crossed by the sources of the Malpoorba, I could follow him by that route; but I must have a communication with this country, which by the same route would be long and difficult, and would be liable to constant interruption from the violence of the rains in these jungly countries. I have therefore determined to have my communication by boats, and at Sungoly, which is 3 coss from hence, and I halt here to construct the boats, as it is in the neighbourhood of a bamboo jungle, and of Darwar, where I can get hides, and it is a plentiful country, with rice, green and dry forage, &c.

2ndly. I must throw my sick and wounded into a place of security, and none will answer so well as Hullihall, which place is 5 coss from hence.

3rdly. I propose to make a collection and depôt of rice at Hullihall, and that cannot be done, unless I go there myself to have a little conversation with the dubash in office. What do you think of the difficulties stated in procuring the supply for that garrison, when I tell you that, about half an hour after my arrival, a buccall of this place told me that he would let me have 500 bags to-morrow, and would make it 1000 before 8 days elapsed?

4thly. It is necessary to curb Munro's amildars a little, who are taking possession of every place in the country, whether belonging to friends or to foes, and who have given great disgust to the allies.

The first is the only reason which induces me to halt; but I shall have a sufficiency of occupation while I am here. I have made all the arrangements for constructing the boats; and I shall go over to Hullihall to-morrow morning to settle the other points which are objects of my attention.

Although I think I shall be able to fill, in this country, 3000 empty brinjaries which I have got, let Purneah desire his amildars to forward supplies to us as fast as they can. I wait only for Palmer's answer from Poonah to begin peace making, according to the plan which I stated to you in my letter of the 3rd. All parties appear anxious for it, and I think that we ought to be so. Budnaghur is in our hands, and the frontier of Soonda is cleared of the banditti. I hear also that the rogues who went to Nurjin, in Canara, have withdrawn.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Kittoor, 7th Aug. 1800.

I arrived here on the 5th. Dhoondiah had gone even to the sources of the Malpoorba, where he passed, and his baggage is following him. Col. Stevenson is after them, and will cut off part of the tail, I hope. I have halted here in the neighbourhood of a bamboo jungle, to make boats, which I must have upon the river, in order to keep up my communication with my rear.

I went yesterday to Hullihall, and was glad to see the country so much improved since last year. It is now one sheet of cultivation. The dubash there ought to be hanged, for having made any difficulties in collecting the rice to be stored. My principal objects in going to Hullihall were to converse with your amildar respecting his operations upon the frontier; and with him and the paymaster's man, respecting a dépôt for my troops, to be made at that place. In regard to the forts, the allies, respecting whom it would be inconvenient to convert them into enemies at the present moment, are exceedingly offended at their forts being taken from them by a parcel of peons. Besides, to tell you the truth, now that Dhoondiah is off, I do not see what end it will answer to put your guards in the forts on the frontier, excepting to perpetuate confusion.

The Company do not intend, I believe, in consequence of this warfare, to take possession of any territory. To garrison a fort, then, against the inclination of the person who deems himself, and is supposed by the government to be, the rightful owner, will only tend to bring on a kind of minor contest on the borders, between your amildars and the Marhatta killadars, in which nobody will be gainers, excepting the thieves; and which we, above all other people, ought to endeavor to avoid. I have, therefore, desired your man to withdraw his people from Jeygoor, &c., which are Goklah's jaghires; and to use the peons he has raised in preserving tranquillity in that part of Soonda, and not to pass the Company's borders, till he hears further from me. Many circumstances have tended heretofore to occasion this system of thieving upon the borders; and that of one party giving protection to the robbers of the other, which I hope will no longer exist.

1st. The government of this country has been for some time in a very disturbed state, and every man has been accustomed latterly to do very nearly whatever he chooses.

2ndly. The Marhattas undoubtedly took possession of Soonda; and if they were not encouraged to do so, they were not opposed by us, until a very late period, when they broke off a treaty which was pending. They have always, therefore, looked at our possession of that country with a jealous and an envious eye; and of course saw with pleasure, and rather encouraged, any attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the people living there under our protection.

I hope now, that, before we shall have done in this country, (if we do not take it for ourselves,) we shall establish in it a strong government, one which can keep the relations of amity and peace. At all events, we have already established a respect for ourselves; we have gained a knowledge of, and have had a friendly intercourse with, the principal people; and it is not probable that they will hereafter be very forward to encourage any

disturbance in our country. They see plainly that it is in our power to retaliate; and from what I have seen of their country, and their mode of management, I am of opinion, that, at present, our robbers would get more than theirs; or, in other words, that they have more to lose than we have. I have had some conversation with them all upon the subject; they promise fairly that nothing of the kind shall happen in future; and I acknowledge that, if we are not to take possession entirely of the country, I rather prefer to trust to what they say, than to the desultory operations of amildars and peons.

In regard to the storing of rice, the dubash swore that he could not get a grain; although the head man of this place, which is only 25 miles from Hullihall, promised a large quantity in 8 days, on the evening that I arrived here. I was, therefore, under the necessity of desiring your amildar (whom I believe to be the brother of Mungush Rao) to exert himself to collect some. He says that he will begin to do so immediately; and he thinks he shall be able to procure a quantity in a short time, which will be of no use to me. He is to put it with the store at Hullihall; to take the receipt of the dubash; and it is to be drawn from thence as I may want it. There was some doubt whether the amildar would not want money for his purchases of grain upon this occasion, as he had given over to the dubash all he had collected. In order to obviate this difficulty, I have ordered the commanding officer at Hullihall to give him whatever money he may want, from the dubash's treasury, upon his receipt; and I have also desired the commanding officer to inform you whenever he shall authorize an issue of money to him. A store of rice at Hullihall will be a great comfort and convenience to me; and I shall be glad to have it increased to any extent that may be practicable. If you should wish any other arrangement, either for the mode of collecting it, or for that of advancing the money, let me know it, and I will alter that above stated accordingly.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kitter, 8th Aug. 1800.

I went to Hullihall and returned again on the 6th, having arranged there every thing I had to do.

Dhoondiah is fairly across the Malpoorba: he left camels, &c., upon the road; but Stevenson has not been able to come up with any part of his rear. Stevenson is now encamped at Konapoor, where he proposes to cross the river. Dhoondiah was yesterday morning within 3 coss of his camp, but he marched in the evening (as it is reported) to the N.E. My opinion is, that he is going towards Bauggreecotta, that he will cross the Gutpurba and the Kistna, and get among the polygars of Soorapoor, &c., who are dependent both upon the Marhattas and the Nizam.

There was a mutiny in his camp yesterday morning, and there is no doubt whatever that his army is reduced almost to nothing: if we are able to push him a little between the Gutpurba and Malpoorba, we shall probably reduce him so low, as to make him a very despicable enemy. In my opinion, we ought not to cross the Gutpurba, if that should be the case; but ought to confine our endeavors to giving strength to the chiefs on the frontier, in order to prevent Dhoondiah's return.

The war will literally have no object nor no end, if we are to follow a single man with a few horsemen to the end of the world; and at the same time, if we do not take some measures to strengthen the frontier, Dhoondiah, or somebody else, will certainly return as soon as we withdraw to our own country. Let me know your opinion upon this subject, in order that I may make a proposition to government without delay. I have already taken measures to make peace between the Kolapoor Rajah and Appah Sahab.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Kittoor, 9th Aug. 1800.

Since my last, Dhoondiah has got on the other side of the Malpoorba by a march through the jungles to the sources of that river, which he has turned. He has been deserted by many of his followers.

Col. Stevenson, with the detachment under Lieut. Col. Bowser, and the 4th regt. of cavalry, is now employed in crossing the Malpoorba at Konapoor; and I have halted here to construct boats, which I propose to use at Sungoly. Saddoolah Khan, with about 1000 horse and one battalion and 2 guns, arrived here on the 8th, and marched yesterday morning to join Lieut. Col. Bowser at Konapoor.

Lieut. Col. Bowser will probably send you a letter which I received last night from Noor Khan, the commander of the Hindustanee horse in the service of the Nizam, in which he desires that I will advance him money on account of pay for the month of Suffer. Considering the service upon which this body of horse is now employed, I should probably have been inclined to assist Noor Khan, if there had appeared any ground of complaint of a want of pay: but as that was not the case, as 15,000 rupees only were due, of which he had already received 2000 from Lieut. Col. Bowser, by desire of Col. Stevenson, I could not think myself justified in giving any money upon this occasion.

It appears, however, by Noor Khan's letter, that no measures have been adopted to provide for the future payment of this corps, as long as it may be employed in this quarter. There is no buckshee with it; and I understand from Lieut. Col. Bowser that he has not received any directions from you upon the subject. As it is very desirable that the people should be satisfied on this head, I shall be obliged to you if you will take it into consideration, and urge the minister to provide means for the payment of his Highness the Nizam's troops, during the time that they may be employed on this service.

It will certainly be desirable, and indeed it may become necessary, that money should be sent from his Highness's territories for this purpose; but if it should be thought proper to authorise Lieut. Col. Bowser to advance the money, and he should feel distress in consequence, I have no doubt but that I shall be able to pay his corps in September for this month, and probably in October for the month of September.

It is impossible to say, at present, which way Dhoondiah will go. I have in my camp a vakeel from the Rajah of Kolapoor; and this morning I received a letter from the Rajah, and another from his minister, by both of which I am assured that an army has been assembled by the Rajah, and that he is ready to move it to any place which I may point out, in order

to co-operate with me. I therefore do not think it probable that he will move towards the territories of that Rajah. My opinion is, that he will endeavor to go, with as many followers as he can bring with him, across the rivers, to the Soorapoor polygar, and the others on the Nizam's frontiers dependent upon his Highness, and the Marhattas. You may depend upon it that I shall endeavor to press him so hard as that the number of followers he shall take with him shall be as small as possible.

If I should find Dhoondiah determined upon the plan I have above mentioned, I shall send off Lieut. Col. Bowser to cross the Kistna without delay.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kittoor, 10th Aug. 1800.

I omitted to answer one part of your letter of the 1st inst. regarding Reyman Beg, the prisoner at Nundydroog. In my opinion, unless Baba Sahab gives his consent, he cannot be punished, but that may probably be obtained through the means of Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Nothing new here. Stevenson is crossing the Malpoorba at Konapoor, and I am making preparations to cross it at Sungoly. If my Native friends were a little alert, I should have 20 boats ready to-morrow.

I heard from Webbe last night, and I am very much concerned to find that he is not going to Poonah. Among other things, he informs me that the 5 companies of the 12th, and the 2nd of the 5th, are coming up the ghauts, as he says, to enable me to oppose the Rajahs in Malabar. I have already ordered these corps to Seringapatam, there to remain encamped under the Caryghaut hill till further orders; and guns to be equipped for them at that place, and every thing else to be prepared.

The question is, in what manner shall they be employed against the Rajahs in Malabar? In my opinion, they ought to go below the ghauts as soon as the weather will permit: if Purneah's people are able to keep the Rajah at all within bounds on the Mysore side of Wynaad, and if I hear from you that that is the case, I shall order them to Cannanore without loss of time. The season will be fair by the time that they will receive my orders, after I shall have heard from you. If they are to oppose the Pyche Rajah on the side of Wynaad, they must, I am afraid, remain on the defensive, as they are not sufficiently strong, by themselves, to enter that jungly country; and I am besides informed that it will be impossible to commence operations in it till the month of November.

It may be possible to open the campaign early in Cotiote, and push forward the roads, and establish ourselves at the foot, if not on the top, of the ghauts; and then, if I am in luck, I shall have settled matters here before November, and can march down to Wynaad, and settle matters there before the setting in of the next rains. Let me hear from you as soon as you can, respecting the ability of Purneah's troops to confine the Rajah to his jungles.

P. S. Kistnapah arrived this morning. The 19th not come yet.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, right of the Malpoorba, 13th Aug. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 9th inst. The loaded bullocks which come from Mysore sell off their goods as soon as they arrive in camp. We

have a bazaar, called the Rajah's, into which they go, and I do not believe they are detained one day. Among these I do not include the brinjarries: they have been detained, as their rice has been issued to the troops through the grain department. But even the brinjarries were detained only once, and that was while the troops were marching from Savanore to Manowly. You may depend upon it that the dealers from Mysore shall not be detained one moment after they arrive.

I have delayed to send instructions for the 12th regt., and the 2nd of the 5th, till I should hear from you; but, by your last 2 letters, I perceive that we must use these troops, in the first instance, to regain possession of Idatera: however, as the 12th will not arrive at Seringapatam till the beginning of September, I shall still delay to send instructions to the detachment till I hear further from you.

Kistnapah is arrived, and is a little wild; but I have given him a check, and I hope he will go on well.

I hope that we shall not be involved in a war with the Marhattas, on the crude notions of ——. Is it possible that any man can believe that it is Scindiah's intention to attack the Nizam at this moment, above all others? We have now a strong force in the centre of the Marhatta country; and should have on our side, in case of a contest with Scindiah, all the Marhattas of these parts, and others from the side of Sera, &c. Scindiah's army has crossed the Kistna; and if the armament has been increased lately, I conceive that he is desirous of co-operating with us in the destruction of Dhoondiah; and, probably, by means of a large force, to check any arrangements of the country on our frontier, which we may think it proper to make. A strong army will give much weight and effect to his intrigues in this part of the country. There is another reason which most probably has weighed considerably in producing the armament at Poonah. Goklah was looked upon by all the Marhatta chiefs to be invincible, and he was much respected at Poonah. His defeat and death have had great effect there, and it is not improbable but that these events may have urged the Peshwah to make some exertion. Whatever may be the real motive of Scindiah's conduct, it is certainly not his intention to attack the Nizam at this moment.

I have heard nothing from Col. Palmer in answer to my letters upon the subject of the arrangements of the countries in our frontier. I do not think it improbable but that Scindiah may himself be desirous of obtaining Darwar and Savanore, as well as Meritch and Tasgaum. I should think it a misfortune if he were to succeed in that object, as, without attacking us openly, which in my opinion the Marhattas will always avoid, he will contrive to put an end to the tranquillity of our frontier. If the Bhow's family retain possession of these provinces, and we can establish them firmly, we shall be quiet, and we ought to be contented. If Scindiah is to have them, my opinion is, that we ought to ask for compensation for our expenses; that we ought to push ourselves at least as far forward as the Werdah, if we do not ask for Darwar and the open country bordering upon Soonda. When I talk of the Bhow's family retaining possession of these provinces, I mention them because they have had them hitherto, and are attached to us, and under our influence; any other

family under our influence would answer equally well after a short time. And when I talk of the bad effects of allowing Scindiah to have these provinces, I mean him or any of his creatures. In short, there ought to be a strong government in this country, the head of which ought to be attached to us; and I prefer the Bhow's family to any other, because they have had possession, and have it now; and if we wish to put in another family, we must have a contest to effect our object. These are my notions, after the fullest consideration of the state of this country.

All the jaghiredars hereabouts would, of course, be averse to our strengthening, to any considerable degree, the hands of the Bhow's family, as they thereby become proportionably weak and insignificant. They therefore now bring forward to notice every little man who has any claims whatever to the soil, such as the Rajah of Kittoor, &c. I receive them all, call for their co-operation against Dhoondiah in the first instance, and refer the consideration of their claims to the Bhow and to a future period. Hereafter, if the Bhow is supported at Poonah, he will be able to crush all these petty Rajahs, and put them on the footing on which they were heretofore in better times: if he is not supported at Poonah, and we should abandon his cause, the Rajahs will do him no harm. My friend Kistnapah has taken some of these Rajahs in hand, and has brought them forward. I have, however, given him a hint that the Bhow's family are my object, and that any man who has any thing to say to the country must look up to them.

I have got 3 battalions of infantry over the river, and many boats prepared, and I shall not be long crossing the remainder of the troops.

To Major Munro.

Camp on the Malpoorba, 16th Aug. 1800.

I wrote to you on the 7th, and informed you of the manner in which Dhoondiah had escaped. A detachment from Stevenson's corps followed his track, and the road was covered with dead camels, bullocks, and people; but we got hold of nothing.

G. O.

Camp at Daste Cottah, Friday, 15th Aug., 1800.

Col. Wellesley has great pleasure in communicating to the troops the following letter received from the Adj. Gen., in which he conveys the approbation of the Commander in Chief on their conduct, and of the occasions which they gave Col. Wellesley of reporting it to head quarters:

To Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Fort St. George, 7th Aug., 1800.

I am directed by Major Gen. Braithwaite to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ult., conveying the agreeable intelligence of your success at Dummul.

Your report of the conduct of the troops in general has been highly satisfactory to Major Gen. Braithwaite; and he desires more particularly to express his approbation of the gallant exertions of Col. Stevenson, Lieut. Col. Capper, Major Desse, Capt. Macpherson, Capt. Heitland, and Ensign Hooper, whom you have distinguished in your report; and to request you will communicate to them the favorable impression he has received of their merits.

G. O. C. C.

10th Aug., 1800.

The series of active and most gallant services performed by the army under the command of Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, employed in suppressing the rebellion of that ungrateful miscreant Dhoondiah Waugh, who has excited insurrections against the power to which he stands indebted for life and liberty; the rapid capture by successive assaults of all the forts of which he had possessed himself between the rivers Toombuddia and Malpoorba: and the recent defeat and dispersion of his army, on the bank of the latter, by
a bold

Bowser has since crossed the river Malpoorba, and has advanced to Shawpoor; and he tells me that he found many dead cattle and people of all ages and sexes on the road. The people of the country beyond Shawpoor plundered 4000 brinjaries. I am now employed in crossing the Malpoorba, and I hope to be prepared to advance in 2 or 3 days. I shall leave something on this side, in case Dhoondiah should double back.

I wrote you fully respecting your amildars on the 7th: since that day I have received a letter from Soubah Rao (whose name, by the by, I never heard till he put himself in possession of part of the country), in which he tells me that he will neither come to me, nor withdraw his tannah, without orders from you; and he makes many bad excuses for this determination. I had no idea that he had so many peons as he says he has (1200), or I should not have called him to me; and I have since begged of him to go wherever he pleases, and never let me see or hear of him again. I agree with you, that, provided he does not disturb my rear, his expedition will do me more good than harm with my allies. I have put them to the test respecting the thieves you mention at Mundragoor. They promise that the cattle shall be forthwith restored, and that the head men of those villages, which, by their own acknowledgment, are inhabited by thieves only, shall be given up to me.

Your people at Hullihall are behaving capitally: they have sent me leather for my boats. Capt. Greenlay informs me that they will send me some arrack, which I expect from Goa; and this will be a considerable relief to my cattle.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick. Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Hoobly, 16th Aug. 1800.

Since I wrote to you on the 9th inst. Dhoondiah has continued his progress to the eastward, having made an attempt to get possession of Shawpoor, and another to possess himself of Gokauk, in both of which he failed. Lieut. Col. Bowser is at Shawpoor. I hope that all the troops will be across this river, and prepared to advance, before Dhoondiah

a bold and decisive attack on his Imperial camp with the cavalry alone, have given the most perfect satisfaction to Major Gen. Braithwaite, who now offers to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley this public testimony of it; and requests him to communicate this his approbation, with his thanks, to the meritorious officers and soldiers under his command, who have upon all occasions, under his auspices and conduct, executed with so much alacrity and valor the measures which he has so ably planned: in the course of which, Col. Stevenson, in the command of the cavalry in particular, and the officers heading the corps of cavalry in general, stand in a distinguished point of view, from the cavalry having been so generally brought forward: but in the course of which also the officers commanding brigades and corps of artillery, infantry, and pioneers, have equally distinguished themselves, as often as the circumstances of the service admitted of their so doing, which has been particularly evinced in the conduct of Lieut. Col. Moneypeuny in escalading the fort of Ramce Bednore, of Lieut. Col. Tolfrey, Major Powis, Capt. Balfour, and Capt. Todd, in the assault of the fortress of Koondgull, and of Lieut. Col. Capper, Major Desse, Capt. Macpherson and Heitland, and Ensign Hooper, who led the separate columns of attack on the fort of Dummul, which they successfully entered by escalade: and it is with much pleasure that the Commander of the army in Chief discovers a succession of such bold leaders, for future operations, in the conduct of officers of inferior rank on the late services, and in particular in the enterprise of Lieuts. Filchett and Jackson, who, with some men of those regiments, swam the river Malpoorba, and seized and brought away, from under the fort of Manowly, a boat which carried the captain of the enemy's artillery, which had already passed the river.

can make any arrangements for crossing either the Gutpurba or the Kistna.

Within these few days I have had several interviews with Noor Khan, in all of which he has urged me strongly to advance the money due to his corps for the month of Suffer; and yesterday he came, accompanied by Saddoolah Khan, the muttaseddees employed by Rajah Kooshen Rao, and other sirdars in the service of the Nizam, to represent the distresses of his troops, and the absolute necessity which existed that I should take some measures for their relief.

I acknowledge that I was strongly inclined to assist Noor Khan, although I was aware of the disinclination of the Court of Hyderabad to our interference in any matters relating to the payment of his Highness' troops: but I positively refused to give him any assistance, unless all the persons present declared in writing that it was absolutely necessary. This they did, in a paper, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose. I then sent an order to Lieut. Col. Bowser to pay Noor Khan the sum of 15,000 rupees, in which are included 2000 rupees which he had before advanced to him, at the request of Col. Stevenson, and 1000 rupees which I had advanced him, and for which, till now, I had not sent Col. Bowser an authority.

I hope that, as this advance was a measure of real necessity, it will not meet with his Highness's disapprobation.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp on the Malpoorba, 17th Aug. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 12th, and I agree with you that I ought not to follow Dhoondiah farther than the Gutpurba, and I should not even have crossed the Malpoorba, if it had not been to give confidence to the allies, and to awe the Rajah of Kolapoor. This Rajah has positively refused to allow Dhoondiah to enter his country, and he has assembled an army to co-operate against him; but it is at such a distance that I can make nothing of it at present. This Rajah appears heartily tired of Scindiah and his politics, and well inclined towards us: if Col. Palmer is only tolerably firm, this would be the time to send Scindiah to Hindustan.

I am going to give Dhoondiah one more run between the Gutpurba and Malpoorba, and I think I have a chance of picking up some baggage, &c.: it is clear I shall never catch him. His baggage has only one way to escape, and that is to recross the Malpoorba near Badamy; but I guard against that by detaching two corps of Marhattas, and a brigade of infantry, towards Jellahall, and I pursue him with my troops along the Malpoorba, Stevenson's along the Gutpurba, and Goklah's and the Mogul's between us, as far as the junction of those two rivers with the Kistna. I think I shall make something of this plan, although I may not probably get hold of him.

I shall write to government this day respecting my future operations. I can tell you that I have supplies to carry me to Poonah, if that were necessary, and my prospects are improving daily. I was a little anxious about arrack for a few days, but Uthoff (who is full of zeal) has sent me a supply from Goa, which will arrive at Hullihall, I believe, this day, and will be here before I can march.

I have reports of 10,000 full brinjarries between this and the Werdah; and I have 3000 out along the skirts of Soonda filling with rice; besides these, the Mysore dealers come in apace. Our price brings a few sheep from this country; and I have encouraged my (Amut Mahal) friend, by paying him for the sheep as they were in numbers at Hurryhur, taking upon the Company (which is only fair) all the loss between that place and the camp. In short, I have, as yet, experienced no serious want, and I have more of every thing now than I ever had; I have better prospects before me.

It is supposed that the rivers Werdah and Malpoorba will be fordable in 2 or 3 weeks, and that the Gutpurba will be fordable in a month.

P. S. Montana has been relieved, but with loss on our side.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 20th Aug. 1800.

I return the papers from Major Walker. I had before received accounts from Malabar of the relief of the two posts. These roads will not answer, unless they do as I desired them at first; that is, cut the underwood to a considerable distance on each side of the road. I have ordered Sartorius to employ the pioneers and coolies on this work immediately, as, whatever may be the plan for the next campaign, the communication with Montana must be made secure, or all will be lost. It will be fortunate if Purneah can check the nairs on the Mysore side: if he cannot, the 12th, and 2nd of the 5th, must go that way.

If he can check them, they shall go to Malabar; and I will send orders to begin by pushing the roads to the foot of the ghauts. Major Walker's plan, of having a force assembled in Mysore, to give room for apprehension in that quarter, would be excellent, if we had troops in Malabar to stand even upon the defensive, or to make such improvements in our roads and posts as are necessary to their security, and to give us the means hereafter of deriving a full advantage from them. But they are so weak in Malabar, their force is so dispersed, and it is so difficult to persuade the commissioners to allow it to be collected, that I am afraid we shall suffer in Cotiote, if we should not be able to send thither this reinforcement. However, Mysore is the first object; and, if Purneah cannot stop the nairs, the 12th and 2nd of the 5th must.

I hope to be able to march on the 22nd. Dhoondiah is in a bad way: his people are starving, are leaving him, and reproach him with their misfortunes. He retorts upon them, and desires them to give their wives and daughters to the Europeans, whom they are afraid to fight. This is the report, and that the Patans have left him. All my arrangements are made, and in a few days I shall press upon him at all points at the same moment.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Hoobly, 20th Aug. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 14th. My state of supplies is as follows: I have 1200 loads in the grain department, and 1500 full brinjarries in camp: I am told that I have 5000 between the Werdah and Malpoorba; and as the head man has not deceived me lately, I believe it. Besides that, 3000 brinjarries left me at Kittoor on the 5th, in order to

fill along the borders of Soonda, Savanore, and Darwar. There are 5000 brinjarries full, who are following the Nizam's camp; but some of them, I believe, have only jowarry.

Now for my consumption. It is impossible to say exactly what it is, when every body can get as much rice as he can eat; as Marhattas, Moguls, and all, go to the same bazaar on one day, and to different bazaars the next; and it is not practicable to form any rational estimate.

The fighting men of the Company's troops, to whom alone I allow rice in times of scarcity, consume 80 loads a day, including those of Bowser's detachment. Thus, then, as long as rice is produced at all in the bazaars, that is to say, while we are in a country which produces rice, I allow about 100 loads of brinjarry to be sold; or, if the country is plentiful, I allow still more. When rice was not to be got in the country, as was the case between the Werdah and Toombuddra, and, indeed, till we came to Kittoor, I allowed none to be sold by the brinjarries, excepting to the grain department; and I issued it to the troops at the rate of half a seer *gratis*. They then consumed 80 bags *per diem*.

At this rate of consumption, I have now in camp some 33 days' rice; and between the rivers, Lord knows what. It is, however, very clear that I am now in no want, and that I am not likely to suffer any.

The brinjarries I look upon in the light of servants of the public, of whose grain I have a right to regulate the sale as I may find most advantageous to its interests; always taking care that they have a proportionate advantage. But, besides these, there are another set of people who have attended my camp: these are dealers from Mysore, of whom I have kept no account. They come and sell their grain, and go off again; and, till we arrived at Kittoor, the rice they brought was all that was sold. Of these, I am told, there are many upon the road at this moment.

I look forward in future to the following sources of supply: 1st, a few hundred loads at Hullihall, suppose 500: 2ndly, when the season opens, 2100 loads, for which I will make the brinjarries go to the Seedasheeghur river: 3rdly, as much more from Canara as you can let me have. You see, by the state of my supplies, that I can wait till the ghauts are practicable for bullocks; and I must beg of you to let me know the road, and the name of the place to which I shall send upon the Seedasheeghur river; and the districts to which you would wish my brinjarries to go in future.

My ideas of the nature of the Indian governments, of their decline and fall, agree fully with yours; and I acknowledge that I think it probable that we shall not be able to establish a strong government on this frontier. Scindiah's influence at Poonah is too great for us; and I see plainly, that, if Col. Palmer remains there, we shall not be able to curb him without going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as the present moment; and probably by bringing forward, and by establishing in their ancient possessions, the Bhow's family, under our protection, we should counterbalance Scindiah, and secure our own tranquillity for a great length of time. But I despair of it; and I am afraid that we shall be reduced to the alternative of allowing Scindiah to be our neighbour upon our old frontier; or of taking this country ourselves. If we allow Scindiah to be our neighbour; or, if the country goes to any other through

his influence, we must expect worse than what has passed, thieves of all kinds, new Dhoondiahs, and probably Dhoondiah himself again. If we take the country ourselves, I do not expect much tranquillity.

In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo, and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandise ourselves at the expense of the Marhattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment, and of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies: at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government, and of defending ourselves, are proportionably decreased. Upon all questions of increase of territory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am in general inclined to decide that we have enough; as much, at least, if not more, than we can defend.

I agree with you that we ought to settle this Marhatta business, and the Malabar Rajahs, before the French return to India: but I am afraid that to extend ourselves will rather tend to delay, than accelerate, the settlements; and that we shall thereby increase, rather than diminish, the number of our enemies. As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country, I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with, if indifference constitutes that character.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 21st Aug. 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 18th. I am afraid that the attempt to establish a *depôt* at Hurryhur, or on the Werdah, would ruin us entirely, as I should find that the brinjarries, who, of course, like the other dealers, object to coming to such a distance, would lodge their rice at the *depôt*, instead of bringing it forward. It would be impossible to frame any arrangement to prevent that; and the idea must therefore be laid aside, although it would certainly be desirable to have a *depôt*, and the nearer the better. If the dealers from Mysore do not like to come forward, it cannot be helped: we must do without them.

The loss at Montana was very great certainly; but not so much so as is represented by the commissioners, whose letters I return. There is a post half way between Cotaparamba and Montana, called Pyche, which was abandoned; but since the roads have been made, at the particular desire of Sartorius, who had not troops to take care of it, my opinion is, that the Pyche Rajah will now withdraw his people from both those posts in Cotiote, where he has lost many men, and that he will direct his efforts to the Mysore side. If he does withdraw, they should lose no time in throwing in a further supply to Montana, and in making such improvements on the roads as will render the communication more easy in future. I see no reason why all the troops that can be spared should not be immediately collected, be pushed forward to Cotaparamba, and employed to cover the working parties upon the road between the river and Montana.

I have yet received no intelligence whatever from Col. Palmer. I suspect that he has made a proposition of some kind to Bajee Rao, as Goklah has just communicated to me a letter from him, in which he desires him to join himself with Appah Saheb and Chintomeny Rao, and settle the country. Baba Saheb and Chintomeny Rao are gone away with Capper; but I do not doubt that they have received letters of a similar tendency. The system hitherto has been to divide these chiefs, to keep those of the Bhow's family in the background, and to bring forward Goklah.

I have besides private information from Ball Kishen Bhow, that private orders have been sent to Appah Saheb to increase his forces to the utmost degree possible; and Ball Kishen Bhow says, that a blow against Scindiah is meditated, and that he is convinced that I shall receive a requisition, through Col. Palmer, to assist in freeing the Peshwah from Scindiah's clutches. There is certainly some change at Poonah, otherwise Goklah would not have been desired to join with Appah Saheb; but what this change is, I cannot say.

I received a letter this morning from the commander of Scindiah's forces: they are on this side of the Kistna. He says that he also is occupied in the destruction of Dhoondiah, and that, if he goes towards him, he will fall upon him and destroy him.

P. S. I omitted to inform you, that, having received some dooley bearers from Madras, I have discharged 7 sets of the Mysore bearers, and have given them their pay to the end of September, to carry them to their villages. I found them so attentive, and they behaved so well in marching with the troops upon all occasions, to the attack of all these places, and at Manowly, that I gave them a present of a pagoda each man at the end of last month.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 25th Aug. 1800.

I enclose 2 letters from Lieut. Col. Palmer, from which it is clear that no arrangement can be made in this country, and I shall therefore confine my endeavors to the recommendation of peace to all the parties. In my opinion, Scindiah will very soon be in possession of Savanore.

I received yesterday a letter from the European commanding officer of his troops, by name Dawes, who says that they have received no orders to co-operate with me, or to interfere at all in the present warfare.

Dhoondiah left 5 guns, a large quantity of ammunition, some arms (Company's), in possession of the Talloor polygar, near whose place I encamped the day before yesterday. I sent Col. Montresor with a detachment yesterday, to take and destroy them, and he did so effectually.

I hear that Col. Capper has taken the fort of Hooley, which is about 6

G. O.

Camp near Chevittygoondy, Friday, 22nd Aug., 1800.

The undermentioned liquors, the property of Mr. Humphreton, sutler in camp, confiscated for his selling spirits to the soldiers contrary to orders, viz. 24 dozen of rum shrub, 4 dozen of Jamaica rum, and 7 dozen of English claret, are to be sold by public outcry, for ready money, at the Provost serjeant's tent, at 4 o'clock to-morrow afternoon. The proceeds, after paying the Provost serjeant, to be remitted to the Military male asylum at Fort St. George. No Natives are to be allowed to purchase, except such as may be authorised by a written order from an officer, or registered sutlers.

miles east of Soondooty. I had passed this place on my way to Manowly, and on the day after the action had given it cowle; whether it was taken possession of by some of the fugitives from Manowly, or from what cause I know not, but some of the baggage of the dragoons was plundered by the people belonging to it. I hear from the Marhatta chief that Capper suffered no loss.

Dhoondiah made two marches towards Badamy to cross the Malpoorba at Tolusghur; but when he heard of the march of Lient. Col. Capper (who must have reached Jellahall yesterday), he returned, and is now gone to the junction of the Kistna and the Gutpurba. Stevenson is moving down the Gutpurba, and I directly upon him, at the distance of about one march from each river. I could not move along the Malpoorba, as I intended, on account of the difficulty of the roads; but I have some Marhattas on all parts of the river. I think I have some chance of falling upon him.

To do Col. Stevenson justice, as soon as I mentioned to him your notion of Major Isaacke's claim to the allowance at Chittledroog, he acquiesced in it, and desired that it might be paid to the Major. I omitted to write to you upon this subject, as I ought; but I had many other things to think of.

I have no power to order the repairs of magazines, storerooms, &c.; but as soon as Francke sends me the estimates you mention, I shall apply to government, that he may be allowed to make the repairs. As McIntyre is at Seringapatam, I shall make the arrangement you propose for the pioneers, and do every thing else in my power to make Chittledroog a good and useful post. While writing upon this subject, it occurs to me to mention, that, in my opinion, we ought to have a post at Hurryhur, with a granary well provided. Hullihall ought to be made a proper post, and to be well stored with grain and provisions, and we may then defy all the Scindiahs of the Marhatta empire. I shall write to government upon this subject, as soon as matters shall have become a little settled.

P. S. I enclose a letter from Mr. Uthoff, which throws further light upon the intended co-operation of Scindiah in concert with the Kolapoor Rajah.

To Lient. Col. Close.

Camp at Bauggrecoffah, 28th Aug. 1800.

I am sorry to inform you that Dhoondiah escaped across the Malpoorba at Boodeyhaul, on the night of the 24th, the river having fallen considerably on that day. He is gone towards the Nizam's country.

Stevenson will be at Boodeyhaul, and, I hope, across the river, this

G. O.

Camp at Dadabawce, Tuesday, 26th Aug., 1800.

Col. Wellesley has received from Lient. Col. Capper a detailed account of the successful attack by storm of the forts of Hooley and Syringhy on the same day, in which it appears that the troops under the command of Capt. Lock and Capt. Dickinson have behaved with the same spirit, which he has had so frequently the satisfaction of observing and reporting to the Commander in Chief, and which has received his applause. Upon this occasion it appears that the officers above mentioned, and Capt. Sir J. Sinclair, and the Coast and Bombay artillerymen under his orders, particularly distinguished themselves. Col. Wellesley requests that they will accept his thanks, and he will not fail to report their conduct to the Commander in Chief.

day: I shall be at Johughur, and, I hope, across, to-morrow. I have made all the arrangements for altering the line of communication for my supplies, and I hope to be able to follow Dhoondiah, without inconvenience, in a day or two. As soon as I found that he pointed to the eastward, I wrote to Meer Alum, who is at Copaul, and apprized him of the possibility that he might cross the Malpoorba, notwithstanding the measures which I took to stop him; and I requested him to provide for such an event. It is to be hoped, that, if he has done so, Dhoondiah will not have it in his power to do much mischief before I can approach him. It is said that there are some brinjarrics and baggage still on this side of the river: I do not know whether that is true or not, but I send a detachment after them to-morrow.

I have received your letter of the 22nd, and wrote to you fully, respecting Scindiah and the Kolapoor Rajah, some days ago; since that, I find that Scindiah's troops, south of the Kistna, have attacked a polygar, who was, at my request, on the banks of the Gutpurba to stop Dhoondiah; and in his absence on this service, have taken his fort of Naibaug. I send the polygar's letter to Col. Palmer and to government. The hircarrahs report that some of his troops are in Dhoondiah's camp, but that I do not believe.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick. Camp at Lucksoocoopa, 10 m. N. of Badamy, 28th Aug. 1800.

I conclude that Lieut. Col. Bowser has kept you regularly acquainted with every thing that has passed since we have crossed the Malpoorba: but I shall now relate the principal events which have taken place, and have led to the present situation of affairs.

On the 17th inst. it was clear that Dhoondiah could not cross the Gutpurba to the westward of Gokauk, and that he must therefore cross that river to the eastward, or the Kistna or the Malpoorba, or fall into our hands. I was in hopes that, if he had attempted to cross either the Gutpurba or the Kistna, either Col. Stevenson, who marched down the right bank of the former river, or I, could have come up with him before he could have effected this object; and in order to prevent him from crossing the Malpoorba, I detached Lieut. Col. Capper with 3 battalions of sepoy and about 3000 Marhatta cavalry to occupy those places which were most likely to be first fordable, and to stop Dhoondiah. Lieut. Col. Capper marched on the 18th, and arrived near Jellahall on the 24th. Unfortunately on that day the river fell considerably, and in the night Dhoondiah crossed it with his army at Boodeyhaul, about 20 miles below the place where Col. Capper was at the time, and he has since gone towards the Nizam's country.

Col. Stevenson will be at Boodeyhaul this day, and will cross the river immediately, and I hope to cross it to-morrow at Johughur. I have already made all the arrangements, and have given orders for turning my supplies to the eastward, and I shall not lose a moment in following Dhoondiah in such manner as to prevent him from doing any mischief to his Highness' country.

Although, from the execution of the plan of operations of which I have above stated the outline, I had every reason to believe that Dhoondiah

would not have been able to escape across the Malpoorba, it was still possible that he might do so, in consequence of an unusually early fall of the river, which has happened. I accordingly wrote to Meer Alum, who is at Copaul, to apprise him of this possibility; and I requested him to take measures to prevent his Highness' country from suffering in consequence of it.

Although Dhoondiah has escaped me for the present, the late operations have not been unattended with advantages. I have taken 5 more guns, with tumbrils and ammunition, muskets with ammunition, &c. &c., which he had left in charge of the polygar of Talloor. Lieut. Col. Capper's detachment took the forts of Hooley and Syringhy by storm on the same day, the 22nd inst.; and, in consequence of the pressure upon him, Dhoondiah has been deserted by many of his followers, brinjarries, and bazaar people.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Jellahall, 30th Aug. 1800.

I marched 17 miles yesterday, and crossed the Malpoorba at the deepest, but in other respects the best, ford that I have seen.

My opinion still is that Dhoondiah will go to the Soorapoor man; but he may do otherwise. He may seek to cross the Toombuddra, and to get among his friends the Patans, and the polygars on our frontier, and the Nizam's. My plan is therefore as follows: to go off myself toward Kanagherry, and to get well into the Dooab with a large number of boats collected at Anagoondy, and, when I shall have got well forward towards Kanagherry, to push Stevenson at him from his present encampment on the Malpoorba. The Marhattas will be between us. If he commences to cross the Kistna, Stevenson may dash at him at once; if he turns back into Savanore, I move again to my left, and cover my supplies, Bednore, &c. The Marhattas are so much afraid of him, that I can get them to do nothing alone; and that is the reason he escaped this time. They were ordered to push on in front of Capper, and to possess themselves of those parts of the river most likely to be fordable, and to get intelligence; but as soon as they heard that he intended to cross the Malpoorba, they kept in Capper's rear, and no orders or entreaties could get them forward. He could not have dared to cross in their front, particularly as Capper would have been within a forced march of them; and, at the time he crossed, it would have been impracticable for him to return to any of the upper fords without falling into my hands.

I sent Col. Montresor after the brinjarries, &c.: he informs me that they were last night at the place where I heard they were, in number 10,000, and he intended to move upon them this morning, so that we shall, at least, have gained so much by our operations.

P. S. Badamy, which I passed yesterday, is a kind of fortified pettah, between 2 hill forts: these last are much of the same construction with those in Mysore.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Jellahall, 1st Sept. 1800.

Unfortunately, the Malpoorba fell on the 24th; and Dhoondiah crossed it on that night, and the next day, at a ford a little above the junction with

the Kistna. Lieut. Col. Capper was then at this place; and, although I had desired the Marhattas to push on for the very place at which Dhoondiah passed, and Col. Capper entreated them to attend to the orders I had given them, and promised to follow with all expedition, they would not move from the camp. If they had occupied that place, Dhoondiah could not have passed there: he must have returned to look for another ford higher up the river, and would then have fallen into my hands. He is gone towards the Nizam's country; and left behind him, on the north side of the Malpoorba, a tandah of 10,000 brinjarries, which I have got. I likewise took and destroyed 5 excellent guns and carriages, some tumbrils (Company's), arms, ammunition, &c. &c., which he had left in charge of the Talloor polygar. I have crossed the river, and I am going to the Nizam's country immediately.

I sent off this day 800 empty brinjarry bullocks to load in Canara, on the Seedasheghur river. I shall desire them to go by Hullihall, and shall give them a letter to your amildar there. I shall be obliged to you if you will write to him, and point out the place to which you would wish them to go to get the rice.

I shall also be obliged to you if you will let me know what sum of money you can let me have between this time and the month of November, after providing for the payment of the troops in Canara, till January, when I understand that you begin to make your collections. I have money in camp to pay the troops for the months of August, September, and nearly for October. I expect at Chittledroog one lac of rupees: so that you see I am not in want; although it is necessary to look forward to the means of procuring a supply in future.

To Lieut. Col. Disney.

Camp at Hunmunsagur, 4th Sept. 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters, for which I return you my thanks. I am glad to find that you are so much recovered, and I hope that the state of your health will allow you to remain in India.

The important subjects upon which you have written have deservedly had much of my attention, and I agree with you generally respecting them all.

My opinion regarding the propriety of disarming the inhabitants of Malabar is just this: that, until they are disarmed generally, not only the Company's government cannot be said to exist in that country, but no regular authority whatever exists. Society is in the worst of all possible states: it is not the will of the strongest which rules it, but it is that of the most daring and most violent; of those, in short, who will commit most crimes to obtain their ends. This being the case, the order of things in Malabar cannot be too soon changed; and I know no mode of changing them for the better, but that of disarming the lower orders of the people. The question is, in what manner shall this be effected? The people are not conquered; how is it possible to disarm them?

I agree entirely in your opinions upon this point. Before we begin to attack a whole people, we must break their strength; and we must break that of the people of Malabar by subduing the Pyche Rajah, not in Cotiote exactly, but in Wynaad. This can be done only by time, and

the expense which always attends the operations of a large army; but if the object is sufficiently great, which, for many reasons, it appears to be, I put the expense out of the question, and consider only the means of bringing such a body of troops upon that point as will insure our object.

Upon this it is to be said, that, from the known correspondence between Dhoondiah Waugh and the Pyche Rajah, we have already taken the first steps towards subduing the latter; and as soon as the campaign is over in this country, I see no reason why we should not all be employed to settle Malabar as it ought to be. To do this we must begin in Wynaad; and I have still hopes that I shall be there before the close of the year.

I am obliged to you for your sentiments upon the different points connected with this subject. I shall recommend Capt. Hunt to Col. Sartorius, and to Col. Beresford,* who, I hear, will succeed to him in the command of the province of Malabar.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kanagherry, 7th Sept. 1800.

I arrived here this morning, upon the plan which I stated to you in my letter of the 30th Aug. Dhoondiah is forward in the Dooah, so that so far my plan has succeeded in preventing him from making a dash at my communication. It is said that he has boats with him: if so, I shall push on with the cavalry, in order to impede the operation of crossing either of the rivers, and have desired Meer Alum to prepare boats for me at Ana-goondy, in case Dhoondiah should by any means contrive to get any large force over the Toombuddra.

Col. Stevenson is, with 3 battalions and 2 regts. of cavalry, this day at Moodgul, and I have desired him to have an eye to a large number of brinjarries, and some baggage, which are in the jungles about Deodroog, and whose intention it is to cross the Kistna into the country of the Soorapoor Rajah. The Marhatta and Mogul cavalry are between me and Col. Stevenson. God knows whether I shall catch Dhoondiah; but I hope I shall prevent him from doing us any mischief.

I did not tell you that I had got a tandah of above 10,000 brinjarries beyond the Malpoorba. I have given them 6000 rupees upon *good security*, and have sent them into Canara to load. I write to Munro upon the subject by their opportunity. These brinjarries give a curious account of the manner in which Dhoondiah goes on. They say that he has with him still above 40,000 of their class, that he employs them and gives them the means of living in the following manner. When he approaches a village or a town which is unprotected by a fort, he sends a body of horse, and of brinjarries, to levy a contribution: he takes to himself all the money he can get, and gives them at a certain low price all the grain and all the cattle they can find. They pay him this price for the grain and cattle, and they are allowed to sell them at such profit as his camp will afford. They say that he has with him nearly all the brinjarries of this part of India. These people who were taken belonged to the Baranahl, and they say there are many others from that country, from the Nizam's and Marhatta country. In the latter, indeed, there is not now a brinjarry to be

* Marshal Viscount Beresford, then commanding the 88th regt.

found, and, from the state of Col. Bowser's supplies, I should imagine that there can be but few in the Nizam's country.

I send orders, by this opportunity, for the march of the 12th regt., and 2nd of the 5th, to Malabar.

For the reasons I heretofore sent to you in my letter of the 25th Aug., I do not think that we shall be able to make any arrangement here. The Bhow's son, Baba Saheb, spoke to me upon the subject most earnestly a few nights ago, and said that he saw plainly that, unless we interfered, Scindiah would have every thing. I told him that I had seen that long ago, and therefore had urged them to make peace with the Kolapoor Rajah. He seemed anxious to make peace: but, by a letter received last night from the Kolapoor Rajah, it appears that he will not make peace with them; and from the difference of the style of the letter, and from the manner of rejecting my offer to bring about a reconciliation, I am of opinion that he must have received some new lesson from Scindiah. I was informed lately that, in a conversation between Col. Palmer and Scindiah upon the subject of the differences between the Kolapoor Rajah and the sons of Pursheram Bhow, the latter asked what right we had to interfere in the business, when the former replied that we never should give up the claim to a certain sum of money due to us by the Rajah. This may not be true, but I have no other mode of accounting for the sudden refusal of the Rajah to listen to my mediation.

The conversation above recited was reported to me by Baba Saheb, when I informed him that we certainly should not take part in their dispute with the Kolapoor Rajah, unless he gave an asylum to Dhoondiah. The sum of money said to be due is, I believe, the ransom of Malwaur.

To the Adj. Gen. Army of Fort St. George. Camp at Yepulpurvy, 10th Sept. 1800.

After I had crossed the Malpoorba at Jellahall, I marched on the 3rd inst., and entered the Nizam's territories at Hunmunsagur on the 5th. As Col. Stevenson was obliged to cross the Malpoorba in boats, he was not able to advance from that river till the 4th. It appeared to me probable, that, when Doondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry

G. O.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, Wednesday, 10th Sept. 1800.

In the course of the present campaign Col. Wellesley has had frequent occasions to return his thanks to the troops under his command, and to report their conduct in the field to the Commander in Chief; but upon no occasion have his thanks been better deserved, nor has the conduct of the troops been more meritorious, than on this day in the attack and defeat of the enemy's army by the 19th and 25th dragoons and 1st and 2nd regts. of cavalry. The effect of their exertions has fully proved what determined valor and discipline can do against a superiority of numbers.

Col. Wellesley now requests that Col. Pater, the officers commanding the regiments above mentioned, Major Paterson, Major Blaquiere, Capt. Doveton, and Capt. Price, will accept his thanks, and will communicate them to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates under their orders, for their conduct on this day. He will not fail to represent their conduct as it deserves to the Commander in Chief.

As the success of this day will most probably put an end to the service on which the troops have been employed, for some time, Col. Wellesley takes this opportunity of returning to all of them his thanks for the patience and perseverance with which they have gone through the successive fatigues to which they have been exposed. He has repeatedly reported the sense of their conduct to the Commander in Chief, and he will not fail to do so again. Returns of killed, wounded, &c.

and Copaul, and would thus impede our communication; or, if favored by the Patans of Kurnool, and the polygars on the right bank of the Toombuddra, he would pass that river, and would enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. I therefore determined to bring my detachment to the southward, and to prevent the execution of either of those designs, if he had them; and afterwards to push him to the eastward, and to take such advantage of his movements as I might be able; while Col. Stevenson should move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance of between 15 and 20 miles from the Kistna, and the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry collected in one body between his corps and mine.

I arrived at Kanagherry on the 7th; and on the 8th moved with the cavalry to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to this place; the infantry being on those days at Nowly and Chinnoor, about 15 miles in my rear. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah moved from Mudgherry, a place about 25 miles from Raichore, at which he had been encamped for some days towards the Kistna; but on his road having seen Col. Stevenson's camp he returned and encamped about 9 miles in my front, between me and Bunnoo. It was clear that he did not know that I was so near him; and I have reason to know that he believed that I was at Chinnoor.

I moved forward this evening, and met his army at a place called Conahgull, about 6 miles from hence. He was on his march, and to the westward; apparently with the design of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor. He had only a large body of cavalry, apparently 5000, which I immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regts. of cavalry.

The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood for some time with apparent firmness; but such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those 4 regts., which I was obliged to form in one line, in order at all to equalise in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles. Many, among others Dhoondiah, were killed; and the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country. Part of the enemy's baggage was still remaining in his camp about 3 miles from Conahgull; I returned thither, and got possession of elephants, camels, and every thing he had.*

The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's force, and, above all, the death of Dhoondiah, put an end to this warfare; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my sense of the conduct of the troops. Upon this last occasion, their determined valor and discipline were conspicuous; and their conduct and that of their commanding officers, Col. Pater, Major Paterson, Major Blaquiére, Capt. Doveton, and Capt. Price, have deserved my most particular approbation. At the same

* Among the baggage was found Salabut Khan, a son of Dhoondiah, a child of about 4 years old. He was taken to Col. Wellesley's tent, and was afterwards most kindly and liberally taken care of by him. Sir Arthur, on his departure from India, left some hundred pounds for the use of the boy in the hands of Col. J. Hely Symons, the judge and collector at Seringapatam. When Col. Symons retired from service, the Hon. A. Cole, the Resident at the Court of Mysore, took charge of him, and had him placed in the Rajah's service. He was a fine, handsome, intelligent youth. Salabut Khan died of cholera in 1822.

time I must inform you, that all the troops have undergone, with the greatest patience and perseverance, a series of fatiguing services.

It is also proper that I should inform you how much reason I have to be pleased with the gentlemen charged with the business of procuring supplies for the troops. Notwithstanding the distance of the scene of my operations from the usual sources of supplies, and rapidity of my marches; and the necessity, from the species of warfare carried on, of perpetually altering their direction, I have always been well supplied with every thing which the troops could want. The Marhatta and Mogul cavalry are now employed in the pursuit of the fugitives; and I propose to draw off towards the frontier of the Rajah of Mysore in a few days.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 10th Sept. 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I this day met with Dhoondiah's army, and had an action with it, in which it was entirely defeated and dispersed, and Dhoondiah Waugh was killed. I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a letter which I have written to the Adj. Gen. at Fort St. George, which will best give the details of the action, and of the circumstances which led to it.

It is necessary, however, that I should lay before you certain circumstances with which it appears to me proper that the Nizam's government should be made acquainted. Upon my arrival at Chinnoor yesterday morning, uncommon pains were taken to detain me at that place: first, false intelligence of the enemy was given to me; next I was told that there was no road to Yepulpurvy; that there was no water at that place; and, lastly, a guide was given to me who, till threatened, would not show the road.

On my arrival at Yepulpurvy I found that all the information which I had received at Chinnoor was false, and that the cause of the great anxiety and caution used to detain me at Chinnoor was that the killadar of that place had on the 8th informed Dhoondiah, by a regular tappall posted for the purpose of giving him intelligence, that I was to halt on the 8th at Nowly, and on the 9th at Chinnoor. I think it probable that the enemy was misled by this information, and that in consequence I fell in with him when he least expected me. But that is no reason why the killadar who gave the intelligence, certainly not with the intention to deceive, should not be punished. He is now in confinement in my camp, and I shall send him over to Lieut. Col. Bowser to be treated as you may think proper. He is confined, not for his treachery, but because he attacked a convoy bringing on sheep for the use of the British dragoons, which had been bought and paid for.

This country is in a sad state: there appears to be no regular authority even in those parts which are inhabited; but the largest part is entirely deserted. Some of the dealers attending my camp were plundered near Kanagherry.

I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know your wishes regarding Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment. I propose to withdraw gradually towards Savanore, and I shall leave him in the Doab, in case there should be any thing for him to do.

I have written to Lieut. Col. Palmer, and have forwarded my letter by messengers; but as the news may reach him sooner from Hyderabad, I shall be much obliged to you if you will make him acquainted with it.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 10th Sept. 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I fell in with the enemy this morning at 7 o'clock, gained a complete victory, killed Dhoondiah and found his body, and took all his baggage that remained in his camp.

About 8 o'clock yesterday evening I received intelligence that he had marched from Mudgherry in the morning towards the Kistna; that he had seen your camp and had immediately turned back, and had encamped on this side of Bunnoo, about 4 coss from hence. The night was so bad, and the horses and men so knocked up from the day's march, that I was obliged to halt till morning; and I did so with less reluctance as it was clear, from his coming so near me, that he did not know that I was here.

I met him on his march, at 7 o'clock, at Conahgull. The body of horse he had with him was numerous, apparently 5000. The troops behaved as you would wish them, and the business was completed. I only regret that you were not with me. We have some horses, one man of the 25th killed; and a few wounded. A large number of the enemy were killed, and the whole force dispersed over the face of the country.

Halt wherever you please, and rest yourself and your men. I have come here for the sake of forage and water, and shall remain here for a day or two, and have sent out the allies to pick up every thing.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 11th Sept. 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a complete victory yesterday in an action with Dhoondiah's army, in which he was killed. His body was found and recognised, and was brought to the camp on one of the guns attached to the 19th dragoons.

I had before informed you of my plan of operations in the Dooab. I marched from Kanagherry on the 8th, left my infantry at Nowly, and proceeded on with the cavalry only. I arrived here on the 9th, and the infantry at Chinnoor about 15 miles in my rear. On the 9th Dhoondiah marched from Mudgherry, about 25 miles on this side of Raichore, towards the Kistna: but he saw Col. Stevenson's camp, turned back immediately, and encamped on that night about 9 miles from hence, between this place and Bunnoo. The night was so bad, and my horses were so much fatigued, that I could not move till morning, although I had intelligence of the place at which he was encamped.

After passing a most anxious night between the 9th and 10th, I moved yesterday morning, and met the whole of the enemy's army at Conahgull, about 6 miles from hence, and 3 from the ground on which he had been encamped. He had not heard of my being near him, and he was on his march with an intention of passing to the westward between my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor, and the Mogul and Marhatta cavalry at Moosky Bilganoor. He, however, drew up in a remarkably strong position when he saw me, and his people, whom I think to have been 5000

in number, stood with apparent firmness. I charged them with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regts. of Native cavalry, and drove them till they dispersed, and were scattered over all parts of the country. I then returned to the camp and got possession of elephants, camels, baggage, &c., which were still upon the ground. If the Mogul and Marhatta cavalry had marched in decent time, the whole body must have been destroyed, as they fled in the line on which they must have met them; but I imagine they did not march till after they had heard that I had moved, and of course were late: they have been employed in the pursuit since yesterday evening, and, I expect, will destroy the whole body. The troops behaved admirably; and I assure you that, if they had not done so, not a man of us would have quitted the field. Thus has ended this warfare, and I propose to draw off gradually toward Savanore in a day or two. Lieut. Col. Bowser, and the Mogul cavalry, will be able to set all matters to rights in the Nizam's territories, and my Marhattas must arrange for themselves.

I have this morning received a letter from Col. Palmer, in which he desires me to hand over to Gunput Rao all the Peshwah's concerns in this country, which man has to my certain knowledge assisted Dhoondiah, and did so, even in his escape from me across the Malpoorba. I look upon it that I have now nothing to say to the concerns of the Marhatta country, excepting to get myself out of it; and I shall accordingly not interfere in any manner in any thing which is going forward.

I wish to have your opinion as soon as possible respecting my route. My own idea is to cross the Werdah at the redoubt, to proceed from thence by Shikarpoor, and along the left bank of the Toombuddra to Oustara, and thence to Seringapatam. My reason for preferring this road is, that I may awe Kistnapah Naig into a peace; and next, because I shall do less injury to the country on that road than on any other. It is a grass country; will afford plenty of forage; and as the cultivation is, in general, paddy, it will not be injured. You can have no conception of the number of people and cattle that I have got with me; and I shudder at the thoughts of the injury which they will do to any dry grain country through which they will pass. I had some thoughts of crossing the Toombuddra at Anagoondy; but I should lose much time there from the want of boats, the difficulty of procuring them, and the rapidity of the river. Besides, it will be convenient to pass by the redoubt, in order to get some things which are there. If I pass by the redoubt, there is no doubt but that the road I propose is the fittest, and that on which I am likely to do least damage. Purneah, however, will be the best judge on this subject, and I will move any way he pleases. Let me hear from you soon, that I may make my arrangements accordingly in good time.

This country is in a terrible state, almost a desert, and, where there are inhabitants, no authority. The Nizam's killadar of Chinnoor had a regular tappall posted, in order to give intelligence to Dhoondiah. He wrote to him on the 8th, to inform him that I was to be on that day at Nowly, and on the 9th at Chinnoor; and it is incredible what pains he took to induce me to go no farther. I was not to be prevailed upon, however, and came on here, and by coming put a stop to the communication. Thus Dhoon-

diah was not apprised of my situation, and even had reason to believe that I was at least 15 miles farther from him.

P. S. It has occurred to me, that, now that we shall be able to carry on the war in Wynaad, it will not be necessary to send down the 12th and 2nd batt. of the 5th regts. to Malabar; and it will be very inconvenient to send away the latter particularly. We must have some kind of force to the northward of Mysore when I go south. I can manage so as to have a sufficient number of Europeans for Wynaad, but I cannot of Natives, without the 5th batt. Let me hear from you upon the subject, what are the intentions of government.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 11th Sept. 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a complete victory yesterday, in an action with Dhoondiah's army, in which he was killed. His body was recognised, and was brought into camp on a gun attached to the 19th dragoons.

After I had crossed the Malpoorba, it appeared to me very clear, that, if I pressed upon the 'King of the Two Worlds,' with my whole force, on the northern side of the Dooab, his Majesty would either cross the Toombuddra with the aid of the Patan chiefs, and would then enter Mysore; or he would return into Savanore, and play the devil with my peaceable communications. I therefore determined, at all events, to prevent his Majesty from putting those designs in execution; and I marched with my army to Kanagherry. I sent Stevenson towards Deodroog, and along the Kistna, to prevent him from sending his guns and baggage to his ally the Rajah of Soorapoor; and I pushed forward the whole of the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry in one body, between Stevenson's corps and mine.

G. O. C. C.

Choultry plain, 24th Sept. 1800.

The operations of the force employed under the Hon. Col. Wellesley on the frontier of Mysore have been frequently marked by circumstances which demanded and obtained the applause of the Commander of the army in Chief; but in no instance has judgment in the plan, and gallantry in the execution of a military movement, been so eminently conspicuous as in the conclusion of the campaign of the 10th inst.; when the rebel chief, Dhoondiah Waugh, baffled by the judicious disposition of Col. Stevenson's detachments in his attempt to escape in a northern direction, was intercepted in his retreat at Conahgull by Col. Wellesley, with the cavalry of his division only; and forced to a decisive action, which terminated in his total defeat and death: Col. Stevenson's detachment on the same day dispersing the remnant of his force, then employed in crossing the Kistna near Deodroog, and seizing the remaining cannon and baggage of the rebel army.

Major Gen. Braithwaite requests that Col. Wellesley will accept his public thanks for the judgment with which his measures have been planned, and the vigor which has marked every movement of his force. He has particular satisfaction in publishing to the army at large the very honorable report Col. Wellesley has made of Col. Stevenson's conduct, and the activity of the detachment under his command, to which that officer attributes the occurrence of the opportunity he seized of forcing Dhoondiah to a decisive action. And the Commander of the army in Chief is happy to record, in honor of H. M.'s 19th and 25th regts. of light dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regts. of Native cavalry, that those corps, under Col. Pater, Majors Paterson and Blaquiere, and Capts. Doyeton and Price, composed the line, whose rapid charge upon a body of 5000 horse, formed to receive them, achieved this glorious conclusion to a campaign, distinguished throughout every stage of its operations by peculiar and progressive energy.

The Hon. Col. Wellesley has expressed his obligation to Lient. Col. Bowser for his services with his detachment from the subsidiary force; and reported, in the warmest terms of praise, the uniform good conduct of the troops in general, under circumstances of uncommon fatigue and difficulty, incident to the nature of the recent service. The advantages derived from the able arrangements of the gentlemen charged with the department of supply have been pointed out to the particular notice of the Commander of the army in Chief;

I marched from Kanagherry on the 8th, left my infantry at Nowly, and proceeded on with the cavalry only; and I arrived here on the 9th, the infantry at Chinnoor, about 15 miles in my rear. The 'King of the World' broke up on the 9th, from Mudgherry, about 25 miles on this side of Raichore, and proceeded towards the Kistna; but he saw Col. Stevenson's camp, returned immediately, and encamped on that evening about 9 miles from hence, between this place and Bunnoo. I had early intelligence of his situation; but the night was so bad, and my horses so much fatigued, that I could not move.

After a most anxious night, I marched in the morning, and met the 'King of the World' with his army, about 5000 horse, at a village called Conahgull, about 6 miles from hence. He had not known of my being so near him in the night, had thought that I was at Chinnoor, and was marching to the westward with the intention of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and me. He drew up, however, in a very strong position, as soon as he perceived me; and the 'victorious army' stood for some time with apparent firmness. I charged them with the 19th and 25th* dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regts. of cavalry; and drove them before me till they dispersed, and were scattered over the face of the country. I then returned and attacked the royal camp, and got possession of elephants, camels, baggage, &c. &c., which were still upon the ground. The Mogul and Marhatta cavalry came up about 11 o'clock; and they have been employed ever since in the pursuit and destruction of the scattered fragments of the 'victorious army.'

Thus has ended this warfare; and I shall commence my march in a

* Afterwards the 22nd light dragoons.

Chief; and he is happy in adding this record of their merits to the general expression of his thanks to the Hon. Col. Wellesley, and the army employed under his orders, on the recent service on the frontiers of Mysore.

G. O. G.

25th Sept. 1800.

The Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council takes this occasion of expressing to Col. Wellesley the high sense which his Lordship entertains of the judicious arrangements made by Col. Wellesley for the supply of his army, of the indefatigable activity displayed in his operations, and of the distinguished ability manifested in those masterly dispositions which terminated in the discomfiture and utter defeat of the enemy.

The force of the rebel Dhoondiah Waugh having increased to that alarming extent which menaced the tranquillity of the Hon. Company's possessions and those of its allies in the western provinces of the peninsula, the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council attached the greatest degree of political importance to the success of the troops under the command of Col. Wellesley; and although the implicit confidence reposed in the talents of that officer cannot be strengthened by the successful events of the campaign, his Lordship will feel the greatest pleasure in reporting to the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, and to the Hon. Court of Directors, the solid, extensive advantages derived to the affairs of the Hon. Company under this Presidency, by the able and spirited conduct of the war intrusted to Col. Wellesley.

The Governor in Council has observed with the utmost degree of satisfaction the patience with which the officers and troops, under the command of Col. Wellesley, have endured this series of fatiguing service, the spirit of zeal which has distinguished the operations of the army, and, above all, the matchless bravery and discipline with which the detachment of cavalry attacked, defeated, and destroyed the collected force of the enemy on the 10th Sept.

The Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council, therefore, directs the officer Commanding the Army in Chief to convey to Col. Wellesley, and to the officers and troops under his command, the public thanks of the Governor in Council for the important services which they have rendered to the British empire in India.

day or two towards my own country. An honest killadar of Chinnoor had written to the 'King of the World' by a regular tappall, established for the purpose of giving him intelligence, that I was to be at Nowly on the 8th, and at Chinnoor on the 9th. His Majesty was misled by this information, and was nearer me than he expected. The honest killadar did all he could to detain me at Chinnoor, but I was not to be prevailed upon to stop; and even went so far as to threaten to hang a great man sent to show me the road, who manifested an inclination to show me a good road to a different place. My own and the Marhatta cavalry afterwards prevented any communication between his *Majesty* and the killadar.

The brinjarry bags must be filled, notwithstanding the conclusion of the war, as I imagine that I shall have to carry on one in Malabar. *

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 11th Sept. 1800.

Col. Stevenson will have informed you of my success of yesterday.

I send with this letter the man to whose accurate intelligence and diligence it is to be attributed. He came into my camp on the night of the 9th, at 8 o'clock, and gave me the information where Dhoondiah was: I sent him back immediately, and desired him to give me the earliest intelligence of any movements he might make. He met me yesterday morning on the march, and told me where he was posted. I have rewarded him with 200 pagodas; and I beg leave to recommend him to you for his honesty, fidelity, and diligence. He tells me that he is a sepoy in your battalion.

I cannot avoid returning you my thanks for the assistance I have uniformly received from you. You have had much fatigue, and have not been so fortunate as to fall in with the enemy; but I assure you that your exertions have nevertheless been sensibly felt, and will always be acknowledged by me.

I will send you your brinjarries as soon as I am certain at what place you are.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 12th Sept. 1800.

I have just received a letter from government, dated the 27th Aug., and another private letter from Webbe: by the former of which I am ordered, at all events, to remain some time in the Marhatta territory; and by the latter, the cause of this order, and the nature of the negotiations now pending at Poonah and Hyderabad, are explained. Of course, the order must be obeyed, and I shall take up a convenient position in front of Savanore, I now think, on the borders of Soonda, in order to get rice; but it will be necessary that exertion should be used to force on our brinjarries, &c. It would be very desirable that they should bring a larger proportion of rice, and a smaller of dry grain: they have latterly brought little else than gram; and as for Bowser's brinjarries, about whom so much boast has been made at Hyderabad, they have brought nothing but dry grain, and that chiefly jowarry. There has not been a grain of rice in Col. Bowser's camp that I have not supplied him.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 12th Sept. 1800.

The letter which accompanies this has been detained here till this day,

as the light troops are out in pursuit of Dhoondiah's adherents, and I did not think it safe to trust it on the road between this and Raichore.

In consequence of a letter from the government of Fort St. George, in the secret department, received this day, I do not propose to withdraw from the Marhatta territory till I receive the further orders of government. I shall leave Lieut. Col. Bowser and Saddoolah Khan and Noor Khan in the Nizam's territories.

I send a letter for Lieut. Col. Palmer, which I shall be obliged to you if you will forward.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

Ball Kishen Bhow came to me yesterday, and urged me in the most pressing manner to give an asylum to his family in the Mysore country. He seemed to wish for a place of safety for them at Chittledroog; and I promised him to write to you upon the subject, and to request you to mention it to Purneah. He says that it is certain that, as soon as we withdraw from the Savanore country, Scindiah will enter it, and will destroy the whole of the Bhow's family: they are determined to oppose him as well as they can, and they are desirous that their families should remain under our protection. To this measure I see no objection, particularly as we have reason to believe that the Peshwah secretly favors this family; and as it appears to be the intention of government either to come to an arrangement at Poonah, which will drive Scindiah to Hindustan, or to interfere in the Marhatta politics in such a manner, that he and his Frenchmen shall be kept away from our frontier. The Bhow again yesterday said that something was brewing at Poonah, and that the Peshwah was determined to shake off Scindiah, and had intimated to Appah Saheb his wish that he should increase his forces to the utmost extent possible. He hinted that their intention was, when they should have placed their families in safety under our protection, to go with their light armies to join Amrut Rao, who, they say, is collecting troops at or near Bassein.

I hear that the treaty of Hyderabad is concluded, and I am in momentary dread of receiving an order to detach thither the troops which are to form the increased subsidiary force. I have only 1892 Coast and 1200 Bombay sepoy, and I am sure you know that Mysore cannot afford another. I have been obliged to do all the duty of convoys, &c., by means of Marhatta and Mysore cavalry and peons; and if I had not done so, my battalions

G. O.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, Saturday, 13th Sept. 1800.

Col. Wellesley has received from Col. Stevenson a report of the proceedings of the detachment under his orders on the 10th inst., by which it appears that he got possession on that day of the only 2 remaining pieces of cannon which the enemy had, and of baggage, bullocks, camels, brinjaries, &c. &c., and that the whole were thrown into confusion and dispersed. Thus the service upon which the troops have been employed has been completely performed.

In no part of the army has there been more exertion or more fatiguing service, nor has it been more patiently borne, than by the detachment under Col. Stevenson; and to their movements is to be attributed the opportunity which was seized on the 10th inst. of destroying the enemy's army.

Upon this occasion, Col. Wellesley requests Col. Stevenson will accept his thanks, and that he will communicate them to Lieut. Col. Bowser and the officers and troops under his orders; and Col. Wellesley will not fail to represent their conduct and services to the Commander in Chief as they deserve.

would probably on a march have shown about 100 men each. I have written to Webbe, however, upon the subject, have stated the impossibility that I should be able to make these detachments, and perform the other services pointed out for me, and I hope that he will adopt some means of procuring the additional subsidiary corps without calling upon me.

Ball Kishen Bhow says, that all eyes at Poonah are directed to this army, and that our movements from this time forward will have great effect in determining Scindiah's.

P. S. I have omitted to mention to you that I have received a report from Col. Stevenson, stating, that on the 10th he had come up with the only 2 remaining pieces of cannon the enemy had, baggage, camels, bullocks, &c., brinjarries, &c.; that he had taken, dispersed, and destroyed the whole. The cannon belonged to the Soorapoor polygar, and were destroyed in his country. Thus the business has been completed.

To the Adj. Gen. Army of Fort St. George. Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have this day received a report from Col. Stevenson of his proceedings on the 10th inst.; by which it appears that near Deodroog he came up with, and took, the only 2 remaining guns the enemy had, a quantity of baggage, camels, bullocks, brinjarries, &c., and that he dispersed and threw the whole into confusion. Their object had been to pass the Kistna, and to go to Soorapoor: the guns belonged to the Soorapoor polygar, and were destroyed in his country; and Col. Stevenson found his people employed on the Kistna, giving assistance to the baggage to pass the river. Thus the service upon which the troops have been employed has been completely performed.

I attribute the opportunity which was given of destroying the enemy's army to the movements of the detachment under Col. Stevenson: ~~in~~ no part of the army has there been greater exertion, or more fatigue, nor has it been more cheerfully borne; and I conceive Col. Stevenson, Lieut. Col. Bowser, and the officers and troops under their orders, to be entitled to my approbation, and to the favorable report of their conduct which I now make to you.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick. Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

As I am to quit the territories of his Highness the Nizam, and to relinquish the command of his troops, it is but justice to Noor Mahomed Khan to inform you that I have always found in him the utmost readiness to forward the service on which he has been employed, and to obey the orders he might receive. He looks up to you for a favourable representation of his services to the Nizam's government, and I shall be obliged to you if you will make it.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick. Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 9th inst. which I have forwarded to Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Since I addressed you yesterday I have received from Col. Stevenson a report of his proceedings on the 10th; and I have the pleasure to inform

you that he came up with, near Deodroog, the only 2 remaining pieces of cannon which the enemy had, a large quantity of baggage, camels, bullocks, brinjaries, &c. &c. ; a great part of which he took, and threw into confusion and dispersed the remainder.

The guns belonged to the Soorapoor polygar, and were destroyed in his country; and it was intended by the enemy that they and the baggage should be sent across the Kistna to his fort at Soorapoor. Col. Stevenson found some of the polygar's people employed in passing them over the river.

Thus the service upon which the troops have been employed has been completely performed; and I have taken this opportunity of issuing an order, a copy of which I take the liberty of enclosing to you, as it concerns a part of the subsidiary force.

I propose on to-morrow to draw off towards the Savanore country, and I have desired Col. Stevenson to join me at Kanagherry with the 4th regt. of cavalry and the pioneers belonging to my detachment. I have requested Lieut. Col. Bowser to remain in the Dooab till he shall hear further from you; and I have pointed out to him the following objects for his attention: To prevent the reassembly of any of the fugitives from the action of the 10th in any part of the Nizam's territories, and to give countenance and support to the detachments under Saddoolah Khan and Noor Khan, to which chiefs I have given directions to search for and pursue them, wherever they may hear of them. With this view, I have desired Lieut. Col. Bowser to take up a central position in the Dooab, well supplied with water and forage; but, if his present position at Deodroog shall answer in those respects, to remain there, as it would cut off from the stragglers all hopes of reaching their friend, the Soorapoor polygar, and from him that of being able to reunite his forces with them.

To Col. Stevenson.

• Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

I have this day had the pleasure of receiving your letters, of the 11th, from Deodroog, in which you give a report of your proceedings and success on the 10th. By these, the services on which we have been employed have been completed on that day; and I request that you will accept my thanks, and that you will communicate them to Lieut. Col. Bowser, and to the troops under your orders.

I enclose you an order which I have issued, which I request you will publish in your detachment.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

I am about to draw off towards the Savanore country. I have desired Col. Stevenson to join me, with the 4th regt. of cavalry, my pioneers, and whatever else you may have of mine; and you must remain in the Dooab, with your detachment, Saddoolah Khan, and Noor Khan, until you hear further from the Resident. The object of leaving you here is, that you should prevent any collection of the fugitives from the battle of the 10th, and to give countenance to the detachments under Saddoolah Khan and Noor Khan in the pursuit and search for them, which I have desired those chiefs to make. With this view it will be proper that you should take up a position in some central situation well provided with water and forage.

If the neighbourhood of Deodroog answers in those respects, your being there will have this further effect, that it cuts off from all the straggled remains of Dhoondiah's force the hope of retreating to the polygar country, and from the polygar that of recruiting his forces from them. You will be the best judge upon this point, keeping in view the object in leaving you in the Dooab being to prevent the reassembling of the force in any shape, and to give countenance and support to the detachments employed in the pursuit and search for the fugitives.

I have issued a proclamation, and have desired the village people to bring every person belonging to Dhoondiah to the officer commanding the British troops, to Saddoolah Khan, or Noor Khan, to assist those chiefs and the Marhatta chiefs in finding them out, and by no means to give them an asylum.

I enclose you a letter from Capt. Kirkpatrick, which I opened in consequence of what was written on the cover. It came by one of several tappalls arrived this morning; all of which go to you by this occasion.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

I have this day had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 11th from Deodroog, in which you give a report of your proceedings and success on the 10th. By these, the service on which we have been employed has been completed on that day; and I request that you will accept my thanks, and that you will communicate them to Lieut. Col. Bowser, and to the troops under your orders.

I enclose you an order which I have issued, which I request you will publish in your detachment.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 13th Sept. 1800.

Capt. Dickson, who will deliver you this letter, has charge of 3 prisoners, whom he will deliver to you. Two of them, by name Moideen Khan and Geeriah, are confined for having been concerned with the killadar of Chinnoor in giving information to the enemy, and, in order that their information might be true, for having endeavored to mislead me on the road between Chinnoor and this place. The other, by name Ameer Saib, is killadar of Chinnoor. He is confined for having attacked a convoy of the Mysore cavalry following me to Yepulpurvy with sheep for the British dragoons. I besides found out that he was in the habit of giving intelligence to the enemy by means of a regular tappall laid upon the road; that on the 8th inst. he wrote to him that I was to be that day at Nowly, and on the 9th at Chinnoor; and it is inconceivable the pains he took to prevent me from coming farther on that day than that place. Among other measures taken to detain me was that of giving me guides who, at the end of 2 miles, swore that they did not know the road, and would not show it, till they were threatened that they should be hanged.

I believe that the battle at Conahgull was the consequence of the information given to the enemy by the killadar of Chinnoor, as it turned out to be false and clearly misled him; but the killadar has no merit in that, and deserves punishment for having had any communication with the enemy of his sovereign.

I have written to Capt. Kirkpatrick, from whom you will hear upon this subject, and I request that till then you will keep these persons as prisoners.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 14th Sept. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 8th. Purneah's observations upon the harvest in Bullum had already occurred to me, and my idea was to destroy it, if Kistnapah Naig should refuse to settle matters with Purneah, when I should approach his country with my troops. The fertility of Bullum, and the constant intercourse between that district and Koorg, to which it will be impossible to put a stop, is what constitutes the difference between Kistnapah Naig and the Pyche Rajah, and renders it more desirable to come to an arrangement with the former than with the latter. If we destroy the harvest in Bullum this year, Kistnapah Naig will still find means of subsistence, and we must perform the same operation in the next year. The Pyche Rajah, on the contrary, has no communication with Koorg, and draws all his subsistence either from Mysore or from Malabar, countries in our possession. Means might and ought to be taken by the Commissioners to stop the trade in grain between the coast and Wynaad, and thus the Pyche Rajah would be much distressed. But I am afraid that the destruction of the harvest in Bullum will do no more than create a temporary inconvenience.

When I thought that the success of the 10th inst. would enable me to return to Mysore immediately, I turned over in my mind the propriety of halting the 12th regt. and the 2nd batt. of the 5th, in order to form a part of the corps which should operate upon Wynaad from the Mysore side. It appeared that, when I should go so far to the southward, I ought not to leave the northern frontier so much exposed as it has been lately; and that, when I should have provided sufficiently for the strength of this frontier, I should not have a body of troops such as, in my opinion, ought to be collected to be sent on the expedition to Wynaad. However, upon looking over my papers regarding the relief of Montana, I found that, at that post, they had provisions only for 52 days from the beginning of August, and therefore that measures ought to be taken as soon as possible to throw in a further supply. I recollected that, in one of the papers sent to you by the Commissioners, it was stated that the post must be relieved again before October, and that a large body of troops ought to be collected for that purpose; and I referred to a private letter which I have received upon the subject from Disney, who was at Tellicherry, in which he tells me that the troops employed upon the last occasion did not behave as grenadiers ought. I therefore determined, at all events, that, as government had sent these corps to Mysore merely to enable me to oppose the Pyche Rajah, they should go in the first instance to Malabar, even if the arrangements to be made to provide a sufficient force for the northern frontier, while I should be to the southward, should oblige me to bring them back to Mysore, in order to form a sufficient detachment to enter Wynaad.

You are now in possession of all my reflections upon this subject, and of the considerations which induced me to allow those corps to march to Malabar, even although I thought it probable that I should want them in

Mysore, for the very purpose for which government sent them to me. You are nearer the scene of action, however, than I am; you must have had later intelligence from Malabar than I have, and must be a better judge whether it will be necessary that those corps should descend the ghauts, in order that Montana may be relieved. If you should think that they ought, allow them to march on, according to the orders they have already received. If you should not think it necessary, send the enclosed letters to Lieut. Col. Harcourt and to Col. Sartorius; and upon hearing from you that you have done so, I will transmit further instructions to Lieut. Col. Harcourt. But, to tell you the truth, I do not think that we shall ever make any head of Kistnapah Naig till we can bring the army into his country, and can spare troops to establish in it a post of our own.

Another mode of providing troops for Malabar occurred to me, but that again is attended with great inconvenience: it is, to send them from Canara, where matters are now tolerably quiet.

But, to tell you the truth, the — establishment is so complete a *humbug* and job, so inefficient in all its parts, there is so little connection between officers and men, and so little discipline, that I am afraid to take the return of a corps, and, in the confidence of its truth, order a stout detachment from it, lest I should find the whole to be false, and that, instead of strength in Malabar, I shall gain only weakness and recruits. This has been the case in one instance already, since the fall of Jemalabad; and in the last season, when I brought down the flank companies of the — regt. and 200 men, making in all 400 Europeans and 400 Natives, they had nothing left in Canara but recruits. They suffered so much inconvenience from detaching their old soldiers, that I am afraid I should get nothing at present but the recruits.

I will speak to Lieut. Col. Montresor respecting the man for M'Kenzie. I have been detained here this day on account of a violent fall of rain last night, but I march to-morrow.

To Col. Sartorius.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 14th Sept. 1800.

I have been under the necessity of ordering the 12th regt. and the 2nd batt. of the 5th to halt at Seringapatam, if they should still be there, or to return thither if they should have marched from thence; according to my former orders, as it is necessary that they should remain in Mysore. You will therefore provide for the relief of Montana without the assistance of these corps.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 14th Sept. 1800.

I am concerned to be obliged to trouble you with another complaint of one of the officers of the government of his Highness the Nizam.

The killadar of Moodgul has seized some of my bazaar people, who had gone to Moodgul to purchase rice; has taken from them what they had purchased, all their bullocks, and 500 rupees in money: he beat the people, to force them to promise they would not complain, and detained 4 of them as hostages, to be further ill treated, in case he found that they broke this engagement thus forced from them.

I should not have to trouble you, if I could have prevailed upon any of

the amildars to send me a vakeel, who could know, and through whom I could communicate with, the officers of his Highness' government upon these trifling points which arise daily; but they have kept at a distance themselves, and have sent nobody near me.

I have been detained here this day by a heavy fall of rain last night, which rendered the roads impracticable; but I hope to be able to march to-morrow.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Chinnoor, 15th Sept. 1800.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, which I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to Fort William.

The important objects now in agitation may make it necessary that I should be reinforced by Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment, if it is not intended that the whole of the subsidiary force should co-operate to obtain them. If that should not be intended, you might probably find it convenient to allow Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment to remain in the Dooab, under my orders, for a short time.

I take the liberty of enclosing a letter for Lieut. Col. Palmer, which I shall be much obliged to you if you will forward to Poonah.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Nowly, 16th Sept. 1800.

I have this day had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 9th inst. My letter to the Sec. of government, of the 12th inst., in answer to his letter of the 27th Aug., will have informed your Lordship that, in obedience to your orders, I should remain in the Marhatta territory; and I shall look forward to the measures to be further adopted, in case of the occurrence at Poonah of either of the two events which the Governor General thinks possible at the present crisis.* It does not at present occur to me that any place, excepting Darwar, would be of any service to me in the operations which may be necessary. I wrote to Lieut. Col. Palmer, to request that he would obtain an order from the Peshwah to have that post given over to my charge, in case of either of the events against which your Lordship is providing.

I imagine that the arrangements which I have already made of the country which has passed through my hands in the course of the contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, viz. to give it over to those who had possession, and who enjoyed its revenues, previous to his rebellion, is perfectly agreeable to the Peshwah's wishes, and to the laws and customs of the Marhatta Empire. I know, from Lieut. Col. Palmer, that it was agreeable to his Highness to have these countries delivered to the sons of Pursheram Bhow, and I believe that their possessions in the provinces of Darwar and Savanore were never confiscated. Those which they had north of the Kistna, at Meritch and Tasgaum, were confiscated, as Lieut. Col. Palmer says, in consequence of the violence of Scindiah: the latter were, I understand, strictly military jaghires; the former were given to Pursheram Bhow, as payment of a debt for expenses incurred in the former Mysore war; and I am informed, and it is probable, that of these they have never been deprived.

* See the Wellealey Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 367.

Those parts of the Marhatta territory in which I have been, which are not, as I have above described, in the possession of the family of the Pursheram Bhow, are either the jaghires of other chiefs, who have, or ought to have, bodies of troops in the service of the Empire, which are maintained from the produce of the land; or they are divided among polygars, who pay a peshcush to the Peshwah, or to the jaghiredars; or they belong immediately to the Peshwah, and the revenue is collected by the officers of the Poonah sircar: but there are tuncaws, either for the payment of different garrisons, or of the army of Goklah, upon the whole amount of the peshcush due by each polygar, and upon the whole amount of the revenue of the sircar, not granted to the family of the Pursheram Bhow, or to the jaghiredars.

In the course of the campaign in the Marhatta territory, I delivered over to each individual that which belonged to him, and to the officers of government those districts belonging immediately to the Peshwah; and by this arrangement I secured the tranquillity of the country, and its resources, which was all that I could desire. I do not apprehend that any inconvenience will arise hereafter from an adherence to this system; or that it will give reason to the friends of Bajee Rao to doubt of the sincere disposition of the British government to act effectually in his behalf; and I am afraid that the adoption of any other system would deprive me of the cordial co-operation and assistance of those chiefs who have acted with me hitherto, would create doubts generally of our views, and that I should be obliged to break up my force into detachments, in order to secure any new arrangement of the country which I might make.

From what I have above mentioned of the state of these countries, your Lordship will observe that I should have no chance of procuring from them any supplies of money or of provisions (excepting for payment), if I were to call for them. The revenue in the Marhatta territory, particularly since Dhoondiah's rebellion, is collected only by force, and I should get none of it, excepting by making detachments from mine. But it is all appropriated to particular purposes, either to pay a debt, to pay jaghiredars who have troops in the service of the Empire, or to pay the Peshwah's troops and garrisons. These, I must observe, are considerably in arrears, and all the chiefs have come to me at different times to request to borrow money to satisfy their demands. Thus it is probable that I should find great difficulty in procuring any money from the country; and that, by the demand of it, I should distress those whose assistance would be very desirable, in case of the occurrence of one of the events expected at Poonah.

The same facts and reasoning apply to the demand of provisions: I get them sent, as I want, for payment; and I am afraid that the demand of them, upon receipt, would not only have the bad effects I have above attributed to the demand of supplies of money, but that I should not be able to procure them at all when wanted.

Excepting to call upon the Rajah of Kolapoor to prevent Dhoondiah from entering his country, I have not had any communication with him. As Scindiah's force south of the Kistna is large, as he has lately added to it 2 battalions, and as it may be reinforced by the army of the Kolapoor

Rajah, I wrote to Capt. Kirkpatrick to suggest that, in case the subsidiary force at Hyderabad should not be employed otherwise, upon the occurrence of one of the expected events at Poonah, it might be of importance that I should have the power of calling for Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment, and, therefore, I request that it may be left in the Dooab under my orders.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nowly, 17th Sept., 1800.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and I have spoken to Capt. Mackay respecting the bullock man, to whom he writes by this post. All the superannuated bullocks are at the grazing ground near Seringapatam.

I enclose you the copy of a letter from the Military board to government, upon which my opinion has been called for. All the places mentioned therein ought to have stores of rice, if they are to be kept as garrisons; but in my opinion Cowleydroog ought to be destroyed, as ought Chandergooty, and the depôts of grain for this frontier ought to be at Hurryhur and Hullihall. I admire the attention to economy in the Military board, which doubtless induces them to lay all the expense and trouble of storing the grain on the Rajah's dewan. I shall give government a hint upon this subject in my answer to their letter; and shall leave it to you to fight the battle, in order to throw all the Company's concerns off the shoulders of Purneah.

I enclose the duplicate of a secret dispatch from Col. Kirkpatrick, which will point out that it is probable that we must look for the means of establishing depôts at stations much more forward than are thought of by the Military board. I have received one of a similar tendency from Lord Clive, of which most probably a copy has been sent to you.

I shall remain in preparation in the Marhatta territory. I have written to Kirkpatrick to recommend that I may have the power of calling for Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment, if it is not intended that the whole subsidiary force should act in case of the occurrence of one of the events expected at Poonah. I have written to Palmer to request that he will ask the Peshwah for an order to the killadar to give me Darwar, which order is to be delivered into his hands only in case of the occurrence of one of those events.

I expect one lac of pagodas in silver from Madras, which will pay the troops in November; I have besides written to Munro to know what he can spare, and I expect to get 50,000 pagodas from him; if I could, besides, ease Mackay of 50,000 pagodas, or Graham, it would enable me to go on till the beginning of the year. I expect Munro's answer every day, and I shall be obliged to you if you will write to Macleod and to Capt. Graham. The Rajah's monthly payments I reckon upon only as sufficient to pay the monthly expense in Mysore, and I do not meddle with them for that reason.

If I do advance to Poonah, we must look out at Bombay for money and other supplies in the beginning of the year, and I have all the arrangements ready for that purpose. As to money from the Marhatta territory, or provisions without paying for them, it is all a joke. The money must

be collected by a military force, and I have none to spare; and if I was to attempt to take provisions upon receipt, I should probably get none for money when I might want them. Besides, the whole revenue of the Marhatta territory, south of the Kistna, belongs to jaghiredars who maintain troops, or to the Bhow's family; or there are tuncaws upon it for the maintenance of the Peshwah's army under Goklah, or for that of his garrisons, such as Darwar, &c. Not only I should get none of it, but I should distress and dissatisfy those who do, from whom I now receive most cordial assistance.

In regard to Col. Kirkpatrick's fears respecting the transfer of the government of the country to the Bhow's family, I have explained to him fully the nature of their claim to any part of it, and that of the arrangement, which I have made as follows. The government of Poonah granted parts of the Savanore and Darwar countries to Pursheram Bhow, as payment of a debt for expenses incurred in the former Mysore war: I do not imagine that the family have ever been deprived of those possessions by the Peshwah, although they have been deprived of their military jaghires of Meritch and Tasgaum, which have been surrendered to Scindiah.

The arrangement which I made was, to give over to every man that which he had previous to Dhoondiah's rebellion, and, among others, to the Peshwah's officers those parts of the country which belonged to the sircar, although there were tuncaws upon the revenues: of course, the Bhow's family received their share of the country among others. I do not conceive that there is any thing in this arrangement to give to the adherents of Bajee Rao reason to doubt of our real intentions to act in his behalf; and I think that the adoption of any other arrangement at the present moment would create numberless doubts, would throw the whole country into confusion, and would require an army, which I have not, to carry it into execution.

P. S. Since writing the above I have seen Mackay again, who proposes that all his bullocks should move up the river to Turrikerra, where they were last year, excepting about 200, which must be near Chittledroog, in order to bring on the money when it arrives from Madras. He says that he will be glad to give over to Purneah the superannuated bullocks till we return to Mysore. At Turrikerra, the bullocks can do no harm, and will have plenty of forage, and the bullock men cannot interfere with the cultivation.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kanagherry, 18th Sept. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 14th, from which I judge that you will have been agreeably surprised at our complete success against Dhoondiah.

I am rather desirous to keep the Mysore horse and peons, for a short time, in order to assist my convoys, in case matters should turn out at Poonah as expected, and my friends here should not relish the part which we shall take. You have the power to keep the 12th, and 2nd batt. 5th, if you wish it.

P. S. I enclose a duplicate of Lord Clive's letter to me, in case you should not have received a copy of it.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Copaul, 22nd Sept. 1800.

It is wonderful that my letter of the 11th did not reach you sooner.

My bazaars are most capitally supplied; I have every thing that I can want in them. But it will be necessary to keep the grain merchants in motion towards us. I have sent near 7000 brinjarry bullocks to Munro, and I hope that he will be able to furnish them with loads before long; I shall have 1800 loads of rice in the grain department: there is no want of sheep, and I have drawn large quantities of arrack from Goa to Hullihall, where I propose to have a depôt of this necessary article. If we get Darwar, I shall move this arrack, the rice which I have at Hullihall, the garrison, reinforced by some Europeans from Goa, and some Natives from Canara, to the former place.

In a day or two I shall be able to arrange my bullock department in some kind of style. The camp equipage presses upon me sadly, and I cannot prevail upon government to come to the determination to make the officers carry their own tents. In bad weather it is impossible to carry officers' tents at the rate at which we march. We have had some very heavy rain here, and the swelling of a nullah has detained me this day. I am sorry for this, as I think that my stay here will give some uneasiness to our friend at Hyderabad.

Meer Alum told me that the sole object of the Court at Hyderabad, now, was to amass money; that for this alone they sacrificed their territory, their honor, and their troops; that they wanted to involve us in a war with the Marhattas for their security; and that, when that object should be effected, they would disband all their troops (of which they had but few remaining), save all their money, and depend upon us for their defence. He said that the transfer of territory to us was a great object to them, as they found they could not govern it without troops, which they were determined not to raise. He said that he had stated this to —, upon his return from Madras, before he heard of his tricks in his family; but that —'s passions had thrown him into the hands of Aristo Jah, and that he would do nothing.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Hanawall, 23rd Sept. 1800.

I omitted to mention to you in favorable terms the services of Saddoolah Khan, whom I always found to be zealous in the cause in which we have been engaged. I shall be much obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of mentioning his name to the minister.

I was detained 2 days near Copaul by a violent fall of rain, and I was sorry to find that my old friend Meer Alum, who was there, had fallen into disgrace at Court. I understand that he has long been a faithful

G. M. O.

Camp at Copaul-droog, Friday, 19th Sept. 1800.

Col. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps, heads of departments, and others, will give orders to their servants and followers not to turn their cattle into the grain fields, and not to cut the grain for forage. Such cattle as may be found in the grain fields, after this order, will be taken up by the Provost, and any people taken cutting the grain will be punished.

G. O.

19th Sept. 1800.

Two salutes of 13 guns each to be in readiness to be fired this afternoon on the Marhatta chiefs, Chintomany Rao and Baba Saheb, taking leave of Col. Wellesley.

adherent to the British nation, and I hope, therefore, that his disgrace will be but of short continuance.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Cowloor, 24th Sept. 1800.

The reason why the brinjarries bring so much gram is, that in our bazars it sold for almost as much as rice did. Latterly it has fallen, and is now 29 seers for a rupee. The process was just this: they bought in Mysore 60 seers for a rupee, and these they sold here for 6 rupees. They could not have bought 60 seers of rice for less than 3 rupees, and they sold in general at 9 seers for a rupee. You see that the profit is evidently on the side of gram. I write to Seringapatam upon the subject of the dealers in Ganjam: but there has been a system of dubashery there lately which has annoyed me considerably; and I am afraid that, if it has not been put a stop to, in consequence of what I have already written to Saxon, the people, whom I have taken such pains to induce to come to the place, will leave it.

The grain at Seringapatam is paddy, and the operation of beating it out is slow. All the beaters are now employed in beating it, and it is sent forward to the army on the bullocks hired for the public service. If there is more rice beat, however, than there are bullocks to carry, it might be given to the dealers in Ganjam at a cheap rate, to be brought forward to the army, and I will write to settle an arrangement upon this subject.

I wish that my instructions permitted me to move forward to the Kistna immediately, as I should do so with many advantages. In the first place, I should cut off that detachment of Scindiah's troops, now on this side of that river; and, in the next place, I should be certain of the co-operation of all my allies. They are now going off, some to keep the Dessarah feast at their jaghires, and others on other occasions; and I dare not hint to them that I may have further occasion for their services, as they would immediately discover the object. Col. Palmer says, in his letter of the 7th, 'He (the Peshwah) is in a manner a prisoner in the hands of Scindiah, who has posted a large body of troops in the city, on pretence of compelling a chief, called Prittee Niddee, to dismiss a party of Arabs from his service, but in reality to watch and control the motions of the Peshwah, whom he suspects of an intention to withdraw.'

Refer to my instructions from Lord Clive, and the letter from Kirkpatrick, and let me know whether you think me warranted to advance in consequence of that paragraph. The advantage in doing so is evident; and besides those above mentioned, there is this additional one, viz. that, if the crisis does not already exist (if the Peshwah is not already a prisoner or has not made his escape), I shall force it forward; and otherwise Scindiah, by his position in Poonah, may keep matters in that state that he will be perfectly certain that the Peshwah cannot make his escape, although he will not have found it necessary further to secure his person.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Dunmul, 25th Sept. 1800.

I some time ago promised Mr. Sullivan that a relation of his should be recommended for the first vacant ensigncy in the 33rd regt., but I rather

believe that he has been appointed an ensign in another corps. If that should be the case, which Lieut. Col. Shee will know, Mr. Morris will be recommended for the ensigncy now vacant in the 33rd. I write to Lieut. Col. Shee upon the subject by this post.

P. S. Upon talking with West regarding an ensigncy for Mr. Morris, I find that there is no vacancy in the 33rd: there ought to be 2 vacancies; but we are obliged to keep on the strength 2 gentlemen, whose removals from the regiment have not been approved of in Europe. I will recollect your wishes regarding Mr. Morris.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Dummul, 26th Sept. 1800.

After receiving my letter of the 14th, I hope that you will have sent the rice to Ankola, notwithstanding that you will before have stopped it, as you state in your letter of the 22nd, and that you will have allowed the brinjaries to go into Canara by the Arbig ghaut, as you first proposed. If, however, you should have ordered them down to Cundapoor, it does not much signify, as I have plenty; and I am going over towards Soonda, from which country I expect to draw enough for my consumption during the time that I may find it necessary to remain in its neighbourhood. Between ourselves, I imagine that I shall have to carry on operations on a much more extended scale than you suspected; but I am well prepared for every thing.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Dummul, 27th Sept. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 22nd. I told you before what steps I had taken, in order to procure directions from the Peshwah to Bapjee Scindiah to give up to me the fort of Darwar, and I am in momentary expectation of receiving Lieut. Col. Palmer's answer to my letter upon that subject, whether the Peshwah complies with my request or does not. If I am to advance to the Kistna, I must have Darwar; and I have already made all the arrangements for getting into it in some manner or other. I have told you that I shall move thither the garrison of Hullihall, reinforced by Europeans from Goa, and that I shall establish there the supplies of arrack and rice which I have collected at Hullihall. This last place shall be given over to Mungush Rao and his peons.

My force is very respectable, and passes for much more than it is: I have besides called upon Kirkpatrick to leave Bowser under my orders, if it is not intended that the whole of the subsidiary force and of the Nizam's army should co-operate on the north side of the Kistna. No answer yet from that quarter. My fingers itch to begin. I should knock that detachment to pieces which has been pushed across the Kistna; should by that means gain a powerful body of allies, which I reckon upon only as so many taken out of the opposite scale; and should have the whole game in my hands immediately. If the Kistna falls, that detachment will escape to the northward; and Scindiah, if he has spirit, will collect there, and endeavor to make a stand. I look upon myself to be fully equal to all he can collect, if I can keep together my allies. They are of use in protecting my rear, my baggage, and my camp. If I had not had them, my cavalry would have been much distressed; and yet they would not have

kept off the Pindarry horse half so well as the Marhattas did in the late service. Scindiah has not got a very large body of country horse; but he will, of course, have some, and they would distress me much if I should have none. The object of the force on this side of the Kistna is to seize this country the moment that I shall withdraw from it. This is the opinion of Lieut. Col. Palmer, and he has repeatedly so stated it. I do not believe they yet suspect our intention to interfere at Poonah.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Lacoonda, 28th Sept. 1800.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 17th last night.

My letter of the 15th will have apprised you that I thought that the assistance of Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment would be desirable for the attainment of the objects now in view; and I requested that that detachment might be allowed to remain in the Dooab for a short time under my orders, unless it was intended that the whole subsidiary force should co-operate upon this occasion. If this should be intended, its efforts may probably be most effectually directed on the north side of the Kistna; and it will, in that case, be desirable that Lieut. Col. Bowser's corps should cross the Kistna and form a junction with the force under Lieut. Col. Dalrymple.

Excepting to co-operate with me in the attainment of the important objects now in the view of government, there is no reason why Lieut. Col. Bowser's force should remain one day longer in the Dooab. You must be best acquainted with the intentions of the Court of Hyderabad, whether to assist at all upon this occasion, to employ the whole subsidiary force, or only that part of it under Lieut. Col. Bowser; and I conclude that you will have made known your wishes to that officer accordingly.

Under these circumstances I do not send any orders to Lieut. Col. Bowser, excepting to be in readiness to move, as soon as he shall hear from you; and I shall not give him any other orders, till I receive your answer to my letter of the 15th inst.

I had the pleasure of receiving one of your letters of the 10th inst. It is more than probable that the second of that date, which you did me the favor to write, fell into the hands of some of the light troops.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Lacoonda, 29th Sept. 1800.

I had heard, from Mr. Warren, of the behaviour of Col. Harcourt's dubash, and I propose to write to the Colonel upon the subject this day.

A part of our cavalry, viz. a detachment of the 1st regt., is at Connatore in the Carnatic; and I am informed that many of the men have already recovered. I shall write to Gen. Braithwaite to request that your cavalry guard may be relieved by a detachment from the 1st regt. at Connatore. I think the state of Mysore will be unpleasant when we get to a distance. Seringapatam requires so large a garrison that it runs away with all our troops: if we could remove the inhabitants from the fort, one battalion would be sufficient for the garrison at present; but as it is, we cannot leave the arsenal there unprotected, and it would be so if the garrison were smaller.

I have long wished to remove my regiment from thence, as they have

been uncommonly unhealthy; and it is Anderson's opinion that they will not recover till they are moved out. But we must have there an European regiment as long as the inhabitants are there; and how to replace them I know not. We have had terrible rains, and I am stopped here.

P. S. I wish that you would take into consideration the mode of repairing the buildings to be used as granaries and provision store rooms in Mysore. It is impossible to do it by means of the officers. 1st, They have never been a sufficient length of time in a place to be able to do much good, and I do not see any probability that this circumstance will be altered soon: 2ndly, It is not to every one that I should think it proper to intrust the execution of these repairs: and 3rdly, They find great difficulty, on account of the many works going on in the country, to procure workmen to repair the buildings to be occupied by themselves and their troops. This being the case, it might perhaps be possible to get the amildars to undertake these repairs (after the heavy part of the country work shall be gone through), the Company paying the expense. Turn this subject over in your mind, and let me know the result.

I have written to government respecting the formation of depôts of grain, and I have recommended that they should be at Chittledroog, Hurryhur, Hullihall, Nundydroog, Seringapatam. Those at Hurryhur and Hullihall will of course be moved forward, if all the pending arrangements are made. I have scouted the notion of throwing all the expense of the depôts on the Rajah, and the trouble on his servants, on the ground of the inexpediency of allowing the servants of one government to have any interference or connexion with the concerns of the other; and have recommended that, if the expense of forming depôts for the Company's troops is to be paid by the Rajah, it may be a separate transaction, to be arranged in the usual manner; but that the depôt may be formed by, may be in charge of, and be disposed of by, the Company's servants.

I have recommended all that you desired for Chittledroog. I have given orders to have the troops moved from Chandergooty and Cowleydroog, and I have desired the officers in charge to deliver the forts, provisions, stores, &c., to the amildars, taking their receipts for the same. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this to Purneah. The provisions and stores in both these forts belong to the Rajah, according to the arrangement of government made last year; but I think that Purneah will do well to dispose of or remove them. I think that a breach ought to be made in Cowleydroog. It borders upon the polygars; as long as we hold Nuggur it can be of no use; and if it is kept in repair, those circumstances which might render it necessary that we should occupy it with troops, would render it very inconvenient to spare any for that purpose. However, it is an ancient place, about which prejudices may be entertained; and, at all events, the palace must be kept in repair.

I wrote to Purneah a letter in Persian, in which I recommended his 3 officers now with me, but particularly called his attention to Govind Rao. The reason is only because he is not so high in the service as the others; for I have had every reason to be pleased with them all.

I see that I have made my postscript longer than my letter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nalloody, 1st Oct. 1800.

I have received a letter from Webbe, dated the 25th Sept., in which he informs me that he has written to Lieut. Col. Mackay, to desire him to halt at Seringapatam with his corps. It is intended that it should form a part of the Nizam's subsidiary force; and Webbe proposes that it should march through the newly ceded districts to join Lieut. Col. Bowser in the Doah, as soon as the completion of the new treaty at Hyderabad shall be announced at Madras. I propose to send orders to Lieut. Col. Mackay to move up to Chittledroog, and he can then move to Anagoondy, and join Lieut. Col. Bowser, whenever that may be thought proper.

It appears not to be intended to attempt to make any great effort against the Pyche Rajah in this season; and I am therefore clearly of opinion that the 12th regt. ought likewise to be stopped. They will certainly be wanted in the Mysore country for one of the many objects in view; and as the 88th regt. is expected in Malabar from Bombay, the 12th regt. will not be much wanted there. If you should agree in opinion with me, I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to Lieut. Col. Harcourt, as soon as possible, the letter which I enclose for him. At all events, Lieut. Col. Harcourt is too late to relieve Montana, if, as we imagine, that post now wants relief.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nalloody, 2nd Oct. 1800.

I received your letter of the 27th yesterday, and the other to the 29th in the course of last night.

I am obliged to you for the arrangements respecting grain. I will take care that the dealers shall not be detained in camp one moment. Some settlement regarding the camp equipage is absolutely necessary. I am now obliged to take 300 bullocks from the grain for that department, and the whole number now provided for it since the end of July is 1200. This falls entirely upon the grain.

As soon as you hear from Webbe, that the money will be sent into Carnara by one of the ships of the squadron, Munro may be desired to send up to Nuggur a sum proportionate to that which will be sent round. I will give orders to have every thing ready at Nuggur to forward it to the army.

The history of Capt. —'s conduct is quite shocking. A particular caution was given by me to Lieut. Col. Mignan, when I desired him to send these troops through the Rajah's country; which caution, I conclude, he gave to Capt. —. There is no remedy for this conduct, excepting to bring this gentleman to a Court Martial as soon as possible; and I shall be obliged to you if you will write me a public letter upon the subject.

The bygarry system is not bearable: it must be abolished entirely, or so arranged and modified as to render it certain that the unfortunate people employed as coolies are paid, are not carried farther than their usual stage, and are not ill treated. When all that is made certain, it will be found cheaper and more convenient for these gentlemen to hire coolies than to trust to the chance of procuring brinjarries on the roads, and there will be but little call for the latter. In truth, the public service but sel-

dom requires the brinjarries : I know of no instance in which they have been required, excepting by the Bombay troops, who have nothing of their own, and are unwilling to pay for what they get belonging to others. It seldom happens, also, that individuals want them ; and when a want of them does exist, it is generally to be attributed to the laziness, the neglect, or the misconduct of the person who suffers it. In my opinion, therefore, the system may be abolished without inconvenience ; but, in any event, it may be modified, and people may be prevented from calling upon the country for brinjarries whenever they think proper.

Besides Capt. —, I have another Bombay gentleman in my eye, who has lately come through this country with a convoy of arrack, and, I suspect, played the same tricks ; that is to say, never paid the people pressed and employed by him in the public service. I have desired that inquiries may be made upon the subject, and, if I find my conjecture to be founded, I shall try him at the same time with Capt. —.

I informed you yesterday that Webbe had written to Lieut. Col. Mackay, to desire him to halt at Seringapatam ; and as the 12th would certainly be too late for the relief of Montana, and the 88th are coming down to Malabar, I requested you to forward the letter I sent you some days ago to Lieut. Col. —. I received last night a letter from that gentleman (from whom, and of whom, I have received nothing but complaints since he entered the Mysore country), in which he informs me, that, as Webbe's letter to Col. Mackay was private, and as the orders to halt the 2nd of the 5th had not come through him, he should not allow Lieut. Col. Mackay to halt, but would march on the 30th, according to the orders he had received before from me. I have written to him this morning, to desire him to halt immediately, and to return to Seringapatam if he should have marched, and to allow Lieut. Col. Mackay to obey any orders he may receive. I think it probable that Lieut. Col. Mackay will have refused to obey his order to march ; and if so, we shall have a fine kettle of fish at Seringapatam : but, in any event, I don't think the government will pass over his refusal to allow an officer to obey their orders, although conveyed in a letter beginning ' Dear Colonel.' I find that his dubash is a fellow, by name Saummy, who had formerly been dubash to poor Aston, and who, when I was with the army last year, came up to Seringapatam, under pretence of being my dubash. He plundered the country all the way up, and, when arrived at Seringapatam, began the old dubash tricks, to turn people out of their houses, to threaten others in various ways with his and my displeasure, in case they did not conform to his wishes in every respect. At length I heard of him, and wrote to Col. Sherbrooke, to desire him to turn him out of the town, and of the Mysore country. If the Colonel does not dismiss him from his service after what I have written him, and the perusal of the papers from Ooscotta, &c., which I have sent him, I shall be obliged to order him to send him away. Here is an officer of reputation and rank in the army, of great family connexions, &c. &c., ruined in his outset by the scum of the earth.

I am obliged to you for your sentiments in answer to my letter of the 24th. I have already written to Lieut. Col. Palmer to request from him the earliest and most accurate intelligence regarding the crisis wished,

and waited for; and I conclude, that the governments of Bengal and of Fort St. George will have given him directions to communicate to me every thing that passes. But I suspect that the communication between Col. Palmer and me, and indeed that between him and all other parts of India, has been interrupted. I do not find that Capt. Kirkpatrick has heard from him since the 7th Sept., the date of the last letter I received: Uthoff certainly has not; and I suspect that the government of Fort St. George has not received a letter from him even of so late a date as that, as Webbe does not mention the state of Poonah (as described by Col. Palmer), in his letter to me of the 25th Sept., received yesterday.

I will write to him, however, as you propose. There are two circumstances which induce me to wish not to begin, as you propose, by advancing to the Gutpurba, under the pretence of seeing how matters stand with my friends the polygars, to the northward of that river. In the first place, when I do advance to the Kistna, I must look forward to the further operation intended, and must make my arrangements accordingly. One of the most important of these is to get possession of Darwar. If I go forward, upon the pretence under consideration, I cannot take possession of Darwar in the name of the Peshwah: indeed, I do not see in what manner I could demand that place, without declaring war against the whole Marhatta race. If I go forward, without having possession of Darwar, I must either return to take it, or I must make up my mind still to go forward without having it in my possession. Either would, in my opinion, be attended with infinite disadvantage to the operations which are intended hereafter.

2ndly. The reason for not making the conduct of Scindiah towards my friends, north of the Gutpurba, the pretence for moving to that river is, that I find that Scindiah is strictly right in having taken possession of their places. They are dependent upon the jaghire of Meritch and Tasgaum, which has been granted to him by the Peshwah; and although it would have been more generous to desist from taking possession of their countries till another opportunity, he had a right to them, and must eventually have taken them. Under these circumstances, I am afraid, that to pretend to move to their assistance will have the effect which government are most desirous I should avoid. It will give to the Peshwah's friends doubts, whether our intentions are to assist him, or to re-instate in their former power the family of Pursheram Bhow. For these reasons, which I think will also be conclusive with you, I deem it better not to advance till the crisis arrives, which is expected. It may certainly fairly be said, that, when a man's capital is in the possession of the troops of another, all his friends imprisoned, and his own person only not under restraint, he is under the power of that other. But the danger of acting upon the state of affairs, as they are now at Poonah, arises from the indecision, the weakness, and duplicity of the Peshwah's own character. To these bad qualities I attribute the strictness of the orders which I have received, viz. to advance only in case he should be in confinement, or should fly. Suppose him not to be in confinement, and that I were to adopt the measures proposed by government, were to take possession, in his name, of all the countries south of the Kistna, and to place garrisons

in those situations most convenient to my operations; and that he were to fly off and to declare that I had no authority from him, that I was an enemy, and was to be treated as such, government or I would be in a scrape, from which it would be difficult to extricate either of us. In truth, if the Peshwah is not in confinement, he has the power to call for our assistance; and if he does not call for it, we have no right to force it upon him. By the same reasoning, if, as long as he has the power, he omits to conclude with us that treaty, so advantageous to him, and so often offered, we ought to suspect his sincerity, and ought not to interfere in his affairs till the last extremity. For all these reasons then, in my opinion, I ought not to move till the crisis is certain.

I have spoken to Mackay regarding his bullocks near Seringapatam. There are on that grazing ground 500, mostly old and unfit for the service: they are placed between the road to Periapatam and the river Cauvery, therefore far north of the probable haunt of the Nairs. Mackay says, however, that if there is any danger they may as well be moved; and proposes a place for them on the north side of the river, also near Seringapatam, where they were heretofore.

To Lieut. Col. Palmer.

Camp at Hoobly, 3rd Oct. 1800.

I had yesterday the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th Sept., which was opened in Scindiah's camp, on this side of the Kistna.

I conclude you have been furnished with a copy of the instructions which I have received from the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George.

I am directed to maintain my position in the Marhatta territory till one of two events expected to occur at Poonah takes place, when I am directed to adopt the further measures pointed out in my instructions. There will be no difficulty in acting, in case of the occurrence of one of the events. If the Peshwah flies from Poonah, there can be no ambiguity in that step; and I shall immediately know in what manner I am to act. But it will be difficult to judge at what time his person is imprisoned.

When you wrote to me on the 7th Sept., that Scindiah had occupied Poonah, with his troops, under pretence of disarming a party of Arabs, but really to watch the Peshwah, and to prevent him from making his escape, which his Highness meditated; and when I heard from other quarters that guards had been placed over the houses and persons of all his Highness' friends and adherents; and all that could be said in regard to the Peshwah was, that he was not immediately under a guard, I concluded that the crisis was nearly arrived, and I expected every moment to receive further intelligence, which would enable me to act. But I now find that on the 15th the crisis was farther removed than it was on the 7th; and it is desirable that I should receive from you a statement of your sentiments regarding this part of my instructions.

At what time am I to understand that the Peshwah is in imprisonment? The difficulty which occurs in the decision of that question arises from the wiliness of Scindiah, and from the weakness and duplicity of his Highness' own character. When I received information that Scindiah had possession of the city, by introducing his troops there, and posting guards

over the Peshwah's adherents, and had most probably taken possession of all the avenues to his Highness' palace, I should have had no scruple of acting immediately as I was instructed, only that there was reason to fear that his Highness would disavow every thing that I should do in his behalf.

I conceive that this duplicity in his Highness' character is the cause of the strictness with which my instructions are worded. In truth, if his Highness is at liberty at all, he can call for our assistance if he wants it; and it may not be deemed assistance if it is given to him before it is called for. What, then, is the degree of *duresse* which is to constitute imprisonment? My opinion is, that, when the secret provisional commission commences to exercise its functions, when Amrut Rao and the Peshwah's friends think that it is necessary for them to take a decided part for the restitution of his authority, I ought to begin to act, whatever may be the degree of restraint in which his Highness' person is held. I do not conceive that it will be safe or proper to do so in any other case, excepting when I hear that there is actually a guard over the person of the Peshwah. I should be glad to receive your opinion upon this point.

I shall also be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give me every information of Scindiah's proceedings, of his strength, &c. &c., in order that I may be able to act promptly, as may appear best for the public interest. It is unfortunate that this crisis has not occurred, as I should certainly cut off that detachment, which has been pushed across the Kistna, before it could re-pass that river: as it is, I am afraid that the river will become fordable, and that the detachment will find means to escape, before the occurrence of either of the events which will authorize me to act.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Hoobly, 3rd Oct. 1800.

I have come here in execution of your Lordship's secret instructions of the 9th Sept., and I propose to remain in this neighbourhood, until the occurrence at Poonah of one of the events expected by your Lordship. There will be some difficulty in ascertaining the exact moment at which one of them may occur. From the manner in which Scindiah has gone on hitherto, I judge that he may long be completely master of the Peshwah's person, and may guide all his actions, and there may be no outward sign of his Highness' imprisonment: at the same time, until there is such an outward sign, I do not conceive myself authorized by your Lordship to act. If, upon conviction that the Peshwah's person is really in imprisonment, although he should not be actually under a guard, I should take possession of all the countries south of the Kistna in his Highness' name, and he should afterwards disavow all I should have done, which, from the indecision and duplicity of his character, is not improbable, I should be in an awkward situation, from which I should find it difficult to extricate myself. If he is really under a guard, this cannot happen. Scindiah, however, it is probable, will never go so far, although he will make it equally certain that the Peshwah cannot escape, and cannot act without his knowledge. Thus, between the weakness and duplicity of one party, and the wiliness of the other, the time of action will pass by. Under these circumstances, it has occurred to me to address Col. Palmer a letter, in which I have stated to him my opinion of the species of *duresse*,

attended by other circumstances, which will render it safe for me to act on behalf of the Peshwah under your Lordship's instructions, short of an actual imprisonment of his person under a guard. I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter to Lieut. Col. Palmer upon this subject.

I have received a letter from Capt. Kirkpatrick, in which he informs me that Lieut. Col. Bowser's corps will remain in the Dooab, liable to be called upon by me if I should find its assistance or co-operation necessary. Capt. Kirkpatrick also informs me that it is intended that a part of the remainder of the subsidiary force, and a large proportion of the Nizam's cavalry and infantry, should likewise co-operate with me eventually. I have recommended to Capt. Kirkpatrick that magazines of grain, rice particularly, should be forwarded in the Dooab, and on his Highness' frontier, north of the river Kistna; as we may apprehend want when all these troops are collected.

I also take the liberty of suggesting to your Lordship the propriety of requesting the Governor General to have sent round to Bombay, as early as possible, a large quantity of rice from Bengal; also that Mr. Duncan should be apprized of the possibility of a call for rice from Bombay, and should be requested to have all the means prepared of transporting it to the nearest situation at which it will be most convenient for the cattle of the army to receive it. With your Lordship's permission, I shall immediately communicate with Mr. Duncan on this point. I have already proposed to Col. Close the means of procuring a supply of money for the month of December: I beg leave to submit to your Lordship that there ought besides to be one lac of pagodas at Bombay for the use of this army.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Hoobly, 3rd Oct. 1800.

I omitted to mention to you yesterday that I thought it probable that a relief would be required for some of the Mysore dooley bearers with the army, who have been with it for a considerable length of time. A few in addition to those now with it may also be desirable.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 3rd Oct. 1800.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received a letter from Lieut. Col. Palmer, dated the 15th Sept., in which he says, 'The Peshwah is not at present under that degree of restraint in which he was when I had the honor of writing to you last, Scindiah having withdrawn all his troops, except one battalion, from the city: he is, however, still narrowly watched and attended by the spies of that chief, to prevent his flight, which he certainly meditated, though I doubt his resolution to attempt it.' Thus, you see, matters are farther from the expected crisis than ever, and it behoves me to attend strictly to the spirit of my instructions. The Peshwah is just in that state from which he can extricate himself by the twinkling of an eye, if he wishes it; and, being in that state, if he does not express a wish for our interference or assistance, I do not see in what manner we can give it to him.

I shall remain in this neighbourhood, between this place and Hullihall, until the crisis arrives, or I shall receive orders from government to with-

draw from the Marhatta territory entirely. In my opinion, I shall receive those orders. This crisis, which appears farther removed on the 15th than it was on the 7th Sept., must have been expected and talked of early in August, at which time Col. Palmer must have written to Calcutta the circumstances which occasioned Col. Kirkpatrick's letter to me of the 25th Aug. The Marhattas, it is true, are slow; but can it be believed that this plan of the Peshwah's, this secret commission, and all these arrangements, which have been talked of at Poonah for the last 2 months, have not come to the knowledge of Scindiah, and that he has not taken every measure in his power to prevent their accomplishment?

It appears now, by Lieut. Col. Palmer's letter, that the Peshwah has never signed the grant of the jaghires of Meritch and Tasgaum to Scindiah; and the Colonel tells me that he has remonstrated strongly against the violence used towards my friends north of the Gutpurba. I neither know nor care what the result may be. The Peshwah's conduct in the affairs of these jaghires shows clearly his duplicity, and his fear of our influence. When first pressed on the subject by Col. Palmer, at my instigation, he would not listen to our proposition to restore these jaghires to the Bhow's family, but swore that he had been forced by Scindiah to surrender these possessions to him. He at the same time told Col. Palmer that he had secretly encouraged the Bhow's sons to oppose Scindiah in his attempt to take possession of them. It now turns out that he has never given them to Scindiah. At Scindiah's solicitation, he has sent an order (as Col. Palmer says) to the Bhow's family, to give up to the Rajah of Kolapoor the fort of Manowly; at the same time, Col. Palmer says, he has sent them secret orders to resist that which Scindiah has got to deliver the fort to the Kolapoor Rajah, and to assert that they have my direction to maintain possession. How is it possible to account for this system of deceit? This appears to be a magnificent place.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Hoobly, 3rd Oct. 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 19th and 22nd Sept., and I am obliged to you for attending to my request regarding Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment.

As it is intended that a great proportion of the subsidiary force, and of his Highness the Nizam's army, should take the field eventually, I beg leave to recommend that magazines of grain (rice particularly) may be collected both in the Dooab and on his Highness' frontiers north of the river Kistna. The only danger to be apprehended, in these large armies at such a distance from our settlements, is the want of rice; and I am, therefore, particularly anxious that measures should be taken to preclude it.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Hoobly, 6th Oct. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 27th Sept. I have been ordered by government to remain for some time in this country; and I have come here in order to eat rice, which I propose to draw from the borders of Soonda, without using any brought from Mysore by my brinjarries. You will, therefore, perceive the necessity that my brinjarries should return

to me to the northward : but I am not in a hurry about them ; and it does not much signify if they do go to Cundapoor and Mangalore to receive their loads.

I fancy that you will have the pleasure of seeing some of your grand plans carried into execution ; all that I can say is, that I am ready primed, and that, if all matters suit, I shall go off with a dreadful explosion, and shall probably destroy some campoos and pultans, which have been indiscreetly pushed across the Kistna ; that is to say, if the river remains full.

I have written to Col. Close about your money, which I shall want. The only reason why I cannot get it is, that you are obliged to keep enough in your hands to pay the troops in Canara, &c., till January. I have written to desire that a sum of money for that purpose may be sent round from Madras, in one of the ships of the squadron ; and, whatever sum I hear that they will send, I will draw an equal one from you : that is the only mode that occurs of procuring the supply of money which I shall want in December.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 7th Oct. 1800.

I enclose the crime on which I propose that Capt. ——— should be tried. Let me know whether it will be convenient that the evidence against Capt. ——— should come to camp, as otherwise I am afraid that the trial must be delayed for some time. If it should be convenient for them to come here, they shall be detained only while it is necessary. I knew that Col. Harcourt would be too late for the relief of Montana. I have received from Col. Sartorius a letter of the 27th Sept., by which it appears that the operations were going on well, and that but little loss had been sustained. No news from Poonah.

To Lieut. Col. Disney.

Camp at Hoobly, 8th Oct. 1800.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 29th Sept. I do not doubt but that our allies are bad ; that they act with us from interested motives ; and that the employment of them will have consequences which will make us regret it hereafter. We are, however, now to look to one great object : the defence of ourselves against the Pyche Rajah ; and eventually to beat him and his rebellion down. We must employ all our means in Malabar to obtain that object ; and as soon as it shall be obtained, it will be time to consider of the further measures to be taken for the peace and safety of the country, and of the effect of those which we shall have been obliged to adopt, to put down the present rebellion.

G. A. O.

Camp at Hoobly, Sunday, 5th Oct 1800.

A Committee to be assembled in each of the garrisons at Seringapatam, Nundydroog, Chittledroog, Nuggur, and Hullihall, to examine and report the state of repair of the buildings in each, used as granaries and provision store houses. These Committees are to state the repairs which will be necessary, in order to render these buildings fit to receive and preserve grain and provisions, and will form an estimate of the quantities which they will contain when in thorough repair. These Committees will consist of the commanding officer of each garrison, president ; the Engineer, if there should be one, and any other 2 officers, members. After having examined and reported upon the buildings intended as grain and provision store rooms, these same Committees will examine and report upon the state of repair, and the repairs wanting to the buildings for ordnance military stores.

I was sorry when you gave up the command at Nuggur, and I then appointed to it another officer, Lieut. Col. Montresor. It is impossible to remove him at present to make room for you; but if I should have it in my power to provide for him in any other manner, I will certainly recommend you to the government of Fort St. George for the command at Nuggur. In order to have an opportunity of doing this, I will seek for an opportunity of providing for Lieut. Col. Montresor at some other station.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Hoobly, 9th Oct., 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 2nd inst., and I am prepared to proceed to whatever point your Lordship may order me, or to make such detachments as you may think proper. The acquaintance which I have obtained in the late war with the characters and views of the Marhatta chiefs in this part of the Empire, renders it my duty to state to your Lordship the effects which are to be apprehended from weakening, to any degree, this body of the troops, by whose exertions we hope to accomplish all that is wished at Poonah.

The object appears to be, to establish the legal power of the Peshwah over the Marhatta Empire. In order to effect this, Scindiah must be removed to his own territories. It is not to be supposed that he will relinquish all that he has been endeavoring to obtain for the last 4 or 5 years, without a contest; and all the chiefs of the Marhatta Empire look to the event of this expected contest with the utmost anxiety. They will join the one party or the other, according to their own ideas of their relative strength, and of the chances of ultimate success; and in case of our interference, which is not expected, the question with them will be, whether our force employed is sufficient to get the better of that which will be brought against us by Scindiah.

It therefore appears necessary that, at least at first, the interference of the Company should be by the means of a powerful body of troops, such as will convince the whole Marhatta Empire of our firm determination to attain our object, and to establish the Peshwah in the enjoyment of the whole of his legal authority. The force which I have at present under my command in the field consists of 690 European dragoons, 975 Native cavalry, 142 British artillery, 1160 British infantry, 3538 Native infantry, including sick, present and absent, of which there are but few. This force, with the assistance which may be expected from the subsidiary troops at Hyderabad, will be fully sufficient; but any diminution of it, or any detachment made to other parts of the Company's territories, will occasion

G. O.

Camp near Hoobly, Wednesday, 8th Oct 1800.

All the European and Native sick of the army who may require carriage, and who may not be able to undergo the duties of the field service, are to be sent, in the course of tomorrow afternoon, into the field hospital at Hoobly. Returns of the sick to be sent into Hoobly are to be transmitted by the respective regimental surgeons to Mr. Anderson, head surgeon, as soon as convenient.

G. O.

Camp near Hoobly, Thursday, 9th Oct. 1800.

An officer from the 73rd regt. to have charge of all the Europeans sent into the field hospital at Hoobly; and Lieut. Ahmuty, 1st batt. 8th regt., who is obliged to go in sick himself, to have charge of all the Native troops sent in there. They are to be furnished by corps respectively with rolls of the men, certificates of the last pay they have received, and lists of their arms, accoutrements, clothing, and necessaries.

doubts of our intentions to adhere steadily to our object till it is accomplished.

The assistance of the chiefs of this part of the Marhatta Empire is necessary to us for several reasons.

1st: They give protection to our convoys of provisions which must come from Mysore: if we could suppose that they would remain neuter in this contest, we should still experience great difficulty and inconvenience from the necessity of detaching our own troops from this small force, for the protection of our convoys. But they will not remain neuter. If they do not join the enemy, they will, under various pretences, render the communication with Mysore so difficult, as to be almost impracticable.

2ndly: By having them with me, the country in my rear will certainly be in tranquillity, and I shall draw from it all the resources which it can afford. The whole of the Marhatta empire is divided in jaghire among the Marhatta chiefs or polygars, as I heretofore represented to your Lordship; and each of these chiefs can command the resources of his own jaghire. The jaghiredar or polygar, who will doubt of our success, and will wish well to the cause of the enemy, will of course impede our progress by the various means in his power. This I experienced in the late contest in several instances; and it is probable I should experience it in many more in a contest, the object of which will be, in whose hands the power of the empire should be placed hereafter.

3rdly: By having the Marhatta chiefs with me, I keep so many out of the opposite scale.

I may therefore conclude that, if this object is to be attained with celerity, we must have on our side the largest proportion of the Marhatta chiefs in this part of the Empire. They will not come forward unless they are clearly convinced, by the efforts which we shall make, that it is our firm determination to attain our object. Under these circumstances, it has occurred to me to consider of the means of collecting a body of troops from Mysore for the Ceded countries, which will be at least equal in size to that which I should conceive myself authorized by your Lordship's orders to detach.

In consequence of your Lordship's orders to halt the 2nd batt. 5th regt., that it might join the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and as I foresaw that there would be some difficulty in collecting a force for the districts to be ceded by the treaty, which augments the subsidiary force, I directed the 5 companies of the 12th also to halt at Seringapatam, in order to form a part of the detachment to take possession of the Ceded countries.

I have reason to believe that the 88th regt. is coming to Malabar, and the 12th will be no longer necessary in that province. There are 8 companies of a battalion of Bombay sepoys at Nuggur, which I would propose to relieve by a small detachment from the province of Canara, and to move the former to Chittledroog, when they should join the 5 companies of the 12th, and the 2nd batt. of the 5th. I would also propose to add to this detachment 7 companies of the 33rd, leaving at Seringapatam only 3 companies of that corps. There is a detachment in the field in the Nundroog district, which might be moved forward into Gurrumconda, and

would still cover the Rajah's territories. Thus there would be 12 companies of Europeans and 8 companies of Natives, besides the detachment in the Nundydroog district, and guns, which could enter the Ceded districts immediately, if your Lordship should approve of that arrangement. If the Resident at Hyderabad would consider one of the corps of this army as belonging to the subsidiary force, the 2nd of the 5th might likewise remain in the Ceded countries.

I shall propose to your Lordship that this force should be kept collected in one body, to be thrown on any point when their exertions might be necessary; and that, until more troops can be spared from other services, a body of peons should be retained in the Company's service, by whose means the Collector will be able to take possession of the country, and to make his arrangements. There are many objections to weakening Seringapatam at this moment, but the arrangements which may be made at that place will, I hope, keep it in perfect security.

If your Lordship approves of this plan, rather than that I should weaken the body of the troops in the field in this country, I shall give orders to have it carried into execution without loss of time.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 10th Oct., 1800.

I have ordered committees to assemble in the different garrisons in Mysore, in order to examine and report upon the state of their granaries and buildings for containing provisions. I gave these orders in consequence of a letter from the Military board, in which they call for detailed information upon this subject. All the information which I could procure has been before them repeatedly, but they shall have it again at one view. I shall send you a copy of these reports.

I am not surprised that Purneah should be desirous to have nothing to do with the Company's concerns. The common practice is to accuse a man of being either a fool or a knave. If he is so fortunate as that it is impossible to give him the former appellation, it is certain that he will be accused of knavery. Our friend, with his sandal wood, has done no more than all his fellows have at different times.

If we should not permanently keep Darwar, I shall recommend that a granary may be built at Hurryhur.

I am more pressed than ever about troops. Lord Clive calls upon me to have a detachment ready to take possession of the Ceded provinces, and then to march to Poonah. Sir W. Clarke and Uthoff swear that the French are coming from Egypt, and want all the Native infantry I have got: on the other hand, the last relief of Montana cost us 154 men killed and wounded (most of them coolies, however); and they are crying out there because they do not see the 12th, and 2nd of the 5th, marching into Cannanore on the 30th Sept., on which day they left Seringapatam. My business is to get over these difficulties in the best manner I can, and what follows is the arrangement which I propose. In addition to every thing, I must also inform you that the fright which affects Sir W. Clarke and Uthoff pervades Bombay, where, on account of the supposed danger, the 88th, which I expected in Malabar, is detained.

Webbe, in a letter of the 4th, which I have just received from him,

appears doubtful of the propriety of my making a detachment from my corps. I wrote to Lord Clive fully upon that subject yesterday, and told him that a contest with Scindiah for the power of the Marhatta state must be entered upon at first, at least, with a powerful body of troops, if it is intended that we should have the assistance of any of the chiefs of the Marhatta Empire. If we have not their assistance, we shall want a still larger body of troops, and, even when we collect them, we must expect that the contest will last longer than it would otherwise. I have, therefore, strongly urged that my corps may not be diminished, and that I may enter upon the contest in such a manner as that all the chiefs may be convinced of our determination to attain our object, and punish those who oppose us, and may be induced, by a sense of their own interests, to join my standard.

But a corps is to be assembled to take possession of the Ceded districts: how am I to collect it? In the first place, there are 5 companies of the 12th: to them I would add 7 companies of the 33rd, leaving 3 of that corps in Seringapatam, or, probably, according to your suggestion, the whole 33rd, leaving the 12th at Seringapatam; 8 companies of the 2nd of the 5th (Bombay) sepoys now at Nuggur, which I would relieve by 3 companies of the corps at Cundapoor, and one company at Bilghy. Besides this, I have proposed that one of the Native corps of this army should be considered as belonging to the Nizam's detachment, and that the 2nd of the 5th should remain in the Ceded countries, at least for a time. This I believe will be acquiesced in. Thus I shall have, for the Ceded countries, one regiment of Europeans at least; 8 companies of sepoys, and one battalion, if the 2nd of the 5th are left. Nuggur will not be weaker than it was before the posts of Chandergooty and Cowleydroog were drawn in.

Besides this force, it might probably be convenient to Cuppage to move forward into Gurrumconda, which would add strength to our operations in the Ceded countries. Webbe tells me that Munro is appointed Chief Collector. I shall recommend to him to operate much at first by means of peons, which will be attended with a double advantage; and this corps of mine, to be assembled, ought to be kept in one body.

I now come to the most difficult part, which is Malabar. They say there is a rebellion in Wynaad, and we may hope, like Voltaire, that the Nairs of the Pyche Rajah may be strangled with ropes made of the bowels of those on the side of Yeman Nair: but still it is necessary to take measures for sustaining that post, if possible. There is nothing that can be done, excepting to send into Malabar half of the 75th regt. from Mangalore. I gave orders upon that subject this day. Thus, then, I shall have provided for all the immediate calls for troops, excepting those dictated by the fears of an Egyptian invasion.

We shall weaken Seringapatam a little, but I shall write to Col. Saxon directions upon that subject, which I hope will prevent inconvenience from that measure. The objection I have to putting the 12th into Seringapatam, is the dubash attached to that corps, who will ruin us there completely. I enclose a letter from Lieut. Carfrae, which you may find of use.

P. S. Not a word yet from Madras respecting my last proposal about money. I am rather anxious about this.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 12th Oct. 1800.

By all means take the 50,000 pagodas from Macleod, which he says will be in his hands in November. If I do not want that sum here, it will be wanted in the Ceded districts, or in Mysore. We have got in Mysore all the expensive part of the army, and we certainly ought to get some of the money to pay them.

I have received a letter from Lieut. Col. Palmer, dated the 1st, in which he does not mention one word of news, nor does he notice any one of my letters written in September. He says, 'The Peshwah has not hitherto made any remonstrance to me against your continuance in his dominions. I am confident that, so long as he may acquiesce in your retaining such a position, you will be happy to show every attention to his wishes, that the country or individuals should not sustain any loss or disturbance.' This does not look like calling for our assistance.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Hoobly, 13th Oct. 1800.

By the last accounts which I have received of the state of affairs at Poonah, it appears that Scindiah is acting with great caution. He has put a stop to certain operations which had been commenced by his troops on the south side of the Kistna, and has manifested a disposition to be reconciled with the family of Pursheram Bhow, and to withdraw his pretensions to the possessions of that chief.

Lieut. Col. Palmer writes on the 1st Oct. 'The Peshwah has not hitherto made any remonstrance to me against your continuance in his dominions.' From the circumstances I have above mentioned, it appears that the crisis expected by the Governor General is far removed; and by that paragraph in Col. Palmer's letter, I should imagine that he is not certain that the Peshwah will not remonstrate against my remaining in his Highness' territories.

Under these circumstances, I shall be glad to receive your Lordship's orders whether I am to withdraw from the Marhatta territory, if I should receive, through Lieut. Col. Palmer, a remonstrance from the Peshwah against remaining longer within it.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 15th Oct. 1800.

The enclosed extracts of Lieut. Col. Palmer's dispatches to Lord Wellesley, will show you that I was not wrong in my conjecture respecting the unsteadiness and duplicity of the Peshwah. Either we shall go to war in grand style with the whole Marhatta nation, or I shall be ordered to withdraw; and, in my opinion, the last will be adopted. Lieut. Col. Palmer hints that I might remain in the Marhatta territory, under a pretence of adjusting a claim of a debt from the Rajah of Kolapoor; but, 1st, I do not see what end that is to answer: 2ndly, it will be tantamount to a declaration of war against the Peshwah, which the measure is intended to avoid. It is evident that his Highness is as much averse to us as he is to Scindiah; that he has now some hopes of freeing himself from the latter without our assistance, and without being obliged to make the sacrifices which we require; and, as Col. Palmer truly says, 'It is the policy of Bajee Rao to deceive every body.'

I write to Webbe this day my opinion of the dispatches, that orders will certainly come for me to withdraw; that it is better that I should withdraw immediately, as I shall thereby have the whole fair season before me for all that I have to do.

I think that, besides depriving Dhoondiah's followers of their arms and horses, they might for a time be under the inspection of the municipality (to use a French phrase). I have long thought that it would be proper that orders should be given throughout the Rajah's country, that no man should be suffered to pass on horseback, or with arms, through or near any village where there might be peons, without having an order from some regular authority to move through the country thus equipped.

I shall call for the Court Martial which you mention. Col. — lately made a complaint of an Asst. Surgeon, just arrived in the country, who disobeyed his orders. The young man was put in arrest, and has since made the most ample apology. The Colonel will not receive the apology, and I am about to send him an order to join the army, to prosecute the Asst. Surgeon; so that there is an end of his career for some time.

I am in capital style here; I get as many bullocks as I can want, arrack from Goa, and I am thereby enabled to hand over, to the detachments to be formed for the Ceded districts, the bullocks hired in Mysore, and the arrack on the road from Madras. I still want the supplies of rice, which they will get, of course, in the Ceded countries.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Hoobly, 15th Oct. 1800.

I received last night your letter of the 4th, enclosing the interesting extracts from Col. Palmer's dispatches, which you are so kind as to communicate to me. Lord Wellesley's plans having been formed upon intelligence which he received of the state of affairs at Poonah early in August, and the crisis, then expected, being further removed than ever in the beginning of October, I suspected some new indecision and deceit on the part of the Peshwah, and the result is exactly what I imagined it would be. It appears now that Scindiah will be obliged to move to the northward with all his forces. The danger then which has threatened the Nizam, and is not far distant from the Company, will be entirely removed, and the Peshwah will be at liberty to follow the desires of his own imagination, or he will be subject to any new influence which may start up in the Marhatta Empire. The question upon that state of affairs is, shall we mend the matter by maintaining a position in the Marhatta territory against the inclination of the Peshwah, under pretence of adjusting a claim of debt upon the Rajah of Kolapoor? We once thought that the influence of Scindiah was the cause of the failure of all our plans at Poonah, and our efforts have been hitherto directed to remove him and his army to a distance. They are now likely to be removed, and we find that the Peshwah is unwilling to accede to any of our propositions. What change can our army effect in his political views and inclinations? In my opinion, none, till his government is overthrown. If that is to be attempted, it is better to go to war directly with him at once, than to do the same thing under pretence of a claim of debt upon the Rajah of Kolapoor.

I agree with you entirely that it is necessary to establish our influence

at Poonah. But, from the new turn which affairs have taken there lately, I conjecture that any change will not effect our object.

I am obliged to you for the step which you have taken respecting the killadars of Chinnoor and Moodgul.

P. S. I have written to Col. Bowser respecting 4000 rupees which I paid on an order of Meer Alum's, being an advance which he made to his brinjarries, and 1000 rupees to Noor Mahomed Khan; and I do not believe that I shall be under the necessity of giving you any trouble upon the subject.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 26th Oct. 1800.

I am rather anxious about money: wherever I may go, I shall want some for December's payment; and I do not see that any arrangement has been made by Webbe to provide for it, although it is impossible to adopt that which I proposed, as the ships of war do not go to the Malabar coast. One lac of pagodas ought to be sent to us by Golah peons, as soon as possible. I mentioned the want of money in a letter to Lord Clive; but I wish you would write to Webbe upon the subject.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 28th Oct. 1800.

I received a letter from Webbe last night, dated the 20th, in which he informs me that the treaty with the Nizam is concluded; and he proposes that I should make my arrangements immediately for taking possession of the territory ceded to us. I, therefore, march to-morrow, with my whole force, towards Savanore, from whence I shall send a detachment directly to Harponelly, if the Toombuddra should be fordable: if it should not be so, the detachment must go round by Hurryhur.

My reasons for moving to Savanore, there to await the further orders of government with the remainder of the army, are as follows:

It is clear, from Col. Palmer's dispatches, that the Peshwah is not less adverse to us than he is to Scindiah, and that he has some hopes of being freed from the latter without our assistance. He has hitherto made no objections to our remaining in his territory, and it is probable that he will make none, as long as he thinks that we are sufficiently strong to keep in check Scindiah's army to the southward of the Kistna; but as soon as we begin to weaken ourselves, it is probable not only that he will desire that I may withdraw, but that he will order some of his officers on this frontier to see that his wishes, in this respect, are complied with. I shall then be in an awkward situation, with an army unequal to offence, very forward in the Marhatta territory; and, after having overrun the country, I shall be obliged to sneak out of it. That won't answer.

If Lord Wellesley proposes that I should remain in the Marhatta territory, notwithstanding the contents of the dispatches which I sent to you,

G. O.

Camp near Hoobly, Friday, 17th Oct. 1800.

Capt. Deas having been ordered by government to proceed to Mangalore to receive horses provided by the agent for purchasing horses, commanding officers of stations in Canara, Malabar, and Mysore are directed to furnish guards as they may think requisite, and such other assistance as may be in their power, for the security of the horses when passing from Mangalore to the cavalry stations, upon Capt. Deas's written application to them for that purpose.

I shall be better placed at Savanore than here for collecting again; and, on the other hand, if he proposes that I should withdraw ~~entirely~~, I shall be so much nearer our other objects. Whether I detach from hence and remain here with the main body, or go to Savanore and detach from thence, my allies will be equally convinced that there is no intention to interfere in their affairs. Upon the whole, then, in some points of view, it is better that I should go to Savanore, and in others it is equal; and, as I think I shall be there in greater safety, I move that way.

I yesterday ordered the Rajah's cavalry to Hurryhur from Rannee Bednore. I shall be obliged to you if you will request Purneah to allow it to remain at Hurryhur, till it is decided what is to be done in this country. As soon as I receive a copy of the treaty, or information respecting the countries ceded to us, I propose to order the Nundydroog detachment forward, as you wished.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 30th Oct. 1800.

I am detained here by the rain, which is violent and incessant. Munro will not be at Hurryhur before the 7th Nov. at soonest; and if the rains extend to the Bednore country, not so soon. I shall contrive to have a detachment across the Toombuddra before that time, if it should become at all practicable to move.

I have written to Col. Harcourt again about his dubash, and I expect good consequences from his receipt of this last letter. I have also written to Gordon respecting victualling the troops, and I have desired him to send into the Carnatic, immediately, the Madras conicopoly belonging to the Madras provision department, heretofore attached to the 5 companies of the 12th regt. As soon as I receive from Mr. Gordon his answer to my letter, requiring the reason why he did not victual this corps on its march to Cannanore, as I directed, I shall issue the order which you proposed in your letter of the 24th, or even one much stronger, if I should find that, in truth, the dubash drove away Mr. Gordon's people: this I now suspect to be the case.

My allies are much dejected upon receiving information of my intention to withdraw. They, however, propose to exert themselves in their own defence, to which I have strongly urged them. It will be a great object gained, if Scindiah is really obliged to go to Hindustan, to prevent him from extending and establishing himself to the southward before he takes his departure. In this view only, does it appear to me at all desirable that I should remain within the Marhatta territory.

The allies have again returned to the proposition which they made to me some time ago, to allow them an asylum for their families in the territories of the Company or of the Rajah, only that they have now stated precisely their wishes. They desire to be allowed to place their families in one of the places mentioned in the enclosed paper, and that Purneah should employ one of them, or one of their dependants, as the aumil of the district, for the revenue of which they would be answerable, and allow them to have their tannah in the place. If Purneah should object to giving them the management of the district in which he may allow their families to remain, they request that he will at least allow them to have their own

people and peons in the place; and if he should object to that, they beg to have an asylum in any one of these places, upon an assurance of protection. If it should not be convenient to Purneah that they should inhabit any one of these places, they request that he will appoint any other for their residence which shall be contiguous to the Marhatta frontier. The only reason why they wish to have the amildary of the district, and their own people in the fort with them, appears to be the fears which their women and families will have among strangers, particularly Europeans. I acknowledge that I am very anxious that they should be gratified to the fullest extent of their wishes; and I shall be obliged to you if you will mention the subject to Purneah, if you do not see any impropriety in their requests.

The families which will come to us will be that of Appah Saheb and his brothers, that of Chintomeny Rao, of Ball Kishen Bhow, and probably those of some of their dependants. If Purneah should have no objection to allowing them to hold the amildary of the district immediately contiguous to the fort, which he might permit them to inhabit, I will inquire from them the name of the person in whose hands they may wish it should be placed.

I have spoken to Mackay respecting the receipt for the young bullocks. He takes them on his returns as received from you, and will send you a receipt for them by this day's post.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Hoobly, 30th Oct. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 14th inst. In consequence of the necessity of sending a detachment from my force to take possession of the districts lately ceded to the Company by the Nizam, I have had an intention for these last 2 days to move to Savanore, but have been detained here by heavy and incessant rain. I propose to remain at Savanore with the main body of the army, till I receive the further orders of government.

I beg leave to congratulate you upon the conclusion of the treaty by which the territory is ceded, of which I am about to take possession.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Misserycotta, 31st Oct. 1800.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received Lord Clive's orders of the 24th to enter the Ceded countries with my whole force. The intention is, I imagine, to keep it together, till orders are received from Bengal, consequent to Palmer's dispatches, which I sent you; and I believe that, hereafter, if there is no objection from Bengal, it will be broke up, and a part will operate to the westward. I marched this morning, but only a short distance. The weather still threatening.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Misserycotta, 1st Nov. 1800.

I received, last night, your letter of the 25th Oct. : I am detained here by the rain.

I do not propose to enter the Ceded districts by Mysore; but I assure you that my numerous followers are in such order that I might venture to produce them any where. We were a month at Hoobly; and the grain fields in the middle of the camp were not touched, and the people

in the neighbouring villages sent to tell me that the safeguards, which I had given them upon my arrival there, were no longer necessary. Lieut. Col. Mackay will enter Harponelly from Hurryhur, either with Munro, or immediately after him. I shall enter that province to the northward with the army, if it should be possible to cross the Toombuddra below the junction of that river with the Werdah. If that should not be possible, I shall continue my march along the left bank of the Toombuddra, as far as opposite Adoni; as I conceive it to be of the first importance that a strong corps should be in the centre of the Ceded districts as soon as possible, and Col. Mackay and Munro will be able to settle the provinces of Harponelly and Anagoondy, most probably, without my assistance. It will be hard, indeed, if the Toombuddra should not be fordable by the time that I shall arrive opposite Adoni.

Lord Clive has desired me to join ——— to this army, and not to detach him on any account whatever. I have therefore ordered him direct from Chittledroog to Anagoondy, where I may expect to be: if I should be obliged to march along the left bank of the river, he must proceed along the right bank of it. I have not desired him to take any measures for settling the country as he comes along; but have merely apprized him that he will pass through a strange country, and have desired him to be upon his guard.

I am obliged to you for your information regarding the Ceded countries; I applied to ——— for some, having understood that his attention, for the last years of his life, has been entirely taken up by inquiries into, and surveys of, those very countries. In answer to my application, he proposes that I should send him a map of my marches, and all the geographical information which I have received from Bombay (which, by the by, is nothing less than true); and he then promises to make a map of the whole. Into this he will most probably insert the result of his own dreams.

You some time ago wrote to me about employing ———, of the Bombay engineers, on the survey of Soonda; and having desired that gentleman to undertake it, he has requested to have an order which would authorize him to draw surveyor's allowances while employed on the work. Upon this subject I wish to have your sentiments. Surveyor's allowances given to a man till he completes a survey are an encouragement to delay; and, to tell you the truth, I am rather anxious that this gentleman should be employed as an engineer in the repair and improvement of the fort of Hullihall. For these he has given a plan, which I have already submitted to the Military board; and during the time that they will take to decide upon carrying it into execution, I have desired ——— to make the survey of Soonda.

My idea is, to order him surveyor's allowances during the time that he may be employed on the survey; and to inform him that I shall order him from the survey as soon as the Military board shall have decided upon his plan for the reform and repair of the works at Hullihall. Do you think that this will answer?

You will have heard from Webbe that I am to have the money in Canara. I shall send back Bistna Punt, peons, &c. Would not you wish that some person should remain here in charge of the Amrut mahal?

P.S. I enclose a copy of the order which I have given respecting — : also one of that respecting the employment of sepoy to seize sheep. It will be necessary that Purneah should give orders throughout the country to supply sheep upon these receipts, whenever they may be required.

To Lieut. Col. Disney.

Camp at Bendikerah, 3rd Nov. 1800.

Your regiment has lately received orders from me to halt at Nuggur until they receive their camp equipage and carriage for it, and further orders to march. It is impossible for me to say, at present, whether they will receive those orders, or to what place it may be requisite to send them, if they should be moved from Nuggur. I will take care, however, that you shall be apprised of any movements which they make.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Noolgoond, 10th Nov. 1800.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th Oct.

Mine of the 30th of that month will have apprised you that I proposed to move to Savanore, as I was under the necessity of sending a detachment from my army to take possession of the countries lately ceded to the Company by the Nizam. Since I wrote that letter, I have received the orders of government to enter the Ceded districts with the whole army; and I have come to this place, at which the Werdah and Toombuddra join, with an intention of crossing the latter. The heavy rains, however, have kept both rivers full; and I propose to march by the left of the Toombuddra till I arrive opposite Anagoondy. At that time I hope that the waters will have fallen; and, if they should not, I shall have been joined by the boats which I have ordered from Hurryhur, and from the post which I have had upon the river Werdah.

I am obliged to you for the communication of your sentiments regarding the situation of our affairs with the Marhattas. I agree entirely in your opinion that it is most desirable that they should be speedily settled; and that, particularly at this moment, there is no reason to be apprehensive for the consequences even of an appeal to arms in order to bring them to a close. The only questions, then, are the propriety and justice of commencing a war to obtain our ends. I can give no opinion upon these points, as I am unacquainted with the particulars of the late unsuccessful negotiation; but, if war should be determined on, I am convinced that we shall suffer no inconvenience from my having withdrawn from the Marhatta territory: if we are not to go to war, you appear to be of opinion that it is proper that I should withdraw without loss of time.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the killadar of Moodgul has restored all the property belonging to the people of my camp which he had seized.

I don't see any reason why Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment should remain longer in the Doob.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 10 miles S. of Copaul, 13th Nov. 1800.

Our tappall Brahmin has written to Appah —, to desire that peons may be posted up to Anagoondy from Chittledroog for the use of the

army. As soon as I arrive at Anagoondy, and find that these peons are posted, I propose to take off those which I have now upon the road from Chittledroog by Hurryhur and Savanore. Hereafter I propose that Munro should run a tappall from Chittledroog by Rydroog into the Ceded districts: I write to him upon this subject. But in the mean time it is desirable that, until that tappall can be arranged, and until I get more forward into the Ceded districts, the peons should be posted direct to Anagoondy, as I have above pointed out.

I have settled with the Amrut mahal man to get sheep from Mysore, until we can ascertain the state of our supplies in the Ceded countries. Bistna Punt did not join from Hoobly, till we had got so far as to render it advisable that he should return to Mysore through the Ceded districts. There are hopes that the river will be fordable in a day or two, and he shall go off the moment he can cross.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 10 miles S. of Copaul, 16th Nov. 1800.

I have received the orders of government to break up the army; to send a detachment into the Ceded countries; to prepare one for Wynaad; and to proceed myself to hold a conference with the Admiral upon some proposed arrangements. I shall have settled every thing to-morrow, preparatory to breaking up the army, and I shall set out immediately for Seringapatam, leaving the troops to follow me. Col. Moneypenny stays in the Ceded districts, with the 25th dragoons, 1st and 4th regts. of cavalry, the 73rd regt., 2nd of the 4th, and 1st of the 12th.

I shall be at Seringapatam, I hope, by the 26th or 27th. I shall proceed by Hurryhur, Hooley Honore, and Chenapatam. Gen. D. Campbell commands in the Ceded districts.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser.

Camp, 10 miles S. of Copaul, 16th Nov. 1800.

I enclose you an extract of a letter which I have received from the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, in consequence of which I have to request that you will detach from your force 2 battalions of Native infantry, with their guns, and send them across the Toombuddra, to be placed under the orders of the officer commanding the troops in the districts lately ceded to the Company by the Nizam.

In case you should not deem yourself authorised to comply with this requisition, in consequence of others, of a more urgent nature, which you may have received from the Resident at Hyderabad, I request that you will send to the Resident a copy of this letter, and wait his further directions.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Anajee, in Mysore, 20th Nov. 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 16th. I had before written to the Commissioners, to desire that they would send Yeman Nair to Seringapatam, and that they would address him to you, as I thought it probable that I should be absent when he would arrive.

I shall be at Seringapatam by the 27th or 28th, and will talk over with you then the other points in your letter of the 16th. I have pressed Webbe hard to be allowed to conduct the Wynaad expedition, and that

arrangements should be adopted to render my journey to the Carnatic, and my absence from Mysore, as short as possible.

P. S. Col. — appears to have mistaken the troops of Cummer u Deen for the garrison of Gurrumconda. I have desired him to try to get into the fort at all events; and if the killadar refuses to give him possession, to threaten him with the resentment of the Nizam, and with the responsibility for all the evil consequences of his disobedience of his master's orders. If he still holds out, arrangements must be made to get the place by force: have it we must, and that speedily.

To the Sec. of Gov. Fort St. George.

Santa Bednore, 21st Nov. 1800.

In consequence of the orders of the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council, of the 9th inst., I broke up the army on the 16th, on the banks of the Toombuddra, and made arrangements, as stated hereafter, for providing a force for the Ceded districts, and one for the proposed service in the Malabar. I sent into the Ceded districts, under the orders of Lieut. Col. Moneypenny, the 25th dragoons, the 1st and 4th regts. of Native cavalry, the 73rd regt., the 2nd of the 4th, and 1st and 12th Native infantry, with 6 field pieces, besides the cavalry guns.

I made a requisition upon Lieut. Col. Bowser, who was still in the Dooab, for 2 battalions of Native infantry. Lieut. Col. Mackay has taken possession of Harponelly; and is now, with the corps under his command, on his march to Rydroog, to get possession of that fort. Major Munro is with Lieut. Col. Mackay.

Before I had received his Lordship's orders not to send into the Ceded districts any part of the detachment which has been hitherto in the field in the Nundydroog district, I had desired Lieut. Col. Cuppage to send a detachment to take possession of the fort of Gurrumconda; and to post the field detachment in the Pollams, between that fort and Pennaconda. This arrangement appeared likely to be of service both to the territory of the Company and of the Rajah. I was in hopes that it was carried into execution when I had received his Lordship's orders, and I therefore did not countermand it. I have since received a letter from Lieut. Col. Cuppage, from which it appears that the troops in the service of the late Cummer u Deen, and of his son, had mutinied, and were disposed to plunder the country. Lieut. Col. Cuppage likewise mentions that the troops in the fort of Gurrumconda had mutinied, and he did not believe that they would allow the fort to be delivered over to the Company's troops. The troops within the fort are in the service of the Nizam. Under these circumstances, I have considered it of the first importance to endeavor to get possession of the fort without loss of time, lest the troops of the Nizam and of Cummer u Deen should co-operate to keep it from us; and, notwithstanding his Lordship's orders, I have desired Lieut. Col. Cuppage to urge the killadar in the strongest manner to give him up the fort, to threaten him with the resentment of the Nizam, and with the responsibility for all the evil consequences which are likely to result from his retaining possession, after he had received the orders of his employer to deliver the fort to the Company's troops.

I have desired Lieut. Col. Moneypenny to cross the Toombuddra at the

Untoor ghaut, below Anagoondy, to proceed by Bellary to Adoni, of which place and of Gooty he is to take possession. He has not got from the head amil the orders to the killadars of Bellary and of Gooty, to deliver to him the possession of those forts, and it is probable he will not receive the orders for some time: I have therefore desired him not to delay at Bellary, but to proceed with expedition to Adoni, for the delivery of which place he has an order. I have supplied Lieut. Col. Moneypenny with rice, provisions, arrack for 50 days, bullocks and military stores, and money. I have arranged a communication between his detachment and Mysore, by way of Rydroog, by means of which I propose to supply him with arrack, rice, and bullocks, until Major Gen. Campbell shall have arranged a communication with Madras, from whence he must draw the former, and shall have brought forward the resources of the Ceded districts in the two latter. I have ordered into the Ceded districts immediately, for the use of the troops, 50,000 pagodas, in charge of Lieut. Read, whom I have appointed Mr. Gordon's Dep. Paymaster in those countries. This officer has lately done the duty of Paymaster at Seringapatam, and is strongly recommended by Mr. Gordon. The remainder of the army is now crossing the Toombuddra, and will march to Seringapatam immediately. I hope to arrive at that place on the 29th, and I shall make all the arrangements preparatory to the expedition to the westward.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Vincaty Gherry, 9th Dec. 1800.

I hear from camp that the followers are going on but badly; and as intelligence to a similar purport may have reached you, I write to inform you that I have given a strong hint to Col. Pater upon the subject; and I hope that, after he shall have received my letter, there will be no further reason for complaint.

P.S. I have this instant heard from Col. Moneypenny, who had arrived at, and got possession of, Bellary. He was going to Gooty: all quiet; but the Nizam's horse are going about the country squeezing what they can get. Col. Moneypenny has sent to Chittledroog the prisoners belonging to Mysore, taken by Col. Bowser in the Dooab after the battle of the 10th Sept. I spoke to you about them on the 29th. I have written to the commanding officer at Chittledroog, to desire that he will take charge of them on their arrival, and that he will subsist them at the usual rate (*viz.* one single fanam *per diem*), till he hears from you regarding them. You will probably wish that they should be delivered over to the amildar, and that some examination of them should be made, before they are finally discharged. At all events, make known your wishes to the commanding officer at Chittledroog.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Fort St. George, 17th Dec. 1800.

Lieut. Col. Bowser has sent me a receipt from you for 5000 rupees advanced by me on account of the troops under his command. As this money was advanced by the paymaster, Mr. Gordon, and as I am about to quit the Presidency upon a foreign service, of which you will have been apprised, I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to send to Mr. Gordon, at Seringapatam, the order for the money. I have sent him your receipt.

I join in the general regret for the loss of Lieut. Col. Dalrymple. I fear that it will be difficult to replace him: indeed, on public as well as private grounds, his death is looked upon by all as a severe misfortune.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Fort St. George, 18th Dec. 1800.

I have had some conversation with our friends here regarding the settlement of Wynaad, the arrangement to be made with Yeman Nair, and, in general, the employment of the Nairs during the campaign in Wynaad. Our idea of placing Wynaad eventually under the same administration with Malabar has been approved, as has the measure of calling up to Seringapatam Yeman Nair, one of the Commissioners. I have informed Webbe that you intend to take the field with Stevenson, and have communicated to him your notion regarding the council, to consist of the Commissioners, Col. Stevenson, and yourself. It is proposed to leave to the decision of this council all the future arrangements in Wynaad, whether regarding the settlement with Yeman Nair, and other chiefs of the same description, or the employment of the Nairs in general on the service. Webbe writes this day to Col. Stevenson upon the subject, and to the Commissioners in Malabar, and you also will probably hear from him yourself.

The pensioners have been a subject of conversation since I have been here. Several modes of relieving the Rajah have been proposed, which I will state to you. One was, to throw these pensioners upon the Rajah, according to the old arrangement, and to relieve Purneah from the engagement, into which he voluntarily entered lately, to pay the full subsidy of 7 lacs of star pagodas: the 2nd was, to throw the pensioners upon the Rajah, and to enter into a discussion with the Rajah's government regarding the burthens upon him; to compare these with his means; and, if the result should be that the country is overburthened, that the subsidy should be permanently lessened: the 3rd was, to leave matters as they were originally arranged, and for the Company to pay these new pensioners (the Ambassadors), in consideration of the heavy burthens upon the Rajah, and of the situation of the Ambassadors, having been sent to European powers. I objected to the first mode, because I thought it would be disagreeable to Purneah; and because, at all events, the relief would be only temporary. I objected to the second, because any new discussion upon the Rajah's situation would be disagreeable, would be a bad precedent, and would tend to shake the first settlement; and, at all events, would create a notion among the Natives that that settlement was not permanent. I think that the third will be adopted, and that the pensions of the Ambassadors will be paid by the Company. Upon the whole, this appears to me to be the best arrangement. I do not like the proposal for a discussion upon the Rajah's situation: it would open a door for another discussion some years hence; and the consequence would be, that the settlement made last year, which was certainly intended to be permanent, would be overturned by the first government which should look to Mysore as a place from which it might be possible to get a few more pagodas.

The officer commanding at Mysore is to have full batta. Webbe proposes to establish the court at Seringapatam: he talks of Leith as the

Registrar, and rather prefers him to Symons. If you, however, prefer the latter, I think it probable that he will be appointed. I know neither of them very well. Pater is appointed to command at Arcot.

I enclose a letter from Col. Cuppage, regarding the prisoners in the Nundydroog district: I shall be obliged to you if you will make known to him your wishes regarding them. I embark to-morrow for Trincomalee, from whence you shall hear further from me.

To the Sec. of Gov., Fort St. George.

Fort St. George, 19th Dec. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report which I have received of the extent, state, and condition of the forts in Canara. They all appear to be in ruins, and it is desirable that they should be entirely destroyed, excepting Seedasheeghur, Rajahman-droog, Morjee, Cundapoor, and Coomblah. I recommend that these should not be destroyed, only because they stand at the mouths of the principal rivers in the province of Canara, and it may be desirable to retain them; but some of these may be useless, and it may be advisable hereafter to destroy entirely those of that description.

To Major Gen. Braithwaite, Fort St. George.

Fort St. George, 19th Dec. 1800.

Having been appointed by the Most Noble the Governor General in Council to command a body of troops collected for foreign service at Trincomalee,* and having been directed by his Lordship to appoint a certain staff for conducting the duties of those troops, I have to request your permission to take from this Presidency, for that purpose, the officers whose names are written hereafter.

Lieut. Col. Colman, 84th regt.; Lieut. Col. Capper; Capt. Scott, of the artillery; Capt. Fitzpatrick; Capt. Ogg; Capt. West, 33rd regt., my aid de camp.

I likewise request your permission to take Mr. Sechino, conductor, in charge of certain provisions embarked in the *Rockingham* for the troops; and that you will be so kind as to allow a conductor, with a detachment of tent and store lascars, to accompany the ordnance and military stores to be sent from Fort St. George.

To the Governor of Ceylon.

Trincomalee, 27th Dec. 1800.

As it is very desirable that the quantity of provisions which will proceed from hence with the armament now lying in the harbour should be as large as possible, I shall be obliged to you if you will allow the Commissary of provisions at Trincomalee to issue, upon my requisition, 150 casks of salted beef of 360lbs. each, of those lately received from Bengal, and now in his charge, and 4000 bags of rice. I shall also be obliged to you if you will order him to supply the European troops embarked in the transports, as well as those still on shore, with fresh provisions, as long as the means in his power will permit him to do so, upon their regular indents. The consumption of wood on board the transports has already been great; and, as I understand that the master attendant at this place

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. ii., pp. 399 and 413

has a considerable quantity in store, I shall be obliged to you if you will give him orders to issue it to the ships which may be in want of it, upon the requisition of either Vice Adm. Rainier or myself.

A certain number of hammocks will be wanted for the troops; and as it has been found practicable to make them of gunny bags, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders to the Commissary of stores to issue 5000 gunny bags upon my requisition. Tents for the 19th and 80th regts. have been embarked at Fort St. George; but it was impossible to procure tonnage for the proportion of lascars which ought to be attached to them. I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that 90 lascars, with the proportion of Native officers, may be added to the armament from Ceylon. Such proportion of them as you may think proper to order from Trincomalee will embark at this place; and such proportion as you may think proper to order from Colombo will embark at Pointe de Galle, with the detachment of the 19th regt. now in garrison there.

I learn, from the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, that your Excellency will add a sum of money to our military chest; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that the part of it which it is proposed should be furnished from the Pay office at Trincomalee should be embarked here; and that the other part of it, which it is proposed should be furnished from Colombo, should be embarked at Pointe de Galle, in the ships which will receive the detachment of the 19th regt. I request that your Excellency will be so kind as to give orders to the proper officer to make me acquainted with the sum which he will embark at Pointe de Galle in consequence of this arrangement. I have already given your Excellency much trouble in the detail of the wants of the armament, and I have stated all that appears necessary at present: but as more wants may be discovered hereafter, and as your Excellency is about to depart for Pointe de Galle, I shall be obliged to you if you would leave orders with the persons in charge of the public stores, and the heads of departments at this place, to furnish what may be required for the armament which their stores can afford, upon the requisition of Vice Adm. Rainier or myself.

To the Governor of Ceylon.

Trincomalee, 27th Dec. 1800.

It will be attended with great convenience to the troops and their followers about to embark from Ceylon, if their families could be permitted to receive from the paymasters in the island those portions of their pay which they may think proper to leave for them. If you will be so kind as to allow those paymasters to pay such sums, I will give orders that the family certificates shall be prepared in the usual manner; copies of which will be given to the paymasters of the troops embarked, who will stop, from the amount of each man's abstract, the amount of the family certificate of each corps and individual.

P. S. As I understand that the European women attached to the 19th and 80th regts. receive a certain allowance from government, I shall be obliged to your Excellency if you will permit that allowance to be continued to them, during the time that the corps to which they are attached may be employed upon service.

To the Governor General.

Trincomalee, 30th Dec. 1800.

1. In obedience to your Lordship's orders, I have come here to take the command of the troops assembled at this place for service.

2. I shall proceed to state to your Lordship the arrangements which I have made for conducting the duties of the troops under my command, which appear to me to require explanation, in consequence of the authority for that purpose which I received from your Lordship.

3. I have appointed Lieut. Col. Colman Dep. Adj. General, and have directed that he shall receive 500 rupees *per mensem* for assistants, in addition to his personal staff allowance. I could not find that any regulation had been made in Bengal, fixing the amount of the allowance for assistants to a Dep. Adj. Gen., and I therefore fixed this allowance, upon a statement of the number of persons to be employed in that manner by Lieut. Col. Colman.

4. I have appointed Capt. Scott, of the Coast artillery, Commissary of stores, with an establishment as stated in the orders of . . . Jan. The lascars for the camp equipage for the 19th and 80th regts. are included in this establishment, but they are not yet arrived from Fort St. George.

5. I have appointed Mr. Sechino Dep. Commissary of provisions, with an establishment, as stated in the orders of the . . . Jan. This gentleman has long been employed in the provision departments of the Coast army, and his services will be absolutely necessary in the event of landing the troops. The establishment brought from Fort St. George with him, although calculated for but a small number of men, will serve as a groundwork for that department, which it will be necessary to form for the Commissary of provisions, should the troops land and be employed in the field.

6. The Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George was pleased to send with me, at my request, one company of artillery, with 3 companies of gun lascars, and a detachment of pioneers, under Capt. Fitzpatrick. His Lordship likewise proposes to send camp equipage for the 19th and 80th regts., with tent and store lascars, and artificers for the service of this camp equipage, and of the store department; and certain military stores, of which the Commissary of stores will send a return to the military board in Bengal, as soon as they shall be received.

7. He was likewise pleased to send with me Lieut. de Haviland, of the corps of engineers, and an establishment which appeared necessary, of which a statement is made in the orders of the . . . Jan.

8. As these detachments of artillery, gun lascars, and pioneers, and the whole of these departments and establishments, belong to the Coast army, to which they will hereafter return, and as it would be inconvenient to alter the rate of the pay and allowances which they have hitherto received, and which they would receive hereafter, I have thought it proper that they should continue to receive the pay and allowances which they have received heretofore, and that they should be paid in abstracts, made out according to the forms in use under the government of Fort St. George.

9. I have therefore furnished the Paymaster with a statement of the rates of pay and allowances on the Coast to all descriptions of persons

detached from the Coast, and with the forms of the abstracts according to which they are to be drawn, copies of which papers I have the honor to enclose. I have appointed Capt. Fitzpatrick, who was muster master in Mysore, to muster the Coast troops and establishment employed in this service.

10. I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders by which these and other arrangements, which do not require further explanation, have been made, and I request your Lordship's confirmation of them.

11. Besides the appointments made by these orders, I have appointed Capt. Lowe agent of transports, at the recommendation of Capt. Malcolm,* of H. M. S. *Suffolk*, to whom, as well as to myself, this appointment appeared absolutely necessary. I beg leave to recommend that he may be allowed to draw the salary which was given to Capt. Kemp, when agent of transports to the expedition prepared against Manilla. I am unacquainted with its amount.

12. I likewise enclose copies and extracts of letters to Mr. Rider, in which authority is given for incurring certain expenses, of which I request your Lordship's confirmation.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Trincomalee, 30th Dec. 1800.

Since my arrival here I have received a letter from Lord Wellesley, in which he talks of going through Mysore in the next season, in execution of a plan which I proposed to him, in consequence of a letter which I received from him in November, in which he started this notion. He proposes to inhabit the Dowlut Baug at Seringapatam, and the palace at Bangalore; and, although I think it very probable that the plan will never be put in execution, I shall be obliged to you if you will now and then take a look at my house, and urge forward the painting of it; and Lord Wellesley has desired me to request that you will have the palace at Bangalore put in a state to receive him.

The Admiral is not here, and I can tell you nothing of our future plans.

To the Governor General.

Trincomalee, 22nd Jan. 1801.

A month has nearly elapsed since I arrived here, but I have hitherto received no tidings of the Admiral or Mr. Stokes. It is evident, from the papers received from Mr. Stokes, of which I am at present in possession, that he is of opinion that the attempt upon Mauritius should not be made, if it is not possible to reach the island before the month of February. It is probable, therefore, that it will be postponed, and that you will have to determine whether you will make the attack on the return of the season in April. As I think it desirable that you should be acquainted as soon as possible with certain circumstances, which in my opinion have altered the situation of affairs, I lose no time in writing to you.

The circumstances of the island have altered in some degree since Mr. Stokes was there, and procured the information upon which you determined to undertake the expedition. In the first place, it is impossible to suppose that the enemy will not have suspected the real object of the

* The late Vice Adm. Sir Pulteney Malcolm, G.C.B.

armament, and will not have prepared for defence. Indeed, before I arrived at Madras, and *before it was known that I was going there*, I received letters from the western coast, stating that the armament was destined either for Mauritius, Egypt, or Batavia, and would be commanded by Sir J. Craig. The removal of the 88th regt. from Bombay to Pointe de Galle has made it very clear that it was not destined for Egypt; and the alteration of the rendezvous, and the removal of the squadron from the straits of Malacca to Trincomalee, in consequence of the alteration of the plan, have made it equally clear that it was not destined for Batavia. Therefore, those who judge of the intentions of government by their acts must have found out the real object of the expedition. But not only have the French had that mode of ascertaining our intentions, but Mr. Webbe informed me of a circumstance at Madras, which proves that they must receive intelligence of them from what they must have deemed at the time the best authority.

A French lady residing at Madras knew that an expedition was about to sail against Mauritius, and she had been desired to make known the names of her friends upon the island, in order that they and their property might be protected. It cannot be doubted but that this intelligence flew to Tranquebar immediately, and, as no object for the armament was defined, it must have obtained great credit. It is probable, therefore, that the French will be made acquainted with the design, and will prepare themselves accordingly.

I acknowledge that I have never been very sanguine in my expectations of the success of Mr. Stokes's plan to surprise the place, for many reasons; but I expected that the enemy would not have heard of the armament, would be unprepared, and their works in bad condition: this cannot be expected in April. In the second place, the number of men at present upon the island is greater than was stated by Mr. Stokes.

I conclude that the government of Fort St. George will have communicated to you the accounts received at Tranquebar by the *Esther*. Two ships of war, and several merchant ships intended for privateers, had arrived at the island, and these must have added to its strength. But if we had been able to sail as first proposed, it is probable that we should have found that some of them were gone out on a cruise, and the others unprepared for their defence. We cannot expect, in April, that a ship will be out, or a man will be absent; and we must therefore reckon upon an addition to the numbers stated by Mr. Stokes of at least 1500 men. In this calculation I do not reckon upon the troops expected; but only upon the vessels and their men positively stated to have arrived. Upon this statement the question is, whether our numbers will be sufficient to ensure the object in April; and whether it would be proper to make a trial of Mr. Stokes's plan. I want much information, which Mr. Stokes alone can give, to enable me to decide upon his plan, and I therefore defer to write upon it till I see him. What I have above written may be, however, considered as independent of all particular plans, and applies only to the general question.

The state of our provisions, on the first of next month, will be as follows:

4 months' provisions remaining, for	1080 men.
4 months' in the <i>Rockingham</i>	100
6 months' nearly, in the other transports	500
3 months' in the ship at Pointe de Galle which brought the 88th from Bombay	600

This will give provisions for the whole number of Europeans for 3 months and a half, exclusive of some beef which I have taken from hence, and will last them more than 4 months, with the savings which I hope will be made upon the issue.

The difference between this and my former statements upon this subject arises from the want of the ship from Madras, which was to have carried 200 men, and to have been supplied with provisions for them for 6 months; from the consumption of this month, in the ships occupied by the 10th regt., the Bengal and Madras artillery at this place, and by the 88th regt. at Point de Galle; and from the deficiencies in the *Rockingham*, owing to the difficulty of embarking provisions at Madras in the bad season. I told you heretofore, that no refreshments could be procured upon this island for the troops; that, if they had been landed, they must have lived upon their sea provisions; and therefore I thought it better to keep them in their ships, than to expose them in tents to the worst weather I have seen in India. Besides, so long as there was a prospect that the Admiral would arrive in such time as to enable us to undertake the expedition, I did not wish to increase the difficulty and trouble at the moment of our departure, by having so many more men to embark. The Natives have been on shore ever since they arrived, but have been obliged to live upon their sea provisions till within this fortnight; and I propose to land the Europeans as soon as I have seen the Admiral, if it shall be determined that we are not to sail immediately.

To Lord Clive.

Trincomalee, 28th Jan. 1801.

I have the honor to enclose a list of certain provisions, which are required at this place for the use of the armament, which should be sent as soon as possible.

A large proportion of the troops have been embarked nearly 2 months, and have consumed the provisions laid in for that period; and the quantity of provisions now remaining in the transports for the whole number of European troops will not be sufficient for more than 4 months, even at a reduced allowance. The 80th regt., and seven companies of the 19th, have been subsisted upon the garrison stock of Trincomalee, since my arrival at this place, many articles of which are already deficient, and the whole will shortly be consumed; and as no fresh provisions can be procured, it is obvious that, if the troops should remain here much longer, a supply of provisions must be sent, or so large a quantity of those intended for the armament will have been used, as to render it impossible to proceed on any service which may be proposed. I have not received any intelligence of Adm. Rainier or of the squadron, and there is every reason to believe that the armament will be detained at this place for some time.

To the Sec. of Gov. Port St. George.

Trincomalee, 7th Feb. 1801.

I have received your dispatch of the 1st inst. by the *Dragon*, and I

have the honor to enclose the triplicate of a letter to the Governor of Bombay, which will point out the arrangements which I propose, in order to carry into execution the plan of the Sec. of State, as detailed in his letter to the Most Noble the Governor General of the 6th Oct. I request that you will do me the favor to forward the letter to the government of Bombay by express.

There will remain in Ceylon, of the body of troops collected here for service, the 19th regt., 7 companies of which are at Trincomalee, and 3 companies at Pointe de Galle. The other corps, exclusive of the artillery, will amount to about 2000 firelocks.

I have been induced to take from hence a body of European troops so much larger than that proposed by the Sec. of State for the service :

1st, Because I have not got with me the number of sepoys which he proposes should be employed ; and I have reason to believe that it will be difficult to collect such a body on the western coast of the Peninsula.

2dly, Because I think it probable that the body of Europeans, which it is intended should be sent from the Cape, will not arrive till the season for sailing up the Red sea will have gone by ; and that it may be thought proper to be provided from India with a body of troops which can carry into execution the wishes of the government.

3dly, Because, if the Governor General should think proper to stop any part of his European force, and to employ upon the proposed service only the proportion stated by Mr. Sec. Dundas, I shall, till a late period in the next month, have it in my power to receive his Lordship's orders ; and at that period the troops will be able either to return to this place, or to proceed to any part of India that his Lordship may think proper to appoint. It is probable, however, that his Lordship may think it desirable that the armament should proceed from India in full force ; and that even the battalion of sepoys should form part of it, for which I have suggested to Mr. Duncan to make preparations.

I hope that this arrangement, and the reasons on which it is founded, will meet with the approbation of the Hon. the Governor in Council ; and if his Lordship will be so kind as to send me his orders to Anjengo, Calicut, Cannanore, Mangalore, Goa, or Bombay, I will take measures to ensure the receipt of them.

The provisions called for in my letter to the Governor of Bombay are in lieu of those which I requested the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council to send here in my address of the 28th Jan. These will not now be wanted, excepting for the supply of the garrison of Trincomalee.

To Capt. Malcolm, H.M.S. *Suffolk*.

Trincomalee, 7th Feb. 1801.

1. I enclose dispatches which I have received this day from the government of Fort St. George.

2. I have to inform you that one of the objects for which this armament was assembled at this place, was to answer the probable demand of His Majesty's ministers for the co-operation of a force from India in an attack upon Egypt, which demand has now been made in the enclosed dispatches.

3. I am therefore of opinion that it will be proper that measures

should be adopted immediately for proceeding towards the rendezvous pointed out by the Sec. of State; and if you should be of the same opinion, I request that you will furnish such convoy for the fleet of transports as you may think proper.

4. I have already made known to you the state of the provisions in the fleet for the use of the troops, and it will probably appear necessary to you, as it does to me, that the deficiency should be supplied before the fleet proceeds to the Red sea. With this view, and in order to have an opportunity of receiving the further orders of the Most Noble the Governor General, and his Excellency the Admiral, upon the contents of the enclosed dispatches, I should propose to proceed in the first instance to Bombay, if the passage to the Red sea would not thereby be materially delayed.

5. If you should approve of this disposition, I will write this day to the Governor of Bombay, to request that provisions, &c., should be prepared for the fleet.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Trincomalee, 7th Feb. 1801.

The Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George has transmitted to me copies of the dispatches which he received from Mr. Dundas and the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 6th and 10th Oct. last, copies of which papers, it appears, have likewise been sent to you.

You will have been made acquainted, by the Most Noble the Governor General, with the objects proposed for the body of troops collected at this place, and at Pointe de Galle, under my command; and you will have perceived that one of his Lordship's reasons for collecting this force was, to be prepared to answer the call of His Majesty's ministers, in the quarter for which troops have now been called for by the letter of the Sec. of State of the 6th Oct. Under these circumstances, and in consequence of a letter which I have received from the Chief Sec. of the government of Fort St. George, I propose to proceed towards the rendezvous pointed out by the Sec. of State, with the troops as per margin,* as soon as I shall have been joined by the ship *Wellesley*, which was to leave Madras, loaded with stores, on the 3rd inst.

You will perceive that I shall have with me a larger proportion of Europeans, and a smaller proportion of Natives, than the Sec. of State proposes should be employed on the service; and as the Most Noble the Governor General may think proper to withdraw from this force some of the Europeans, I take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of making preparations to add to it a battalion of Native infantry.

I shall sail from hence under the convoy of H. M. S. *Suffolk*; and Capt. Malcolm is of opinion, that to go to Bombay will not materially retard the fleet. I am induced, therefore, to go there, not only to have the honor of paying my respects to you, and to receive the orders which I may expect from the Most Noble the Governor General, but to receive certain refreshments and provisions, of which the troops are in want, and of which I am about to give you a statement. As the troops have been

* Bengal, Madras, and Bombay artillery, 10th regt., 80th regt., 88th regt., detachment of the 86th regt., Bengal volunteer sepoys, 1st batt.

for nearly 2 months at Trincomalee, at which place there are no refreshments, it is desirable that they should have the full advantage of those which I understand that Bombay can afford; and that preparations should be made to supply them as soon as they shall arrive in that harbour. I hope that I shall be able to depart from hence on the 12th inst., and you will be able to form a judgment of the period at which it is likely that we shall arrive at Bombay.

I have the honor to enclose a return of certain articles of provision, which it is desirable should be in readiness at Bombay, to be embarked on the fleet as soon as it shall arrive. It will be very desirable that an addition should be made, at Bombay, to our military chest, if this measure should suit the convenience of your government. I shall be obliged to you if you will favor me with such intelligence as you may think it proper that I should have, while on my passage along the Malabar coast.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Trincomalee, 8th Feb. 1801.

I only yesterday received your letter of the 25th Dec., which Webber had kept, I imagine, till he was certain that I had not left this place. By the same opportunity I received a letter from Col. Stevenson, of the 16th Jan., by which I learn, with great satisfaction, that matters are going on in Wynaad in the most prosperous manner, and that there was every reason to hope, at that time, that they would be brought to the issue for which we all wish, before the conclusion of the fair season. How much I lament that I have not had the conduct of the operations which have led to this situation of affairs! But it is useless to regret what cannot now be remedied.

The expected call has at last been made for the co-operation of a force from India in an attack upon the French in Egypt from the Mediterranean, by Sir R. Abercromby's army. The force called for is much smaller in European troops than that which is now collected here; and it is proposed by Mr. Dundas that it should be joined by a regiment from the Cape of Good Hope. I judge, however, that the ships in which these last were to sail from the Cape would not leave England till the beginning of November; and if the commanding officer of the squadron pursues what is called the shortest route, along the coast of Africa, he will reach the mouth of the Red sea at midsummer. In any event, by the other route he must come to India, he will not reach the Straits of Babel-mandel till the season most favorable for a voyage up the Red sea has gone by. Under these circumstances, I shall have to depend only upon what I bring with me from India. I shall leave this place in a few days, and proceed to Bombay to take in some provisions, as the troops have been obliged to live upon their sea stock at this place for the last 2 months. I shall call upon the coast of Malabar, at Calicut, and Cannanore, where I shall hear of you, though, I am afraid, not from you. If, however, you should write to me, and desire Col. Sartorius to forward your letter to Bombay, in case the fleet should have passed Cannanore, I shall receive it.

I am not without hopes that I shall be relieved from this command, and that I shall soon return to my old situation. Lord Wellesley, in a late

letter, proposes this measure, and I assure you that I shall receive my successor with great satisfaction. I am sorry to see that Gen. — did mischief to the country: I suspected something of the kind, when I read Gen. Braithwaite's order.

I observe that Mofuhkar ul Dowlah is ambassador to Poonah; and, by a late letter from Tom Sydenham, there appears some chance of settling our matters with that court. However, I am afraid of the ambassador's temper with the Brahmins; but if he should adopt the interest of the Peshwah as that of his employers, as is the case sometimes, there is no doubt but that he will bring all matters to bear.

To the Governor General.

Trincomalee, 9th Feb. 1801.

1. The Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George has transmitted to me copies of the dispatches of the Sec. of State to your Lordship and himself of the 6th Oct., and of the letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the 10th of the same month to his Lordship, in a letter from the Chief Sec. of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, of which I enclose a copy.

2. These letters have induced me to come to a determination to proceed to Bombay, with the troops under my command, under convoy of H.M.S. *Suffolk*; and I have the honor to enclose copies of my letters to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, written in consequence of my forming this determination, that will best explain the motives which urged me to it, and the arrangements which I have proposed to the latter government for the speedy supply of the deficiency of provisions required for the troops.

3. Since I have formed this determination, and have written these letters, further information has reached me, although through private channels, which has tended to confirm me in the opinion which I had formed of its propriety.

4. I have learned that Vice Adm. Rainier dispatched the *Cornwallis* to your Lordship from Prince of Wales's Island on the 24th Dec., and Mr. C. Stokes in that ship, in charge of his Excellency's dispatches. It is therefore clear, that his Excellency did not think it practicable to undertake, in this season, the expedition, with a view to which your Lordship might still wish that the troops should remain at Trincomalee; at the same time that, if it should be practicable, and your Lordship should wish to undertake it in the approaching season, it would not be difficult to bring back the troops, so that they should be at Trincomalee long before the period for sailing arrived.

5. I have besides learned that, on the 31st Dec, his Excellency the Vice Admiral had received intelligence that part of his squadron, which had been to the eastward, was very unhealthy, and that he had determined to remain at Prince of Wales's Island till the end of January.

6. From the whole of this intelligence, and from the tenor of your Lordship's dispatches and instructions, I conceive and hope that I shall conform to your wishes in proceeding to Bombay immediately, and eventually to the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Sec. Dundas, in his letter to your Lordship.

7. I beg leave to recommend, that, if possible, the full number of troops, supposed to be required for the proposed service, should proceed from India; as, by my letter to Fort St. George, your Lordship will perceive that I fear that the squadron under Sir H. Popham will not be able to effect its passage in time. There is every reason to believe that it will not have sailed from England before the 1st Nov., in which case it cannot arrive in the Red sea before the end of March, and probably later.

8. If your Lordship should determine that the whole of the armament required should proceed from India, it will be necessary that you should order the Governor of Bombay to furnish one battalion of Native infantry.

9. My different letters to your Lordship will have pointed out to you the want of tonnage for the troops; and, notwithstanding that I expect the *Wellesley* from Madras, I have thought it proper to take up the ship *Maria Louisa* at this port. I will hereafter transmit a statement of the terms on which this ship is taken up.

To Vice Adm. Raimier.

H. M. S. *Suffolk*, Trincomalee, 14th Feb. 1801.

I arrived here on the 24th Dec. last, in consequence of orders which I received from the Governor General, and in hopes that I should have an opportunity of aiding you on a service which was proposed for the troops assembled at this place and at Pointe de Galle. It is probably fortunate that it has not been possible to carry that service into execution, and that the troops are still here in preparation to obey the orders of the Sec. of State.

Capt. Malcolm informs me that he will leave here, for your perusal, certain dispatches from the Sec. of State to the Governor General, and Governor of Fort St. George, dated the 6th Oct.; and a letter from the Secret Committee to the latter government, dated the 10th Oct., which I received from Lord Clive on the 7th inst. From the tenor of the dispatches of the Governor General to yourself and to me, I had not a doubt, upon the receipt of those dispatches, but that it was my duty to proceed with the troops towards the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Sec. Dundas; and accordingly I wrote a letter to Capt. Malcolm on the 7th inst., of which, and of his answer, I understand from him that he sends you copies.

Capt. Malcolm is of opinion, that to go to Bombay will not materially retard the fleet; and we proceed there, not only that we may be able to receive the provisions, of which there is a deficiency, in consequence of the troops having been so long at this place and having lived upon salt provisions, but that we may have an opportunity of receiving the further orders of the Governor General and of yourself. If the Governor General, or you, should still be desirous to undertake the expedition which was first proposed, and if it should be determined that the troops which I now take from hence are to form part of the armament for that purpose, I understand that it will not be difficult to bring them back to Trincomalee from Bombay, before the season shall come round at which it would be proper to undertake that service.

On the other hand, if the Governor General should depend upon this body of troops, to carry into execution the wishes of His Majesty's ministers, as stated in the letter of Mr. Sec. Dundas of the 6th Oct., it is absolutely necessary that we should proceed towards the rendezvous pointed out by him without loss of time. These are the considerations which induced me to propose to Capt. Malcolm to proceed towards Bombay immediately; and since I proposed that measure to him, other circumstances have come to my knowledge, which have convinced me of its propriety.

I have heard from Mr. North, that the Governor of Bombay did not propose to make any preparations to send a force to the Red sea, in consequence of the letter of Mr. Sec. Dundas of the 6th Oct., a copy of which was sent to him from England, until he heard that the armament which was assembled at this place had been otherwise disposed of; and, besides, I learn that he had only two battalions of sepoy of 600 men each, of which he could dispose. It appears then, not only that he has no troops to answer the call of His Majesty's ministers, but if he had them, or if they could be sent to him, it is probable that the preparations to be made previous to sending them to the proposed rendezvous would take up so much time, that the season for sailing up the Red sea would be gone by before they could reach its mouth. Therefore some of the troops assembled at Ceylon must proceed on that service; and if it should be determined that a part of them should be employed on any other service, and should return here, there will be no difficulty in obeying any orders which may be given to that purport, as I have before observed. Capt. Malcolm has put up for you a large packet of dispatches from the Governor General, some of which I opened according to his directions. They are in triplicate, and relate principally to the expedition which it was proposed to carry into execution in December.

The Governor General sent here 5 Asst. Surgeons, who, I believe, were intended for the ships, and I have disposed of them as follows. One of them, Mr. Small, is in the *Suffolk*; Mr. Rice in the gun boat *Fury*, and in charge of the sick in her and the *Wasp*; Mr. Carnegie in the *Waller*, which vessel remains at this place; and Mr. Pollock in the *Anna Maria* transport.

Mr. Cheese is a gentleman much esteemed in Bengal, on account of his professional abilities, and he is desirous of returning thither. I have allowed him to return to Calcutta, as I understand, from Capt. Malcolm, that it is not likely that you will be desirous of detaining him contrary to his inclination, particularly as it is not probable that any of the ships of your squadron will be sent on any service which will detain them long at sea.

To the Sec. of Gov. Fort St. George. H.M.S. *Suffolk*, off Tincomalee, 15th Feb. 1801.

I have the honor to inform you, that the fleet of transports went out of the harbour yesterday, and the whole are now at sea with a fair wind. The Hon. Company's ship *Waller* remains at this port to receive the orders of the Admiral, or of government; the gun boats *Fury* and *Wasp* accompany the fleet.

To the Governor of Ceylon.

Pointe de Galle, 18th Feb. 1801.

I have received your letters of the 17th inst.; and as I am so unfortunate as to differ in opinion with you, regarding the propriety of going to Bombay, and as you have recorded your opinion, and the communication of it to me, it is necessary that I should trouble you at some length, as well to justify myself in your eyes, as that those who will have to judge hereafter of the propriety of my decision upon this occasion may know the real grounds upon which I formed it.

1st: I learn from Capt. Malcolm that the passage from hence to the Red sea will not be materially retarded by going to Bombay; that the fleet must proceed along the coast as far as the Vingarla rocks, to the northward of Goa, before it crosses; and in some cases, that it may be necessary to go still farther north.

2ndly: Supposing the delay by going to Bombay were likely to be greater than it appears at present, it is impossible to think of going to the Red sea until the ships and troops are provided with many articles which are at present deficient. This deficiency has been occasioned by the necessity of using at Trincomalee what was intended to be used upon the voyage. On the 1st of this month, there were on board the fleet about 4 months' provisions for the whole armament; at this moment this quantity will last $3\frac{1}{2}$ months; and supposing my passage to Mocha should be much better than even you suppose it would, I should reach that station with a sufficiency of provision to last the troops $2\frac{1}{2}$ months; and my first thoughts must be directed to taking measures for procuring a further supply.

You propose that I should send my indent to you for the articles which are deficient; and from the kindness and attention which I have already experienced, I should certainly have every inclination to do so. But I must observe, that you have neither the means of supplying all my wants, nor those of transporting to me the articles which you could supply. You then propose that they should be supplied from the Malabar province, which I beg to inform you is equally destitute of what I want as the territories under your government. But you propose that I should proceed without the articles which I have requested the Governor of Bombay to prepare, and you have no doubt but that he or the Governor of Fort St. George will send them after me. Articles of provision are not to be trifled with, or left to chance; and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished. If there is a chance that by going to Bombay with the fleet we shall be late, is it not more probable that the provisions for which shipping must be prepared at Bombay will be late, and is there not a chance that the provisions will miss the fleet entirely, and that the troops will be in want? If the provisions are to be supplied from Madras or Calcutta, the probability of want is greater in proportion to the greater length of the voyage.

Upon the whole, then, as far as regards supplies wanted for the fleet, I conceive that I act with propriety, and that I do that which will tend most to insure the object of the armament, by proceeding to Bombay to receive provisions on board the ships in which the troops are embarked. I have taken every measure which I can think of to make it certain that

these articles, and certain refreshments, of which the troops who have been at Trincomalee are greatly in want, may be prepared by the time I reach Bombay; and if they are so, I shall certainly be in time for every thing. If they are not, and if I am detained at Bombay, I have seen letters from Adm. Blanquet, which lead me to be of opinion that I shall not be too late for one of the objects proposed, even in the end of April; and as for the other, it is possible to reach it at all seasons.

3rdly: I am very anxious to receive the orders of the Governor General regarding the armament, and I can receive them only by going to Bombay. The orders of Mr. Sec. Dundas confine the demand upon India to one regiment of Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoys; and it may probably be the intention of his Lordship to employ upon another service the Europeans I have under my command, which are above the number demanded. It is surely my duty to afford his Lordship an opportunity of giving me his orders, particularly as I am strongly urged to take the steps which will put me in the way of receiving them, by the motives which I have above stated, and which affect so nearly the final success of the service proposed; when I learn from the best authority that the fleet will not be materially delayed by taking those steps; and when I have reason to believe, from another excellent authority, that, even after the greatest delay which can possibly be expected, I shall still be in good time.

To the Governor of Ceylon.

Pointe de Galle, 18th Feb. 1801.

I have received your letter upon the subject of my proceeding to Bombay, to which an answer will accompany this letter. I am concerned that you or Gen. Macdowall* should have thought it necessary to write a public letter upon this subject, as I hope that I have always shown myself ready to attend to your wishes, in whatever manner they may have been made known to me. The existence of your public letter upon the records of your government increases considerably my responsibility upon this occasion. However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay are so strong, and the urgency of the measure is so great, and will appear so much so to all those who

* Commanding the forces at Ceylon: he was lost at sea, 8 or 9 years later, in returning to Europe.

Marquis Wellesley to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Fort William, 10th Feb. 1801.

1. Since the date of my last dispatches to you, on the subject of the intended expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France, I have received dispatches overland from England, which have determined me to relinquish for the present the prosecution of those expeditions.

2. For the contents of those dispatches, and for the measures which I now propose to pursue, I must refer you to my instructions, of this date, to Major Gen. Baird, which he is directed to communicate to you.

3. I have appointed Major Gen. Baird to command the armament, which is now destined to the Red sea, and I have appointed you second in command on that important service.

4. For my instructions for your guidance, I must refer you to my above mentioned dispatches of this date, to Major Gen. Baird.

I have forwarded a copy of this letter to Major Gen. Baird, for his information and guidance.

will have to judge of my conduct, that I persist, and I still hope that it will meet with your approbation, and that of Gen. Macdowall.

To Major Gen. Baird.

H.M.S. *Suffolk*, 21st Feb. 1801.

I have just received a letter from Lord Wellesley, dated the 24th Jan., by which I am informed that you are appointed to take the command of the body of troops which have hitherto been under my orders;* that you were likely to leave Calcutta for Trincomalee towards the end of the month; and that the object was an expedition against the Dutch settlement in Java. You will probably be much surprised to find that I have left the island of Ceylon with the troops, and have gone towards Bombay; and I write you this letter to explain the motives which urged me to take this step without waiting for orders from the Governor General.

On the 7th Feb. I received from the Governor of Fort St. George a copy of a letter from Mr. Dundas to Lord Wellesley, dated the 6th Oct., calling for the co-operation of a body of troops from India in an attack upon Egypt. As the troops were collected in Ceylon, partly with a view to be prepared to answer this call, I conceived it to be my duty to proceed immediately towards the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Dundas; and I go to Bombay because I understand that it will not materially retard the arrival of the fleet in the Red sea; because I know that the troops are in want of provisions, which can be furnished at Bombay only; and because I am desirous of receiving the orders of the Governor General before I proceed finally to the Red sea. In my opinion, the letter from Mr. Dundas, which I have above mentioned, will make a considerable alteration in the plan which the Governor General had on the 24th Jan.; and that he will, in consequence, be obliged either to relinquish the attack upon Batavia entirely, or to provide another body of troops for that pur-

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 451.

Marquis Wellesley to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 3rd March, 1801.

I received this day your private letter of the 7th Feb., and the dispatches noticed in Mr. Barlow's letter of this date. Being in hourly expectation of receiving a direct communication from you, of the grounds and motives which induced you to act upon Mr. Dundas's letter of the 6th Oct., before you had received any intimation of my intentions with respect to the mode of prosecuting the expedition to the Red sea, I have not expressed any official opinion on the subject. I entertain a confident hope that you will furnish me, at the earliest possible period of time, with such official documents as shall enable me to deliver my sentiments in a regular form, and in a manner agreeable to my wishes, and satisfactory to you.

After the fullest deliberation, my determination is to make the most powerful diversion which may be practicable on the coasts of the Red sea; and for that purpose to employ, in the first instance, the whole force assembled at Ceylon and Bombay. If the campaign in Egypt should be protracted, it will become a question to what extent the army acting upon the coast of the Red sea may be augmented within the next season.

My first opinion inclined to the literal execution of the King's commands, and to the prosecution of an expedition either against the Mauritius or against Batavia, with such forces as I might have been able to collect for either purpose, after having satisfied Mr. Dundas's requisition: under this impression, I directed Col. Kirkpatrick to write the private letter addressed to Mr. Duncan on the 7th Feb.; but a fuller consideration of the subject induced me to change my opinion. The result of attempting operations in Egypt and in India, at the same time,

would

pose. I therefore proceed on my voyage, notwithstanding that I have received his orders of the 24th Jan.

It is true, that the number of European troops called for in Egypt is not equal to that which I have with me at present, although the number of Natives is greater; and I might immediately send back to Trincomalee some of the European troops, in order to give Lord Wellesley an opportunity of sending both expeditions, if he should think it proper. Upon this last notion I must observe, that I do not think it probable that he will wish to send both expeditions: if he should wish it, I shall know it upon my arrival at Bombay, from the tenor of his orders to Mr. Duncan; and I can immediately send back to Ceylon the troops which it may be intended to employ upon the expedition to Batavia. These will arrive at Ceylon long before the period for sailing will come round.

As I before observed to you, I do not think it probable that Lord Wellesley would wish to send both expeditions: he will send that to Egypt only; and as I know that it was his intention to give you the command of this body of troops, in case they should go to Egypt, I recommend you to come to Bombay and take the command of them without loss of time. If Lord Wellesley should determine to send both the expeditions, and if he should wish that you should command that to Batavia, you will be with the troops which must go on that service. On the other hand, if he should determine to send troops to Egypt only, you will be late, unless you proceed to Bombay immediately.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

1. The letters which I have received, since my arrival at this place, give me reason to apprehend, that neither my departure from Ceylon, nor my coming here, have been approved by your Excellency.

would probably have proved an unfavorable one to both services; and it is evident that the diversion on the coasts of the Red sea cannot prove advantageous, unless it be powerful, and unless it be prosecuted at the earliest possible moment.

Gen. Baird will bring you several letters from me, which will serve to explain my motives for wishing you to retain the second command of this expedition. I am persuaded that a full consideration of the question will induce you to agree with me in opinion, that the extent of the force to be employed rendered it necessary to appoint a general officer to the chief command; while the sudden call to active service precluded the possibility of removing you from the second command without injuring your character, or of leaving you officially the power of option, without reproach upon the impartiality and justice of my administration.

You will, however, exercise your judgment upon the propriety of desiring leave to return to Mysore; and if you should retain your anxiety on that subject, I shall not attempt to obstruct your wishes, nor shall I feel any sentiment of unkindness upon the transaction; but my decided opinion is, that you will best satisfy the call of your public duty, and maintain the reputation of your public spirit, by serving cheerfully and zealously in your present situation. Henry arrived safe and well on the 22nd Feb. I enclose an abstract from the Duke of York's letter * respecting your future situation in India.

* Extract from the Duke of York's Letter.

'Having the pleasure of knowing personally Col. Wellesley, I am thoroughly acquainted with his merits, and your Lordship may be assured of the satisfaction I shall feel in laying his name before His Majesty, to be placed upon the Staff in the East Indies, as soon as his standing in the army shall admit of his being promoted to the rank of Major General.'

2. Although my address of the 9th Feb., with its enclosures, stated the outlines of the reasons which induced me to take those steps, without waiting for your Excellency's orders, I am induced to enter again into further detail of them, in order, if possible, to remove an impression which has given me great uneasiness; or, at least, to prove that I acted upon the most mature deliberation, and did what I thought best for the service, and most likely to be agreeable to you.

3. I always considered that your Excellency's intentions were, that I should attend to the intelligence which I should receive from Bombay, of a call from Europe for the co-operation of a force from this country in an attack upon the French in the Red sea, which you foresaw would be made; and even that the expedition upon which you ordered that I should proceed at the end of December was to be relinquished, in case intelligence came of a call for co-operation in the Red sea.

4. Upon this point I must observe, that the government of Fort St. George conceived that I ought to proceed towards the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Sec. Dundas, when they sent me the copies of the dispatches, as appears by their Secretary's letter of the 1st Feb., a copy of which has been already laid before your Excellency; that the government of Bombay expected that I should proceed towards it, and therefore did not send the troops which they had in preparation; and that the Governor of Ceylon conceived that I ought to proceed towards it, and urged me repeatedly, in the strongest manner, to lose no time previous to my departure.

5. I received the dispatches of the Sec. of State on the 7th Feb., and I knew that your Excellency could not receive them till about the same day. If I had waited at Trincomalee, and you had written me your orders immediately, I should not have received them by post till the 3rd or 4th March, and at that time the stock of provisions for the troops would have been reduced to one, for three months.

6. I consulted with Capt. Malcolm regarding the passage to the Red sea, the season, and the line which it would be most proper to follow. He was of opinion that no time ought to be lost; that it would be necessary to proceed up the coast as far as the Vingorla rocks, before the fleet could go to the westward; and that to go to Bombay would not create a material delay. Upon this opinion I formed my plan, and determined to sail as soon as a vessel loaded with military stores, then expected, should arrive from Madras.

7. The only doubt I had upon my mind, was whether I should take from Ceylon more than one regiment of Europeans and the battalion of sepoys, and trust to the preparations at Bombay for the remainder of the equipment. But although the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay had been ordered to have troops in readiness in case I should want them, I was ignorant of the resources of the latter, and I did not believe that they would be able to furnish the troops which have been sent to the Red sea; and, therefore, I took with me the whole of the force for which I had tonnage, knowing that, if your Excellency should wish that some of the troops should be employed upon another service, and should return to Ceylon, they would be there in good time.

8. I determined to go to Bombay, because, when I sailed from Trincomalee, I had provisions for only $3\frac{1}{2}$ months; and I knew, by your letter of the 1st Dec., 1800, that it was your opinion that the troops ought not to go to the Red sea with a smaller quantity than for six months. I was very anxious to receive your Excellency's orders, which would reach me at Bombay; and as I have above stated, I was informed by Capt. Malcolm, that, as the fleet would be obliged to go as far north as the Vingorla rocks, the passage to Mocha was not likely to be materially delayed, by putting into Bombay to receive the supply of provisions, which I had requested Mr. Duncan to prepare.

9. I have thus laid before your Excellency the grounds upon which I conceived myself obliged to come to a decision, when I received the dispatches of the Sec. of State; and those upon which I determined to sail immediately, with all the troops for which I had tonnage, and to go to Bombay; and I now proceed to state the reasons why I have persisted in that determination, notwithstanding the receipt of subsequent advices from you and Mr. Duncan.

10. When I was off Cape Comorin, I received your Excellency's orders of the 24th Jan., in which you inform me that you have appointed Major Gen. Baird to the command of the troops, and that you intended to send them on an expedition to Batavia. I was certain that you had not received the dispatches of the Sec. of State when you wrote that letter: I knew that you must depend for the expedition to the Red sea upon some of the troops which had been, till then, under my orders; and, as I did not know what might be your wishes after you should have received the dispatches, I determined to proceed according to my original plan; and I dispatched a letter to Major Gen. Baird, to Trincomalee, to apprise him of my notions. If your Excellency had determined to carry on both expeditions, the troops for that for Batavia would have been at Ceylon, before the season for sailing would have come round; and if you determined to carry on only that to the Red sea, they would be at Bombay, collected for that purpose.

11. I received a letter from Mr. Duncan, on the 16th inst., in which he enclosed a copy of a letter from Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, dated the 7th Feb., and informed me that Gen. Baird was to command the expedition to the Red sea. Notwithstanding the contents of the enclosure, I did not know, till then, of the intention to dispatch from Bengal any of the vessels, laden with provisions, mentioned by Mr. Sec. Barlow. At that time I was so near Bombay, that I was induced to adhere to my original plan. The intelligence received from Mr. Duncan did not state what your Excellency's intentions were regarding the proposed expedition to Batavia; although Mr. Duncan informed me that Major Gen. Baird was appointed to command the expedition to the Red sea. It was, therefore, necessary that I should come here to receive your orders. The fleet was in want of water, which could not be procured at any port to the southward of the Vingorla rocks, on account of the want of conveniences for that purpose, without losing more time than was likely to elapse while it was coming to Bombay; and the troops, in general, wanted refreshments. The 10th regt., in particular, had become sickly from having been so long on board

ship, living on salt provisions, and has lost men. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to come on to Bombay.

12. Since my arrival here, I have perused your Lordship's instructions to Major Gen. Baird, and your dispatches to the Governor of Bombay; and I perceive that I have anticipated your wishes in bringing from Ceylon all the troops for which I had tonnage. I imagine that I should have incurred your disapprobation, in a great degree, if I had not taken steps to insure the receipt of your Excellency's orders, before the final departure of the troops for Mocha; and I certainly could not have received them, the ships would have gone ill supplied with water, and the troops in want of refreshments, which no other place can afford, if I had not come on to Bombay.

13. Having thus explained all the motives which urged me to depart from Ceylon, and to come here, I beg to observe, that, notwithstanding the unexpected length of the passage hitherto, it is probable that the fleet will be at Mocha sooner than it would have been, had I waited at Trincomalee for your Excellency's orders, and certainly better refreshed and supplied with water and provisions. But whatever may be your Excellency's determination upon my conduct, I hope that you will give me credit for having maturely considered the points upon which I had to decide; and for having had an earnest and zealous desire to forward the service in view, and to give it the full benefit of your Excellency's foresight in collecting the troops in Ceylon.

14. The whole of the fleet is not yet come in, but, as the ships arrive, I will take care that they shall be dispatched as soon as they receive their water. All the arrangements are made for putting the provisions into the ships, and your Lordship may depend upon it that not a moment shall be lost.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.*

Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

I have received your note of the 3rd March, but none of your other letters which you say you have written to me. I hope that you received those which I wrote to you while you were in England, giving an account of how we were going on in this country. I enclosed them to the Doctor,† and desired him to destroy those which should arrive subsequent to your departure, on your return to this country; so that some of them written lately you will probably never see. I was very anxious about you, as you must have come from the Cape in the track of the French privateers homeward bound; and you were longer on your passage than we had reason to expect you would be.

I have written a long letter to government this day, about my departure from Ceylon, which I hope will explain every thing. Whether it does or not, I shall always consider these expeditions as the most unfortunate circumstances for me, in every point of view, that could have occurred; and, as such, I shall always lament them. I was at the top of the tree in this country; the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, which I

* Lord Cowley, G.C.B.

† The Hon. and Rev. Gerald Wellesley, D.D, a Prebend of Durham Cathedral.

had served, placed unlimited confidence in me, and I had received from both strong and repeated marks of their approbation. Before I quitted the Mysore country, I arranged the plan for taking possession of the Ceded districts, which was done without striking a blow; and another plan for conquering Wynaad and re-conquering Malabar, which I am informed has succeeded without loss on our side. But this supercession has ruined all my prospects, founded upon any service that I may have rendered. Upon this point I must refer you to the letters written to me, and to the Governor of Fort St. George, in May last, when an expedition to Batavia was in contemplation; and to those written to the governments of Fort St. George, Bombay, and Ceylon; and to the Admiral, Col. Champagné, and myself, when the troops were assembled in Ceylon. I then ask you, has there been any change whatever of circumstances that was not expected when I was appointed to the command? If there has not, (and no one can say there has, without doing injustice to the Governor General's foresight,) my supercession must have been occasioned, either by my own misconduct, or by an alteration of the sentiments of the Governor General.

I have not been guilty of robbery or murder, and he has certainly changed his mind; but the world, which is always goodnatured towards those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect that both, or worse, have been the occasion of my being banished, like Gen. Kray, to my estate in Hungary. I did not look, and did not wish, for the appointment which was given to me; and I say that it would probably have been more proper to give it to some body else: but when it was given to me, and a circular written to the governments upon the subject, it would have been fair to allow me to hold it till I did something to deserve to lose it.

I put private considerations out of the question, as they ought and have had no weight in causing either my original appointment or my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in which I have been treated by government upon the occasion. However, I have lost neither my health, spirits, nor temper in consequence thereof. But it is useless to write any more upon a subject of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever.

I enclose a memorandum upon the subject of Trincomalee, which will point out to you the inconveniences of that port as one of rendezvous or equipment. You will find it of use in the next expedition. Remember, also, that it is difficult for ships to get round Ceylon in the south-west monsoon after the middle of March.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Bombay, 25th March, 1801.

Letters arrived last night from Muscat, by which I learn that it is probable that Sir R. Abercromby has commenced his operations. If the expedition from India against Egypt means any thing, it is to encourage the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt to rise against the French, and to create a diversion in favor of Sir R. Abercromby. This must be done immediately, or as soon as possible, or it will be useless.

Gen. Baird is not come. They tell me that he will find it difficult to get round Ceylon, and the Lord knows when he will arrive. I therefore

intend to go off immediately, and to commence the operations in the Red sea with the troops now there, if Gen. Baird should not be on board any of the ships now in the offing. My former letters will have shown you how much this will annoy me; but I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and convenience, when it is necessary. As all my baggage, &c., are on board one of the transports not yet come in, I go as bare as is possible.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 31st March, 1801.

1. I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders which I have had occasion to issue since the 31st Jan. last, which will require your confirmation.

2. I likewise enclose copies of letters to the Paymaster, giving my authority to incur expenses, of which I request your approbation.

3. When quitting Ceylon, I received from the government of that island a sum of money amounting to 55,905 Porto Novo pagodas and 8000 Bombay rupees, which money was brought to this place in H.M.S. *Suffolk*.

4. Mr. Duncan, however, having informed me that those coins were current in the countries on the shores of the Red sea, but at a considerable loss, I have requested the Governor and Council of Bombay to receive them into the treasury; and he proposes to supply the armament, instead of them, with a sum nearly equal in Spanish crowns and German dollars.

5. I have the honor to enclose the copy of the proceedings of a committee on some provisions, which have been condemned and destroyed in

The Hon. H. Wellesley and Marquis Wellesley to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Calcutta, 28th March, 1801.

You will perceive, by the accompanying dispatch, that Mornington has authorized you to return to Mysore, if you think proper. I think this is contrary to his own opinion; but Lord Clive and Webbe have strongly urged it. You will judge for yourself, after weighing all the advantages and disadvantages of your quitting the army under the command of Baird; and it is for the express purpose of enabling you to act as you shall think best, that Mornington has furnished you with the annexed dispatch.

Perhaps you will think it better to remain with him; and Mornington's objects will then be completely fulfilled, of employing the two men of the highest reputation in the army, and of combining the talents which are most likely to conduce to the success of this most important expedition.

HENRY WELLESLEY.

This letter entirely expresses my sentiments. It may not be unpleasant to you to know, privately, that I entirely approve of your movement from Ceylon, under all the circumstances of the case, and that I think it will prove a very useful step. I shall hereafter say a word, too, *privately*, on the nature of the precedent which might be created by this step, unless guarded by the special exigency of the case, or rather (what is much safer) by your knowledge of my intentions and objects.

WELLESLEY.

I fear, my dear Arthur, that you will have quitted Bombay before this letter can reach you. Act as you shall think best, without any apprehension of displeasing Mornington; for I am certain he will approve whatever step you take upon full consideration. No news. Kirkpatrick is gone to Poonah.

H. W.

the ship *Gabriel*. Other committees have been assembled at different times, and have examined and condemned provisions, and their proceedings will come before you in the regular channel; but the quantity examined and condemned by this committee is so large, that I have thought it proper to lay its proceedings before you without further loss of time.

6. Major Gen. Baird arrived yesterday, and I delivered to him the command of the troops.

7. The ships stated in the margin have received their provisions and sailed this morning; the others will be ready to sail when the General may think proper to order them to sea.

8. It has been necessary to put into some of the ships above 100 tons of ballast, besides their water and provisions, which has been the occasion of their being detained so many days longer than I expected.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Bombay, 31st March, 1801.

When I wrote to you on the 25th, I was in hopes that I should be able to sail the next day; but on that night I was seized with a fever, which has lasted ever since, and of which I have not yet recovered. It is of the intermittent kind.

Gen. Baird has arrived. I am quite distressed about my officers who followed me through the Mysore country. However, I have seen enough already to be certain that, if I do not go, matters will be uncomfortable; and if I well can, I will go. I have the satisfaction of finding that there is not a man here who would have come, had he known what was likely to happen to me, if he had the power of refusal. Indeed, in this respect, the feelings of the greater part of the army agree with mine. Mr. Stokes is not yet come.

The Governor Gen. to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 28th March, 1801.

The several arrangements being now completed, which induced me to avail myself of your knowledge and experience in the equipment of the expedition to be employed on the shores of the Red sea, it appears to me that your services may, at present, be more usefully employed in resuming the chief command of the troops stationed in Mysore. You have, therefore, my permission to return to that station; but you are to consider this dispatch as containing merely my permission for your return to Mysore, and not any peremptory order to that effect. You will communicate this dispatch to Major Gen. Baird.

If the troops now employed in the Red sea should proceed to the Isle of France, after you shall have quitted the second command, my intention is, that Col. Champagne should hold it; and, in this case, should the French islands be reduced, I propose to authorize Major Gen. Baird to hold the government of that conquest until his Majesty's pleasure can be received.

Marquis Wellesley to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 28th March, 1801.

Having judged it expedient to appoint a Major General to the chief command of the expedition proceeding to the Red sea, and not thinking it probable that the course of events will enable me to call upon you, for your service in the separate command of any part of the forces now destined to act in Egypt, it appears to me that your talents, skill, and activity might now be employed, with more public benefit, in the chief command of the troops stationed in Mysore, than in the station which you hold under my recent orders.

You have, therefore, my permission to return to Mysore; but you are to consider this dispatch as containing merely my permission for your return to Mysore, and not my peremptory order to that effect.

To J. Webbe, Esq., Sec. of Gov.

Bombay, 7th April, 1801.

Since I wrote to you last I have had a fever, which prevented me from putting in execution the intention I then had of going to the Red sea immediately.

The General arrived on the 30th, and is gone, and the troops are gone likewise. I am not quite well; and this circumstance, together with the probability resulting from the contents of the last dispatches from Europe, that Sir R. Abercromby's attack on Lower Egypt will be relinquished, and, therefore, that our troops will be recalled from the Red sea, and many other good reasons, have made me desirous not to go. To this Lord Wellesley has consented in his last letter. I shall write to Lord Clive upon the subject as soon as I can. If I am well enough, I shall go to Malabar by the first opportunity.

You will have heard that Colman has been dismissed from his situation, to which I had appointed him. The General offered to make him D. Q. M. G., which Colman declined, and he is now here.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Bombay, 8th April, 1801.

My fever has left me, but I am still weak, and I have got another disorder, of which it appears the medical men here do not know the nature, and which, I think it probable, will oblige me to go to a cold climate. This circumstance, and the great probability held out by the late dispatches from Europe, that Sir R. Abercromby's attack upon Lower Egypt will be postponed, or, rather, will never take place, and, therefore, that the operations proposed in the Red sea will, likewise, be relinquished, have induced me to determine not to go. I shall write to the Governor General upon this subject, as soon as I am able.

In the mean time, it is but justice to Gen. Baird to say, that his conduct towards me has, by no means, occasioned this determination, but that it has been perfectly satisfactory. He offered Col. Colman to appoint him D. Q. M. G., which the latter declined. I hope that, if the service goes on, matters will be conducted satisfactorily. I have been a slave to it till this moment, notwithstanding I was sick; and, now, they have only to take care of what they have got, till the operations on shore commence. I have given the General my opinion fully, in writing, upon this part of the subject.

The ships are all gone, excepting one which came in only yesterday, having sprung a leak at sea. Arrangements were immediately made, to move the troops to other ships, and they will go to-morrow. From what I have seen of the state of the ships, the troops, the water casks, &c., I am convinced that, if we had not come here, the expedition would have been obliged to quit the Red sea before they would have been there one month. The 10th regt. have, to a man, got the scurvy, and lost above 20 men on their passage from Ceylon.

To Major Gen. Baird.

Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

The first circumstance I have to detail to you is, the state of my health, which is, indeed, the cause of this letter. I have had no fever since I saw you, but, I am sorry to say, that the breaking out, of which I com-

plained, is worse than it was; and has become so bad as to induce Mr. Scott to order me to begin a course of nitrous baths. This remedy, exclusive of the disease itself, is sufficient to induce me to be desirous to wait, at least, rather longer than the *Susannah* will; if not to give over all thoughts of joining you. I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled; however, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment. I need not enter further upon this subject, than to entreat you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned it; and to inform you, that, as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct. I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras; and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

The *Maria Louisa* is unable to go on at present, and the 80th regt. will sail by Saturday, in the *Morad Bey*, 150; the *Nelson*, 70; the *Dundas*, 70; and about 70 followers distributed in the 3 ships. They will have 6 months' provisions of every thing, even of meat. The *Asia* would have been taken up for this detachment, according to your desire, only that she is dismasted, and wants copper on her bottom; and the owners were desirous she should go into dock, if only for 3 days, before she should take her departure for the Red sea. This operation, however, and the equipment of her with masts, &c., were likely to take more time than will be lost by the slow sailing of the vessels above mentioned; and I, therefore, preferred them, and they will be ready immediately.

I enclose the memorandum upon your operations, and I refer you to my public letter for other matters. Wishing you every success.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS IN THE RED SEA.

[Enclosed by Col. Wellesley to Major Gen. Baird.]

The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor General, in the expedition to the Red sea, are:

1st. To get possession of the forts and ports which the French may have on its shores.

2ndly. To urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence operations against them.

3rdly. To assist the operations of the natives by giving them arms and ammunition ; or by a junction with them, either of a part, or of the whole, of the force.

The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez, that the object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Adm. Blanquet, may have succeeded in effecting the objects in view, when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez. Cosseir will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.

The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here ; and I shall now proceed to the second object of the expedition, viz. to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favor of Sir R. Abercromby, and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

From the intelligence lately received from the Red sea, I am induced to believe that, after the Turkish army was beaten by Gen. Kleber, in March last, and after Col. Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt. He is now stationed there, and, from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt, excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cosseir. It is probable that, when Sir R. Abercromby commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt ; and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his sense of his own interests may point out.

I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes ; and certainly, until the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English ; and showed his power of doing injury to the French by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army, under Gen. Dessaix, in pursuit of him.

It is very probable that he does not deem his tenure in Upper Egypt very secure. He must be aware that, as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him ; and, from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed, the fact, that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army, is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him ; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect that, as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it, to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence.

Without being too sanguine, we may expect, then, that, as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt, he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason,

the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him ; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him ; and he ought to be urged, in the strongest manner, to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him ; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength, as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him ; and, finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red sea, in order to ensure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

The possession of the port of Cosseir, and of the navigation of the Red sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favorable to the English.

The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in Arabia ; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and Arabia, and to Mecca in particular, that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to the consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz. to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cosseir at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert : they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army, or detachment which may cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile, when they reach them ; if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great, that the operation ought not to be attempted.

It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can be neutral in the contest in contemplation : they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and probably no forage ; and it is needless to point out that, if the Desert is to be crossed under these circumstances, care must be taken not only to send, with the body of troops which may cross, a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them, until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country, as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle ; a number much greater than the government of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply ;

but there is another consideration connected with this subject, besides the supply of cattle; and that is, the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

Upon this point, I need only call to the General's recollection the difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions, even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, plentifully supplied with well water, and every other advantage of arrangement in the supply, distribution, care, and food of the cattle; and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But this is not the worst that is to be apprehended: the cattle will, of course, land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state, before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done: but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately; and upon the inutility of the measure, if they do.

It may be imagined, that, supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering, if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength, not of our weakness, will induce them to come forward; and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will show to be impossible.

I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke, and to co-operate with us.

The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he shall have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted; and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile, that he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish a post at Ghennah; and, if possible, another in the Desert, between that place and Cossair, in order to ensure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah he should make the dépôt of his stores, &c., which might be brought across the Desert by degrees; and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

On the consideration of the question regarding the crossing the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that

operation by the enemy; because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who may cross the Desert.

I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they have shown their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent.

To Major Gen. Baird.

Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Capt. Moor, the garrison storekeeper at Bombay, which will explain the arrangements which have been made at this port, to complete the supply of provisions to me for 6 months for the Europeans and Natives embarked. Besides the supply noticed in the enclosed letter to have been sent, there is a further supply on board the other ships dispatched from hence; and one will sail in a few days for the troops on board the *Wellesley*, *London*, *Experiment*, *Anna Maria*, *Hydra* grab, and *Fancy* brig, of the amount of which Capt. Moor will apprise you in due course. I likewise enclose a packet, containing the invoices and bills of lading of treasure, sent for the service of the armament when I had the honor of commanding it. Enclosed is the receipt of Mr. Rider, the Paymaster, for the treasure on board the *Experiment*, which he has carried to account.

I have the honor to enclose a packet of papers and returns relating to the amount, the nature of which their titles will explain. In obedience to your orders, I dispatched Lieut. Col. Capper to Sir R. Abercromby, on the 7th inst., with a letter, of which a copy is enclosed. I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders which I have signed for money received from the Pay office at Bombay since your departure.

When all the troops shall have gone from hence, I propose to take up all the vouchers, and to forward them to Mr. Rider, and to give the Paymaster Gen. at Bombay a receipt according to the form enclosed. I beg leave to refer you to my private letter of this date, for a statement of the reasons which have prevented me from joining you.

To Major Gen. Baird.

Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Capt. Moor, giving an account of the provisions which have been embarked in some of the ships in this harbour. I likewise enclose a letter from Col. Champagné; and a copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor of Bombay, upon the subject of the mode of settling the account of the money received from the Paymaster Gen., since the departure of Mr. Rider and yourself. This mode appears well calculated to ensure the satisfactory settlement of the account, without the risk of the loss of the vouchers. If it should meet with your approbation, I request you will order Mr. Rider to transmit his receipt to the Paymaster Gen. in Bombay, as soon as certified copies of

the vouchers, as prepared in the enclosed copy of my letter to the Governor, may reach him. I have the honor to enclose accounts of the sums of money which have been received from the Paymaster Gen., under authority from me since I wrote to you last.

To Lord Clive.

Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

I have to inform you that I have had a fever since I arrived here, which has prevented me from accompanying the armament to the Red sea, although I have recovered all but my strength. I therefore purpose, with your Lordship's permission, to proceed to join my command. I judge, by the Governor General's private letters to me, that he would have had no objection to this, even if my health had not obliged me to give over all thoughts of going to the Red sea; but, under the present circumstances, he must approve of it.

I acknowledge that, although I expected to return to put myself under your Lordship's orders, more worthy of your favors than I have been hitherto, I shall even now return with the greatest satisfaction. I have not forgot the confidence which was placed in me, nor the favor with which all my endeavors to serve the public were viewed, by your Lordship's government; and if your Lordship should think proper to employ me again in the same situation, an adherence to the same line of conduct which has heretofore gained your approbation will, I hope, gain it again.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

You will be glad to hear that I propose to leave this place for Malabar in a day or two. The Governor General consented to my return to Mysore if I wished it; at the same time that he said he should regret my quitting the army employed on the expedition. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to go on, notwithstanding that I was superseded in the command.

When upon the point of carrying into execution this *laudable* but highly disagreeable intention, I was seized by a fever, which kept me in bed for some days; and although I have now recovered, I am still weak, and am taking a remedy which prevents me from going to sea. It has, therefore, been impossible for me to go on the expedition, and I return to my old situation, with a pleasure more than equal to the regret which I had on quitting it.

I enclose a letter to my friend Quin, to desire that he will send my elephants, bullocks, and some coolies, to meet me at Cannanore; and if he should be out of the way, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that these means of conveying my baggage, &c., may be sent to meet me.

To Col. Champagné.

Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

I take the opportunity of the departure of Col. Ramsay to write you a few lines. I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have caused my removal from the command of the troops; but I conclude that the Governor General found that he could not resist the claims that Gen.

Baird had to be employed. I believe you know that I always thought that Gen. Baird had not been well used, when I was called to the command. But I do not think it was proper that I should be disappointed more than he was, in order that he might have no reason to complain. However, this is a matter of little consequence to any body but myself, therefore I say no more on the subject.

Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation,* but said that he should regret my doing so; and for this reason, and because I saw in the General the most laudable intention to allow me to render him the services I could, I determined to proceed upon the expedition. I was, however, seized with a fever, and a breaking out all over my body; and here I am under a course of nitrous baths for a cure. When I shall be well, God knows! but, in the mean time, I cannot join the armament. I see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my reputation and future views; but it cannot be helped, and to things of that nature I generally contrive to make up my mind.

I heard you were ill, but I hope not seriously. I thought it probable that you would not like to go one step beyond this, and that you would take advantage of your illness to go home. However, as you are well, you are in the right to go on.

To Major Gen. Baird.

Bombay, 13th April, 1801.

The detention of the ships till this morning has given me an opportunity of sending you a further report on the provisions sent from hence. You will observe, from that report, that Major Bell has a tolerably large quantity of provisions, besides what he brought here. Allowance ought also to be made for about 150 Natives, taken out and drafted from the *Rockingham*, which of course leaves a larger share of provisions for those who remain.

I am sorry to tell you that the *Dundas* and the *Nelson* are so small, and have so little capacity to hold provisions and water, that there is not a supply of the latter for more than 4 months on board each of those ships. The *Morad Bey*, however, has provisions and water for 6 months, as indeed have the two others a supply of provisions for the same time.

P. S. I must inform you that none of the ships have their full quantity of rice: the reason is, that rice is scarce at Bombay, and, as I knew there were in the fleet about 10,000 bags of rice, I did not wish to press to have a large quantity taken from hence.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Bombay, 13th April, 1801.

I have the honor to inform you that all the ships having troops on board, which I have expected at this place, have arrived, received their

* G. O. G.

Fort St. George, 25th April, 1801.

Circumstances having occurred which enable the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council to avail himself again of the services of the Hon. Col. Wellesley, his Lordship in Council is pleased to direct that Col. Wellesley shall return to Seringapatam, and resume the command of the forces in Mysore.

[During the following year, Col. Wellesley was fully occupied in organizing the civil and military administration of the important territory of Mysore, of which he gave a detailed account to the Governor General in July, 1804, inserted according to date.]

provisions, water, &c., and have sailed towards the place of their ultimate destination, excepting one, the *Maria Louisa*, from which the troops have been removed, and in which it is proposed to send to the Red sea provisions, and water, and forage for the cattle: she will be ready to sail in the course of a few days.

As I commanded the expedition when it came here, and as all the ships have been revictualled in consequence of requisitions made by me, and I have had the best and most frequent opportunities of observing the manner in which the business was conducted by Capt. Moor, it is but justice to him to represent to you that some of the ships were completely refitted, took in ballast, and received 3 months' water and provisions for their crews and the troops embarked in them, and sailed in 4 days after they arrived; that 5 ships, which have been added to the armament from this port since my arrival, were equipped with 6 months' provisions, &c., and the troops embarked in 5 days after the requisition was made for them; and that, in short, the whole business has been conducted with regularity and rapidity, and satisfaction to myself, and to all the parties concerned. As Capt. Moor was the only person concerned in making the arrangements and conducting the details of the service, I cannot but attribute to him all the merit; and I therefore beg leave to recommend him to your notice, and to your favorable report of his exertions to the Governor General.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 30th May, 1801.

Purneah was a little alarmed when he received your letter. The witnesses arrived here on Friday evening, and were examined yesterday morning; and certain others arrived yesterday evening, and will be examined to-morrow. We shall then, I believe, close the prosecution. I find that it is intended to puzzle the Court Martial by an endeavor to prove that the dubash is in the service of a sutler of Seringapatam: but the said sutler will have some fear to own a dubash whom I have ordered into confinement for misconduct; and I have, besides, given notice to the sutler that, if the dubash is proved to belong to him, or that he has participated at all in his acts, the sutler also shall be brought before the Court Martial, and, whatever may be the event, that he shall not remain at Seringapatam, and, if I can effect his removal, not at all in India.

I have commenced the examination into the complaint from the store

G. O.

Seringapatam, Sunday, 17th May, 1801.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley having returned to Seringapatam, and resumed the command of the troops in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, all reports are to be made to him as usual.

G. O.

Seringapatam, Thursday, 21st May, 1801.

All reports from stations, corps, and detachments in the provinces of Malabar, Canara, and Wynnaad, and all applications, are to be made to Col. Stevenson, according to the orders of Government of the 28th April, and he will communicate them to Col. Wellesley. In instances of an urgent nature, officers commanding corps, stations, or detachments, in the province of Canara, or in Wynnaad, will communicate their reports direct to Col. Wellesley, if they should have reason to believe that time will be lost by sending them to Col. Stevenson. In such cases they will, at the same time, send a copy of their communication to Col. Stevenson; and they will report to him all steps which they may take in consequence of the receipt of any order from Col. Wellesley.

department which you mentioned to me some time ago. The lascars, &c., denied any knowledge of the letter and petition which had been sent to Madras, and, when questioned as to the particular grievances alleged in the different paragraphs, they denied that they existed. They said that they had claims upon the Company for the amount of family certificates which had been unpaid, but that they did not believe that ——'s dubash had received the money from the Pay office. The day before I commenced the inquiry, I ordered —— to dismiss the dubash from his service, and from all interference in the store department; and his house was searched, his doors were sealed, and a sentry was placed over the house to prevent the removal of property. But still, if there was any real ground for complaint, his influence over the people was sufficiently strong to prevent it from coming out. I have appointed Wednesday for continuing the inquiry, into the state of the family certificates, and I did every thing in my power to encourage the people to come forward with their complaints, if they had any, on that day.

I have, besides, published a proclamation in which I have called upon all persons who have purchased stores to come forward and state from whom they have purchased them; and I have promised that no injury shall be done to those who come forward voluntarily and make a discovery; but I have stated that those who do not discover, and who shall be found to have purchased stores, shall be punished. The consequence is, that I understand that several people have come forward, and have disclosed some valuable secrets: among others, one man has stated that he bought from —— between 300 and 400 maunds of saltpetre. You shall hear more upon this subject as we go on.

Lord Clive has consented to my plan for filling the ditch, and I shall begin that work as soon as Heitland arrives, which will be, I believe, on the 3rd June. I spoke to Purneah this morning, and he said that he could furnish any number of cammaties we might want, without injury to the country, as in reality the people were without employment. I have, therefore, asked now for 500; and if I find that Heitland arranges the work well, I shall call for more. I will settle with Butcha Rao the most convenient mode of paying these people, working them, &c. &c.

Purneah has asked me for another gun, which is the fourth I shall have given him. Send me a requisition for a 6 pounder, its carriage, and limber, and ammunition in the limber box. As the carriage is old, it

G. O.

Serlingapatam, 23rd May, 1801.

Commanding officers of corps and detachments encamped upon the island of Serlingapatam will be pleased to give orders to their men not to quit their lines without being properly dressed as soldiers, with their side arms. It is contrary to the orders of the garrison of Serlingapatam for any soldier to approach any guard, or to appear, excepting he is properly dressed; and those appearing otherwise will be stopped by the garrison guards.

G. O.

Serlingapatam, 24th May, 1801.

In consequence of the Commander in Chief having expressed to Col. Stevenson his disapprobation of a letter having been forwarded to head quarters, which was not in conformity with the rules laid down in the G.O. 19th Sept. last, and of his having required that order to be enforced, Col. Wellesley requests that officers having occasion to correspond on public matters will attend particularly to the above mentioned rules, especially in letters to be forwarded to head quarters.

would probably be better for Purneah if he borrowed it only at present, and if he got a gun only. Gordon will, hereafter, give him an excellent new carriage and limber. However, let that be as you please.

I am glad to hear that you are better, but I hope that you will go to Madras. I swear in Capt. Symons on Tuesday.

P. S. I have been obliged to alter the disposition I had made of the cavalry, and to send the 2nd regt. to Arcot, and keep the 5th regt. in this country. The General represented to Lord Clive that, if the 5th regt. came, it would be obliged to return here soon to relieve the 2nd, which corps must go down to the Carnatic, and therefore it was best to send down the latter at once. I have besides received an official order through the Adj. Gen.'s office to send the 2nd.

To the Comm. in Chief, Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 1st June, 1801.

In obedience to the orders of the Military board of the 24th May, I have assembled a committee of officers to inquire into the circumstances set forth in a petition to the board, and an address to you; and in the course of the proceedings of the committee, matter having come out in which the name of Lieut. Col. ———, of the 1st batt. of artillery, is implicated, I have thought it my duty to communicate to you such matter without loss of time, and accordingly I have the honor to enclose a copy of the proceedings of the committee on this day.

You will observe that the information which has been brought forward is to be attributed to my proclamation to the inhabitants of Seringapatam, and to a trust in the promise which it contains, that those who have purchased stores shall receive no injury, provided they declare it, and make known the persons from whom they purchased them. I hope that you will use your influence with the government and the Military board that my engagement may be inviolably adhered to.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 4th June, 1801.

I have been so much taken up by the inquiry into the complaints from the store department, that I have not had time to write since I received your letter.

The result of the inquiry, so far as it has gone, is, that * * * * took saltpetre from the godown, and sold it at his house. I have sent the Commander in Chief a copy of the evidence against the Colonel, and I think that he will be put in arrest forthwith. Our friend, the Commissary, has been guilty of making false musters, as appears in the clearest manner; and I have therefore suspended him from his office, and I have appointed Capt. Browne, of the Bengal artillery, to take charge of it. I am afraid, that, besides, * * * * will be found to have been concerned in many, if not in all, of the evil doings of his dubash.

* * * * does not appear to have been quite clear, and I think that the dubash intends to tell the truth, and to produce his books, from which he has already told us that he will show that he had authority for all he has done from * * * * or from ———: the false musters, clearly proved and brought home to the Commissary, could not be passed over, in my opinion; and I believe that, upon the whole, the only chance — has of sav-

ing his commission eventually is to lose his office immediately. You cannot conceive what a scene of villany has come out, almost the whole of it since I went to the field last year, or when I was away with the army upon the former occasion.

I have given orders to have the sentry placed as you wish at the Laal Baug.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 6th June, 1801.

Our committee sit daily from 9 till 4 and 5, and I have not, therefore, time to write much.

— has been guilty of an act of great indiscretion. The dubash declared publicly before the committee, that he had papers which would prove that all that he had done was by order from the Commissary, or * * * . — went and broke open the desk, and took away those papers. We have forced him, however, to restore some of them, and they prove against him every thing that is bad. * * * is not quite clear, and I think that he will be broke.

I received your letter about the Koorg Rajah last night; and, according to your wish, I went out this morning to the ground on which the ladies were encamped, under pretence of taking leave of them, and mentioned the subject of your letter to the vakeel. He said that he would say to the Rajah what I had desired him. I have recommended that Scott should be made Commissary at Seringapatam, and Browne to act for him till he returns from the service on which he is now employed.

P. S. There is a report to the northward that Dhoondiah is still alive, but there is no such report here. There is some fellow collecting troops about Padshahpoor.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 7th June, 1801.

Capt. Symons has pressed me for an opinion regarding the time to which the reference may be had for the decision of causes in his Court. I wish to know what you think upon this subject. I was formerly of opinion that it would be proper not to go farther back than the 4th May, 1799; but a better acquaintance with the subjects which will come under discussion and for decision before Capt. Symons, and a longer consideration of the question, have altered my opinion upon it. In the first place, almost all the disputes about property had their origin before the place was stormed, when the people had some property to dispute about. They are, in general, cases of deposit of the following nature: a moorman, in general, has borrowed from a shroff, or chitty, a certain sum of money upon a pledge of jewels, of a far greater value than the money which he received; the shroff, or chitty, either was, or was not, plundered (for it is by no means true that they were all plundered) of his property, and pleads that as an excuse for not paying his debt; on the other hand, the chitty, sometimes, has the pledge, and, knowing that the moorman has no money, presses him for payment.

This outline is that of nearly every case that is likely to come before Capt. Symons; and I acknowledge that I conceive that justice will not be done, if they are not decided. Of course, the storm of the 4th May, 1799,

must always be taken into consideration in all questions of property which arose prior to that day ; and where it can be clearly proved, or, at least, proved to the satisfaction of the judge, that the debtor lost all his property in the general wreck, the debt must be a matter of composition, and time must be given him for payment ; but I acknowledge that I think that to consider no question of property which arose prior to the 4th May, or, in other words, to take a sponge and wipe away all debts and credits, would not be justice.

In the 2nd place : there are some instances in Seringapatam of property having been plundered by Natives from Natives, either on the 4th May, or immediately previous to it. In the last year I referred a case of this kind to be decided by Ogg and Barclay and Hubbeeb Oollah, and it ended in a composition, and a bond from the plunderer for the amount of the sum which it was fixed he should pay : such cases cannot be decided, and no evidence of facts, prior to the 4th May, can be had recourse to, if questions which arose prior to that period cannot be considered.

3dly : I believe that it is contrary to the practice of all nations to deprive the conquered of all right to property which arose prior to the conquest ; and yet this would be the effect of the limitation under discussion.

4thly : the object of the limitation is only to save trouble to the judge and his Court ; and as I have above shown that injustice must be the consequence, the value of the object is not equal to the evil which it will occasion.

These are my sentiments upon the subject, after having long considered it, and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what you think about it.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 9th June, 1801.

Capt. Symons has mentioned to me, that duties are levied at the different chokeys close to the island upon goods coming to Seringapatam ; and, upon inquiry from Butcha Rao, I received from him a Marhatta paper, of which the enclosed is a translation. Probably you settled something upon the subject since my departure ; or, if you have not, the zeal of the amildars on the other side of the river may have induced them to levy these duties without orders. At all events, let me know your sentiments upon this subject.

We have nearly done with the Store committee : nothing can be so bad as —, excepting and * * * *. To-morrow will be a most interesting day. The dubash is to come forward with a general confession of all the villanies in the Store department since the capture of the place.

I hope that you continue in good health.

To the Comm. in Chief, Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 10th June, 1801.

I have received your letter of the 6th inst. Lieut. Col. — was appointed a member of the committee for the valuation of the captured stores on the 2nd March by a garrison order, of which the enclosed is a copy. When the Colonel was a member of this committee, he officiated as president, Lieut. Col. — being commanding officer of the garrison, and his other occupations having prevented him from attending. As

president of the committee, which was then occupied in valuing and ascertaining the quantity of saltpetre, Lieut. Col. ——— had in his possession, for some time, the keys of the choultry in which the saltpetre is kept.

I enclose extracts from the proceedings of the committee now sitting, which will show from whence the saltpetre sold in the Colonel's house was taken, by whom, by what means, and by whose order. As the Natives in general are very indistinct as to time, it has not been possible to ascertain whether the saltpetre was taken from the godown or choultry, at the time that Lieut. Col. ——— had in his possession the key of that building. The serjeant mentioned by the lascars, whose name they don't know, I have reason to believe is a man by name Edwards, lately appointed a conductor, and stationed at Chittledroog.

To the Comm. in Chief, Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 11th June, 1801.

I enclose an extract from the proceedings of this day of the committee appointed to inquire into the allegations of a petition and letter supposed to be from the artificers and lascars of the store department, which will throw more light upon the removal of saltpetre from the stores to the house of Lieut. Col. ———.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 11th June, 1801.

The General Court Martial have closed their proceedings, and have found Mr. ——— guilty of only one of the counts, upon which was founded the charge of ungentlemaulike behaviour, viz. that of beating Chinbeswah Chitty; but although they have found him guilty of that charge, they have *honorably* acquitted him of the charge of ungentlemanlike behaviour. They have found him guilty of disobedience of the orders of the Commander in Chief for this crime. They have sentenced the President to give him a private reprimand. Of course, I have sent the proceedings to be revised; but I do not expect much benefit from the revision. When they come to me again, I shall send them to the Commander in Chief, with my remarks upon them; and I shall write you a public letter, in which I shall enclose a copy of my letter to the Commander in Chief, and one of the proceedings and sentence of the Court Martial.

You will thus be enabled to fight the battle against Mr. ——— by a complaint to government of his conduct on the part of the Rajah's government, and the least that can be done will be to remove him from this country with disgrace.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Col. M'Alister upon the subject of the complaints made through Servitun Rao. What shall be done upon this occasion?

Yesterday's proceedings of the Committee went more against the Commissary than those of any other day. You may recollect that I informed you that Roebuck's house had employed people to purchase old arms, locks, &c. &c., at Seringapatam, and the steps that I took to put a stop to the traffic. ——— was acquainted with the circumstance at that time by myself, and was particularly warned to look after his people. Notwithstanding this, he sent off from the arsenal 7 bandies loaded with gun locks, as soon as I had turned my back to take the field with the army; and he

found out the people who were collecting old arms, seized all they had collected for his own use, paid 45 pagodas for what he seized, and never communicated to me, or to any body, one word about the matter. He threw these arms, locks, &c., into the arsenal, where they are at this moment. Besides this, it has been proved that he has made Purneah pay for a large part of the arms and stores which have been issued to him upon your public requisition, and by my authority or that of Col. Stevenson. I wish you would get from Purneah an account of all the sums of money which he has paid to * * *, and for what. I hope that we shall close our proceedings this day; when they are closed, they shall pass through your hands, on their way to the Military board, as I judge that you will be curious to peruse them.

I enclose a letter which I have received from a lady: she wishes to pass for the relation of Seid Ibrahim. I have told her that I referred the letter to you, who are charged by government with the care of this family.

P. S. I have not got the paper from the relation of Seid Ibrahim, but will send it to-morrow.

I have received the revised proceeding of the Court Martial, which I shall send you also. The *honorable* acquittal is omitted; but the reprimand is to be *public* by myself: still I shall send the Court Martial to the Commander in Chief.

To the Comm. in Chief, Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 12th June, 1801.

I enclose the proceedings of a Court Martial, which has been assembled at Seringapatam for the trial of Mr. Assist. Surg. ——. This gentleman was put in arrest by me, in consequence of a complaint from the Rajah's government, through the Resident, of his conduct at almost every stage on the road between Sera and Seringapatam; and the charges against him were framed upon the complaints from the nearest village, Chutter, in order that the inhabitants of the more distant villages might not be obliged to quit their occupations, for the purpose of appearing at a Court Martial to prosecute.

After an attentive perusal of the proceedings of the Court Martial, I cannot agree with them in opinion that the charges against Mr. ——— have not been proved; particularly I cannot agree with them that he is not guilty of the 2nd and 4th articles of the 1st charge. It appears by the evidence which he produced himself, that he never paid more than one gold fanam for all that he received for himself, his servants, his horses, and Mr. Boxley, during nearly 24 hours that he remained at Chutter; and, by the evidence of the people of the village, that he paid nothing.

The evidence on the 4th article of the 1st charge speaks for itself, from which it appears that Mr. ——— did not pay the price of the country for the coolies he employed.

In regard to the 3rd article of the 1st charge, of which the Court Martial have found Mr. ——— to be guilty, but which they are of opinion does not constitute ungentlemanlike behaviour, I must observe that Mr. ——— himself gives as a reason for beating and tying up the inhabitant, that he wanted thereby to oblige him and others to deliver straw for his horses, having already received provision for himself, his

servants, and his horses; for which straw and provision for himself, his servants, and his horses, thus forced from the inhabitants by tying up and beating one of them, it appears by the evidence he did not pay.

I never can agree in opinion with the Court Martial that this scandalous conduct is not unbecoming the character of a British officer and a gentleman; and I never can approve a sentence which describes it in other terms than those of the strongest reprobation.

In regard to the 2nd charge, viz. a disobedience of your orders, of which Mr. ——— has been found guilty, I do not consider a reprimand from me to be a sufficient punishment for that crime, particularly after a trial by a Court Martial; and I must observe that I did not require the authority of the sentence of a Court Martial to enable me to reprimand any officer for misconduct, much less for disobeying your orders.

The prosecution against Mr. ——— was instituted upon the complaint of the Rajah's government, in consequence of the injury received by, and oppression upon, the inhabitants by him, on his journey from Sera to Seringapatam. Having proved before a competent Court the truth of their charges against him, they will surely expect that he will be punished. What will be the opinion of British justice, honor, and protection, if a gentleman who has been guilty, almost under the guns of this fort, of such acts of oppression as Mr. ——— has himself acknowledged, is suffered to go unpunished?

I conceive that the Rt. Hon. the Gov. in Council will probably be induced to mark Mr. ———'s conduct with his disapprobation; and I must observe that the proceedings of the Court Martial, and the sentence which was first passed, and which was revised, give ample reason to believe that the trial was not conducted with the steadiness, and the verdict was not given with the deliberation, which ought always to be the characteristics of these Courts. For these reasons, I have thought it proper to lay the whole matter before you, and to delay to take any notice of the Court Martial or of Mr. ———, till I shall receive your orders.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 12th June, 1801.

I send herewith the proceedings of the Court Martial and my letter to the Commander in Chief, and I beg that you will send them forward, when you shall have perused them. Probably it would be most proper to delay to send you a copy of these papers, till I shall have received the Commander in Chief's answer; but if you should think otherwise, let me know it, and they shall be sent to you immediately. I have received your letter of the 10th, which I have communicated to Capt. Symons, and, in consequence, he begins his proceedings immediately.

To Capt. Malcolm.

Seringapatam, 13th June, 1801.

I have received your letter of the 9th.

The horse has a fine figure, is bright bay, and above 15 hands high. You have not let me know what I am to pay for him. I am well mounted upon Arabs, and I don't intend to ask you for any of your stud.

I wish you joy of the termination of your mission: I am convinced that it will be approved of, and I hope that you will be sent upon another

to a place where your presence is much wanted, and where you will do much good.

Your brother will have made you acquainted with all that passed, and all that I thought respecting my being safe seated in the command of the troops. I had latterly determined to go upon the expedition, but I was prevented by a fever, &c. &c.

We are here in tranquillity, as you observe, and great prosperity. This establishment has answered all our most sanguine expectations, and I hope it will be permanent.

You will be sorry to hear that your friend — is in a scrape, from which he will find it difficult to extricate himself. I send this day to the Military board a report upon his department, in which a scene is detailed, such as never has been surpassed, and, I believe, seldom equalled, in this country.

I did not know that Col. Kirkpatrick was at Madras. Pray present my best compliments to him.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 13th June, 1801.

I have received your letter of the 11th June, upon the subject of the duties levied at the chokeys on the river side by the Rajah's amildars.

I agree in opinion with you, that the price of all articles has fallen considerably: I believe that the price of all the necessaries of life, excepting firewood and timber for building, is lower at Seringapatam than it is in the largest part of the territories under the government of Fort St. George, and there were no complaints of a rise in price of any article in consequence of the levy of the duties in question. The question, however, does not, in my opinion, rest upon those grounds. The government were very anxious that the article should be inserted in the treaty which prevents the levy of duties upon goods coming to Seringapatam; and I think that both parties will eventually derive more benefit from a strict observance of it, than either could derive from a partial departure from it upon the present occasion.

In the conversations which you and I had upon this subject heretofore, it appeared that the object was, that Seringapatam should have all the benefit of the treaty; at the same time, that care was taken that the Rajah should not suffer in his revenues, by an abuse of the exemption in favor of that place by the general class of dealers in Mysore. With this view, it was settled that no duties should be levied upon goods coming to Seringapatam nearer than 30 or 40 miles; and that the duties at the chokeys, at that distance, should continue at the rate at which they were at the time that we had that conversation. I was furnished at that time with a statement of the rates of the duties paid at places at that distance. This arrangement was made to avoid one of two evils which the Rajah's country would experience from the operation of the treaty. One was, that all dealers passing through his country would say that they were coming to Seringapatam, which would have occasioned perpetual disputes and inconveniences. The other was a remedy for the first, viz. to give to dealers, really belonging to Seringapatam, passports, of which it was feared that they would take advantage to oppress the country. There was, besides,

an apprehension of other evils, from placing the issue of these passports in the hands of the commanding officer.

What is the object proposed in altering this arrangement? I do not see any, excepting to add to the Rajah's revenues what he could collect upon the consumption of Seringapatam; and I do not think that it will at all compensate for the evil to both parties of the smallest departure from the treaty. What has happened already shows the necessity of adhering to it strictly. Purneah, with the best intentions, levied duties upon all articles of consumption, excepting on some kinds of grain; and although it is true that no inconvenience has been felt from the levy of those duties, it cannot be argued that none would ever have been felt, from the exercise of the right to increase them, which certainly results from the exercise of that of laying them on at all. In writing my opinion upon this subject, I do it as an individual much interested in the Rajah's prosperity; the decision upon it rests with you. In the same manner, I shall tell you what I think regarding the continuance of the Rajah's duty upon beetel and tobacco, supposing that you should be of opinion that it is proper that any duties should be levied by his amildars upon goods coming to Seringapatam.

The Company, for a certain reason, think it proper to raise a revenue from the island of Seringapatam: this reason is, to pay the expense of a Court of justice there established. This certainly must be supposed to be a benefit to the inhabitants, and, as such, it is reasonable that they should pay for it.

You are of opinion that, if the Company's farm of beetel and tobacco is to last, the Rajah's duties ought to continue, otherwise that the Company's profit from the farm would be so much out of the Rajah's pocket. In the first place, the Rajah, by treaty, ought to levy no duties upon the consumption of Seringapatam; and if it were true that he would lose all that the Company would gain, he must attribute the loss to the treaty, and not to the Company's farm, or their collector. In the next place, supposing that you should determine that the Rajah should continue to levy the duties, there is no reason why the collector should not continue his farm, which (by-the-by) was established during the existence of the Rajah's duties. What is the consequence? By this arrangement, the inhabitants of Seringapatam and the troops would pay two duties upon the consumption of their articles instead of one, viz. one to the Rajah, the other to the Company. As the collector may find it necessary, or may think it proper, to raise revenue from many articles of consumption, besides those already farmed out (and it may be depended upon that the Board of Revenue will stimulate him to levy all he can), it becomes of still more importance to Seringapatam than it has been hitherto, that the treaty should not be departed from; at least, that it should not be departed from in a greater degree than you settled that it should in our former conversations upon this subject.

I omitted to tell you that a man had come here from Baba Saheb, and from Ball Kishen Bhow: I will send you to-morrow the purport of his conversation. It was upon the old subject, their desire that we should join them in an attack upon the Rajah of Kolapoor, &c.

Our Committee has finished its proceedings, and I hope to send them off this day. If they do go, it shall be through your hands, and I shall be obliged to you if you will forward them without delay.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 15th June, 1801.

I have received your letter of the 13th: we have all suffered from a want of water lately, as the repair of the aqueduct is not yet completed, and it will take some days still. When that is finished, and, indeed, sooner, if a sufficiency of water comes into the nullah, I will take care that your garden shall not want. The nullah, when completed, will be put under Symons; and I propose to give out an order, and to publish a proclamation, to forbid that any mound should be built up in it by any body. Thus every body will have his share. I go to the Laal Baug occasionally, to see how they are going on; and I will take care that the place shall not suffer by your absence.

I enclose a memorandum of the conversation with the Marhatta vakeel, which was drawn up by Ogg, and is nearly word for word accurate.

The Military board permitted some time ago that I should give Purneah the 3 or 4 elephants which he lately returned to the karkhana, under an idea that they had only been lent to him. If Purneah wants them, he shall have them, but I shall be glad to give one of them to Bistnapah. He has a kind of claim upon me for an elephant, which Govind Rao's party took during the campaign, and which I bought for the Company for 200 pagodas. I could not give him this elephant, without making a reference to government, and should be glad to give him one of those which the Military board permitted me to give to Purneah, provided he has no objection.

P. S. I have just returned from viewing our great work, and you cannot conceive how finely we get on. I expect that we shall have made great progress before you return.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 16th June, 1801.

Futteh Aly, the son of Karim Saheb, has been missing since yesterday morning: he lived in a house with his mother, with the young Savanore Nabob, and it seems that he has lately shown symptoms of insanity, and a great disinclination to go to Vellore, lest he should be obliged again to live in the house with his father. Butcha Rao has people looking out for him in all quarters, and I have little doubt but that we shall find him.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 18th June, 1801.

I send you a supplement to the proceedings of the Committee, and I beg you to forward it to the Military board as soon as you shall have perused it. At this meeting, matters came out much worse than any that have yet appeared. * * * knew of ——'s robbery, and participated in it. The transaction stood thus: —, as President of the Committee, sent the saltpetre from the godown to the stores, and daily got the receipts of the Commissary for the quantity sent. When the saltpetre was all weighed, and sent to the stores, and given in charge to the Commissary, * * * re-

turned to — his receipts for 320 candies, for which receipts * * * paid him about 950 pagodas, or about 3 pagodas per candy. This saltpetre is still in the stores, and is over and above the quantity on the books, for which receipts remain in the hands of the Committee for the valuation of the prize property; and it was —'s intention to sell it when a fair opportunity should offer. This is besides the positive robbery by * * * of the quantity reported in the proceedings of the Committee, which you have already seen.

Futteh Aly is not yet found. It appears that he was much enamoured of one of the Koorg Rajah's sisters, and it is supposed that he is gone after her.

To the Comm. in Chief, Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 25th June, 1801.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 20th, and a reply to your public letter goes to you by this tappall.

It is not true, as Col. — has told Gen. —, that he received from Capt. — the money which he offered the General lately. He had it in his own possession, and he brings forward the name of Capt. —, not, as he says, to screen him, but, in fact, to screen himself. It appears, by the minutes of the Committee of Inquiry, that —'s plan was to save himself by throwing all upon —, who could not be saved. He said that — had consented to this arrangement; but that I don't believe.

I enclose the account * * * gives of the letter which he wrote to Mr. —.

I hear that Lieut. Col. — passed Vellore some days ago, and that he did not show his face; but that he had his palanquin shut up.

To the Comm. in Chief, Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 25th June, 1801.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst., and I now proceed to give answers to those points upon which you have desired my opinion. The evidence against Lieut. Col. — are some of the merchants and bazaar people of Seringapatam, some gun lascars, a serjeant and a private of the artillery: all of whom can be produced immediately after Lieut. Col. — shall be put in arrest, and a Court Martial shall be ordered to try him. The Court Martial ought to be assembled at Seringapatam; but there are not in Mysore either a sufficient number of officers of rank, or officers of sufficient rank, to compose the Court Martial. In my opinion, the officers who have been members of the Committee of Inquiry ought not to be members of the Court Martial. They know too much of the subject, and must have formed an opinion upon it, which nothing that they will hear hereafter can tend to remove.

My letter to the Chief Sec. of government of the 18th inst. will have made you acquainted with my general opinion regarding the evidence against Capt. —. I hold the same opinion, nearly, regarding the evidence which has appeared against Lieut. Col. —. I do not mean to assert that there is not evidence to convict both, particularly Lieut. Col. —, of gross misconduct, and even dishonesty, without bringing

forward * * * *; but neither can be convicted of the strongest charges against them, and possibly not even of any charge, unless * * * * is produced in evidence. In my opinion, therefore, the first step ought to be to obtain the decision of government whether this man is to be pardoned or not; and then to decide in what manner, before what tribunal, and on what charges, these officers should be tried.

In regard to Mr. ———, since you wrote on the 20th, you will perhaps have perused the proceedings of the Committee on that day; and you will probably be of opinion that Mr. ——— ought not to be put in arrest, or brought to trial. However, if you should think that he ought to be tried, the evidence against him depends upon the pardoning of * * * *, as that does against Lieut. Col. ——— and Capt. ———.

The committee of which I am president had no secretary: one of the members wrote the minutes. In my opinion the most proper mode of proceeding, when government shall have decided whether * * * * shall be pardoned, will be for the Commander in Chief to give me orders to put in arrest the officers above mentioned; and to frame charges against them, founded upon the minutes of the committee of which I am president, and upon such other information as I may have obtained. I mention this, because I have reason to believe that there is evidence of many transactions in the store department, by the officers above mentioned, which has not appeared upon the minutes of the committee, but which are of a nature equally improper with those which have been brought forward, and are now before the Military board.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 2nd July, 1801.

Since I wrote to you last, nothing extraordinary has occurred here.

Major Parkinson was ordered by the General to leave at Bangalore his sick officers and men, and a small detachment to take care of the buildings. I do not know what he has done in consequence of this order; indeed, I have not yet heard that he has marched. If he should not have left a Captain at Bangalore, I shall be obliged to you to let me know whom you wish that I should send there.

I received orders from government last night to send the pioneers to the southward, and to stop our great work at this place. I have written to Wilks, however, and I hope to be permitted to recommence it under Mr. Warren. I refer you to my letter to Capt. Wilks upon this subject.

I am glad to find that you are recovering. I am still very well. Our winds are very sharp and boisterous, but, at the same time, dry. The people of the country complain that there is a want of rain.

P. S. I refer you to a letter which I wrote to government on the 30th, for a statement of the arrangements made for carrying on the work at the ditch; and to one which I sent yesterday to government from Col. Stevenson, for the pews from Malabar.

To the Comm. in Chief, Fort St. George.

Seringapatam, 7th July, 1801.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3rd inst. I now enclose a draft of the order which I propose to publish upon the subject of

the General Court Martial, of which Lieut. Col. ——— is president; and of Mr. Assist. Surg. ———, as soon as I shall have received your approbation of it.

My reason for wishing to have your approbation of this order, previous to its publication, is, that I perceive, by the letter of the Judge Advocate General to you (which I conclude you transmitted to me that it might guide my judgment in framing an order upon this subject), that that gentleman is of opinion that the crime is not uncommon in this country, and therefore it may be thought that the reprimand should be conveyed in more lenient terms than I have proposed to use in the enclosed draft of an order. I rather believe that Mr. Anstruther is mistaken in his notion of the generality of the practice imputed to Mr. ———; and, even supposing it to be correct, I am convinced that you would be highly displeased were I to pass over so flagrant an instance of it, without marked disapprobation. However, as you have been pleased to transmit me a letter containing the opinion above mentioned, I am very desirous to be made acquainted with your sentiments, before I publish to the troops under my command the enclosed order.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 7th July, 1801.

I send you a letter from the General, upon the subject of Mr. ———'s Court Martial, and one from the Judge Advocate. I likewise send you a copy of my letter to the General upon this subject, and of the order which I propose to issue. Be so kind as to keep these papers, as I shall refer to them all in a public letter, which I shall write to you as soon as I shall have closed this transaction. I do not agree in the General's notion, that, because the Court Martial have thought proper to acquit Mr. ———, against the evidence, it is not in the power of government to mark his conduct by their disapprobation. But, whatever may be their opinion upon that subject, it is absolutely necessary that Mr. ——— should be removed from this country.

I likewise enclose a letter from * * *, and one from Servitun Rao. By the latter, it appears very clearly that the complaint was well founded, and so I have observed to * * *. You will be the best judge whether, after what has happened, and considering the temper in which * * * is, and the probability that it will also pervade the Court Martial, it will not be best to reprimand the naig and the conicoply, and order them to be dismissed from the guard. Let me know your wishes upon this point. If they are to be tried, Servitun Rao must be ordered again to send the people who can give evidence upon this subject.

The river has risen to a greater height than it has been known to rise for some time. It has, in consequence, destroyed the glacis on the southern face of the low outwork in the *fausse braie*, which flanks our breach; and I am afraid that that outwork will likewise go, if the river does not soon fall. It has also destroyed the sluices in the northern glacis. If government do not soon determine to commence, in earnest, a repair of this fort, the expense will be saved, as there will be no fort to repair. Between the river on one side, and the weather on the other, the whole is crumbling to pieces, and nothing can save it but a speedy repair. I am

convinced that one lac of pagodas, which could not be laid out in less than 2 years, would complete it. Literally nothing has been done to the fort, since we came into it, excepting to repair part of the breach over which our troops marched. I say only part of it, as it is, at this moment, just as easy to get in at the western bastion, and, indeed, all along the southern face, as it was to get into the main breach, on the day the fort was stormed. I shall, of course, report these late disasters, as soon as the river shall fall sufficiently low to allow me to ascertain their extent; but I acknowledge I am tired of reporting where no remedy is applied.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 10th July, 1801.

My last letter will have pointed out to you what I had done in consequence of the refusal of the Commander in Chief to interfere in the case of Mr. —, and what I proposed to do hereafter.

I have anticipated your wishes respecting the dubash; and he is, I believe, at this moment, before a Native General Court Martial, which is sitting. I shall send you a copy of the proceedings on his trial, with the other papers. The —'s conduct, upon this occasion, is certainly very extraordinary; but not more so than it has been lately in other instances. I rather believe that he has not behaved very candidly towards me, in making a reference to government, regarding the appointment of certain commissaries in Malabar, in the course of the last year. I reported such of those appointments as were made in my time, in November last; and stated particularly the reasons why I had not given orders that they might be discontinued, which reasons were then deemed satisfactory. When a further reference was made regarding them lately, knowing that poor Turing was gone, and that Webbe might forget what had passed in November last, in the hurry of the present moment, I sent — an extract of my letter to government, of the 14th Nov., in which the appointments had been reported, along with the other papers upon the subject. I am convinced that he never sent that extract to government, or they would not have written the answer they have written upon that subject: however, it is not deserving of further inquiry.

P. S. I was, last night, at Mysore, at the marriage of the Delaway's son.* The Rajah, and every thing, in high style.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 17th July, 1801.

I have received, from the General, an answer to my letter, from which I cannot judge whether he approves or not of the order which I proposed to issue, regarding Mr. —, and the Court Martial; but I shall issue it in the course of 2 or 3 days, if I do not hear further from him. The dubash has been tried, and sentenced a punishment, &c. &c.; but, in consideration of his having ill treated the inhabitants of Chutter, in the presence of Mr. —, and, as he says, in his defence, by his particular order, the Court Martial have recommended that he should be pardoned the punishment. They have sentenced, that he should pay all the expense of

* The Delaways of Mysore, formerly the hereditary Prime ministers of the Rajahs of Mysore.

the damage he did; and I have desired that they should add that he should be banished. I propose to publish the whole at one and the same time; and the proceedings of the Native Court Martial will make a good commentary upon Mr. —'s conduct, and upon the proceedings of the Court Martial which tried him.

I am glad to find that you are recovering. Every thing goes on well here.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 22nd July, 1801.

In consequence of the complaints, which you communicated to me, of the conduct of Assist. Surg. —, on his journey from Sera to Seringapatam, I ordered a Court Martial to assemble for his trial, on charges founded on the complaints preferred by the inhabitants of the nearest village, Chutter.

Enclosed I send you a copy of the proceedings of this Court Martial, and of a correspondence which I have had with the Commander in Chief upon this subject, from which you will perceive that I am by no means satisfied with the sentence which has been pronounced against Mr. —.

As it appeared that a dubash, by name Vinket Soubah, belonging to Mr. Boxley, a sutler, had been, in many cases, the instrument of the oppression complained of by the inhabitants, on the road between Sera and Seringapatam, and as he had been particularly active in the village of Chutter, I thought it proper to order that he should be brought before a Native General Court Martial, for his conduct in that village. I enclose a copy of the proceedings of that Court Martial, on the trial of this person, and one of a letter from the President to me. I likewise enclose the copy of an order which I have issued this day to the troops under my command.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 22nd July, 1801.

Although the sentence of the Court Martial is confirmed, Col. Wellesley is concerned that he cannot approve of it. In his opinion the evidence went to convict — of all the articles of the charges brought against him; and that, the Court Martial having found him guilty of the 3rd article of the 1st charge, viz. having caused to be tied Chinbeswah Chitty, an inhabitant of Chutter, and having flogged him, they ought to have held out that scandalous conduct to the execration of the army, by pronouncing it unbecoming the character of a British officer and a gentleman.

This sentence would have been the more proper, as — avows that the inhabitant was tied, and he beat him with a view to force from the village forage for his horses; and it appears by the evidence that he had already received forage for his horses, and provisions for himself and his servants, for which, any more than for the forage thus forced from the inhabitants, by tying up and beating one of them, it also appears by the evidence that they received no payment.

The Court Martial, however, having pronounced that conduct only a disobedience of the orders of the Commander in Chief, and having delivered a sentence that — for that crime ought to be reprimanded, it becomes Col. Wellesley's duty to reprimand him.

— has been found guilty by a General Court Martial, of which Lieut. Col. Saxon is president, of a disobedience of the orders of the Commander in Chief, in tying up and beating an inhabitant of the village of Chutter, as he himself says, in order to force from the village forage for his horses. He ought to have known that he is a part of that body of troops placed in this country to protect the inhabitants, and not to oppress them: having, however, forgot his duty in that respect, and having been found guilty of conduct very improper in a British officer, a repetition of which would be highly prejudicial to the British interests and character in this country, he is hereby publicly reprimanded.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 24th July, 1801.

I have this day written to Mr. Piele, to request that he would inform Purneah that Baba Saheb's family would soon come to Hooley Honore; and to tell him that I should be obliged to him if he would give his orders to Sorvitun Rao, to be prepared for their reception. By a letter received this day by the vakeel, it appears that the amildar, lately appointed by the government of Poonah, is come into the province of Savanore, where it is no longer safe for Baba Saheb's family to remain. The amildar is backed up by young Goklah, who is now spending his leisure time in the plunder of the Kittoor country.

I conclude that you will have seen my late letters to Webbe, and to Capt. Wilks, giving all the intelligence from this country. I believe that the cavalry are by this time at Cheylor. All remains quiet in Malabar and Wynaad.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 29th July, 1801.

A servant of Butcha Rao's (a moorman) lately applied to the Cutchery upon a question of divorce from his wife; and after he had been divorced, and had been informed that one of the legal consequences of that sentence was, that he was to provide for her support for a certain time, and was to pay her dower, he said he was a servant of the Rajah's, and desired that the case might be referred to Butcha Rao. Butcha Rao joined in this request.

In the course of the different conversations which I had had with Capt. Symons, since the establishment of the Adawlut at Seringapatam, I had taken opportunities of expressing to him my wish that he should be cautious in entertaining complaints of the Rajah's servants, of which I thought it probable that many would be made in which the Courts of Seringapatam can have no concern whatever. Accordingly, Capt. Symons never had entertained any, excepting of the kind above alluded to. However, the claim of Butcha Rao to interfere in this case brought a letter from Capt. Symons to me, in which he desired that I would consider and state my opinion whether, and how far, the Rajah's servants are, and should be, liable to the jurisdiction of the Court.

I have done so nearly to the following purport; and I hope that this opinion, and the practice which I have recommended, will be agreeable to you and to them. In the first place, the regulation makes no exception of any persons, being Natives; all of that description residing upon the island of Seringapatam are liable to the jurisdiction of the Courts which it establishes. It could not have been in the contemplation of the government to make an exception in favor of the Rajah's servants, because, in fact, it is not supposed that they reside on the island; and the tendency of such an exception would have been to confine the jurisdiction of the Court to those who should choose to submit to it, and to those of whom it could be proved that they received the pay of the Company, or were in the service of some of their officers and servants.

I have therefore no scruple in laying down the principle broadly, that every person, being a Native, residing in the island of Seringapatam, is liable to the jurisdiction of the Court.

I now come to consider the restrictions upon acting upon that principle thus laid down, which are required by expediency, policy, and good manners. Purneah resides in the Fort, with all his property and his family; and the principal officers of the Rajah's government reside there likewise. I do not see any necessity for restricting the operation of that principle in the Court of Phousdarry. It is not very probable that the persons, in whose favor we might wish to restrict it, will commit crimes for which they could be tried there; and it is clear that their servants and adherents must be subject to its jurisdiction, as long as they remain on the island.

The question is entirely different when the crimes are considered which it is possible might come before the Cutchery. In the course of the administration of the government of this country, it is not possible but that Purneah, or his officers, must occasionally do injury to, or seize, private property. It would be a curious circumstance if the person, whose property should thus receive injury, should have a right, by taking a house at Seringapatam, to bring Purneah into the Court of Cutchery.

Considering the connexion between the island of Seringapatam and the Rajah's country, it is impossible but that questions must arise daily between the inhabitants and the Rajah's servants, residing on the island, some of whom it would be highly improper, and others it would be very necessary, to bring into the Cutchery; and yet without more experience than we have had of the operation of the Court (of the manner in which the machine works), it is not possible to define cases so as that government may enforce a regulation which will secure the jurisdiction of the Court on one hand, and will prevent the Rajah's principal servants, residing upon the island, from suffering inconvenience on the other. I have therefore proposed to Capt. Symons the following arrangement and rules for his proceedings in the cases above described.

In the 1st place, I have proposed that, whenever a complaint is made in the Court of Cutchery against any of the Rajah's principal servants, or any of his servants, for an act of government, the matter of it should be referred to the Resident, or to the commanding officer, before any further steps should be taken.

2ndly: That, whenever a dispute shall be brought into the Cutchery between 2 persons notoriously in the Rajah's service, that dispute shall be referred to the Rajah's tribunals, provided both parties consent.

3rdly: That disputes regarding property in which no act of the Rajah's government is concerned, and in which one of the parties is not one of his principal servants, shall be tried and decided in the Cutchery.

Notwithstanding my desire to gratify my little friend Butcha Rao, I have recommended to Capt. Symons to enforce his decision regarding the moorman's divorce, as there appears to be nothing in that, excepting a desire on the moorman's part to get rid of his wife, and to allow her to starve, and on Butcha Rao's only a desire to oblige his friend the moorman.

I hope that you are getting better. The river is rising again, and the weather is very harsh here just now.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 1st Aug. 1801.

I think it probable that you will be returning to us soon; and before

you leave Madras, I wish you would hint to our friends there the necessity of sending a force to this country, towards the end of November, in order to enable us to undertake the Bullum business. We ought to be strong, in order to be able to do it in style. The river has come down again with some violence, but is not so high as it was in the beginning of July by nearly 2 feet.

MEMORANDUM UPON SERINGAPATAM.

1. In consequence of the possibility that it may be necessary to alter the arrangements for the government in Mysore, after the peace expected in Europe, it has been proposed to destroy the fortifications of Seringapatam; not only as a measure of precaution to prevent a fortress so difficult of access from falling into the hands of our enemies, but as one advisable, even if it were certain that the arrangements for the government of Mysore would remain as they are.

2. If there is a prospect that Great Britain will be obliged to make a peace so bad, as that Mysore will come again into the hands of our enemies, there is no doubt whatever but that the destruction of Seringapatam would be for many years a considerable drawback upon them. It would be so, however, only till the place could be rebuilt: the position, which is the great strength of Seringapatam, would still remain, on which a new and a stronger fort might in time be raised.

3. Admitting, however, the propriety of the measure, connecting it with a bad peace in Europe, there are several considerations which lead me to be of opinion, that it would be an improper one, if the present arrangements for the government of Mysore are likely to continue.

4. Seringapatam has long been the capital of an extensive and powerful empire, the whole of which is now in the possession, or under the government, or under the immediate influence, of the Company's government of Fort St. George. The conquest of Seringapatam, which was accompanied by the fall of Tippoo, and the possession of his principal arsenal, gave the Company the possession and the power of disposing of this vast empire.

5. Whatever may be the real state of the case regarding the power of Seringapatam, resulting from its strength and its position in Mysore, there is no doubt whatever but that the natives look to it as the seat of power, and that they consider themselves under the government of that power in India which has possession of that fortress.

6. There is a double government in Mysore, the operations of which are now conducted in such a manner, as that there can be no occasion for exerting the influence and power in the hands of the Company from the possession of the fort of Seringapatam. But however well the person, in whose hands the conduct of that government is at present, may establish his system, can it be certain that it will last? Is it known who will succeed to him? Who will be the Native successor of the present Dewan? If the French are to return to India, and particularly if they are to be allowed to have any but commercial establishments, is it known the effect that such a change may have upon the system of government in Mysore?

7. The treaty with the Rajah provides that, under certain circumstances, the country may be resumed by the Governor General in Council. It is to be supposed that, whenever the Governor General shall be desirous of resuming the country, it will be in consequence of the difficulties in which the general government will be involved by the pressure of an extensive warfare. It is hardly possible to suppose any other case in which the resumption would be justifiable, or could be attempted. In this case, however, it will not be possible to spare troops to force the execution of the treaty, if the Rajah should be inclined to resist it. Will Bangalore or Chittledroog give the power and influence over the country which will be necessary under such circumstances, and which, doubtless, Seringapatam has?

8. Seringapatam has been found, by experience, to possess means for equipping an army, which no other place in the Company's territories, or under their influence, has, Madras excepted. It is supposed, however, that these means are to be attributed to its being the ancient seat of empire, to its large garrison, and to the residence of many of the Rajah's servants in the fort, and on the island. It is also supposed that this effect of its being the ancient seat of the empire will soon be done away by the emigration of the people who depended upon the former government; that the means which are the consequence of the size of the garrison will exist wherever there may be an equal number of troops; and that those which are the consequence of the residence of the Rajah's principal servants will remove with them to Mysore.

9. Admitting that any other garrison of equal strength would draw to it the same number of people that have been brought to Seringapatam by the troops, and that the removal of the Rajah's servants to Mysore will occasion a diminution of the population of Seringapatam, I cannot admit that the fall of the empire of Tippoo has diminished, or will diminish, its population in the least. In fact, the place is more populous now than it ever was, if the armies that Tippoo had are struck out of the calculation; and, supposing that those who were attached to his government and person should be inclined to leave it, which they are not, they would find it difficult to pitch upon a place in the peninsula in which they would not live under a British government.

10. But I attribute the facility which has been found in equipping an army at Seringapatam, the great means which that place affords, to its being a British possession, as well as to the other causes to which have been attributed those excellent effects. Bangalore, Chittledroog, Sera, Nuggur, Colar, are nearly, if not equally populous with Seringapatam: some of them are places of great trade and riches, and all of them might afford, and doubtless afforded, to Tippoo, the means of bringing his troops into the field.

11. When I took the field last year, the Rajah's government had the strongest interest in my success; and I do them no more than justice in saying, that they did every thing in their power to forward it: yet, notwithstanding their exertions, and those of the officers in command of the different forts, I did not get a bullock, or a man, or any thing which could enable the troops to remain in the field, from any place excepting Seringapatam.

12. At Chittledroog, there was a numerous, if not a more numerous garrison at that time, than at Seringapatam; but still, the followers of the corps at the former were brought from the latter; which fact may be adduced as a proof that the means of Seringapatam are not to be attributed exclusively to the size of its garrison; and that even those means which depend upon its garrison might possibly not be removed with it. When the troops were ordered into the field, one regiment of cavalry was brought from Bangalore, the followers and equipments of which were sent from Seringapatam.

13. It may be said that, although the fort of Seringapatam may be destroyed, and its garrison and depôt of stores removed to another place, the island will still belong to the Company; and that the population and means of equipment which it affords will still be in our power, and in the Mysore country. But admitting that to be true, I contend that we shall not enjoy the same advantages from them which we have hitherto: we shall not be able to apply them with the same readiness to the service, if it should be possible to procure them for it at all.

14. We have experience of the benefit of equipping an army at Seringapatam; we know that those means still exist; and we have reason to believe that they will continue as long as the garrison and depôt of stores are at that place. We do not know that they would exist at Seringapatam if the fort were destroyed and the garrison removed; and we have reason to know, from experience, that they would not exist at Chittledroog, even if the garrison and stores were removed thither; and I believe that they would not exist at Bangalore, if they were removed to that place.

15. But not only have we experience of the singular advantage of Seringapatam as a place of equipment, but we know it is acknowledged by all parties as the most convenient depôt in point of locality for service in the province of Malabar: I might also add, in the province of Canara. In truth, next to the opinion which universally prevails of the power attached to the possession of this fort, this is the point of view in which to have possession of it appears to me to be the most important.

16. From Goa to Cochin, there is not a single post which could be held by any body of troops for a moment. The works of Cannanore have been erected at vast expense, but the garrison could not remain in that fort opposed to the fire of a man of war anchored in the roads. The works are commanded in such manner as to render the situation of the besieged very disadvantageous, if the fort should be attacked on the land side; and the fort is so small as to be incapable of holding even the quantity of stores which are necessary for the desultory service in the Malabar province. Besides, it is falling down, as appears by the reports made to the Military board. The stores in Canara are now in the open town of Mangalore.

17. The state of the seasons on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar operates as a strong reason for preserving the fort of Seringapatam, and making it the depôt of the troops in those provinces. The vessels which could be employed to convey stores could keep up the communication only in the months of January, February, March, April, and part of

May; and, even during those months, with considerable difficulty and delay. In the latter part of May, in June, July, August, and September, it is impossible for vessels to approach the Malabar coast; and in October, November, and December, it is equally so to approach Madras. It is more easy to communicate between Bombay and the coast. But the consequence of supplying the troops in those provinces with stores, either from Madras or Bombay, is, that a fort must be constructed, and arsenals must be built, for their preservation. The question is, therefore, whether it is better to keep Seringapatam, with all its supposed inconveniences, or to build a fort in one of the provinces below the ghauts to the westward.

18. Many objections might be urged against building a fort in those provinces, the expenses of which are sufficiently obvious; but there is one objection, to which particular attention is requested, as it may bear upon the general question in other respects.

19. A fort situated upon the sea coast is liable to particular objections. An enemy, although of inferior strength, has the power of attacking it, and, unless it is of great strength, would possess himself of it before assistance could be sent to it. This would certainly be the case, if the supposed enemy were stronger at sea; which, it is true, we have no reason to expect at the present moment. But it might be the case if we were stronger at sea.

20. The extent of the seas under the Admiral in this part of the world renders it impossible for him to provide for the protection of every part; and the difficulty, in all seasons, of going to all parts of both coasts must for ever render the situation of a fort on the sea coast in some degree dangerous.

21. If such a fort should fall, the enemy has immediately an establishment on the coast, to deprive him of which would require an army, and the equipment for a siege; whereas, his landing, under any other circumstances, would be an event, the bad consequences of which might be defeated as soon as the body of troops in the western provinces, supported by those above the ghauts, could be collected.

22. In regard to the insurgents in Malabar, the war against them cannot be carried on at all without assistance, either from Seringapatam, or from Bombay, or Surat. Stores, ordnance, and grain might be sent round from Madras, or from Bombay; but a fort must be built to receive them, and then there are no means of moving them in those provinces independent of the assistance above mentioned. In point of economy, there is no doubt whatever but that it is more expedient to supply these means from Seringapatam, than from Bombay or Surat.

23. Having thus stated the grounds which I have for believing that Seringapatam is the most convenient dépôt for the coast of Malabar, I proceed to consider that place, in the same point of view, in reference to the line of frontier to the northward. I must first beg, that the principles of European warfare may not be applied to this country, in arguing this question, to a greater degree than they are applied to the service when that is to be carried on.

24. It would be convenient, that a dépôt of stores, for a service intended in any particular country, should be as near the scene of operations as

possible. In European warfare, it is absolutely necessary that the expense magazines, &c., should be on the spot; and they are usually moved forward in proportion as the army is enabled to advance. But in this country, in which armies take the field with such formidable equipments, with arsenals and magazines, in fact, which they always carry with them, it is not necessary, however convenient it would be, that the *depôt*, which is to supply those equipments, and the wants of the service, should be immediately in the neighbourhood of the scene of action.

25. My experience of service, in this country, proves the truth of that observation. In Gen. Harris's war, notwithstanding the number of posts in advance, in which *depôts* had been formed, every article of provisions, and stores and ordnance, was brought from Madras; and, in fact, if the cattle could have been fed in that neighbourhood, and if there had not been a necessity of forming a corps of observation at Arcot, for the speedy support of which it was necessary to provide, Gen. Harris would have gained time by collecting his army at Madras, and marching at once from thence, instead of collecting at Vellore. In the last campaign, in the same manner, although Chittledroog was not unprovided with stores, every article was brought from Seringapatam. In neither case was there either delay or inconvenience; and, in both cases, the armies would have been as well provided, and equally secure, if there had not been a gun, or an article of military stores or grain, in any of the advanced posts.

26. I do not contend that, in the one case, it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Madras at Vellore or Kistnagherry; or, in the other, that it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Seringapatam at Chittledroog: but I contend that it was not inconvenient to have them otherwise; and that the service, in either case, did not suffer from the distance of the *depôts*, as it would have done if the same warfare had been carried on in Europe, without moving forward the magazines.

27. This circumstance arises as well from the nature of the service in India, in which immense equipments always accompany the troops, as from the manner in which those troops are usually posted in times of peace. Considerable time must elapse before a body of troops can be collected on the frontier for service; and the stores required for such service would be on the frontier from Seringapatam, as they were in the last campaign, before all the troops for the service could be collected.

28. I am aware that the consequence of this reasoning goes the length of giving up Chittledroog: upon which I have to observe, that, if I am to choose between Seringapatam and Chittledroog, for a general *depôt* for all possible services, I should certainly prefer Seringapatam; and that I have no desire to keep the stores in Chittledroog, even for service in the Marhatta territory. I prefer, by far, the fort of Hullihall in Soonda, on the one hand, and that of Hurryhur on the other; and in these I should desire to have no stores or grain, excepting such as I might find it convenient to lodge in them, at the time the service should be going on.

29. With a view to service on the frontier, there is but little difference in the distance of Seringapatam and of Bangalore from the scene of action. Bangalore is 85 miles distant from Seringapatam is 104. It is true,

that those articles of ordnance and stores, which must come from the Presidency, by going to Seringapatam, must thus go 80 miles more than they would if the depôt were fixed at Bangalore. But, in the first place, it is to be considered, that, if the resources of the Mysore country are fairly called into action, but few articles will be required from the Presidency. In the next place, it is to be recollected, that a large proportion of those articles, which might be wanted from the Presidency, will be required in the western provinces, if it should be determined, according to my system, that the corps serving in those provinces should be provided from this country; and, therefore, that they will not suffer by being transported at once to Seringapatam. But supposing the circuitous route to the frontier, by Seringapatam, should be an objection to that place, of such weight as to occasion a preference for Bangalore, let the other advantages of Seringapatam be taken into consideration: the general opinion of its power, the means which experience has proved it possesses of equipping an army, its superior convenience as a depôt for the Malabar coast, which will more than compensate for the trifling disadvantage of being obliged to go 80 miles of distance to reach it.

30. But there are other objections to Seringapatam, which, if well founded, would be decisive of the question. In the first place, it is supposed that Seringapatam requires a garrison, even in times of peace, of one regiment of Europeans, 3 battalions of sepoy, and a large proportion of artillery. Seringapatam is full of Moorish inhabitants; and, as it contains a large arsenal, it is not deemed safe to trust this arsenal without a large garrison, till these inhabitants are removed from the fort. But measures are now taking to remove these inhabitants to the pettah; and when they, and the Rajah's servants, shall have left the fort, there will be no reason to have any apprehension for the arsenal. The works of Seringapatam are in ruins, because they have never been repaired since the siege: the weather and river have done them damage to a much greater degree than they would if they had been in good repair; and they are accessible in many places. The communication between one part and another of these works is not complete; and it is, therefore, necessary that the guns which may be required for the works should be always in their places. These two inconveniences, which the repair of the fortifications would remedy, create a necessity for larger guards, and a greater number of them on the works, than would otherwise be required. The garrison of Seringapatam furnishes the Rajah's guard, and that of the Resident. It is the seat of the head quarters of the division, which necessarily causes the employment of a number of men on duty: it furnishes the guards for the public elephants and cattle, and other small detachments; and as the paymaster, the treasure, and the stores, are at Seringapatam, the detachment with the treasure and stores for the out stations are furnished from its garrison. These circumstances naturally create a want of troops; but the removal of the Moorish inhabitants, and the repair and completion of the fortifications, would enable us to provide for those duties, and to keep the arsenal in safety, with as small a body of men at Seringapatam, as at any other place in the country. In time of war, and in case of a siege, Seringapatam would require as small, if not a smaller,

garrison for its defence, than any other place that has been proposed as a great depôt. An army which should besiege Seringapatam must determine at once to attack it from the north, or from the south side of the river, or from the island. No army could be brought there sufficiently numerous to form 3 divisions, or even 2 divisions, large enough to make 2 or 3 attacks upon the place, because these divisions would be effectually separated from each other, and each must be strong enough to defend itself against the army which would be employed to raise the siege. In providing a garrison for the defence of Seringapatam, if such a measure should ever be necessary, no more men would be required than to defend it on one point of attack. But looking to Seringapatam as a place liable to be attacked, it has a singular advantage over every other fort in India, viz. that, from the month of June to the month of December, in every year, it is impossible to approach it.

31. It is also said that Seringapatam is unwholesome, and that art cannot remedy that defect; but that Bangalore is otherwise. Seringapatam certainly has been found to be unwholesome to the European troops; and, indeed, in the last year, the same objection applied to all parts of the upper country. I apprehend, however, that Seringapatam is not really more unwholesome than Bangalore; and, upon that point, I should be glad to have the opinion of Mr. Anderson. I apprehend that a great part of the sickness at Seringapatam is to be attributed to the nature of the buildings which the officers and the troops have occupied. Open choultries and buildings, which do not keep out the weather, cannot be supposed to answer in this country; and have been equally fatal in all parts above the ghauts. Since the buildings have been improved, the health of the troops has improved; and, in this season, we have not had any sick officers, or more sick men than there have been in other garrisons.

32. It is also said, that the position of Seringapatam is bad, not only in reference to a depôt for service on the frontier, but as a fortress to cover the country, and stop the enemy. In this respect, Seringapatam is not worse than we know Chittledroog to have been. Pursheram Bhow passed in sight of that fortress more than once; and it appears to have been no impediment to his operations in the northern parts of Mysore. But, in fact, no fortress is an impediment to the operations of an hostile army in this country, excepting it lies immediately in the line on which the army must necessarily march; or excepting it is provided with a garrison of such strength and activity, as to afford detachments to operate upon the line of communication of the hostile army with its own country. In case the Company should be involved in hostilities of such extent, as that they should be obliged to stand on the defensive in this country, when at war with a foreign power, it is not probable that the government will be able to give garrisons to the fortresses in this country, of the strength sufficient to afford detachments to operate upon the enemy's line of communication with his own country; and all the fortresses which have been proposed as depôts would be equally incapable, from situation, of stopping an enemy.

33. The advantage of the possession of them, therefore, would be the

power which each would have over the country; and their relative advantage would be in proportion to the power of each. I have already pointed out the power which, in my opinion, is attached to the possession of Seringapatam; and the history of this country has pointed out more than one instance, in which the Mysore country has been overrun by a victorious army, which, however, has been obliged to quit it, because it had not possession of Seringapatam.

34. An objection has been made to Seringapatam, on account of the expense of the repairs which will be necessary to that place. These repairs will not cost one third of the sum at which they have been estimated; but it is said that, at all events, they will be more expensive than the repairs of Bangalore. When the buildings required for Bangalore are completed, I should much doubt it. But it is forgotten that Seringapatam affords cover for one regiment of Europeans at least; and that it will afford cover for 2 regiments, when the family of the Sultaun shall have been removed from the place. The buildings at Seringapatam will also give an hospital, some quarters for officers, &c. In comparing the expense of the repair of Seringapatam with that of Bangalore, and the establishment of the depôt at that place, or at Chittledroog, the expenses of the cantonment, arsenal, hospital, &c., to be built, ought to be added to the latter. Besides, I have above shown the necessity of building a fort on the Malabar coast, in case Seringapatam is destroyed, the expense of which ought likewise to be added to that of establishing the depôt at Bangalore or at Chittledroog.

35. There is no doubt but that Seringapatam is better provided with timber than almost any other place in the peninsula: that article is cheaper in the bazaar at Seringapatam than it is at Madras. Provisions, and every other article, are cheap: firewood alone is dear, but not dearer than at Chittledroog, or than it would be at Bangalore, if Bangalore were equally populous. The dearness of firewood is a necessary, although a greatly inconvenient, consequence of large populations, in almost every part of India.

36. In regard to the inconvenience of the river, it is trifling. The communication has seldom been interrupted, and never for more than 2, or at most 3, days at a time, and even then not entirely. Six iron 18 pounders, four 12 pounders and howitzers, with all their equipments, were sent to the northward, in the year 1799, when the river was full, with but little inconvenience; and, in the last year (1800), the army in the Marhatta country received regular supplies of every thing from Seringapatam, not only across the Cauvery, but across the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba, by means of basket boats, without any inconvenience.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 6th Sept. 1801.

Before I had received your letter of the 3rd, I had intelligence of your appointment to Poonah, which I regret much on public, as well as on private, accounts. I hope that you will see Malcolm before you go. I imagine that Purneah heard, some time ago, of the probability that you would not return to this country: at least, Butcha Rao appeared to be acquainted with it.

I see clearly that we shall get no troops from the Carnatic for the Bullum business, in this year; but if we are fortunate in our pursuit of the Pyche Rajah, I am not quite certain that I have not, under my own command, the means of settling it. I shall know more about it in the course of a few weeks. In the mean time, the arrangements going on at Seringapatam, to decrease the number of idle moormen, will enable me to weaken that garrison considerably, on any occasion in which troops may be wanted. I find Symons a most active and able assistant, and matters go on very smoothly.

I acknowledge that I do not agree with Webbe respecting the destruction of this place. I think that he has not considered its utility, in some points of view; that he has been misinformed regarding the difference between its distance from the frontier and that of Bangalore; and that he has overrated the additional distance occasioned by coming here. He has also given more weight than it deserves to the consideration, that the depot is too far from the frontier, and too little to the superior advantage of Seringapatam as a place of equipment. In regard to the expense, I believe that it will be equal, whatever plan is adopted; but if the destruction of Seringapatam is to be accompanied by the building of a fort in Malabar or Canara, which, I believe, must be the consequence, that plan will be the most expensive. The fort of Cannanore is just large enough to contain the commanding officer's house: it is tumbling to pieces; and a frigate in the roads would blow a garrison out of it. The stores in Canara are in the open town of Mangalore.

Webbe talks, in his Memorandum, of sending stores to the Malabar coast by sea; but, when they arrive there, where are they to be kept? And he has not considered the difficulty, amounting almost to an impossibility, of communicating, by sea, between the two coasts. During the months of May, June, July, August, and part of September, it is not safe to approach the western coast; and in October, November, and December, equally unsafe to approach the eastern. During the remainder of the year, the north-west winds prevail so generally upon the Malabar coast, that it is with difficulty that the best ships make their passage to the northward, as was found to be the case in the last year; and the kind of vessel in which stores are sent from Madras by sea, in general, would not be able to get to the northward at all. But, in truth, there is such a want of carriage upon the coast, and the inland communication along it is so difficult, that the troops in those provinces must always, in a great measure, depend upon this country for many of their supplies. Has Madras sent any one article to those provinces since they have been under its government? Medicines and military stores, from Seringapatam, are the only articles that have been supplied to them; and even the monsoon has not stopped the communication.

Upon the whole, I think it fortunate that the success in Europe and Egypt gives us a prospect of a better peace; and that we have time to review our opinions upon this subject, and to reconsider the question. In a very short time, Seringapatam will be to be kept with as small a garrison as any other place in the country.

I gave orders to Gordon to pay the bill for the repairs at the Laal Baug,

at the time that you sent it to me, and I understood that he had done so. I shall inquire, however. We are tolerably well here now. No officers sick, and but few soldiers. I attribute the healthiness of the soldiers to an improvement which I have lately made in their barracks: having built up the whole of the verandah in the Green Palace, in which they are quartered.

P.S. The Court Martial is sitting on the trial of the offenders in the store department.

To Capt. Malcolm.

Seringapatam, 20th Sept. 1801.

I envy your situation upon the river Hoogly. I am tied here by the necessity of prosecuting, at a General Court Martial, —, —, and —, who robbed the stores, when I was absent in the field.

I am concerned that the Governor General should have any such cause of uneasiness as you describe. However, it is very certain that nothing annoys a man with a feeling mind so much as the disapprobation of those whom chance has made his superiors for a short time, particularly when he knows that such disapprobation is undeserved. Let me hear how you go on. When do you think of coming this way?

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

Seringapatam, 30th Nov. 1801.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Chief Sec. of government, relative to the repairs of the fort at Nuggur, respecting which I had a conversation with the Dewan in your presence some time ago.

I shall be obliged to you if you will procure from the Dewan the estimate of the expense to be incurred in the proposed repairs, as mentioned in the first paragraph of the enclosed extract. I imagine that the repairs which the Dewan proposes to give to the fort of Nuggur will not be greater than those alluded to in the second paragraph of the enclosed extract; and if that should be the case, I will use the discretion given to me to authorise expense on that account.

To Lord Clive.

Seringapatam, 25th Dec. 1801.

I enclose you a letter for the Governor General, which I have received from Sir W. Clarke. That addressed to your Lordship, dated the 20th inst., which Sir W. Clarke mentions therein, has not yet arrived here, at least it has not passed through my hands.

The Commander in Chief will have acquainted your Lordship with the disposition of the troops in the province of Canara, made with a view to enable Sir W. Clarke to hold his position. Besides these troops, I shall march from hence towards the Bullum country on the 4th Jan., and shall be in readiness to move to his assistance whenever that may be necessary.

I have written to Mr. Read, to request that he will take care to keep Sir W. Clarke supplied with rice from the northern parts of Canara by boats; and I shall write to Sir W. Clarke this day, to desire that he will bring such quantity as he may be able, to last our troops as long as their salt provisions will. As, however, Sir William has the sea open, and the province of Canara so near him, I do not apprehend any thing from the momentary scarcity and dearness of rice at Goa.

To the Sec. of Gov.

Seringapatam, 28th Dec. 1801.*

I enclose an estimate of the expense which will attend the repair of the fort of Nuggur and the buildings therein occupied by the Company's troops, and by their provision and military stores, amounting to 30.0 pags., 2½ fans., 2 annas. Of this sum, 940 pags., 5½ fans., 3 annas, are for rebuilding the wall, and 1285 pags., 9½ fans., 3 annas for repairing the sheds, with which it is necessary in that country to cover the walls of the forts; and half of these sums will fall upon this government by the treaty with the Rajah of Mysore. I apprehend, however, that the expense of the repair of the buildings within the fort, occupied by the Hon. Company's troops and stores, amounting to 783 pags., 7½ fans., ought to fall upon the Hon. Company's government.

I likewise enclose a memorandum of the expense which will be required annually to keep this fort in repair. This expense is occasioned by the constant rains in the province of Bednore: these are so destructive to all buildings, that, if the mode proposed (and universally practised in that country) to shelter the fort from their effects is not adopted, an expense equal to that now to be incurred will be required in repairs in the next season.

The enclosed papers are translations of Marhatta papers which I have received from the Dewan.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. M^r. Alster, comm. brigade of cavalry.

31st Jan. 1802.

I have mentioned to Col. Wellesley that you found the ground about Belgode unfavorable for horse drills, or exercising either of the regiments of the brigade, and he has desired me to write you that, for the above reasons, he has no objection to your moving off towards the nullah near Polliam, where he thinks you will find good ground, or to any other place in the neighbourhood where you can be accommodated; but he wishes you to keep as near to this country as is consistent with the attainment of the above object, lest the retiring of so large a body of the troops should give rise to a belief that the whole was about to withdraw, which might obstruct the settlement of the country.

The D.A.G. to Major English, Arrekerry.

31st Jan. 1802.

The work for pioneers and cammattees is so great in this quarter, that the Hon. Col. Wellesley has been obliged to direct that the Mysore cammattees employed with you shall be called up here, and he requests that you will permit them to proceed. He further desires that you will send one half of all the cutting and entrenching tools which were left by Capt. Herland at Arrekerry, for your working parties. These you will load upon tent bullocks, and send them under a havildar's guard by the road which the detachment marched, viz. by Hebsalle, Aneybaloo, and Heeremundy. As they will find the road clear and good, if the bullocks are lightly loaded, they may reach Heeremundy in 1 day, where they will probably find the detachment.

Mr. Mills, the conductor, has been directed to send any cutting or entrenching tools that may remain in the barracks under the same escort.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. M^r. Alster.

6th Feb. 1802.

I have laid your letter of the 5th before the Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding

* There are no copies of letters or dispatches between the 28th Dec. 1801, and 20th April, 1802, in the Duke of Wellington's papers; and none have yet been found in the records of the Residency at Mysore. The only notice of the reduction of the Bullum Rajah, which took place at this time, is to be found in the G. O. of 4th and 10th Feb. 1802, and the correspondence of the Dep. Adj. Gen. The letters of the Dep. Adj. Gen. are in the handwriting of Capt. (afterwards Sir R.) Barclay. They were copied from drafts written by Col. Wellesley, in whose handwriting the corrections are also made. These letters are printed in smaller type.

in Mysore, and am directed by him to inform you, that, as he intends to review the 19th dragoons and the 5th regt. of cavalry before returning to Seringapatam, he requests that you will march with the brigade to any place between Polliam and the high ground beyond Chinroypatam which you may find suitable for the above purpose, as well as for the preparatory drills and exercise.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Spry.

10th March, 1802.

I have communicated your letter of the 6th to Col. Wellesley. He is not exactly informed at present of the number of bullocks at Cannanore, nor of the employment for them; and, besides, it would require more time than can well be spared to have any of them sent up to Mangalore for the service of the 1st batt. 3rd regt., as it is desirable that the corps should move in such time as that the whole of the reliefs ordered may be accomplished, before the setting in of the rains either in Soonda or Canara; and as it is the duty of the paymaster of the station to find cattle and dooley bearers for the troops, the Colonel expects they will be provided without delay. He conceives that, in case of any difficulty in procuring them, the paymaster is authorised to call upon the collectors for assistance; and the hire, if greater than allowed by the regulations, may be certified, and referred to government afterwards: but the service must not be impeded by any difficulties of that nature.

Col. Wellesley will readily forward any public representation that may be made regarding the high rate of hire of cattle, or servants for the public service, in Canara; and he does not wish the 1st batt. 5th regt. to be ordered to march until its equipment is completed, provided that is accomplished in any reasonable time; but it would be better for all the troops ordered to move to march without their

G. O.

Camp at Heeremundy, Thursday, 4th Feb. 1802.

Col. Wellesley has much pleasure in publishing the following extract of a letter from his Excellency the Commander in Chief, dated 30th Jan. last, and minute of Council which accompanied it:

‘I request you will communicate to the troops employed in the attack of the barriers of the Bullum Rajah the sentiments of approbation entertained by Government and myself of their meritorious conduct on the occasion.’

“Resolved that the Commander in Chief be requested to convey to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley the Board's entire approbation of the judicious dispositions made by that officer, in the attack of the barriers of the Bullum Rajah, and their satisfaction at the success which attended it.”

G. O.

Camp at Oggichully, Wednesday, 10th Feb. 1802.

Upon breaking up the detachment, Col. Wellesley has to make his acknowledgment of the regularity, good order, and discipline of the troops, which he will not fail to report to the Commander in Chief.

The Colonel is obliged upon this occasion to notice a material defect in the equipments of all the Native corps, viz. an almost entire want of carriage for their sick. He is aware of the difficulty of procuring carriage of the best kind for the sick; but that difficulty, like others, can be surmounted; and Col. Wellesley takes this opportunity of making public his determination, in case he should have occasion again to take the field with the troops, to report to the Commander in Chief the name of every commanding officer of a Native corps, who shall not have for his battalion such carriage for his sick as Col. Wellesley can approve of.

G. A. O.

Camp at Hassim, Saturday, 13th Feb. 1802.

Col. Wellesley will have great pleasure in reporting to the Commander in Chief the excellent state in which he found the 19th light dragoons.

G. M. O.

Camp at Hassim, Sunday, 14th Feb. 1802.

Col. Wellesley is well satisfied with the state of discipline and order of the 5th regt. of cavalry, considering that only a short time has elapsed since that corps was raised, and that it has labored under many disadvantages. He will report his sense of the exertions of the officers of this corps to the Commander in Chief.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 28th Feb. 1802.

Col. Wellesley begs to recall to the recollection of officers under whose charge these bearers may pass, the orders of government which require that, when any money is given to any person in the employment of the Company, a certificate of the period to which such person is paid should be given likewise.

complete equipments, in the fair season, than to run the risk of being overtaken in the rains, by waiting long for them.

A guard has been ordered for your regimental stores, which will proceed all the way to Mangalore; and Lonsdale has got his route and passport.

The D.A.G. to Major English, comm. 2nd batt. 10th regt.

17th March, 1802.

I have laid your letter of the 15th inst., with its several enclosures, before the Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, who directs me to inform you that he cannot look upon Capt. S——'s conduct, in not immediately obeying the order to proceed to Madras, in any other light than a mistake in point of etiquette; but he leaves that matter open for you to act in it as you may think proper. He does not apprehend any material impediment to the trial from the short delay that Capt. S—— will make.

In regard to the lists of witnesses which Capt. S—— has given in, Col. Wellesley directs me to observe that he cannot be restricted in summoning whomsoever he chooses; and that the regulations of the service have provided a certain penalty for those who summon witnesses, whose evidence is found on the trial not to be material to it.

Col. Wellesley cannot take any notice of your observation, 'That the summonses are wanton, and seem to proceed from a wish of individual annoyance, as well as to incommode the battalion at large.' But he desires that Mr. Wise may not be permitted to leave the corps, until it is in a situation where other medical assistance can be provided for it; and he wishes that Capt. S—— may be informed that Mr. Wise will proceed to Madras as soon as the above object can be obtained.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Cuppige, Naggur.

19th March, 1802.

The very unsettled state of the Mahratta country, and the numerous bodies of troops, of all descriptions, at present roving about there on the borders of Soonda, have induced Mr. Reid, the collector of that province, to apply to the Hon. Col. Wellesley for a guard for the protection of his principal Cutcherry at Bonawassi, and the treasure occasionally lodged there. The detachment from your battalion, ordered this day to march to Bonawassi, is intended for the above purpose; and Col. Wellesley requests that you will give the officer instructions accordingly.

As the detachment will be stationed at Bonawassi for some time, it is not to be considered on field allowances; but, if necessary, may use the tents which it will carry thither, till quarters and a guard house be provided, concerning which the collector has been written to. The route is by Anantpoor and Chandergooty.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Orrock, 1st batt. 8th regt. N.I.

31st March, 1802.

The Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to transmit the enclosed letter to you, and to request that you will explain to Lieut. H—— how very unbecoming the abuse of a woman is under any circumstances, and how necessary it is that he should discharge his debt to Mrs. F——, and to signify to him Col. Wellesley's expectation that it will be discharged immediately; also his orders that the workman employed by Mrs. F—— may be immediately permitted to return to her service, if she has any claim to him as a servant.

G. O. G.

16th March, 1802.

The Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council having received, through the channel of the Commander in Chief, a report from Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley of the success of his operations against the Rajah of Bullum, who had long resisted in arms the authority of the government of Mysore, his Lordship in Council has great satisfaction in expressing to Col. Wellesley his public thanks for the judicious and spirited manner in which that service has been conducted and finally completed by the defeat and punishment of the rebel chieftain, and the entire establishment of the power of the Rajah of Mysore throughout the province of Bullum; and the Commander in Chief is requested to convey to the officers and troops employed in that service, under the command of Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, the entire approbation of his Lordship in Council of their conduct.

G. O.

Seingapatam, 1st April, 1802.

Col. Wellesley proposes to inspect the troops in Mysore, according to the orders of the Commander in Chief, between this time and the month of September next. He will expect to find the corps in good order; and calls the attention of commanding officers of corps particularly to the firing of ball cartridge.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Rand.

31st March, 1802.

The Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to express to you the surprise with which he has read, in the enclosed communication from Capt. Symons, that you have taken upon yourself to interfere in, and to obstruct the proceedings of the judicial courts established in Seringapatam, which Capt. Symons conducts so much to the advantage of the public, and to Col. Wellesley's satisfaction. The Colonel further directs me to desire that you will send the man mentioned in the enclosed communication, by the name of Ibram Saheb, to attend at Capt. Symons' Cutchery, at 8 o'clock this evening; and you will understand that he is to remain under the orders of the Court until released by Capt. Symons.

You will please to return the paper enclosed herein, with your acknowledgment of the receipt of this order.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Macfarlane.

8th April, 1802.

I have showed your letter of the 5th to Col. Wellesley.

When in Bullum, he got a list of all the fortified villages in the country; but as they far exceeded what our pioneers and troops could be expected to lay open, and to destroy the defences of, this season, he selected the most important of them, according to the list in your instructions, for the scenes of your operations. And as, from the time those have occupied you which you have already visited, he does not now expect that you will be able to lay open sufficiently all those in the list, he does not wish that you should delay more than a day at any other village which you may fall in with on your march from one proscribed village to another; but he requests that you will urge the amildars to use their utmost endeavors to destroy the defences of all the smaller villages not in your list.

Mention in your next letter whether you laid open the villages in the circle or forest of Arrekerty, on your visit to that place; and give a summary of what has been done towards the fulfilment of your instructions.

The D.A.G. to the Officer comm. at Hullihall.

9th April, 1802.

I have laid Major Ker's letter of the 5th inst. before the Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, &c., together with its several enclosures, and I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of Capt. Johnson, the engineer employed at Hullihall, that as it appears by the letter from the adjutant of the corps of engineers at Fort St. George to Capt. Johnson, dated 29th March, that the latter officer's being relieved from the charge of the public works at Hullihall is left to the discretion of the officer commanding in Mysore (as far as the senior Engineer has any thing to say to the matter), Col. Wellesley cannot give his consent to Capt. Johnson's being relieved from the charge of those works.

Col. Wellesley directs me to state further, that as the station of Hullihall and the corps of Bombay pioneers are both under his command, had the Bombay government done him the honor of consulting him on the propriety of removing Capt. Johnson from the charge of the works at the one to the command of the other, he would have stated circumstances which induce him to be of opinion that the removal of Capt. Johnson from the charge of the works at Hullihall is inconvenient to the service, and that a more beneficial arrangement for the service might be made than to appoint him to the command of the corps of Pioneers.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Johnson.

18th April, 1802.

I have submitted your letter of the 13th inst. to the Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, and am directed by him to inform you that he conceives it will be for the good of the service that you continue at Hullihall, to superintend the public works on which you have been for some time past employed, until they are finished.

To Major Malcolm.

Seringapatam, 20th April, 1802.

I have received your letter of the 27th March, for which I am much obliged to you.

The arrangements made by you at Madras must have been very satisfactory to Lord Wellesley. They have secured the accomplishment of

an important measure, the permanent settlement of the revenue in the territories under the government of Fort St. George, and the cordiality and co-operation of that government with the Supreme government at the present crisis. If the permanent settlement of the revenue had been left to the present board of Revenue, that measure would never have been effected; and if Lord Clive had gone to England, the government which would have succeeded to him would have quarrelled with the Supreme government, and, under the spurious names of reform of military expenditure and increase of investment, would have been guilty of every enormity that has lately met with the approbation and patronage of the Court of Directors. The merit of the arrangements which have prevented these evils depends upon the characters of the individuals affected by them; and the degree of approbation which will be given to them at home will be in proportion to the knowledge which people have of the characters of the leading men in India, particularly of those of the favorites of the Court of Directors. I hope, therefore, that Lord W. has taken care in his dispatches to bring a few facts to the knowledge of his friends in England. I rejoice to hear that he intends to go home, if justice is not done to him by the Court of Directors; and if the ministers do not give him security that he shall not be again liable to the corrupt and vulgar interference of Leadenhall street in the operations of his government. Their appointment to all the principal offices at Fort St. George, and the encouragement which I understand they have given to their councils to oppose the acts of their governors, are inconsistent with the spirit of, if not directly contrary to, the law; and their sending out to India all those who have been sent home for misbehaviour must, if not prevented in future, end in the annihilation of all British power in India. All these measures are aimed directly at Lord Wellesley, and he cannot remain in the government, and no *gentleman* can succeed to him, if means are not taken to prevent them in future. It is reported that * * * 's conduct at — has at last come to his ears. I rejoice at this most sincerely, and I hope that he will be treated as he deserves. His conduct for a length of time has really been a disgrace to the British name and nation; and I was certain that Lord W. could not know all.

The D.A.G. to Col. Carlisle, 1st batt. of artillery.

25th April, 1802.

The two blank cartridges, which Seid Permaul has been convicted of stealing, were brought from the place where he had concealed them by the man who gave the information, and they were sent to Lieut. Macintosh, to be kept till further orders. The syrang has been sentenced to make good the value of them; but as they were recovered, Col. Wellesley thinks it only necessary that they be delivered over to the Commissary of stores, and he directs me to request that you will give orders for their being so.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Mackay, 1st batt. 2nd regt. N.I.

28th April, 1802.

The Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, has perused your letter of this date, and the answers given by Lieuts. C— and P— to the complaint preferred against them; and he directs me to acquaint you, for the information of those officers, that as it appears from their own statements that they committed acts of violence in the bazaar, which might cause the losses to the inhabitants which are stated in their complaint, and of which, from the nature of the acts, and the manner of committing them, the officers cannot be supposed capable of forming a correct judgment, he desires they will wait upon the master of the

police, and settle the amount of the loss sustained by the inhabitants through their acts, as reported by Major Symons.

Col. Wellesley desires me to acquaint you, further, that he has had reports of various acts of violence, of a nature similar to those above alluded to, committed by officers in the garrison of Seringapatam, which he has reason to believe must have come to your knowledge: that it is with no less concern than surprise that he finds officers setting so bad an example to the troops in the garrison; and that, in case of repetition of such acts, he will be under the necessity of bringing the conduct of the persons who may be guilty of them to a public discussion, of which Col. Wellesley requests that you will apprise the two officers above named in particular.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. M^r. Alister, 2nd regt. of cavalry.

12th May, 1802.

I have laid your letter of the 8th inst., with its enclosure, before the Hon. Col. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, and am directed by him to inform you that he is aware of the Commander in Chief's being averse to the strong measure of dismissing any Native officer from the service without the formality of a public trial; and that he has reason to believe his Excellency would not adopt it in the present case, notwithstanding the flagrant impropriety of jemidar Abdulla Khan's conduct.

Col. Wellesley directs me to add, that if you put the jemidar's crimes into the form of regular charges, he will order a General Court Martial for his trial, to be assembled at such place as will be most convenient for Lieut. Col. Maxwell, or other principal witnesses who may be required for the prosecution.

To Major Malcolm.

Seringapatam, 7th June, 1802.

I enclose a letter for the Governor General from the Rajah of Koorg, which was opened by my Persian interpreter, by mistake. I likewise enclose the translation of a letter which I have received from the Rajah of Koorg by the same occasion, and I shall be obliged to you if you will urge the Governor General to comply with the Rajah's requests. The board of Revenue at Fort St. George have already approved of little attentions which were paid to the Rajah of Soonda, on his passage through Canara, by the collectors, at my request.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 19th June, 1802.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th inst., and I shall lose no time in procuring and sending to Hyderabad the bark which you require, if the tree can be found. I wish that it may be beneficial to the health of his Highness the Nizam; but I acknowledge that I fear the only benefit he will derive from the prescription will be that which a person, who has long been afflicted with sickness, derives from the hope of a cure.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 23rd June, 1802.

The bark of the tree at Chinroyapatam required for his Highness the Nizam is arrived, and I propose to dispatch 2 camel hircarrahs with it to-morrow morning. More from the same tree shall be sent with that which has been required from Kope, as soon as it shall arrive.

I enclose a letter for the physician, which I have received from the person at Chinroyapatam to whom he wrote.

To Josias Webbe, Esq.

Seringapatam, 26th June, 1802.

I have delayed to thank you for your letters containing the news, till I could send you the estimate of the expense of building a house for the

Resident at Mysore, according to the plan given you by Mr. Goldingham, and another of a house, according to a plan drawn by Piele, which we here think will answer better than the other. The objection to Mr. Goldingham's plan is, that it gives you only one entertaining room, and that the accommodations for the gentlemen of the Resident's family are crowded together and inconvenient. Those allotted to the Resident himself are at a distance from the room in which he is to live, at the same time that they will not be private, as the Cutchery is to be in the same building.

The Resident ought to have two entertaining rooms; and, if his house was to be built at Seringapatam, one of them ought to be large enough to entertain the whole garrison. As, however, it is to be built at Mysore, rooms of the size of those in Piele's plan will be sufficiently large, and they are conveniently situated in respect to each other.

When people are to reside for a length of time in a place, nothing can be more inconvenient to them, particularly in this country, than to live in the same building. It is, therefore, far preferable that the gentlemen of the family should have each a separate bungalow. This arrangement will be more convenient to them, and, I imagine, to every body else. Upon the whole, I think that the house, according to Piele's plan, would be the most convenient of the two. Indeed, the want of a second entertaining room in Mr. Goldingham's must condemn it entirely. The expense, however, of the latter is far greater than that of the former, but I imagine that it may be much reduced. In the first place, there is no necessity for verandahs of the breadth of 18 feet to the principal building. The expense would be much diminished by their being reduced to 15 feet the largest, and 14 the smallest. The cross walls need not be 2 feet thick: this will again reduce the expense. The bungalows for the gentlemen are larger than it is necessary that they should be. They might easily be reduced in size so as to cost only 1000 instead of 1500 pagodas each. Upon the whole, I think that the expense of a house on Piele's plan may be brought to about 10,000 pagodas.

I send it to you as it is, in order that you may judge for yourself. Probably, from the two plans, some of your friends at Madras will be able to make out one which will answer better than either. They will be able also to estimate the expense of any building of which they may give you a plan, from the prices stated in the enclosed estimates.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 1st July, 1802.

I have this day sent off 2 camel hircarrahs with the bark of the only tree remaining at Kope, of the kind described in your letter to me, and some more of the bark of the tree at Chinroyapatam: leaves, &c., accompany both parcels. I hope that they will be beneficial to the Nizam. They will, at least, prove the desire which I have, and, I am convinced, every British officer has, to do what can be gratifying to his Highness.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Whitelocke, Chittledroog.

7th July, 1802.

Major English, of the 2nd batt. 10th regt., having represented to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, that some circumstances had delayed him on his road to Nunddroog until the 3rd inst., and that, in order to reach

Chittledroog within the period of 20 days allowed him to be absent, it will be necessary for him to set out on his return immediately, without having accomplished the object of his journey, and that there was not even time for him to apply, *through you*, for an extension of his leave to the end of this month, Col. Wellesley has directed me to inform you that, for the reasons above stated, he has granted Major English leave to be absent from his station until the 31st July.

To Major Malcolm.

Seringapatam, 12th July, 1802.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 20th June, which, with its enclosure, fully explains the College question, and the conduct of the Governor General in regard to the orders which he has received. It appears that he has taken the only ground that it was possible for him to take; and he is fully justified in the delay to abolish the institution, by the approbation which the Court of Directors have given to it, which would have induced them to continue it, if the Company had not labored, as they imagined, under financial embarrassments; by the fact that those embarrassments no longer exist; and by the circumstances of the persons belonging to the institution, who, if it was suddenly abolished, would be deprived of bread.

I think that the question, whether Lord Wellesley should go home or not, now stands precisely where it did before he received these orders. He had no reason to expect any thing but injury from the Court of Directors, till his appeal to the King's ministers should have been received, and till they could have acted in consequence. If the grounds were good on which he determined to remain in India another year, and if the Court of Directors should desire it, and recall some of their offensive orders, and should promise support in future, and if the ministers should engage for that support,—they are equally good at present. He expected injury when he was induced to come to this determination; and, now that it has been received, he ought not to alter it. In fact, if the Court of Directors and the ministers should act as Lord Wellesley has required, the College question, as well as all others, will be given up to him; the government

G. O.

Seringapatam, 17th July, 1802.

Col. Wellesley was concerned to learn that any officer, under his command, had been put in arrest for 'coming to the parade of his regiment in a state of intoxication;' and although it appears, by the evidence which has been brought before the General Court Martial, of which Lieut. Col. Mackay was president, that Major Bell, the commanding officer of ———, may have been mistaken on this occasion, Col. Wellesley is concerned to be under the necessity of observing that, if there had not been good reason to believe that ——— was in the habit of drinking intoxicating liquors at undue hours, Major Bell would not have attributed his staggering upon the parade to intoxication, but would have supposed that it was occasioned by other causes. It is not to be imagined that any officer would cast such an imputation upon another, upon the first symptom of his deserving it, and the observations made by ——— in his defence, that his staggering ought to be imputed to indisposition, would be correct, if circumstances had not given too strong reason to believe that intoxication alone was the cause of it.

Col. Wellesley therefore, in reprimanding ——— for the crimes of which he has been found guilty, cannot avoid calling his attention, and that of the troops under his command in general, to the other crime of which he has been acquitted. It is one of the most degrading to the character of an officer, which renders him unfit for any part of his duty; and by the practice of it he fails in that most essential point, the setting an example to the soldiers under his command. Col. Wellesley, however, has the pleasure of reflecting that this failing is rare among the officers under his command, in proportion as it is great; but he warns all against even the suspicion of it.

—— is hereby publicly reprimanded. He is released from arrest and directed to return to his duty.

at home will approve of the delay in the execution of the orders recently received, and, finally, of that institution.

In what I have above written, I have not considered whether the Indian ministers have the power, the ability, or the inclination, to force the Court of Directors to act as Lord Wellesley requires; or whether, if they have, the Court of Directors will be sincere and cordial in the support which they may engage to give. These questions, I conclude, were maturely considered when Lord Wellesley determined to remain in India another year, on certain conditions; and they are not affected by the orders to abolish the College, and ought not now to be taken into consideration.

I think that affairs in Europe are in a curious state. I wish that you would send me one set of newspapers from the 1st Jan. last.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Cuppage, Nundydroog.

18th July, 1802.

I have submitted your letter of the 15th, together with all its enclosures, to Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, and I am directed by him to state his opinion on the subject of those papers as follows:

When the paper No. 1 was communicated to you by the Circar servant at Nundydroog it was your duty to interfere, to inquire into and to remedy the matters therein complained of, if they were well founded; and he considers the paper No. 2 as the most delicate manner in which these complaints against Capt. B. could be noticed. They were not assumed as facts, nor were any orders given on the subject. They were merely communicated to Capt. B., who was left at liberty to alter his conduct, as of his own accord, in any point wherein, on due consideration, he might think it necessary; or, it gave him an opportunity of denying the complaints entirely, or of explaining his conduct in the several instances noticed; one or other of which he ought to have done directly, from his knowledge of the subject, instead of attempting to defend himself, as in No. 4, by bringing forward a letter or message from the amildar of the station, implying that he had not complained; which, besides giving more credit to the amildar's than to your official communication, was no less than saying that you had caused subjects of complaint to be transmitted to Capt. B. which had not been communicated to yourself. Capt. B. ought to have received the assistance which he got from the field commutaries towards repairing his house, &c., as an indulgence, instead of claiming it as a right; or making the quantity of labor which he got from them as a set-off against what he conceived to be complaints urged against him. His expenses and pains in circulating potatoes and vine plants among the neighbouring Circar gardens, however meritorious, are unconnected with the present subject.

The first part of the order contained in No. 3 is only reminding the party concerned of the standing orders of the garrison; and the station of Gorribunda being under your control, you have a right to order that any exterior regulations regarding the officer in command and the wants of the Circar, which you had once approved, should not be altered.

After the explanation given in No. 5 to Capt. B., his again repeating, in No. 7, that the amildars had made no complaint, and therefore he knew not to what to answer, is only an aggravation of his conduct noticed in No. 3.

Col. Wellesley is of the same opinion as you have expressed of Capt. B.'s letter No. 9; and, since you have referred these papers to Col. Wellesley, and Capt. B. has, in No. 10, advanced all that he seems to have thought necessary to justify him in the Colonel's opinion, he desires that you will communicate these his sentiments to Capt. B., but to no person else, that they may not in any shape influence the opinion of others on this subject.

Col. Wellesley directs me to add that, as the origin of so much correspondence was a complaint of matters which, at the most, had not been carried to any great length, and which the person who made the complaint appears desirous to push no farther, and which might have been stopped at first by Capt. B. confining his reply to a justification of himself, or a denial of what was alleged against him, he hopes that the matter will here rest and go no farther.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 5th Aug. 1802.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th July, with its enclosures, and I am much gratified to find that what I did at your desire for the Nizam has given his Highness satisfaction.

In consequence of the absence of Gholam Aly, the person who had given security for the payment of a sum of money, of which he had defrauded the wife of the Nabob of Savanore, was prosecuted at her suit in the Court of Cutchery, and was cast. A subscription, however, was set on foot for this person's benefit, and the whole amount of the debt for which he had been security was subscribed; and he was, consequently, liberated from his confinement.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Pogson, Sera.

6th Aug. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to transmit to you the accompanying translation of an arzee from the amildar of Sera to the Dewan. He desires me to say that it is not his wish or intention, at present, to inquire into the truth of the several points represented in that paper; but to inform you that such privileges, as are therein stated, have never been allowed to officers commanding stations in the Mysore country; to desire that, if such customs have been levied as are alleged, the money may be returned; and, finally, to request that you will conduct matters at Sera, so as that no representation of a nature similar to the present may be made to him in future.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Pogson.

10th Aug. 1802.

I have laid your letter of the 8th instant before Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, and I am directed by him to say that, if you manage matters with the amildar of Sera, so that no complaints are made, he will be perfectly satisfied; but, as it appears that a man taking your name had exceeded all your orders and committed irregularities in Sera, he considers such person to be undeserving of being allowed to remain there in future, and desires that he may be sent out of the place.

P.S. In answer to your private letter to me, I can only inform you that the amildar of Sera happens to be personally known to Col. Wellesley; that he found him very active in providing the materials for building the barracks at Sera; and that Col. Maxwell frequently mentioned him, as being exceedingly attentive and obliging to him; from which circumstances Col. Wellesley entertains a good opinion of him. From a conversation with the Dewan immediately after your arrival at Sera, I understood it to be the intention to allow you all the privileges which Col. Maxwell had enjoyed. I do not know what those were, but I imagine they will not readily allow more.

G.O.

Seringapatam, 24th July, 1802.

It having been reported that several mad dogs have appeared in the fort and upon the island of Seringapatam, and that some accidents have already happened to the inhabitants, all dogs that may be found running loose after 9 o'clock in the morning of the 25th inst., in the fort or upon the island of Seringapatam, are to be killed, and a reward of 2 fanams will be paid for every dead dog which shall be produced to serjt. major Lewis, near his own quarters at 5 p.m., and in the rear of the brinjarry golah, in Shaher Gunge-am, at 6 o'clock p.m., every day until further orders. After counting and paying for each dead dog, the serjeant major will cause them to be removed and buried; for which purpose 2 pioneers and scavengers' carts are directed to attend him at the places and times above specified. He will keep an account of the number of dogs produced to him and paid for daily, and will draw the amount of the rewards paid for killing them from the paymaster.

Officers commanding corps in Seringapatam are requested to allow such of their men as choose to destroy the dogs, which have become such a nuisance, leave to be absent from their duty for that purpose, and also to make use of their bayonets.

G.O.

Seringapatam, 31st July, 1802.

The authority given in the G. O. of the 24th inst. for killing dogs in the fort and island of Seringapatam is to cease, and no rewards will be paid, on that account, after 6 o'clock this evening.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Cuppage.

10th Aug. 1802.

I have submitted your letter of the 8th instant, together with its enclosures, being two original letters from Capt. — to you, marked Nos. 4 and 5, and copies of several papers, numbered 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, before Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, and I am directed to communicate, for your and Capt. —'s information, his desire that all future communication may be dropped on the subject treated of in those papers.

Col. Wellesley has observed that much inconvenience arises from commanding officers communicating in writing with officers under their orders, when living in the same garrison with them; and he recommends that, when you have any thing to say to officers under those circumstances, you will order them to attend you, and deliver your sentiments to them; and also that you hear their representations in the same manner, verbally; and he particularly desires that Capt. — may have a perusal of this letter, in your presence, and that nothing further may be written upon the subject.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 25th Aug. 1802.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st July, and I take this opportunity of sending to Hyderabad an additional quantity of the bark of the Murgosah tree, and letters for the Nizam and his minister, which are enclosed. I also send copies of them for your perusal; and I request you to transmit them with the bark.

I am obliged to you for sending the property of Gholam Aly Fakeer. When I wrote to you last, I conceived that a sum of money had been subscribed sufficient to pay that for which Lulf Aly Bey had been security; but, upon inquiry, I find that was not the case: that Lulf Aly Bey has paid a considerable sum out of his pension given him by the Company, and that a sum still remains due. The money which you have sent will pay the whole, excepting about 200 rupees.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 26th Aug. 1802.

Since I closed my letter to you yesterday, 2 more parcels of the bark of the Murgosah trees are come in from Nuggur, where a tree of that kind has been found; and I send them with the others, although they are not mentioned in my address to his Highness the Nizam. I shall be obliged to you if you will present them to him.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Cuppage.

Gundessy, 13th Sept. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to transmit to you the inclosed extract from the superintending surgeon's report on the state of the sick in the battalion under your command; and, as the liberty to the sick, therein represented, is considered as highly detrimental to them, Col. Wel-

G. O.

Seringapatam, 6th Sept. 1802.

Col. Wellesley has heard with much concern that, in some instances, the officers of the army in the provinces below the ghauts, particularly officers of the junior ranks, and who have been but a short time in the country, have beat the Natives of the country, whether in their service or employed by them, or generally followers of the troops, or residents of the place at which such officers are stationed. The practice is very irregular and illegal, and, if not speedily put a stop to, will tend to the material inconvenience and injury of the troops. In this country, any more than in England, no man has a right to take the law into his own hand, or to punish another for an offence or injury done to himself. There are magistrates, who have full authority to decide in every case which can occur, and to whom, if necessary, complaint ought to be made. Col. Wellesley therefore prohibits this practice entirely, and desires that the officers commanding in Malabar and Canara, and those commanding stations and corps, will report to him any instances of the kind that may occur in future.

lesley directs me to desire that you will give orders that, whenever a Native commissioned or non-commissioned officer, or private soldier, is reported sick, he may be immediately shown to the surgeon in the medical charge of the corps, and entered in his list; and no man must be absent from his duty on account of sickness, excepting he is in the surgeon's list. At the discretion of the surgeon he is to be sent to the hospital; and no man once received into the hospital shall quit it, on any pretence or authority whatever, but by the leave or direction of the surgeon. If any sick man has permission from the surgeon to live in his quarters, the surgeon shall invariably see him once a day.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Poggson.

Banawar, 14th Sept. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to send to you the accompanying translation of a paper delivered to him by the Dewan of Mysore, and to inform you that such arrangements, as therein stated to have been proposed by you, have never existed, and cannot be allowed, in Mysore; that he has never made inquiries into the foundations of the complaints which have been lately made to him from Sera, but has referred them all to you, in order that you might rectify, of your own accord, whatever was amiss in the arrangements there. In the present case he desires that, if such a proposition has been made to the amildar as he has stated, it may be formally recalled, and that you will allow the butchers and bang sellers of Sera to go on with their business in the same manner as when Lieut. Col. Maxwell commanded; and I am directed to add that, if any more complaints come from Sera, Col. Wellesley will make particular inquiry into the foundations of them, and will take such measures as may effectually prevent any thereafter; and he fears those measures will tend to arrangements which may not be agreeable to you.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 7th Sept. 1802.

The General Court Martial having found Capt. ——— guilty of parts of the charge exhibited against him by his commanding officer, and having passed a sentence that he should be reprimanded, it becomes the duty of Col. Wellesley to reprimand him. The customs of the service and the G. O. of the army point out the channels by which all communications, representations, and complaints are to reach the superior authorities; and all deviations from those channels are irregular. In making the representation of the claim of the officer commanding the company to which he belonged, of money drawn for the men of that company by Lieut. * * *, the adjutant, which was undoubtedly well founded, Capt. ——— ought to have forwarded it to the commanding officer in Malabar, through Capt. ———, his immediate commanding officer.

The letter written by Capt. ———, the substance of the 2nd charge against him, of which he has been in part found guilty, is entirely unjustifiable: Capt. ——— was his commanding officer, and performed what he thought his duty in writing the letter, which is stated to have drawn that intemperate reply from Capt. ———. If he conceived he had reason to complain of the contents of that letter, the mode of redress was open to him, as it is to all officers and soldiers of the army; and nothing should have induced him to attempt to make that a personal quarrel for which the Articles of War have provided. Col. Wellesley has, however, great pleasure in observing that Capt. ——— offered to make an ample apology for this effect of his intemperance, and he regrets that it was not accepted. The public time and attention have been taken up by this subject; Officers have been called from their stations, at a considerable degree of inconvenience to themselves and the service; and the whole dispute originated in the practice so common and so prejudicial to the dispatch of business, of writing upon all occasions.

Capt. ———, Capt. ———, and Lieut. ———, residing in the same cantonment, there was no occasion for writing a word upon the subject: the whole might have passed in verbal communications; and if that more expeditious mode of transacting the public business had been adopted, it is probable that Lieut. * * * would have given the explanation required from him, that Capt. ——— would not have thought it necessary to make a reference in an irregular form to the commanding officer in Malabar, and he would not have supposed he had a provocation to write an intemperate letter to his commanding officer.

In the course of the proceedings on the trial of Capt. ———, Col. Wellesley has noticed certain irregularities, stated to exist in the detachment under the command of Capt. ——— at Cannanore: respecting these he will send further orders to the commanding officer in Malabar.

Capt. ——— is hereby reprimanded. He is released from arrest, and desired to return to his duty.

To his Highness the Nizam.*

21st Sept. 1802.

After the assurance of devoted submission, the representative of the sincere well wisher, Col. Wellesley, has the honor to state to the attendants on the presence, the treasury of bounty, of the unsullied Nabob of exalted titles, whose turrets are the heavens, and whose origin is celestial, (be his dignified shade extended!) that 2 purses, containing the illustrious enayetnamahs, replete with kindness, the one vouchsafing the acknowledg-

* Translated from a letter in Persian, on the records of the Residency at Hyderabad.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 10th Sept. 1802.

Col. Wellesley has received a report from Lieut. Col. Brown, commanding at Hullihall, dated the 5th inst., upon the subject of the conduct of certain officers of the 1st batt. — Bombay regt., regarding a baker at Hullihall, which appears to him so extraordinary as to require this public mode of expressing his sentiments upon it.

It appears that Ensign —, of the 1st batt. — regt., beat the baker of the place, in consequence of which Lieut. Col. Brown issued an order to prohibit all officers and soldiers under his command from molesting the inhabitants of Hullihall in any manner. Col. Wellesley entirely approves of that order issued by Lieut. Col. Brown, and he desires that he will see it carried into execution, and that he will put in arrest and report to him the name of any officer who disobeys it.

In consequence of the beating given to this baker, or for some other reason, it appears that he does not choose to bake any longer at Hullihall, and that he quits the place and proceeds to Goa. Some of the officers of the 1st batt. — regt. then write letters to Lieut. Col. Brown to complain that they have not bread for their breakfasts, and others wait upon him to make similar complaints, having omitted to put on their side arms.

The officers of the 1st batt. — regt. must be informed, 1st, that Lieut. Col. Brown is by no means obliged to find a baker to bake bread for them; 2dly, that, living in the same fort with their commanding officer, it is their duty to wait upon him, to make their complaints known to him, and not to write to him upon all these trifling occasions; and 3dly, that, if they should find it necessary to wait upon him, or even to quit their quarters at all, the standing orders of this army, and the customs of every military service, require that they should wear their side arms.

Col. Wellesley likewise calls the attention of Lieut. Col. Brown to these orders; and he is astonished that he should have passed unnoticed so extraordinary an instance of the disobedience of them as that which he reports in his letter of the 5th inst.

By the papers transmitted with Lieut. Col. Brown's letter of the 5th inst., Col. Wellesley observes that Lieut. — and Ensign —, being officers of the day, reported that the 'garrison is distressed,' and 'in great distress,' for want of bread. Col. Wellesley desires that Lieut. Col. Brown will make him acquainted with the orders for the duty of the officer of the day at Hullihall, particularly stating whether the state of the provisions in the bazaar of Hullihall comes under the cognizance of that officer.

G. O.

Santa Bodnore, 19th Sept. 1802.

Col. Wellesley has great pleasure in observing that the state of the 5th regt. of cavalry is much improved in every respect since he saw them in February last, particularly that of the horse appointments and accoutrements. He will not fail to report this state in the most favorable terms to the Commander in Chief; but he requests that Major Leonard will immediately commence practising the system of discipline ordered for the cavalry by the G. O. of the Commander in Chief, 1st Dec. 1801.

G. O.

Chittledroog, 23d Sept. 1802.

The state of the discipline and the appearance and good order of the 2nd batt. 10th regt. are highly creditable to Major English, and Col. Wellesley will not fail to lay his sentiments regarding them before the Commander in Chief.

Col. Wellesley takes this opportunity of returning his thanks to Major English, Capt. Ridge, and Lieut. Francke for the trouble they have taken to ascertain points respecting which he had required information, and for the assistance these officers have given him in the survey of the fort of Chittledroog.

G. O.

Sera, 26th Sept. 1802.

Col. Wellesley has great satisfaction in expressing his approbation of the state of the discipline, order, and appearance of the 7th regt. of cavalry, which he will report in the most favorable terms to the Commander in Chief.

ment of the bark of the Murgosah trees, and the other communicating the extensive benefit which had been effected by it, with an order for the transmission of some bark from the trunks of both the trees, sealed, and under the charge of the camel hircarra of the prosperous Circar, honored and elevated me by the grandeur of their approach and the dignity of their arrival.

On learning the circumstance of the benefit which had been experienced by the brilliant constitution, from the attendants on the presence, from the application of the aforesaid bark, I derived the utmost happiness.

In compliance with the exalted order, 2 bundles of the desired bark, the one from the trunk of the tree at Chinroyapatam, and the other from the trunk of that at the village of Kope, have been delivered, sealed, to the camel hircarrahs of the Circar, abounding in kindness, and are dispatched to the exalted presence. They will pass, no doubt, under the noble inspection.

In consequence of the length of the journey from Seringapatam to the village of Kope, which is situated at the distance of 400 miles, and of the incessant rain in the vicinity of Nuggur, the passing and repassing on the road is very dilatory and difficult, and the procrastination and delay of some days have, therefore, occurred in obedience to the orders of the unsullied presence. I hope that the medicine which is transmitted, having attained the honor of application, may be beneficial in its effects on the constitution, replete with purity.

The desire of my heart, the seat of constancy, is that the exalted attendant will confidently regard and esteem the aforesaid bark as a memorable instance of the loyalty of the well wisher, and as a testimony of the anxiety of British officers to effect all arrangements which may be desired by, or beneficial to, the noble presence.

May the God of his slaves grant that the orb of your prosperity may shine and glitter from the eternal horizon, like the sun in the zenith!

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Brown, Hullihall.

Woodanelly, 24th Sept. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to acknowledge his receipt of your dispatch dated the 15th inst., and to inform you that he sees clearly, by the copy of the orders issued by you at Hullihall on the 18th April, 1802, and from what you have stated further in the letters above quoted, that the officers on the duty of officers of the day at Hullihall had nothing to do with the state of the provisions in the bazaar of the station; and that the officers on that duty, who lately made reports to you, concerning a want of bread in the bazaar, did so with the intention of giving you trouble. The Colonel hopes that the orders of the 10th inst. will have brought those officers to a better understanding of their duty; but, in the event of a repetition of such conduct as was noticed in those orders, he expects that you will immediately put those officers, who may so behave, in arrest, and report all the circumstances to him.

G. O.

Nundydroog, 5th Oct. 1802.

Col. Wellesley has great pleasure in finding that the 2nd batt. 18th regt. is improved in its discipline and appearance since he inspected it last year; and that the officers in particular appear to have paid great attention to the duty required from them in the field. Without attention on the part of the officers and a knowledge of their duty, a battalion, however well disciplined, cannot be placed in line to act with others; but Col. Wellesley observes that the 2nd batt. 18th regt. is as perfect in this respect as in others, and he will report on its state in the most favorable terms to the Commander in Chief.

MEMORANDUM UPON OPERATIONS IN THE MARHATTA TERRITORY *

As before long we may look to war with the Marhattas, it is proper to consider of the means of carrying it on. The experience which has been acquired, in the late contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these points, for the benefit of those, in whose hands may be placed the conduct of the operations of the army, in case of such a war as I have above supposed we may expect. The season at which it is most convenient to commence a campaign with the Marhattas, is that at which the rivers, which take their rise in the western ghauts, fill. This happens, generally, in the month of June. In this year, the Toombuddra was not fordable after the 14th June, the day before the army reached Hurryhur; and in other seasons, I understand that that river fills nearly at the same time. The reasons why I think that the most favorable season for operations against the Marhatta nation are as follow :

1st. The Marhatta army is principally composed of cavalry, and their plan of operations against a British army would be to endeavor to cut off its communication with its rear, and to impede the junction of its supplies from the Mysore country. As the rivers are not fordable, as there are no bridges, and no means of passing them, excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult, and might be rendered impossible, to procure, the fullness of the rivers operates as a barrier. It is certain, that the enemy cannot pass them in large numbers, and it is probable that they would not venture to throw across a small body, or rather, that they would not be able to prevail upon a small body to remain on a different side from the main body of their army. The inconvenience and delay which the British army experience in crossing the rivers by means of boats, when they are full, is trifling; and, in fact, they would experience no inconvenience or delay, if good pontoons were provided, and a bridge were thrown across each river for the passage of the army. The communication might afterwards be kept up by means of the common basket boats. If the army should be thus equipped with a bridge, the Marhattas would never dare to detach a body across any river, for the purpose of annoying our communications. Thus, then, we should enjoy all the advantage of a river not fordable, to shorten the line of our communication, which river our enemy could not pass with a large body of troops, and over which he would not dare to detach a small body; and we should have it in our power to pass it with as much ease, and with as little inconvenience and delay, as we should experience if the river were fordable.

2dly. The Marhatta country in general is but ill supplied with water. The rains which fill these rivers, although not heavy at the beginning of the rainy season, are sufficient to fill many nullahs; and an army has at this time some chance of being supplied with water, of which, in the dry season, it is certain it would never find much, and frequently none. The inconvenience to be apprehended from the rains is trifling. It is true,

* This Memorandum was written in September, 1801.

that heavy rain would ruin the cattle of the army, and would put the roads in such a state as to render them impracticable for wheel carriages. But heavy rain for any long continuance is not to be expected in the Marhatta territory; and particularly not early in the season. During the last season, which was extraordinarily severe upon the coast, we had only two days of distressing rain; but we had some rain nearly on every day.

The Marhatta country is in general a fine black soil, very fertile, and highly cultivated. The roads are all excellent, excepting when the rain is heavy. At that time the black cotton mould becomes a swamp, through which it is scarcely practicable for a man to move; the wheels of the carriages sink to their axletrees, are clogged with mud, and it is impossible for the cattle to draw them. The produce of this fertile country is jowarry principally, and other dry grains, but no rice. This is the great difficulty with which our army would have to contend. The rice which must be procured for them must be brought from the distant rice countries in Mysore, or from Canara, with which country, in the rainy season, it is impossible to keep up a communication. The army also might depend upon procuring some sheep and bullocks in the Marhatta territory; but if its European force should be large, it will certainly require supplies of the former from Mysore, and, in any case, supplies from thence of the latter. It is well known that jowarry straw is the best kind of forage for horses and cattle, and of this there is an abundance everywhere; and besides this forage, it seldom happens that green forage cannot be found.

The means of defending this country are trifling; and it must depend upon the strength of the army which is in it, compared with that of the British army. All the strong places are liable to be carried by assault, excepting, perhaps Darwar or Kooshgul; and it is doubtful whether these last might not be thus taken, if attacked by resolute troops.

Having thus detailed my observations on the Marhatta territory, with a view to operations within it, I come to state those which I would recommend, and the preparatory steps to be taken, in order to have the means of carrying them on with vigor, celerity, and effect. The first object in any Marhatta war, commenced in the season which I think most favorable to a British army, would be to push the enemy across the Kistna, and to establish ourselves firmly on that river as a barrier, from which we could advance to their capital, or to suit other ulterior objects as might be held out. I would propose, then, to assemble the troops at Chittledroog; but they must be provided with every necessary before they arrive there, as nothing at all useful to military operations can be procured at that place.

The army ought to be provided with pontoons and other materials for building a bridge. On account of the difficulty of procuring rice and arrack in the Marhatta territory, a large store ought to be collected and kept at Chittledroog, and another at Hurryhur. This last place ought to be repaired, and put in a defensible state for a small garrison, as well for a point of communication with the Mysore country for the army when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, as for a post to guard the basket boats, &c., which must be made use of to convey over the Toombuddra the supplies which must follow the army. The fort at Hullihall, in Soonda, ought also to be put in repair. Granaries and storehouses, for

arrack and for military stores, ought to be built at this station. Large stores of rice and arrack for the supply of the army, when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, and certain military stores, ought to be collected at Hullihall. This post, if strengthened, would be an excellent depôt, and would be supplied at all times without difficulty, from Bombay by Goa.

The army, being assembled at Chittledroog, should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur. Its first object should be to drive the enemy across the river Werdah, and to establish itself between these two rivers. After this shall be effected, it might cross the Werdah. The best place for this will be between Deogherry and Savanore. It must be recollected, that, although the army will cross this river by its bridge, it will still be necessary that it should be provided with basket boats, in order that its supplies may cross the river likewise. These, or materials to make them, cannot be procured at or near Deogherry, and the boats must, therefore, be brought from the Mysore country. The boatmen must likewise come from the Mysore country. It will be necessary to establish a post upon the Werdah, as a guard for the boats, which, otherwise, it would be in the power of the enemy to seize or destroy, as a link in the communication with Mysore, and in order effectually to establish the British power in the country between that river and the Toombuddra.

The next object would be to get possession of Darwar. The straight road to that place, by Savanore and Hoobly, is the best. If the rains should have been heavy, the road to Darwar should be from Savanore to Bindigherry, and along the Soonda hills. The soil near these hills is red, and the roads are practicable, even in rainy weather. In my opinion, Darwar can be taken by a *coup de main*. The attack ought to be made on the south-west side. Means might be adopted for keeping down the fire of the besieged, by one of cannon from two hills, on which the Bhow's and the British batteries were erected in the former war, and by an enfilading fire from a height above a tank on the north-west angle. The assailants might move, under cover of the back of that tank, to the foot of the glacis, where they would be covered from the fire of the besieged. They might move along the foot of the glacis till they should come opposite the hills above mentioned. They ought then to possess themselves of a square and a round work in the glacis, by turning them by the covert way. They ought to be provided with fascines to fill a part of the ditch, and they might escalate the outer wall, taking care to carry over some ladders for the purpose of escalating the inner wall.

After having got within the outer wall, they should turn to their left, and proceed to a tank between the two walls. Along the back of this tank, it is said, there is a passage over the inner ditch to a gateway. At this gateway the wall is not more than 20 feet high, and might easily be escalated. This passage is represented as being an aqueduct from the tank outside, on the north-west angle of the fort, into the body of the place. There is a passage for water from this tank through the glacis, and it is probable that it leads over both the ditches. At the same time that this attack should be made, another ought to be directed against the gateway, which is on the south-east face. There are other gates. The

party which should proceed on this attack might also get under the glacis, by the back of the tank above mentioned; only it should proceed along the northern face, and round to the gateway by that route. After blowing open the gates in the outer wall, it is said that the inner wall, near its gate, is not more than 20 feet high. This party ought also to be provided with scaling ladders.

If the attack should fail, or if, from any reason, it should be thought advisable to attack the place regularly, and to effect a breach in the walls, the only mode of doing this is, by erecting the breaching battery on the crest of the glacis. The face to be attacked will be the same. The troops would establish themselves under the glacis, and in the round and square works within it, as I have above recommended. These works would be excellent flanks to the trenches under the glacis. The troops would have to work back to the hills above mentioned, on which the Bhow's batteries were erected in the last war; and at which would, of course, be collected the reserve for the trenches.

Having, by one of these modes, got possession of Darwar, but particularly if by assault, all the other places in the country would fall of course. The first object would be to establish a garrison and the dépôts in that place.

The garrison, &c., might be moved forward from Hullah, which ought still to be held by a small force, as a post of communication with the sea coast. The enemy should then be driven across the Malpoorba, and the country between the rivers should be cleared entirely. Boats should be made and prepared, and the army should cross the Malpoorba between Doodwar and Moorgoor. A post should be established on the river for the care of the boats.

The river Malpoorba is more rapid than the Werdah or the Toombudra, is more liable to rise and fall suddenly, and therefore the enemy would be more likely to return from the country between that river and the Gutpurba, than from that between the Malpoorba and the Werdah. The only place which, on this route, is worthy of attention, is Belgaum: this place has a wet ditch, but I am informed that it is dry in parts, and that the place is otherwise liable to be taken by assault. Belgaum lies to the westward of the high road to the Kistna, and is situated in a rice country. It might be possible to draw supplies from this country; and, with this view, it might be desirable to have a garrison of British troops in Belgaum: otherwise it will be useless.

The fort of Badamy, which is esteemed of some strength, lies north of the Malpoorba, but about 70 or 80 miles from the road to the Kistna. Unless it was found that the enemy hung about this fort, it would be better not to lose any time in going to attack it, until they are all driven across the Kistna. If they hang about Badamy, it must be attacked. Badamy ought, more properly, to be called two forts than one. There are two forts on two separate hills, and a fortified pettah between them. It appears to me that the hill forts might be taken by storm, by approaching them from the westward.

After the enemy should have been driven across the Gutpurba, this river ought to be crossed in the same manner as the Malpoorba, somewhere near Gokauk, and a post ought to be established upon it.

Jan. 1802. Since the commencement of this Memorandum was written, the Company have got possession of the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra, which river has become their northern boundary; and it may, perhaps, be thought that the plan of operations, in case of a war with the Marhattas, ought to be altered. There are several reasons, however, for which they should continue to be the same.

Firstly: The treaty, by which the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra have been ceded to the Company, has allied it more closely with the Nizam, whose interests now appear to be inseparable from those of the Company. The quarrel of the Company, therefore, with the Marhattas, which may create a necessity for any military operations, will equally involve the Nizam; and it will be necessary that measures should be taken, either by himself or by the Company, to defend the Dooab from the incursions of the Marhattas.

Secondly: The defence of the Dooab will provide for that of the Ceded districts, which that country covers entirely. If the Nizam's army is collected at Copaul, and Moodgul is occupied with strength, it would be impossible for the Marhatta army to make any impression of consequence on the Dooab, or to penetrate the Ceded countries in any strength. It may be a question whether, when the British army should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, the army of the Nizam should not immediately cross the Kistna, and guard his Highness' frontier to the northward of that river, if they should not operate offensively upon the enemy. At all events, they ought to cross the Kistna as soon as the Marhattas begin to retire from the countries to the southward of the rivers which fall into the Kistna. But it may be said, as the Company have now got possession of extensive countries immediately to the southward of the Toombuddra, and in the neighbourhood of the Marhatta territory, they ought to carry on their operations from thence, and leave Mysore to its own defence. There are several objections to this measure, which I will detail.

1st. Mysore is very defenceless towards the Marhatta territory: a body of Marhatta horse would overrun the whole of the rich province of Bednore, would plunder Bednore itself, and might push their devastations to within 60 miles of Seringapatani, without the chance of danger or molestation.

2ndly. They would immediately connect themselves, and act in co-operation with the polygars along the range of the western ghauts, as far as Koorg; and probably the provinces of Malabar and Canara would be the scene of their intrigues, and the Company's dependants in those provinces would take arms.

3rdly. The countries into which they would thus push themselves are those from which supplies of rice for the army must be drawn, when it enters the Marhatta territory; and thus rice must come by the road of which the enemy would have possession.

4thly. The first step to be taken, after crossing the Toombuddra (supposed at Anagoondy), would be to clear out the countries beyond the Werdah, of the detachments of the enemy which would have entered them, and thus much valuable time would be lost. Therefore, there is no doubt but that it would be best to assemble the troops at once at Chittledroog, and to cross them quickly over the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, by which

measure a stop will be immediately put to the operations of the enemy in that quarter.

In case it should be determined to enter the enemy's country by Ana-goondy and Copaul, either with the whole British army, leaving Mysore defenceless, or with the Nizam's army in co-operation with the British troops collected in Mysore, the first place of consequence which will be met with is Dummul. This is a stone fort, the walls of which are above 35 feet high, with a dry ditch of unequal depth. On the south and west sides there is the flank of a tank, and some rough ground and buildings which give cover to the near approach of a body of troops. In the centre nearly of the south side there is an old gateway, now blocked up, where the place may be escaladed with ease. There is a trench cut across the road that used to lead to the gate, which, however, may be easily passed. The gateway, also, on the north face leading to the pettah, may be attacked with advantage.

The road from Dummul to Hoobly and Darwar is good in dry weather; but during the heavy rains it is impassable, as there are about 20 miles of the black cotton soil which I have above mentioned. If the rains should be heavy, the best road for a body of troops, marching from Dummul to Darwar, would be by Sirhitty, Luckmaisir, and Savanore, and along the Soonda hills.

Kooshgul lies not far from the direct road from Dummul, by Hoobly, to Darwar. This place is strong, from its situation and its works. It is situated in the middle of a plain of cotton ground. There is no water within several miles of it for the supply of an army; and it is surrounded by 2 walls, 2 ditches, a covert way, and glacis. The ditches, however, though deep, are very narrow, and might easily be filled up, particularly that one in the glacis. On the east side of the south face there is a dam of some water across the outer ditch, over which it would be very practicable to pass; and it appeared to me that it would be most easy to assault the inner fort on the same side. It is to be recollected, however, that, after having passed the outer ditch in the glacis, the assailants would have to pass into the covert way, an inner ditch, the outer wall, and afterwards the inner wall, to parts of which there is no ditch. It is clear that this place can be taken by a *coup de main*, and probably in no other manner; but I strongly recommend that it should be avoided if possible, and that its fall should be considered as dependent upon that of Darwar.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Boles, commg. in Malabar, &c. Deenelly, 5th Oct. 1802.

I have laid your letter of the 29th ult., and the copy of charges against Lieut. —, of the 1st batt. 2nd regt., which accompanied it, before Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore; and I am directed to inform you that, upon a reconsideration of the reasoning upon Lieut. —'s case, as stated in Col. Wellesley's letter to you of the 1st Sept. last, he is convinced of its truth; and, in conformity thereto, he considers it very improper that an officer should be put in arrest for crimes charged against him at his own request. Col. Wellesley will not, therefore, order a General Court Martial to be assembled for the trial of Lieut. —; and in case Major — should think proper to refer this subject to the Commander in Chief, the Colonel requests that his letter of the 1st Sept., all the papers which were then referred to him and were the subject of it, and this letter, may be laid before his Excellency likewise.

Supposing that Col. Wellesley had been inclined to order a General Court Martial to be assembled for the trial of Lieut. —, he has observed that the paper reporting the arrest of that officer is informal, as it has not the signature affixed to it of the officer who put him in arrest, viz. Major —; and, further, that the charge of ungentlemanlike behaviour is not drawn and laid against Lieut. — according to the terms of the Articles of War, the words *scandalous and infamous* being omitted, which, indeed, is not extraordinary, as the charge is, in fact, given against Lieut. — by himself; and that the facts, on which this charge is grounded, are not so clearly specified as the customs of war require that they should. Col. Wellesley's reason for directing the last remark to be made is that, if Lieut. — should be tried, he is determined that all the transactions at Mr. —'s house, which are to be the subject of trial, shall come before the Court Martial, and that the trial shall not be a joke, conducted by Lieut. — and his friends, in order to procure an acquittal, upon his partial representation of the case. It is the Colonel's decided opinion that Lieut. — ought not to be tried, and he will not order a General Court Martial for that purpose; and he recommends to Major — to release him from the state of arrest, in which he has been improperly placed: but, if the result of what has passed should be that Lieut. — is brought to trial, and the charge is not altered, Col. Wellesley will give orders to the Judge Advocate in Malabar to take care that the evidence which will be brought before the Court is full, and that it may give the members of the Court Martial a complete knowledge of all the facts which occurred in Mr. —'s house, which are to be the subject of trial.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. J. Brown, on escort with stores. Seringapatam, 23rd Oct. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to desire that you will proceed by the following stages, viz. Hoossinpoor on the 24th, Cuttammullawaddy on the 25th, Periapattam on the 26th, Seedapoor on the 27th, Veerajundrapett on the 28th, Stony river on the 29th, Eercoor on the 30th, and Cannanore on the 31st. As there is a possibility of disturbances existing in the district of Cotiote in Malabar, Col. Wellesley desires that you will encamp on the 29th on the east or left bank of the Stony river, at the foot of the ghaut, which, being in the Koorg country, will be so much the safer; and on your march the next day to Eercoor, it is necessary that you be particularly on your guard, by keeping your convoy as close together as possible, and covering it with an advance rear and flank guards, with loaded arms; and, although the march be long, you must neither halt to dress or eat victuals, nor to unload your cattle, even for a minute.

The officer commanding in Malabar will be informed of your march, and will be directed to order a strong detachment to advance from Eercoor on the morning of the 30th, which will meet you about Victoor, and return with you to Eercoor, from which you will proceed to Cannanore as above, or according to such instructions as you may receive from the officer commanding in Malabar. Having delivered the stores and cattle, you will return with your company by the same route, and with the same precautions, to Seringapatam. If you receive orders from Lieut. Col. Boles to halt in Koorg, you will do so, and report the circumstance to me.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Boles.

Seringapatam, 23rd Oct. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to inform you that Lieut. Brown will march to-morrow morning with a company of sepoy, escorting camp equipage, dooley bearers, bamboo coolies, and carriage bullocks, for the use of the European troops who may be ordered into the field in Malabar, of which a particular list will be forwarded to you hereafter, and some stores for the 2nd batt. 3rd regt. Lieut. Brown will be at Stony River on the 29th instant, and is directed to encamp that night on the left bank, in the Koorg country, and to march the next day to Eercoor without halting, as that is the stage on which an enemy, if there be one, can best annoy the convoy. The Colonel requests that you will order up 2 companies of sepoy, or such other party as from circumstances you may deem necessary, from Cannanore to Eercoor on the 29th, with instructions to march early the next morning on the road to Stony River, until they meet Lieut. Brown with his escort, when the two parties will unite and march to Eercoor, according to Lieut. Brown's instructions. They will proceed

the next day to Cannanore, from which Col. Wellesley requests that you will permit Lieut. Brown to return with his company to this place. If you find it necessary to detain Lieut. Brown in Koorg, on account of disturbances in Cotiote, he may receive your orders at Veerajundrapett on the 28th, and he is directed to obey them.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Brown, Hullyhall.

Seringapatam, 31st Oct. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to inform you that, there being a probability of the 1st batt. 3rd regt., Bombay N. I., quitting Goa, and going up to Bombay, the object in ordering a company of the 1st batt. 5th regt. to march from Hullyhall to Goa is that there may be a sufficient number of British troops there to take charge of and guard the ordnance, military, and provision stores now there belonging to the Company, which the 1st batt. 3rd regt. will not carry along with it. You will, therefore, direct the officer in command of the company above mentioned to put himself under the orders of the officer commanding the British troops at Goa, on his arrival there, and inform him that, in the event of the 1st batt. 3rd regt. sailing for Bombay, his duty will be to take charge of the ordnance and military and provision stores, and generally of every thing belonging to the Hon. Company which may be left by that corps at Goa, and to remain there in charge of the same till he receives further orders from Col. Wellesley. He ought to report to the Colonel, or to me for his information, his arrival at Goa, and all circumstances that may occur connected with his duty as above detailed.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Boles.

3rd Nov. 1802.

Capt. Gurnell entered Wynaad on the 27th ult., having been opposed by the nairs at the Bawally nullah or boundary, where they had 1 man killed and 2 wounded, and we 1 sepoy wounded. The next day he marched to Mannutwaddy, and had a true nair engagement. They had chosen good ground, and where a nullah prevented his getting quickly amongst them, and attacked a party of the Mysore horse and their followers and the bazaars; 4 horsemen and 4 followers were killed there, and some ran away. The detachment, however, made their intended march to Manuntwaddy, with only 1 sepoy wounded. The next day, 5 companies joined Capt. Watson, and went to look for the enemy at a pagoda which they had stockaded, but found it evacuated. On the 30th, Capt. Watson marched with his own party towards Tanbercherry, and 5 companies of Capt. Gurnell's returned to the Bawally nullah with the horse, for which the country was found to be too wet at present. They saw no enemy. Harris came out as far as Kakumnullah to take up some rice and other things collected there, and marched again on the 1st. Capt. Gurnell had seen Major Drummond when he wrote on the 30th, but had not learned any plan ordered by you or proposed by the Major for the future operations of the troops in Wynaad; and as Col. Wellesley has not heard from you since the 20th ult., nor seen any

G. O.

Seringapatam, 26th Oct 1802.

Col. Wellesley was much pleased with the performance of the regiment "de Memon" at the inspection, and it appears that the officers of that corps have taken much pains to make it perfect. Col. Wellesley will make a favorable report on its state of discipline to the Commander in Chief.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 29th Oct. 1802.

Col. Wellesley was much pleased with the appearance of the 2nd batt. 3rd regt. at the inspection. He observed particularly that the sepoys were expert in that essential part of their discipline, the use of their arms in firing ball cartridge, to which the officers must have paid attention.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 2nd Nov. 1802.

Frequent instances having occurred of applications being sent to head quarters through irregular channels, all of which have been returned by the Commander in Chief, Col. Wellesley desires that it may be understood by the officers of the army, that the mode of making an application to head quarters is first through the immediate commanding officer of the corps or station to which they belong, and then through the commanding officer of their division of the army. It is probable that applications sent in any other channel will not be attended to.

letter from Malabar of older date, excepting Lieut. Brown's report of his arrival at Eercoor, he has desired me to write to you the above detail of Capt. Gurnell's movements, and to request that you will make him acquainted with the situation of affairs in Cotiote, your operations for the last 14 days, and your future plans.

The D.A.G. to the Officers commg. stations in Mysore.

4th Nov. 1802.

Complaints having been made by the Dewan of Mysore, through the Resident, to the Hon. Col. A. Wellesley commanding, that, for 2 months or more, rupees have been issued in great numbers from the pay office at Chittledroog under the denomination of sicca rupees, at the same exchange as the Company's rupees, although they are of much less value; and those rupees, being necessarily passed by the troops at the rate they receive them, have occasioned so great a loss to the inhabitants of the country, that the Rajah's government have been obliged to cry down the rupees known in this country by the name of sicca rupees, and to prohibit their being received by the inhabitants in any manner or at any rate of exchange; Col. Wellesley has in consequence not only sanctioned the recall of a number of those rupees lately issued at Chittledroog, but also forbidden any more of them being offered to the troops; and he has directed me to inform you of those rupees being prohibited from passing in this country, or issued at the pay offices, and he authorises you to refuse to receive them, if any shall be offered in future payments of the troops under your command.

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

Seringapatam, 9th Nov. 1802.

Having lately received from Lieut. Col. Whitlocke information that the amildar of Chittledroog had stopped the circulation of certain rupees, called sicca rupees, which the troops had received from the pay office at that station, I approved of an order which that officer had issued, in which he required the pay office to exchange the coins of that description remaining in the hands of the troops, amounting to 8000 rupees. I, besides, gave directions to Lieut. Col. Whitlocke to ascertain what sum of money remained in the pay office at Chittledroog, specifying in what coins; and I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter and its enclosure just received from him, by which it appears that there is a large sum at Chittledroog in these sicca rupees, which coins the pay office writers declare that they have received from the amildar: I conclude that this has been on account of the Rajah's kist.

I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to ascertain whether the Rajah's servants have paid any coins of this description into the pay office at Chittledroog, and what number; and generally in what coins they have paid money into that office since the month of May last. If they should have paid these coins into the pay office, it will be necessary either that they should exchange them, or that they should enforce their circulation at the same rates at which they have paid them in. But if they should not have paid them, the prohibition of their circulation ought to be continued, as they are a very base coin; and I shall commence an inquiry into the mode by which they came into the paymaster's office.

In the mean time I have reason to apprehend that, as the circulation of these coins is stopped, and the sum at Chittledroog besides is so small, the troops will suffer some inconvenience on account of the want of their pay for the last month. I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will let me know whether it is in the power of the Rajah's servants to lodge a sum of money in the pay office of Chittledroog for a similar sum which will be paid to them here.

The D.A.G. to Officer commg. 1st batt. 8th regt. N.I.

9th Nov. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, has already sent you orders to furnish working parties from the corps under your command, to be employed in constructing certain works which Capt. Davies will erect in Wynaad; and he has directed me to desire that the bills for working money may be made out, as for troops in the field in situations of danger from an enemy, while that circumstance exists, and afterwards for the common working money, and that you will transmit an abstract of the numbers of men furnished daily for the preceding week, every Sunday, specifying the circumstances under which they worked, in order that the same may be laid before the Commander in Chief, that his Excellency's sanction may be obtained for the rate of working money, previous to the bills being presented to the paymaster for payment.

JOURNAL of the measures taken, arrangements made, and orders given, in consequence of the notice received from Mr. Webbe and the Commander in Chief, that it was probable that an Army would be assembled on the Toombuddra, with a view to operations in the Marhatta Territory.*

[*This Journal was commenced that nothing might be omitted or forgotten in the various equipments and arrangements required in the projected expedition; which being completed, the Journal was discontinued.*]

12th Nov. 1802. Received a letter from Mr. Webbe, dated the 9th, giving me notice of the probability that an army would be assembled on the Toombuddra.

I had a communication with Mr. Piele, in which I urged him to desire Purneah to put the forts of Hurryhur and Hoonelly in decent repair. I gave him notice of the probable want of grain and rice, and desired him to urge the Dewan to stop the exportation of the former entirely, and of the latter from the countries bordering on the ghauts. I likewise desired him to give notice to the Dewan that we should want 20,000 sheep *per mensem*, and that they ought to begin to collect between Sera and Chittledroog. I desired the Commissary of stores of Seringapatam to prepare an equipment for a force which would require 20 field pieces, and to repair all the carriages that required it.

I wrote to Capt. Johnson, of the Bombay engineers, to desire that he would carry into execution his plan for removing six 12 pounders from Goa to Hullihall.

I wrote to Lieut. Dillon, the acting Resident at Goa, to request that he would undertake to remove to Hullihall all the Company's stores at Goa, beginning with the arrack and the 12 pounder shot.

I wrote to Mr. Reeves, the Paymaster; Major Doolan, the commanding officer at Goa; and Mr. Read, the Collector, to urge the adoption of all the measures which could facilitate these operations. I ordered Mr. Gordon to lay in 30 garces of rice, at Hullihall in Soonda.

I wrote to Mr. Read, to request he would facilitate this measure, and that he would let me know how much more Soonda could supply.

Capt. Barclay wrote, by my orders, to the brinjarry gomastah, Mutrin Lallah, to desire him to come up from Conjeveram immediately, and to inform him that all the brinjarries in the Carnatic, Mysore, and Ceded districts would be immediately wanted; that they were to load, and join the army. He also wrote to all the naigs of the brinjarries, directing them to load and wait for orders to move.

* There are many letters, &c., noted in this Journal as having been written, of which there are no drafts or copies to be found in the papers of the Duke of Wellington.

I received a letter from Gen. Stuart, of the 9th, ordering certain corps to be prepared for the field, and certain other preparations, and desiring my opinions on certain points. I gave him those opinions in a letter of this date.

13th Nov. Capt. Barclay, by my orders, gave directions to the garrison storekeeper to prepare 30,000 lbs. of salt beef for the European troops, and kegs for it. He also desired him to entertain 3000 carriage bullocks. He also desired him to stop the sale of gram at Chittledroog. To beat out the paddy at Chittledroog and Hullihall. To purchase rice in this neighbourhood, and to report when 1000 bags should be ready.

14th Nov. The officers commanding the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry were ordered to hold their corps in readiness for field service, and to make the necessary preparations.

15th Nov. I gave authority to make advances to the bullock owners, of 2 pagodas for each bullock.

16th Nov. I made a report to Gen. Stuart upon the subject of the bullock establishment in a letter of this date.

17th Nov. I received a letter from the Sec. of the Military board, dated 12th Nov., ordering doolies to be repaired. Ordered. I received from Gen. Stuart a letter of the 13th Nov., apprising me of stores being sent from Madras, requiring gunny bags from Cannanore and Tellicherry, information regarding the galloper carriages attached to corps of cavalry in Mysore, and brinjaries. I reported to the General, in a letter of this date, the state of the galloper guns of the regiments; the number of brinjarry cattle, as far as I had accounts of them; the arrangement of the proposed depôts at Hurryhur. I wrote to Lieut. Col. Boles to order up the rice bags from Tellicherry and Cannanore. It was reported to me that the arrack kegs in store, at Hullihall in Soonda, were in bad condition. I wrote to Lieut. Dillon, the acting Resident at Goa, to desire that he would take measures to have them repaired: I desired that he would send for them, if he should require them, to carry up the arrack from Goa. I apprised him that I had applied for arrack and salt provisions to Mr. Duncan, which I begged him to forward to Hullihall.

I wrote to Major Doolan, to desire he would also assist in repairing the arrack kegs at Hullihall, and in removing them to Goa, if wanted.

I wrote to Mr. Duncan, to request that he would send arrack, in large quantities, to Goa, consigned to the care of the acting Resident, and 400 kegs, with iron hoops, of 4 gallons each. Also 30,000 lbs. of salt provisions, packed in kegs of 45 lbs. each.

Capt. Barclay gave directions, by my order, to the 1st of the 2nd, 2nd of the 3rd, 2nd of the 18th, and 2nd of the 10th, to prepare for field service, and to provide carriages for the sick.

18th Nov. I had a conversation with Mr. Anderson upon the subject of the medical arrangements of the troops in the field: in consequence of which, I gave Mr. Piele a memorandum of articles which would be required to construct temporary buildings at Hurryhur for a field hospital.

I reported to Gen. Stuart the request I had made to Mr. Duncan, and recommended that a Resident might still be kept at Goa, although our troops were withdrawn.

I ordered 50 artillery men from Malabar, with 120 gun lascars.

19th Nov. I forwarded to Gen. Stuart Mr. Anderson's proposed medical arrangements, with my remarks. I reported to him that there were 20 tents in store for the 1st batt. of artillery at Seringapatam. I ordered that as many gunny bags as could be procured in a month should be made at Seringapatam, Chittledroog, Paughur, Hullihall, Mudgherry, and Nugur. Likewise that 30,000 lbs. of biscuit should be prepared.

20th Nov. Received a letter from Gen. Stuart, of the 16th, desiring me to order ammunition, &c., to be prepared for six 12 pounders, with a proportion of shells. Ordered. Likewise allowing me to order lead from Paughur, Mudgherry, and Mergasy, to Chittledroog, or elsewhere.

21st Nov. I wrote to Capt. Baynes, to order it to Chittledroog, notwithstanding any orders to the contrary he might receive from the Military board. Likewise desiring me to send off as many cattle as might be spared from the Mysore equipments. I ordered 400 to Madras.

I received a letter from the Military board, of the 16th, ordering 500,000 musket and 20,000 carbine balls to be cast; and wooden bottoms of sizes for shot to be prepared in the arsenal of Seringapatam. Ordered.

I received a letter from the Military board, desiring that 4 howitzer carriages at Seringapatam might be repaired. I reported to the Board that they were repairable for garrison purposes only, in a letter of this date.

I wrote a letter to Gen. Stuart, in which I again recommended that the cattle might not be sent to the Carnatic. I observed upon the number of guns to be sent from the Carnatic, and compared them with those ordered here, and those that could be provided in this country. I recommended that the whole equipment, excepting the four 18 pounders and 4 howitzers, might be provided in this country.

I received a letter from Gen. Stuart, dated the 17th, in which he desires I will order Capt. Scott to prepare platform carts.

22nd Nov. I wrote to Gen. Stuart, and informed him that it appeared that Capt. Scott could prepare the 6 pounder gallopers, and not the platform carts: that I, therefore, indented for 20 carts.

In consequence of my proposition of yesterday to Gen. Stuart, to prepare 26 field pieces in Mysore, I wrote to Col. Whitelocke, to prepare 6 field pieces, and to send 19 tumbrils to Seringapatam, by bullocks, which were sent off for that purpose.

To examine the musket ammunition in store.

I gave Mr. Piele a detailed memorandum regarding the mode of supplying gram for three objects, viz. to have 7000 stock in the Gram Agent General's department on the frontier; to have a bullock load for each horse in the regimental stock on the frontier; to have a supply of gram in stations there, so that none in the Gram Agent General's stock should be touched.

I ordered up the gun bullocks stationed at Mangalore.

23rd Nov. I ordered that the gram at Chittledroog, and arrack kegs, &c., at Hullihall, might not be sold according to the orders of the Military board, and reported this to the Commander in Chief.

24th Nov. I received a letter from Gen. Stuart, in which he informed me that he should require field pieces from Mysore only for the 7 corps

which would pass through Mysore from the southward, and come from garrisons in this country, and for the 33rd regt., and 4 iron 12 pounders from Chittledroog, and in answer to mine of the 13th.

I reported to the General, in a letter of this date, my notion of a depôt at Hurryhur: likewise the arrangements made for the supply of gram.

I received a report from Col. Boles, that the gunny bags were sand bags.

25th Nov. In consequence of Gen. Stuart's letter of the 19th, I countermanded the 6 pounders ordered on the 22nd, at Chittledroog, and directed 4 iron 18 pounders to be completed there. I likewise countermanded four 6 pounders at Seringapatam, and ordered 4 tumbrils, with fixed ammunition, to be prepared for 4 iron guns at Chittledroog.

I gave Mr. Gordon orders to prepare servants for the depôt at Hurryhur: likewise to lay in gram at that station. My reason for deferring to give these orders to this period is, that I know the gram was to be in bags, of which we had none; that the first of it would go from Seringapatam, and that the bullocks are only now ready.

26th Nov. I received a letter from Capt. Walker of the 23rd, in which he requires the communication of my sentiments upon two points connected with this department, viz. the mode of paying for gram procured in Mysore, and that of procuring it. I answered this letter, and gave my opinion upon both points in detail, and pointed out the object of the arrangements for procuring gram, and how they were to be carried into execution.

I received a letter from Gen. Stuart, of the 22nd Nov., in which he tells me that he approves of not sending the public cattle to Madras. I countermanded those ordered away on the 21st.

I gave Mr. Piele a memorandum upon the subject of the depôt at Hurryhur, in which I required that Purneah might repair the pagodas there; that he might give me the list of the names of places in that neighbourhood in which rice could be procured; that he would try to get some gunny bags for the service from Purneah.

30th Nov. Received from Gen. Stuart a letter of the 26th, in which he details the pieces of ordnance required from Mysore, amounting to 20 field pieces. In consequence thereof, wrote to Col. Whitelocke, to prepare 4 field pieces, with 6 tumbrils, including the 2 field pieces heretofore ordered. Desired him also to send here only 18 instead of 19 tumbrils, heretofore ordered.

Received a letter from the Military board of the 26th, ordering from 2000 to 2500 four and half inch shells, 600 to be filled, fused, &c., and arms and accoutrements for the 1st of the 3rd. Ordered.

I wrote to Gen. Stuart, and pointed out that, if the shells above mentioned were surplus to 300 he had ordered, we should require 12 tumbrils to carry them: if not, 6 tumbrils.

1st Dec. Conceiving there was a mistake respecting the report from Col. Boles, that the gunny bags in Malabar were sand bags, I wrote to Col. Montresor, to desire that he would inquire whether there were none in charge of the Garrison storekeeper; and, if there were any, to send them up.

2nd Dec. I this day ordered Mr. Gordon to entertain 1000 more bullocks, making, in the whole, 5000.

4th Dec. I had a conversation with the vakcel of Goklah, upon the subject of the disposition of his master, and of the other Marhatta chiefs on the frontier, in the present crisis, and reported the result to Gen. Stuart, in a letter of this date. I desired Butcha Rao to send for Govind Rao, whom I intend to dispatch into the Marhatta country to gain intelligence upon the same points.

I wrote to the Resident at Goa, to desire him to purchase 30 leaguers of arrack, which he reported to be in a ship in Goa roads.

I wrote to Col. Montresor, to desire him to send the 1st of the 8th out of Wynaad, so that they may be here by the 15th.

To Major Doolan.

Seringapatam, 12th Nov. 1802.

I have to inform you that I have given directions to Capt. Johnson of the engineers, who heretofore offered his services for that purpose, to move from Goa to Hullihall six 12 pounders. At the former place you will be so kind as to afford to Capt. Johnson every assistance he may require, that the garrison under your command can give, whether in bullocks, lascars, troops as escorts, or as working parties. You will likewise be so kind as to inform the amildar that I have written to Mr. Read, the collector, to apply for assistance in making the road for these guns up the Tenim ghaut. He will of course receive his orders from Mr. Read upon that subject in due time; but I beg that he will make his arrangements to afford it at the earliest possible period after he shall receive them.

Besides these guns, certain ordnance and provision stores will likewise be sent from Goa to Hullihall; I have requested the acting Resident, Lieut. Dillon, to have them forwarded, and to communicate to you the extent and nature of the assistance which he will require from you: you will be so kind as to give every assistance to forward this service which your garrison can afford.

I have desired the paymaster in Mysore to lay in 30 garces of rice at Hullihall. I beg to have from you returns of the ordnance, military, and provision and garrison stores at present at Hullihall.

The D.A.G. to Major Doolan, Hullihall.

16th Nov. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, has received your letter of the 12th, and the copy of your garrison orders which accompanied it. In regard to Capt. Johnson's application, that officer has received the instructions of the Military board concerning the mode in which the work at Hullihall is to be carried on, and Col. Wellesley cannot sanction any deviation from the board's orders. If they are incompatible with present circumstances, Capt. Johnson will of course represent that to the board. Col. Wellesley further desires, that you will neither raise nor circulate any report of war that may alarm the inhabitants of the country, and that you will confine yourself to the discipline of the troops under your command, to the particular duties attached to the command of the port of Hullihall, and to those specified in his last letter to you.

To Major Doolan.

Seringapatam, 17th Nov. 1802.

I have written to Lieut. Dillon, the acting Resident at Goa, to request that, if he should have occasion for them, he will call for the kegs in

store at Hullihall, in order to remove thither the arrack in store at Goa. You will be so kind as to communicate with Lieut. Dillon, and attend to all his requisitions upon this subject. The arrack kegs require repairs; and, if Lieut. Dillon should want them, he will either send people to Hullihall to repair them, or he will have them repaired after they shall be brought to Goa. If Lieut. Dillon should require you to send the kegs to Goa, and does not send people for them, you will indent upon the paymaster for the number of people wanted for this service; you will desire his servant, stationed at Hullihall, to comply immediately with this indent; and you will urge the amildar to give him every assistance in his power to enable him to comply with it.

To Lieut. Dillon, Envoy at Goa.

Seringapatam, 17th Nov. 1802.

By a letter transmitted to me by Major Budden, I observe that the Governor General has ordered that the troops may be withdrawn from Goa. I hope, however, that you are to remain; and, at all events, I beg that you will remain there, till you receive the further orders of government. In the present situation of affairs in this part of India, it is essentially necessary that a person should reside at Goa, on the part of the British government, who possesses the confidence of, and has an influence over, the persons at the head of the government of that settlement.

The D.A.G. to Officers coming batts. and regts. for field service.

17th Nov. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to inform you that the corps under your command will be called upon for field service; and his reason for giving you this early intimation thereof, is that you may be prepared with carriage for the sick agreeably to the regulations. No wheel carriage will be allowed for that purpose, nor for the conveyance of baggage. The Colonel further desires me to request that you will pay every attention to perfecting the corps under your command in firing ball.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Ridge.

21st Nov. 1802.

I have received your public letter of the 19th, but delay to communicate it, officially, to Col. Wellesley until I apprise you of the probable consequences of

G. O.

Seringapatam, 16th Nov. 1802.

Upon the arrival of Col. Montresor in the province of Malabar, all reports of the troops in Malabar and Canara are to be made to him.

Col. Wellesley has every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Lieut. Col. Boles since he has held the command in those provinces, and particularly since the commencement of the present disturbances in Wynnad, and he will report his sentiments on the conduct of Lieut. Col. Boles to the Commander in Chief.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 21st Nov. 1802.

Capt. Scott having reported that ———, of the 77th regt., employed at work in the yard of the gun carriage manufactory, has been repeatedly drunk and absent from his duty, his pay as an artificer is to be discontinued from the 20th inst., and he is to be sent to join his corps by the first opportunity. Further orders respecting this man will be given in the garrison of Seringapatam.

It is necessary that the European artificers should understand that they are not brought to Seringapatam to receive a large allowance and to get drunk. It is essentially necessary that they should perform with regularity the work allotted to them; and if they fail in doing so, their pay as artificers must be stopped.

Accordingly, Capt. Scott is requested to keep an account of the number of days in each month in which any man may be absent from work on account of drunkenness, and a deduction is to be made from the pay of the men thus absent for a proportionable number of days, and credit for this sum is to be given to the Company in the abstracts. Besides, any man who perseveres in these irregular habits will be sent back to his corps, and be otherwise punished.

so doing. The Colonel will not authorise any deviation from the established rules of the service, which lay the *onus* of providing carriage for the sick on the officers commanding Native corps; and if he is to take your letter as an official report, that you cannot provide such carriage, he will order another corps from the field, which can be equipped according to regulations. You have time to make great exertions, and even to write to Major English, who may engage bearers, and doolies, I conceive, may be made anywhere.

The D.A.G. to Major Doolan.

21st Nov. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, has received your letter of the 16th inst., covering a surgeon's certificate, upon which you have thought proper to allow Lieut. B—, of the — regt., to leave his station and go to Goa. The Colonel has directed me to return that certificate to you, and to signify his orders that you will recall Lieut. B— to his station and duty with all possible expedition. He expects to see that officer returned "present" in the next monthly return.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Pogson, 7th regt. Native cavalry.

21st Nov. 1802.

I am directed by Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, to inform you that family certificates cannot be granted to the men of the 7th regt. of cavalry upon the former plan; but another arrangement will be ordered in due time, which has already been tried in this country, and found to be more convenient, safe, and easy, both for the public and individuals.

The D.A.G. to Officer commg. a body of European troops.

23rd Nov. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, has had various reports, for several days past, of a body of armed Europeans having entered the Mysore country to the eastward, and directed their march towards Bangalore. He expected in consequence to have heard from the officer commanding that force, if it was British, of the orders he had received for entering the Mysore country, the time of his doing so, and the object in view, in all of which he has hitherto been disappointed; and the hircarrahs appointed to observe the motions of that body of troops having just reported that they have passed Bangalore, and are advancing towards this garrison, he can delay no longer to call upon you for the information above stated, which he ought to have been furnished with several days ago, if the body of men, under your orders, consists of British troops. Col. Wellesley has therefore directed me to require from you, to what state the troops you command belong, your orders for entering the Mysore country, the time of your doing so, and a communication of the object intended by sending you into this country; unless your instructions are from the Governor in Council of Fort St. George or the Commander in Chief, and are declared to be secret; in which case you will be pleased to say that they are so.

G. O.

Seingajatom 26th Nov 1802.

With a view to render the orders of the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council regarding passports to Europeans travelling through the territories of Fort St. George more efficient in the Mysore country than they have hitherto been, the amildars have been directed to require a sight of his passport from every European, of whatever rank or nation, who may propose to pass through the districts under their respective management; and they have been required in the most positive manner to detain every such European who does not produce a passport corresponding with the printed form transmitted to them by the Resident.

The amildars have been particularly informed that the above orders do not extend to officers commanding bodies of troops, or to those troops, nor to the public officers of government who may have a passport authorizing them to travel post on the public service.

Col. Wellesley publishes the foregoing regulations to all concerned, and he requires all European officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of His Majesty's or of the Hon Company's service, and also all other Europeans proposing to pass through any part of the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, to produce their passports to the servants of his Highness' government whenever they are required to do so; and he directs that, in every case wherein the amildars, thinking that the passport does not correspond with the form transmitted to them, require the person producing it to remain at the place where his passport has been demanded until reference can be made to the Resident, or to the nearest military station, such person shall remain there quietly, without giving any molestation to the amildar or to the inhabitants, until such reference has been made.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Seringapatam, 2nd Dec. 1802.

A vakeel from Goklah, the commanding officer of the Peshwah's troops on the frontier, arrived here yesterday; and, according to the tenor of the orders I formerly received from the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council, upon this subject, I had a communication with him this morning.

He brought me a letter from Goklah, and delivered a long message from him, translations of which I shall have the honor of transmitting to-morrow, as soon as I can procure them. The purport of the letter was a history of the late transactions at Poonah; that he and Holkar could not agree; that the Peshwah had fled below the ghauts, and had desired him to join him with his army; that the road was difficult, and, if he should go there, his presence would be useless; that he was then encamped upon the Kistna, and wanted to know what orders I had to give him. I propose to detain the vakeel until I can receive your answer, if I may; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give me your orders on the subject.

*The D.A.G. to Major * * *, commg. a detachment of H.M. — regt.* 2nd Dec. 1802.

Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to transmit to you the accompanying 3 papers, which are translations of arzees from the soubahdar of Bangalore, and the amildars of Biddedy, Muddoor, and Mundium, to the Dewan of Mysore, containing complaints against you, as commanding officer of the detachment, for certain things said to have been done by your order at the several stages above mentioned; and the Colonel desires to have your answers to each point, particularly the reason of your putting the bazaar people, sent along with you from Bangalore to Ramgerry, in the guard.

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

Seringapatam, 3rd Dec. 1802.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of the report of a committee which I appointed to meet at Chittledroog to inquire into the mode by which certain sicca rupees came into the pay office at that station. You will observe that it is very clear that the greater number of them were placed there by the paymaster's cash keeper, to whom I write upon this subject; but it is not denied that a sum amounting to 2313 rupees was paid in sicca rupees to the pay office at Chittledroog by the amildar.

As the circulation of this coin has been stopped, with great propriety, by the Rajah's government, I beg to suggest to you the propriety of paying back for the sircar the sum of 2313 sicca rupees, and receiving in lieu thereof a similar sum in other coins which are the currency of Mysore.

I wish to draw your attention to a circumstance which has appeared before this committee, viz. that one of the farmers of the revenue has paid sums of money direct into the pay office without their passing through the hands of the amildar. This appears irregular, and may be the source of much abuse: I therefore beg to suggest the propriety of forbidding this practice in future.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Seringapatam, 4th Dec. 1802.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to send you so immediately a satisfactory account of the sentiments of the Marhatta chiefs on the frontier. I had a conversation again this morning with Goklah's vakeel, the purport of which was as follows: He says that Bappojee Goneish Goklah

was the person who arrested Holkar, afterwards put to death by order of the Peshwah: as consequence thereof he has nothing to expect from Jeswunt Rao Holkar: that he is determined to be faithful to the Peshwah, whose troops he commands, and he wishes to know what orders I have to give him.

The vakeel appears to think it probable that his master will be obliged to retreat from his present position on the Kistna; and he wishes to know whether, in that case, he could be allowed to retreat with his troops into the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore; and he promises faithfully, that, in case he should receive the permission for which he now asks, his troops shall pay for every thing they might receive, and no depredation shall be committed. The vakeel also requested that an asylum might be afforded within the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore, to the females of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, and those of some of his principal officers. He also presented me a letter from Goklah, and another from Lingo Punt, translations of which I have the honor to enclose. Lingo Punt was the vakeel from the father of Bappojee Goneish, and afterwards from his son, to me, during the campaign of 1800. In answer to these verbal requests, I told the vakeel that it would be necessary that I should refer the matter to government, and I gave him general assurances of friendship and good will. I desired him to wait here until I should receive the answers of government to his requests; and I shall be obliged to you if you will honor me with your orders, as well regarding them, as regarding the military conduct of Goklah hereafter. In the mean time I propose to write general answers to the letters, translations of which are enclosed.

I took an opportunity this morning of entering into a general conversation regarding the views and objects, and probable line of conduct, of all the Marhatta chiefs in this part of India, in the present crisis of Marhatta affairs. It is obvious that Goklah must be very decided in his conduct: he has no favour to expect from Holkar; and this is probably the reason for which he, so immediately after his success, dispatched this vakeel to me. The vakeel says that the Putwurdun family (Pursheram Bhow's) are exactly in the state in which you could wish them to be, viz. in anxious expectation of future events, and intending to adopt a line of conduct suitable thereto; or, in other words, to take part with the strongest. He says, that it is reported that Holkar intends to place on the musnud a son of Amrut Rao; and that, if he adopts that line of conduct, and places some power in the hands of Amrut Rao himself, the minds of people, in general, may be more reconciled to him than they are under the existing order of things: for that, at present, every man is doubtful, and determined to take part with the strongest. He says that Goklah, although he has no hopes from Holkar, will hold his ground, if power should be thrown into the hands of Amrut Rao. I questioned him regarding the strength of the chiefs at present: he says that Goklah's body of troops consists of 4000 horse, and 3000 foot, with some guns. He says the horse are 2000 good, and 2000 indifferent; that 500 of the good are pagah, and 1500 silladar; 1000 of the foot are good, commanded by 2 European officers, 1000 are Arabs and Rohillas, and 1000, I believe,

of the ordinary peons of the country. This state of Goklah's force I believe to be true: it is nearly the same as I recollect it to have been in 1800.

The Putwurdun have 4 bodies of troops, nearly of the same strength and description as Goklah's; and they are situated, for the present, in the neighbourhood of the Kistna. One commanded by Appah Saheb, another by Baba Saheb, and another by Dada Saheb, being 3 brothers, and sons of Pursheram Bhow, and a fourth by Chintomeny Rao, who is the son of Pursheram Bhow's brother, and is, in fact, the head of the family. I have no doubt that all these chiefs will join you forthwith; but I propose to send a man into that country to find out their intentions exactly, and the strength of their troops, and to discover the intentions of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and of the Rajah of Kittoor. Both these chiefs have now bodies of troops on foot.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 5th Dec. 1802.

The following corps and detachments will prepare to take the field at the shortest notice, viz. the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry, 50 rank and file of the 1st batt. of artillery, with a proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers, and gun bearers in proportion, 1st batt. 2nd regt., 2nd batt. 3rd regt., 2nd batt. 10th regt., 2nd batt. 18th regt., and the corps of pioneers.

The inconvenience which is the result of the Native corps being unprovided with carriage for their sick is so manifest, that Major Gen. Wellesley trusts that every officer in command of a corps will provide himself with proper carriage, according to the regulations; and all may depend upon it that, if they should not be so provided, the omission will be noticed.

Major Gen. Wellesley has frequently experienced the inconvenience of private carts upon service. He begs that officers will provide other means of carrying their baggage.

Ground will be allotted on the island of Seringapatam by Lieut. Knox, for the families of the 3 Native corps ordered from that garrison, and also for those of the 1st batt. 8th regt., to hut themselves upon, as they must all evacuate their present huts in the fort as soon as the battalions march out.

The families of the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry are directed to be sent to Chittledroog, where Lieut. Col. Whitelocke will allot ground for them to hut themselves upon.

For the accommodation of the families of soldiers and sepoy who are going on service, officers commanding corps will see the following arrangements adopted:

Officers commanding companies are to make out a list of the names of the men belonging to their companies who are desirous of leaving a part of their pay for the use of their families, to be paid to them at Seringapatam or at Chittledroog; and this list is to contain opposite to the name of each man the amount of the sum which he intends shall be paid to his family monthly. A copy of this list is to be left at the office of the Paymaster at Seringapatam or at Chittledroog, accordingly as the families are left at those stations; and another copy is to be given to the Paymaster in camp, according to which he is to make stoppages from the amount of the abstract of each company.

Officers commanding corps will leave at Seringapatam or at Chittledroog a careful non-commissioned officer, who will receive from the pay officers at those stations respectively the amount of the sums which the men of each company may have allotted to their families, and will distribute them to those for whom they are intended. These non-commissioned officers must be made acquainted with the persons to whom they are to pay those sums, and must be provided with certificates from the commanding officers of their corps stating that they are the persons authorized to receive from the pay office the sums allotted for the families of the soldiers or sepoy of the corps respectively. In case a casualty should happen in a company to a person whose name is on the list of those desirous to make a provision for their families, a new list for that company must be made out and forwarded to the pay officer at Seringapatam or Chittledroog, and a copy of it must be given to the paymaster in camp, in which new list the name of such person must not be included.

It is the intention of Major Gen. Wellesley to exercise the corps in the garrison of Seringapatam, and encamped in its neighbourhood, in line together; and he therefore requests that the mounted and staff officers of all corps will make themselves perfectly acquainted with the method of taking up lines of march and formation, as laid down in the 3rd paragraph, 179th section of the Rules and Regulations for the formation and field exercise of the Forces.

Major Gen. Wellesley will inspect the 1st batt. 14th regt. at Sultaunpett on Wednesday morning next.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Whitechoke, Chittledroog.

6th Dec. 1802.

You will receive orders to-day for allotting ground in the fort of Chittledroog for the families of the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry; and you may find it necessary to order the families of the 2nd batt. of the 10th to hut themselves anew, in order to leave the ground vacant, which will be most convenient for the corps that is to garrison the fort; and the General requests that, in allotting the ground for those 3 corps, you will study the convenience and wishes of the families as much as may be possible, without material inconvenience, or risking the safety of the garrison. The General is particularly desirous that none of those families may be obliged to go up the hill to hut themselves, because he knows that the natives in general have an aversion to that situation; and he fears it would prove very unhealthy to the people in question, who are natives of the Carnatic, besides being very inconvenient to women and children.

To Major Doolan.

Seringapatam, 7th Dec. 1802.

I have just received your letter, with an enclosure from Lieut. Martin, which I return. Under the orders of the Commander in Chief it is the duty of a corps at a station, at which there is no fort adjutant, to perform the functions usually performed by the latter when such an appointment exists; and, accordingly, if Lieut. Martin is adjutant of the 1st batt. 5th Bombay regt., stationed at Hullihall, he must do the duties of fort adjutant of that station, without any additional allowance. I return Lieut. Martin's letter, because I conclude that he was not aware of this regulation.

In regard to the stores expected at Hullihall from Goa, they are of two kinds, garrison and provision stores, and ordnance and military stores: the former, under the regulation of the government of Fort St. George, to which I refer you for more detailed information upon this subject, are to be placed under the charge of the garrison storekeeper, Mr. Gordon, who, I conclude, has servants at Hullihall to take charge of them; the latter, the ordnance and military stores, are in charge of the commanding officer of the place, under the same regulations. He has usually the assistance of certain ordnance officers; and I propose that there should be such an establishment at Hullihall. But, until this establishment can be formed, I conclude that neither Lieut. Martin, nor any other officer, can, with propriety, refuse to give you the assistance which you may require, either in arranging the stores, or in taking care of them, particularly when they learn that the establishment of this dépôt of stores at Hullihall is an object of the utmost importance.

If, contrary to my expectations on this subject, either Lieut. Martin, whose duty it is to assist you, or any of the other officers under your command, should refuse to give you the assistance you may require, I request to have from you the names of such officers, in order that I may lay them before the Commander in Chief.

*The D.A.G. to Major * * * *, commg. a detachment of H.M. — regt.* 7th Dec. 1802.

I have laid your letter of this date before Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, who desires me to inform you that he consents to your joining the part of the — regt. stationed at Vellore; but previous to your departure the General thinks it necessary to advert to your conduct, since you came last into the Mysore country. Complaints have come from every place at which the detachment of those under your command halted on its march to Seringapatam, of improprieties committed by you: such as your obliging the bazaar people of the villages, near which you halted, to pay you certain duties and customs; and the amildars to furnish for your use certain articles, for which you never paid. These complaints having been referred to you, you have stated, in

reply to them, that you were informed by persons, to whose advice you acknowledge that you would not have trusted in any other case, that you had a right to the duties, customs, and presents which you claimed; and that you never forced any thing from the amildars, or inhabitants of the villages through which you passed, but that every thing was given to you without trouble, upon your simply asking what was your right; and that your servant had orders to pay for every thing received for your use. Upon this subject Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to recall to your recollection that an officer of your rank should, in a case of this kind, refer for information upon a doubtful point, not to a person whose advice he would not take upon any other occasion, but to the Articles of War, or to his superior officers, from either of which authorities you would have found that conviction of the practices of which you have been accused costs an officer only his commission. But although you have acknowledged that you did follow bad advice upon this occasion, you also declare that you did nothing blamable; and that every thing was given to you without violence, and upon your asking simply what was your right. The General observes upon this statement, in the first place, that the amildars of the Mysore country knew, as well as the collectors in the Company's territory, that those demands are not the right of the commanding officers of detachments, and they are full as likely to refuse to admit them: secondly, that, if they could have imagined that you had such rights, they would not have complained when you exercised them. The General rather supposes that your advisers thought it probable that the amildars in this country would so far forget their duty as to admit those demands without complaint, and therefore they were made, although no officer would have ventured to make such within the Company's territories. It may be perfectly true that the persons on whom you levied those duties and customs were no losers, because you permitted them, and they did charge prices in proportion on the goods which they sold; but you forget the officers and men under your command, and those who follow them, who were made to pay double the price of every thing they consumed, in order that a few fanams might be put into your pocket. This conduct the General considers, upon the whole, so repugnant to every military principle, and to the customs of the service, so far as he is acquainted with them, and to the Rules and Articles of War, that he would have deemed it his duty to bring it before a General Court Martial, only that he perceives, by the G. O. 22nd Sept. 1802, the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council has taken measures to prevent the recurrence of such practices. He cannot, however, deliver his sentiments upon the subject without expressing his abhorrence of them, and his concern that an officer, particularly a field officer of the — regt., should have been accused of them. Major Gen. Wellesley further directs me to subjoin an abstract of the value of the articles received by you, and not paid for, at the several stages; and of the taxes levied by you on the shops, including the money stopped by your servant out of the price of sheep, for whose conduct, in such cases, you are answerable; and to inform you that the amount must be returned by you to the Mysore Circar, for the use of the inhabitants.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes, Paughur.

8th Dec. 1802.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to desire, that, on being relieved according to the orders of this date, you will march with your company, by the route of Chittledroog, to Hurryhur, which place you will occupy. It is intended to form a large dépôt of provisions in that fort, the care and protection of which is the object in sending you there at present; and a convoy of above 2500 bullocks, escorted by a company of the 2nd of the 18th, will march from this place on the 10th for the dépôt, where it will arrive on or before the 29th inst.; and it is expected that you will have reached the place 2 or 3 days sooner, and will have made such preparations for the reception of the provisions as the time and circumstances will admit.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Brice Lee, 2nd batt. 18th regt.

9th Dec. 1802. *

Mr. Gordon, the garrison storekeeper of Seringapatam, has been directed to despatch a large quantity of rice, and other articles of provisions, from Seringapatam to Hurryhur. It is expected that the whole will be ready to move from the north side of the river to-morrow morning, and the company under your command is intended as an escort. You will therefore inform yourself, from Mr. Gordon,

of the number of loaded bullocks, and the quality of their loads, with the names of the bullock maistries and their servants, proceeding in charge of the provisions. After which, you will inquire into the state of preparation of the convoy; and when the whole is ready, you will march with it, by the enclosed route, to Hurrehur, where you will receive further orders. If you learn on your march that there is not ground, at any of the places mentioned in your route, for so large a number of cattle as composes the convoy, without encroaching on the grain fields under crop, you may halt at any of the intermediate villages on the same road, where you can get open ground, but so as not to increase the number of your marches to Hurrehur; and you will consider it as much your duty to protect the villages, and the grain on the ground on your route, from the depredations of the bullocks and their drivers, as to guard and protect the convoy itself.

To Major Malcolm.

Seringapatam, 11th Dec. 1802.

Since you wrote to me on the 7th, Gen. Stuart has written to me a very satisfactory letter upon the subject of the command in Mysore. I imagined that he intended I should relinquish it when the army should take the field, because he desired me to make arrangements for leaving the staff in this country, and I concluded that the staff ought to be with the commanding officer; and, as I was certainly to accompany him, another officer was to be appointed to command in Mysore during my absence. It appears, however, by his last letter, that his wish that I should leave the staff behind is founded upon his fears of creating a jealousy in his army in the minds of other officers. This fear is rather vague, as they ought to recollect that the staff is attached to me as commanding a subsidiary force, and jealousy may as well be expected from any other advantage I may have, which they have not. However, the General's wishes must be complied with, and I shall say no more respecting the staff. I assure you that, if he had removed me from Mysore, or in any case that can occur, I shall do every thing that I think can forward his objects.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 9th Dec. 1802.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief has been pleased to authorize family certificates in behalf of the non-commissioned officers, drummers, R. & F. of European corps, and of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, drummers, R. & F. of Native corps ordered for field service, being prepared for issue when those corps shall be ordered to move in advance from their respective stations in the Mysore country.

The commanding officers of corps and detachments stationed in the Mysore country which have been ordered to be in readiness, and of such corps as may arrive in the Mysore country from the southern division of the army, and may be ordered for field service, and also of the detachments of Bombay artillery encamped near Seringapatam, are accordingly directed to see that the family rolls and certificates of their respective corps and detachments are prepared agreeably to the regulations and kept ready to be issued, when the corps, &c., shall be ordered to advance.

This order renders the arrangement for the accommodation of the families of the troops going on service, published in the orders of the 5th instant, unnecessary, excepting as far as relates to the allotment of ground on the island of Seringapatam and in Chittledroog for their hutting themselves upon.

G. O.

Seringapatam, 10th Dec. 1802.

The Medical board having stated to the Commander in Chief their opinion that the sickness, particularly when cases with which Native corps stationed in cold damp situations in the vicinity of hills, and surrounded by jungles, are so severely afflicted, is principally caused by the troops being out at exercise, before the damps and dews are dissipated by the sun, which, from chilling the men, produce fever; and that the most salutary effects might be expected if the time of drill was changed from daybreak to 9 o'clock, his Excellency has been pleased to direct that orders may be given for such alteration in the hours of exercise of corps circumstanced as above described; and the commanding officers of all Native corps and detachments of Native corps in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, so circumstanced, are directed to alter their hours of exercise accordingly.

If the war is to go on, on the great scale for which preparations are making, the Governor General must come round to Madras. All the reasons which operated to induce him to come to Madras at the commencement of the war with Tippoo exist at present, and there are others which did not exist at that time. You are well acquainted with the state of the government of Madras at present: Gen. Stuart I consider as the heart and soul of it, and, as soon as he shall depart to take the command of this army, the whole will fall to pieces, and a scene of confusion will follow, which must be disastrous to the army in the field.

I don't know enough of Marhatta politics to be able to give an opinion as to the necessity of the great preparations which are making. I understand that the object is to support the Peshwah in his government; and that operation, supposing that hereafter it should be deemed advisable to undertake it, may or may not require a very large army, according to the real strength of the power in rebellion against the Peshwah. It appears to be imagined now that there is a chance that Holkar and Scindiah will unite against us and the Peshwah, if we should interfere in his affairs. It is possible that the disunion of those Chiefs may be more advantageous to us than any arrangement we could make with the Peshwah, and that we ought not to interfere in such a manner as to induce them to unite. If that should be the case, it will be proper to pause for a time; and the great preparations at present making will not be necessary.

It is possible that the Peshwah's authority at Poonah may be restored by the natural cause of the contest between these two Chiefs, and that will be the time for us to conclude our arrangements with his Highness to lodge our subsidiary force at Poonah. The Governor General alone can decide upon these questions, and many others connected with this subject. But it is possible that the nature of them will change every day; and he will have much earlier intelligence of every event at Madras than he can at Calcutta. Besides, if the General takes the field, nothing but his presence can keep the government of Madras in the direct line. I wish that you would urge him upon this subject.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Whitelocke, Chittledroog.

14th Dec. 1802.

I have communicated your letter of the 10th to Major Gen. Wellesley, who desires me to write to you that he thinks the Nejeeb lines will answer extremely well for hutting the families of the 2nd batt. 10th regt., and to request that you will allow them to commence hutting as soon as they please. As the men who have no families will not require any huts at Chittledroog after the corps marches, and the corps which relieves them will not march in, till the other goes out of garrison, when the one may take up the ground of the other, the General does not think it necessary to give those unmarried men the trouble of building new huts for the short time they will have to stay at Chittledroog. He is also of opinion that the corps coming in should not hut up the hill at all, but in a place which he particularly pointed out to Lieut. Francke.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Ridge.

14th Dec. 1802.

Col. Whitelocke having made some reference to Major Gen. Wellesley about the hutting of your corps, I have this day communicated to him the General's wishes, that the men with families may be permitted to commence their new huts as soon as they please, within the Nejeeb lines, which the Colonel mentions as the place they prefer; and that the unmarried men may not be obliged to build new huts which they would occupy so short a time: thus I hope that the

business of hutting is settled to your satisfaction. In answer to the other part of your letter, Gen. Wellesley desires me to inform you, that, when he commanded the army against Dhoondiah, he allowed every Brigadier to choose his own staff; and, if he were to command the troops on the present occasion, he would follow the same rule: but the Commander in Chief takes the field in person, and if the army is not brigaded before Gen. Wellesley joins, he will mention you to Gen. Stuart.

Message delivered by Suddasheo Rao, vakeel from Goklah, to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Seringapatam, 16th Dec. 1802.

As it is probable that Sree Munt Bajee Rao will claim the protection of the English, Goklah has a great desire to join their army, and to act in their cause; and Goklah wishes to make known to Gen. Wellesley, that, should he receive orders from Sree Munt Bajee Rao, it is his intention to acquaint him (the General) with the nature of those orders, to take his advice on the subject, and to act accordingly; and, should he receive any from Amrut Rao, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar, he will act in the same manner; as it is his particular desire to act agreeably to the General's wishes upon every occasion, let his orders from the people above mentioned be what they may.

Goklah wishes that the friendly communication, which at present exists between him and the General, may continue; and he will make known to him, in his correspondence, every circumstance, of a public nature, which may occur in the Marhatta country; and he hopes that the General will be kind enough to let him know any of importance, that may be determined on, relative to arranging the affairs of the Marhatta empire.

Goklah has sent his vakeel, Suddasheo Rao, to Gen. Wellesley, not only to request a place for his family to remain in, but also to cultivate his friendship.

To Lord Clive.

Seringapatam, 19th Dec. 1802.

In consequence of your Lordship's orders of the 8th and 11th inst., I have had a conference with the vakeel sent here by Bappojee Goneish Goklah, the purport of which I am about to lay before you.

I informed the vakeel of your Lordship's concern at the difficulties which opposed the progress of Bappojee Goneish to the Konkan with his troops, in obedience to the Peshwah's commands; and that the state of

G. O.

Seringapatam, 15th Dec. 1802.

In consequence of the Government Order of the 22nd Sept., which strictly prohibits officers in command of military stations from being engaged in levying, receiving, or being concerned in any tax, impost, or receipt from the bazaars after the 1st Jan., 1803, or from receiving any perquisite or emolument of command, the officers in command of military stations in the territories of the Rajah of Mysore are forbid to interfere in the bazaars in any manner whatever, excepting for the promotion of peace and good order in the stations under their command, and in the manner pointed out by the Government Order of the 22nd Sept. The allowances given to the officers commanding the stations of Chittledroog, Nundydroog, and Paughur (which were made in lieu of advantages given to the officers commanding the other stations in Mysore, which, under the G. O. 22nd Sept., 1802, can no longer be enjoyed) are to be discontinued after the 31st Dec. But Major Gen. Wellesley has great pleasure in informing the troops under his command, that he has received an intimation from the Resident that it is the intention of the Rajah's ministers to pay to officers in command of the following stations in the Mysore country annually a sum at least equal to that which those of the 3rd class, as described in the G. O. 22nd Sept., in the Company's territories, will receive, viz.: Chittledroog, Nundydroog, Nuggur, Paughur, Mudgherry, Mergasy, Sera, cantonment of Santa Bednore, Bangalore, and the Rajah's guard at Mysore. The exact amount of this allowance will be notified in the G. O., as soon as possible after the distribution shall be made of the funds arising in the Company's territories, and will be paid by the Resident upon bills, countersigned by the D. A. G. in Mysore.

Officers in command of any of these stations, for a period of less than a year, will receive a proportionate part of the allowance in the same manner for the periods of their respective commands.

the connexion between his Highness and the British government did not admit of the junction of any part of the force under my command with that of Goklah. I then pointed out to him the mode of political communication between the British government in India and the Native states; and informed him that the negotiations, then depending between his Excellency the Governor General and the Peshwah, had been committed exclusively to Lieut. Col. Close; and that the result of those negotiations must determine the mode of conduct to be observed by the British government, in the present convulsion of Marhatta affairs. I expressed a sanguine expectation, however, that the events which had recently happened might ultimately tend to augment and corroborate the relations of amity between the two states.

In respect to the specific proposition of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that his army should be received into the Company's territories, and that an asylum should be given to his family and to those of his principal officers and adherents, I informed the vakeel, that no application had been made by the Peshwah that any body of Marhatta troops might be admitted within the British territories; and, consequently, that the relations at that moment subsisting between the British government and the Marhatta empire did not admit of your receiving an armed force. I told him that I had received your Lordship's orders to give security to, and treat with respect, such persons as might be obliged to seek protection, with their families, within the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore, under the present aspect of public affairs; and I pointed out Seringapatam, in Mysore, as the place to which it would be most convenient that such persons should go. At the same time, I told him positively that no armed men would be admitted within the frontier.

The vakeel appeared to be satisfied with this communication, and then delivered another message from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, of which the enclosed paper contains the purport. In answer thereto, I referred him to what I had before said, by your Lordship's orders, and expressed myself much gratified by his confidence in British officers. I also stated my sanguine expectation that recent events would have the effect of augmenting and strengthening the relations of amity between the two states, and those in the service of each. The vakeel then asked whether, in case the course of events should occasion a junction between the British army and that under the command of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, it was probable that any pecuniary assistance would be afforded by the commander of the former to the latter: I replied that the supposed junction of those two bodies of troops, as well as every arrangement depending thereon, and the nature and the extent of the assistance to be afforded by the one to the other, must depend upon the negotiations between the British government and the Peshwah; which I had before informed him were committed exclusively to Lieut. Col. Close.

To Major Doolan.

Seringapatam, 23rd Dec. 1802.

I have the honor to enclose you the copies of papers received from the Adj. Gen. at Bombay, upon the subject of an application from yourself and the officers of the 1st batt. 5th regt.

I beg to know from you whether you recommend that Lieut. Martin should be appointed the adjutant of the battalion under your command, as the Commander in Chief at Bombay does not approve his having been recommended by Capt. Wood, and will not lay the recommendations before the Adj. Gen., unless they are forwarded and fully approved of by me; and I do not propose to forward them, unless it is your decided wish that Lieut. Martin should be the adjutant.

The D.A.G. to Major Burrows, 2nd regt. of cavalry.

31st Dec. 1802.

The Dewan of Mysore has reported to Major Gen. Wellesley that the amildar, or manager of the village, near to which you are encamped, and another of the public servants of the same village, have been confined in one of your guards, on account of a robbery committed in your camp. The General therefore directs that you will release those men immediately, and afterwards state to him any complaint that you may have against them.

To Lord Clive.

Seringapatam, 1st Jan. 1803.

Capt. Mahony, heretofore Resident in Koorg, arrived at Seringapatam some days ago; and, in obedience to the orders of the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, I have, in communication with that gentleman, taken into consideration the proposed plan of remuneration for the services of the Koorg Rajah.* For the reason stated by the Governor General in Council, in his Excellency's letter to your Lordship upon this subject, I am clearly of opinion, not only that no part of the territories of the Rajah of Mysore ought to be given to the Rajah of Koorg, but that care ought to be taken that the executive government of Mysore should not be informed that it was ever in contemplation to propose an exchange of territory with the Hon. Company, with a view to granting to the Rajah of Koorg the territories which they should cede.

The services of the Rajah of Koorg, however, still deserve remuneration. It appears, by Capt. Mahony's accounts, that he expended sums of money, and furnished supplies of cattle and provisions, in the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, of a value amounting in the whole to about 4 lacs of rupees. If he had consented to be reimbursed this expenditure, he would have received bonds of the Bombay government for this sum of money, bearing an interest at 12 per cent. per annum, in the beginning of the year 1799; and, in this manner, would have added nearly 2 lacs of rupees to the sum above mentioned. It may, therefore, be fairly concluded, that, by the liberality of the Rajah of Koorg, the Company's treasury is richer at this moment no less than 6 lacs of rupees, than it would have been if he had taken payment of the money expended, and for the supplies furnished by him. In this view of the question, I do not take into consideration the nature of his services, or the time at which they were rendered; but I have stated particularly what the supplies, furnished by him, would have cost the Company, if they had been furnished by any

* The Rajah of Koorg was an ally of the Company in the last war of the Mysore, and was present at Tippoo's attack on the detachment of the Bombay army, under Gen. Stuart, at Sedaseer. His report of that affair to the Governor General is to be found in the Appendix to Col. Beaton's 'War in Mysore.' There is also an interesting account of this Rajah of Koorg, in Capt. Basil Hall's 'Fragments of Voyages and Travels,' vol. ii. p. 218, 3rd Series.

other person, as I found thereon the amount of remuneration which I intend to recommend to your Lordship to grant him.

When the arrangements of the territory of the late Tippoo Sultaun were made, in the year 1799, the Rajah of Koorg was desirous to have the districts of Panjah and Bellary, in Canara, to which he conceived he had a claim, as they had belonged heretofore to his family, and they connected with Murca and Soobroo, in the same province. It is supposed that these districts are worth about 6000 canterai pagodas *per annum*, and they might form part of the proposed remuneration to the Rajah of Koorg.

The districts in Mysore, to which the Rajah of Koorg in like manner stated a claim, are Penapatam, Betudpoor, and Akibgoor, the value of which, by the schedule, appears to be 17,500 canterai pagodas. It will not be proper to give the Rajah those districts; and I recommend to your Lordship that others of equal value, connected with Panjah and Bellary, and the Bentwall river, in the province of Canara, may be ceded to him.

Under this arrangement, he will have nearly 24,000 canterai pagodas *per annum*, which is about the value of the sum which the Company have annually, by his forbearing to demand payment of the money due to him: he will have 2 districts in Canara, to which he conceived he had a claim, and certain other districts in the same province, connecting him with the Bentwall river, of the same value with districts in Mysore, which he is desirous to possess; but which, under existing circumstances, it is not possible to grant him.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 1st Jan. 1803.

Webbe has desired me to write to you upon the subject of our operations to the northward; and, although it is difficult to form an opinion on the subject of any military operations without knowing precisely their object, I comply with pleasure with his wishes, and I shall be happy if what I may write shall prove at all serviceable.

I shall suppose our object to be to march the army to Poonah, there to re-establish the Peshwah's authority. At this season of the year, I do not know of any natural obstacle to impede our progress, excepting the great distance. The principal obstacle of art is the fort of Darwar, which I conclude the Peshwah will have ordered the killadar to deliver up to us. If his Highness should not have given these orders, or if the killadar should not think it proper, we must make ourselves masters of that fortress. I am of opinion that it is to be taken by a *coup de main*, and I should certainly attempt it. It may not, however, be thought proper to attack the place in this manner; but, at all events, I do not conceive that it will stop the British army more than a few days. It will also take 3 or 4 days to arrange our garrison in the place, and to remove thither our stores, grain, &c., from Hullihall, in Soonda.

After Darwar shall be in our possession, I do not know of any place that will stop the British army for a moment.

I will suppose that the army shall have arrived upon the Toombuddra, and that Gen. Stuart will be prepared to advance from Hurryhur on the 1st March. I do not think it possible that he could be there sooner: he has a very large and heavy equipment, which he brings from Madras: he

has Carnatic cattle to move it; and he meets with the old disappointments in procuring them. He does not quit Madras till the 15th of this month; his troops and stores about the 12th; he has then 400 miles to march to Hurryhur, which will take him more than 6 weeks.

After quitting Hurryhur, he will have 8 marches to Darwar, and from thence 22 to Poonah, by Padshappoor, Chickoree, Meritch, and Tasgaum; and one more, if he should go by Shawpoor and Belgaum to Meritch. I should recommend the latter road, because I believe that it will be convenient, if not necessary to us, to have possession of Belgaum; and that, by that road, we shall be more certain of finding water than by the other.

According to this account, I do not think that you ought to look out for us at Poonah before the end of April.

In this estimate of the time which will elapse before we arrive at Poonah, I have concluded that we shall meet with no impediments on our progress occasioned by the efforts of the enemy. I am far from thinking, however, that we shall not meet with such impediments, and, if we do, our progress must be considerably slower than I have supposed that it will be, and the period of our arrival at Poonah be considerably delayed.

I have not yet had any satisfactory communication from the Putwurdun family, of their intentions upon the present occasion: it appears that they and Rastia's family are leagued against Goklah, whose troops they are driving from the Kistna towards the Toombuddra. It is possible that, when they shall see our army in the field, they may be induced to join our standard, but at present I very much doubt their intentions. It will not be very practicable to make great progress through the southern Marhatta territories, with such a heavy equipment as Gen. Stuart has proposed, if the chiefs of this family and Rastia are united against us.

At all events, at present, owing to the confusion at Poonah, and the delay in assembling our troops on the frontier, the countries on the other side of the Toombuddra are in a sad state of disorder. The heads of districts and of villages have seized the supreme authority, and have raised troops, and are carrying on against each other a petty warfare, which will be as destructive to our supplies and our communications with Mysore as it is to the country itself. Unless, therefore, the Putwurdun, and all the chiefs in this part of the empire, join cordially with us, and take advantage of our presence to settle the country, it is very obvious that we shall lose our communication with Mysore on the day we shall quit the Toombuddra.

These circumstances have made me turn my mind seriously to a project, which the great distance between Mysore and Poonah had induced me before to take into consideration; viz. to establish a depôt, by means of the Bombay government, either at Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to the island of Bombay, or Salsette, of not very difficult access from the ghauts: this post to be occupied by the Bombay troops, and to be filled with rice, arrack, salt provisions, and military stores for a field train, if we should have fought an action. By this arrangement we should carry on the war at Poonah with an army provided with cattle, &c., from the eastern side of the peninsula, and with

the resources of Bombay; and we should shorten our line of communication many hundred miles.

I propose this plan to Gen. Stuart, and, if he should adopt it, I shall write a detail upon the subject to Mr. Duncan. In the mean time, it will be well if you turn it in your mind, and if you should agree in opinion with me, as to its propriety, and should think it practicable, fix upon a place upon the coast, which the Peshwah must be requested to give up to us.

I cannot conclude this letter without letting you know how amply Mysore has contributed to the supply and equipment of the army to be assembled on its frontier, and how readily our little friend Purneah has come into all my plans for the service.

1st. I have raised here 8000 bullocks before they had got one at Madras; besides the bullocks for the cavalry gram.

2ndly. At the end of the gram harvest, one month before the new gram comes in, the cavalry Gram Agent Gen. is supplied with 7000 loads; and the cavalry are brought upon the frontier, with 500 loads each regiment, where they find 6000 loads to supply their consumption while they remain there.

3rdly. A dépôt is formed of 7000 loads of rice at Hurryhur.

4thly. Mysore alone gives 32,000 brinjarry bullocks loaded, which will meet the General at the back of the Chittledroog hills, at the end of this month.

5thly 60,000 sheep, assembled in different flocks between Sera and Chittledroog; and

6thly. A body of silladar horse, amounting to above 5000.

The D.A.G. to Major Burrows.

4th Jan 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, directs me to transmit to you the accompanying state of the circumstances which occasioned the complaint of the Dewan of Mysore, communicated to you in my letter of the 31st ult., the outline of which was sufficiently acknowledged by the soubahdar yesterday to induce the General to give credit to every part of the statement, and he therefore directs me to inform you that he considers the soubahdar's conduct as improper in the highest degree; that the amildars in this country are not amenable for articles stolen in camps, although they are ready enough to cause search to be made for them, and the thieves; and the soubahdar insisting upon the man giving a muckelka to produce the stolen goods was an assumption of authority, highly unwarrantable, and deserving of punishment. Neither has any one a right to compel any of the inhabitants, much less the particular servants of the government, and the principal servants in their villages, to attend him about the country, as the soubahdar obliged the parbutty and pated to do, running before his horse; and had the soubahdar earned his violence so far as to compel any of those people to conduct him to Mysore, and thereby to have alarmed the Rajah's family, consisting of an infant boy and some old women, no consideration would have induced the General to have overlooked his behaviour. As matters are, he only desires that you will cause the impropriety of the soubahdar's conduct to be explained to the regiment, and further, that no person, excepting the commanding officer in any camp or cantonment, has a right to send for, or have any communication with, the servants of government. Commanding officers may, in such cases, do what appears proper to them, upon their own responsibility; or they may refer any matter of complaint to the officer commanding the division. The General has observed with satisfaction the propriety of your conduct on this occasion, and also that the soubahdar was not countenanced by any of the European officers. Some things stolen in your camp at Nungunoor have

been found upon people who appear to be from below the ghauts, and to have come up along with the regiment, which circumstance shows that the amildar in this country ought not to be held amenable for thefts committed in camps. The articles here alluded to will be delivered up to any person sent by you to receive them.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Johnson, Engineer at Hullihall.

9th Jan. 1803.

I communicated your letter of the 20th Dec. to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, who has since had the further satisfaction to learn that the whole of the guns and stores, intended to be removed from Goa to Hullihall, had not only been successfully brought up the ghauts, according to the plan recommended by you, but have reached Hullihall without any accident. Certain circumstances did not allow the General to divulge his sentiments sooner on the concluding paragraph of your letter, viz. your joining the pioneers in Malabar. He has now, however, directed me to acquaint you that, on account of your knowledge of the territories and places near to Hullihall, he has thought proper to recommend to the Commander in Chief that you should remain some time at Hullihall, until his Excellency can determine whether he shall have occasion for your services with the army in the field.

The D.A.G. to Major Hill, 1st batt. 4th regt., Bangalore.

17th Jan. 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to inform you that he has intimation of 2000 stand of new firelocks having been dispatched from Madras for Seringapatam, by the Pednaig Durgum pass. He therefore requests that you will detach a company of the battalion under your command, under an European officer, with orders to proceed on the road towards the pass, until he meets these arms, or as far as the bottom of the pass, and wait there for them, and to escort them to Bangalore. But if the treasure coming from the Carnatic for the army should come up with the company before the arms do, the officer must join the escort with the treasure, and leave the arms to their chance; because the treasure is the last part of the equipment and supply of the army coming from the Carnatic; and if the officer should remain behind it, he might be too late to overtake his corps on its march to the frontier.

To J. Duncan, Esq, Governor of Bombay.

Seringapatam, 20th Jan. 1803.

Gen. Stuart will have informed you that, adverting to the probability of the march of the army to Poonah, and the possibility that our communication with Mysore, and the seats of the resources of the army on this side of India, might be precarious, and, at all events, would be difficult, on account of its length, I had proposed to him a plan for the formation of a depôt at Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to the islands of Bombay or Salsette, by means of the govern-

G. O.

Seringapatam, 6th Jan 1803

His Excellency the Commander in Chief has signified his pleasure that no wheel carriages, with the private baggage of the troops ordered for service, shall be permitted to pass the frontier.

G. O.

Camp near the French Rocks, 16th Jan. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley will see the 1st batt. 2nd regt., the 2nd batt. 3rd regt., and the 2nd batt. 12th regt. out in line to-morrow morning. He will be on the ground at about half past 6; and he particularly requests the commanding officers of corps not to allow the men to come out of their tents before the sun rises.

The officers commanding corps will receive certain general memorandums upon the subject of the exercise of several corps in line, to which he particularly requests their attention.

G. O.

Camp near the French Rocks, 18th Jan. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley will see the 1st batt. 3rd regt., the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 2nd batt. 18th regt. out in line to-morrow. (*The remaining part of the order of the 16th repeated.*)

ment of Bombay. He has been pleased to approve of this plan, and has desired me to write to you upon the subject in detail. You may recollect that I before hinted the subject to you; and I should have written to you upon it more particularly, before now, if I had seen clearly the object which Gen. Stuart proposed for the campaign. It is clear now that our object must be Poonah, and to re-establish the government of the Peshwah in that city; and we must provide for our subsistence while in that neighbourhood, supposing that the object of our enemy should be to cut off our communication with the source of our supplies, or that, from its length and difficulty, our subsistence should become precarious.

The first point for consideration is the situation for the proposed *depôt*. It should be somewhere on the coast, within reach of water carriage from Bombay, both that the *depôt* may be formed without difficulty or great expense, and that it may be in the power of the government of Bombay to provide for its defence with ease, supposing that the enemy should have a design to attack it. It should be at no great distance, and of easy access, from the ghaut leading to Poonah. It should have 2 gates, at least, if not more, all of easy access to cattle; and it should be of such strength as to render it probable that a small body of troops could keep it till reinforcements could be sent from Bombay. I say nothing of the buildings which the fort ought to have, in order to hold the articles which I am about to detail as a list of our probable wants, for I know that temporary buildings can be constructed with great celerity everywhere, particularly when Bombay can furnish such quantities of materials and workmen. From the description of the kind of place wanted, and of the situation in which it ought to be, you will be the best judge on what place upon the coast to fix; and you will, of course, communicate your wishes upon that subject to Lieut. Col. Close.

The articles of which we shall be principally in want, are food for our Europeans, for our Native troops and followers, and for our horses; military stores, medical stores, and money.

1st. For the Europeans we ought to have 10,000 gallons of arrack, in kegs of 6 gallons each, well fortified with iron hoops. It will not be possible for you, I should imagine, to procure the number of kegs that

G. O.

Camp near the French Rocks, 19th Jan 1803.

All beats of the drum to be taken up from the 33rd regt. till further orders.

The commanding officers of corps in camp are requested not to allow their men to sleep out of camp: neither are they to be allowed to absent themselves so far from camp as the fort and island of Seringapatam without a pass in writing, signed by the officer commanding then company, and the commanding officer of the corps to which they belong.

Major Gen. Wellesley has heard that exchanges of men have been made by some of the corps in the Mysore country, without the permission of the Commander in Chief. No man can be exchanged, without receiving a discharge from the corps which he quits; and no man can receive a discharge, without orders from the Commander in Chief. Major Gen. Wellesley therefore recommends that all those exchanged sepoys should return to the corps to which they originally belonged; and he positively forbids such exchanges in future.

Commanding officers of battalions are requested to pay particular attention to the memorandums which have been sent to them regarding the exercise of several corps in line. They are taken either from the regulations, or are the necessary consequences of them, and are given to them, as they may not occur to officers who have not been in the habit of seeing large bodies of troops act together, however well acquainted they may be with other parts of their profession.

will be necessary to hold all this arrack ; but the greater the number you can procure the better : that part for which kegs cannot be procured might be sent in casks of 50 or 60 gallons each, for which the General might send his carts, if the state of the road would permit it ; and if not, there will be a proportion of kegs with the army.

For the European troops, 90,000lbs. of salted meat will be required, also packed in kegs well fortified, 45lbs. in each keg, besides pickle, &c. ; and the same quantity of biscuits in round baskets, containing 60lbs. each ; these baskets to be covered with waxed cloth. Slaughter cattle for 3000 Europeans for one month would likewise be useful ; but these might remain in a situation in which it would be probable they might get some food, and would be attended to, till the army should be prepared to send for them.

2ndly. For the Natives, all that we shall require is 600 garces of rice. Each garce contains 4800 pucca seers, each seer 2lbs. It would be desirable that encouragement should be given to some of the traders at Bombay to have ready, for those of our camp, ghee, turmeric, doll, and other bazaar articles : but in the formation of a depôt of this kind, it is impossible to enumerate these, or for the government to lay them in. Salt, however, is an article of necessary consumption, both to the European and the Native troops ; and of this article it is desirable that there should be in the depôt 60 garces.

3rdly. We shall want military stores only in case we should have fought an action previously to our arrival at Poonah ; but it would be as well that they should be prepared for us : the expense of them is not great, and, if we do not want them, they will be available hereafter in the arsenal of Bombay. Enclosed I have the honor to send an account of the ordnance we shall have with us, for which a quarter equipment ought to be prepared according to the Madras regulations ; or, if that book should not be at Bombay, according to those of the Bombay government.

4thly. In respect to food for our horses, I am afraid that that which they use is not procurable at Bombay, viz. coulthee ; but if coulthee is procurable, there ought to be 150 garces of that grain in the depôt : if not, an equal quantity of chenna.

5thly. Medical stores : we ought to have 3 months' consumption of these for 3000 Europeans and 15,000 Native troops, particularly bark, Madeira wine, mercurial ointment, calomel, and not forgetting nitrous acid.

6thly. In respect to money, I conclude that Gen. Stuart will write to you particularly. I have not the means of estimating our expenses ; but I think you ought to be prepared to send us 16 lacs of rupees.

The next point to which I beg to draw your attention, is the mode of taking care of this depôt, and in which its contents are to be delivered to those whom Gen. Stuart will send for them.

The provision stores for the Europeans will not be very bulky, and not very difficult to be counted and delivered from the charge of one person to that of another : it will not be necessary, therefore, to employ many persons in the charge of these stores, and they might be under the superintendence of the person who will have charge of the rice. It is not probable

that the rice will remain any length of time in store, and, therefore, there does not appear any necessity for its being in bags; particularly as every head of cattle which will be sent from the army, to carry it away, will have its bags. It is essentially necessary, however, for the sake of regularity and expedition, that there should be a great number of conicopies, measuring men, and servers, attached to this grain; and that it should be stored in buildings in different parts of the fort, all of easy access from the gates. One gentleman should be appointed to superintend this department, that of the provisions for the Europeans, and that of the grain for the horses; for the care, measuring, and delivering of which the same measures ought to be taken as for the rice.

The medical and military stores ought each to be under charge of an officer of the departments to which they belong, with the proper number of servants for their care and delivery. The treasure might remain at Bombay till the General should call for it.

It has occurred to me, that you may find some difficulty in procuring the large quantity of rice for which I have called as above; but I have provided for this difficulty, and I wish I could do so for all the others in which you may be involved by this call upon your resources. I have written, by desire of Gen. Stuart, to the collectors in Canara, and have apprized them of the possibility of your wanting a large store of rice; and I have requested them to stop the exportation from that province till they should hear from you whether you would want it or not. If you should want any, they could send you any quantity that you could require. If you should not want it, I beg you to desire your secretary to apprise them of it, in order that they may take off the embargo which I conclude they will lay on in consequence of my request.

I believe that I have now adverted to all the points which I had to detail to you; but if I should not have done so, and should recollect any thing further, I am sure that you will excuse my troubling you again upon this subject.*

P. S. I have omitted in this letter to mention draught and carriage bullocks to you, because Gen. Stuart tells me that he has already drawn your attention to this part of our equipments. I beg leave, however, to call to your recollection the necessity that every carriage bullock with which you will supply the army should have a saddle. I conclude that you will not be able to procure any cattle for hire at Bombay, as we do in this part of India; and that all those with which you will supply us will be Company's property, and their drivers in the Company's service.

Wheat is not an article for dépôt in general; but it is one very necessary for the consumption of the European officers and soldiers of the army, and ought not, if possible, to be left to chance. It would, therefore, be very desirable that there should be 4 or 5 garces of wheat in the dépôt. It is, likewise, desirable that the traders at Bombay should be encouraged to have, ready to be purchased by the dealers of our camp, sheep, or slaughter cattle.

* For the Instructions for the advance of the British army into the Marhatta territory, see the Wellesley Dispatches, Marquis Wellesley to Lord Clive, 2nd Feb. 1803, and 3rd Feb. 1803, vol. ii. pp. 41 and 46.

To — — —.

Seringapatam, 20th Jan. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th this day, and I lose no time in replying to that part of it, in which you inform me that the Rajah, or Dessaye, of Kittoor has expressed a wish to be taken under the protection of the British government, and has offered to pay a tribute to the Company, and to give you a bribe of 4000 pagodas, and me one of 10,000 pagodas, provided this point is arranged according to his wishes. I cannot conceive what could have induced the Rajah of Kittoor to imagine that I was capable of receiving that, or any other sum of money, as an inducement to do that which he must think improper, or he would not have offered it. But I shall advert to that point more particularly presently.

The Rajah of Kittoor is a tributary of the Marhatta government, the head of which is an ally, by treaty, of the Hon. Company. It would be, therefore, to the full as proper that any officer in command of a post within the Company's territories should listen to, and enter into, a plan for seizing part of the Marhatta territories, as it is for you to listen to, and encourage, an offer from the Rajah of Kittoor to accept the protection of, and transfer his allegiance and tribute to, the Hon. Company's government. In case you should hear any thing further upon this subject from the Rajah of Kittoor, or in future from any of the chiefs of the Marhattas on the frontier, I desire that you will tell them, what is the fact, that you have no authority whatever to listen to such proposals; that you have orders only to keep up with them the usual intercourse of civility and friendship; and that, if they have any proposals of that kind to make, they must be made in a proper manner to our superiors. You may, at the same time, inform them that you have my authority to say that the British government is very little likely to take advantage of the misfortunes of its ally, to deprive him either of his territories, or of the allegiance or tribute due to him by his tributaries.

In respect to the bribe offered to you and myself, I am surprised that any man, in the character of a British officer, should not have given the Rajah to understand that the offer would be considered as an insult; and that he should not rather have forbidden its renewal than that he should have encouraged it, and even have offered to receive a quarter of the sum proposed to be given to him for prompt payment. I can attribute your conduct upon this occasion to nothing excepting the most inconsiderate indiscretion, and to a wish to benefit yourself, which got the better of your prudence. I desire, however, that you will refrain from a renewal of the subject with the Rajah of Kittoor at all; and that, if he should renew it, you will inform him that I and all British officers consider such offers as insults on the part of those by whom they are made. You shall hear from me to-morrow regarding the Store establishment of Hullahall. The battalion under your command is not destined for field service at present.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 21st Jan. 1803.

I have just received from Sir W. Clarke a copy of your letter of the 6th, to Mr Grant, the Sec. of government, at Bombay, in which you

desire to have from Sir William a particular account of the intentions of Appah Saheb, and the other chiefs in the Marhatta territories, towards the Toombuddra, in the present crisis of Marhatta affairs. In my letter of the 1st inst., I alluded to this topic, as the intentions of these chiefs might affect our military operations, and might retard our progress towards Poonah; and I stated some facts regarding the Putwurdun, and Rastia's family, and Goklah.

Matters regarding these three chiefs remain nearly as they were when I then wrote. Goklah is encamped near Savanore, and he has a detachment at Arnee upon the Toombuddra. Rastia's son has a force near Jellahall,* which drove Goklah down to his present position from the neighbourhood of the Kistna.

I have the most positive assurances that our army will be joined by Goklah, and I believe them to be sincere; as his vakeel, who was here, told me that his master had nothing to hope from Holkar, as he had taken, and given up to Ballojee Koonger, the brother of Holkar, who had been put to death. His only reliance, therefore, was upon the English, and their endeavors to restore the power of the Peshwah. I have not had hitherto any communication with any of the Putwurduns, excepting a civil letter from Chintomeny Rao, and an answer from Ball Kishen Bhow, to a letter which I wrote to him and sent by Govind Rao. I at the same time desired Govind Rao to discover the intentions of the Putwurduns upon the present occasion. Ball Kishen Bhow declared that he considered himself as belonging to the English, and should join our army himself, and should do everything in his power to influence the others to adopt the same line of conduct. But he said he could not answer for the others of the family; and he and Govind Rao are gone together to Hurrupoor upon the Kistna, where the whole family are encamped, to discover their intentions. I shall hear from Govind Rao in a few days, and I shall let you know what he writes. I have had no communication with Rastia, and do not know his intentions; but I am certain that, if I were to go to the frontier with the army, I should have vakeels from him and all these chiefs.

The Rajah of Kittoor has a vakeel here now, with a proposition to join us with 4000 horse and 7000 infantry, and a desire to be taken under our protection. I have informed Lord Clive of the arrival of this vakeel, and have treated him with attention. Futtu Sing was encamped with the armies of the Putwurdun, at Hurrupoor, and the avowed intention of this junction was to punish the Rajah of Kolapoor. But Futtu Sing has now returned towards Poonah, having been recalled, as it is said, by Holkar, as Scindiah's army was advancing rapidly to the southward from Burhanpoor. I can say nothing positive relating to Appah Saheb's reconciliation with the Peshwah; but I shall hear every thing from Govind Rao, to whom I have given detailed instructions to ascertain those points which could lead me to form a judgment of the real intentions and wishes of every chief in that part of the empire.

I have not heard any thing of the horse, which you say was sent up the ghauts from Mhar, under the chiefs named by you, to remain on the road between the Kistna and Poonah.

You will hear from Mr. Duncan that Gen. Stuart has approved of the plan for the dépôt; and I wrote yesterday to Mr. Duncan, in detail, upon the subject of the General's desire.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Macleod, 2nd batt. 12th regt.

23rd Jan. 1803.

The Dewan of the Rajah of Mysore has represented to Major Gen. Wellesley that, in consequence of some little family quarrel, Mahomed Khan, son of Mokurub Khan, a principal officer in the Rajah's country, left his father's house a considerable time ago, and had not been heard of till some days past, when he was discovered in your battalion as a sepoy. The father is extremely anxious to get the young man back to his family; and the Dewan has made a particular request to the General to obtain his discharge from the Company's service, in which the General would be glad to gratify him, and has accordingly desired me to mention these circumstances to you, and to request that, if you have no particular objections to the measure, you will apply for his discharge.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Atticoopah, 9th Feb. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter received from Mr. Read, the collector in Soonda, and I beg to know from you the names of the ghauts which have been cleared by you, to what places they lead, and by whose orders they were cleared. After I shall have received this in-

G. O.

Camp near the French Rocks, 30th Jan. 1803.

The line, including the 33rd regt., to be out to-morrow morning for exercise at the usual hour. The whole will close to the 1st batt. 2nd regt.

Officers commanding corps will be very particular in their attention to the quick circulation of the commands, and, in general, to all the circumstances recalled to their recollection in the different memorandums which have been sent to them.

G. O.

Camp near the French Rocks, 3rd Feb. 1803

The line to be out to-morrow morning at the usual hour. The corps will close up to the 1st batt. 2nd regt. Each man to have 10 rounds of blank ammunition, and the whole to be loaded.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that gentlemen, who may not be employed in the exercise of the troops, will keep at a distance from the line.

G. O.

Camp near the French Rocks, 4th Feb. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley is well satisfied with the attention which the commanding and other officers belonging to the corps in camp have paid to the exercises of the troops in line. He particularly requests their recollection of the different objects to which he has had occasion to draw their attention, in the course of the exercise, as the invariable principles upon which all great bodies of troops must act together, and those which will elucidate the system of discipline for individual corps, ordered by the Commander in Chief.

The operations of great bodies of troops may be more complicated: they may be formed of two or more lines, composed of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, according to their numbers and the nature of the country which may be the scene of their operations. But whatever may be the nature of those operations, the mode in which each individual corps is to act will be the same as that which has been practised for the last fortnight by the troops in line.

Major Gen. Wellesley also flatters himself that the objects proposed by each manœuvre laid down in the book of regulations, or those to be practised by individual corps, are more clear than they were when the exercise commenced.

G. O.

Camp near the French Rocks, Monday, 7th Feb. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that every man, not on public duty, may march with his corps in the line. There is no occasion whatever for guards among the baggage, and the use of them is positively forbid.

The sick and convalescents who may be able to walk, but cannot march with their corps, are to move on the reverse flank of the column of march, and those of each corps are to be kept together as much as possible.

The general assembly will beat off to-morrow morning by order of the senior officer present in camp, at the hours appointed.

The orderly hours are 12 o'clock on halting days, and 4 P. M. on marching days, when the adjutants of corps will attend at the D. A. G.'s tent.

formation, I will give you further directions respecting the mode in which the expense is to be paid.

Memorandum in answer to Capt. Moor's paper.

14th Feb. 1803.

1. I see no material objection to the formation of the depôt at Bombay, and to the delivery of its contents to the army from boats, provided the gentlemen at Bombay are of opinion that the navigation to Panwell is practicable during the monsoon. If it should not be so, the troops may never enjoy the advantage of the depôt, unless it be placed in security on the coast, before the monsoon sets in.

2. I concur in Capt. Moor's proposal in regard to the packages, particularly if the contents of the depôt are to be brought to the coast in boats, and delivered as wanted. But the rice and the grain ought to be

G. O.

Camp at Atticoopah, Wednesday, 9th Feb. 1803

Lieut. Brown, in charge of the stores, having complained that there were not a sufficient number of bullocks in readiness to carry off the loads in the store department this morning, and that he was under the necessity of procuring 7 bullocks, the expense of procuring these bullocks is to be charged against Chimny Chitty, owner of bullocks, who had not at the ground of encampment of the store department, this morning, the number of bullocks which, it appears by the register, are hired by him for the service.

All the owners of bullocks attached to this department must have been blamable this morning, and must have employed their spare cattle in an improper manner. Major Gen. Wellesley therefore desires that it may be clearly explained to them all, that, the next time that bullocks are wanting to move off the ground the loads in any department, a deduction shall be made, from the monthly hire to be paid to each owner, of the sum which he ought to receive for the spare bullocks belonging to him, for one day; and if this practice is continued, a muster will be ordered on every day after the march.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that Capt. Mackay will give orders to the drivers not to allow the draught bullocks to run. The commanding officer of artillery also is requested to give orders to the officers and non-commissioned officers of the artillery, detached with brigades, or attached to the park, not to suffer the drivers to allow the bullocks to get into a trot.

Whether, in consequence of this order, Major Gen. Wellesley shall be able to prevent the cattle from being driven in this manner, or not, he positively forbids commanding officers of corps from following the guns beyond the rate at which the troops can march with ease to themselves. The commanding officer of each corps is to lead his battalion at a steady even pace, and the commanding officer of each company his company at the same pace. When the badness of the road, or an obstacle, may occasion a halt, and a consequent break in the line, the corps or company which may have halted is not to run to regain its distance.

Commanding officers of corps and companies are responsible that this order is strictly attended to, as one most essential to their men. They will not be able to bear the fatigue of the marches which they will be required to perform, if they are to be forced to move at a pace at all quicker than that at which they can march with ease.

The Commander in Chief having declared his intention to appoint Mr. Beckwith to be Provost marshal to the army in the field, and Mr. Beckwith being at present in camp, he is to act as Provost marshal, till the orders of the Commander in Chief shall be received.

The heads of all villages in the country have orders to sell straw, &c., to the troops and their followers; and the Major General requests that, in case any officer should have occasion to complain that the inhabitants refuse to sell their forage, he will be so kind as to send with his complaint the person who can point out the village in which the person resides, and the person who refused to sell what may have been required. At the same time, as it is probable that this road will be much used by convoys, &c., coming to the army, officers will be aware of the necessity of requiring from the villages no more forage than is absolutely necessary to them.

G. O.

Camp at Kichairy, Thursday, 10th Feb. 1803.

Commanding officers of Native corps will place sentinels over all grain fields, or stacks of grain, which may be within or near to their lines, with orders to prevent cattle from grazing on the former, or the followers from carrying away the latter; the attendants on cattle, or the followers, who may attempt to carry away the grain, are to be made prisoners, and sent to head quarters.

packed in packages, each of 3 mercals, and each mercial 12 pucca seers, each seer 2lbs.

3. The suggestion in the 10th paragraph must, of course, be attended to.

4. Boats must, of course, be established on the two rivers noticed in paragraphs 23 and 24. There will be no difficulty in crossing the cattle.

5. The rivers in the southern part of the peninsula, viz. the Malpoorba, the Werdah, the Toombuddra, the Cauvery, and the Cubhany, do not fill till between the 15th and 20th June. I write this from the experience of 4 years. The rains set in to the southward before they begin to the northward: it is, therefore, to be supposed that the rivers which rise in the hills to the southward will fill first. I mention this in order that the exact time at which these rivers may be expected to fill may be investigated; as to procure boats to pass them is an object of much importance, and one which will take much time.

6. Skins to cover the boats, which must be of the basket kind, might be prepared at Bombay.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Jingey Jalaub, 19th Feb. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose indents made by the officer commanding at Hullihall, passed by the Military board, on the stores at Seringapatam. I have taken upon me to address these indents to the acting Dep. Commissary at Hullihall, as the stores at that station can now afford to supply the articles indented for, and as it might be inconvenient for them now to travel to Hullihall from Seringapatam by the road which leads along the frontier.

G. A. O.

Camp at Chinroypatam, Saturday, 12th Feb. 1803

There is no more straw in the village of Chinroypatam, or in those in the neighbourhood. It is necessary therefore that persons wanting it should send to the villages at the distance of 2 and 3 coss.

The officers are requested not to send papers or written orders with their servants going for straw. Money only is necessary; and papers sent by some tend to confuse the inhabitants of the country, and are the occasion that others find difficulty in getting what they want.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that returns may be made to the Acting D. Q. M. G. of the probable quantity of straw that will be required daily for the cattle attached to corps, departments, and individuals, by the following persons. The number of cattle, and the number of bullock loads of forage which they will consume, to be included in these returns, reckoning that 15 bullocks will consume 1 bullock load in a day.

1. The commanding officers of corps for the corps under their command respectively.
2. Lient. Brown for the bullocks attached to the store department.
3. The cattle in the bazaar by the superintendent of supplies.
4. The bullocks in the grain department by the Acting D. Q. M. G.
5. The individuals in head quarter line, each for himself.

G. M. O.

Camp near Jumboor, Sunday, 13th Feb 1803.

In consequence of orders to that purport received from the Commander in Chief, family certificates are to be issued immediately by corps employed on service in the field with the division of the army under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley, including the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry.

Commanding officers will take care that the G. O., 23rd Dec. 1802, are conformed to in every respect in the issue of these family certificates; and that the rolls required are transmitted to the paymasters, and to the military auditor general.

Commanding officers of corps in camp are requested to send off the families as soon as the certificates can be delivered to them. They will recollect that they can make them payable to the families for any period that they may think proper.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Chalmers.

Benkypoor, 21st Feb. 1803.

In walking through the camp this morning, Major Gen. Wellesley was surrounded by a number of bullock men belonging to your battalion, who represented that they had all been flogged, because the tents were not up soon enough to-day. The General therefore desires me to call to your recollection that these men, natives of this country, have as yet been but little acquainted with Europeans, and consequently are more apt to take the alarm, at any appearance of what may be only requiring their duty from them, than the natives of the Carnatic are; and if they should desert you now, the corps may be distressed in its present situation. Besides, the road was so bad to-day that most people's baggage was late getting in; and these men might not have been able to get on their bullocks so quick as usual.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hooley Honore, 22nd Feb. 1803.

I enclose a letter from Govind Rao, and another from Ball Kishen Bhow, by which you will perceive that the dispositions of the chiefs of the Putwurdun family are favorable to the Peshwah. They are all encamped on the Kistna. I shall send you Govind Rao's detail as soon as I receive it.

I might arrive at Hurryhur on the 25th, and I am finely equipped for the service in every respect. I make long marches with the greatest facility, and my cattle are all fresh. I wish I could say as much for Gen. Stuart; but he is badly off indeed. He has lost a number of cattle, and those which remain are in a very bad state. We are to halt in 3 divisions; Gen. Stuart at Mayaconda, Gen. Campbell at Harponelly, and myself at Hoonelly, till further orders are received. Gen. Stuart's cattle will recruit a little there, but not much; and I see no remedy but that which I have recommended to him, viz. to diminish his monstrous equipment, and to leave behind him every thing not absolutely necessary. I shall see him at Mayaconda on the 26th, and will try to persuade him to adopt this measure.

I have not heard where Gungurdhur is; but Bappojee Scindiah will certainly refuse to give him up Darwar till he sees our army approach it.

G. A. O.

Camp near Kerah-sinta samoodrum, Wednesday, 16th Feb. 1803

The people who are sent to the villages for straw must take with them the sum of money which will be sufficient to pay for what they want. They are not to require change from the people of the villages: they have it not to give to them.

G. O.

Camp near Benoor, 18th Feb. 1803.

When the cavalry are ordered for the advance, they will always move from their lines in such time as to be in the high road on the marching flank, and ready to move off exactly at assembly beating.

G. O.

Camp at Hooley Honore, Tuesday, 22nd Feb. 1803.

As the troops will encamp for some time to come along the river, it is expected that all the bullock drivers and grass cutters will bring in the full proportion of green forage, as without such assistance it is not possible for any country to supply the forage for this detachment for any length of time.

All corps and detachments of corps in camp will send in present states to the D. A. G. one hour after their coming to their lines to-morrow.

G. A. O.

22nd Feb. 1803.

Complaints having been made that the people sent to purchase straw do not go to the places appointed for them in orders, commanding officers of corps and heads of departments are requested to explain fully the places allotted for their followers to forage, as any people found deviating from the orders will be punished. Straw is not to be required at any time in the village which gives its name to the camp (unless particularly ordered), because the forage collected there is reserved for the Company's draught bullocks.

The threat to use 6 baums of rope may then be useful. But, at all events, I think we can take it by a *coup de main*.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. * * * *, 1st batt. 2nd regt.*

Aneywary, 23rd Feb. 1803.

I have communicated your letter of the 22nd inst. to Major Gen. Wellesley, who desires me to inform you that, as the man, Annatty by name, whom you denominate *acting vakeel* to the battalion, although so lately brought before a public tribunal by you under the denomination of vakeel, has been mustered and returned as such for at least 15 months past, he must henceforth be considered as such to all intents and purposes, until regularly discharged from the Company's service. And, as he ought never to have been employed in any business but the public business of the battalion, the General cannot consent to his being confined in order to be tried by any military tribunal, excepting a public one, under his own inspection, for crimes of a nature unconnected with his duty as a servant of the Company; and he must not be confined beyond the usual time, unless a regular crime in writing is given in against him. That crime, for which you now propose to try him, appears to be grounded on facts, for which he has been already brought to trial and acquitted, although the crime is differently worded. Major Gen. Wellesley cannot admit of this irregularity. He also desires me to observe that this man, being a public servant of the Company, ought not to be employed in these private concerns.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Hoonelly, 2nd March, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st. The cavalry

G. O.

Camp at Aneywary, Wednesday, 23rd Feb. 1803.

An outlying piquet to mount in future, to consist of 1 subaltern officer and a detail of 50 Native troops, with a puckahie from each corps of Native infantry in camp; the whole to be commanded by a captain, to be furnished by roster from the infantry. The piquet will parade on halting days in front of the 33rd regt. at half past 6 in the morning; and on marching days on the marching flank of the infantry a quarter of an hour before assembly beating. The details to parade in the order in which their corps are encamped in line.

An adjutant of the day from the infantry will mount daily, who will receive the details and parade the piquet, and will attend the captain of the piquet, until it takes up its new ground, when he will return to camp, and deliver any report which the captain of the piquet may have to send; after which his tour of duty will be over.

Till further orders it will not be necessary that the captain of the piquet should remain out with it; but he must march with it, post it, and visit it frequently during the day and night, and must always be in readiness, and report when he comes off duty.

It is possible that this division of the army may remain upon the ground in the neighbourhood of Davara Hoonelly for some days. Major Gen. Wellesley therefore requests commanding officers of corps, heads of departments, and individuals, to be very particular in sending their followers to forage in the places allotted to them. It is obvious that the difficulty in foraging the cattle of this division of the army will become every day greater, in proportion to the time that it shall remain on one ground. Major Gen. Wellesley therefore again presses the officers of the army to save the dry forage as much as possible, by the use of green forage: much can certainly be procured on the banks of the Toombuddra, in quantities nearly sufficient for the use of the cattle, if the officers will force their followers to do their duty and bring it in. There is certainly a great consumption and waste of forage in this division of the army, which it is the duty and the interest of every individual to prevent as much as possible. It is reported that some has even been burnt; and Major Gen. Wellesley declares his determination to punish any person who may be guilty of so wanton a disobedience of orders in future.

G. O.

Camp at Davara Hoonelly, Thursday, 24th Feb. 1803

It has been reported to Major Gen. Wellesley that there is green forage among the hills of Rawgund-hinsie, east, and Bellguttie, west, sufficient to supply the army for 4 days. he consequently requests the officers and others to send out their followers to those hills, and along the banks of the river, to endeavor to procure 2 days' forage, which, with that in the villages allotted to the corps, &c., yesterday, will afford forage for 5 days.

Major Gen. Wellesley intending to go over to head quarters to Mayaconda to-morrow, the command of this division will devolve on Lieut. Col. Chalmers, as senior officer in camp, during his absence. All reports to be made to that officer accordingly, who will receive particular instructions for his guidance.

of this division will march to-morrow morning for Soolakairy. I delayed ordering their march till I should arrive here, purposely that I might make arrangements for supplying them while at that place. They have all got good bazaars, and will take from hence as much rice as their bazaar people can carry; and I shall do my utmost to keep them supplied hereafter. I wrote yesterday to Col. Dallas on this subject, and recommended that, in case the bullocks attached to the bazaar of this camp could not supply his wants regularly, on account of the greater distance, he should apply to you, through Lieut. Blacker, for some of the brinjarry rice. If you should consent to grant him any, their bags may be filled again in the same manner as those emptied in your camp. I have, however, hopes that I shall be able to supply his wants without coming upon the brinjarries or any public store: the only doubt I have of it is the distance he is from me.

Mr. Gordon's bullocks that are in this camp are very well supplied with drivers, indeed better than any that I have yet seen. It is not improbable but that some of the drivers of those sent to you may be at Hurryhur with the owners and maistries, who are there settling their accounts. As soon as I ordered these bullocks to your camp, I sent Mr. Gordon's servant from hence to settle their accounts, in order that they might be delivered over in every respect clear to Major Symons. I dare say they will be found not deficient in drivers, and I know that they left Seringapatam complete. The bullocks which left Seringapatam on the 18th Feb. are marching to join you by the road of Sera and Chittledroog, and not by the lower road, as I imagined. They are in charge of a guard of the 1st of the 2nd, and may be expected every day.

I had a conversation with the Dewan yesterday respecting draught cattle: he promises to supply 400 for sale. They will be all trained cattle, and fit for immediate work. I shall report upon them from time to time as they arrive. I also mentioned to the Dewan your wishes respecting the pay of the shepherds, to which he has readily consented; viz. that they are to have the country pay, $1\frac{1}{2}$ pagodas, while within the Rajah's territories, and 2 pagodas when they shall pass the frontiers. I settled with him that his servants were to take charge, for the Company, of 40,000 sheep, as many within, and as many beyond, the frontier as you might think proper; that shepherds were to be entertained and kept up for this number; that he has also to keep up that stock of sheep, and, if at any time there should be a few more, the same number of shepherds should take care of them. By this arrangement much of the expense will be saved, you will always have a stock of sheep at your command, and a difficulty will be avoided in settling a detailed account of shepherds' wages according to the number of sheep in the charge of the Rajah's officers, which must vary daily. Besides, it would be hard to discharge a number of shepherds at a distance from the frontier when the sheep

G. O. (*by Lieut. Col. Chalmers.*)

Camp at Davara Hoonelly, Tuesday, 1st March, 1803.

A salute of 15 guns to be held in readiness in the park, to be fired on the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley's return to camp to-morrow morning. The officer commanding the artillery will place lascar sentries with banderols, to give notice of his approach to the right of the lue, which will be the time for commencing the salute.

should be consumed ; and equally so to throw the expense of maintaining them upon the Rajah. By this mode his officers in camp, in charge of the sheep concern, will take care to send the shepherds back to the depôt flock in Mysore, in proportion as the flocks in camp shall be delivered over to the commissary.

I beg to know from you whether you approve of this arrangement? I believe it would be proper that I should leave to Col. Dallas the order of the casting committees on the cavalry horses ; or, if you wish that I should still order these committees, and give them instructions according to your G. O. of the 28th Feb., I shall do so, and shall go over to see the horses which the committee may cast.

Upon a reference to Major Munro's last letter to Capt. Barclay, I find that he has not received your orders, not to forward on to the frontier of Mysore the depôt formed at Bellary, and he is still paying Wurdy bullocks for this purpose. The Wurdy bullocks will be useful to you empty, and under present arrangements the depôt at Bellary will be more useful there than it can be elsewhere.

It would be well if a hircarrah camel were dispatched from your camp to Bellary, with a letter to Mr. Cochrane, (Major Munro has gone to Adoni,) to desire that he would send you the Wurdy bullocks without loads, without loss of time, consigned to Major Symons.

I enclose a memorandum upon the subject of the salary of the superintendent of supplies and his establishments, by which you will observe that Major Macleod's salary was 300 pagodas, and not 500, as I imagined ; and that Capt. Barclay had, when he was acting in that capacity under me, 100 pagodas, the scale which you fixed as that to be paid to Lieut. Blacker.

Translation of a Memorandum given to Major Gen. Wellesley by Goklah's vakeel.

1. Goklah sent a vakeel to Bajee Rao, the Peshwah in the Konkan, who represented to his Highness the situation of Goklah's affairs. His Highness said, that the country in general was in great confusion ; that Goklah must conduct himself according to the wishes of the commanding officer of the British forces ; and his Highness was desirous of hearing of his fidelity to his cause, through Lieut. Col. Close. Goklah wished, therefore, that Major Gen. Wellesley would write to Lieut. Col. Close, and inform him that he had full confidence in Goklah ; that he was a brave man, &c.

2. Accounts to the following purport have come from Poonah. For the settlement of the countries towards the Carnatic, Shekamut Khan, Meer Khan Patan, and Fetry Sing Maunna, have come, with their troops, into their zillah of Gurkan. Besides these chiefs, others of inferior note are about to take their departure. Holkar himself is with his army in Poonah. For these reasons, Goklah's vakeel at Poonah recommends it to him to connect himself with the Company, and that speedily, as, without their assistance, there is no safety for him. Goklah therefore requests, that, if the army should not enter the country, some battalions might be sent to his assistance, and that a place of safety may be given to him for his family.

3. Goklah saw Govind Rao at Noorgoond, who, he concludes, wrote Major Gen. Wellesley an account of his interview with him.

4. Goklah's army is in some difficulties for want of pay, and the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, is at a great distance. Goklah therefore wishes for assistance, in a pecuniary way.

The conversation which Major Gen. Wellesley had with the vakeel was to the same purport with the memorandum nearly : The General told Ran Rao, that he

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd inst. The failure of the Seringapatam cattle is very-extraordinary indeed. They are not hired under any particular bargain, and there is nothing to prevent the rejection of those deemed unserviceable. I find that some of the drivers were at Hurryhur settling their accounts, which is probably one cause of a deficiency of these people found at muster. The cattle were very fine, and complete in drivers, when they left Seringapatam. Besides the cattle in your camp, 973, including spare, are gone to Chittledroog, to take thither the loads of stores left in that garrison.

I now enclose a state of our wheel carriages, and the draught cattle required for them. The number of spare is 180, and they will go off to your camp to-morrow morning. This number will soon be increased by the emptying the treasure tumbrils, and by transferring to the horses the cavalry guns and tumbrils. But till these measures are effected, it would answer no purpose to send away more bullocks, and would render it necessary to leave carriages behind, if you should order me suddenly to march. I also expect some deliveries of cattle immediately from Purneah: 136 carriage bullocks will also go to your camp to-morrow morning; these are above the number required for this camp, and will make the total number delivered to Major Symons stand as follows: Mustered by Major Symons, 1928; sent to Chittledroog for the stores, 973; and from this camp, 136: total 3037.

Mr. Gordon's man tells me that the owners will replace the bullocks which Major Symons has rejected. I sent some rice to Col. Dallas's camp this morning, and I shall send some more to-morrow.

Upon looking over the memorandum I sent you this morning, I find that the paper No. 1 is erroneous, as it includes 4 tumbrils, with fixed ammunition for iron 12 pounders, to be transferred from the grand army

would write a letter to Lieut. Col. Close, as desired. In regard to the second point, he observed to him, that the British army was upon the frontier, and therefore there could be no great danger to be apprehended from the forces of the chief mentioned; and, in regard to the third, he said, that the Company were not bound by treaty to pay the Peshwah's troops; that it appeared that his Highness had provided already for the payment of the army under Goklah's command; that Goklah should take measures to reap the advantages of that provision; and that, as no more had been provided for the British troops than was absolutely necessary for them, he was to expect nothing from the Commander in Chief.

Extract from 'The Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire.'

The command of the advanced detachment necessarily required the united exertion of considerable military skill, and of great political experience and discretion; and Lord Clive was therefore of opinion, that it could not be confided, with equal prospects of advantage, to any other person than the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, whose extensive local knowledge, and personal influence, among the Marhatta chieftains (acquired by his conduct in the command of Mysore, and by his victories over Dhoondiah and other refractory chiefs), were peculiarly calculated to ensure success to the intended operations. Lord Clive, accordingly, desired that Gen. Wellesley might be appointed to the command of the advanced detachment, under instructions to be furnished to him by Lieut. Gen. Stuart, according to the spirit of the Governor General's orders of the 2nd Feb. 1803.

In conformity to these instructions, Lieut. Gen. Stuart directed a detachment from the main army, assembled at Hurryhur, to be formed under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley, for the purpose of advancing into the Marhatta territory.

to this camp, whereas these tumbrils are now here. I enclose another paper No. 1, corrected; and I shall be obliged to you if you will destroy that which I sent this morning.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum and certain other papers, upon the subject on which you have desired my sentiments, of which I hope you will approve.

It may appear extraordinary that it should be necessary that this detachment should be so much stronger than that which is advancing from Hyderabad; but it must be recollected: 1st: that the latter will not advance beyond the Nizam's frontier till the former shall be at hand to join it; and that the supposed enemy will be much disinclined to pass that frontier to attack it. 2ndly: that this detachment must be not only of sufficient strength to defend itself, but also to give confidence to, and keep together, the Peshwah's party in the state.

It is not so strong in the essential points, cavalry and European infantry, as that which I commanded in the country heretofore; but I think it is respectable, and I know it is so well equipped, that it will answer all the objects in view. If you should take the command of it yourself, I hope you will do me the favor to allow me to accompany you in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that country and its inhabitants, in a military point of view, was learned when I was in it; and I shall do every thing in my power to make myself useful to you. If you should not think proper to take the command of this detachment yourself, and, in consideration of the information which I have had opportunities of gaining of that country and its inhabitants, and the communications which I have constantly held with its chiefs, you should be pleased to intrust it to me, I shall be infinitely gratified, and shall do every thing in my power to forward your views.

Although I have in this letter adverted to the command of the detachment to be sent forward, I am by no means desirous to press you to make known your sentiments upon it till the proper time.

Memorandum submitted to Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

It appears now to be intended that a detachment from the army upon the frontiers shall enter the Marhatta territory, and that the main body shall remain within the territories of the Company. Upon this subject several questions are to be considered, upon which I shall enter into detail.

The first of these is the number and description of the troops and equipments that would be required to form a detachment which could with safety be trusted within the Marhatta frontier, until a junction should be formed with the detachment from Hyderabad.

2ndly, the quantity of provisions which this detachment ought to have with it.

3rdly, the mode according to which this detachment is to subsist in the Marhatta territories.

4thly, the situation in which it would be most convenient for the main body of the army to be placed, with a view to the subsistence of the

advanced detachment, and giving it support and countenance, and to the general defence of the frontier.

5thly, the manner in which the main body of the army is to be fed in this position.

1st. It is my opinion that a detachment, consisting of either the 25th dragoons and the 1st and 4th regts. of cavalry, or the 19th dragoons and the 2nd, 5th, and 7th regts. of cavalry, with the five companies of the 33rd regt., another regiment of European infantry (the 73rd would answer best, as that corps has been in that country before), 150 artillery, 6 battalions of Native infantry, one corps of pioneers, 4 iron 12 pounders, 2 brass 12 pounders, sixteen 6 pounders for the line, and as many guns drawn by horses as could be fitted out, would be, with the Rajah's and Marhatta horse, such a detachment as could be sent with safety into the Marhatta territory. The Seringapatam equipment, having 10 lacs of musket ammunition, would be sufficient for this detachment.

2ndly. It ought to carry with it 2 months' arrack at full allowance, and provisions for 1500 European troops, and 2000 loads of rice in the grain department.

3rdly. The Mysore brinjarries, amounting at present to 26,000, ought to be sent with it, all full. What will remain of the depôt collected at Hurryhur, as well as that at Hullihall, ought to be allotted to it, as well as all the resources which the Mysore country can afford. Besides these, the bullocks attached to the Mysore bazaar will be able to supply the camp with the resources of the country in which the detachment may be situated.

4thly. With a view that this advanced detachment may have the full advantage of the resources of provisions above stated, it would be necessary that the army should move out of Mysore as soon as the arrangements for the advance of the detachment shall be made. Under present circumstances, the best defensive position which the army could take would be in the Ceded districts on the Toombuddra, in advance of Bellary, and probably of Anagoondy, with Purneah's army in Mysore, on the Toombuddra, near Hoonelly. They would then be able to move forward to the support of the advanced detachment: they would protect the Ceded districts, if the enemy should attempt to penetrate into those countries, or, by a movement to their left, Mysore, if he should attempt to penetrate into that country.

5thly. The army might be fed in this position: 1st, by the 22,000 brinjarries belonging to the Ceded districts; 2ndly, by 14,000 brinjarries belonging to the Baramahl, and which are now on their march to join the army; 3rdly, by the depôt formed at Bellary, which can be increased to any extent that may be thought proper; and 4thly, by the resources of the Ceded districts. The 5000 loads of rice also, brought up in the grain department from the Carnatic, are not disposed of in this memorandum, and would be applicable to the subsistence of the main body.

The annexed papers will show the detail of every thing, excepting money, medicines, and gram, that will be required by the advanced detachment of the strength supposed. I have no means of calculating the two former, and the quantity of the latter to be sent must depend upon the number of horses of which the detachment of cavalry will be composed.

Lieut. Gen. Stuart to Lord Clive.

Camp near Mayaconda, 3rd March, 1803.

I this day had the honor to receive your Lordship's dispatch by express, dated the 27th ult. I have directed the divisions of the army to assemble at Hurryhur on the 6th inst.* and I expect that the detachment under Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley will be able to commence its march into the Marhatta territory on the 8th. I shall have the honor, on my arrival at Hurryhur, of communicating to your Lordship a detail of the arrangements which I propose to adopt relative to that movement.

I have acquainted the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad with the period of time when Major Gen. Wellesley's detachment will be ordered to advance from the frontier; and I have informed the latter of the arrangement which I have made in regard to the junction of an European corps with the subsidiary force.†

* Force assembled at Hurryhur under the command of Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

CAVALRY.		Eur.	Nat.	Total.	Grand Total.
H. M.'s 19th dragoons	.	413			
.. 25th do.	.	562			
				975	
1st regt. Native cavalry.	.		437		
2nd do. do.	.		438		
4th do. do.	.		438		
5th do. do.	.		421		
6th do. do.	.		431		
7th do. do.	.		438	2606	
					3581
Artillery	.	390			390
Gun Lascars.	.		563		563
INFANTRY.					
H. M.'s 33rd regt. 5 companies	.	322			
H. M.'s 73rd do.	.	756			
H. M.'s 74th do.	.	754			
H. M.'s Scotch brigade	.	1013		2845	
					2845
1st batt. 2nd regt. N. I.	.		1005		
1st do. 3rd do.	.		1109		
2nd do. 3rd do.	.		998		
1st do. 4th do.	.		1010		
2nd do. 4th do.	.		1010		
2nd do. 5th do.	.		1014		
1st do. 8th do.	.		997		
1st do. 12th do.	.		1011		
2nd do. 12th do.	.		1000		
2nd do. 18th do.	.		1011		
1st do. 14th do.	.		1011		
1st do. 17th do.	.		997	12,182	
					12,182
Corps of pioneers	.				800
				Grand Total	19,798

With 4 iron twelve and 4 iron 18 pounders; 4 brass twelve pounders; 40 field pieces, 12 galloper guns, and 4 howitzers.

† Subsidiary force attached to the Nizam under Col. Stevenson.

CAVALRY.		Total.
3rd regt. Native cavalry	.	516
6th do. do.	.	502—1018
INFANTRY.		
2nd batt. 2nd regt. N. I.	.	1275
1st do. 6th do.	.	1288
2nd do. 7th do.	.	1290
2nd do. 9th do.	.	1286
1st do. 11th do.	.	1008
2nd do. 11th do.	.	1035—7182
Artillery	.	168—8368

With 310 lascars and 2 companies of pioneers.

The 94th (the Scotch brigade) afterwards joined, from the advancing division under Major Gen. Wellesley.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Hoonelly, 4th March, 1803.

I had the honor of receiving yesterday your first letter of the 3rd, and I have stopped here this day in order to see the vakeels, to write letters to the sirdars upon the frontier, and to make various arrangements preparatory to the march of the troops. I shall go to Hurryhur to-morrow morning, and shall join you at Kurdewarrah on the 6th. This division will march from hence on the 6th, and will be at Hurryhur on the 7th.

I have given orders that the brinjarries may be collected. They will be in good time. Major Robertson will give his own directions to Kishen Rao, who is in your camp, regarding the sheep; but I have sent to Purneah on the subject.

I am entirely at a loss whom to recommend for the offices mentioned in your second letter of the 3rd; as all the officers who have been employed with me heretofore have been selected by you for situations of importance in the army. It occurs to me, however, that, as the business of all the departments of the army will, under present arrangements, be much less than was expected when the appointments were made, the business, both of the army and of the advanced detachment, might be done by the same officers, only by a different arrangement of it. Major Robertson might superintend the business of Major Symons' bullock department in the army, and Major Symons might superintend Major Robertson's grain and provision department and Mr. Darval's pay department with the advanced detachment; or *vice versa*, Major Robertson might take charge, in the advanced detachment, of Major Symons' and Mr. Darval's departments, and Major Symons of his in the army. I should, however, prefer to have Major Symons with the advanced detachment, because he could give me a little assistance in the language, of which I stand much in need, my Persian interpreter being at Seringapatam, doing his duty at that place. In case you should adopt this proposal, it would be necessary that the gentlemen at the heads of departments should send with the advanced detachment, or leave with the army, as the case may be, proper servants to carry on their respective duties.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hoonelly, 4th March, 1803.

You will have learned, from Lord Clive's instructions to Gen. Stuart, of the 27th Feb., that every thing ends, at last, in my going forward with a detachment; and that the main body of the army is to remain on the frontier, with a view to its defence, or to giving support to the advanced division, if it should be necessary. The army joins, consequently, at Hurryhur, on the 7th, and I shall move forward as soon afterwards as circumstances will permit; but as I sent to Gen. Stuart, yesterday, detailed arrangements for detaching a body, of about the strength stated in Lord Clive's instructions, I imagine that all the preparations for my march will be in readiness in a very few hours after the army shall join. I shall leave this to-morrow for Gen. Stuart's camp, to forward them, and you may depend upon my not losing one moment of time.

I enclose my last letters from Govind Rao, from which you will perceive the state of the opinions and intentions of the jaghiredars upon the frontier. Besides this, Goklah's vakeel in my camp still assures me of

the determination of his master to adhere to the cause of the Peshwah, and to join me. I have desired Govind Rao to urge Ball Kishen Guingurdhur to come and meet me; and if Darwar is not to be got by force, I shall, at least, try what I can do by fair means and threats.

I return you a copy of Capt. Moor's memorandum, with a memorandum in answer thereto. I like the depôt at Bombay well, particularly as I find, from Gen. Stuart, that the harbour at Bombay is, at all seasons, practicable for boats.

I shall keep you informed of every thing that occurs.

The D.A.G. to Col. Montresor, commg. in Malabar and Canara. 4th March, 1803.

I have the honor to forward to you, by order of Major Gen. Wellesley, orders for a European and a Native General Court Martial to be assembled in the province of Malabar, at such times and places as you may be pleased to direct; also warrants for the presidents, whose names you will please to cause to be inserted in the warrants respectively, reporting them, as soon as determined, to Gen. Wellesley.

I also transmit to you charges against Lieut. ---, 1st batt. 2nd regt.; soubahdar ---, 2nd batt. 1th regt.; and soubahdar ---, 2nd batt. 8th regt., Bombay N.I.; upon which Major Gen. Wellesley directs that those officers may be tried, and he directs me to request that, in the event of there being any other prisoners in the provinces under your command, whose cases you may think deserving of being investigated by either of these General Courts Martial, you will forward the charges against such prisoners, for his consideration and orders previous to the prisoners being brought to trial.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Hullyhur, 7th March, 1803.

I have to request that you will give directions that the carriages of the 6 iron 12 pounders at Hullihall may be put in a state fit for service without loss of time, and so that they may travel a short distance, if necessary.

Lord Clive to Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort St. George, 7th March, 1803.

I have had every reason to be highly satisfied with the mode in which the intercourse with the Marhatta jaghiredais has been hitherto carried on, through the medium of Major Gen. Wellesley; and the same causes which induced me to suggest to your Excellency the expediency of employing that officer in the command of the detachment destined to advance in co-operation with the southern jaghiredais, lead me to recommend your continuing to take every advantage of that officer's personal influence with these chiefs, and of his extensive knowledge of their views and sentiments, in order to carry the intentions of the Governor General into full execution; and it is by no means my intention, when I recommend to your Excellency, in conformity with the wishes of the Governor General, to employ the abilities of Major Malcolm on such affairs of a political nature as may arise, to limit the powers of your Excellency in authorising Major Gen. Wellesley, or any other officer, to hold direct intercourse, or to negotiate an arrangement, with any of the Peshwah's officers, upon the principles prescribed by the Governor General. I am well convinced your Excellency cannot have too great a latitude in this respect, and that it is essential to the success of the public service that you should feel yourself at perfect liberty to act, on every emergency that may occur, in the mode dictated by your own judgment.

To Lieut. Col. Close. Camp opposite Arner, on the Toombudda, 8th March, 1803.

In my last letter I told you that I should not be very long arranging the detachment to proceed under my command towards Poonah. Accordingly I moved into camp yesterday, and am this day 6 miles in advance of it, and I shall proceed on my march to-morrow. I have with me the 19th light dragoons, 4th, 5th, and 7th regts. of cavalry, under Col. Dallas;

the 74th and Scotch brigade, and 6 complete battalions of Native infantry; 4 iron 12 pounders, 2 brass 12 pounders, sixteen 6 pounders, 4 galloper 6 pounders, besides the guns attached to the cavalry. I cannot cross the river till I shall be opposite Havanoor, because there is no water between Rannee Bednore and Havery.

Force composing the advancing division under Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

		Eur.	Nat.	Total.	Gd. Total.
CAVALRY.	Lieut. Col. Dallas,	H. M. 19th light dragoons .	412	412	
	Commanding.	1th Native cavalry . . .	138		
	Major of Brigade,	5th do.	421		
	Capt. Grant.	7th do.	438	1297	
					1709
INFANTRY.					
4th BRIGADE.	Lieut. Col. Harness,	H. M. 94th (Scotch brigade)	751		
	Commanding.	1st batt. 2nd regt N. I. . .	1005		
	Capt. Tolfrey,	2nd do. 3rd do.	998		
	Major of Brigade.	Lieut. Monn,	2nd do. 12th do.	1000	
	Quarter Master.				
5th BRIGADE.	Lieut. Col. Wallace,	H. M. 74th regt.	1013		
	Commanding.			1767	
	Capt. Vans Agnew,	1st batt 3rd regt. N. I. . .	1109		
	Major of Brigade	1st do. 8th do.	997		
	Lieut. Campbell,	2nd do. 18th do.	1014	6123	
	Quarter Master.				7890
		Artillery	108		108
		Gun lascars			206
		Pioneers			704
Grand Total					10,617

Note Major Gen Wellesley had earnestly proposed that his own regiment, the 33rd, to which he was much attached, should accompany the advancing division under his command; but circumstances prevented the desired arrangement.

G. O. C. C

Hurryhar, 7th March, 1803.

The following officers are appointed assistants in the public departments, and will proceed with the detachment of the army under the orders of Major Gen the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Mr Surgeon Gilmour to be a surgeon on the staff, and to inspect hospitals, &c., reporting to Mr. Anderson, superintending surgeon of the army.

Capt. J. G. Graham, of the 2nd regt., to be an assistant in the Pay department.

Capt. T. Younger, of the 2nd regt., to be an assistant in the department of Commissary of grain and provisions.

Lieut. Monteith to be an assistant in the department of General Agent for cavalry supplies.

The latter officers will be allowed a salary of 100 pagodas each per month, and the heads of the several departments will send a proportion of their establishments to be employed under their respective assistants, who are directed to make up their accounts monthly, and transmit them to their principals with the army.

Mr W. Ausbie is appointed surgeon of the field hospital, to be formed at Hurryhar; to which such of the sick of European and Native corps, as Mr. Anderson may deem it necessary to place under his charge, will be sent to-morrow morning.

Lieut. Bellingham, of the 8th Native regt., is appointed Major of Brigade to Major Gen. Wellesley.

G. M. O.

Camp near Hurryhar, Monday, 7th March, 1803.

Corps and detachments will forage to-day as follows. Written orders on the villages are sent round for specific quantities to each corps, &c., and a person to show the villages. Should the quantity allotted to any corps or department not be sufficient, they may send across the river to purchase more; but in that case a careful non-commissioned officer from corps, and a mistry from departments, must accompany the followers of each, to see they pay for the forage and commit no outrage.

G. A. O.

7th March, 1803.

The 33rd regt to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning, and join the grand army. Col. Elliott will report his arrival in camp to the Adj. General.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Gubgherry, 9th March, 1803.

Every thing allotted to this detachment arrived in camp yesterday evening, excepting the medicines, which I knew from Mr. Anderson were not to be sent from the army till this morning; and I marched to this place this day. I expect the medicines this evening, and I propose to commence my march to-morrow morning. All the brinjaries have not yet joined me; indeed, some that engaged in the service, I believe, will not come at all. I have desired Capt. Baynes to march on the 12th, with a certain number that will be collected at Hurryhur before that day; and I have requested Mr. Piele to arrange that a party of the Rajah's horse shall wait for others expected at Hurryhur on the 15th or 16th. By taking care to keep the bags filled of those I have with me, by giving them orders upon Hurryhur as long as I am in this neighbourhood, and upon Hullihall when I get more forward, I have little doubt but that I shall have plenty. It is necessary, however, that Lieut. Blacker should give directions that none of the brinjaries allotted to this detachment should be allowed to remain with the army; and that all the persons attached to my bazaar may be sent after me with Capt. Baynes.

I send with this, for Hullihall, to be forwarded by the tappall, a letter which contains orders regarding the preparations to be made for issuing the supplies at that place, so that the cattle, &c., may not be delayed there.

G. O.

Camp near Gubgherry Droog, Wednesday, 9th March, 1803.

The captains of the piquets of infantry will on to-morrow, and till further orders, remain out with them.

A field officer of the day to mount in future, to be taken from the line of infantry, to the exclusion of the officers commanding brigades, who will be in charge of the piquets, will command them on the march, and post them, and will also frequently visit them during the day and night.

Whenever it may be necessary to make use of drag ropes to the guns, and tumbrils in the line, the officer commanding the brigade which may happen to march in the rear will be so kind as to leave a company of native infantry at such place, in order to assist the wheel carriages in the park and provision department. This assistance is particularly required in descents.

Major Gen. Wellesley observes that there are many wheel carriages on the line of march, carrying private baggage, and drawn by bullocks. The Commander in Chief has given most positive orders upon this subject, as Major Gen. Wellesley imagines, to the whole army, which he is determined to carry into execution in this detachment. He has experience of the inconvenience of private carts in the movements of light detachments, and that, in all cases of difficulty, they fall upon the rear guard, the troops composing which are obliged to bring them on. He therefore gives notice, that wheel carriages drawn by bullocks, carrying private baggage, will not be allowed to pass the frontier. This order does not, however, apply to wheel carriages drawn by horses or mules.

As Major Gen. Wellesley is with a detachment in advance of the army, and the communication between the Commander in Chief and the officers commanding corps and stations in Mysore and Soonda, and the officers commanding in the provinces of Malabar and Canara, may be more speedy than if it was made through the medium of Major Gen. Wellesley, he has obtained the permission of the Commander in Chief to order that, upon all occasions of urgency, which require the immediate attention of the Commander in Chief, or his immediate decision, the officers above enumerated are to report or apply direct to head quarters in the field, sending a copy of such report or application to Major Gen. Wellesley, as well as copies of the Commander in Chief's orders upon such reports or applications, or upon any other subject. In all cases, however, not of urgency, and not requiring the immediate decision of the Commander in Chief, officers are to report to Major Gen. Wellesley as usual; and at all events to send their monthly and other returns in the manner heretofore ordered.

Lieut. Gen. Stuart to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Hurryhur, 9th March, 1803.

You have already been apprized of your appointment to the command of a detachment destined to advance into the Marhatta territory, and of the description and extent of the force composing that detachment. You have also been furnished with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General and the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George, relative to the purposes of its movements, and have been supplied with copies of all the public communications that I have received regarding the present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, the strength and disposition of Jeswant Rao Holkar's forces, and the probable object of his designs. The above instructions from government will fully explain to you the plan of proceedings, by which the Governor General has proposed to re-establish the authority of the Peshwah, and fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance concluded with his Highness. The information derived from these papers, together with your own extensive knowledge of the state of the subject, has therefore obviated the necessity of furnishing you with detailed instructions from myself, on the particular measures to be adopted in pursuit of those objects; more especially as the nature of the service upon which you are proceeding, depending on the sentiments of a people, whose views and opinions are but imperfectly known at this distance, and on events of a contingent nature, precludes the practicability of ascertaining the exact operations which it may be thought proper to undertake.

Although I have considered it to be expedient to avoid prescribing the particular plan of the operations of your detachment, yet I judge it necessary to state certain principal objects, which, in my judgment, ought to regulate the course of your proceedings.

1. To encourage the southern jaghiredars to declare in favor of the Peshwah's cause; to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities, and to induce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment, for the purpose of re-establishing his Highness' government.

2. To proceed to Meritch, and form a junction with the Peshwah; or, should that measure be deemed inadvisable on the part of his Highness, with such of his chieftains and troops as may be able to meet you there.

3. To open a communication, and form a junction, with the subsidiary force under Col. Stevenson, and the contingent of his Highness the Nizam.

4. To proceed eventually to Poonah, and establish an order of things, in that capital, favorable to the return of the Peshwah, and the attainment of the ends of the late treaty.

The means of accomplishing those objects must be regulated by your own judgment, in conformity to circumstances. It will require every exertion of your ability to unite the southern jaghiredars in an effectual support of the Peshwah's cause, distracted as they are at present by internal dissensions and hostilities. The interests and fears, however, of those chieftains will render them solicitous to avert the calamities threatened by the further success of a power that derives its support from contributions and plunder; and they must be sensible that the retreat or overthrow of that power, and the restoration of a regular government, are the only means by which the dangers to which they are now exposed can be prevented, and the possession of their tranquillity secured. But, in encouraging the co-operation of those chieftains, you will carefully abstain from any specific engagements of a nature incompatible with the rule established by his Excellency the Governor General for the conduct to be observed towards them. You will receive, herewith, duplicates of the letters stated by Lieut. Col. Close to have been transmitted, by the Peshwah, to the chieftains in the neighbourhood of Meritch and the Kistna, who are considered to be attached to his cause, enjoining them to join and co-operate with the British troops on their advance. You will forward those letters to their respective addresses, at such times, and accompanying them with such instructions to the chieftains, on the subject of their co-operating with you, as you may find to be most expedient.

The general state of affairs renders the rapidity of your advance of essential advantage; as your early arrival upon the Kistna, and your junction with the Peshwah's troops and the subsidiary force, will materially contribute to frustrate any designs which may be meditated against his Highness' interests, or the arrangements of the late treaty, and to give union and efficacy to your operations. I consider it therefore of importance that you should employ every practicable

degree of expedition in collecting the forces of the southern jaghiredars, and proceeding, in conjunction with them, to join the Peshwah and the Nizam's force. I attach the greatest consequence to the latter junction, and I request that you will keep the means of accomplishing it at all times in view.

The detachments under you and Col. Stevenson, while separated from each other, are exposed to misfortunes, from which their united strength would effectually secure them. The subsidiary force, in particular, destitute of Europeans, and occupying an advanced position, may be hable to the necessity of acting under very unfavorable circumstances.

Every view of our situation appears to me to require that your junction with Col. Stevenson's force should be effected at the earliest practicable period of time, as that measure will secure, more than any other, the safety of the British troops, and the general success of the plans of government.

I have not noticed, in the foregoing orders, the conduct to be observed, on your part, in case of the opposition of any chieftain; and, in particular, of Jeswant Rao Holkar, from whom we are led to expect most opposition to your proceedings.

The instructions of the Governor General and Lord Clive contain no orders, and afford no positive rule, to guide my determination on this important head. I infer, however, from the spirit of those instructions, that, if the majority of the southern jaghiredars, and the sentiments of the body of the people, are found to declare in favor of the restoration of Bajee Rao, the British detachment ought to persevere in the endeavor to re-establish his authority; and should the detachment, during the prosecution of that endeavor, encounter the hostility of any individual jaghiredar, that they are to employ, in concert with the well-affected jaghiredars, every practicable means to overcome his opposition. In the event, therefore, of any single feudatory opposing resistance to the restoration of the Peshwah, after you have ascertained that the sentiments of the majority of the chieftains are favorable to that measure, I am of opinion that the instructions which I have received justify me in authorising you to compel his submission.

This authority must, however, be understood to apply to the case only of your experiencing hostility from any of the Marhatta chiefs, for the principle of his Excellency the Governor General's policy is, to avoid a war; and as his Excellency has directed me to bear this principle in mind, as the rule of our conduct on every emergency that may arise, you will carefully forbear from the adoption of any measure that is likely to involve the occurrence of hostilities with any of the parties of the Marhatta empire.

The numerous considerations which recommend the early and expeditious advance of the detachment, render it unadvisable, in my judgment, to undertake the siege of Darwar. The reduction of that fortress might be attended with delays extremely detrimental to the success of our cause; and I do not apprehend that Bappojee Scindiah, intimidated, as he will be, by the vicinity of the army under my command, and afraid to exasperate future treatment from the Peshwah, will attempt to molest your communications. I therefore consider it to be expedient that this fortress, notwithstanding the important advantage which would be derived to your operations from its possession, at the present crisis of affairs, should be permitted to remain under its present killadar. It may, however, be proper that you should avail yourself of the impression which the advance of the British force will produce upon the minds of the people, to require of Bappojee Scindiah his probable views.

The instructions to Col. Stevenson, which I have ordered to be furnished to you, will explain the measures prescribed to that officer. I have instructed him to communicate regular information of his proceedings and situation to you, and to obey your orders. When you shall have opened a safe communication with this officer's force, you will detach H. M.'s Scotch brigade to join it; and consider that corps, from the time of its removal from your detachment, as attached to the establishment of the subsidiary force. Col. Stevenson, according to the last letter which I have received from that officer, was to be at Perinda on the 16th March.

I have written to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, informing them of your advance, and requesting them to communicate with you; and I am desirous that you should afford them every information regarding your progress that it may be requisite for them to know.

You are aware of the importance of making me regularly acquainted with your

operations, with the sentiments of the people, and the general state of affairs connected with the proceedings of your detachment. It will be particularly necessary for you to transmit to me the earliest possible information of such circumstances as may be expected to occur to obstruct the progress of the detachment, either from the disinclination of the people in general to the cause which it supports, or from the opposition of any individual chieftain.

The army will take a position in the Ceded districts, ready to support your operations, when support shall appear, from either of these causes, to be necessary.

I shall, on receiving information of the probability of serious resistance being opposed to your advance, anticipate this necessity by a movement of the army to support you.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Oollull, 10th March, 1803.

I have received a letter from the minister of the Rajah of Kolapoor, in which he asks me by what route it is proposed that the troops shall march, as it is his master's intention to join with his troops. The Rajah of Kolapoor is attached to Scindiah.

I have desired Col. Carlisle to send the galloper 12 pounders, and their harness, to your camp; also all the bullocks which Mr. Gordon may have hired at Seringapatam. I do not want any; and, if I did, those behind me now would not be able to catch me.

I have ordered a company, under an European officer, from the garrison of Nuggur, to Hooley Honore, on the Toombuddra, to relieve the escorts from the garrison of Seringapatam, and to have a look out for all that is coming from thence, and to correspond with Col. Carlisle and the gentlemen in your camp. You will find them useful in this position.

G. O.

Camp at Oollull, Thursday, 10th March, 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley has received from head quarters new standards for the 4th, 5th, and 7th regts. of cavalry, and new colors for the 1st batt. 8th regt., which the Commander in Chief has ordered him to deliver to those corps.

These corps will be formed in a line to-morrow morning at sunrise, upon the right of the camp of the cavalry, with their rear to the flank, the left of the 1st batt. 8th regt. being within 70 paces of the river.

Upon the arrival of Major Gen. Wellesley in the front and centre of the line, the right half squadron of each of the regiments of cavalry, and the 1st grenadier company of the 1st batt. 8th regt., will move out to the front, together with the commanding officers of the corps, and the officers who are to receive the standards and colors respectively. These officers must have with them the old standards and colors.

When Major Gen. Wellesley shall deliver the new standards and colors to the commanding officers, the cavalry are to carry swords, and the 1st batt. 8th regt. to present arms. Officers to salute, and trumpets and drums to sound and beat a march. The half squadrons and company advanced in front to receive the standards and colors are also to carry their swords, present arms, and officers to salute, &c.

After the standards and colors shall have been received, the half squadrons and company are to move off towards their respective corps. Upon their arrival at the right of their corps, they are to file off from the left of half squadrons and company, and to march down the line of their regiments. The front rank is to march between the line of officers and the front rank of the regiment or battalion, and the rear rank between the front and rear ranks. The officers with the standards and colors in front of the line of officers.

When arrived upon the left of the regiments and battalion, the front and rear ranks are to wheel to their left, and to return along the line of their regiment or battalion, the front rank between the front and rear ranks of the line, and the rear rank in the rear of the line, to their places in the line. The officers with the standards and colors are to return along the front of the line to their places in squadrons and battalions.

The cavalry to carry swords, and infantry to present arms, officers to salute, and trumpets and drums to sound and beat a march, when the half squadrons and company shall arrive upon the right; the cavalry to slope swords, and infantry to shoulder arms, as soon as the officers with the standards and colors shall have taken their places in squadron and battalion; the corps are then to break into an open column, right in front, and march past the General in squadrons, and by companies, to their lines.

To the Adj. General.

Camp at Oollull, 10th March, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Whitelocke, commanding at Chittledroog, and I beg leave to recommend that Lieut. Moore may be appointed to act as Fort adjutant, at Chittledroog, during the absence of Lieut. Carfrae.

I likewise enclose the proceedings of a committee, which has examined the lot of remount horses brought to camp by Lieut. Monteith, one of which has been taken by Cornet Atkins, in consequence of the permission of the Commander in Chief. I have directed that the other horses may be divided equally between the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry.

I also enclose an order issued by me regarding certain horses which I had purchased in consequence of orders from the Commander in Chief, and had placed, with his approbation, in the 2nd regt. of cavalry. I now request the confirmation of the enclosed order.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Oollull, 11th March, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th. The tumbrils will leave this camp to-morrow morning, but I cannot yet say in what numbers, as the Paymaster's people have not yet completed their payments, and I do not know what sum in silver will remain to be carried in them. None of them are very good, and 2 of them are quite unserviceable. Indeed all the tumbrils are old and very bad. They have been in every campaign in the Mysore country since the year 1798, and I sent the greater number of them into Chittledroog, in an unserviceable state, in the year 1800.

Lieut. Gen. Stuart to Lord Clive.

Camp at Hurryhur, 10th March, 1803.

I have endeavored, in determining the amount of the force of Major Gen. Wellesley's detachment, to adhere as nearly as possible to the principles established for the regulation of that question, by his Excellency the Governor General, and by your Lordship; to render the advancing detachment sufficiently strong to maintain its ground, until sustained; and to retain, at the same time, with the army, a force capable of moving, when requisite, to its support.

The strength of the advancing detachment, including the regiment destined to join the subsidiary force, is greater at present than that of the army: were the former made stronger, it would be doubtful whether the army, on an emergency, would be able to sustain it: for the same circumstances that might make support necessary to the advancing detachment, would render it difficult for a weaker body to effect its relief; and were the detachment weaker, it might be exposed to serious misfortunes.

Upon strict military principles, I should have been solicitous to render a detachment, destined to proceed upon a remote service, sufficiently strong to remove the apprehension of its requiring support; and it has appeared to me that I ought to recur to those principles, as the rule of my conduct, in the event of any serious hostility being offered to the force under Major Gen. Wellesley. In that case, therefore, setting aside all secondary considerations connected with the temporary tranquillity of the frontier, I shall deem it to be the principal object of my duty to secure the general safety of the British army, by a prompt movement, to join the detachment in advance.

I am, however, led, by a view of present circumstances, to think that the support of the army will not be required; as the favorable disposition already manifested by some of the southern jaghiredars, and the undecided conduct of those from whom opposition might be expected, will, it is probable, enable the advancing detachment, the Peshwah's troops, and the Nizam's force, to effect a junction. After that event, the British army will be equal to the prosecution of any service which it may be required to undertake.

Goklah's letter was only complimentary, and to request that I would protect his country. He also informs me that he is sending to me a man, whom I know to be his uncle. I have besides received, through Govind Rao, letters from Appah Saheb and other sirdars, and one from the killadar of Darwar. This man said to Govind Rao that he was the Peshwah's servant, and was willing to obey all orders that he should receive from him. I learn, however, from a man at Darwar, that the killadar is much afraid that we shall attack his place: but I have desired this man to give him assurances that we were the enemies of nobody; and that, if he remained quiet, offered us no interruption, and allowed us to enjoy the resources of the country, he should not be molested; and that we were advancing at the call of the Peshwah, whose orders must be obeyed.

The route which I sent you yesterday did not contain the marches which must be made to join Col. Stevenson. The reason is, that, from the want of sufficient information, I have not yet determined by what route they shall be. I am, however, making inquiries upon the subject, and I hope, in a few days, to be able to give you a decided answer upon it. I am obliged to conduct these inquiries with caution, lest, in appearing too anxious to form this junction, they should suspect that I think myself weak; and that the junction is absolutely necessary for the safety of both detachments. The want of water in the country will oblige both detachments to keep upon the rivers as much as possible; and I rather believe that I must proceed by the way of Beejapoor to the Beemah, and march up that river; and that Col. Stevenson should advance and join me upon it. By that mode the Nizam's frontier will not be uncovered for a moment.

G. O.

Camp at Oollull, Friday, 11th March, 1803.

The troops will enter the Marhatta territory to-morrow morning, but they are not to consider it as an enemy's country. The strictest order and discipline must be observed, and every thing that is required from the country must be paid for. Major Gen. Wellesley will certainly punish any person who may be found guilty of a breach of this order.

The officers commanding corps and the heads of departments are requested to make the followers bring in forage for the cattle. Small guards are to be sent with the foragers, and they are to see that they get what may be required, and that what is taken is paid for. The excuse that the inhabitants will not sell their forage will not be allowed: they have been informed that they must sell what is required, and, if the forage is refused, it must be taken, and the price of it laid down.

Commanding officers of corps and heads of departments will receive from the D. A. G. a copy of Major Gen. Wellesley's proclamation to the inhabitants of the country, which may as well be sent out daily with the foragers.

The D. A. G. will point out to the corps, which have lately joined, certain orders issued in this detachment since it left Seringapatam, which, with others issued since they joined, are to be considered as standing orders; and the officers commanding brigades will direct those corps to copy them from such others in the brigades as may have them. If they are not at length in the orderly books of any of the corps of cavalry, Lieut. Col. Dallas will be furnished with a copy by the D. A. G.

Officers commanding brigades, or their quarter masters, will indent on the commissary of stores for their distinguishing flags and staffs, and on the paymaster for the pockalies and artificers allowed. And as the commissary of stores cannot furnish lascars for carrying the flagstaffs, the officers are authorized to entertain lascars for that purpose themselves, agreeably to the regulations.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers will not countersign chitty for extra quantities of arrack, as it cannot be allowed under present circumstances.

Capt. Mackay having represented that there is no green forage to be procured in the neighbourhood of camp, and that the elephants with this detachment, being principally new elephants from Ceylon, will not eat the dry Junnaloo straw, in quantities sufficient to support them, he is authorized to purchase sugar cane for them, until other green forage can be procured from the river or jungles.

Mr. Darval has equipped us but badly with servants; but that is his own affair: he will be the loser if the accounts are not regularly kept. I take care of the money, which is the principal point, and have it always in front of my tent, under an officer's guard. I write to Major Robertson also, respecting some shepherds, whom I request he will send with Capt. Baynes to-morrow.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Reitle, 12th March, 1803.

I crossed the Toombuddra into the Marhatta territory at Havanoor this morning, and marched to this place, which is upon the Werdah. The inhabitants are all in their villages, and have promised to supply the camp with every thing that the country can afford.

I sent off 4 tumbrils to your camp this morning, some of them containing the treasure which remains after paying the troops in this camp, out of the lac of pagodas sent here for that purpose. I cannot say exactly what the sum is, as I could not procure any account of it from Mr. Darval's servant. Besides this sum, there are 30,070½ rupees, belonging to the money allotted to this detachment, in Mr. Piele's tumbril. It is part of the 80,000 pagodas sent by Mr. Ravenshaw. These rupees were put in Mr. Piele's tumbril for the convenience of carriage, and were forgotten by Mr. Darval's servants. I have, however, retained 30,070½ rupees of the surplus money: so that I have in camp 3 lacs of pagodas clear; and I have written to Mr. Piele to request that he will pay Mr. Darval the money which he has in his tumbril.

The money tumbrils are all in a very bad state: indeed, I am surprised that even one of them has come on so far as it has; and I think it very probable that, although empty, it will not get back to your camp. There are 48 of the Company's draught bullocks drawing these tumbrils. Those in the cavalry guns cannot be sent yet; as, owing to some mistake between the gentlemen of the cavalry and Capt. Mackay, the bandy with the harness was left behind in the cavalry lines at Gubghurry: but I hope it will join this day, and, if it does, these bullocks will also be sent to you to-morrow.

We had some deserting last night, both of sepoys and followers: many of the bazaar people, and others attached to this bazaar with bullocks, have joined the army. However, we are well supplied, and, by means of the stores at Hurryhur and Hullihall, I think we shall quit the Malpoorba with every bag full.

Lieut. Gen. Stuart to Lord Clive.

Camp at Hurryhur, 12th March, 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley, having been intrusted, previously to my arrival on the frontier, with the management of all communications with the Marhatta chieftains, and selected, by your Lordship's desire, for the command of the advancing detachment, has been continued in that management; as I have been desirous to prevent the inconveniences which would result to his proceedings, from the delays attending references to me on the subject of his transactions with the chieftains of the Marhatta state.

I have informed Major Gen. Wellesley of your Lordship's wishes regarding the employment of Major Malcolm; and I believe no obstacles will occur to impede the exercise of the authority with which your Lordship has judged it expedient to furnish that officer, of cultivating an intercourse with the Marhatta chieftains, if the progress of affairs should render that measure necessary.

Extract from 'The Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire.'

Major Gen. Wellesley commenced his march from Hurryhur on the 9th March, and crossed the Toombuddra river on the 12th. The progress of the British troops through the Marhatta territories was most successful. They were every where received as friends; and almost all the chiefs in the vicinity of the route of the detachment joined with their forces, and accompanied the British army to Poonah. The amicable conduct of the jaghiredars and of the inhabitants (arising principally from the fame which the British arms had acquired in the campaign under Major Gen. Wellesley's command against Dhoondiah Waugh) contributed to enable our army to perform this long march, at a most unfavorable season of the year, without loss or distress.

Great merit is also to be ascribed to the ability, temper, activity, and skill of Major Gen. Wellesley, in directing the system of the supply and movement of the troops, in preventing plunder and all excess, and in conciliating the inhabitants of the districts through which his route was directed.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. * * * *.*

Camp near Reitlie, 12th March, 1803.

The tent bearers of your battalion have represented to Major Gen. Wellesley that the serjeant major has given them 6 rupees 2 fanams and 60 cash, as their wages for last month, although, as they allege, they agreed for Company's pay and batta. The General, therefore, directs me to observe to you, that he is not surprised at the frequent reports of desertions of the followers of the 1st batt. 2nd regt., under such circumstances as those above stated; and, further, that if there shall be any more desertion, and the corps shall be deprived of its proper proportion of followers of any description, the General will be under the necessity of laying the whole matter before the Commander in Chief, and of recommending that no allowances may be paid for establishments that are not actually kept up.

P.S.—Before I could despatch the foregoing I received your report of the desertion of 4 sepoys and some coolies. The General is concerned at the desertion of so many sepoys from so old an established corps, of which the report would have come more properly through the Brigade Major, but he is not surprised at coolies deserting who are paid as yours appear to be.

To the Governor General.

Kariggy, upon the Werdah, 13th March, 1803.

You will be anxious to hear from me as soon as possible after I have entered the Marhatta territory, and I lose no time in writing to you.

I crossed the Toombuddra at Havanoor yesterday, and marched to this river, and made another march towards Savanore this day. We have been well received by the inhabitants of the country: the villages are all full, and the camp is well supplied with forage and provisions: I have no doubt whatever but that I shall be able to bring forward, for the service of the Peshwah, all the jaghiredars in the southern part of the empire; and I think that all your plans will be carried into execution.

This detachment of the army is well supplied with provisions, and every thing it can want; and, excepting in forage, for which every large body of troops must depend upon the country which is to be the seat of its operations, is nearly independent of the resources of this country. We owe this state of our supplies to the flourishing resources of Mysore, and to the ease with which they are brought forward for the use of the British armies. But any change in the system of government in that country will be immediately felt, and particularly by that body of troops which will be in advance. I draw your attention to this subject, because I have learned from Gen. Stuart that Lord Clive is going to England immediately, in the *United Kingdom*; and I suspect that the person who may succeed to him in the government of Fort St. George is not likely to pre-

serve matters in Mysore in the state in which they are at present. It is impossible to suppose otherwise than that, after a residence there for 4 years, I have acquired considerable influence in that country, which has lately been exerted to bring forward its resources for the use of the armies, and will have the effect of keeping this body of troops well supplied; but this influence depends upon my retaining the command in Mysore, of which I think it probable that the new government of Madras will wish to deprive me.

I had an explanation with Gen. Stuart upon this subject some time ago, and he declared that he was determined that I should exercise the command in Mysore, while in advance with the army, which he then imagined that he should lead into the Marhatta territory. When leaving him, on the 8th of this month, I spoke to him upon it, and he desired me to make such arrangements as I might think proper, to enable me to exercise the command in Mysore, while in the Marhatta territory. I have submitted to him these arrangements, and he has approved of them. But still I fear the new government of Madras; one of whose objects, I believe, is to overturn the existing system in Mysore, of which I have hitherto been the principal support. I am willing to resign the command of Mysore as soon as this campaign is over; but I am anxious that this detachment should be in a state of efficiency and well equipped: it can

G. O.

Camp near Restlie, Saturday, 12th March, 1803.

Two active and intelligent sepoys to be selected in each corps of infantry, and sent as orderlies to Major Gen. Wellesley. They are to be relieved on the 1st day of every month.

When there may be any considerable breach in the line, or any accident may have happened likely to occasion one, which obliges a corps to halt, the officer commanding the corps in front of which the breach is, or which may be obliged to halt, will order a drummer to beat the long roll, which is to be repeated by all corps in front of that in which there may be a breach, but not by those in the rear. The officer commanding the corps which may have beat the long roll will acquaint the officer commanding the brigade to which he belongs of the cause: when the long roll shall be beat, all the corps in front of that which shall have beat it will halt.

When a corps in front of which there may have been a breach in the column shall be at the distance of 200 yards from that which precedes it in column, a drummer is to pass the taps, which are to be repeated by all the corps in front in the column, and the whole are to move forward immediately.

As, however, the cattle with this detachment are good, and it is possible without hurrying either them or the troops (a practice which is again positively forbid) to close up any small interval which may occur, without a general halt of the column, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that officers commanding corps will not pass the long roll, unless it should be absolutely necessary that the men should halt, to enable their corps to regain their situation.

G. A. O.

12th March, 1803.

In consequence of complaints of the rioting of soldiers in the bazaar, and this day in the villages, in the neighbourhood of the camp, which may be attended by the worst consequences to the detachment, and to the service in general, and the impossibility of knowing who those soldiers are, and to what regiment they belong, if the practice is continued of allowing them to go about, if not dressed as soldiers, Major Gen. Wellesley desires:

1st. That no soldier be allowed to leave his lines, unless dressed as a soldier ought to be, with his side arms, excepting to go to bathe, to play at long bullets, or any other game, in front of the lines. Commanding officers of regiments are requested to give orders to their regimental sentries upon this subject; and the guards in camp will, in general, have orders to stop all soldiers found out of their lines not properly dressed, who shall be punished for disobedience of orders.

2nd. No soldiers are to be allowed to go into the villages, excepting the dragoons with their foragers, but those dragoons must be dressed in their uniform when on this duty. Guards of Native infantry are sent to each of the regiments of European infantry, to go out with their foragers, purposely that the Europeans may not be sent into the villages on that service.

be well supplied only by the resources of Mysore; and I am certain of having the use of them only by keeping the command in Mysore in my own hands. I wish, therefore, if it should be possible, that the new government of Fort St. George may be prevented appointing a person to fill my situation in Mysore while I am absent.

I should not have written to you on this subject, as I know that you are unwilling to interfere in matters that concern the subordinate governments, only that the risk of this detachment is great; and that, if the change is intended, advantage may be taken of Gen. Stuart's absence from Madras to effect it. If he should be consulted, or should have time to give his opinion, I know that he will object to the measure. Malcolm had not, yesterday, reached Gen. Stuart's camp at Hurryhur.

I hear nothing of any of Holkar's troops, and I do not know that we have an enemy in this country.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Kariagy, 13th March, 1803.

The bandy, with the harness, arrived in camp yesterday, after I wrote to you; and to-morrow I shall send you the bullocks which have been employed in drawing the cavalry guns. I heard yesterday evening that one of the empty treasure tumbrils had broken down near Oollull; at which, indeed, I am not astonished, as it has been in a very bad state ever since it came from the army.

I find that the brinjarries like the mode of filling the bags at the stores so well, and are so active in carrying it into execution, that I think it probable that I shall be able to advance from the Malpoorba with every bag full. In that case, it will be necessary that I should have 500 bullocks more to carry on the salt beef, and 400 kegs of arrack in store at Hullihall, and sent from Bombay. I have accordingly arranged with the bullock owners in this camp to raise that number, which they say they can procure with great ease. I write to your secretary on this subject.

I have a letter from Seringapatam, by which I learn that 4 carriages, for 6 pounders, with brass naves, are preparing at that place. Do you wish that they should be sent to your camp?

I enclose a paper of intelligence received from Sir W. Clarke. Ram Rao, who resides at Darwar, wrote, on the 4th, that Bappojee Scindiah was in Darwar with his troops, and much afraid of being attacked; and he did not allude, in the most distant manner, to this agent of Holkar, nor have I received an account of him from any body else. It is very improbable that Bappojee Scindiah will give up his fort to a Bramin sent to take it without troops. If his disposition be thus friendly to Holkar, he would probably be the fittest person for Holkar to leave in charge of the fort, and it would not be necessary to send any other to take it. Therefore I do not believe that this intelligence of Sir W. Clarke's is true. But if it should be true, it is a matter of some consequence. The question, in that case, will be, whether we ought not to send for Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, and call upon the present possessors of the fort to give it up to him, as the killadar appointed by the Peshwah. With such a force as I have, and with all the people of the country on our side, I do not think that they would refuse it; or, if they did, it is, in fact, not a strong place,

nor one which would take much time to reduce. I should be glad to be favored with your directions upon this subject.

I have proceeded hitherto, in regard to Darwar, in this manner: I wrote to Ram Rao, and desired him to calm the apprehensions of Bappojee Scindiah; to assure him that I was not ordered to attack him, or any body that did not molest the British troops; that the English were the allies of the Peshwah, and that all we required from the country was, to be treated as friends by his officers and servants, and to enjoy our share of its resources, which were necessary to us. I, at the same time, gave him a hint that the Peshwah's orders, whatever they were, must be obeyed; and I did this, lest, notwithstanding the late orders of the Governor of Port St. George, and your present intention that Bappojee Scindiah should not be attacked, the Peshwah should press the taking possession of the fort for Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, and that it should consequently be necessary to attack it with British troops. As I do not credit this intelligence of Sir W. Clarke's, I shall still proceed upon the same principle in all my communications with Bappojee Scindiah; and as he is a clever fellow, it is not improbable but that, if not already in the hands of Holkar, we may make him our friend, and the fort may be as useful to us in his hands as if it were in our own.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Deogherry, 14th March, 1803.

I arrived here this morning, and I propose to continue my marches forward on the day after to-morrow. You will probably have received, from Gen. Stuart, a copy of my instructions, in which I am urgently desired to take the earliest opportunity of effecting a junction with you. You will observe, however, that other objects are also held out to my attention; the collection of, and junction with, the southern jaghiredars, and the junction with the Peshwah, should his Highness come to Meritch. At present, I think that none of these objects are incompatible. I can collect and join myself with the southern jaghiredars on my road towards you; and if his Highness should come from Bassein, and join his army upon the Kistna, I can also join myself to him. The only inconveniences attending these different objects are, that they will take time, and that I cannot fix that at which I shall be in your neighbourhood. However, every thing cannot go on as we could wish.

I shall make you acquainted in this letter with my intentions, as far as I can determine them, and you must make your own calculations where I cannot. I intend to march to Meritch on the Kistna, by the route of Darwar, Belgaum, and Chickoree. I shall be at Darwar on the 22nd, at Belgaum on the 27th, at Chickoree on the 1st of April, and at Meritch on the 5th. All this, however, will depend much upon my being able to find water on the road, of which I have not very favorable accounts. If I should be able to go by the proposed road, and should not be obliged to deviate from it to find water, I shall certainly make the marches above stated. How long I shall be obliged to remain at Meritch, God knows; but my route to join you ought to be by Punderpoor. I do not know yet whether there is a road direct from Meritch to Punderpoor, or the nature of it; but I imagine there must be one. At all events, there is

the circuitous road by Beejapoor, mentioned in Moore's book, on which I shall certainly be able to march. When once I arrive upon the Beemah, our junction will not be very difficult.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Deogherry, 15th March, 1803.

I arrived here yesterday, and halted this day, to give some rest to my brinjaries, who have joined, with Capt. Baynes. Ball Kishen Letchma, one of the Putwurdun family, arrived in this camp yesterday evening, and gives the strongest assurances of the cordial co-operation of all the sirdars of that family, in our measures for the restoration of the Peshwah's government.

Govind Rao also, who was employed by me, by your desire, for the purpose of ascertaining the dispositions of the different chiefs in the same cause, gives a most favorable account of them. He had seen the killadar of Darwar, Bappojee Scindiah, who told him that it was reported that the British troops were to attack the fort; that it was not necessary to attack it: for, if we wanted it, he would withdraw, with his family, and would give it up. The garrison is very small, consisting of about 500 horse and 1000 peons, ill paid; and Govind Rao has no doubt whatever but that the fort would be given up upon our demand of it. I have sent off the letters to the different sirdars, and have written to each to inform him of my approach, and to desire he would join me.

Upon a perusal of the letters respecting the killadary of Darwar, I do not find that any mention is made, in the copy which I have got, of the delivery of the fort to the officer commanding the British troops. It may be mentioned, however, in the sealed letter to Ball Kishen Gungurdhur. Under these circumstances, I have many doubts whether it would be proper to take any steps to get possession of this fort, even if the measure had been left to my discretion; which, as you have desired to have my opinion upon all points, I shall detail to you. The advantage of having this fort is the security it would give to our rear, and the hold which it would give us of the country. In case of an accident, also, it might be ruinous to us if in the hands of an enemy. In respect, however, to these advantages and benefits, I have to observe, that, so long as your army remains upon the frontier, we shall enjoy them, whether we have the fort or not, supposing that the killadar should not be decidedly hostile to us; and if he should be so, or should become so, and if any accident should happen to us, it would always be in your power to get possession of that fort.

On the other hand, it may not be so certain that Bappojee Scindiah is inclined or willing to give up this fort; and if it is asked for and refused, it must be taken. To take it will not require time, but it may occasion the loss of lives: there will be some wounded, at all events, and it would be necessary to halt, to make arrangements for establishing an hospital and a garrison in it. At the same time, I have no doubt whatever but that, to take the fort, particularly if the killadar is friendly to us, and gives promises and security that he will not interrupt our communication, will occasion great jealousy of our views among the jaghiredars, and will make them less hearty in our cause. This will be the case, particularly

if it be true that the Peshwah has not given an order to Ball Kishen Gungurdhur to deliver the fort to the British commander; which order certainly does not appear in the copy of the letter to that chief transmitted to me. Upon the whole, therefore, I think that to ask for the fort is attended with risk; that even to have possession of it may be disadvantageous to the line of measures which are carrying on; and that all the advantages which can be expected from the possession of it will be ours, whether we have it or not, in consequence of your position on the frontier.

A salute in your camp was heard here this morning, by which I conclude that Malcolm is arrived: I do not, therefore, delay to send off this letter.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Deogherry, 15th March, 1803.

I received this morning your letter of the 13th in answer to mine of the 9th. I rather believe that the bullocks, &c., which I shall send for the supplies to Hullihall, will arrive there on the 20th inst.

The arrack kegs, which I mean should be sent to the detachment, are those containing 4 gallons each which come from Bombay, but not those of a larger size. There ought to be 400 of these.

I shall require with the detachment, besides the articles detailed in my last letter of the 9th, 2000 gunny bags. If you should not be able to procure these from the paymaster's servant, you will be so kind as to send

G. O.

Camp at Deogherry, Tuesday, 15th March, 1803

The detachment to march to-morrow morning by the left; baggage on the left.

The general to beat at a quarter past 4 o'clock, and the assembly at a quarter past 5.

The cavalry to form the advance, and will cross the river by a ford on their left: they are to be followed by the details of infantry coming on piquet, under the field officer of the day, which will cross the river by the ford on the left of the infantry. 50 pioneers to march with the advance, 100 at the head of the column of infantry, and the remainder of the corps not attached to departments with the park. The park and the wheel carriages in the provision department to follow the line of infantry. The piquets now on duty to form the rear guard.

The quarter masters, &c., to meet the Acting D. Q. M. G. at the head of the line on the march.

In future the soldiers are to receive their 2 drams at 2 different times in the day. They will receive the first dram on marching days upon their arrival at the new ground of encampment, and on halting days at daylight in the morning, at the flag of the commissary of provisions, as at present. At the same time the second dram for each man will be delivered to the charge of the quarter masters, who will send the quarter master serjeants, or other trusty persons, to receive it.

The commissary of provisions will issue kegs to the quarter masters of regiments, in which the arrack is to be kept in the regimental lines, under such a guard as the commanding officers of regiments may think proper to appoint; and the second drams are to be issued to the soldiers in their lines at the hours which the commanding officers of regiments may think most proper.

The commissary of provisions will arrange that a sufficient number of bullocks attached to his department may attend the quarter masters of the 19th light dragoons, the artillery, the 74th, and Scotch brigade, to carry the kegs on the line of march, and to move them to and from the flag at the commissary of provisions when necessary.

The quarter masters will be so kind as to take care that the kegs which will be delivered to them are filled with water as soon as emptied of arrack, in order to prevent their becoming leaky.

The arrack is to be delivered to the 19th light dragoons near the rear of the lines of that regiment by a conicoply, who will be sent there for that purpose; and Capt. Mackay will take care that draught bullocks attend at the flag of the commissary of provisions to remove this arrack on halting days before daylight, and on marching days at the moment the arrack shall reach the new ground of encampment.

me that number of the bags which will have contained the rice which you will issue to the people whom I will send for it, or you will take them from the rice which will remain there. In order to carry these empty bags to the detachment, or for other purposes, some bullocks may be required; and I request you to call upon the amildar to be prepared with assistance of this kind, which I promise to send back to him from the Malpoorba. The number of bullocks which I may require may be 500.

I have not yet decided whether I shall come upon the Malpoorba at Doodwar or at Turmoory. I request you to get an account of the road to the latter.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

You will be so kind as to forward the enclosed letter to Sir W. Clarke by express. In my letter of yesterday I omitted to mention to you that I wished you to have cut, and ready to be forwarded to my camp, by people whom I shall send for them, 60 bamboos, each of 30 feet long: they are intended to make ladders.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I am getting on as well as I could wish. On account of the want of water on the direct road from Hurryhur to Savanore, I have been obliged to come by a circuitous route, which has detained me longer than I should otherwise have been; but I expect to be at or near Darwar on the 21st or 22nd, at Belgaum on the 27th, and at Meritch on the 5th April. From thence, even if obliged to go by Punderpoor, to join Col. Stevenson, I shall be at Poonah before the time at which I told you, in my letter of the 1st Jan., that I thought it probable that Gen. Stuart would arrive there with his army.

My cattle are in good order; I get plenty of forage; and I have little doubt of bringing up my detachment in good style, at least as far as the Kistna. Our cattle afterwards will depend upon the state of the country for forage, of which, particularly in the neighbourhood of Poonah, I have but bad accounts.

I have sent the Peshwah's letters to the sirdars to whom they were addressed, with a short letter from myself, stating that I had entered the country with the army, and was anxious to be joined by them. I also enclosed them a copy of my proclamation on entering the country. To these letters sufficient time has not yet elapsed for me to receive answers; but, by the accounts which I have received from Govind Rao, of the disposition of all the chiefs in this part of the empire, and from the letters which I have from Goklah, the Putwurdun, and others of inferior note, I have little doubt that all will come forward in the Peshwah's service in this crisis. You shall hear from me as soon as I receive any answers to my letters.

The people of the country have received me well; my communication is perfectly free and secure, and the camp is supplied with all that the country affords. I believe that my passport is the only safe conduct through the country at the present moment. I enclose a copy of my proclamation, also a copy of a memorandum from Appah Saheb, and one

from Goklah, with my answers. You will have observed, in my instructions, that Gen. Stuart has desired me not to attempt to take Darwar. I think that place of great importance in a military point of view; but as this expedition of mine partakes as much of politics as of military operations, I am of opinion that it is best I should not meddle with Darwar; particularly as in case of accident, or if the killadar should misbehave, or attempt to use the means given him by the position of his fort to annoy my communication with Mysore, Gen. Stuart will be at hand to take his fort from him. I observe that the copy of the letter from the Peshwah to Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, which I have got, does not contain the orders to deliver the fort to the British commander. They may, however, be in the sealed letters which I have sent to that chief.

The fort of Darwar gives such a hold of this country, that the possession of it by us, in any manner, would create great jealousy of our views in the minds of all the chiefs; but it would do this particularly if we were to take possession without communication with Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, who is I don't know where, and without the Peshwah's orders to him to deliver it.

Govind Rao has communicated with Bappojee Scindiah, who said he heard that we intended to attack his fort; that, if we wanted it, we had only to ask for it, and that he would withdraw, with his family, and deliver possession of it. Govind Rao says, also, that the garrison is very weak, and ill paid. I look upon it, however, to be not so certain that Bappojee Scindiah will deliver the fort when asked for it: if it is asked for and refused, it must be attacked; and then force commences, which the Governor General deprecates, and from which he has ordered us to desist as long as possible. If, along with this, we consider that the possession of the fort, in whatever manner it is obtained, will create jealousy, and that, in consequence of Gen. Stuart's position upon the frontier, it is not absolutely necessary, even in a military point of view, there appears every reason for my refraining from interfering with it at all. Ram Rao, our agent at Darwar, wrote me word that Bappojee Scindiah was much alarmed in consequence of the report that we intended to attack his fort: upon receiving this letter I desired Ram Rao to tell him that I had no instructions to attack his fort, and that I did not intend to molest any body that did not interfere with me. I, at the same time, hinted that the Peshwah's orders must be obeyed; and I did this, lest it should be necessary hereafter for any body of British troops to attack this fort, in order to put the Peshwah's officer in possession of it. I propose now to proceed, in regard to Darwar, as follows: I shall send Govind Rao to Bappojee Scindiah to-morrow, to tell him that I am marching near his fort, and that I have no intention to interfere with it; that I require from him an engagement of fidelity to the Peshwah, and an assurance that he will not interfere with my communications. I shall desire Govind Rao to hint to him that we have orders to put Gungurdhur in possession of the fort, with which I doubt not he is acquainted already, and that Gen. Stuart is at hand to carry into execution that measure, if I should receive any thing from the fort of Darwar but assistance. I shall also instruct Govind Rao not to make a direct proposition of it, but to urge him to satisfy me of

his intentions by sending his son to my camp. I am nearly indifferent whether he sends him or not, as I know that his fears of Gen. Stuart, and his hopes of future favor, will be more likely to keep him in order than any thing else; but to have his son in my camp will have a good appearance. The Peshwah will not be pleased that the fort is not taken possession of immediately for Gungurdhur; but he must recollect that that chief is not upon the spot, and not to be found at present. You shall hear the result of this negotiation at Darwar.

I omitted to mention that I intend to desire Bappojee Scindiah to desist from annoying the Rajah of Kittoor, from whom I shall receive the greatest assistance in grain, &c., while in his neighbourhood.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

The Putwurdun family are particularly anxious that I should give their letter to you, to request that you would recommend them to the Peshwah. I have every reason to believe that every member of this family will come forward in his Highness' service in the present crisis of his affairs, and I therefore recommend this family to your good offices.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Tuddus, 17th March, 1803.

I have received a letter from Col. Montresor, from Calicut, of the 6th, from which I learn that the rebellion has spread much in Malabar, and that the rebels were in force not far from that place. The criminals confined in the gaol at Calicut had also got loose: 60 had made their escape, many were killed and some wounded in attempting it. The guard over the gaol had been surprised. Those people were chiefly rebels confined by Col. Stevenson.

I mislaid Col. Montresor's letter yesterday evening, otherwise I should send it to you, but I have above stated the outlines of the information which it gives. I now enclose a letter which I have written to Col. Montresor upon this subject; and, if you should approve the directions it contains, I beg you will allow it to be forwarded to him. In fact, no more can be done in this season than I have there stated. It will be useless to leave more posts, or to have more men in Wynaad than the post at Manuntwaddy, and those on the tops of the ghauts. If there were two battalions in that district, they would be obliged to remain shut up in their posts, where they would be useless: at the same time, the greater the number of troops to be left in Wynaad, the greater will be the difficulty of providing for them.

I received yesterday your letter of the 15th inst. I have sent Govind Rao with a message to Bappojee Scindiah, of the same kind with that which I formerly sent, of which you approved. I shall march to-morrow to Misserycotta, where I shall halt next day to allow Major Malcolm to join me, and to give time to Govind Rao to arrange every thing with Bappojee Scindiah.

G. O.

Camp at Tuddus, Thursday, 17th March, 1803.

On marching days officers commanding corps will report their arrival in writing to the officer in command of the brigade, within one hour after the line comes to its ground: should any men be absent they shall be confined as soon as they come up, and reported, through the adjutant of the corps to which they belong, to the Brigade Major.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Misserycotta, 18th March, 1803.

You are to make issues of rice from the stores at Hullihall upon orders signed by Capt. Barclay, the Superintendent of supplies; for which rice you are to take the receipt, in duplicate, of the person in whose favor the order will be given. One copy of this receipt you are to send, without loss of time, to Capt. Barclay; the other you are to keep with his order, as the voucher for the issue of the rice.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Misserycotta, 18th March, 1803.

Capt. Baynes marches from hence to-morrow morning, with a detachment as an escort of cattle, going from hence to receive supplies at Hullihall.

These consist of brinjarry bullocks, respecting the loads of which you will receive an order along with this letter; of bullocks in the provision department, which are to carry kegs of 4 gallons each, filled with arrack. The remainder of these kegs, and the beef kegs, are to be carried as far as the river Malpoorba by the bullocks supplied by the amildar. Besides these there are 100 bullocks loaded with empty arrack kegs: these are to be filled with arrack from that in store at Hullihall.

You will be so kind as to issue the 393 four gallon arrack kegs filled with arrack, the 600 kegs of salted provisions, and arrack to fill 200 arrack kegs, to the servant of the Commissary of provisions, who will accompany Capt. Baynes, and take his receipt for the same.

You are likewise to deliver to Capt. Baynes 2000 empty gunny bags, respecting the carriage of which to the detachment I have given him directions. You will deliver the bamboos which you have had cut to the officer of pioneers who will accompany Capt. Baynes.

You will send this detachment with Capt. Baynes all the Company's draught cattle at Hullihall in Soonda.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Hoobly, 20th March, 1803.

Capt. Johnson, who arrived here yesterday evening, has informed me that the amildar at Hullihall is prepared to supply as far as 1000 bullocks to carry loads to the Malpoorba. You will employ these bullocks, in the first instance, in the manner directed in my letter of the 18th, sent to you by Capt. Baynes: 2ndly, you will issue from the stores at Hurryhur one load of rice for each bullock, which will remain after providing for the service mentioned in that letter, taking Capt. Baynes's receipt for the same; and you will send the whole number loaded, with Capt. Baynes, to the Malpoorba. I send herewith an order for a company of the battalion under your command, under an European officer, to march from Hullihall to join the detachment upon the Malpoorba. Be so kind as to communicate this letter to Capt. Baynes.

G. M. O.

Misserycotta, Saturday, 19th March, 1803.

A salute of 15 guns to be held in readiness in the park to be fired on the arrival at Major Gen. Wellesley's tent of Major Malcolm, the Resident at Mysore.

G. O.

Hoobly, Sunday, 20th March, 1803.

The detachment will approach the fort of Darwar to-morrow, and Major Gen. Wellesley requests that officers will not go to see it, or attempt to go into it, as that may be disagreeable to the people in it, and they may refuse admittance to the officers.

To Capt. Cunningham.

Camp at Hoobly, 20th March, 1803.

By the description rolls of remount horses which I have received from you up to the 14th inst., it appears that you have now at Mangalore 30 mares for the stud, and 308 horses. Upon the receipt of this letter you will be so kind as to make arrangements according to the orders you heretofore received, to send to Fort St. George the mares and the number of horses required for the remount of the body guards of his Excellency the Governor General, and of the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George; and the remainder of the horses are to be sent by the route heretofore given to you for Santa Bednore to the Soolakairy Lake, to which place further orders respecting them will be sent.

I wrote to the Dewan this day, to request that preparations of grain and forage may be made at each stage on the road to Botnunnghur for 100 horses, and at each stage on the road to Santa Bednore for 250; so that there will be no want. I informed him also that you will settle with Mr. Piele whether you will take the grain, giving a receipt for it, or you will pay for it as it is received. You will accordingly immediately acquaint Mr. Piele at Hurryhur with your wishes upon this subject.

P. S. As I apprehend there will be a scarcity of water between Belloor and the Lake, by the route of Adjumpoor, I recommend that the horses should be sent from Belloor to Turrikerra, Benkypoor, Hooley Honore, and Soolakairy Lake.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Hoobly, 20th March, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 17th and 18th, to the former of which I should have yesterday written an answer, only that Major Malcolm arrived in the morning, and the whole day was passed in discussions with him. He will have informed you that he proposes accompanying the detachment, at least as far as Meritch, which I think may be attended by the best consequences. I yesterday received an answer from Bappojee Scindiah to a message I sent him by Govind Rao. I enclose translations of letters from that chief and Govind Rao, which will point out the nature of the arrangement with him. I desired Govind Rao to hint that, in case any harm should be done to my followers, you would instantly fall upon his fort; that the Peshwah had given orders that it should be given over to another person; and that his only chance of saving it would be to be faithful to his Highness in the present crisis of his affairs. I expect his son in camp this day.

My letter to Col. Montresor will have settled the Malabar question. If your whole army was to move that way, you could effect no more in this season than I have suggested to him.

I am concerned that you have been disappointed in the number of brinjarries expected from the Ceded districts. Capt. Barclay has sent to Capt. Blacker all Major Munro's letters, by which it appears that the number he expected from the Ceded districts was 22,000. I cannot conceive in what manner he can have been disappointed. Mr. Cockburne wrote, on the 7th Feb., that 7000 brinjarry bullocks, loaded with rice, had on that day commenced their march for the army, and 7000 more loading. Since that time he has sent no intelligence of either party. I have been

disappointed in the number of those people I expected from Mysore, but I know the cause of their absence. Some of those, also, to the amount of 6000, have been counted among the Ceded districts and Baramahl brinjaries, and are to join your army. But I am so well supplied from the country, that I think, if Col. Stevenson is supplied at all, I shall still have enough. I now enclose the memorandum upon the subject of boats, which I had drawn up some days ago, but which I detained till Major Malcolm should arrive; as, before I should submit it to you, I wished to consult him upon a point connected with politics relating to this subject. You will observe that, in the memorandum, I propose that a post should be established in a redoubt to be constructed on each of the rivers.

It appears to me that it would add essentially to the safety and convenience of the advanced detachment, if these redoubts were to be constructed and the troops established in them immediately; and Major Malcolm agrees in opinion with me, that, however it may secure our communication with Mysore, and give confidence to those inclined to come to us, the measure will not create any jealousy in the minds of any of the jaghiredars in this part of the country. If you should be of that opinion, the first post to be established is that on the Werdah. There is already a redoubt there, constructed by me in 1800, which could be repaired by 300 pioneers in a few days. It wants only a gate and a bridge, either of hurdle or plank, and the earth which has been washed from the parapet into the ditch to be cleared out. If you can spare the pioneers from your camp for this service, it would be most convenient; and, in case you should approve of the plan, and of occupying those posts directly, I enclose a letter to the commanding officer of Nuggur to send a company to the Werdah, which I request you will allow to be forwarded. The road from Oollull to the Werdah is by Reitlie and Deogherry. The redoubt is on the river, about a mile from Deogherry. At all events, whether or not the post is now established upon the Werdah, it will be necessary for me to take measures to establish one upon the Malpoorba. We have several sick men, particularly in the Scotch brigade, and it is necessary to have a field hospital at some place or other. Wherever we have such an establishment we must have a guard for it; and it is as well to establish it at once in a place in which we must have one eventually. I therefore now propose to establish the hospital at Sungoly, a village in which I had heretofore the guard over the boats on the Malpoorba. If I find that village will hereafter answer all the purposes of the redoubt, it will be unnecessary to construct one: if not, it would be desirable that the 300 pioneers should proceed to Sungoly as soon as they shall have finished the work upon the Werdah. Upon this point, however, I have to observe that I am well provided with pioneers, and that I can spare the number which will be required for this work; although I am aware that, eventually, I may have great occasion for their services. I consider always that your army may be obliged to move, and it will not answer to cripple you for my convenience; but if your 300 pioneers can be spared, it would be desirable that they should finish these works.

With a view to the establishment of the hospital, I have ordered a company from Hullihall to the Malpoorba; and in case you should ap-

prove of the plan of establishing our posts directly, I shall order forward the two other companies from the garrison of Hullihall for the posts on the Gutpurba and Kistna.

Memorandum on boats.

Between the 14th and 20th June, the rivers Toombuddra, Werdah, Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna will fill, and it will be necessary to cross them in boats. Those which have been found most convenient for this purpose are the common country basket boats, which ought to be covered with double skins of leather. They can be made with ease in all parts of the country, and can be transported from one river to another.

There ought, however, to be a permanent establishment of 20 boats upon each of those rivers. Each boat ought to have 3 boatmen. For the care of these boats there ought to be a guard at each of the rivers; and, in order to preserve regularity in the passage of them, and the regular payment of the boat people, without which they will not stay in the service, this guard ought to be commanded by an European officer. The whole of the boats might be placed under the superintendence of Capt. Cunningham, who managed this concern heretofore, and who might reside at a central situation.

The boats for the passage of the Toombuddra ought to be at Hurryhur; those for the passage of the Werdah at Deogherry. I shall hereafter point out the places at which it would be most convenient to have those for the passage of the other rivers.

I shall write to Purneah to take measures to have prepared 20 boats of a proper description at Hurryhur, upon the Toombuddra; likewise to prepare a similar number at Chandergooty and Anawooty, and to float them down the Werdah to Deogherry. I propose to give directions to the amildar at Hullihall in Soonda to prepare 40 boats, which will be carried to the Gutpurba and the Kistna. Major Munro might make up the remainder in his districts, and send them to the Malpoorba.

The whole number of boat people that will be required is 300; viz. 60 at each river. I shall write to Purneah to make arrangements to furnish as many of these as he can. Major Munro likewise might furnish some. We cannot depend upon the country for any. Besides these people, there ought to be a muttaseddee, at 10 pagodas *per mensem*, 4 chucklers, and 2 basket makers, with the establishment at each river. The pay heretofore given to each boatmen was 1 gold fanam for every day he did not work, and 2 gold fanams for every day he did. The same pay ought to be given to them now, and they ought to be paid daily.

In case this plan should be approved of, it will be necessary to appoint troops as guards to the boats on each river, and to construct posts for their security. The troops at Hurryhur will guard the boats on the Toombuddra; a company from the garrison of Nuggur may be sent to Deogherry, on the Werdah; and 3 companies from the corps at Hullihall in Soonda to each of the posts on the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna. A gun may be placed in each post, which the garrison of Hullihall could supply.

In case this plan should be approved of, a proportion of ammunition and 3 months' provisions ought to be placed in each post. The post of

Hurryhur is supplied already. Major Robertson might supply that upon the Werdah; and his assistants, with this detachment, those upon the other 3 rivers. One grain conicoply must be left in each post.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp near Darwar, 21st March, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that Riknajee Scindiah, the son of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, paid me a visit this morning, and remains in this camp. The killadar gives the most positive assurances of his fidelity to the Peshwah, and of his determination to do every thing in his power to forward the service on which the British troops are employed. He has desired me to give him a letter to you, to inform you of the manner in which the detachment has been received, which I shall do. I march to-morrow, and shall be on the Malpoorba on the next day. If I find water in the places in which I expect it, I shall be at Meritch on the 2nd April.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 12 miles N. of Darwar, 22nd March, 1803.

You will have observed that the old iron in the carriages made at the manufactory at Seringapatam does not work up well, and I much fear that the country iron will not answer. At all events, we know that it will take more working, and will require a greater expenditure of charcoal, than that brought from Europe; and, consequently, the latter is preferable, even if it does not possess other superior advantages. I have had a correspondence with Capt. Scott upon this subject, since the carriages he first made broke down; and he has proposed that an indent should be sent to England for iron, which might come out in the Company's ships as ballast, and might be landed at Cannanore: from thence it could be moved without expense, or at a very moderate one, to Seringapatam.

Enclosed, I have the honor to send a list of articles of iron, for which Capt. Scott would propose to indent, if you have no objection to the measure. In the mean time, we can make a fair trial of the new country iron; and if it should be found not to answer, this will arrive in India in time for the manufactory in the next year. Nothing new here this day. I propose to transmit to you an account of my route, in order that you may see at what places you will find water, in case you should have occasion to move forward.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sungoly, 23rd March, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 15th. I sent to Bappojee Scindiah regarding the fort of Darwar, as I told you I would. The result of my message to him was a promise on his part to be faithful to the Peshwah; an engagement that he would not molest our supplies; that he would refrain from attacking the Rajah of Kittoor; and he has sent his son to this camp as a security for his good behaviour. I sent Govind Rao to hint to him that Gen. Stuart was upon the frontier with a large army; and that he must expect that Darwar would be attacked by the General, if he departed from his engagements upon this occasion: he also hinted to him, that the Peshwah had given the command of Darwar to another sirdar.

I am getting on well, and shall be at Meritch before the 5th. Every thing continues in the highest style. I have not yet been joined by any of the sirdars; but I expect some of them to-morrow from Manowly, on this river. Goklah has gone forward, and proposes to join on the Gutpurba.

Malcolm, who is in this camp, and I are very anxious to receive accounts of the Peshwah's intentions regarding joining this army in the neighbourhood of Meritch. It is exceedingly desirable that he should join, and almost absolutely necessary that we should communicate with you. Indeed, without this communication, I do not think it possible to be able to settle this business in the manner wished for by the Governor General; and in the crisis of our affairs in Europe, as well as in India, this mode of settling it appears most desirable. I hope, therefore, that we shall soon hear from you upon this point decidedly, whether the Peshwah will join this army at Meritch or not.

It is unfortunate that his Highness cannot be prevailed upon to make some offer to Holkar: even supposing that it should be such a one as it is certain that Holkar would not accept, the negotiation upon this point would be something gained. It would prevent that Chief from making any attempt upon Col. Stevenson or the Nizam's contingent, which I now consider our weak point; and, on the other hand, it might prevent him from concluding with Scindiah. In the mean time, I should be in Col. Stevenson's neighbourhood; and although we might fail in making the peaceable arrangement of which the Governor General is desirous, we should, at least, be certain that no disaster could happen to any of us. Hitherto, I have not been able to send Col. Stevenson any positive instructions. The Commander in Chief has directed him to take a position in the neighbourhood of Perinda, and to wait there, till he should receive further orders from me. He is not strong enough alone, or even reinforced by the Nizam's troops, to contend with Holkar; and, therefore, I cannot desire him to move till I shall arrive within reach of him. I have apprized him of my marches towards Meritch, and of my intention, afterwards, to move towards Punderpoor.

To Lient. Col. Close.

Camp at Nassaree, 25th March, 1803.

Siddajee Rao Nimbilkar, commonly called Appah Dessaye, joined my

G. O.

Camp at Sungoly, Thursday, 24th March, 1803.

A salute of 13 guns to be held in readiness in the park to be fired this afternoon on the arrival at a tent to be pitched in front of the line of Siddajee Rao Nimbilkar, coming on a visit to Major Gen. Wellesley.

G. O.

Camp near Nassaree, Friday, 25th March, 1803.

The baggage master serjeant will indent on the commissary of stores for 3 flags, on small bamboos, to be carried on camels or elephants for the direction of the baggage of the different brigades in the detachment, viz. a blue flag for the cavalry, a white flag for the 4th brigade, a red flag for the 5th brigade.

These flags are to be carried to the officers commanding brigades, who will direct a quarter master of the European regiment in each brigade to take charge of them, and see that they are placed, every marching day, on the leading elephant or camel carrying the camp equipage of the corps.

It is not necessary that the baggage of a brigade should follow its particular flag at present; but the followers ought to be made to distinguish it, so as to be able to follow it readily when ordered, as in the case of a brigade being detached, or otherwise.

camp yesterday; and, in an interview which I had with him, he promised to do every thing I should desire him in the support of the cause of the Peshwah, and has desired me to give him a letter to you, to apprise you of this circumstance.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Nassarce, 25th March, 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 23rd. One of the sirdars, to whom the Peshwah wrote, came into camp yesterday evening, and I received him in due form. He promised to obey all orders I might give him in the Peshwah's cause, excepting to pay for straw and wood. His name is Siddajee Rao Nimbilkur, and he has about 1000 horse.

Goklah has gone forward, and joins me on the Gutpurba on the day after to-morrow. I get on as well as I could wish; and, by the supplies which I have received from Hurryhur, I have now more provisions of every kind in camp than I had on the day I quitted the army. The bazaar is well supplied from the country, and the brinjarry bags are all full. They will continue so until I march from the Kistna. The gram agents' bags likewise are nearly full.

To Lieut. Longford.

Camp, 26th March, 1803.

Mr. Piele has informed me that you have made a demand upon the Rajah's servants of the keys of the fort of Hurryhur, the propriety of complying with which has been referred to me.

I have no doubt whatever regarding who ought to have the keys of forts in the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, occupied by the Company's troops: but I do not think it material to decide, upon the present occasion, who should keep the keys of Hurryhur: I therefore request that you will cease to demand those keys; and I beg you will in all cases endeavor to conciliate the servants of the Rajah's government. You will be so kind as to desire Mr. Gordon's servant at Hurryhur to receive into store at that place, and carry to account on the books, all the grain which the Rajah's servants may throw in there. I have received your letter upon the subject of clothing for the corps in this detachment; and I beg that you will detain it at Hurryhur till I send you further directions.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 3 miles S. Padshappoor, 27th March, 1803.

I enclose the answers which I have received from some of the sirdars, and a letter from Chintomeny Rao to the Peshwah. You will observe that

G. M. O.

Camp near Ankoley, Saturday, 26th March, 1803.

Commanding officers of corps will appoint a guard to take charge of the forage within their lines and to the front and rear of them, and a non-commissioned officer to serve it out to whoever applies for it, whether belonging to the corps or not, and to receive the regulated price for the same, which is to be paid over to the D. Q. M. G. from the manager of the country. The forage alluded to is that in heaps on the ground covered with earth.

G. M. O.

Camp near Ankoley, Sunday, 27th March, 1803.

The orderly trumpeters and drummers with the majors of brigade are to be always in readiness, at those officers' tents, to take up the rounds and beats from the Dep. Adj. Gen.'s orderly drummers, which the majors of brigades must take care are repeated by their orderlies, until taken up by corps and passed along their brigades.

Whenever an orderly trumpeter or drummer hears a signal from trumpet or drum, he is not to consider from whence it comes, but is to repeat it instantly.

the former are as favorable as I could expect them to be. I get on as well as I could wish. I shall be on the Gutpurba to-morrow; and on the Kistna, at Erroor, on the 1st April.

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

Camp, 27th March, 1803.

It is possible that the detachment of the army under my command may remain in the Marhatta territory after the rains shall have commenced, and the rivers which run in the western ghauts shall have filled; and it is necessary to take measures immediately to provide for this contingency. I propose to have 20 basket boats upon each river; and I wish you to request Purneah to provide those to be placed upon the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, and upon the Werdah at the redoubt under Deogherry. These last may be made at Anawooty and Chandergooty, and may be floated down the river to their stations.

I enclose a memorandum stating the size of which the boats ought to be, and the mode in which they ought to be constructed: I beg you to have it translated and communicated to Purneah. The object now is to take measures to procure a sufficient quantity of leather, well tanned; respecting which, I should imagine, if measures are taken in time, there will be no difficulty. Besides boats, I must look to Purneah's districts for a large supply of boatmen. I shall altogether want 300 of this description of people. I have called for an account from Soonda of the number of people of that description which that province can afford; but I imagine that I shall not find many. I must therefore depend upon Purneah for all that he can get for me. Their pay shall be a gold fanam for every day they do not work, and 2 gold fanams for every day they do. I commence from the day on which they shall leave their villages for this service, besides payment to the muttaseddees and duffadars, &c., whom Purneah may place over them. The rivers will fill on some day between the 14th and 20th June: all our arrangements, therefore, will be in readiness at the commencement of that month.

To Major Doolan.

Camp, 27th March, 1803.

It is possible that the detachment of the army under my command in this country may remain in it till after the rains shall have commenced, and the rivers which rise in the western ghauts shall have filled; and it is necessary to provide for this possibility. The sooner we begin to make boats, to keep up our communication, the better; and I look to the station of Hullihall, and to the province of Soonda, for a large supply. The number which I shall require from thence, to be placed on the rivers which I shall mention hereafter, is 40 basket boats.

Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, you will be so kind as to communicate with the amildar at Hullihall upon this subject, and apprise him of this call upon the resources of the districts under his management. You will also send a copy of this letter to Mr. Read, with my request to that gentleman that he will give directions to the amildar to exert himself in furnishing these boats, which may prove to be important to the existence of this detachment.

I enclose a memorandum which will point out the size of which these

boats ought to be, and the mode in which they ought to be made. The first thing to which you ought to direct the attention of the amildar is to procure a sufficient number of well cured skins. I imagine that it will not be difficult to find them in Soonda, at Darwar, or at Goor. The province of Soonda abounds in the other materials required for the construction of the boats; and I should imagine that the amildar will not find it difficult to procure the basket makers. The boats will be wanted in the beginning of June, and the amildar will take his own measures to have them ready at that time. I shall also be much obliged to you if you will inquire, and let me know, what number of boat people the province of Soonda can supply for these boats. The pay allowed is very liberal, viz. 1 gold fanam *per diem* for every day they do not work, and 2 gold fanams for every day they do work. According to the information which you will give me upon this point, I shall regulate the call which I shall make upon the province of Soonda for this species of assistance.

Memorandum respecting basket boats.

Camp, 27th March, 1803.

1. The size best calculated for strength and use is 10 feet diameter in the clear, and 2 feet 3 inches high.

2. It is indispensable that the covering of leather should come over the gunwale of the boat, to be lashed to the framework within: most accidents that happen to these kind of boats arise from a neglect of this precaution. There ought to be a double covering of leather, to add to their security and strength; but this is of less importance than that any part of the gunwale should be left uncovered. It may be useful to notice that the hides should be sewed with leather.

3. The materials that are required for basket boats are bamboo lath; jungle wood (the best is called souri, a tough thorn); country rope; leather.

4. A framework should be made of 3 of these laths together, and worked with others, about 4 inches apart, in a succession of triangles, until it allows the diameter required, 10 feet. In this state it is fixed in uprights driven in a circle of 10 feet diameter, the ends bent upwards and worked close with single lath for 2 feet 3 inches, and which forms the sides of the boat; the remaining ends are then twisted in with the small parts of souri, or pliable jungle wood, and this forms the gunwale, which should be well lashed with country rope. This is the mode of making the boats, with which the Natives are as well acquainted as we are.

5. In this state it is taken from the uprights, and the centre of the boat fixed in a little mound of earth (say 6 inches), when it is lined with the toughest jungle wood that can be procured, and lashed to the frame within it: these should cross each other, so that the pressure may be equal on every part of the boat. Eight pieces are sufficient, about the thickness of $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 inch rope, made long enough, with the ends pointed, to run into the bottom of the gunwale, and secured with country rope.

6. It is absolutely necessary that a frame to fit, made exactly as the bottom of the boat should be then fixed within it, the smooth part of the

bamboo uppermost. This is laid over the lining of the jungle, to which it is lashed by the same wood within to the sides of the boat.

7. This is the general mode of making boats: the great error is in preparing the lath too thick, whereas it can scarcely be made too thin. The strength of the boat depends upon the goodness of the jungle wood for lining, and its being equally crossed, in order that it may sustain an equal pressure in all its parts.

8. It is desirable that there should be a second frame, worked close in a circular manner, and lashed within; for, on the transporting of baggage, it prevents a pressure on the leather from bamboos, feet of cots and tables, that pass through the triangle bamboo work of the boat. It preserves the leather, and adds but little to the weight.

*The D.I.G. to Lieut. Col. * * *.*

Camp, 28th March, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to inform you that Annatty, vakeel of the battalion under your command, has complained to him of your general severe treatment, and, particularly, that you flogged him yesterday for not having provided straw for the bullocks, although he had not been furnished with money for the purpose. Instead of punishing a man for not having taken straw without paying for it, Major Gen. Wellesley had expected that an officer of your rank would have supported the orders given by him on that subject, and that you would have obliged every person belonging to your corps to have paid for the straw which he took. The General directs me to acquaint you that he will hold you responsible for any deviation from the orders on this head by the 1st batt. 2nd regt.; and to signify to you his further order that you do not again flog, or cause to be flogged, the vakeel Annatty, who is a servant of the Company, excepting by the sentence of a Court martial.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 12 miles N. of the Gutpurba, 29th March, 1803.

I enclose a duplicate of my letter of the 14th. I have nothing to add to it, excepting that I am getting on as well as I could wish; and that I shall be at Meritch 2 days sooner than I told you in that letter. My motions afterwards must be guided by the accounts I may receive of you, of Holkar, and of the Peshwah.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 12 miles N. of the Gutpurba, 29th March, 1803.

I have written to Col. Stevenson and Col. Close, but I cannot say whether my letters have reached them. I apprized Col. Stevenson exactly of my intended movements; but it was, and is still, impossible for me to give him any orders. Those which you sent him provided for his safety till I should reach him; and it will not be proper to order him to move till that time, or till I shall ascertain exactly the position of Holkar.

It is now reported that Holkar is gone towards Ahmednuggur and Chandore; and if the report be true, there will be no inconvenience in Col. Stevenson's making a movement towards the Beemah, on the road to Poonah, as I shall advance towards Jejoory. But till I shall approach Jejoory, or till it is ascertained that Holkar is gone off towards Chandore, it will not be proper that Col. Stevenson should quit his position at Perinda.

I enclose the translation of a paper, which, with the concurrence and advice of Major Malcolm, I have given to Appah Saheb's vakeel. He has had 3000 pindarries in his service, to whom he gave no pay, and who sub-

sisted by plundering the Rajah of Kolapoor. In order that all those chiefs may come forward in the service of the Peshwah at the present crisis, I have prevailed upon them to cease hostilities; and of course Appah Saheb's pindarries can no longer subsist upon the plunder they might acquire in the territory of the Rajah of Kolapoor. If they had been dismissed from Appah Saheb's service, which would have been the natural consequence of a cessation of hostilities between him and the Rajah, they would have gone into the service of Holkar, or of some of his chiefs, and would have increased the number of that description of troops which have always been found to do our armies most injury; and as these particular pindarries were in Tippoo's service, they know the mode in which we carry on our operations, and that by which they can injure us, much better than that description of people in Holkar's army, who come from Hindustan. If they had not gone into Holkar's service, they would have set up for themselves under some independent chief, and would have plundered the Savanore and Darwar countries, and have entirely interrupted our communication with your army. It therefore appeared to me, and to Major Malcolm, to be absolutely necessary that Appah Saheb should retain them in his service.

It is impossible, however, that they should be retained on the footing upon which they have served hitherto; viz. to subsist by the plunder of the country. We shall pass through the countries of the Peshwah, or of his friends and adherents, and it would be very inconvenient that they should plunder there: indeed, I doubt whether Appah Saheb could venture to lead this description of troops into those countries. Under these circumstances, the only measure that could be adopted was, that Appah Saheb should take them into pay; but as none of the chiefs have much confidence in the Peshwah's gratitude for their services, he was unwilling to adopt that measure without our guarantee that the Peshwah would allow of the muster of those troops, and that his Highness would reimburse the expense of their maintenance while they should be employed in this manner.

This measure, of which I now request your confirmation, may draw after it a necessity to advise the employment, and to guarantee the payment by the Peshwah, of troops of this description, in the service, at present, of other sirdars; but I do not believe that the number will exceed 1000. It may also occasion a necessity to give an advance of money for their pay; but this sum, under present circumstances, can be afforded. I have to observe, on this subject, that a month will bring our military operations to great maturity. In that space of time we shall be able to ascertain whether Holkar will acquiesce peaceably in our arrangement with the Peshwah, or whether that chief must be driven from his Highness' territories by force. In less than that time, also, the measure of hiring those troops can be laid before his Highness, and he can decide whether or not he will retain them in his service. If he should not approve of retaining them, they may either be discharged, or may be employed in the plunder of the enemy without pay, according to circumstances; and, at all events, supposing that his Highness should refuse to pay their expense, which is scarcely possible, the charge to the Company will be trifling in comparison

with the benefit which this detachment must derive from keeping this body of pindarries out of Holkar's service, and from cutting off our communications with the army. Upon the whole, therefore, I request your confirmation of this necessary arrangement. Goklah has joined me with his army, and I am to meet him this afternoon.

Engagement given by Major Genl Wellesley to the vakeel of Appah Saheb.

Narrain Rao, vakeel of Appah Saheb, having represented that his master had in his service 3000 pindarries, to whom he gave no pay, and who had been in the habit of subsisting by plunder, he desires to have Major Gen. Wellesley's advice and opinion regarding the best mode of disposing of these people in the present crisis, for the service of the Peshwah.

Major Gen. Wellesley is of opinion that these troops ought not to be discharged, because, if discharged, they might be employed against the Peshwah; and they ought not to be employed by Appah Saheb without pay, because, as they must subsist, they would plunder the countries of the Peshwah, or of his adherents, for their subsistence. Major Gen. Wellesley, therefore, advises that they should be taken into pay at the rate of 20 rupees per month each man; and he guarantees to Appah Saheb that the Peshwah will allow them to be mustered, and that his Highness shall reimburse to him the sums paid to them.

Under this arrangement the pindarries must not be allowed to plunder.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. * * * **

Camp at Manowly, 29th March, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, having received your letter of the 28th ult., wherein you report having confined the vakeel Annatty, for making the complaint to him yesterday, has directed me to desire that you will release that man forthwith.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

30th March, 1803.

I enclose an extract of a letter, and of its enclosure, that I have addressed to Gen. Stuart upon a subject of some consequence, which will explain itself. I shall be on the Kistna, at Erroor, to-morrow, where I shall halt one day; and at Meritch on the 3rd. The accounts which I have received are, that Holkar has gone towards Chandore with his army; and it appears to me to be of the utmost importance that I should reach Poonah with the least possible delay. If I find, therefore, that it is true that Holkar is gone to the northward, I shall march directly to Jejoory; and I shall send orders to Col. Stevenson to arrive at Gardoon, on the Beemah, on the day that I shall reach Jejoory. I shall then move by my left to Poonah, and bring him either to Jejoory, or in front of that place on the Beemah, leaving the Nizam's troops at Gardoon.

If Holkar should remain at a small distance from us, it will be necessary to alter this plan thus far, viz. that Col. Stevenson and the Nizam's troops should either join me, or be at one march from me on my right; or march towards Poonah on the direct road from Gardoon, while I march by that from Jejoory. If it should not be true that Holkar is gone to the northward, and he should post himself in such a manner as apparently to have an intention to impede the junction of Col. Stevenson with me, or to have the power of impeding it, I shall move towards Col. Ste-

venson at Perinda, before I proceed to Jejoory. In any one of these cases, I hope to reach Poonah about the 20th April.

After my arrival there, in my opinion, it will be necessary that the Peshwah should come up the ghauts as soon as possible; and I conclude that you will have formed all your arrangements for that purpose. Of course, my movements from Poonah must be guided in a great degree by those of Holkar; but if he should have gone off to the northward, I shall stretch out towards the ghauts, as well to open the communication with Bombay, at the earliest possible period, as to provide for the Peshwah's safety on his journey from Bassein. You will observe that this letter is written under the impression that I shall not see you at Meritch, of which I think there is at present no prospect.

To Futtý Sing Maunia.

1st April, 1803.

I hear that you are encamped with your army at ———.

I am advancing with the British troops on the Peshwah's business. I hear from Col. Close that he has held communications of a friendly nature with your master, Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and I should be much concerned that there should be any interruption of these friendly communications. I therefore recommend that you should draw off with your troops to the northward of Poonah, and wait there the further orders of your master.

I send Kawder Nawaz Khan, a person of consequence, to you, who will converse with and inform you of various reasons which render this measure expedient.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Erroor, on the Kistna, 1st April, 1803.

I have the honor to inform you that I arrived here on the 31st March, and have halted for 2 days, in order to establish at this place a field hospital, which is much wanted on account of the general deficiency, among the native corps, of carriage for their sick. I have the satisfaction to observe, however, that the sick are by no means numerous; and that, if the corps were rather better provided with carriage, or if the weather was not so extremely hot, it would not be necessary to have a field hospital at this place.

I have taken the opportunity of this halt to have a general muster of the cattle, &c., attached to the different corps and departments; and have the pleasure to inform you, that, although they have made a long march from Seringapatam in a short space of time, and in a season very unfavorable, they are still capable, with very little assistance, of moving the grain, provision, and ordnance stores, for which they were hired. The Company's draught cattle are in high condition.

I have now in this camp 10,000 brinjarry bullocks with full bags. The daily consumption of the bazaars is 200, so that I have a supply which will last 50 days. Besides these, other brinjarries are following, of whose number I cannot give any accurate account. None of them are at a greater distance than 3 marches, and they will soon overtake us.

I attribute this prosperous situation of the detachment, at this advanced

station, to the supplies afforded us by the depôts formed at Hurryhur upon the Toombuddra, and Hullihall in Soonda; and to the favorable manner in which this detachment has been received by all classes and descriptions of the people of this country.

It is needless to enter into a detail respecting the animosities between the chiefs, in whose hands is placed the power over the countries through which this detachment has passed. In order, however, that the Commander in Chief may form a judgment respecting what has been done, it will be necessary to inform him, that since the year 1800, when I was in this country before, it has been one continued contest for power and plunder between the different chiefs who have armies under their command: between the Putwurdun's (Pursheram Bhow's) family and Goklah, in the countries bordering on the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba; between the Putwurdun and the Rajah of Kolapoor in those bordering on the Gutpurba and Kistna; between Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and the Rajah of Kittoor; between Goklah and the Rajah of Kittoor, and Goklah and Bappojee Scindiah; besides various others of inferior note, either immediately employed under these, or for themselves, under their protection. I have prevailed on all these chiefs to cease their contests for the present, and to join this detachment with the troops, which would otherwise be employed in the plunder of the country, or in the prosecution of their private quarrels, and to co-operate with me in the service of the Peshwah. They have also allowed me the use of the supplies of the countries under their management or protection, on payment; and have protected the people belonging to my camp in their passage through their countries.

For the further protection of the people with supplies, who are on their road to join this camp, I have placed posts on the Werdah, the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna, at the places at which it will be necessary to have posts hereafter, if this detachment should be in advance of the army, when the rivers shall fill which rise in the western ghauts. I have been joined by the troops of Goklah, of Bappojee Vittell, of Appojee Rao Nepauneeckur (commonly called Appah Dessaye), of the Putwurdun family, of the Rajah of Kittoor, and of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, whose son is in camp.

I expect to be joined at Meritch by the troops of Prittee Niddee, of Rastna, and some others. It is impossible to say to what number the whole will amount, but I imagine not less than 20,000 horse. My next object must be to join Col. Stevenson, in the attainment of which I imagine I shall find no difficulty.

It is now reported that Holkar, with the main body of his army, is gone towards Hindustan by the Nimderrah ghaut. If that should be the case, the junction will not be difficult; but, even if it should not be true, as this detachment is of sufficient strength to move any where, I can march towards the Nizam's frontier, and then form this junction. Fatty Sing Maunia and Mheer Khan Patan are in my front, nearly in the station in which they have been represented to be in the different letters received from Lieut. Col. Close. It is said that they intend to fall back as I shall advance.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Erroor, on the Kistna, 2nd April, 1803.

I have this morning had a long conversation with Goklah and his vakeels, in the course of which he represented strongly the distresses under which he labors. He has requested me to write to you upon the subject. It is very desirable that some steps should be immediately taken by the Peshwah for his relief; and I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to his Highness upon that subject. If his Highness should be disposed to relieve his distresses, I can, at your desire, advance him a sum of money amounting to 50,000 rupees, without incurring the risk of distressing my own troops.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 23rd March. My future line of march still remains in the same state of uncertainty in which it was when I last wrote to you. It is still reported here that Holkar is gone to the Nimderrah ghaut: but he has left Futtu Sing Maunia and Mheer Khan to the southward: there is, therefore, reason to apprehend that his line of operation does not lie on the road by which he has moved himself. With a view, however, to ascertain the intentions of Futtu Sing, I have sent off Kawder Nawaz Khan with a letter to that chief, of which the enclosed is a copy, and I shall hereafter have a similar communication with Mheer Khan.

I shall march from hence to-morrow, and I am still in style. In regard to the depôt, I enclose a memorandum for Capt. Moor, which will explain particularly what I shall first want. In your letter of the 23rd, you talk of bringing up a convoy with the detachment which will attend the Peshwah's person; but you forget that the bullocks from this division will not have reached Panwell at the time at which you will march from thence. I conclude, therefore, that all that you will be able to bring will be loads on the bullocks which Mr. Duncan will have provided for the service of the army. The loads which I should wish to have on them, whatever may be their number, are rice: we have plenty of arrack and of every thing else.

In the memorandum which goes enclosed, you will observe that I have pointed out to Capt. Moor the number of bullocks which I imagine I shall first send down, and the loads which I should wish to have prepared for them. These bullocks are exclusive of those which I suppose will be sent with the Peshwah's detachment with loads of rice.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Allen, on the Kistna.

Camp at Erroor, 2nd April, 1803.

The objects in stationing the company under your command are—1st, to give confidence to the brinjaries, bazaar people, &c., who are following the detachment under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley; 2nd, to provide a guard for those articles of provisions and stores which it may be found convenient to leave behind the detachment; 3rd, to provide a guard for the boats which it may be necessary eventually to place upon the river Kistna; and 4th, to provide a guard for the hospital stationed there. You will keep these objects in view: you will immediately remove your provisions and ammunition into the ghurry, of which the General has arranged with the amildar that you are to have possession, which you will consider as your post. You may remain encamped on the river, as you may find it convenient, but you must always have a guard in the redoubt. You will preserve the most strict discipline among the troops, &c., and will do every thing in your power to conciliate the people of the country to the British interests. Tappalleons will be placed in Erroor, with whom you will communicate and see that they go off regularly. They will be

directed to report to you. You will receive, this afternoon, an account of every thing that will be left in the redoubt. Hereafter you will receive instructions for your guidance, in case it should be found necessary to place boats upon the river Kistna. Orders will be given to the officer commanding your battalion to provide for the pay of the detachment under your command. The amildar has his house in the fort, and is not to be molested in it. These instructions to be handed over to an officer of the 1st batt. 5th regt. Bombay N.I., who will relieve you in a few days; and, when relieved, you will join this detachment. You will correspond regularly with Lieut. Christie, stationed at Sungoly on the Malpoorba, and with Lieut. Elwood at Goorgherry, on the Gutpurba, and also with me, for the information of the General, informing those 2 officers of every convoy or person of any consequence that passes your post, and reporting the same to me, together with such information as you may obtain of what is passing in the country.

(A similar letter to Lieut. Christie at Sungoly, and to Lieut. Elwood at Goorgherry.)

Memorandum for Capt. Moor.

1. Major Gen. Wellesley is well satisfied with the loads as prepared by Capt. Moor, viz. each of 120 lbs.

2. At the end of April, or the beginning of May, the following number of bullocks will be sent to Panwell, to receive a corresponding number of loads. Grain department: 1700 bullocks for rice. Provision department: 500 bullocks for salt provision; 200 for arrack; 20 casks, of 60 gallons each, to be filled with arrack. Gram department: 3000 bullocks for gram. Brinjarries: 10,000 bullocks for rice; 2000 bullocks for gram; 200 bullocks for wheat; 500 bullocks for salt.

3. In this estimate is included the probable first call of the detachments of troops expected from Hyderabad; and the quantity of articles which Major Gen. Wellesley requested Mr. Duncan to have prepared, with a view to the supply of the troops under Lieut. Gen. Stuart, will answer for those which, it may be expected, will be assembled in the neighbourhood of Poonah.

4. It is recommended that the articles for each department, above specified in paragraph 2, may be in separate boats. The boats for each department to be distinguished by a flag. Those of the grain, red; those of the provisions, white; those of the gram, blue; those of the brinjarries, red and white cross.

5. The heads of departments will indent regularly upon the Garrison storekeeper at Bombay for the articles which they will require, and can carry away; and these indents will be countersigned by Major Gen. Wellesley.

6. The brinjarries will have orders for the delivery of the number of loads required by them, signed by Capt. Barclay, the superintendent of supplies, for which a gomastah of brinjarries will pass his receipt in duplicate: one copy of this receipt to be kept by the officer who shall deliver the grain; the other to be forwarded to Capt. Barclay in camp. The brinjarries will afterwards pay for the rice in camp; and this account will be one to be settled between the governments of Fort St. George and

G. O.

Camp at Myshall, Sunday, 3rd April, 1803.

The detachment will pass the fort of Meritch to-morrow, and Major Gen. Wellesley requests that the officers will not go from the line to look at it, or attempt to go into it, or the pettah.

Bombay. Major Gen. Wellesley will write upon this subject fully to the government of Bombay.

7. As the heads and servants of the departments will be strictly accountable for every article they shall receive, it is doubtful whether they will be willing to receive them by tale. The brinjaries will certainly require to measure the grain in some of the bags which they shall receive; and, therefore, Major Gen. Wellesley recommends that, besides intelligent accountants to keep the accounts, and make the deliveries with regularity, there should be a number of measuring men and sewers in readiness at Panwell.

8. It is also desirable that there should be in readiness, in the service of the public, 300 or 400 coolies, to assist in the removal of the loads from the boats to the bullocks, so that there may be no delay.

9. If the neighbourhood of Panwell should not be well supplied with forage, a few boats loaded with straw, to be sold at a reasonable rate, would be very necessary.

10. Answers will be given hereafter to the other paragraphs of the memorandum.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 3 miles S. of Meritch, 3rd April, 1803.

I arrived here this morning, and received your letter of the 23rd March. I have just heard that Fatty Sing Maunia, who was in my front, has moved off to the eastward, it is supposed, with an intention to join

Major Malcolm to Lord Clive.

Camp near Meritch, 3rd April, 1803.

When I had the honor to inform your Lordship of my intention to join the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, for the purpose of communicating with that officer on a variety of subjects, intimately connected with the present service, it was not my intention to proceed farther than a few marches with the British force under his command, and my letter of the 15th ult. must therefore have conveyed that impression to your Lordship's mind. Circumstances have, however, since occurred, which have made me determine to accompany this detachment to Poonah; and, in adopting this resolution, I trust I have not acted contrary to the spirit of your Lordship's instructions.

As political questions, of a serious magnitude, seemed likely to arise, and to press for decision, as this force approximated to Poonah, it was suggested to me, by the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, that the information I possessed of his Excellency the Governor General's sentiments, as applicable to the present crisis of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and to the general system of politics in India, might be more required in this quarter than in any other; and that considerable advantage to the public service might eventually be derived from my accompanying him to Poonah; a circumstance which would also enable him to take measures, in communication and concert with me, for the conciliation of the southern sirdars and jaghiredars of the Marhatta Empire, who were expected to join his corps as he advanced.

As this suggestion of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley entirely corresponded with the dictates of my own judgment, as to the mode in which my exertions would best conduce to the promotion of the public interests on the present important occasion, I readily acquiesced in his wishes; and, in doing so, I am assured my conduct will be honored by the approbation of his Excellency the Governor General, whose flattering and liberal confidence has left me unrestrained to pursue, in this particular, and in all others, the line of conduct which circumstances of the moment lead me to think most likely to contribute to the success of the service in which we are engaged.

I have the honor to enclose, for your Lordship's information, a memorandum
of

Meer Khan. This movement enables me to decide to march towards you immediately. If they hang about the Beemah, I shall go to Punderpoor; from which place you shall hear further from me, and I shall then point out to you the modes by which I propose that we should join. In that case, I shall be at Punderpoor on the 11th or 12th.

If they follow their master to the northward, which I think most probable, I shall not go so far to the eastward as Punderpoor, but shall endeavor to reach the Beemah river by a direct route. In that case, also, I shall communicate, with all possible speed, by what route I wish you to join me.

of the state of the southern Rajahs, sirdars, and jaghiredars of the Marhatta Empire; which, though perhaps full of small errors, is correct in the leading facts; and will convey to your Lordship a tolerably just idea of the state of the country through which this corps has passed, and in which it still continues.

The march of a British force through this distracted country has had the happy effect of reconciling its contending chiefs, and of giving confidence to its oppressed inhabitants; and the union of all ranks in a sentiment of respect for the English name has occasioned an abundance of supplies of every description, which will enable the detachment to leave the banks of the Kistna with more provisions than it did those of the Toombuddra. The discipline and conduct of the English troops, who have before served in this quarter, have, no doubt, contributed much to this favorable general impression. But the confidence and respect of every class, in the provinces to the south of the Kistna, is in a very great degree personal to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley; to the admiration which the Marhatta chiefs entertain of that officer's military character, and the firm reliance which the inhabitants place on his justice and protection, the extraordinary success which has hitherto attended the progress of this force must be principally attributed.

No specific engagements have been entered into with any of the sirdars or jaghiredars. they have received general assurances that they shall be recommended in the strongest manner to the Peshwah, if their conduct is such as to merit that mark of favor and friendship.

Several of the chiefs who were under the Peshwah's displeasure have been excited to action by a promise of the British influence being exerted to restore them to the confidence of their Sovereign; and there is reason to expect some of this class will serve with much zeal and activity, as they cannot but view the present opportunity as the only one which could have occurred to afford them a prospect of regaining that favor which their conduct had justly alienated.

Every means has been taken which could be devised to prevent the jaghiredars plundering the districts of each other, while the British troops are in this quarter; as it was obvious that, unless this could be effectually checked, we could neither expect supplies from the adjacent country, nor aid from the different chiefs, whom it was so essential to combine in one general cause. The success of the measures which have been adopted with this view have exceeded expectation; and there is good reason to hope these provinces will enjoy, during the present season, a comparative tranquillity to what they have known for many years.

For the purpose of securing this important object, and of preventing an accession to the strength of Holkar, Gen. Wellesley has engaged, both to the chiefs of the Putwurdum family, and to Goklah, that his Highness the Peshwah will admit of their return, and pay all the troops (including pindarries) extra of their quota, with which they accompany the army on the present service: by this measure he has prevented the dismissal of that part of their horse which is, above all others, calculated to destroy a country, and to distress and harass an army.

I enclose, for your Lordship's information, a list of the chiefs, and the number of their troops, who have joined the British force. There is reason to expect that their numbers will be considerably increased in a very few days: they are all professedly warm in their attachment to the Peshwah; but most of them only view the general cause as the means of advancing their particular interest.

The Rajah of Kolapoor, and several others of the chiefs of this part of the country,

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart. Camp at Doondewarry, 8 m. N.E. from Meritch, 4th April, 1803.

I heard yesterday that Futtý Sing Maunia, who has been some time on the road between Meritch and Poonah, about 20 miles to the northward of Tasgaum, had moved to the eastward, it is supposed, with an intention to join Meer Khan. As I could not expect that any of the chiefs assembled upon the Kistna would move from the neighbourhood of Meritch, while Futtý Sing should remain in his station on the road to Poonah, I was

country, are under the influence of Scindiah, and likely to act as he dictates; and I am concerned to observe, from the last dispatch from Col. Collins, that there is little prospect of this chief being brought to take a favorable view of our present connexion with the Peshwah.

Your Lordship will observe, in the memorandum which I have the honor to enclose, that Abdul Kher Khan, the Nabob of Savanore, is in a state of extreme misery. He has represented his situation, through a vakeel, to Gen. Wellesley, and pressed the General to oblige Bappoo Goklah to pay him part of the arrears of his pension, to prevent him and his family perishing from absolute want. The difficulty and distress which Goklah has to pay his troops upon the present service made it impossible to urge him upon a point of this nature; and the General has, therefore, in attention to my suggestion, relieved the distresses of the Nabob of Savanore by a present of 5000 rupees, in the name of the Hon. Company. This act of charity will, I am sure, be honored by your Lordship's approbation. It relieves from severe distress the representative of a noble family, and the brother in law of the late Sultaan; and is calculated to raise the reputation of the British government.

It was stated, some time ago, to Gen. Wellesley and myself, by the vakeel of Appah Saheb, that Muraba Furnavees, the cousin of Nana Furnavees, would join the British army, provided he was assured of protection; and that he should hereafter be permitted to retire to Benares, or where else he chose, without molestation, in the event of his not coming to a satisfactory accommodation with the Peshwah. As Muraba was at liberty to proceed where he chose when he made this overture, his conduct showed a desire to be restored to favor by his master; and as his junction, from his rank and respectability, was an object of importance, and was considered as such by the chiefs who were co-operating with the British army, the assurance he required was given; and I am happy to inform your Lordship he is in Meritch, and will probably join in a few days, and proceed with the British force to Poonah.

From a general view of the disposition of the Marhatta chiefs in this quarter, of the actual state of the British detachments under the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley and Col. Stevenson, and the present distribution of Holkar's force, I am satisfied the great object of reinstating his Highness on his musnud in Poonah will be speedily effected; and, that measure once accomplished, it will be easy to form a disposition of the troops in this quarter, that will defy the efforts of any combination which can possibly be formed with the view of defeating the important ends of the present arrangement.

Names of Marhatta sirdars and jaghiredars who have joined Gen. Wellesley, and list of their forces:

	Horse	Infantry.
Appah Saheb	2500	1000
Bappoo Goklah	3000	1500
Bappoo Vittell	300	
Appah Dessaye, the Jaghiredar of Nepawnee	300	100
Vakeel of Kistoor Rajah	100	100
Bappoo Scindiah	150	100
Total	6350	2800

N.B. Chintomeny Rao Pandoorung, Gunput Rao Paunsel, Vittell Seo Deo, and Pursheram Pundit Prittee Niddee, are expected to join to-morrow: their force will more than double that already in camp.

rather embarrassed until he marched. I am, however, now upon my road to Pundepoor, at which place I shall arrive on the 11th. My junction with Col. Stevenson, in 2 or 3 days afterwards, then becomes certain.

I have received 2 letters from Col. Stevenson, the last dated the 20th. He had arrived at Perinda, and had been joined by 6000 horse, and 5000 infantry, with 40 guns, of the Nizam's army. The hircarrahs, who had been in Holkar's camp, reported that it was 8 or 10 coss from Ahmednuggur, about the 20th of March, his army moving to the northward, but not with great celerity. I have apprised Col. Stevenson of my movement towards him, and shall send him orders regarding the mode in which he is to join me, as soon as I shall see what is done by Futty Sing and Meer Khan, when they shall have joined. I think that they will follow their master to the north, and leave the game in our hands.

Every thing here goes on well. The brinjarries have had a little dispute with their muttaseddee, which has given me some trouble; but, after sitting up a great part of last night with them, I have settled it to the satisfaction of all parties. They have desired to have an officer to reside in the gollah with them; and on this account, as well as because, by the inquiry, it appears that a more active superintendence is necessary, than could be given by the superintendent of the bazaars, I have appointed Capt. Baynes to do this duty, under Capt. Barclay. He will reside in the gollah; but, whenever his corps is wanted for service, he is to join it, which will not be attended with inconvenience.

All the papers relating to this transaction will be sent, by Capt. Barclay, to Lieut. Blacker, as, in fact, all the brinjarries are generally concerned; and the abuses which have prevailed would, sooner or later, create discontent among them all.

The Governor General to the Gov. of Fort St. George. Fort William, 4th April, 1803.

The Governor General in Council has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's official dispatch to the Governor General, dated the 15th March, enclosing the copy of a letter from his Excellency the Commander in Chief of the army of Fort St. George to your Lordship's address; in which his Excellency has detailed the arrangements, adopted under your Lordship's authority, for the formation and march of a detachment, under the command of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, towards Poonah, in conformity to the instructions of the Governor General, addressed to your Lordship, in an official letter, under date of the 2nd Feb.

Those arrangements appear to have been regulated by Lieut. Gen. Stuart, under your Lordship's orders, with the utmost degree of judgment and ability, and to have embraced every object connected with the successful accomplishment of the service on which the detachment is employed. The Governor General in Council entirely approves of the selection of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley for the command of the troops detached towards Poonah. The extensive local knowledge, and influence, possessed by that officer, and the confidence reposed in his approved talents, firmness, temper, and integrity, by the Marhatta chieftains, on the frontiers of Mysore, render him peculiarly qualified to discharge the complicated duties of a command, which will require the united exertion of considerable military skill, and great political experience and discretion.

The Governor General in Council observes, with peculiar satisfaction, the judicious arrangements which have been adopted for securing to the detachment regular and sufficient supplies of provisions, independently of the resources of the country through which the detachment will have occasion to march. Those supplies being principally derived from the resources of Mysore, it becomes an object of

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Hingomgaum, 5th April, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st inst., and am happy to find that you approved of the engagement into which I entered with the Putwurdun family. I have not yet ascertained what number of these pindarries they have with them. In the last conversation which I had with their vakeel on this subject, he said that they had sent the greatest number of those they had to Rastia, in the Sholapoor country, not expecting that I should consent to the proposed arrangement. If this is the case, there will be employment for these people, without injury to our cause, and at no expense.

I had a conversation with Goklah, 2 or 3 days ago, regarding his situation, in which he complained much of his distress for money. In consequence, I wrote to Col. Close, to request that he would urge the Peshwah to take some steps to relieve their pressing distresses. I also told Goklah

of the utmost importance to provide, by every practicable precaution, against the decline of that active influence and energy, by which we have hitherto been enabled to apply the resources of Mysore to the exigencies of the army in the field.

The activity and energy which have distinguished the conduct of the executive authority in Mysore are principally to be ascribed to the influence which Major Gen. Wellesley has been enabled to establish in that country by his judicious conduct of the British army stationed at Mysore. The preservation of that influence is inseparably connected with the continuance of Major Gen. Wellesley in the command of the British forces in Mysore, while that officer shall be employed in the immediate conduct of the operations of the detachment advancing towards Poonah. The Governor General in Council, therefore, considers Major Gen. Wellesley's continuance in the military command of Mysore to be essentially necessary to the successful accomplishment of the service in which that officer is at present engaged. With these sentiments, his Excellency in Council deems it to be proper to direct, in this special manner, that Major Gen. Wellesley retain the military command of Mysore, until further instructions shall reach your Lordship from this government. Your Lordship will be pleased, accordingly, to instruct his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the coast to frame, in concert with Major Gen. Wellesley, such arrangements as may appear to be necessary to enable Major Gen. Wellesley to exercise the military command in Mysore, while employed in conducting the operations of the detachment, and other public duties, within the Marhatta territory.

If any officer should have been appointed to succeed Major Gen. Wellesley in the military command in Mysore, previously to the receipt of this dispatch, his Excellency in Council directs that the command in Mysore be restored to Major Gen. Wellesley, immediately upon the receipt of these instructions. The instructions which his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the coast has issued to Major Gen. Wellesley are framed with the greatest wisdom and prudence, and are entirely conformable to the views and intentions of the Governor General in Council. The state of the internal government of Mysore, in all its branches, being intimately connected with the subject of these instructions, his Excellency in Council further directs that no alteration be made in any civil or military appointments in Mysore (including the appointment of all native officers, civil and military), without previous reference to the Governor General in Council, and without his express authority; and that no change be suffered to take place in any part of the existing system of the civil or military government of Mysore, without the previous sanction of this government.

The Governor General in Council requests that your Lordship in Council will be pleased to consider the instructions, stated in this dispatch, to be intended to form the basis of a permanent system for the future administration of Mysore, and for regulating the extent and nature of the control to be exercised in the affairs of that possession by the Governor General in Council.

to keep his troops together, and that I would engage that he should be allowed to muster the overplus of his established numbers.

As Goklah is in possession of the revenues of Savanore, the Nabob of Savanore has claims upon him for 50,000 rupees *per annum*, allowed him from those revenues by the Peshwah. This pension, however, is paid very irregularly, or rather is not paid at all; and the consequence is, that the Nabob and his family are starving. He represented his situation to me as I was passing, and has since sent a man here to desire that I would urge Goklah, at least, to provide for his subsistence; but it is obvious, that, when I was obliged to refuse Goklah all pecuniary assistance, and, at the same time, to urge him to endeavor to keep his army together without pay or plunder, when he stated that he was in the greatest distress, I could not ask him to pay money to the Nabob of Savanore. This man is of an ancient and respectable family, and is nearly allied to the house of Hyder. He was married to the sister of Tippoo, and his sons are at this moment living at Seringapatam, on a pension which they receive from the British government. Under these circumstances, Major Malcolm has recommended that I should relieve the Nabob's distresses by a gift of 5000 rupees. To this I have consented; but I have yet given nothing to the Nabob, nor have I made any promise of assistance to his servant.

In my opinion, even if the whole of this sum of money is given to the Nabob, it will be well laid out. At all events, his family is an object of charity; and, although not to such an extent as Major Malcolm now proposes, I relieved their distresses myself, when I was in this country in the year 1800.

In consequence of the general appearance of affairs, I have desired Col. Stevenson to move towards Punderpoor, if he should not have heard that Holkar is on his return to the southward, or that he meditates an attack upon the Nizam's territories to the northward.

If I should find Futtu Sing Maunia and Meer Khan go off to the northward, I shall turn that way also, as soon as I reach the main river, and shall not touch upon the Beemah. In that case, also, Col. Stevenson will turn to the northward; and we shall join upon the Beemah.

To Col. Stevenson. Camp at Hingomgauni, 20 m. N.E. from Mentch, 5th April, 1803.

I am now on my march towards Punderpoor, with a view of forming a junction with you. I have received your letter of the 28th. If you should not have received any intelligence of Holkar's return from the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, or of his threatening the Nizam's territories to the northward, you will be so kind to commence your march towards Punderpoor, to join me as soon as convenient, after you shall receive this letter. I propose to be at Punderpoor on the 11th; but, before I arrive there, it is probable that I may receive intelligence of the movements of Futtu Sing Maunia, which will enable me to turn at once to the northward. I shall, in that case, move immediately towards Jejoory; and I shall request you to direct your march upon that place.

I recommend that you should leave the Nizam's troops within the Nizam's territories, unless you should think it necessary to have them with you; and, at all events, that they should not cross the Beemah. They can march, in a separate column, up the river, as far as opposite Gardoon,

where you will turn to the northward. I must request you to preserve the most strict discipline among your troops, when in the Marhatta territory; and that you will take measures to make them pay for every thing. We have got on by these precautions.

The Nizam has accepted the proposition of Meer Khan to be taken into his service.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Pleulerleath, Hurryhur. Camp at Hingomgaum, 5th April, 1803.

It has been intimated, from head quarters, to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, that a party of recovered men belonging to corps in this detachment is on the way from Seringapatam to Hurryhur; and that you are also sufficiently recovered to enable you to proceed to join your corps, according to such route and instructions as the General might send to you. Major Gen. Wellesley, therefore, directs me to desire that you will take charge of all such recovered men, belonging to the Native corps in this detachment, as may have arrived at Hurryhur when you receive this letter, and also of such as may have recovered in the hospital there, and march them by the enclosed route to a post on the Kistna, near Erroor. It will be convenient, both for the supply of your party and for the encouragement of the brinjaries who may be following this detachment, if you can join with any large tandah of them, either by halting a few days till they collect, or by making one or two forced marches to overtake them, and the Major General authorises you to do so; but, as you may not have the opportunity, he authorises you to indent at Hurryhur for as much rice for the troops as will serve them till they shall arrive at Deogherry on the Werdah; to indent there for what will serve them to Sungoly on the Malpoorba; to indent there for what will serve them to Goorgherry on the Gutpurba; and to indent at that place for as much as will serve them to the post on the Kistna, near Erroor. The officers commanding at those several stations will order your indents to be complied with, upon your showing them this letter, and giving them extracts from it.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace, 71th regt. Camp at Hingomgaum, 6th April, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to inform you that sonbahdar Kader Nawaz Khan, who sent in serjeant Miller of the 71th from Tasgaum, has returned to camp, and informed him that the serjeant came of himself and claimed his protection, upon hearing of his arrival at Tasgaum, informing him that, having drunk some liquor in one of the Marhatta camps, he was conducted away by some of those people to Kolapoor, from whence the Rajah had sent him to join his troops, giving him 5 rupees for his expenses; but the people who were conducting him allowed him to be plundered of his clothes and money by some horsemen on the road. From the report of the sonbahdar, Major Gen. Wellesley is satisfied that serjeant Miller had no intention to desert, and therefore he requests you will order him to be released. He, at the same time, desires that you will explain to the regiment the danger which the men run by straying into the Marhatta camps, in the vicinity of this detachment; and that you will also give strict orders that they may not leave the lines of the detachment.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Nogeze, 7th April, 1803.

I hear that Futtay Sing Maunia and Meer Khan are about to join, and will then move off to the northward. They are about 12 coss from this camp. I have arranged with Major Malcolm that he is to give the Nabob of Savanore an order upon Mr. Piele for 5000 rupees, which he is to receive. This arrangement will save our funds here, and will be more convenient to the Nabob than any other could be.

I wish to have your directions regarding the mode in which I shall charge for the carriage of the tappall for this detachment. The peons who carry the letters are matchlock men, in Purneah's service: there are

5 of them at present at each station, and, as they were brought from the Mysore country early in March, they have been paid from the beginning of that month. You will observe that the arms in the hands of these runners, and an additional number at each stage beyond the usual proportion, are necessary in this country, in which every second man that is met is a soldier; and that it was but fair to pay the peons from the time that they were employed exclusively in our service. This, however, will make the expense greater than that of the army tappall, and much greater than the receipts. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting that I should charge the expense monthly, as an extraordinary, not provided for by the regulations, supported by the necessary vouchers. This appears to me to be a more simple mode than to have the bills sent with all their long explanation to the Postmaster general.

The company have arrived upon the Werdah, but they have no spare ammunition. It would be very convenient if 4 or 5 bullock loads could be sent to them from the army.

I have received from Col. Close a letter of the 28th March, which, however, contains no news. He had received a letter from me of the 18th, in which I detailed the plan according to which I proposed to proceed at Darwar, with which he was perfectly satisfied.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nogeze, 7th April, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 28th March. I am now upon my march towards the Beemah, with an intention of forming a junction with Col. Stevenson. When I arrived in the neighbourhood of Meritch, I found that Futty Sing Maunia, who had been upon the Kistna, and Meer Khan, who had been upon the Beemah, drew off, apparently with an intention to form a junction somewhere in the neighbourhood of Pundepoor. The march of Futty Sing made the chiefs on the Kistna easy regarding the safety of their possessions during their absence from them, and enabled me immediately to urge them to accompany me on my march towards Col. Stevenson; which was rendered more necessary, as Futty Sing and Meer Khan were about to join in his neighbourhood. I saw the probability that, when joined, they would draw off to the northward; but still they were not to be trusted, and my junction with Col. Stevenson was likely to insure the safety of both, and, eventually, the success of all our future operations.

Since forming the determination to effect this junction, and giving Col. Stevenson orders accordingly, I have received information that the Nizam has accepted Meer Khan's offers of service; that both he and Futty Sing are in full march to the northward; and you tell me that the Peshwah is in treaty with Futty Sing. By whatever route, therefore, I should approach Poonah, it is probable that Col. Stevenson and I could both be in safety; but I persevere in my march to the Beemah: 1st, because that route to Poonah is nearly as short as that by which I must have gone from the place where I heard of the change of circumstances which no longer rendered the junction necessary: 2ndly, because it is desirable that I should communicate immediately with Col. Stevenson, and form such an arrangement of our force as will provide for all probable events.

By this route I shall reach Poonah on the 23rd or 24th of this month; and I now proceed to communicate to you my ideas of the mode in which his Highness' march from Bassein to Poonah must be secured. He ought to leave Bassein on the 20th, so as to arrive at the ghauts about the 27th or 28th. I shall not stay at Poonah more than one day, because there is no forage there; and because I must approach the ghauts to cover his march, if the enemy should return from the northward in force to impede it; and, at all events, to send my cattle down to Panwell for my supplies. I shall arrive at the ghauts about the 27th or 28th. If Holkar should not return from the northward, and there should be no threatening appearance when I get farther to the northward, I do not propose to draw Col. Stevenson's corps to Poonah, or that the Nizam's army should pass his Highness' frontier. For the sake of forage, the troops must separate in some degree; at the same time that they may be so stationed as that they may join at short notice. The mode in which I should propose to station them, in that case, would be, the Nizam's corps of infantry and cavalry on his Highness' frontier, at the nearest point to Poonah; Col. Stevenson's corps in front of Jejoory, upon the Beemah; Col. Murray's at Poonah, with the Marhatta cavalry coming up with me; and my own division towards the ghauts.

By this disposition we shall subsist with ease: I shall be able to draw from Bombay the supplies we shall require; and we can form a junction of all our troops, if that measure should appear necessary. I have been joined by Goklah, by Appah Saheb, and one of his brothers, and the son of Baba Saheb of Meritch; Chintomeny Rao comes in this evening; by Bappojee Vittell; by Vittell Seo Deo's nephew, Narsing Kundee Rao; by Appah Dessaye; by Rubran Chowdy, and some others of inferior note.

Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, Gopal Rao Paunseh, Madhoo Rao Rastia, and Prittee Niddee, have not made their appearance. The latter sent me word that Futty Sing was plundering his jaghires; but I hinted to him that I had heard a report of the Peshwah having given orders, that the jaghires of those persons who had joined the enemy should be confiscated; and had said, that those only who should join this force would be in favor hereafter: I therefore imagine that I shall bring him in.

It is true that his Highness has given these orders, and has directed that the jaghires of such persons should be confiscated immediately; and that the revenues arising from them should be applied to the payment of the troops now with me. But it is impossible to take measures to carry these orders into execution, without spreading over the whole country, and employing his troops in confiscating jaghires, instead of in one uniform operation directed against the common enemy.

I observe what you say regarding slaughter cattle; and I will immediately put a stop to the killing of bullocks in this camp, which has continued to this time. Sheep, however, are but bad travellers in wet weather; and I must request of you to urge Mr. Duncan to have a large quantity of salt provisions prepared, as the best substitute for every thing else. I will send him down casks to pack it in, in proportion as I shall consume that which I have already.

I also observe what you say regarding Scindiah. I am in good marching

trim; and, if I can keep my cattle alive, I do not fear any confederacy that can be formed, after I shall once reach Poonah. We must, however, keep our southern jaghiredars in good humor; and upon this point I wish you to urge the Peshwah. I also suggest to you the propriety of altering the treaty with him thus far: viz. not to take any part of Savanore, but territory elsewhere, for obvious reasons referable to other chiefs. But, if that cannot be effected, it would be advisable, in settling what districts are to be ceded to us, to avoid touching any of their jaghires; and to urge the Peshwah to provide handsomely for Goklah, in lieu of the revenues of Savanore, which he will lose by the transfer to us of the countries not already given away in jaghire.

P. S. I enclose you a paper giving the dimensions of wheels wanted for 4 iron 12 pounders, respecting which I wish you to make some arrangements with Mr. Duncan. I shall also want 20 tumbril wheels.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Hutteer, 50 miles from Meritch, 8th April, 1803.

Appah Saheb called upon me last night, and told me that a carkoon had come in from Futty Sing Maunia, with proposals as follow: viz., 1st, that Futty Sing should be taken, with his troops, into our service; 2ndly, that a country should be allotted for their subsistence; 3rdly, that, if those propositions should not be accepted, he should be permitted to go wherever his fortune might lead him.

G. O.

Padshahgaum, Friday, 8th April, 1803.

As the detachment is now approaching districts which have been for some time past the stations of large bodies of cavalry, and which have been frequently plundered, it is probable that the supply of dry forage, which they can afford, will be but small and very difficult to be procured.

Major Gen. Wellesley therefore requests the heads of corps and departments, and the officers of the detachment in general, to urge their followers to cut the roots of the grass upon which alone the existence of the cattle depends. In order to enable them to procure this species of forage, Major Gen. Wellesley will allow tools to be issued from the stores in such proportions as may be required; but care must be taken of them, and they must be returned when wanted for other services.

The forage guards are not intended to be placed over forage in villages in order to secure it for any particular corps or individual. They are intended to go out with the foragers to purchase forage, to see that they commit no disorder, and pay for what they receive, and to oblige the people of the country to deliver what is wanted for payment. This practice of placing guards over forage to secure it for particular corps, or individuals, is therefore forbid, excepting by the heads of the following departments, viz. that of the agent for draught cattle, that of the commissary of provisions, and that of the grain agent general.

It is to be understood by the heads of all these departments that, if there should be any dry forage in, or in the neighbourhood of, the camp, the agent for draught cattle must have it, and the other guards must be withdrawn when his shall go to a village. Capt. Mackay, however, and all those heads of departments, are not to place their guards over more forage than their cattle can consume. The remainder is always to be at the disposal of the villagers, to be sold to whoever goes for it, and all the former orders respecting forage are still in force.

Capt. Hentland will give orders that an officer of pioneers sees that there is a clear road out of camp to the distance of at least one mile. Whenever, in consequence of the neglect to make a good passage over a ravine or nullah, or to remove any impediment, the wheel carriages shall be delayed within the camp, or in the distance of one mile from it, Major Gen. Wellesley will consider the officer of pioneers responsible, whose duty it will have been to see that there is a good road.

The corps in the 5th brigade to send each 2 carpenters, 2 smiths, 2 hammermen, and 2 bellows boys, with their tools, to the park immediately, to repair the carts in the medical department.

The abstracts of the 1st batt. 8th regt. Native infantry having been examined, the pay of that corps is to be received this afternoon.

I desired that he might be referred to the Peshwah for an answer to his propositions; and that, until he should receive that answer, he should go off with his troops to the northward of Poonah, and there wait the Peshwah's orders. The carkoon was called in afterwards, and I encouraged him to continue the negotiation, which I had understood, from Lieut. Col. Close, that the Peshwah's durbar had already commenced with him.

It appears, by this man's account, that Fatty Sing is an adventurer, with a body of Hindustanee troops, amounting, as he says, to 40,000, but really about 10,000, with some guns; and is ready, avowedly, to serve any person who is willing to pay him. The result of the communication of last night is, that he is going off from my front; but whether he will enter the service of the Peshwah, or not, depends upon his sense of the ability and will of the Peshwah to pay him, or to afford plunder for his troops.

Meer Khan, as well as Fatty Sing, is drawing off.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Hutteer, 8th April, 1803.

As I find that, as I advance, Fatty Sing Maunia and Meer Khan draw off to the northward, I propose not to go to Punderpoor, which is 2 or 3 marches out of my road. I shall, however, strike upon the Beemah at Nursingpoor, the place where that river and the Necra join; and I beg that you will direct your route upon the same place. I shall be at Nursingpoor on the 13th or 14th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hutteer, 8th April, 1803.

After I had written to you yesterday, Appah Saheb called upon me, and told me that a carkoon had come to him from Fatty Sing Maunia, with certain propositions to the following effect: The 1st was, that he should be taken into our service. The 2nd, that countries should be allotted for the subsistence of his army. The 3rd, that, if these two propositions were not accepted, he should be allowed to depart, and go wherever his fortunes should lead him.

I referred him to the Peshwah for an answer regarding his proposals for service; and I begged that he would retire to the countries beyond Poonah, till he should be made acquainted with the Peshwah's decision regarding his proposals. The carkoon was called in, and he said that Fatty Sing was ready to serve any body who would provide for the subsistence of his troops; and that, as I had not accepted his proposals, he should seek his fortune elsewhere. I encouraged him to offer himself to the Peshwah; and as, by your account, his Highness' durbar had already had communications with him, it is probable that, having failed here, he will bring to a close his negotiation with his Highness.

Appah Saheb pressed strongly upon me the situation of Vittell Seo Deo and his troops. The countries allotted for their subsistence are in Hindustan, and have been destroyed by Holkar, in consequence of the attachment of Vittell Seo Deo to the Peshwah's cause, and his services to his Highness. The distresses of these troops appear to be very great; and it is an object of the utmost consequence that some steps should be immediately taken for their relief. In case measures should not be provided

by the government of Bombay to feed the Europeans coming up the ghauts with the Peshwah, and if these troops are to be fed by my departments, it will be necessary to add to my establishment of servants in the provision departments; and I enclose a list of servants, artificers, &c., which I request you to urge Mr. Duncan to send to me. I shall write to him fully, upon this and other points, as soon as I can get upon the tappall road.

To Lieut. Col. Munro.

Camp at Hutteer, 8th April, 1803.

As it is possible that the service on which I am employed may last after the rivers shall fill, it is necessary that I should make arrangements for having boats upon all of them. I have accordingly written to Purneah, and to Mr. Read, to have some prepared in Mysore and in Soonda; and I must request you to have 20 basket boats made in the Ceded districts. They should be of the size of 10 feet diameter, and 3 feet deep, and I wish that they may be covered with double leather. The leathers ought to be sewed with thong, and of such a size as to cover the gunnels of the boats all round. I intend that your boats should be upon the Malpoorba, respecting which I will write to you hereafter. Besides boats, I shall want boatmen, of which your districts ought to furnish a large proportion. Purneah says, that, when he managed Harponelly, that district in particular furnished a large number of people of this description. The total number that I shall want is 300, of which Soonda can give only 20; Mysore, I suppose, about 100; and I must depend upon you for the remainder.

The pay which I have given the boatmen is one gold fanam for every day they do not work, and two gold fanams for every day they do; this money paid daily, if they choose it. Let me know how many people of this description you can send me for this pay. You will see, by the date of this letter, that I have lost no time; and I am still in high style. I am now moving towards the Nizam's frontier, to facilitate a communication with Col. Stevenson, and eventually our junction. As I advance, Futty Sing and Meer Khan fall back, and I meet with no opposition. I expect to be at Poonah some time about the 20th.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Kowaspoor, 10th April, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 1st, by which I observe that you have not got the key of the cipher. It is, therefore, more than probable that you will not have been able to read the orders which I sent you on the 5th, and the 8th inst., to desire you to march towards Punderpoor, and afterwards to march towards Nursingpoor, at the junction of the Neera and Beemah, and to meet me there on the 13th. If you should have received the cipher, and those letters, you will, of course, have com-

G. O.

Camp at Nasera, Saturday, 9th April, 1803.

The frequent mistakes made by the guards, ordered for securing forage for the draught bullocks, by their going to Capt. Mackay's tent, when they ought to go to the marching flank, having rendered it impossible for those guards to be of any service sometimes two days out of three, Major Gen. Wellesley will in future hold the adjutants of the corps, whose duty it may be to furnish that guard, answerable for its repairing, in due time, to its proper station.

menced your march; and, probably, will now be near Punderpoor, or Nursingpoor, and you will continue to your destination. If you should not have been able to read those orders, and, of course, have not obeyed them, then I request you, upon the receipt of this letter, to commence your march to Gardoon, on the Beemah, at which place you will hear further from me.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Kowaspoor, 11th April, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 30th and 31st March, and the 2nd inst.; and I have delivered, to the different sirdars, the letters enclosed in the former.

About a month ago, the vakeels of Appah Saheb made a proposition to me, regarding Muraba Furnavees, which I did not exactly comprehend, and to which I then gave no answer, but referred the subject to Malcolm. It was, that he might be received under the Company's protection, and that he might be allowed to retire from Poonah whenever he might think proper. At a subsequent meeting, the vakeels were told that he might come to camp, where he should remain in safety; that endeavors would be made to reconcile the Peshwah towards him; and that, if they should not succeed, he should be permitted to go wherever he pleased. The groundwork of this engagement was the probability that this man would be useful to the cause of the Peshwah and ourselves. But he certainly might do it an injury; and there did not appear any objection to placing him in the situation in which we found him: that is to say, at liberty to go where he pleased, if the Peshwah should not be reconciled to him.

Three weeks elapsed without hearing more of Muraba Furnavees, when I heard that he was arrived at Meritch; and it was even reported that he was in camp. About the same time, a few days ago, Bappojee Vittell, the Peshwah's officer, came to me, and told me that the Peshwah had given him directions that Muraba Furnavees should be arrested, and given over to his charge. I then desired Muraba not to come here, as I found that the Peshwah was so much irritated against him, that he had desired that he might be arrested; and it was therefore probable that his Highness would never be induced to pardon him. At all events, it was not proper that I should receive, in my camp, a person respecting whom the Peshwah had given orders that he might be arrested. He is now gone to the northward.

Appah Saheb sent to me yesterday, to inform me that, when we should arrive at Poonah, he should desire to take leave, as he could not meet the Peshwah. The causes of his wish not to meet his Highness are, the Peshwah's conduct towards him upon the subject of the Rajah of Kola-poor, and his general fears of the Peshwah's suspicious and jealous disposition. I told his vakeels, that there was plenty of time to take into consideration this determination; and that I hoped he would not so far forget his own interest as to take such a step in a hurry. The result of the conversation was a promise, on their part, to endeavor to alter his intentions; but they said that they thought I should have most influence over him.

When I sent Appah Saheb the Peshwah's letter, enclosed in yours of the 30th, I told his vakeels that I understood, from you, that the Peshwah

was very desirous to be reconciled to their master; and that that letter would probably contain some expressions of friendship, which would be agreeable to him. They informed me, yesterday, that the letter was no more than a copy of the first, sent to desire him to join me, and in the same terms as that written to every other sirdar. The departure of this man from Poonah would be a severe blow upon us; and you may, therefore, rely upon my exerting all the influence I may have over him to induce him to stay. In truth, excepting his family, and those under his influence, and Goklah, and one of the Peshwah's officers, Bappojee Vittell, not a soul has joined this detachment; although all have been repeatedly written to, and places have been appointed for their junction, to which they have promised to come.

There can be no doubt but that the establishment of our influence at Poonah will be highly disagreeable to the majority of the Marhatta chiefs, and that it will interfere materially with the interests of some, and the objects of ambition of all. It may be expected that it will be opposed by the more powerful of the members of the Marhatta States; and, upon the whole, it is clear that, in this crisis of Marhatta affairs, all means of conciliation ought to be adopted by the Peshwah, to reconcile as many of his servants as possible to the new system introduced into the government. It would appear, however, from the Peshwah's conduct, either that he does not feel the nature of his situation in this respect, or that, feeling it, he is indifferent to it. There are some instances of his conduct, as it affects those who are serving him in concert with us, which appear rather extraordinary. One is his having sent a man, by name Soobarow Mooty, to seize the talooks of Savanore and Darwar, and to collect the revenues of them: thus depriving Goklah of the only means of paying his army; and, at all events, creating a disturbance in those countries, in which it is so material to us to maintain tranquillity. This Soobarow Mooty is the man who was in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, from which he was turned out by your desire, in consequence of his having had improper communications with Holkar, at Poonah. I have him in this camp, where he shall remain till we get to Poonah.

Another instance is his employment of the Rajah of Kolapoor to seize the person of Muraba Furnavees, who, he says, in the letter he writes upon that subject, is with the Putwurdun, near Meritch. Will the art of man be able to convince the Putwurdun of this one fact, that the Peshwah will reconcile with them, and will make a reasonable arrangement of their affairs with the Rajah of Kolapoor?

Another extraordinary instance of counteraction in the Peshwah, is his order to, the only servant he has here, Bappojee Vittell, to seize the jaghires of all those who have joined Holkar. This may be a very proper measure at any other time; but the consequence of carrying it into execution at present would be the separation from this detachment of every Marhatta horseman that now accompanies it; and, if they once separate from us, I do not think them likely to join again. I mention these circumstances to you, because I think that, in your arduous situation, you ought to be made acquainted with every thing. In the present state of the Peshwah's government, he must be considered as engaged in a civil

war, in which there can be but two descriptions of persons, loyalists and rebels. The general effect of his measures ought to be to increase the numbers, and to bring forward the services, of the former, which, particularly as his government is to be re-established by strangers, can be done only by extraordinary conciliation. You know best whether his disposition is of a kind to adopt this mode.

I have already written to you fully respecting our junction with you. Col. Stevenson has not got the cipher; and, therefore, I am afraid that he will not have been able to read the orders which I sent him to join me at Nursingpoor, at the junction of the Beemah and Neera rivers, on the day after to-morrow. In case he should not have been able to read my former orders, I have sent him directions to march to Gardoon.

P. S. I enclose a memorandum upon an important subject, which I beg you to give to Mr. Duncan, and request him to have the measures proposed carried into execution.

Memorandum respecting boats, &c., for bridges.

1. In the present state of our affairs, it is possible that the troops stationed in the territories of the Peshwah, and on the frontiers of the Nizam, may be under the necessity of carrying on military operations at an early period after their arrival in the neighbourhood of Poonah. The western rains will have set in in the month of May, and the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will fill in June; and, although to carry on military operations in that season is attended with some inconveniences, I conceive that it is also attended by advantages to our troops, particularly if they possess the power of passing the rivers, which the superior knowledge of European nations in the art of war has brought to the highest state of perfection.

2. When a force shall be stationed at Poonah, there will be a complete chain across the Peninsula, of which Bombay must be considered the point of support. The junction of the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah, with what Bombay could afford, would effectually oppose the invasion of the Deccan by any of the powers of Hindustan. But, in order to do this with success, it is necessary that they should collect, at least as soon as the powers of Hindustan commence to approach the Nerbudda; and this can be done only by the use of the superior European mode of crossing the numerous rivers, during the rains, which intersect this part of the Peninsula.

3. The operations, therefore, which it may be necessary to carry on during the approaching rains, and, at all events, the efficiency of the forces to be stationed at Hyderabad and Poonah, and their support by Bombay, require that a pontoon establishment should be formed immediately at that Presidency.

4. The cheapest mode of forming this establishment would be at once to make the pontoons which it might be expected would be required for the service; but it is necessary that something of this kind should be proposed immediately, and there is not time for the construction of the pontoons on that plan which has been most approved. It appears, however, that, by incurring a trifling expense, a substitute can be found at Bom-

bay; and that the troops in this country will have all the advantages of a pontoon establishment, even in this season, should the operations take place which I think possible.

5. I shall now proceed to detail the substitute which I would propose for pontoons; the mode in which they ought to be fitted up; the stores, &c., which ought to be prepared for a bridge of boats; and the establishment which ought to be formed for it. I shall afterwards point out the mode in which I propose it should be carried.

6. There are, in all parts of the coast of Malabar, boats cut out from the solid teak trees, flat bottomed, and with sharp prows: they are to be found, also, of all dimensions. These would answer, if they could be obtained of that size which is most approved of for pontoons, or of one nearly approaching to it. That size is as follows:

	Feet.	Inches.
Greatest length	21	0
Length at bottom	16	8
Width within	3	11
Width at bottom	3	5
Depth	2	1

But if they cannot be procured of that size, I shall be satisfied with them if of 18 feet long, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet broad; but the greatest possible breadth, and the length as above stated, is desirable. It is necessary, however, that they should be all of the same length, and nearly of the same breadth, and of the same height. They ought, also, to be painted or stained with the oil used for Patamar boats, in order to preserve them from the sun and weather.

There ought to be 40 of these boats. For each boat there ought to be the following stores: 4 beams, called baulks, 22 feet 8 inches long, 1 foot wide, and 4 inches thick; 1 gang board, 22 feet long, 1 foot wide, and $2\frac{1}{4}$ inches thick; 10 planks, 12 feet long, 2 feet wide, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ inch thick; 1 oar; 1 anchor; 1 graplin; 4 iron bolts, with keys; 4 binding sticks; 4 spring lines; 4 fascines; 4 pickets; 1 cable; 1 sheer line; 1 pontoon carriage. With this memorandum goes a paper, which will point out the mode in which a bridge of boats is made; and, consequently, that in which the beams above mentioned should be prepared for being bolted together, and that in which the planks should be prepared to be laid upon the beams.

7. Besides these stores, there ought to be two 5 inch cables, each of 500 yards in length.

8. There ought to be the following establishment for these boats: 1 officer of the corps of engineers; 1 bridge master; 1 European conductor; 6 carpenters; 6 smiths; 6 hammermen; 6 bellows boys; 80 harbour or river lascars.

9. The common mode of carrying pontoons in Europe is on a 2 wheeled carriage, on which is placed the pontoon, and within it all its stores. That mode of carriage, however, is inconvenient; and would not answer, particularly in this country, in which all carriages are drawn by bullocks. The carriages, therefore, for these boats ought to be on 4 wheels.

10. That which would answer best, and would be most easily prepared, would be one made of the old axletrees and wheels of common brass 6

and 12 pounder gun carriages: 2 of these ought to be joined together by a perch. A bed for the boat ought to be fixed on each axletree; that on the front axletree being made so high as to permit the wheels to traverse under the boat, when it should be required to turn the carriage: this bed, on the fore axletree, ought to be fixed by a pin in the centre, on which it should turn.

11. The common calculation of the weight of a pontoon, with its equipment, is 1200 lbs. I am not certain of the weight of one of the boats which I have above pointed out as a substitute, but I imagine they may be about 300 or 400 lbs. In that case, one of these carriages may be able to carry 2 of these boats, with their equipment; but, upon this point, those who will fit them out will be the best judges. I have only to observe, that the carriages ought not to bear a greater weight than 1200 or 1300 lbs.

12. It is recommended, that, as soon as the boats can be procured, and the machinery completed, the bridge should be fitted in the strong tideway in Bombay harbour, between the shore and a vessel moored.

Memorandum on the manner of laying a bridge of boats across a river.

The bank on each side, where the ends of the bridge are to be, must be made solid and firm by means of fascines, or otherwise. One end of the cable must be carried across the river, and, being fixed to a picket, or to any thing firm, must be drawn tight across where the heads of the boats are to be ranged.

The boats are to be then launched, having on board each 2 men, with the necessary ropes, &c.; and are floated down the stream, under the cable to which they are lashed endwise, by the rings and small ropes at equal distances, and about their own breadth asunder, more or less, according to the strength required.

If the river be very rapid, a second cable must be stretched across it, parallel to the first, and at the distance of the length of the boats, and to which the other ends of the boats must be lashed. The spring lines are then lashed diagonally from one boat to the other, to brace them tight; and the anchors, if necessary, carried out up the stream, and fixed to the cable, or sheer line, across the river. One of the chesses, or planks, is then laid on the edge of the bank, at each end of the bridge, bottom up, which serves to lay the ends of the baulks or beams upon; (it appears that the beams ought to lay in lines across the boats, from one end of the bridge to the other, and must be bolted together in such manner as to allow of fixing them in that mode;) and as a direction for placing them at the proper distances, to fit the chesses or planks that cover the bridge.

The baulks should be then laid across the boats, and keyed together, their numbers proportioned to the strength required in the bridge. If the gang boards are laid across the heads and sterns of the boats, from one side of the river to the other, they will give the men a footing for doing the rest of the work. Across the baulks are laid the chesses, one after another, the edges to meet, (the chesses, or planks, must have laths nailed upon them, in such manner as to form 4 grooves, to receive the 4 beams

on which the planks are to be laid,) and baulks running between the cross pieces on the under side of the chesses. The gang boards are then laid across the ends of the chesses, on each edge of the bridge.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Kowaspoor, 11th April, 1803.

I did hope to be joined by Col. Stevenson on the day after to-morrow, according to the orders I had sent him to that purport; but I received a letter from him last night, of the 8th, by which I learnt that, on that day, he had not received the cipher from Hyderabad. A letter from me, in cipher, had reached him on the 1st; so that I am in great hopes still, that, if he then wrote to Hyderabad for the cipher, he will have received it soon after he wrote to me on the 8th: lest, however, he should not, I have sent a party of horse to him, with a letter, to desire him to march to Gardoon, to which place I shall send him further orders.

I have no news. Holkar appears to be in full march to Chandore. Futtu Sing and Meer Khan cross the Beemah this day, I believe, to follow him. All his troops are withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Poonah, in which city, however, Amrut Rao still remains, with about 2000 horse, and 2000 infantry, with guns. I shall be at Poonah about the 20th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Aklooss, on the Neera, 13th April, 1803.

Appah Saheb called upon me on the evening of the 11th, to apprise me of his intention to ask to take leave, as soon as we should arrive in the neighbourhood of Poonah. All possible arguments were urged to induce him to remain, and meet the Peshwah, to which he did not pretend to give an answer; but merely said that he had made a vow that he would not meet his Highness, till his affairs with the Kolapoor Rajah were settled. Upon being told that he could not expect that any measures would be taken in his favor, if he did not come forward heartily in the present crisis, he said that he was sorry for it, and that he must submit to his fate. Never did I see a man so obstinate, and so little able to bring forward even pretences to justify his obstinacy. His vakeels declare that he is obstinate, that he really feels what he says, and they have desired me to urge him to alter this intention. I rather suspect, however, that he has expressed this desire to take leave, either in order that we may press the Peshwah to settle his affairs with the Rajah of Kolapoor, or in consequence of some arrangement made with Muraba Furnavees. Appah Saheb and his brother had a meeting with this man, which lasted all night, at which nobody else was present, and nobody knows what passed.

I am now 7 marches from Poonah. Stevenson ought to be this day at the junction of the Beemah and Neera, 8 miles from here.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Sarhatty, on the Neera, 14th April, 1803.

I was in hopes that I should have been joined by Col. Stevenson this day, as he is but a short distance from me; but the baggage of his division was misled yesterday by accident, and he is obliged to halt for it. He will be here, however, to-morrow. I have heard, from the Peshwah's vakeel at Sattarah, that Futtu Sing Maunia has settled his affairs with the Peshwah, and is gone into his Highness' service. I believe it to be true,

although that chief and Meer Khan went off together from this place, towards Poonah, 5 days ago.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sarhatty, 14th April, 1803.

The heat of the weather, and the badness of the roads, destroy my wheels, particularly those of my tumbrils. I shall, therefore, be obliged to you if you will apply to the government of Bombay for 40 wheels for tumbrils, instead of 20, for which I before asked. It is possible, however, there may be no wheels at Bombay, and that we must repair those we have got. In that case we shall require all the seasoned timber stated in the enclosed paper. At all events, we shall require a large portion of it for cart and gun wheels, and for tumbril wheels, which I know cannot be replaced at Bombay. It would be very convenient, also, if we could have a few artificers from Bombay, for a short time.

I was in hopes that Col. Stevenson would have joined me this day, but an accident has misled his baggage, and he was obliged to halt for it: I hope, however, that it will have joined him this morning, in which case he will be here to-morrow. I shall still be at Poonah on the day I told you. This timber might be sent up by coolies. I have no news.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Aklooss and Sarhatty, 15th April, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that Col. Stevenson came to this camp this morning. His detachment is encamped near the junction of the Beemah and Neera rivers, and would have joined, only that, owing to a mistake, their baggage missed the road on the 13th, and had not joined till late yesterday evening. The Scotch brigade, with a third part of the provisions, remaining with this detachment, will join Col. Stevenson's detachment to-morrow morning.

The next objects of my attention are to secure the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to Poonah, and to open a communication with the coast, so as to draw from thence the supplies which I may require. I have already arranged with Lieut. Col. Close a plan for the Peshwah's march; and, in order to secure the execution of it, I shall move immediately towards Poonah, and from thence towards the Bhore ghaut. I shall reach the head of the ghaut before the Peshwah will be at the foot of it.

Holkar himself is near Chandore, about 300 miles from Poonah, and the officers and troops in his service have all followed in the same direction. Amrut Rao alone remains at Poonah with about 1500 men, and I have no doubt but that he also will go off as I shall advance. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to me to be unnecessary to bring to Poonah all the troops; and as the country is much exhausted, and there is but little forage in any place, I have thought it best to dispose of them in such situations as that the whole will procure forage and subsistence, and they may join with facility and celerity in case that measure should appear to be advisable. Accordingly, I have desired Col. Stevenson to march from his present position up the Beemah to Gardoon; to leave near that place, within the Nizam's frontier, all his Highness' troops; and to place himself, with the Company's troops, farther up that river towards Poonah, near its junction with the Moota Moola.

Hereafter, when the Peshwah shall have arrived at Poonah, and I have received supplies from Bombay, it will be equally convenient and consistent with the safety of all the troops to make a movement to the eastward, and to place more of them within the Nizam's frontier; and I shall, accordingly, adopt this measure when circumstances will permit it.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Aklooss and Sarhatty, 15th April, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Col. Stevenson came over here from his camp this morning, and the Scotch brigade will join him tomorrow. I have written to the Adj. Gen. this day upon the subject of my future operations, in which letter you will observe a detail of the line of march which Col. Stevenson will take.

The proceedings of a General Court Martial go this day to Major Pierce, as Judge Advocate, on a sepoy for desertion. I am sorry to have to inform you that this crime has been very common lately, particularly in Col. Chalmers's corps, to which that sepoy belongs, and in Col. Orrock's. The former has lost 80 men since the 15th of last month, and the latter 33 since the 1st of this month. I therefore think it desirable that the sentence on this sepoy should be carried into execution.

I have heard that Meer Khan, having learned that Futtu Sing Maunia had made his bargain with the Peshwah, and had sent his family, with a body of horse, towards Sattarah, attacked his camp, plundered it, and took Futtu Sing prisoner. His infantry, however, had got off, and had been taken into the service of the Peshwah by his ladies at Poonah, who had even supplied them with money. Meer Khan, after this feat, went off to the northward, with some degree of precipitation. I believe the principal facts of this story to be true.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Aklooss, on the Neera, 15th April, 1803.

I should have written to you before now, only that I had no direct mode of communicating with you, and I knew that Major Malcolm, who has accompanied me, wrote to you daily.

I have now the pleasure to inform you, that I joined Col. Stevenson this day, and have reinforced the detachment under his command by the Scotch brigade. I have advanced thus far without the smallest opposition. I have been joined by some of the Marhatta jaghiredars of the southern countries, principally those who served, in the year 1800, with the British troops under my command; and by some of the sirdars who quitted the Peshwah by his Highness' desire, when he fled from Mhar; others, of both descriptions, are expected, and I know that some are on their road to join.

As I have advanced, Meer Khan and Futtu Sing Maunia, the former of whom, with other Patan chiefs, was on the Nizam's frontier, and the latter, with other Marhatta chiefs, towards Meritch, have gradually fallen back. They joined their forces near this place, and marched 5 days ago towards Poonah. I hear that Futtu Sing Maunia, who offered himself to me, has made an arrangement with the Peshwah. I have this account from the Peshwah's vakeel at Sattarah, the person, I believe, who concluded the arrangement. Whether Futtu Sing has made this arrangement

or not, it is very obvious that he does not think himself equal to cope with either of the British detachments, even when joined by Meer Khan. It is, therefore, probable that the two chiefs will continue to draw off as I shall advance towards Poonah; and at last, if they should not have quitted Holkar's service, that they will retire entirely with Amrut Rao, who is still at Poonah.

My plan of operations now is to bring the Peshwah up the ghauts; to receive from Bombay the supplies of provisions which are necessary for the troops, and which have been prepared; and, while I am effecting these objects, to keep the troops in such situations as that they will procure forage, and can join with ease and celerity, in case an attack should be threatened from the northward. With this view, I have desired Col. Stevenson to leave the Nizam's troops on the Beemah, within the Nizam's frontier, and they will move on towards Gardoon, where they will remain. The Colonel, with his detachment, will be either upon the Beemah or the Kurrah river, about 2 or 3 marches from the Nizam's troops, and the same distance from Poonah, and I shall be in that neighbourhood. By this disposition we shall all get forage, and shall subsist with ease; at the same time that we shall be able to join at any point which may be threatened.

I beg that, in case you should think it necessary to acquaint the Nizam's ministers of this disposition, you will do me the favor to inform them that I shall pay due attention to the safety of the Nizam's frontier. As soon as the Peshwah shall have reached Poonah, and I shall have received the supplies which I require, it will be consistent with the general objects in view, and with the safety of the troops, to make a movement of all these bodies to their right, and thus to bring more of them into the Nizam's territories. In the mean time, I do not think there is any reason to apprehend that they will be attacked.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Aklooss, 15th April, 1803.

You will be desirous to hear from me, and to receive my opinion of the state of our military affairs in this country; and I take the earliest opportunity of writing to you, afforded by the junction of the Nizam's army. My march to this place has been unopposed, and I have received from the country all the assistance which it could afford. I have been joined by some of the southern jaghiredars, and of the Peshwah's officers, who quitted him, by his desire, at Mhar, after he had fled from Poonah; but there are many of both descriptions still absent. The jaghiredars who have joined are principally those who served with the troops under my command in the campaign of 1800; and the sirdars are those lately raised by the Peshwah to high offices in the state from very inferior situations. In all it is easy to observe a want of attachment to the cause of the Peshwah; but, particularly in the jaghiredars, I have observed not only a want of attachment and zeal, but a detestation of his person, and an apprehension of his power, founded upon a long series of mutual injuries.

None of these persons have ever hinted to me the nature of our engagements with the Peshwah, or their sentiments upon them: as, however, these engagements may affect the interests of some, and the objects of ambition of all, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they view them

with jealousy. I am far from thinking, however, that if, in consequence of these engagements, we should be attacked by any thing like a confederacy of the greater Marhatta powers, we shall have to carry on this contest unassisted by these chiefs; but the number of those who will assist us, and the degree of assistance which they may give, will depend much upon the Peshwah.

We have, undoubtedly, an influence over those chiefs, one which is daily increasing, to which I attribute our successful progress to this moment. This influence is founded, in some degree, upon their fear of our power, but much more upon their hope of our support in forwarding their views, and of our protection against the violence and oppression of their own government, and the greater Marhatta powers. Here we must depend upon the personal character of the Peshwah, and upon the manner in which the new treaty will work: upon which points I shall defer to write any thing until I am better informed.

Having brought up my corps thus far, and effected a junction with the Nizam's army, it is my intention to march to Poonah, which place I shall reach about the 20th, and then to bring up the Peshwah from Bassein. I have already arranged a plan for this purpose, which I have sent to Col. Close, according to which, the Peshwah will ascend the ghauts about the 28th. Holkar himself has gone towards Chandore, about 200 miles from Poonah, and his detachments, under Futty Sing and Meer Khan, which were, the former near Meritch, and the latter on the Nizam's frontier, near Beejapoor, have fallen back gradually as I advanced. They joined at this place, and went off towards Poonah 5 days ago.

You will have heard of Futty Sing's treating with the Peshwah, and Meer Khan's treating with the Nizam, to enter into the service of those Princes respectively. Futty Sing offered himself to me. I referred him to the Peshwah; and I heard last night, from the Peshwah's vakeel at Sattarah, who, I believe, conducted this treaty, that all matters between the Peshwah and Futty Sing were arranged. If, however, they should not be so, and these chiefs should still continue in Holkar's service, I conclude that they will fall back still farther as I advance to Poonah; and that they will take with them Amrut Rao, who is still in that city with a small force. I intend, therefore, at present, to dispose of the troops between the ghauts and the Nizam's frontier in such a manner as that all will find forage and subsistence; and that, if there should be any appearance of an attack, the whole may form and protect the part menaced without loss of time. The question, whether the supposed confederacy will be formed, and whether we shall have to contend with it, ought to be brought to a decision as soon as possible:

1st. Because, if we are to have a war, we shall carry it on with great advantage during the rainy season.

2ndly. Because we are ready, and the supposed enemy are not; and every day's delay after this time is an unnecessary increase of expense to us, and an advantage to them.

3rdly. Because we shall immediately ascertain the views and intentions of the Peshwah regarding the alliance in general; and we shall leave no time for intrigues among the jaghiredars in his and our interest.

4thly. Because nothing but our determined and early opposition to the confederacy can save us from it, supposing it to exist. To withdraw from our engagements with the Peshwah will rather accelerate its attack, with the addition of the Peshwah's force.

In order to bring this question to a decision, the Peshwah should be urged immediately (if possible before he should arrive at Poonah) to desire Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda. This chief ought at the same time to be pressed upon this point by our minister at his camp; and all the screws, menaces, &c., might be brought to bear upon him, upon his Frenchmen, and upon the Rajah of Berar.

If Scindiah should cross the Nerbudda, and our minister is kept in his camp, we shall know upon what to depend. We ought immediately to break up our army in this country, taking care to have at Bombay a sufficient number of Europeans to reinforce the Poonah detachment, whenever their services shall be required, and to keep our north-west frontier of Mysore and the Ceded districts in strength. My reasons for thinking that the army here ought to be broke up, if Scindiah goes across the Nerbudda, are:

1st. That it does not weaken us, because the same number of Native troops as we have at present will be at Poonah; we shall have the Europeans and train of ordnance at Bombay, to join the Poonah detachment; and the cavalry in the Ceded districts can always join the Hyderabad detachment in a short time.

2ndly. Because the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah, thus reinforced, can join as soon as Scindiah shows an intention to cross the Nerbudda.

3rdly. Because, by breaking up the army, and leaving nothing more at Poonah than the usual detachment, the jealousy of our strength will cease in a great degree, and we may then see in what manner the new treaty will work.

I think it probable that a system of menace towards Scindiah, his Frenchmen, and the Rajah of Berar, will put a stop to the negotiations for the formation of the confederacy, to which there are already many natural obstacles, particularly as we and the Nizam are prepared, and already in the field. But if Scindiah should refuse to give an unequivocal symptom of his good intentions by retiring across the Nerbudda, I can have no doubt of the confederacy; and, for the reasons I have above stated, we ought to attack it without loss of time. The operations in this event will be of a nature so general, that it is difficult to give an opinion concerning them. The battle must be fought either on the Nizam's frontier, or near Poonah, by these troops; but the impression which will put an end to the contest, like that which will prevent the confederacy, must be made from the northern frontier of Bengal, and from Midnapoor.

This letter is already of a greater length than I intended to make it, and contains a consideration of points which require a more detailed discussion than I can give them at present; but still, I think it is best to send it to you. Malcolm has apprised me of the reason for which you are anxious to bring these questions to a decision as soon as possible, of the validity of which I am fully sensible. But, exclusive of these reasons,

which must be conclusive to every friend of yours, those of a military nature, to which I have above alluded, are decisive.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nimbsakur, 16th April, 1803.

I received last night your letter of the 7th. I am glad to find that there is, in your opinion, so little chance of a combination. I agree entirely in opinion with you, and I wish sincerely that the gentleman at Hyderabad was of the same opinion, or, thinking differently, that he would keep his opinion concealed.

There is a report in camp that the Rajah of Berar is dead, which will certainly put an end to all thoughts of the combination which has been apprehended; although it may eventually occasion others which may give us equal or greater trouble.

I have written a letter to Amrut Rao, of which I enclose a copy: I shall also write a letter to Govind Rao Praunsepy, to apprise him of my approach, and to request him to inform the ladies thereof. Likewise to learn from them what guards they would wish to have in the city, on the day that the troops will encamp in the neighbourhood. I wrote to you fully respecting the march of the Peshwah, and shall say no more on that subject till I receive your answer.

Goklah's distresses press upon him very strongly, and I have some apprehension of the effect which the approaching departure of Appah Saheb may have upon him, as well as upon others. I have, therefore, in consequence of your letter, given him 10,000 rupees; but I shall give him no more, till I receive from you a positive request from the Peshwah to make him an advance.

You will have heard of the plunder of Futti Sing's camp by Meer Khan: the latter has marched off to the northward. As there remains in these parts at present no force of any consequence, I have directed the execution of that disposition of which I apprised you. Accordingly, Col. Stevenson, who was in my camp yesterday, and was joined by the Scotch brigade, marches up the Beemah, with the Nizam's troops, on the left bank of that river. They will halt within their own frontier, opposite Gardoon; and the Colonel will move on with the Company's troops to his station, which will be somewhere below the junction of the Beemah with the Moota Moola. He will arrive there much about the same time that I shall arrive at Poonah.

I enclose a list of medicines wanted for the troops, which I request you to apply for: they must be sent up by coolies. The sheep contract will answer well.

To Lt. Gen. Stuart. Somergaum, junction of the Neera and Kurrah, 17th April, 1803.

I received last night your letter of the 10th. As I observe you have not received regular information from Lieut. Col. Close since the 22nd March, I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from him, since that date, which contain any thing of importance; a practice which I shall continue till I shall hear from you that you receive regular intelligence from Lieut. Col. Close.

The dispatch from Lieut. Col. Collins, of the 25th March, is very im

portant and satisfactory. You will observe the communication to Lord Wellesley of the intention of burning Poonah. With a view to prevent the execution of this plan, I have written a very civil letter to Amrut Rao, to announce my approach, in which I have stated that I shall take measures to ensure the safety and tranquillity of the city on my arrival there. I think it possible that this letter may draw from him an answer, and that he will send me a vakeel; and if he does, and remains at Poonah, I shall keep up the correspondence till I get within reach of Poonah with the cavalry, when I shall move forward briskly to prevent the execution of this horrible plan.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay. Camp, 4 miles W. from Baramootty, 18th April, 1803.

In a letter which I addressed to Mr. Duncan by desire of Lieut. Gen. Stuart, on the 20th Jan. last, I apprised him of the probable wants of the body of troops, which it was at that time expected would march from the frontiers of the territories of the Rajah of Mysore towards Poonah; and I requested him to give orders that preparations might be made at Bombay for supplying those wants.

I have now the honor to inform you that I have advanced thus far towards Poonah, in command of a detachment from the army, which it was heretofore supposed would enter the Marhatta territories; and that I shall immediately send bullocks to Poonah for loads from the different departments of the body of troops, according to the statement which follows hereafter. Grain department: 1700 bullocks for rice. Provision department: 500 bullocks for salt provisions; 200 bullocks for arrack, 20 casks, of 60 gallons each, to be filled with arrack. Gram department: 3000 bullocks for gram. Brinjarries: 10,000 bullocks for rice, 2000 for grain, 200 for wheat, 500 for salt. I have above mentioned the greatest number of bullocks which can be sent immediately from each department. As, however, the cattle have made an extraordinary long march in a short space of time, and in an unfavorable season, it is probable that the number which will be sent from each department will not amount to that above set down. But that will be a matter of immaterial consequence.

I propose to direct the heads of departments to indent upon the garrison storekeeper at Bombay for the number of loads for which cattle can be sent; specifying in the indent the contents of the loads, according to an account of the mode in which they will be prepared, which I have received from Capt. Moor. I shall countersign these indents; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will lay my request before the Hon. the Governor in Council, that the garrison storekeeper may receive orders to supply at Panwell all indents countersigned by me.

The brinjarries are a species of dealers who attend the armies with grain and other supplies, which they sell in the bazaars. In general, they seek for those supplies which are sold at the cheapest rate, and they bring them on their bullocks to the armies. Occasionally, however, these supplies have been issued to them from the public stores, as well by the Native, as by the Company's governments, at a cheap rate, and they are allowed to sell them at the usual rate of the camp bazaars. It would not

be reasonable to expect that the brinjarries who attend this camp would return in such time as to be at all useful to this body, if they were to go to Mysore to procure fresh supplies; and as this country is exhausted, and at all events does not produce rice, which is the ordinary consumption in the camps of the Company's armies, it will be necessary to issue rice and other supplies to the brinjarries from the stores collected at Bombay. Indeed, I requested Mr. Duncan to collect this store with a view to this issue.

The mode in which the issues of supplies to the brinjarries ought to be regulated is as follows. The superintendent of bazaars ought to give the gomastah of the brinjarries an order upon the stores for the quantities of the different species of supplies required. The gomastah will accompany the brinjarries to the stores, and will pass his receipt in duplicate for the quantity received. One copy of the receipt ought to remain with the garrison storekeeper, to form, together with the order of the superintendent of bazaars, his voucher for the issue; and the other copy ought to be forwarded to the superintendent, to enable him to recover from the brinjarries the price of the supplies in proportion as they shall dispose of them. The superintendent then becomes responsible to government for the price which may be settled for each article of supplies, thus issued upon receipts to the brinjarries.

If the Governor in Council should approve of this mode of regulating the issue of supplies to the brinjarries from the public stores at Bombay, I have to request he will give orders to the garrison storekeeper to issue whatever may be required upon an order signed by Capt. Barclay, the superintendent of supplies, taking from the gomastah of brinjarries a receipt for the same in duplicate; one copy of which is to be forwarded to Capt. Barclay in camp, the other to remain with the garrison storekeeper, to form, together with Capt. Barclay's order, his vouchers for the issue.

I shall hereafter lay before the Governor in Council an account of the prices at which I may be able to agree with the brinjarries that they shall take these supplies; and I shall request his orders regarding the mode in which the money received from them is to be disposed of.

I have transmitted to the Resident with the Peshwah a list of the medical stores which will be required for the use of the troops under my command; and I beg you to lay my request before the Governor in Council, that these may be sent to Poonah by such conveyance as he may think proper. I have also transmitted to the Resident with the Peshwah an account of wheels which are required for iron 12 pounders, and others for ammunition tumbrils, and of timber which will be required for the repair of nearly all the wheels and the ordnance carriages in this detachment. I request, that, if it should be possible to send these articles from the arsenal at Bombay, they may be transmitted by such conveyance as the Hon. the Governor in Council may think proper.

I have communicated to the Resident with the Peshwah a list of artificers who will be required for the department of the Commissary of provisions with this detachment; and a list of servants who will be required by the same officer, in case it should be intended that he should victual the European troops advancing with the Peshwah. I request that orders

may be given that these may be hired and sent ; and that the assistance of the artificers belonging to the arsenal of Bombay may be given to repair the ordnance carriages in this detachment, as far as may be practicable, consistently with the performance of other necessary work at Bombay.

By a copy of a letter from Capt. Moor to the Governor of Bombay, which I have just received from Lieut. Gen. Stuart, I observe that he has made an agreement for the purchase of 15,000 sheep, to be delivered at Poonah. Some of these will be necessary immediately for the subsistence of the troops ; and, at all events, as the rains may soon be expected, it is desirable that the whole should be sent up the ghauts without loss of time.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 4 miles W. of Baramootty, 18th April, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 11th ; the cossids who brought it, and who left Poonah on the 16th, in the morning, report that Amrut Rao marched 5 days ago. I think this report is probable ; but if I should find that it is not true, and that Amrut Rao is still at Poonah, I shall do something of the kind that you recommend, but in a more effectual manner. I shall march to-morrow night to Poonah with the cavalry. I had intended this before I received your letter. Ball Kishen Gungurdhur is not here. The other sirdars also, who quitted the Peshwah when he was at Mhar, are absent, excepting Bappojee Vittell, whose party is but small. The Putwurdun and Goklah, in my opinion, are not to be trusted in a business of this nature.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 4 miles W. of Baramootty, 18th April, 1803.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received this morning from Lieut. Col. Close. The messengers who brought it from Poonah report that Amrut Rao quitted that city four days ago, which report is confirmed from another quarter. But if he should not have done so, I shall, to-morrow night, carry into execution the plan which I yesterday wrote to you that I had formed, in order to frustrate his designs.

The D.A.G. to the Officer commanding at Hurryhar. Camp at Meeruz, 18th April, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to request that you will ascertain the place on the river nearest to your post where boats ply during the rainy season ; and that you will measure the breadth of the river at such place, and report it to me for his information.

(Similar letters to the officers commanding at Sengoly on the Malpoorbu, Deogherry on the Werdah, Goorgherry on the Gutpurba, and Erroor on the Kistna.)

To Lieut. Col. Harness.

Bottom of the Bhore ghaut, 20th April, 1803, 8 A. M.

The road down the ghaut is so bad that the cavalry guns have been detained at it till now, and I think that we shall not march from hence till 9 or 10. I have ordered Col. Macleod to halt at Loney this day, and to join me to-morrow.

The pioneers, excepting those employed in the forage business, and a battalion, must work at the ghaut this day. If Heitland is not satisfied with this day's work, he must begin upon it again early in the morning, and you must defer the march of the line till the road down the ghaut is finished.

Send on your advanced guard and a battalion to Loney, with the baggage departments, brinjaries, &c. : the road down the ghaut will answer for them, and is sufficiently extensive ; but it will require much repair to make it what it ought to be for our wheel carriages, and the march of the line and park must, therefore, be late.

I shudder when I think of the dreadful destruction of the wheel carriages which there will be, on this day's and to-morrow's march. You will find some of my leavings upon the road. If the cavalry tumbrils which I mean cannot be repaired, the 3 pounder shot, in particular, must be taken out of them, and brought forward. That is a scarce article. Your march of this day will be something about 12 miles ; that of to-morrow, to Loney, about 10 ; the following day, 12. I do not recommend a halt, as its consequence may be, that some belonging to us may stay on the ground for ever.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Poonah, 20th April, 1803.

Having had reason to believe that it was Amrut Rao's intention to destroy by fire the town of Poonah as soon as the British troops should arrive in the neighbourhood, I made a forced march of above 40 miles, last night, with the cavalry and a battalion, and the troops under some of the southern jaghiredars, and arrived here this day at 2, in order to prevent the execution of this design. I was detained above 6 hours in the Bhore ghaut, about 20 miles from hence : in consequence of which I imagine that Amrut Rao heard of this movement, and he marched off this morning, leaving the town untouched.

My infantry will move here on the day after to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 20th April, 1803.

After I wrote to you on the 18th, I heard that Amrut Rao still remained in the neighbourhood of Poonah ; that he had removed the Peshwah's family to Sevaghur ; that many people were flying, and all believed that the town would be burnt. In consequence of this information, I marched last night with the cavalry and a battalion, and arrived here this day at about 2, and the town is safe. Appah Saheb, Goklah, Appah Dessaye, and Bappojee Vittell, with their forces, accompanied me. I was detained about 6 hours in getting the cavalry guns through the Bhore ghaut, in consequence of which I imagine that Amrut Rao received intelligence of my march, at such time as to enable him to depart this morning before I arrived. The infantry will be here on the day after to-morrow, and on the next day I shall move towards the ghauts. We have marched 60 miles since yesterday morning.

P.S. I am in your house, and have some of the troops quartered in your stables. I eat your forage and grain also.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

You will observe, by my letter of this date to the Adj. Gen., that I arrived here yesterday, and the effect which this movement has produced. We were detained a great length of time in the Bhore ghaut, and, consequently, arrived here at a later hour than I expected. The heat of the

weather was great; however, none of the men have suffered, and but few horses. I should have written to you yesterday, but I had no means of dispatching a letter. The people are returning fast to Poonah: they have already opened their bazaars, and we are well supplied. Forage is to be got, but it is scarce. I transmit the copy of a letter, and enclosure, which I received yesterday from Col. Close.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

I wrote to you last night to inform you of my arrival here. I have nothing new to tell you this morning, excepting that we are well supplied, and that I expect to get so much forage as that my troops will be able to stay here for a day or two. This will be a great convenience, as we have marched 7 days, and the carriage cattle are much knocked up.

I send you a letter from Amrut Rao, and 2 from the killadar of Sevaghur. I did not receive the first till late last night. The people are returning fast to their houses, and are delighted with our treatment of them.

To the Governor General.

Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

I arrived here yesterday with the cavalry of my division, and the Marhatta troops under Appah Saheb, Goklah, and others of the Peshwah's officers.

I had received repeated intimations from Col. Close, that Amrut Rao, who still remained at Poonah, intended to burn that city, when I should approach with the British troops; and, at last, a request from the Peshwah, that I would detach some of his officers with their troops, to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious, that, even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poonah, their force was not of the description, or of such strength, as to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's design; and I, therefore, determined to march forward with the British cavalry and the Marhattas, as soon as I should arrive within a long forced march from Poonah. In the mean time, I received intelligence that Amrut Rao was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th; and that he had removed the Peshwah's family to Sevaghur, a measure which was generally supposed to be preparatory to burning the town; and I marched on the 19th, at night, above 40 miles to this place, making the total distance which the cavalry have marched, since the 19th in the morning, about 60 miles. Amrut Rao heard of our march yesterday morning, and went off with some precipitation, leaving the town in safety. It is generally believed here that he intended to burn it, and that it was saved only by our arrival. The infantry will come here to-morrow.

I received a very civil letter from Amrut Rao, in answer to one which I wrote to him. He says that he will send a person to talk to me upon his business. I consider it to be very important that he should be brought in, and I will do every thing in my power to induce him to submit to the Peshwah's government.

Matters in general have a good appearance. I think they all will end as you wish. The combined chiefs, of whom we have heard so much, have allowed us to come quietly, and take our station at this place; and,

notwithstanding their threats, have taken no one step to impede our march, or to divert our attention to other objects. Here we are now in force, in a position from which nothing can drive us, and in which we shall gain strength daily. On the other hand, they have not yet made peace among themselves; much less have they agreed to attack us, or on any particular plan of attack. If I should be mistaken, and that, in opposition to the conclusions of reasoning upon the state of our affairs with each of the Marhatta chiefs, who, we are told, were to combine to attack us; and, upon a comparison of our means of annoying each and all of them, with theirs of annoying the Nizam (which is all that they can do), we should still have a war with them, you will have the satisfaction of reflecting, that, in consequence of the course of measures which you have already pursued, you have removed the seat of war to a distance from the Company's territories; and that you have the means of carrying it on in such a state of preparation, as to insure its speedy and successful termination.

In thus reasoning upon the subject, I conclude that we should have had to contend with this confederacy at all events; or, at least, that we should have had a war with the Marhatta powers, in some shape, even if this treaty with the Peshwah had not been concluded. Upon this point I have only to observe, that the establishment of Holkar's power at Poonah, founded, as it was, upon repeated victories over Scindiah's troops, would probably have occasioned demands upon the Nizam. But, supposing that I may be mistaken, I declare, that, from what I have seen of the state of this country, it would have been impossible for Holkar to maintain an army in the Deccan without invading the Nizam's territory. They have not left a stick standing at the distance of 150 miles from Poonah; they have eaten the forage and grain; have pulled down the houses, and have used the materials as firewood; and the inhabitants are fled with their cattle. Excepting in one village, I have not seen a human creature since I quitted the neighbourhood of Meritch: so that the result of your omitting to make some arrangement for the Peshwah, which was to occasion the re-establishment of his power, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if only for the subsistence of those multitudes in Holkar's suite, or their march to the countries to the southward of the Kistna. This last course might have procrastinated the evil, as they might, in those countries, have found subsistence for another year; but then their next step would have been to seek for it in the Company's territories, the very sources from which we should have been obliged to draw our supplies in the contest which must have ensued.

Supposing, therefore, that you should be blamed for adopting a course of measures, in which there is a distant risk that you may have a contest with the Marhatta powers, you have the satisfaction of reflecting, that, in consequence of those measures, the scene of action must be at a distance from the Company's territories; and that you are in such a state of preparation as to insure its speedy success: at all events, it is probable that, if you had not adopted those measures, either the Company or their ally must have suffered all the evils of war, without having the same means of averting them, or of limiting their duration.

In all great actions there is risk, which the little minds of those who will form their judgment of your's will readily perceive in that which I am now considering; but their remarks ought not to give you a moment's uneasiness; and I have, in this letter, made you acquainted with a fact which must silence every objection to your measures, and which I shall take care to send in an official form, through the channel which I believe to be the source of the croaking which I hear.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

After detaching the Scotch brigade to join Col. Stevenson, as reported in my letter of the 15th April, I continued my march towards this place by the road of Baramooty: I received different intimations from Lieut. Col. Close, that it was Amrut Rao's intention to stay in this neighbourhood till I should approach with the British troops, and then to burn the city; and an urgent request from the Peshwah to detach some of his Highness' officers, with their troops, in order to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious that, even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poonah, the force they had with them was not of the nature, or of sufficient strength, to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's designs; and as I had intelligence that he was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th, and that he had removed the Peshwah's family to Sevaghur, a measure supposed to be preparatory to burning the city, I determined to march to Poonah in the night of the 19th, with the cavalry and a battalion of Native infantry. Accordingly, I arrived here yesterday about 3 o'clock, having been detained about 6 hours in the Bhore ghaut, and found the city in safety. Amrut Rao heard of this movement in the morning, and marched off with some precipitation. He is now at Juneer with a small force. It is generally believed here that Amrut Rao did intend to burn Poonah, and that the city has been preserved by the arrival of the British troops. The infantry of the detachment under my command will arrive here to-morrow.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 22nd April, 1803.

There is a report in circulation that Holkar had given orders to one of his officers, by name Wahag, to join Meer Khan; and to the latter, when joined by the former, to proceed towards Gardoon, and act in the Nizam's territory. I do not believe this intelligence to be founded: however, I observe that Holkar is still upon the Godavery, and I believe Meer Khan has not gone far to the northward. It is, therefore, desirable that you should have an eye upon Meer Khan, and receive constant intelligence from his camp. If you should have any reason to believe that that chief intends to attack the Nizam's country, or the troops under Mohiput Ram, it will be necessary that you should place yourself a little nearer to those troops than we before settled: viz. within a good march of them; and your communication ought to be constant. Let me hear from you all the intelligence you may receive from Meer Khan's camp, and I shall keep you informed of every thing that I shall learn here. I wrote you, yesterday, an account of the mode in which I had come here.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 22nd April, 1803.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have had some further conversation with Appah Saheb's vakeel, the result of which is, that Appah Saheb consents to remain in the neighbourhood of Poonah, till the Peshwah can consider his demands and claims upon his Highness' government; but he refuses to meet the Peshwah, till he has some reason to be certain of his favor. He is very anxious that some steps should be taken in this business as soon as possible; and I now enclose the copies of memorandums which he gave me some time ago, and the copies of my answers, and the copy of an additional memorandum, which he gave me this morning. These papers contain all his demands. It appears to me, that, if he should be satisfied regarding his claims upon the Rajah of Kolapoor, there will be no difficulty in settling other inferior points. The infantry are now coming in. We have suffered a sad loss, by the fracture of carriages, within these last 3 or 4 marches; but, by the assistance of a little maistry here, I hope that we shall soon get to rights again. As we can get forage here, I propose to halt for a day or two.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 19th. In regard to that containing intelligence of the plunder of the Nizam's territories, we are now adopting the measures most likely to secure them from that evil. I think that you doubted Sookroodoor's intelligence; and, whatever may be Holkar's intention and line of action hereafter, I do not think that, at present, his preparations are so ripe as to induce him to make a demand upon one of the Nizam's pergunnahs. I wrote to Rastia and to Ball Kishen Gungdhar this day, regarding their irruption into Soorapoor.

In respect to that letter, in which you have copied an extract from one which you have received from the Resident, I have to observe, that, whatever may be the Resident's private opinion, it would be as well that he should refrain from a communication of it. The fact is, here I am at Poonah, unopposed, and in strength; and the Resident knows, or ought to know, that those chiefs, who are supposed to intend to combine against us, have not yet made peace, and cannot have settled any plan of operations. It is true, that, as we have taken into our hands the bone for which they have been contending for some years, not one of them is very well pleased; and each gives out that the whole will combine against us. But there are many considerations which must be maturely weighed, by at least two of the parties, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, before they will venture upon a war with the English, particularly when we are prepared, and they are not.

It may be asked, why they give out that they intend to combine? I

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 22nd April, 1803.

As the forage at this place is brought in from the hills at some distance, it is not reasonable to expect that it should be sold at the price at which the troops have procured forage hitherto; measures will be taken, however, to have it sold as cheap as possible.

The officers, &c., who may go into Poonah are requested not to go to the Peshwah's palace, or the houses of the principal chiefs.

Safeguards must be placed by the nearest corps over all the gardens in the neighbourhood of the camp; and no cattle must be suffered to go into them.

answer, because they know that some of us are, like other men, to be frightened by their threats; that, particularly, they have their effect at the Nizam's durbar, in which they are daily brought forward; and for this reason it is that our Resident at that durbar, instead of listening to the fears of that Court, and propagating them, ought, above all other men, to inculcate the improbability of this combination; or its certain failure, if it should ever be attempted.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 20th. You will have been informed, by mine of yesterday, that Appah Sahel will remain in this neighbourhood; and that it is my opinion he will be satisfied with a very moderate settlement of his differences with the Kolapoor Rajah. In respect to the Peshwah's interference in those affairs, I have to observe, that the Putwurdun must be considered as his subjects; and that they have a right to expect that he will interfere to afford them a protection, which it is his duty to give them.

According to the instructions I have received, I have entered into no engagements; but I have promised generally, that those who should join this army, in their master's cause, should be recommended to his favor. From respect to the British nation, and I may almost call it a personal attachment, the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, and Goklah, have joined us; but not a chief belonging to the Peshwah, excepting Bappojee Vittell. Indeed, as appears by the enclosed letter from Col. Stevenson, some of these are employed in the plunder of the Nizam's country. If our recommendation of these chiefs, who have joined us, is to be unattended to, we must expect, not only that they will leave us, but that no others will ever join us. Soobarow Mooty showed me the Peshwah's sumnuds: they may be forgeries, but I have him here, and you will judge for yourself.

I wrote to Mr. Duncan this day, respecting his forwarding to us certain of the stores, as my carriage bullocks are so completely done up, that, if I attempt to send them down the ghauts till they shall have had some rest, I shall lose them all.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

I have received a letter from Col. Close, in which he tells me that the Peshwah was to quit Bassein on the 26th. We may, therefore, expect him here in the beginning of May.

I intend to move from hence, towards the hills, on the 26th, in order to procure forage with more facility; but I shall be obliged to leave here the greatest number of the wheel carriages to be repaired, and the loads of the carriage cattle. There is not now a serviceable wheel in the whole detachment, excepting those in Capt. Scott's form, 6 pounder carriages and tumbrils: but I expect that the whole will be put in a serviceable state at this place, in a short time; and, besides the means here, I have called upon Bombay for assistance, both in new wheels and materials, and artificers to repair the old. The carriage cattle, also, are much knocked up: they have been marched hard, and have had no forage for some days. I, therefore, leave their loads here, and take them on to the hills to forage.

A few days' rest will recover many of them, and I am able to get here about 1800 fresh bullocks. I leave here a corps to guard these articles, which will be in safety, particularly as I shall not be more than one march or two from them.

I intend to purchase from the brinjarries all the rice they have left, and to send the whole down to Panwell to receive fresh loads. We have been so well supplied that the brinjarries are in some degree losers by attending us, and it is therefore necessary to give them this advantage. Besides, by this arrangement I enjoy the advantage of having at Poonah, before the rains set in, a larger quantity of rice than I should have if I were to send down the brinjarries to receive fresh loads only in proportion as those should be consumed that they have at present. Indeed, as long as we remain in this neighbourhood, we shall not be under the necessity of consuming any of the brinjarry rice, as the bazaar of Poonah is plentifully supplied from the neighbouring countries.

Major Malcolm to Lord Clive.

Camp near Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship of the arrival of the whole of the force under the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley at Poonah, which city, there is every reason to conclude, was saved from total destruction by a rapid movement of the cavalry under the General's command, who actually marched near 60 miles in 32 hours to its relief.

2. The inhabitants have testified, by the most lively gratitude, their sense of the exertions by which they have been saved from entire ruin; and great numbers have already shown their confidence in the protection of the British government, by returning to the habitations which they had deserted.

3. Few other chiefs, except those who, I informed your Lordship, were with Gen. Wellesley's corps when it was encamped near Meritch, joined it on the march, but though there is ground to suppose this conduct in some has proceeded from want of zeal and attachment to the Peshwah, it is, perhaps, to be attributed in others more to the rapidity of Gen. Wellesley's advance, and to their own dilatory habits, than any other cause.

4. Appah Sahib early intimated to the General and myself, that, though he would show his duty to the Peshwah, and his friendship to the English, by accompanying the British force to Poonah, it was his intention to return immediately from that capital to his jaghire; as he had vowed never to pay his respects to the Peshwah, till that prince had done him justice on the Rajah of Kolapoor, by whom his possessions had been despoiled, and his father murdered.

5. As the defection of the Putwurdun family, of whom Appah Sahib is, in fact, the representative, would, at this moment, have been attended with serious injury to the interests of his Highness, every argument was opposed to the resolution which this chief had taken; but he continued, unmoved, to persevere in his determination, till he was explicitly informed that the effect which such conduct, at this crisis, would have on the interests of the Peshwah, and the interests of the British government, as connected with that prince, was such as must place him in the relation of an enemy to both governments. This communication, which was made after our arrival at Poonah, alarmed him so much, that he has agreed to stay near this city, until his case has been recommended to the Peshwah's attention; and he has promised, should that Prince attend to his situation, and give him the relief that his services demand, that he will no longer hesitate in paying his personal respects at Court, or in remaining there as long as he is required.

6. I understand, by a letter from Col. Close, that the Peshwah proposes to leave Bassein on the 25th inst. His Highness will, therefore, be re-established in his capital early in May; and that object, when accomplished, will admit of the disposition of the force in this quarter, that will put an end to those fears now entertained of a combination among the Marhatta chiefs, which I consider as unlikely to be formed, and, if formed, still more unlikely to act with either union, vigor, or effect.

The D. A. G. to Lieut. Walker, 1st batt. 8th regt. N.I. Camp at Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley has appointed you to march the drafts from camp to Erroor, and directs me to enclose a route by which you will proceed, choosing your own halting places. A party of Mysore horse and peons will accompany you, in order to their being posted by a tappall muttaseddee in different villages on the road. As the district through which you will march is in an unsettled state, and infested by robbers, it is necessary that you should march regularly and with caution, take up your quarters for the night in some strong position, and keep strict guard. I also enclose, by the General's order, a proclamation, which you ought to send before you by a horseman, or one of the peons who can speak the language of this country, to be shown to any bodies of men whom you may see on the road, and into all the villages through which you may have to pass. This proclamation must be given in charge to the senior jemidar when you give over the party to him at Erroor. I enclose a detail of the draft who proceeded under your charge. Lieut. Plenderleath, of the 1st batt. 3rd regt., is now on his march from Hurryhur to Erroor, with a party of recovered men. If you find him there waiting for orders to advance, and you have met with nothing on the way to prevent so small a party as his from coming on, you will show this letter to him as an order for his doing so, and you will return with him to Poonah, where you will both receive further orders. The General further desires that you will take charge of a sum of money which Captain Graham will deliver to you, to be given to Lieut. * * *, commanding at Erroor, for the disbursements of that station.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay, agent for public cattle. Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley authorises you to make an advance to the bullock owners, in the grain and store departments, of 9000 pagodas, to enable them to provide 1800 carriage bullocks for those departments. This advance is to be made by instalments of one-tenth of the whole sum to be advanced for the number of bullocks which such owner engages to provide; and when a corresponding number of bullocks has been brought and marked, another tenth to be advanced, and so on until the whole sum has been paid to them.

You will stipulate with the owners, receiving this large advance, that it is to be recovered by the stoppage of half a pagoda monthly, from the hire of each bullock belonging to them respectively, until the whole shall be liquidated. You will keep a register of the periods of mustering these bullocks, and you will receive orders hereafter for the distribution of them to the departments.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 25th April, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 22nd. It is surprising that you should not have known, on that day, of my arrival at Poonah on the 20th, as I have reason to believe that it was known to the Peshwah on the 21st. I shall march to-morrow towards Tullygaum. I enclose you a letter which I received this morning by a vakeel from Amrut Rao. I had a conversation with this vakeel, in the course of which he expatiated much upon the conduct of Bajee Rao towards his master, and all the principal sirdars of the Empire.

The end of the conversation was a desire that the Company's government should interfere to place Amrut Rao in a situation suitable to his great rank and expectations in the state. In answer, I told him that Amrut Rao had connected himself with the enemies of the Peshwah, and that he must be considered as an enemy; that the first step towards reconciling him with his brother was, that he should withdraw himself from all communication with the Peshwah's enemies.

The vakeel replied that the Peshwah had given orders that he might be seized (which is true), and that it was therefore impossible for him

to stay in the neighbourhood of this army; and that he had therefore gone to Nassuck, where he should remain. I still insisted that his secession from the Peshwah's enemies was necessary; and that, as he could not come near this army, it was desirable that we should have his declaration that he had separated himself from them, to show in answer to the reports which would be circulated, in which his name would be used to his disadvantage. The result of the conference was, that I should write him a letter to that purport; and I enclose you the draft of one which I have made.

Amrut Rao's vakeel declares that Holkar and Ambajee Inglia have not met. He blames Holkar's conduct much, and says that it has been inconsistent in respect to ourselves. He declares that he has neither opposed us, nor made friends with us; and that, by his conduct, he has suffered us to establish ourselves here. There is some truth in the remark. This man, who appears to have some ability, is come here, either with an intention of treating with our allies, or to lull us into security, and probably both. However, we have a strict watch over him, and I shall have no scruple in sending him off, if I find that he attempts the former: in regard to the latter, I defy him to do us any mischief. The vakeel said that the Rajah of Berar was every body's friend, and was determined to remain at peace. I am glad that you have occupied Panwell. My pioneers went this morning to clear the Bhore ghaut; but I wish I could be certain that Bulwunt Rao had left the lower country. I conclude, however, that he will not like to remain cooped up between Col. Murray and me, when I shall have made a march or two towards the ghaut.

The D.A.G. to Major Kennet, commg. the detachments at Poonah. 25th April, 1803.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to communicate the following instructions for your guidance, while commanding the detachment at Poonah: You must be very particular in your guard of the military stores and of the provision stores. You must have an outlying piquet across the river to watch the fords, and a strong inlying piquet ready at all times to turn out. You must examine all the fords and modes of getting across the river to the rear of your camp, and you must have all the passages watched either by the Resident's peons, or by sepoy. Col. Close's newswriter and the other servants of the Residency will be desired to communicate with you, and you will send constant intelligence to camp of whatever you hear.

To Major Doolan.

Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th inst.

You will be so kind as to communicate my request to the amildar at Hullihall that he will carry into execution the repairs and improvements of the powder magazine and the house at Hullihall, approved by the Military board, according to Capt. Johnson's estimate of the 30th Jan. last. I request you to let me have an account of the repairs which the annual committee thought necessary to all the buildings at Hullihall; and that you will request the amildar to make preparations for giving these repairs.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

I did not march this morning, as I intended, as I heard last night that

Holkar had made 3 marches towards this place, and I thought it proper to halt this day to ascertain the truth of this report. The result of my inquiries is, that he has marched towards the Nizam's frontier; and he was, on the 21st, at a station about 8 coss from the Godavery, and at a small distance from the frontier of Holkar's, of the Nizam's, and of Scindiah's territories. He had not, on that day, had the interview with Ambajee Ingolia, which it is supposed will produce a peace between Holkar and Scindiah; and it is reported that Ambajee Ingolia had sent to the Rajah of Berar the boy, Kunder Rao Holkar, who is a great bone of contention between Scindiah and Holkar; and this circumstance may delay the negotiation for peace. If they are only delayed till the Peshwah's arrival here, and that we shall be enabled to take up a better position for the defence of the Nizam's frontier, I think that all will end well. I intend to-morrow to march towards the hills.

P. S. I believe the Peshwah was to leave Bassein yesterday.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

I heard last night that Holkar had moved this way, which induced me to halt till I could learn the truth of this report; and the result of my inquiries into it is, that he is on the other side of the Godavery, that he has been joined by Meer Khan, and that the movements of which I had heard were directed towards the Nizam's frontier to the eastward. It does not appear, however, that he has passed the boundary, and the marches which he has made are directed towards a point at which his territories join with Scindiah's. By all accounts, he had not had the interview with Ambajee Ingolia, which, it was supposed, would produce peace, on the 21st of this month; and, therefore, whatever may be intended, no peace has yet been concluded between Holkar and Scindiah.

There is a report here that the boy, Kunder Rao Holkar, whom Jeswunt Rao is desirous of getting into his hands, has been placed in the hands of the Rajah of Berar; and if this should be the case, Jeswunt Rao will not be pleased. However, this is merely a report.

Upon a full consideration of the state of affairs, I have not yet seen any thing to induce me to alter the disposition of the forces already made, with a view to bringing the Peshwah to Poonah, and giving strength and security to his government. That must still be our object; and we must not disturb a disposition which must secure it, on account of a possibility that a few villages may be plundered by Holkar's army in the vicinity of the Nizam's north west frontier. I believe that the Peshwah put himself in motion yesterday: if he did, he will be here in a few days; and I think that in 10 days, at the furthest, we may bend all our means towards the security of the Nizam's country. I shall march to-morrow towards the hills.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

I received accounts last night that Holkar had made 3 marches towards this place; and I was induced to halt this day in order to ascertain the truth of those reports. The result of my inquiries is, that he is gone towards the Nizam's frontier; and that he was, on the 21st, at a place about

8 coss beyond the Godavery, at a small distance from his own, or the Holkar territory, the same from Scindiah's, and the same from the Nizam's. He has sent his baggage towards Chandore, which is the only symptom of an intention to attack the Nizam. It is certain that on the 21st he had not had the interview with Ambajee Inglia, which it is supposed will produce a peace between Holkar and Scindiah; and it is now reported here that Kundee Rao Holkar has been given up by Ambajee Inglia to the Rajah of Berar. This circumstance may have some effect upon the negotiations for that peace; at all events, it proves the interference of the Rajah of Berar to produce it, which alone will occasion delay, and that, under present circumstances, is almost all that we could wish.

God send the Peshwah soon here! My fingers itch to do something for the security of the Nizam's frontier; and, till the Peshwah is re-established at Poonah, and his government begins to have some authority, it will not answer to alter the disposition which must insure that object, only to save a few villages from plunder. I enclose a duplicate of a letter which I have written to Col. Murray: be so kind as to peruse and send it to him.

To Col. Murray.*

Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 22nd and 23rd inst. I learn from Lieut. Col. Close that he has communicated to you the wishes of his Highness the Peshwah respecting the movements of your detachment, according to which you are, of course, to conduct yourself. The Colonel, however, has informed me that he has requested you to send off 5 or 6 companies to Panwell, with 2 guns, for the purpose of occupying that place, and of affording security to the supplies which will have been forwarded thither from Bombay. I conclude that you will have complied with this request, and that the troops, on their march to Panwell, will have driven off the troops belonging to Amrut Rao, occupying Abtah and Carnallah. If that should not have been done, it appears to me a very necessary measure, and I request you to turn your attention to it. The ghaut, I am informed, is exceedingly bad; and some time will elapse before you will be able to bring up all your carriages: a part of your troops, therefore, might be employed in clearing the road to Panwell of enemies, while the remainder should move your advanced carriages up the ghaut, and no time would be lost.

I have written to the government of Bombay for certain articles of supply, which must be forwarded by means to be furnished within that settlement; and I request you to afford protection to such of them as you may hear are prepared to leave Panwell, when your troops shall move from that quarter towards the Bhoore ghaut. I send from hence brinjarry bullocks to load with rice, but it will be some time before they will arrive at Panwell, and they will be too late for your troops; and, at all events, an escort from this camp will go with them, which will be sufficient for their protection, particularly if the road should be cleared by you.

* Col. Murray was of H. M. 84th regt., on the Bombay establishment, and afterwards, as Lieut. Gen. Sir John Murray, commanded the division of the army on the Eastern coast of Spain, and was tried by a General Court Martial for his conduct at Tarragona.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart. Camp at Panowullah, 10 m. from Poonah, 27th April, 1803.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 19th last night. I have great hopes, notwithstanding the threats held out at Hyderabad, that the combination of the northern Chiefs will end in nothing.

The Governor General has a strong check upon Scindiah to the northward, and another upon the Rajah of Berar; and it is not very probable that these Chiefs will involve themselves in a war in which they must be certain losers, merely for the pleasure of plundering the Nizam's country.

The result, then, of the peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and of this combination, may be, that Holkar will be made the tool to annoy the Nizam: but, supposing that to be the case, against which there are many probabilities, the enemy, although not to be despised, will not be very formidable. But I should doubt Holkar entering, immediately, so far into the views of his rival as to undertake to conduct this contest, as principal, merely for the gratification of his feelings of disappointed ambition. It is much more probable that Holkar will avail himself of the moment of peace to gain possession of the territories belonging to his family, which will probably be ceded to him. Upon the whole, therefore, I think that, although there will be much bad temper and many threats, there will be no hostility.

I have observed, from the commencement of the negotiations with the Peshwah to the present moment, that no British agent has ever been threatened with this combination. We have heard of it principally from the Court of Hyderabad, and from the Native servants in the employment of our Residents, upon which description of people threats are supposed to have some effect; but these threats have never been held out to Major Kirkpatrick, Col. Collins, or Col. Close, in their communications with the servants of the principal Marhatta chiefs, or the principals themselves. Amrut Rao's vakeel, with whom I had a long conversation the other day, never hinted that there was an idea of a combination of the Marhatta chiefs. I do not conclude, from this silence of theirs towards us, that they have no such idea, because I know it is the common conversation; but I conclude from it, that they are well aware that we are not people to be frightened by threats; and that they know that, as soon as they should hold out this threat, we should immediately take some steps to ward off its effects. They know well that we have it in our power both to defend ourselves and annoy them, of which I believe them to be much more afraid than we are of their combination.

I have heard frequently of the supposed combination of different Marhatta chiefs; but when the nature of our situation upon the frontiers of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar has been explained to them (of which they are in general very ignorant), and they have been informed of Scindiah's answers to Col. Collins, they will be satisfied that the combination,

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, 27th April, 1803.

As this detachment depends principally upon the dry grass to be found among the hills for forage for the cattle of all descriptions, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that the officers commanding corps, heads of departments, and individuals, will caution their followers, in the most particular manner, against setting fire to the grass among the hills. He prohibits all persons whatever from dressing victuals among the grass, smoking cheroots, or having any fire with them at all.

if ever formed, will not do us much harm. I marched this morning with an idea of procuring forage with more ease.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Panowullah, 28th April, 1803.

I have received intelligence that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has entered the Nizam's territories, in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad and Dowlutabad. It is said by some, that he has only encamped in the neighbourhood of villages belonging to himself, within the Nizam's boundary; but, at all events, the officers in the Nizam's service, with Col. Stevenson's corps, are much alarmed for the safety of his Highness' possessions, and of those 2 forts, and have urged strongly that some measures should be taken for their defence.

The Peshwah will arrive at Poonah on the 2nd, and it is probable that the troops which are with him will arrive in a day or two afterwards. Meer Khan, Holkar's sirdar, in command of his largest detachment, still keeps open his negotiation with the Nizam to enter his Highness' service. On the 2nd May, therefore, we shall be in greater strength than ever at Poonah, and have attained one great object of our expedition; and, if Holkar should not be weakened by the defection of Meer Khan, at least his confidence in that chief must be shaken. Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to desire Col. Stevenson to collect the Nizam's army and the subsidiary force at Gardoon, and to make 3 or 4 marches to the northward. If he should find that Holkar is only plundering the villages on that frontier, in the same manner that they have been plundered in every year by every chief who approaches the boundary, he is not to go farther on; but if he should find that Holkar makes a serious attack upon either of the Nizam's forts of Dowlutabad or Aurungabad, he must move quickly to their support.

In the former case, although at some distance from me, we shall still be able to combine our operations, or to join, if necessary; and in the latter case, I must move to the northward and eastward, to be at hand to support Col. Stevenson, in the event of any support being given to Holkar by the other parties. My opinion is, that this is only a plundering excursion of Holkar. It is certain that he has not yet made his peace with Scindiah; and, whatever he may do hereafter, he would not venture upon so desperate a course of action as a regular attack on the Nizam previous to that event; and I think that Col. Stevenson's first movement to the northward will induce him to withdraw: whether it has that effect or not, Holkar is so much weakened, and Col. Stevenson is so much strengthened, that the force of the latter must be considered more than a match for that of the former. The only doubt I had upon my mind, respecting the propriety of giving Col. Stevenson those instructions, was occasioned by the Governor General's wish that all hostilities should be avoided; but I conceive an attack upon the Nizam's country must be resisted, and that means must be taken to prevent Jeswunt Rao from obtaining such a footing within it, as he would have by the possession of the forts of Dowlutabad or Aurungabad. As soon as I shall receive a true account of the state of affairs in that quarter, I propose to write to Holkar, respecting his situation on the Nizam's frontier.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Dallas. When the cavalry arrived here on the 20th, they had made such a march that their grass cutters could not keep up with them; and, in fact, they did not arrive till late on the 21st, and on the 22nd. There was no straw to be got for the horses, and the long grass which was brought from the hills was bought and given to them. As there is no fund in the cavalry for paying for this grass, and as it was necessary to give it to the horses, I have ordered that it might be paid for, and the charge will be laid before you for your approbation. From the 22nd, the grass cutter establishment ought to have supplied the horses with forage; but such is the nature of the soil in the neighbourhood of Poonah, that the grass cutters cannot find any thing to cut, without going to a great distance to the hills, which is not possible at present, and the officers are still obliged to buy large quantities, at some expense, for their troops. As this is a new expense for an article already provided for, I do not wish to allow it without referring the subject for your decision. The ground certainly is very bare, and forage is very dear. In case you should think proper to authorize the incurring any expense on this account, there are two modes in which the charge may be made: either by allowing the quarter master to purchase the quantity of forage which is deficient, and charge for it upon honor; or by giving an allowance for each horse, either to that officer or to the officer commanding each troop, for procuring the necessary quantity of forage. According to either mode, it ought to be understood, that, so soon as the country shall afford green grass, or that forage becomes cheap, the charge is entirely to cease.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Panowullah, 28th April, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 25th. It is certain that, on the 25th of this month, the supposed peace between Holkar and Scindiah had not been made; and Ambajee Inglia, through whose medium it was supposed that it would be negotiated, had not met the former; on the contrary, Ambajee was then at Burchampoor.

It is true that Holkar has approached the Nizam's frontier, and he may have entered it. He has 2 villages within the Nizam's boundary, near which he encamped; but it does not appear, by any of the accounts, that he has made attempts upon either of the forts of Dowlutabad or Aurangabad, both of which are in the neighbourhood of the place at which he is stated to be encamped; or that he has plundered the country to a greater degree than it has been plundered every year, or than will continue to be the case, so long as the Nizam continues to have forts without garrisons, and the walls tumbling down.

I am still of opinion that there will be no combination of the three Marhatta powers against us; and that, supposing there should be a peace between Holkar and Scindiah, Holkar is more likely to take advantage of that peace to establish his power in the territories belonging to his family, than to employ himself, as the tool of his rival, in the plunder of the Nizam's country, a game in which he must, sooner or later, meet with certain destruction. However, it will not answer to expose the Nizam's country to invasion upon my political speculations; and we must there-

fore immediately turn our minds to taking measures for its defence. In doing this, however, we must not lose sight of our great object, that of securing the Peshwah in his seat; nor must we put it out of our power to join all our forces, or to combine our operations, if this great combination should be made, and we should have to contend against its force. The Peshwah will be at Poonah on the 2nd; and the British troops, which have been at Bassein with him, will probably arrive about a day or two afterwards. My opinion, therefore, is, that you might now move 3 or 4 marches to the northward, towards Aurungabad.

If you find that Holkar makes any serious attempts, either upon that place or Dowlutabad, you must move quickly to their support; but if he is only seated upon the frontier, it will not answer to disturb the arrangements, which must produce success in the end, merely to save a few villages at present; and in that case, I do not wish you to move to a greater distance than 3 or 4 marches from Gardoon. You will be within the Nizam's country, and, I conclude, will find forage, &c., in plenty. I wish that you would ascertain exactly where the tappall runners, on the road between Poonah and Hyderabad, are stationed nearest to Gardoon; and fix a writer at that place to receive and forward all letters from Poonah to your camp. I shall send them by the Resident's dawks as far as the neighbourhood of Gardoon. I shall write to Holkar upon the subject of the plunder of the Nizam's country.

You will observe, from this letter, that I think it desirable we should keep so near one another as to preserve the power of combining our operations, if that should be necessary; and that, with that view, I do not wish you to move beyond 3 or 4 marches from Gardoon, unless Holkar should have made an attack upon Aurungabad or Dowlutabad. The Nizam's troops are, of course, to accompany you. Meer Khan's letter to Noor ool Oomrah tends strongly to convince me that Holkar does not mean to attack the Nizam. He would not venture upon such a measure, when threatened with the defection of so large a portion of his army. I shall speak to Col. Close respecting the Peshwah taking Meer Khan into his service: but it is my opinion that the Nizam ought to take all the troops he has; and I dare say they will not amount to a third of the number of which he boasts. I do not go farther to the westward than this place. When I marched from Poonah, yesterday, all the people of any property, who had returned to that city, quitted it again.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 28th April, 1803.

I have halted here this day, because I found that my march from Poonah created great alarm, that several of the principal inhabitants were leaving the place, and that the ladies of the Peshwah's family, who had been desired by his Highness to come down from Sevaghur this day, were afraid to venture in. I have therefore sent back all the Marhatta troops, and I shall remain here. I have sent the cattle further up the valley to graze.

It is reported that Holkar has entered the Nizam's country near Dowlutabad and Aurungabad; and that he is about to attack those places. I have therefore ordered Col. Stevenson to make a movement to the north-

ward, and even to go to their support if he should find that Holkar has really attacked either of them. Meer Khan still keeps open his negotiations with the Nizam. In a letter written to Noor ool Oomrah, about 10 days ago, he says that he has written to Holkar to desire leave to quit his service.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace, commg. the 5th brigade.

28th April, 1803.

I have submitted Lieut. Little's reference on the point of the duty of the adjutant of the day to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley; and I am directed by him to inform you, that, according to the orders of the 23rd Feb. and 9th March last, the adjutant of the day is not under the orders of the field officer of the day, from the time the piquet is posted until assembly beating the next day. At the same time it is apparent from those orders, that it was his intention that the field officer of the day should have the assistance of a staff officer, whenever it was likely that the piquets would be employed, or that that assistance should be essentially necessary; but that the adjutants should not be unnecessarily taken away from their regimental duties. This point may be easily regulated by a little consideration and conciliation on the part of the officers concerned; and the General does not at present think it expedient to draw the line, more particularly, for the duty of the adjutant of the day.

To the Governor General.

Panowullah, 29th April, 1803.

I enclose a letter from Col. Close, from which you will perceive the difficulties which he experiences in moving the Peshwah.

You will hear, from ———, sad accounts of the invasion of the Nizam's territories by Holkar's troops. He is within the boundary certainly, somewhere near Aurungabad and Dowlutabad; and, wherever a body of troops of that kind is placed, they can do nothing but injury. But I doubt his intending more than to take, from the Nizam's country, the common plunder taken by every Marhatta chief passing to the northward. This will always be the case, so long as the Nizam keeps his frontier forts of Aurungabad and Dowlutabad without garrisons, and in ruins, although the countries in their neighbourhood have been annually plundered.

Till now, I expected the Peshwah at Poonah on the 2nd May; and, yesterday, I directed a movement, to the northward, of the Nizam's army, and the subsidiary force, which are on his Highness' frontier, according to the former disposition. If this expedition of Holkar is only for the common plunder, Col. Stevenson's movement will check it; and the Nizam's army will still be in a situation to combine its operations with, or even to join, this force. If Holkar attacks Aurungabad or Dowlutabad, or attempts any other solid enterprise, Col. Stevenson will move to the assistance of the part attacked with all celerity; and I must move to the northward and eastward likewise, as soon as the Peshwah shall arrive at Poonah, in order to keep up our communication, and to be able to afford him assistance, if any movement should be made by Scindiah. However, I am sure that Holkar will move off directly; and I shall write to him this day, to desire him to desist from these attacks upon the Nizam's territory. I am most anxious for the Peshwah's arrival. If he had moved on the day that I proposed, he would have been at Poonah before now, and I should have been at liberty to take up a position on the Nizam's frontier, which must have secured it from insult. Malcolm is gone to meet the Peshwah.

The D.A.G. to Captain Welsh, 1st batt. 3rd regt., Talgaum.

29th April, 1803.

In consequence of the reports which you have sent, and others received by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, of the water and forage in the neighbourhood of Wadegaum, he directs me to desire that you will march early to-morrow morning with your detachment, and all the cattle grazing under its protection, towards Wadegaum, and encamp near the nullah and tank described in your report. It is reported that a river runs within a mile upon the right of Wadegaum; and if that be the case, and there should not be a sufficient quantity of water in the nullah and tank, you will move to the river. The General calls your attention particularly to the most important part of your duty at present, which is, to see that a sufficient quantity of forage is brought in by the drivers and pioneers, and given to the cattle at night; and that they are driven out in the day to a place in which they will find grazing, if there should be such a place.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 30th April, 1803.

It is hoped that the Peshwah will be at Poonah by the 2nd May, which I have entertained in consequence of my communications with those of his sirdars here who correspond with him, I disturbed the disposition which I had made of the troops, and authorised Col. Stevenson to move for the relief of Aurungabad. You may easily conceive, then, how uneasy I am at his Highness' delays: however, they cannot be helped, and must be submitted to.

In my letter of the 28th, I apprised you of my reasons for halting here. The cattle are gone up the valley to graze, and are as far on as Worgaum. I get plenty of forage for the cattle that remain here.

I have written a letter to Holkar, to desire him to withhold from the plunder of the Nizam's country, which I dare say will have no effect. I have also written to Chinchore Deo, to desire him to withdraw from the Konkan entirely; and, lest he should make an excuse for not complying with my desire, that my troops are in the ghaut. I have told him that he may come up to the Bhore ghaut, and that my troops will allow him to pass. Bistnaph Punt is there with the Mysore horse, a company of infantry, and the pioneers. I write to Col. Murray to forward my supplies, particularly of arrack, even although the Peshwah should not march.

Malcolm went on to the ghaut yesterday, but returned this day, when he heard of his Highness' delays. I have no news for you. It is reported that Holkar intends to make a slight dash at Hyderabad. I have desired Stevenson to have an eye to that quarter.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Panowullah, 30th April, 1803.

I learn, by letters from Col. Close, that some delay has occurred in the movement of his Highness the Peshwah, and it is possible that there may be more. Under these circumstances, I have to request that, as soon as any of the articles of supply which I have required from Bombay shall have arrived at Panwell, with the means of moving them, you will order them to be forwarded without delay. Those of which I am principally in want, at present, are arrack, and wheels for ordnance carriages. The former can be carried upon coolies, which I requested might be sent from Bombay for that purpose; or upon 400 bullocks, which, I learn from Col. Close, you have hired for the public service, and have dispatched to Panwell. The latter can be carried upon coolies. A small escort can pro-

tect their march to the Bhor ghaut, where there are troops belonging to me. I am most anxious for the arrival of the arrack. I shall not want the wheels till after the Peshwah shall arrive at Poonah.

P. S. I have received your letter of the 27th.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Panowullah, 30th April, 1803.

There are reports here that Holkar intends moving upon Hyderabad with a light army; and they appear to come from something like authority. However, I do not believe these reports; although we ought to be prepared for every thing, from a disposition so wild and unmanageable as Holkar's is represented to be. I, therefore, recommend you to have an eye to your right; and, if you find that Holkar really makes this dash at Hyderabad, you must move upon that place as quickly as you can. You will, of course, prevent the pindarries from cutting off your communication. Indeed, they will not venture to attempt it, when there is such a body of horse in your camps; and they ought to be cut up most unmercifully, whenever they are caught. I am sorry to tell you that the Peshwah has delayed his march, and that he will not arrive at Poonah till the 6th or 7th. However, that must make no difference in your movements, under present circumstances.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 1st May, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 28th April.

My former letters will have informed you of my reasons for staying here, and of those I had for sending back to Poonah the Marhatta chiefs, with their troops.

The ladies of the Peshwah's family are now in Poonah, and have particularly requested that I should not go farther off than Tullygaum, and that the Marhatta troops should remain near the city. I am afraid, also, that, if I march towards the ghauts, there will be great alarm in the town. On the other hand, I do not see any probability that an attempt will be made by any party to obstruct the Peshwah's march; and, therefore, upon the whole, I think it best to remain in my present position, and that the Marhatta chiefs should stay at Poonah. If, however, you think that I ought to move towards the ghauts, or that the Peshwah would be gratified by my making a march or two to meet him, I will do so, either with the troops, or alone, as you may think best.

*The D.A.G. to Major * * * , 7th Native cavalry.*

Camp, 1st May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley has perused your answer to my second

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, 1st May, 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will take advantage of the present halt to exercise their corps. This measure will be beneficial to them in other respects, as well as in their discipline.

It is very necessary that means should be adopted to prevent the troops or followers from carrying off forage from the villages, or from the inhabitants bringing it to camp, without paying for it; and Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will endeavor to prevent this practice. Not a day passes that many complaints are not made upon this subject; and in future any person, who shall be found to have disobeyed the orders relating to it, will be punished.

A troop of Native cavalry to parade at head quarters at 5 o'clock to-morrow morning to escort Major Gen. Wellesley to Poonah. It will return in the evening.

letter of this date, on the subject of the forage taken away by 2 troopers of the 7th regt. of cavalry, without its being paid for; and directs me to repeat his order to you to see the complainers paid for the forage removed by the regiment under your command; and he further recommends that, in future, you give a more respectful answer to a letter written by his order.

The D.A.G. to Captain Vesey, commg. 1st batt. 3rd regt. N.I.

1st May, 1803.

The bearer, Killie Rajah, has some complaint against 2 officers of the battalion under your command. Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to desire that you will order a particular inquiry to be made into the merits of the complaint, and that the whole matter should be taken down in writing; and if the subject cannot be adjusted by your authority, you will report your proceedings to him.

The D.A.G. to Major M^cCally, 2nd batt. 12th regt.

Camp, 1st May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to return to you your letter to him of this date, and to inform you that, under the present circumstances, he cannot allow any officer to quit the detachment, excepting on the most urgent business, or upon a certified bad state of health, and recommendation of the surgeon that a change of situation is absolutely necessary; and even in those cases he will not grant leave to any officer unless the application for it be made through the regular channels of regimental and brigade commanding officers, where there are such.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Poonah, 2nd May, 1803.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ult., with its several enclosures.

Having already had a sufficient number of wheels constructed at this place, for the iron 12 pounders, I do not now want any wheels of that description from Bombay; but I request to have as many tumbril wheels as can be prepared, to be sent forward from time to time, as they may be in readiness. The dimensions of the axletrees of the tumbrils were sent on to the Resident with the Peshwah; but if the naves of these wheels are unbored, they will answer so much the better, and the brass boxes can be fitted in them here.

I can procure whatever timber I want at this place; and I have directed Capt. Noble, the Commissary of stores, to correspond with Capt. Blackall regarding the quantities and dimensions of the iron, which will be required for tires; and I beg that the latter officer may be instructed to attend to Capt. Noble's representations on that head, and to send that iron as soon as possible. I have also desired Capt. Noble to transmit a list of the artificers required by him, specifying all the particulars relating to them, upon which Capt. Blackall has desired information.

To Col. Stevenson.

Poonah, 2nd May, 1803.

I came over here this morning, to see how my park was coming on; and I have received your letters of the 29th and 30th April. The account of your hircarrahs, transmitted in your letter of the 29th, is very satisfactory. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar has taken the field; or that any thing like a peace has been concluded between Scindiah and Holkar. My last accounts from Burhampoor are in a letter from Col. Collins, of the 25th April, in which he does not mention that event as probable.

I think that the Nizam's government would do well to take Meer Khan into pay; and I dare say that his numbers will not amount to many more than those which his Highness is willing to entertain. I shall write my sentiments upon this subject to the Resident.

I conclude that you will move to the northward on this day. I do not expect that the Peshwah will arrive here for some time: but as all those who would be likely to interrupt his approach are at a distance, I do not think that your being at a distance from Poonah can be of any detriment; and I think that your movement to the northward will check Holkar's career. I have already written to him, to desire that he will refrain from plundering the Nizam; and to inform him that I had desired you to move towards Aurugabad, for the defence of his Highness' provinces in that quarter.

I have perused Mr. Kennedy's memorandum, and the medicines which he requires shall be supplied at Poonah, as well as the wine and the clothing. You must authorise him to entertain carriage for these articles, which carriage he must immediately send over to Poonah, to remove them to your camp. Send a small guard, either of sepoy's or Nizam's cavalry, with the cattle.

You must immediately establish an hospital, and leave in it all the sick of the Scotch brigade that require carriage. Look for some secure place for this establishment within the Nizam's frontier. If you do not do this, the first action you will have will be ruinous to you. I know that the surgeons will carry about the sick men till they die; although I am aware that, generally speaking, it is best to keep the sick with their corps: but in a case of this kind, where there are so many men sick, and the carriage for the sick is so insufficient, and there is every probability that there will be more sick, an hospital must be established, in which every case not on the mending hand ought to be thrown. I cannot give Mr. Kennedy any assistance of surgeons. The best man you have should be left in charge of the hospital, and the care of the corps from which you take him given to somebody else. One gentleman will easily attend two corps. I shall go back to my camp this night.

To Col. Munay.

Panownallah, 2nd May, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 30th April. I approve of your leaving only 3 companies at Panwell, under the notion that the Konkan is quiet, and likely to submit to the Peshwah's government; and that these companies will be sufficient to afford escorts to the supplies coming from thence, at least as far as the Bhore ghaut, where I have some troops.

I learn, from Col. Close, that there is a prospect that the places of which I requested you to get possession, in my letter of the 26th April, are likely to submit to the Peshwah. Their submission will bring matters in the Konkan to a state very favorable to our communications with Panwell. But their submission ought to be insured before our troops quit the Konkan: otherwise I shall either be obliged to send thither another detachment, or to have larger escorts than can be conveniently afforded for the supplies which must be drawn from Panwell. I expect

that those articles, of which I am most in want, will have been prepared to move from Panwell with you; otherwise the arrack, in particular, must follow at the earliest possible period, escorted by a party of the troops left for the security of the post. I have sent a small detachment with my brinjarries, who, however, I do not expect will arrive at Panwell for some days.

It is difficult to determine what ought to be done with your money. I brought from Mysore many coins not the currency of some of the districts through which I marched; but I prevailed upon the chiefs with me to publish proclamations stating the value of those coins, and promising that they should be received in payment of the revenue at the same. This expedient has also been lately adopted at Poonah, in respect to some of the coin in my camp.

It is probable that, if you mention this subject to Lieut. Col. Close, he will be able to prevail upon the Peshwah's government to adopt a measure of the same kind. If that cannot be done, I can suggest no remedy, excepting that you should purchase, with your gold mohurs, coins which are the currency of the Konkan, if they can be found. To issue the gold mohurs to the troops, or to the dealers, at a depreciated rate of exchange, will answer no purpose; and will only tend to increase hereafter our inconveniences, from having coins not the common currency of the country.

My pioneers are at work upon the Bhore ghaut, and I dare say that it will be very practicable by the time that you will arrive there. Be so kind as to leave behind your sand bags.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Poonah, 2nd May, 1803.

I came over here this morning, to see how my park was coming on, and I am happy to tell you that I have completed new wheels for 4 iron 12 pounders; and that, even if Bombay cannot assist me, of which I have my doubts, I shall soon be in style again.

I have just received your letter of the 30th April. Amrut Rao's vakeel is still with me; we have frequent conferences with him, and we know that he has no communication with any body else. No answer, however, has yet been received from Amrut Rao.

I am on good terms with the killadar of Loghur, though I believe he is a little afraid of me. I have, however, written to him twice, and have received friendly answers.

I have written this day to Col. Murray, about Bulwunt Rao's posts in the Konkan, and other matters, a letter which he will communicate to you. I told you that I had written to Chinchore Deo, but my letter will now be of no use, as he has joined the Peshwah. I hear all that Ram Dyall says, but I do not believe one word of it. I had yesterday a letter from Collins, dated the 25th April, from which it appears that no steps had been taken in the supposed treaty of peace so late as that day. I get some bullocks here, and I hope my own are recovering.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

I received last night your letters of the 12th and 24th, the former of which had gone to Madras by mistake.

I enclose a copy of a letter from Col. Collins to the Governor General, of the 25th April, which contains some information of importance. Col. Collins's private letter to me contained nothing but the account of Holkar's movement upon Aurungabad, of which I heretofore informed you. I likewise enclose an extract of a letter from Col. Close, in which he gives his opinion of the measures to be pursued, if it should be true that Scindiah is about to march from Burhampoor.

It is my opinion that it is by no means certain that Scindiah will advance to Poonah, and it is most probable that the report of his intended march has been circulated for the purpose of intimidating us, or the Nizam : however, it is as well to be prepared with a consideration of the measures to be adopted in case Scindiah should advance to Poonah.

I have no doubt whatever but that the force which will be here when the Peshwah shall arrive will be more than equal to contend with his, of which I enclose you an account : I am also of opinion that Col. Stevenson's force with the Nizam's army are fully equal to the defence of the Nizam's country against either Holkar or Scindiah. If both should unite in an attack on the Nizam's country, Col. Stevenson and I must co-operate or join in the defence of it, leaving at Poonah a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah's person against straggling parties : on the other hand, if both should approach Poonah, Col. Stevenson must come nearer to me.

You will probably be desirous that I should give my opinion regarding Lieut. Col. Close's proposal contained in the enclosed paragraph of his letter. In the event of Scindiah's advance, our military position ought to be such as to give confidence to those connected with us, and to show the wavering, and our enemies, that we are really in strength. It would not answer to move at once to Hyderabad, as you would thereby leave open the Rajah of Mysore's country, and the Company's ; and would remove the check upon the southern jaghiredars. But if you were to cross the Toombuddra, and move to Moodgul, you would be nearer the scene of action at Poonah, within 12 or 14 marches from Hyderabad, and close upon the southern jaghiredars. You would also be in a better situation to defend the Company's frontier.

In 6 weeks from this time the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will fill. I know that Native armies are then very incapable of carrying on their operations ; and you will be so near the Kistna, that you can decide whether you will cross it, and at once carry your decision into execution. We are upon very good terms with those of the southern jaghiredars who are with us. I have prevailed upon Appah Saheb to remain here till the Peshwah shall arrive ; and in consequence of a letter from Col. Close, in which he communicates the desire of the Peshwah that I should distribute 30,000 rupees among his officers who may be most distressed for money, to be repaid on his Highness' arrival at Poonah, I have advanced 20,000 rupees, at two different times, to Goklah. He also appears in very good temper. It is very probable, however, that, in case Scindiah should advance towards Poonah, the jaghiredars will become at best neutral, and will return to the southward under various pretences ; and if there should be nothing to check their enterprises, their neutrality would very soon degenerate into enmity.

I have opened a communication with Amrut Rao, and he has a vakeel in his camp. I have written to him, to recommend that he should separate himself from the Peshwah's enemies, and that he should formally declare that he had done so. In that case, hopes are held out to him that measures will be taken to reconcile him to his brother, according to his request through his vakeel to that purport.

The Rajah of Berar is certainly not dead. I am getting on well in the repair, or rather re-construction, of the carriages. I have called upon Mr. Duncan for a lac of pagodas, which I believe I shall receive. I will write to the Adj. Gen. on this subject as soon as I am certain that I shall get the money. I shall then have money sufficient to go on to the end of July; but I think it will be as well, in the present times, always to have 2 months' pay in hand.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

I received last night, upon my return from Poonah, your letters of the 28th, and one of the 1st inst.

It is very probable that Meer Khan intends to enter the Nizam's service: but he found the durbar rather dilatory in giving an answer to his proposals; and although he said that he had desired to be dismissed from Holkar's service, it is probable that he delayed to express that desire till he should be certain that he was to be received by the Nizam, with the number of followers that he should think proper to bring with him. Indeed, I think that, if he should quit Holkar's service, he will not take a formal leave: in the mean time, so long as he remains in it, it is natural that his troops should be enumerated amongst the forces of Holkar, and that the hirearrahs, who report what they hear, or the more numerous people who report what they invent, should detail the intended operations of that body as well as of the others.

In respect to the route to be taken by your provisions expected from Hyderabad, you must give your own orders to them. They are now, I suppose, directed to march upon Perinda by Beeder, and along the Mangeyra river: by the time that they arrive at Beeder, it is probable that you will have been able to determine upon the position which you will take, or upon your march to the northward, according to my letter of the 28th April, and you can direct the march of your provisions accordingly.

I heard yesterday evening, at Poonah, that Holkar had received some money from Aurungabad, how much I cannot say; and that he was gone off towards Hindustan. If this account be true, it will enable you to take up your proposed position on the Seenah.

I am sorry to find that you have reason to complain of your brinjaries. If you should want arrack, you must send carriage bullocks to Poonah for it, with a guard.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

Col. Stevenson will have acquainted you with the orders which I sent him on the 25th April, to move to the northward, towards Aurungabad, in consequence of the intelligence which I have received, that Jeswunt Rao

Holkar had approached that place with a body of troops. I also wrote to Jeswunt Rao, to urge him to refrain from the plunder of the Nizam's territories, and to apprise him that I had desired Col. Stevenson to move in the direction of Aurungabad to give them protection.

I have since been informed that Jeswunt Rao has levied a contribution upon Aurungabad, and that he has gone off to the northward; but I have not received this intelligence from any good authority.

I have perused a dispatch from Col. Collins to his Excellency the Governor General, of the 25th April, in which Col. Collins informs his Excellency that it is reported, in Scindiah's durbar, that that chief intends to commence his march towards Poonah on the 6th inst. I cannot give credit to this intention; and I am inclined to believe that the report of its existence is circulated with the same view that so many other reports of the same kind have been circulated lately, viz. to intimidate the Nizam, or the Hon. Company's government. However, it is necessary that we should be prepared to meet the hostility which must be intended if the chief should advance. This operation may be connected with a predatory invasion of the Nizam's territory by Holkar; or both parties may join in an operation against the force at Poonah; or the advance to Poonah may be laid aside, and both may invade the territories of the Nizam.

In any one of those cases, it is my opinion that Col. Stevenson, with the Nizam's army, ought to be placed 3 or 4 marches to the northward of Gardoon, nearly in the position in which he will find himself, after having made the movements directed, with a view to checking Jeswunt Rao Holkar's irruption into the Nizam's territory. If Holkar alone should operate on the Nizam's territory, Col. Stevenson will be fully equal to its defence. If both parties should join, either to force the British troops from Poonah, or invade the Nizam's territory, the Colonel and I will be so near each other, that we can combine our operations, or join, if it should be necessary.

I have received several letters from Col. Stevenson upon the subject of the negotiation between the officers of the government of his Highness the Nizam, and Meer Khan, to take that chief into his Highness' service. It appears that his Highness consents to take into service only 3000 men, whereas the number of Meer Khan's followers amounts to 25,000, according to his statement.

From my experience of these Native armies, I doubt whether Meer Khan will produce, at muster, more than double the number of men that his Highness consents to receive; but, when I am considering the means of defending his Highness' long line of frontier from the plunder of a light body of horse, I cannot refrain from recommending that, whatever may be Meer Khan's numbers, his Highness should take them into pay. If hostilities should be commenced, the expense will be more than repaid to him, and the people under his government; and the very circumstance of the purchase of the service of a chief, commanding so large a body of horse, of such repute as Meer Khan, and much in the confidence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will certainly shake the general confidence of his army, and may have the effect of preventing the threatened hostilities.

I repeat that I do not believe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will venture to

cross the Godavery, and expose himself to a conflict with the troops in this quarter, and to the certain consequences, to himself, of hostilities with the British government. I have to observe, however, that, if hostilities with Scindiah and Holkar should be the consequence of the present crisis of our affairs, the British government were never so well situated to carry them on with success, and to bring them to a speedy termination. The territories of the Nizam may suffer, from their vicinity to the scene of action; but this is a misfortune for which there is no remedy. It is probable that they would have suffered in a greater degree, if hostilities had commenced under other circumstances.

By all that I can learn, the Nizam has apprehended an attack from the Marhattas, at different periods in the last 3 or 4 years, and his frontiers have never been exempt from their predatory operations. If the attack had been made when the British troops were not in this quarter, the country must have suffered more than it can at present. But, supposing that there was no foundation for his Highness' former apprehensions, and that it was not probable, at the different periods supposed, that the Marhattas would attack him, I may safely assert, that the certain consequences of the establishment of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power at Poonah, founded, as it was, upon the momentary defeat of Scindiah's armies, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories. It would not have been possible for Jeswunt Rao to support his army for another season, in the countries which I have passed between the river Kistna and Poonah; and he must either have passed the Kistna, or have entered the Nizam's territory, if only for their support. The former measure, it is true, might procrastinate the evil for another year, and might divide it between the Nizam, the Company, and the Rajah of Mysore; but, within a year, and certainly with smaller means of defence, the Nizam's territories must have been the scene of operations of a Marhatta army.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 3rd May, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 2nd, in which you enclosed a copy of your address to the Governor General, of the same date, with a copy of its enclosure.

It gives me great satisfaction to reflect that, as soon as I had received intelligence of the irruption of Jeswunt Rao Holkar into the territories of the Nizam, I took measures for their defence; although, in order to do this, I was obliged to break up the disposition of the allied forces, of which his Highness the Nizam, and his ministers, had approved. The orders for Col. Stevenson's march were dated on the 28th April.

It is unfortunate that his Highness the Nizam's territories should be so situated as to be liable to the predatory invasions of the Marhattas; and it must be obvious to his Highness that no army can give them complete protection. Those places in which there are the greatest riches, and which may happen to be unprotected, must suffer; and for this reason it is advisable that his Highness should, at an early period, adopt measures for the defence of the rich cities, placed, like Aurungabad, upon his extreme frontier. In case there should be a contest with the Marhatta powers, the operations which may be necessary for the general defence of

his Highness' territories must oblige the army to leave some of these places at a distance; and each of them, being at a distance from the army, and not having in itself the means of defence, is liable to, and probably will, be plundered. It is easy to perceive, from the tenor of the paper which was sent to you by Azim ool Oomrah, that the Nizam is considerably alarmed at the prospect of a war with the Marhattas. A war with the Marhattas must have been the consequence of the proceedings in this part of India in the months of October and November last, and the Nizam's territories must have been the scene of its operations.

The advantageous military positions which we have taken up in consequence of our political arrangements with the Peshwah, and the additional force which those arrangements give us, may, in my opinion, still prevent the hostilities which are apprehended; at all events, will considerably alleviate their evil; but this must depend upon our own determination and exertions. We are much mistaken if we suppose that, to depart from our engagements with the Peshwah, and to give up the advantageous military position which we have taken, will alter the supposed intentions of the northern Marhatta powers to go to war, or will save the Nizam's territories. Such a line of conduct not only would expose his Highness' interests and power, but those of the Hon. Company, to the most imminent danger. I beg that you will do me the favor to assure the Nizam's government, that every thing I can do shall be done for the safety of his Highness' territories. I apprised Col. Stevenson, some days ago, of the reported intention of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to move towards Hyderabad. I desired him to watch his movements towards that place; and, if he found that he went that way, to march upon Hyderabad with all celerity.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 1st and 2nd inst. I return Collins's dispatch, of which I have transmitted a copy to Gen. Stuart.

It is my opinion that Scindiah will not move, and that the report of this intention has been circulated in order to try to intimidate us or the Nizam; or, that if he does move, that he will not venture to cross the Godavery. If he should, however, come this way, I think that Gen. Stuart ought to cross the Toombuddra, and come to Moodgul. I shall be more than equal to Scindiah; and Stevenson is fully equal to the defence of the Nizam's country. Hyderabad is reinforced by 2 battalions. If Scindiah and Holkar should join in moving here, or in an attack upon the Nizam, Stevenson and I must approach one another, and co-operate; leaving here, in the latter case, a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah's person.

Gen. Stuart's position at Moodgul will enable him to move upon Hyderabad, or Poonah, from neither of which he will be at any great distance, to provide for the defence of the Company's frontier, till the rivers fill, and to keep the southern jaghiredars in check. If he moves to Hyderabad at once, he abandons all the other objects.

I am pretty certain that we cannot expect much more than neutrality from the southern jaghiredars, if Scindiah and Holkar join hostilities against us, unless the Peshwah should cordially reconcile with them, and

handsomely reward them. They will return, under various pretences, to their jaghires; and, unless there should be some check upon them, their neutrality will soon degenerate into an enmity, more destructive to us, by far, than any we shall have to contend with in this quarter.

I will go to the ghaut, to meet the Peshwah, with pleasure; but you must be aware how prejudicial any length of absence will be; and I shall not, therefore, move till I hear from you, either that his Highness is at the ghaut, or the certain day on which he will be there. These delays are certainly terrible, particularly at the present moment. I am glad to find, from Col. Murray, that the Peshwah has possession of Abtah and Carnallah.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Edwood, Goorgherry.

3rd May, 1803.

The officer, who was sent to march the drafts ordered from the Native infantry corps in this detachment from the 1st extra battalion to Erroor, having reported to the General that a number of bazaar men and other descriptions of camp followers had joined him on his march to Erroor, and were proceeding towards Mysore, the General directs me to request that you will stop every person who may arrive at your post about the time that the drafts do; inquire of the jemidar who will be in charge of the drafts what he may know of those men; and you will make prisoner every one who may appear to you to have left camp without leave, and send the whole back to Erroor, or the post nearest to you on the road to Poonah, from whence they will be sent on to camp.

(Similar letters to Lieut. Christie at Sungoly, and Lieut. Stuart at Deogherry.)

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

I have to inform you that I have lately arrested, in this camp, 2 wandering Europeans, who, I rather believe, are deserters from the Portuguese service; and I have sent them in charge of a party going from hence to Panwell with brinjarry bullocks.

My object in arresting them was to prevent people of this description from frequenting this camp, with a view to entice the European soldiers to desert; and I have directed that they may be sent over to Bombay, and delivered over in charge to the town major of that garrison.

I shall be obliged to you if you will bring my request before the Hon. the Governor in Council, that these men may be sent to Goa by the first opportunity that may offer.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Col. Montresor, in which he recommends that Lieut. Bruton may be appointed Brigade Major in Malabar. You will observe what he says respecting Capt. Watson, to whom, I believe, it was your intention to give this appointment.

I likewise enclose a letter which I have received from Capt. Noble, upon the subject of his allowances. I have seldom seen an officer who has taken more pains with a department, and has brought one on with

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

Frequent complaints are made that soldiers and sepoys stop the people bringing in forage for sale, and take it from them at their own price; the consequence will be, that the inhabitants will cease to bring forage for sale at all, from which great inconvenience will be experienced. This practice is forbid; and no forage is to be forced from a man bringing it in for sale. The only remedy for the dearth of forage is to send out followers to cut it, by which means the demand will be diminished, and of course the price must fall.

more success, than Capt. Noble has that intrusted to his charge; and he is now most usefully employed in the reconstruction of all our wheels, in which he has made more progress, under all disadvantages, than has been made in the arsenal of Bombay.

The Peshwah had not arrived at Panwell at 2 o'clock yesterday; but Col. Close wrote, at that hour, that he expected him in the evening.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 3rd. This delay of the Peshwah is terrible.

A letter goes this day to Capt. Young, at Panwell, upon the subject of the supplies there. The first plan was, to lodge every thing in store-houses; afterwards, it was determined that nothing should be landed, but that all should remain in boats, till the cattle should be prepared to receive their contents. I do not know for what reason this last plan has been departed from; but I have desired Capt. Young to take care to place every thing under cover that he may land. The brinjaries are gone down, and this day a number of bullocks will go off for grain. Capt. Young, as well as Capt. Moor, will be apprised of their number.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 2nd and 3rd; and have desired the officer in command of the troops in the Bhore ghaut to relieve the detachment coming with the arrack, and to forward it to me. It is very desirable that the tranquillity of the Konkan should be insured, before the whole of your detachment moves up the ghauts; but I imagine that, when the Peshwah moves forward, and is prepared to ascend the Bhore ghaut, it will not be possible for you to remain behind with the main body of the detachment. This, however, will depend upon the communications which you will have with Lieut. Col. Close.

I have little doubt but that the forts of Abtah and Carnallah will admit the Peshwah's garrisons, and that then the tranquillity of the Konkan will be insured.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 5th May, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 3rd. I am glad to find that you are getting on so well, and that you have so fair a prospect of reaching your destination.

It is now reported that Holkar has quitted the Nizam's territories, and is about to move to the northward; but I cannot say what truth there is in this report. Col. Collins writes that Scindiah was to march from Burhampoor on the 6th inst.: I cannot say whether or not he will carry that intention into execution, or, supposing that he should, with what object. But it is necessary that we should take into consideration the general views which he may have, and that we should be prepared with plans accordingly. This march of Scindiah may be preceded by, or connected with, a reconciliation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and it may be intended to interrupt the execution of the arrangement between the Company and the Peshwah. The parties may attempt to carry into execution this intention,

by an invasion of the Nizam's territories by Holkar, while Scindiah will advance towards Poonah. In that case, the defence of the Nizam's territories must depend upon you and the Nizam's army, while I shall deal with Scindiah: or both parties may invade the Nizam's territories; in which case, your force and mine must confine their operations to their defence, leaving at Poonah a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah's person: or both parties may advance together towards Poonah; in which case, your force and mine must co-operate, or join in this quarter.

In each of these last hypotheses, you will observe the necessity that we should be within reach of each other; at the same time that it is necessary that you should be in a situation to defend the Nizam's territories, if they should be attacked, and that I should be at no great distance from Poonah. The position which you propose to take upon the Seenah appears to be the best that you could have for all purposes; and I think it probable that it will check all predatory invasions of the Nizam's territory; particularly if you keep the Nizam's light cavalry in motion along the frontier, and thus frighten any small party from coming in.

I beg you to bear in mind the general view I have above given of the probable plans of those to whom we may be opposed, and that of the mode in which we must act to defeat them. With the imperfect knowledge we have of their designs, it is impossible to do more at present than lay down general principles and objects; and I rely upon you for doing every thing in your power to forward my wishes. I have just heard that the Peshwah will be up the ghaut this day, in which case he will be at Poonah about the 7th or 8th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 5th May, 1803.

I have received your 2 letters of the 3rd in the evening. In respect to Col. Murray's march, my first idea was, that I should put the Peshwah in possession of Abtah and Carnallah, with a part of the detachment; while the remainder should be employed in removing the carriages up the ghaut, and in escorting his Highness towards Poonah. The Colonel then informed me that he believed that Abtah and Carnallah had surrendered; and that he proposed to leave only a small force at Panwell, with which arrangement I told him, in my letter of the 21st, that I was satisfied, provided it was certain that we had Abtah and Carnallah. Yesterday I got a letter from him, proposing to remain in the Konkan with his whole force; in answer to which, I told him that it would not be possible for him to remain behind with the main body, when the Peshwah would ascend the ghaut; and that the strength of the detachments to be left, if the forts of Abtah and Carnallah should not have surrendered, must depend upon his communications with you.

In regard to the depôt at Panwell, my first idea was, that every thing should be landed, storehouses erected, and all matters arranged in such manner, as that none of the difficulties and inconveniences would have occurred which you have mentioned. The gentlemen at Bombay, however, seemed to think that the best mode of proceeding was, not to land the stores, till the cattle, &c., should have arrived to receive them, and that

they should then be delivered from the boats. I agreed to this proposal, and suggested all the arrangements which were likely to facilitate its execution. I imagine that they now find that large boats cannot come up to Panwell; that small boats loaded reach it with difficulty, and that the stores would be exposed to the weather in these last; that it would be difficult to deliver them from these small boats, and therefore that it is best to land them at once; and now they experience some inconveniences on account of the want of storehouses, and they are reduced to adopt the expedients which you have mentioned. A little inquiry upon these points, before they sent over the stores, and proposed that they should be delivered from the boats, would perhaps have been as well. However, as it is now, a letter has been written to Capt. Young, referring him to the government of Bombay for orders to build store rooms, if they should be wanted; and a copy of this letter has been sent to Bombay.

In respect to the use which I shall make of the dépôt at Panwell, I have to observe that it must depend upon circumstances. I have sent down to Panwell all the bullocks I had that could walk; I have apprised the government of Bombay of their number, of the loads which they could carry, and of what kinds of stores; and I have regulated the mode in which these stores should be issued. I have also required from the government of Bombay certain stores for which I could not send carriage; viz. arrack, ordnance wheels, and iron to repair ordnance wheels; and I have requested the government of Bombay to collect the coolies, who could be hired in Bombay, in certain proportions, to carry up these articles. If they have, in the first place, proceeded upon false information regarding the river at Panwell, and afterwards have omitted to give their officer proper instructions regarding the issue of the stores, I see no remedy for the inconvenience which will be the result of these errors and omissions, excepting patience to wait till they shall have corrected them. I have no officer whom I could send there, that would be of the smallest use: indeed, from what I have above written, you will observe, that, if I were there myself, I could do no good. I have considered Capt. Moor's proposal to supply me with cash, upon which the following reflections have occurred.

The expenses of my division amount to about one lac of pagodas *per mensem*; and it is my opinion that I ought to have always 2 months' pay in hand. Capt. Moor's source of supply is a good one, if I can stay at or near Poonah, and if matters at Poonah should become so settled as to restore confidence to the people of property, that they will not be afraid to show their riches.

I cannot be certain, under present circumstances, that it will be proper for me to remain at or near Poonah. Many events may occur which will render it absolutely necessary that I should move towards the Nizam's frontier; and, on the other hand, if Scindiah commences his march on the 6th of this month, as is supposed, we must not expect the immediate revival of confidence in Poonah. I have, therefore, written to Mr. Duncan, to desire him to send me money; and I have suggested, that I should give bills upon him for money to whoever would advance me any; and that I should be allowed to take it up upon receipt from any person that will give it, which receipts are to be replaced by bills to be drawn upon Be-

nares or Calcutta, by the government of Bombay. By all these modes put together, I may get the sums I want. After paying the troops their pay for April, I shall have money enough to pay them for May in the beginning of June, independently of all foreign supplies.

P. S. I have just heard that the Peshwah will be up the ghaut; and I leave this place in the morning to meet him at Karly, or wherever he may encamp, to-morrow.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Panowullah, 7th May, 1803.

I went out yesterday to meet the Peshwah; and I have the pleasure to inform you, that his Highness passed this camp this morning, and is now in a village between this and Poonah. I imagine that he will wait there for a day or two, for a lucky one to make his entry; but, as we have him so near, it is not of material consequence.

There has been some difficulty respecting the delivery of the fort of Carnallah, in the Konkan, to the Peshwah's authority; and Col. Murray has halted below the ghauts for orders regarding it. As this fort lies close to the communication with Panwell, and there is no middle road to be taken with respect to this killadar, whose obedience to the Peshwah's orders and authority must be enforced, I have, in concert with Col. Close, desired Col. Murray to put his Highness' officers in possession of Carnallah. I rather believe that it will be given up to him without difficulty: but, lest it should not, and it should be necessary to attack the fort with guns, I have requested Mr. Duncan to send some to Panwell, from Bombay. Carnallah is but a short distance from Panwell.

I have had only an interview of form with the Peshwah, and I cannot as yet give you any idea of the shape into which he proposes to put his government. But we propose to press him on this point as soon as possible.

I have no news from the northward: Col. Stevenson has marched, according to my instructions of the 28th April.

To the Officer commg. the pioneers, Bhore ghaut.

Camp, 7th May, 1803.

On the receipt of this letter, you will be so kind as to prepare 6 ladders, each of 30 feet long. As soon as they shall be prepared, you will send them, with 100 pioneers, to join the detachment under Col. Murray, at Choke. I beg you to apply to Col. Murray, if you should require any gunpowder to blow rocks, in order to make a practicable road down the pass.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Panowullah, 7th May, 1803.

I have received your notes of the 4th. I have little doubt but that, if Holkar should be still before Aurungabad when you have made your supposed four marches, he will leave that place; and it is then desirable that you should halt, for the reasons I have mentioned to you in my late letters. But if, notwithstanding your first advance and my letter, he should still remain near Aurungabad, and should still press that place, you must continue your march forward and beat him off: Under present circumstances, however, I do not mean that you should follow him; as, in so doing, you might get yourself so far forward, that, if he and Scindiah should join, you might be in a scrape, before I could give you support.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the Peshwah is now between this camp and Poonah.

I have pressed Major Kirkpatrick upon the subject of Meer Khan; and you may inform his friend Noor ool Oomrah of this circumstance, and tell him that I think he and his whole party will be taken into the Nizam's service. But tell Noor ool Oomrah that it is necessary that Meer Khan should now move across the Godavery, and out of the Peshwah's territory; and take care not to touch upon those of the Nizam, otherwise he may chance to feel the weight of the English swords, before he comes to be in the way of fighting on our side. If he does not immediately move out of the Peshwah's country, I must arrange an expedition against him.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Panowillah, 7th May, 1803.

I delayed to answer your different letters upon the subject of the refusal of the killadar to deliver up the fort of Carnallah to the Peshwah's officers, till I should have an opportunity of conversing with Lieut. Col. Close upon that subject. I availed myself of an opportunity afforded by the arrival of the Peshwah yesterday in this neighbourhood. I have determined that I will not suffer the Peshwah's authority to be trampled upon in the manner in which it has been by the killadar of Carnallah; and that the detachment under your command shall be immediately employed in getting possession of that fort for his Highness.

As soon after the receipt of this letter as may be convenient for you, you will march back to Choke. I enclose an order to the officer commanding the pioneers in the ghauts to prepare scaling ladders, and to send them after you, by a number of pioneers, sufficient to carry them with ease to the attack of the place. On your arrival at Choke you will reconnoitre closely the fort of Carnallah. If from the view which you will take of the place, and the accounts which you will receive of its strength, you should have reason to believe that you will be able to get possession of it without breaching the wall, you will attack it as soon as the pioneers shall have brought you the ladders from the ghauts. If you should think it necessary to delay in order to breach the place, you must wait at Choke till the guns arrive, for which I have written to Bombay. In either case, you will send to the killadar a letter, (which will be transmitted to you this afternoon,) about 2 hours before you make your attack.

For many reasons, but principally because it will save time, and will contribute much to our military reputation in this country, I should prefer to attack this fort without breaching its walls: but I must observe that those attacks are not certain in their issue, unless they can be made at more than one point at the same time; and unless you can cover the advance of the troops for the assault by a heavy fire of musketry on the defences, and, if possible, by an enfilade of the part attacked.

You will keep these observations in your recollection, in coming to a determination upon the mode in which you will attack the place; but if the ground should be at all favorable, you have such a fine body of European troops, that I have no doubt but that they will take the place by escalade. If you should attack Carnallah, the garrison must be made an example of. It will not answer to be obliged to attack many of these

places; and nothing but a severe example of the garrisons of those which may be attacked will prevent the occurrence of this necessity every day.

The D.A.G. to Major Doolan, commg. at Hullahall.

7th May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley has ordered the paymaster with this detachment to advance 500 sultany pagodas to the vakeel of the Rajah of Kittoor, for the pay of that Rajah's troops who accompany the detachments; and the vakeel has granted his receipt for the money and engaged that his master shall pay the money to you at Hullahall. To this end I enclose a certified copy of the vakeel's receipt, and a letter from him to the Rajah of Kittoor. The General desires that you will forward the letter by a hircarrah; and when the money is paid to you in Hullahall, that you will give up the duplicate of the vakeel's receipt (after writing your own receipt upon the back of it) to the person who pays the money. You will pay the money into Mr. Gordon's office at Hullahall, and inform him that you have done so on account of Capt. Graham, the paymaster with this detachment, and desire him to transmit to Capt. Graham a bill for the amount.

[To Major Kirkpatrick (omitted letter), 8th May, 1803, see Addenda, p. 1159.]

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 8th May, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th April, and I rejoice to find that your means of movement are so ample. My cattle were certainly much distressed upon their arrival in this neighbourhood, but rest has brought some of them about again. I get some in this country, and I have called upon Mr. Duncan for supplies of others.

I think that, upon the whole, I shall be as well off as ever, before circumstances will permit me to move from Poonah. At all events, I doubt whether I should derive any benefit from your cattle if you were to send them; because, although I know that forage is to be got all along the road, excepting perhaps near Poonah, I do not think the bullock people would make the necessary exertions to procure it, and the cattle would arrive here in a state unfit for service. Thus, without doing this detachment any benefit, you would deprive yourself of an advantage, which may be essentially necessary to you hereafter. I do not want either grain or military stores, and I believe I shall not want money. However, I shall be able to form a better judgment upon this point in a few days, when I hope I shall have ascertained whether the persons who have been employed by Mr. Duncan to supply me have the necessary means in their power.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Col. Collins. You will there see what his opinion is of the views of the northern chiefs at present. In a letter, however, he says he knows, from undoubted authority, that Scindiah disapproves of the present measures of his minister, and he has privately signified thus much to the Colonel.

The Peshwah does not go into Poonah until Friday or Saturday next; but that is a matter of little consequence, as we shall immediately begin our business with him, and I hope we shall make more progress here than we should even if he were at Poonah. Col. Close has pressed him to allow me to have a conference with him this evening. I shall inform you of all the particulars that may pass whenever I shall see him.

Col. Close has given up his opinion of your movement towards Hyderabad, and entirely agrees with me, that the best position for your force would be that which I took the liberty of suggesting to you. He says, that the fact is that all the southern jaghiredars, and every man who has

any property in the empire, wish to see the present arrangement carried into execution, as the only security for that property; but that they are afraid and ashamed to join in its establishment, on account of the adverse party, and of the abuse which has been lavished upon the Peshwah, and all those who have adhered to him, or who have assisted us. The force stationed at Moodgul, which would be an obvious check upon them, would likewise afford them an excuse for doing that which they must see to be their interest. You will probably have heard, from the Resident at Hyderabad, of the irruption at Aurungabad. It is fortunate I took such early measures to defend his Highness' country, of which the Resident at Hyderabad has been informed. I hear daily from Col. Stevenson: he is getting on well; and he says, in his last letter, that Holkar is gone off from Aurungabad. I had already heard this report, but I cannot say whether it is true or not. I do not know whether Holkar has levied a contribution upon Aurungabad.

To the killadar of Carnallah.

Camp, 8th May, 1803.

I have learnt, with some degree of concern, that, when you were desired, by Naroo Punt Chinchore Deo, to deliver up the fort of Carnallah to Pundit Purdhaun, you refused, and have kept possession of the fort, contrary to his Highness' wishes and commands. I have now to inform you, that I have orders, from the British government, to establish and support his Highness' just and accustomed authority in the Marhatta empire, and to defend it against all who may be inclined to attack it; and a sufficient force has been placed under my command to enable me to obey those orders. I shall, therefore, begin by putting his Highness in possession of the fort of Carnallah, which undoubtedly belongs to him.

I hereby desire you immediately to deliver up that fort to Col. Murray; and I give you notice, that he has my orders to attack it in 2 hours after you shall receive this letter. I also give you notice, that, if he should be obliged to attack the fort, he has my orders to make an example of you and the garrison. I, therefore, recommend you to take advantage of the leisure afforded you, to send away your women and children.

On the other hand, if you choose to deliver up the fort, Col. Murray has my orders to give you cowle; and you may go wherever you please with your garrison, your property, and that of your troops, excepting government stores and public property; but your decision must be immediate.

To Bappoo Rao Augria.

Camp, 8th May, 1803.

You will have heard that, in consequence of engagements entered into between the British government and Pundit Purdhaun, I have advanced with a British army to Poonah; and the consequence is, that his Highness is restored to his musnud. I enclose you a proclamation, according to which I have directed, and shall continue to direct, my conduct, while I shall remain in this country. I shall attack nobody who does not attack me, or the Peshwah, or who does not oppose the just and accustomed authority of his Highness' government; and I write to you as a friend, to apprise you of these circumstances, and to desire you to remain in full

confidence, that, so long as you conduct yourself like a faithful servant to his Highness, no harm shall be done to you.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 8th May, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a letter for the killadar of Carnallah, and another for Angria. You will transmit the former, according to the directions contained in my letter of yesterday: you will send the latter to Angria, whenever you may find it convenient. I likewise enclose translations of those letters. I learn that there is a scarcity of water in the fort of Carnallah, for which reason the garrison was lately diminished in numbers. I conclude, from this circumstance, as well as from your account of the strength of the garrison, either that the fort will be evacuated upon your return to Choke, or when the killadar shall learn that you intend to attack it; at all events, that you will be able to attack it as soon as you shall receive the ladders. When you shall have possession of Carnallah, you will deliver it over to the Peshwah's officer, who is in that neighbourhood; and you will march to join me as soon as it shall be convenient to you.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 9th May, 1803.

Matters have taken rather a serious turn to the northward. It appears, by the dispatches come in from Col. Collins, one of the 1st, the other of the 2nd, that the Rajah of Berar has marched from Nagpoor, towards Oomrawootty, which place appears to be within the Nizam's northern boundary; that Scindiah was about to move from Burhampoor on the 4th, to meet the Rajah of Berar near that place, also within the Nizam's boundary; and that Scindiah has, in a letter to the Governor General, positively declared his right to demand choute from the Nizam's territories.

Col. Collins had written a letter to Scindiah on the 2nd, to desire to withdraw from his court, (if he was about to enter the Nizam's territories to meet the Berar Rajah,) and to have an escort to conduct him to Poonah. He had not received an answer to this letter. I do not know where Holkar is, but I imagine that he also is gone to the northward. Col. Collins says that Meer Khan has joined him. As soon as I can get the Peshwah into Poonah, I intend to march towards the Nizam's frontier. You must have an eye to this collection to the northward. Scindiah has rather hurried forward his march from Burhampoor, from which I conjecture that some enterprise of importance, in the Nizam's country, is intended, previous to the rains.

The only enterprise which will signify one pin will be an attempt upon Hyderabad. You must, therefore, be prepared to march towards Hyderabad immediately, if you should find that they go that way. Ascertain the road, distances, &c. If they do not move towards Hyderabad, in a few days after you receive this letter, you may depend upon it they will not attempt it. They will not have time to establish themselves there, or to plunder the place, before the Godavery fills; and they will not like to risk an attack upon their armies, by our united force, with that river full in their rear. Upon these grounds, therefore, I recommend that, for a short time, you should keep your eye upon Hyderabad. Afterwards, we may look to other objects.

The Peshwah goes into Poonah on Friday. I shall move, immediately afterwards, towards the Nizam's frontier. I have received your letter of the 7th.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.

I received, this day, your letter of the 22nd April; and I shall immediately write the dispatches which you have desired I should. As, however, appearances are doubtful to the northward, as you will perceive by Col. Collins's late dispatches, I cannot fix the time at which the troops can return to their stations; but I still think we shall not have a war.

We are playing a little at cross purposes here. Col. Collins encourages Scindiah to march to Poonah, or rather does not object to that march, which ought to be done at present. Col. Close and I think that the Peshwah ought to write to Scindiah, to inform him that he has regained his power, and that he must not come here; and that I ought to write a letter to Scindiah, in similar terms. The consequence of his coming will be a contest, preceded by a long Marhatta negotiation, in the course of which he will intrigue with all the Peshwah's chiefs, shake their allegiance, and throw the country (which is getting into order) into a new scene of confusion. It is better, by far, that the contest should be at a distance; but there is a far better chance of avoiding it entirely, if we keep him away.

We ought to have some authority here to settle matters with all these chiefs, under some general instructions from you. The state of affairs varies daily; and, before orders can come from Bengal upon any question, the circumstances which ought to guide the decision have entirely changed. Besides, the fact that Col. Collins does not object to Scindiah's march to Poonah, and that Col. Close and I think it necessary to object to it, shows the propriety of vesting some person with authority to direct all our affairs in this quarter.

Malcolm is not very well, and is gone into Poonah; but I have proposed to him to go to Bengal, to point out to you the state of affairs in this quarter, and to urge the adoption of this measure.

You will hear, from Col. Close, how the Peshwah is going on. As soon as he makes his entry into Poonah, and I shall have settled, at that place, the detachment which may be deemed sufficient for the protection of his person, I intend to move towards the Nizam's frontier.

To Lord Hobart, Sec. of State.

Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.

In consequence of orders from his Excellency the Governor General, of which I enclose a copy, I transmit to your Lordship an account of the proceedings of the British troops under my command, to this date.

You will have heard from the government that I was detached in the month of March from the army assembled on the frontiers of Mysore, with about 9000 men, to effect a junction with the Company's troops subsidized by the Nizam, and his Highness' army assembled on the western frontier; and then to proceed to Poonah, in order to assist in the restoration of the Peshwah to the exercise of the power of his government. I marched nearly 600 miles through the territories of the Marhattas, not only unopposed by them, but receiving all the assistance which

their country could afford. As the country, however, through which I marched since I crossed the river Kistna had been the scene of the horrid depredations of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's troops, I could not draw much from it.

I was joined on my march by several of the jaghiredars in the southern districts, principally those who served with the British troops under my command in the year 1800; and by the Peshwah's officers who had quitted his Highness, by his desire, when he fled from Mhar, after the defeat of his army by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in the neighbourhood of Poonah. At length I formed a junction with the subsidiary force and the Nizam's army, to the northward of Punderpoor, on the 15th April.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar quitted Poonah in the end of March, and went towards Chandore, a fortress in his possession to the northward of the river Godavery. His detachments, which had been as far to the southward as the neighbourhood of Meritch and that of Beejapoor, fell back as I advanced, and at length went off to the northward when I formed the junction with the Nizam's army. I was thus enabled to make a disposition of the troops which would provide for the security of the Nizam's frontier; and for that of the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to his capital. Accordingly, having reinforced the subsidiary force by a regiment of European infantry, I broke up immediately again and moved upon Poonah, with my own division and the Marhattas, where I arrived on the 20th April; and I left the Nizam's troops upon his Highness' frontier.

From thence, in the neighbourhood of Gardoon, our line extended to the western ghauts, and the troops could subsist with ease, and could assemble at any point at a short notice. After I had made this disposition, I learned that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had entered the Nizam's territories in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, that he had surrounded that city with his troops, and had demanded large sums of money from the inhabitants.

The Peshwah was not arrived at Poonah; but as he was attended by a detachment of the Bombay army, consisting of the 78th regt., 5 companies of the 84th, and a battalion of Native infantry, with artillery, under Col. Murray, there was every appearance that his march to his capital would be uninterrupted.

On the 28th April, I ordered Col. Stevenson, the commanding officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, to move to the northward with that force and the Nizam's army. I expected that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whom I apprised of these orders, would draw off, as soon as he should find that Col. Stevenson was approaching him, and he has done so. Col. Stevenson is now posted upon the river Seenah, about 50 miles to the northward of Gardoon; from which place he can protect the Nizam's frontier as far as Aurungabad, or he can move towards Hyderabad, or can join with my division, as may appear advisable.

The Peshwah arrived at Chinchore, about 8 miles from Poonah, on the 7th inst., and his Highness proposes to make his entry into his capital on the 13th inst. By that time the detachment from the Bombay army, under Col. Murray, will have got possession of the fort of Car-

nallah, in the Konkan, the killadar of which refused to deliver the fort to his Highness the Peshwah; and I shall then move towards the frontier of the Nizam.

It is impossible to obey the orders conveyed in the second and third paragraphs of the enclosed copy of a letter from his Excellency the Governor General, for reasons connected with certain political events which have occurred since the probable date of his Excellency's dispatches to your Lordship. At that period the Governor General must have received the accounts from the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; from which there was every reason to believe, from his own declarations, that that prince was satisfied in his own mind that the treaty of Bassein contained no stipulations injurious to his interests, and that he would not endeavor to prevent the parties from carrying it into execution. But by dispatches written to the Governor General by the Resident with Scindiah, on the 25th April and the 1st and 2nd inst., copies of which I have perused, it appears that the disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam is not so friendly as might have been expected, and that that prince intended to march from Burhampoor on the 4th inst. I am doubtful of the direction of his march; but it is reported that he intends to approach the Nizam's frontier, to meet there the Rajah of Berar.

Your Lordship will observe, that I have already taken measures for the defence of the territories of his Highness the Nizam, and that I propose to march to that quarter with my own division, as soon as the Peshwah shall have entered Poonah, leaving at that city such a detachment of the Bombay troops as may be deemed sufficient for the protection of his Highness' person. These measures, as they must preclude all hopes of forming an establishment within the Nizam's frontier, or of any very lucrative plunder, in the short space of time between this and the period at which the rivers will fill that rise in the western ghauts, may probably prevent the supposed march into the Nizam's territories. At all events, it is my opinion that neither Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, nor Jeswant Rao Holkar, will venture to remain within our reach, where their operations will be confined by the rivers. Therefore, the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if it should be made, will be confined to his frontiers.

Upon the whole, considering the slight hopes of advantage which these Chiefs can have in this invasion, and the certain loss to which two of them at least must be liable, from a state of hostility with the British government, with which your Lordship must be well acquainted, I cannot believe that they will venture upon a course of measures so hopeless; and it is probable that the reports of the march of the Rajah of Berar, and of the direction of the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam's territories, have been circulated with a view to intimidate the Peshwah and the Nizam. But until the views of these princes are decided, it is impossible to recommend that the army in this quarter should be broken up. In the mean time, the Peshwah's government is settling fast; and his Highness appears to be decided to adhere to the treaty with the Company, and to forward all the objects of the alliance. If, contrary to my

expectations, the northern Chiefs should be determined upon hostilities with the British government, the military position which we have obtained by the treaty of Bassein, and by the rapid march of the division under my command, and the advanced state of our military preparations, afford means of protecting the territories of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

It is unfortunate that the territories of the Nizam should have suffered by the irruption of a freebooter at Aurungabad, and that they should be threatened again by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Benar. But scarcely a year has passed in which his Highness has not suffered or apprehended a similar misfortune; and there is no doubt but that he must have suffered in a greater degree in this year, if the treaty of Bassein had not been concluded.

The certain consequence of the establishment of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Poonah must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territory, if only for the subsistence of the troops. It would not have been possible to draw subsistence for those numerous bodies of horse, for another year, from the countries between the Godavery and the Kistna, through which I have marched; and they must have sought for it either in the Nizam's territories or in the countries to the southward of the Kistna. In either case, the Nizam's territories would have been invaded; and in the latter, those of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

Although it is by no means certain that endeavors will be made by any of the Marhatta chiefs to interrupt the execution of the treaty of Bassein, yet, as appearances are doubtful, and the reports which are in circulation may reach your Lordship, I have thought it proper to avail myself of the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, to make you acquainted with the real state of the public affairs in this quarter; and with the means which we have of resisting this interruption, and of defending the Company's ally, the Nizam.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 10th May, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a dispatch of the 2nd inst., from Col. Collins. The purport of the Persian letter to the Governor General was, an assertion of Scindiah's claim to choute from the Nizam, and a determination to support it. The paragraph to which Col. Collins objects, is one in which Scindiah declines the interference of the British government, in the dispute between him and the Nizam about choute.

I hope that Col. Collins will have been induced to remain in Scindiah's camp. I think that he was rather hasty in his determination to withdraw; and that, by withdrawing, on the grounds of Scindiah's altering the direction of his march, he has done no good. Scindiah's ministers will still go on negotiating with Col. Collins's Native agents, and they will persuade their master that the absence of the Colonel from his camp is not a novel occurrence, and is not a sign of war. Thus we shall lose all the advantages of the check upon them of Col. Collins's presence, and of his influence over Scindiah; and, by the manner in which he has withdrawn, he has not given Scindiah any reason to fear the commencement of hostilities with the Company.

The Peshwah is not yet gone into Poonah; but business goes on here, and his Highness is making the necessary arrangements of his government, and appointing his ministers, and appears determined to adhere to his treaty with the Company, and to carry into effect the objects of the alliance. We do not yet know that Scindiah has marched; but, as soon as the Peshwah goes into Poonah, and Col. Murray arrives with a detachment of the Bombay army, I propose to move towards the Nizam's frontier, in order to be rather nearer to Col. Stevenson.

The number of the royalist sirdars is increasing. I have received messages from two or three this morning, desiring to send vakeels to me, to intercede for them with the Peshwah.

This moment is critical: the rivers will fill in about a month, and it appears to me that Scindiah, if he intends hostilities, has marched in this hurry, either to establish himself in some post of consequence, or to make a dash at Hyderabad, so as to get back across the Godavery before that river fills. Col. Stevenson is well placed to impede this operation, and I have desired him to have a watchful eye upon the proceedings to the northward, and march at once on Hyderabad, if he should find that they have views upon that place: but I do not imagine that any of those chiefs would like to incur the risk of the consequences of their being to the southward of the Godavery when that river may fill. A few days will put that place in safety; as, after the period at which the Godavery shall fill, they will not choose to venture across that river.

We are all anxious to receive a communication of your sentiments upon the subject of Col. Collins's former dispatch, announcing Scindiah's intention to march upon the 6th. Major Malcolm is unwell, and is gone into Poonah.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 10th May, 1803.

Since I wrote you this morning, another dispatch has been received from Col. Collins, a copy of which I enclose. I do not know where Badowly is. It is very obvious that they are afraid of allowing Col. Collins to quit Scindiah's camp, although it is difficult to say what is their object.

Col. Collins intends to press the Peshwah to desire Scindiah not to advance to Poonah; and I think that I ought to write him a letter to say that such is the Peshwah's wish, and that it is proper it should be complied with. Before I determine upon this point, however, I shall see what the Peshwah will write. I am very anxious to know your determination regarding your future position.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 10th May, 1803, 6 P.M.

News is come in from Holkar's camp of the 14th Mohurroom, or the 6th May: he was then near Aurungabad, but not at the place. Stevenson was upon the Seenah on the 7th, and was rather inclined to halt, for which I am not sorry, as we are thereby secure of Hyderabad. We can suffer no more at Aurungabad than we have already.

A dispatch is come from Collins of the 4th. Scindiah had asked him to stay, and said that he intended to march upon Poonah by Badowly, in

company with the Rajah of Berar. Scindiah marched on the 4th, and Collins was to follow him on the 5th. The Peshwah is to be desired to tell Scindiah not to come to Poonah, and I am to write to him to the same purport.

Madhoo Rao Rastia's vakeel has been here to beg pardon for not coming, and to promise good behaviour in future. No other news.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 11th May, 1803.

I have received a letter this day from Mr. Duncan, by which I learn that the chance of my being supplied with money from Bombay is but very small; and I think that I cannot depend much upon getting money at Poonah for bills upon Bombay or Bengal. I shall, therefore, be obliged to you if you will send me a lac of pagodas. Silver answers better here than gold, that is to say, if they are rupees of the proper kind, such as Chandore, of which I believe you can have but very few: but Sultauny or Behaudry pagodas will answer better than any other silver coin, than those or than any gold coin.

There is another advantage in these pagodas, which is, that they can be easily coined. In my opinion, the best way of sending this money would be on the hircarrahs camels, escorted by a company of Native infantry. They ought to go from your camp to Sungoly, on the Malpoorba, either direct by Dummul, Gudduck, Noolgoond, Bedkeerah, and Sungoly; or by the Werdah and the road by which I marched. If they come by the former route, it would be as well that there should be 2 companies for the escort as far as Sungoly, as they will pass through Goklah's country, where there may be some of his troops in distress. From Sungoly they will go to Goorgherry upon the Gutpurba, and thence to Erroor on the Kistna; and from Erroor by the direct road to Poonah, upon which instructions will be sent to the officer commanding at Erroor. The officer ought to be instructed to take care to keep the camels well fed, and to make long marches, generally in the night if he can. I have no news this day. I am to see the Peshwah this evening.

To Col. Murray.

Chinchoe, 11th May, 1803.

I received yesterday your letter of the 9th inst.; and by one which I have also received from the officer commanding the pioneers, I observe that the scaling ladders will have arrived at Choke yesterday: I hope, therefore, you will have received them this day.

By a dispatch I have this day received from Mr. Duncan, I learn that, agreeably to my request, the 18 pounder guns were to be sent from Bombay to Panwell, on the 9th, in the event of their being found necessary for the reduction of the fort of Carnallah: as, however, their arrival at Panwell may still be considered doubtful, and, at all events, their being used may be attended with considerable delay, it is very desirable that the business at that fort should, if possible, be effected without them.

I am glad you propose to supply your want of cash from that coming from Panwell to my camp, amounting, as I understand, to 40,000 rupees.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Hestland.

11th May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th, and to inform you that, as you are employed under his own immediate orders and directions, you cannot detach any of your men without reference to him; and he desires that you will attend to any suggestions that Col. Murray may make respecting the work in the ghaut.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 12th May, 1803.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Collins. I do not know where Shawpoor* is.

I came here this day, in order to turn out our line for the Peshwah, on his arrival to-morrow.† I visited his Highness yesterday evening, according to appointment; but as his ministers said that he had no apartment in his dwelling at Chinchore, in which I could have a private conference with him, this was deferred till Saturday.

* Shawpoor, near Buihampoor.

† Extract from 'The Notes relative to the late transactions in the Marhatta Empire.'

Arrangements were made by the Governor of Bombay, and by Lieut. Col. Close, for the march of the Peshwah towards Poonah. A detachment, consisting of H. M.'s 78th regt. (which left Bengal on the 7th Feb., and arrived at Bombay on the 5th April, 1803), 5 companies of H. M.'s 84th regt., a proportion of artillery, and 1035 Sepoys, in all, 2205 men, was formed, and placed under the command of Col. Murray, of H. M.'s 84th regt., as an escort to his Highness, who left Bassein, attended by Col. Close, on the 27th April.

On the 7th May, the Peshwah passed Gen. Wellesley's camp at Panowullah, near Poonah. On the 13th, his Highness, attended by his brother Chimmajee Appah, and by a numerous train of the principal chiefs of the Marhatta empire, proceeded towards the city of Poonah, and, having entered his palace, resumed his seat upon the musnud, and received presents from his principal servants.

Lieut. Col. Close to the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Chinchore, 11th May, 1803.

5. To yield protection to his Highness the Nizam's territories, secure the alliance alluded to, and perfectly establish his Highness the Peshwah in his government, are objects which his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has committed to the conduct of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, whose military authority is not limited to the troops under his immediate command, but extends over the whole of the force headed by Col. Stevenson.

6. Adverting to the nature and extent of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley's situation, I, of course, considered that, as his Highness the Peshwah approached the ghauts, the troops that accompanied him from Bassein naturally fell under the orders of the above officer; and on this principle Col. Murray is now acting against the fort of Carnallah, under his express instructions.

7. Having consulted Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the present crisis of affairs, I have received it, as his decided opinion, that the services of the whole of the detachment under Col. Murray are indispensably necessary to afford him the means of accomplishing the great object committed to his charge, to which he conceives all considerations of a military nature must at present be wholly subordinate.

8. In so far as my opinion may be considered of any weight, I must say that my ideas on the present subject perfectly coincide with those of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley; and, thus impressed, I have only to add my judgment, that, while every possible effort is exerted to cover the Attavesy, and effect the transfer of the lands lately ceded to the Hon. Company in Guzerat, any extremity should be hazarded in regard to these objects, rather than deprive the Major General of the services of any part of the detachment now employed under Col. Murray.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Col Murray has put the Peshwah's officers in possession of the fort of Carnallah. The killadar delivered up the place. The Colonel will now march here immediately.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 12th May, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and I think you have done right in making the forward movement which you have reported.

Holkar was at Aurungabad, as far as I can learn, on the 7th. I have received two letters from him, professing friendship. In one, in answer to my letter, he says that the only money he has taken from the soubahdar of Aurungabad was a sum due for the revenues of 2 villages belonging to him, by name Savygaum and Amberry, which the soubahdar has received for 5 years. He swears that he has done no other injury to the Nizam's country. I dare say that there is not one word of truth in this story. This letter is dated the 15th of Mohurroum. His army at Aurungabad consisted mostly of cavalry: he has sent the infantry, excepting one campoo, in different directions. His cavalry altogether are not more than 16,000, of which 8000 only are fighting men, exclusive of Meer Khan's and Shahamut Khan's parties. These two are likewise detached; and it is reported in the camp, that Holkar and Meer Khan have quarrelled. Holkar says, in the end of his letter, that he has marched forward; but where he does not say; and I do not believe he has marched at all. Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the 4th.

Col. Collins writes me from Shawpoor, on the 7th, that Ballojee Koonger, the vakeel from the Peshwah, was to meet him there on that day; and that, after having had a conference with that person, Scindiah would proceed by forced marches to Badowly, to meet the Rajah of Berar. Col. Collins also tells me, that it is reported that Scindiah and Holkar had made peace.

I shall not be able to march from hence certainly before the 20th. You must keep a good look out forward, therefore; and take care not to adventure yourself, single handed, against the combined forces of those chiefs. You do well to make basket boats. But if the government of Bombay are as active as they ought to be, I shall have a bridge of boats. With this, we shall be able to carry on the war wherever we please. I believe that the rivers will not fill till the middle of June.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Poonah, 13th May, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Jeshunt Rao Holkar, in answer to one which I wrote to him upon the subject of his conduct at Aurungabad. It is reported here that Holkar was invited to plunder Aurungabad by the Nizam's sirdar in charge of that city. From your knowledge of the character of this sirdar, and of his connexions, you will be able to form a judgment of the probable truth of this report.

His Highness the Peshwah will arrive at Poonah this day; and I propose to march as soon as Col. Murray shall have joined with the detachment of the Bombay army.

To Dhoondoo Bullall, killadar of Loghur.

Camp, 13th May, 1803.

Governor Duncan has communicated to me the letters which you have written to him, and to Senhor Lima de Souza, and the purport of the verbal message delivered from you by Appojee Punt; and I am happy to observe, from the perusal of these documents, that you are both willing and ready to aid and assist in accomplishing the Peshwah's views.

The English army has come to Poonah in consequence of a treaty between the British government and his Highness the Peshwah; and, by the blessing of God, his Highness has this day returned to his capital, and has resumed the powers of his government. The orders which I have received are to support his just and accustomed authority, and I certainly have no intention to do any injury to those who do not oppose his exercise of it.

I am, therefore, happy to observe that you do not intend to oppose it, but that you propose to forward his Highness' views; and, as long as you persist in that line of conduct, and that you refrain from communicating with, and giving aid to, his Highness' enemies, which is entirely inconsistent with the duty of a faithful servant, you may rest confident that nothing will be done to injure you, or Mattoo Sree Baye Saheb.

To Bappoo Rao Angria.

Camp, 13th May, 1803.

Since I wrote to you last, a detachment of the troops under my command has taken possession of, and delivered over, the fort of Carnallah to the officer of his Highness the Peshwah; and his Highness' colors are now displayed in that fort, and his authority established in the district depending upon it.

As there may be still some plunderers lurking about that district, I beg that you will give orders to your officers to exert themselves to prevent them from finding an asylum in your districts.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th. Nothing new has occurred here since I last wrote to you, excepting that the Peshwah entered his capital yesterday, and I am to have a meeting with him to-day.

I have received an answer from Holkar to my letter upon the subject of the plunder of the Nizam's territories. It is very civil. He says that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had, for years, collected the revenues of two villages, which he names, belonging to him; that he had gone to demand this money, and that he had received some of it; that he had done no mischief to the country; and that he was then going away. It is true that he has 2 villages near Aurungabad, and it is reported that he has done no mischief to the country; but I believe that he has not moved farther than 6 or 7 miles from Aurungabad.

Col. Stevenson was within 50 miles of the place; but, in consequence of the reports of Scindiah's march, I desired him to be aware of going too far forward, lest he should be exposed to the attack of their united army, or that Holkar should get round him, and march upon Hyderabad. I have desired him to watch the movements towards that place very particularly.

The place at which Scindiah was, on the 7th, is only one march from Burhampoor; and there are no accounts that the Rajah of Berar has marched, although he has gone into his tents.

Col. Murray will be here about the 18th. The Peshwah has written to Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, to desire that they will not come to Poonah.

When I saw a possibility that we might have to contend with this confederacy, I wrote to Mr. Duncan to request that he would supply us with a bridge of boats, respecting which I sent him a detailed memorandum. He has made but little progress in this work, which is most essential, (in this country, so much intersected with rivers, none of which are fordable in the rains,) as well for the protection of the Nizam's country, as for the safety of the two detachments; nor has he managed our depôt so well as might be wished, or supplied us with other articles called for so quickly as might have been expected. I have had, therefore, some thoughts of running down to Bombay; and, if I can settle matters with the Peshwah, in a satisfactory manner for the Chiefs, this evening, I shall carry that plan into execution to-morrow. I shall be here again on the 18th; and I propose to march, on the 20th, towards the Nizam's frontier.

My aide de camp, Capt. West, has informed me that the office of Judge Advocate to the King's troops is vacant, and he has requested me to apply for it for him. He has been with me 4 years, and has served with me upon every occasion in which I have been employed, and, of course, has rendered me the greatest assistance. He appears to me to be qualified for this situation; and I shall consider myself much obliged to you, if it should suit your arrangements, to appoint him to it.

To Lieut. Col. Munro.

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

I learn, from Gen. Stuart, that he has desired you to supply me with 20 boats for the Malpoorba, and some boatmen. You know that the rivers will fill between the 14th and 20th June; and I beg you will take early measures for providing this mode of passing them.

As you are too far from me, and it is possible that you may not be able to send off the boats at a period sufficiently early for my purpose, I have directed that 10 of the boats made in Soonda, which were intended for the river Gutpurba, may be left on the river Malpoorba: 10 of your boats, consequently, are to be sent to the Gutpurba, about 30 miles farther on. I beg you to give orders, upon this subject, to the people you will send with the boats. Their station upon the Malpoorba will be at Sungoly; that upon the Gutpurba will be at Goorgherry. The boatmen whom you send should be divided equally between the stations on the rivers Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna. Their pay is to be one gold fanam for every day they do not work, and 2 gold fanams for every day they do. It is to commence from the day they leave their villages, and to be paid weekly. I will settle with you for them, to the day of their arrival at their posts, as well as for the expense of the carriage of the boats. Afterwards, they will be paid by the officer in charge of the posts.

P. S. The Peshwah arrived yesterday, and is going to be seated on his musnud.

To J. H. Peile, Esq.

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

As the rivers will fill between the 14th and 20th June, it is necessary that measures should be taken to ensure the arrival of the boats made in the Mysore country, and of the boatmen, at the posts of Hurryhur and of Deogherry, on the Werdah, as soon as may be convenient. I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah upon this subject. One or two of the boats for the Werdah ought to be carried to that river early in June, to be used as soon as the river shall fill, so that the communication may not be stopped. The remainder may be floated down the river from Chandergooty, when it shall fill. I hope that Purneah will be able to supply a large number of boat people, for I have no chance of getting any in the Marhatta country, even at our high rate of pay. Whatever number he may supply may be divided, at first, between the post at Hurryhur, and that on the Werdah. If he should be able to give more than are wanted for these, they must be distributed among the other rivers.

You are quite right respecting Purneah's money: I had not returned it to you, but Barclay has paid it, or will pay it this day, to your brother. I am sorry to tell you that he has not been very well, but he is now better. We have no hopes of returning immediately to Mysore; but I still think that I shall put an end to this business without hostility, and, possibly, at an early period of time.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

The Governor General has desired me to make you acquainted with every thing that occurs here; and I cannot do so better than by sending you a copy of my letter to the Sec. of State,* written by his directions.

There has been no material alteration since I wrote that, excepting that the Peshwah arrived yesterday at Poonah, attended by all the sirdars who came with me; and Holkar, to whom I wrote a letter to desire that he would refrain from the plunder of the Nizam's country near Aurungabad, has written a very civil answer, in which he says that he went to Aurungabad to claim some money, which the Nizam's soubahdar had received, for 5 years, from 2 villages belonging to him, in the neighbourhood of that city; that he had received part of what he wanted, and that he had done no injury to the country, and was then about to depart. It is true that he has 2 villages near Aurungabad; and I am informed that it is true that he has done no injury to the country; but I do not believe that he has moved farther than 6 or 7 miles from Aurungabad.

It is reported here, that the Nizam's soubahdar of Aurungabad invited Holkar to the plunder of that place; and I think there is some foundation for this report.

Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the 4th inst., but on the 7th he had made only one march. He waited for the Peshwah's vakeel, Ballojee Koonger, who was the person deputed by the Peshwah to communicate the treaty of Bassein to Scindiah. In fact, Ballojee Koonger was Scindiah's vakeel at Poonah, and he continued to act in that capacity after he was appointed to be the Peshwah's Dewan. He was in that situation when the

* See letter to Lord Hobart, 10th May, 1803, p. 438.

Peshwah concluded the treaty of Bassein, to which he was privy. After this circumstance, and Scindiah's declaration to Collins, which you will read in the Governor General's dispatch to the Secret Committee, it is strange that there should be now a prospect that Scindiah will oppose the arrangement. I have had more dealings with the Marhattas than any other man now in India; and it is my opinion that they must be brought into order by an operation on their fears.

The Governor General tells me that he is going to send me instructions, and I delay to do any thing till I hear further from him. My own opinion is, that I ought to write to Scindiah, to point out to him the danger of involving himself in hostilities with the British government, and to tell him that I was going into the Nizam's territories; that we are bound by treaty to defend them, and that he must expect very unpleasant consequences if I should find him there. At the same time, I should recall to his recollection his own sentiments on the treaty of Bassein; and I should press him to state openly his doubts, if he entertained any, as well as his claims upon the Nizam. If this letter should have any effect, I would press him by another to cross the Nerbudda. In the mean time, at all events, whether I write to him or not, I shall march into the Nizam's country; and if the government of Bombay supply me with a bridge of boats, for which I have asked them, I shall carry on the campaign during the rainy season, which the Marhattas cannot do; and I think that a few months will entirely settle the question. I have got a fine army, in excellent order; and I think that this combination or confederacy, with which we are threatened, will find that we can march as well as fight.

The Peshwah appears determined to adhere to the alliance, and to forward all its objects: he has written to Scindiah, and to the Rajah of Berar, to desire that they will not enter his country.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. * * *, E. roor.*

Camp, 14th May, 1803.

One of the Marhatta chiefs here has represented to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley that, if you were to send an account of all your wants for the supply of the troops under your command to the amildar of the town of Chickoree, he would divide them among the villages around in such a manner that they would be furnished more readily, and with greater ease to the inhabitants, than heretofore, and the General has, in consequence, desired me to request that you will act accordingly.

(Similar letters to the officers at Deogherry and Sungoly.)

To Lieut Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

I saw the Peshwah last night, according to his appointment. The object

Lieut Gen Stuart to Lord Clive. Head quarters, 25 m. N. of Bellary, 23rd May, 1803.

I have the honor to forward to your Lordship a copy of a dispatch from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, bearing date the 15th inst

The state of my health, which has suffered considerably from fatigue and the intense heat of the weather, has obliged me to proceed to Bellary.

I have left the army under the command of Major Gen. Campbell, and have furnished that officer with instructions for his guidance. I trust that in the course of a few days my health will be sufficiently re-established to enable me to rejoin the army at Moodgul: in the mean time my presence at Bellary will be useful in forwarding various necessary arrangements connected with the subsistence of the troops in the positions which they will probably occupy.

of my visit was to press his Highness to relieve the distresses, and to attend to the requests, of those Chiefs who had come forward in his cause with me, and thus to excite them to fresh exertions in his service, and to bring forward others who still remained behind. It was agreed between me and Col. Close, that he should begin by pressing him to prepare the army which he is bound by treaty to produce; and that then he should be informed of the distresses and claims of the chiefs, whose troops it was certain that his Highness would enumerate among those to be appointed to join the British detachment. In the course of the conversation his Highness showed much quickness and ability; and I observed that he appeared particularly anxious to perform all the stipulations of the treaty, of course at the smallest possible expense to himself. But he gave satisfactory assurances that he would immediately commence to settle with the different chiefs who had come here with me; and that, in proportion as his Highness should satisfy them, he would signify the same to the Resident; and that they were thenceforward to be considered as part of his Highness' contingent.

By this mode of settlement we shall know whether any progress is made or not; and as the production of the force is referable to the treaty, it will be possible to urge his Highness to accelerate his negotiations with these chiefs, by pointing out to him, as occasion may offer, that the progress made by him in fulfilling the obligation laid upon him by that instrument is not so great as might be expected. It is satisfactory to observe, that the Peshwah considers the treaty as highly advantageous to him, and that he is anxious to fulfil all its stipulations. Upon the whole, we were all satisfied with the meeting. I find that it will not answer to go to Bombay; I therefore stay here.

It is reported that Holkar has gone to a considerable distance from Aurungabad, which I believe to be true. Col. Stevenson was, on the 12th, half way between that place and Gardoon.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

I find that I cannot leave this without very great inconvenience, and I have therefore determined not to go to Bombay: you have my permission to go there, however, if you should think proper, and you may keep the escort laid upon the road for me. If you do not think them necessary, or if you do not propose to go to Bombay, order the troops composing it to join their corps. I am obliged to you for the horses laid upon the road, and I beg you to have them taken off.

In answer to a question which I put to the government of Bombay regarding the provisioning the troops under your command in future, I was informed that it was to be done by the Bombay government and its servants exclusively, and that my departments had nothing to do with it. accordingly, I have made no arrangements for feeding your troops; but, of course, they must be fed by my departments, if the government of Bombay

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 16th May, 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley intends to march from this place in a few days; and it will be necessary that the commanding officers of native corps should have the carriage for their camp equipage spare ammunition and stores in the most efficient state.

have omitted to take any measures to insure your regular supplies. I have written to Bombay frequently respecting supplies. The articles which I want principally are salt provisions, in the provision department; and ordnance wheels and stores, in that of stores. But, excepting the arrack sent upon 200 bullocks hired by you, I have received no arrack yet, and no provisions, and no iron, nor ordnance wheels. If you should go to Bombay, it will be well if you would urge the gentlemen at the head of departments there to send forward 3000 or 4000 gallons of arrack: 400 bullocks, or 300 coolies out of 4000, which they have promised, would bring up this supply. Salt provisions, also, will be much required, as the Bombay sheep contractor has failed entirely; but this is not so necessary as arrack, for sheep can be got in the neighbourhood of Poonah.

It is a most extraordinary circumstance that I cannot get iron from Bombay. I hear that some is landed at Panwell; but, instead of sending it up, or arrack, or provisions, they are sending medicines, which, however useful, might have been deferred, till we get other articles essentially necessary to our consumption, or to enable us to move from hence. I mention these circumstances to you in case you should go to Bombay: but if you should not go there, you will do well to write to have your own provisions forwarded; and till they arrive, of course your troops will be fed by my departments.

The D.A.G. to W. H. Gordon, Esq., Paymaster in Mysore. Camp, 15th May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to inform you that he has ordered an establishment of basket boats to be provided for the public service.

The Kistna,	at Erroor . . .	20	} boats.
The Gutpurba,	at Goorgherry . .	10	
The Malpoorba,	at Sungoly . . .	10	
The Werdah,	at Deogherry . .	20	
The Toombuddra,	at Hurryhur . .	20	

The boatmen are to be paid by the officer commanding the station where they are employed; and Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to request that you will make an advance, on the 1st June next, from your office at Hullahall, of 30 pagodas each to the officers commanding at Erroor, Goorgherry, and Sungoly; and, from your office at Hurryhur, of 50 pagodas each to the officers commanding at Deogherry and Hurryhur. The whole establishment of boats will be placed under the general superintendence of Capt. W. Cunningham, D. Q. M. G., who will take charge of it as soon as the duty on which he is at present employed will permit him; and he has been instructed to arrange the sums of money which will be necessary hereafter for the officers in command of the several posts to have in their hands for discharging the expense of the boat establishment; and Gen. Wellesley requests that you will comply with his requisitions for that purpose from the officers as above stated. Capt. Cunningham will specify in his indents that the money is required for the boat establishments; and when the amount of the disbursements shall have been passed by the Commander in Chief or government, they will be transmitted to you to be entered in your accounts in place of the sums advanced.

(Instructions accordingly sent to the officers commanding the above stations.)

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Chalmers.

15th May, 1803.

I have laid your letter of this date before Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, and I am directed by him to inform you that he knows no other contractor for the carriage of the camp equipage and stores of the battalion under your command than yourself; and, as he knows that carriage cattle have been, and are still to be, procured here, he expects that you will be ready to fulfil the terms of your contract when the corps moves from this place.

To the Sec. of Gov, Bombay.

Camp at Poonah, 16th May, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant.

In conformity to the directions contained in the second paragraph, I have ordered the officer in command of the two companies in charge of the treasure to march as soon as he shall have procured carriages for it, (if carriages should not have been sent from Bombay,) and to proceed to the top of the Bhore ghaut. He is to be relieved at Cundolla by a similar detachment from Col. Murray's corps, now encamped at Karly. Agreeably to the wishes of the Hon. the Governor in Council, I should have ordered a detachment of this corps down to Panwell to take charge of the treasure; but this measure would have caused a delay of 3 or 4 days in its arrival at Poonah; which, as I wait to receive the treasure, before I can march from Poonah, might be very inconvenient.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Dale, Brigade Major, Col. Murray's detachment. 17th May, 1803.

I have the honor to inform you that no written regulation has been established by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley relative to the price of forage and the mode of collecting it; but, as it is an article of absolute necessity, he allows every person to insist upon having it, for money, wherever it is to be found. At the same time, as it has been provided by the inhabitants of this part of the country with labor, and as an encouragement for them to bring it in for sale, he allows them to put their own price upon it, and protects them, upon all occasions, in getting that price.

To J. Duncan, Esq. Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 18th May, 1803.

I am about to march from Poonah in a few days; and it is necessary that I should make every arrangement which can insure the supplies of my troops whilst they will be employed to the northward: I therefore trouble you with a plan upon this subject. The brinjarry cattle which I brought with me, or which followed me from Mysore, are completely knocked up: I may expect that about 6000 out of 25,000 which have left that country will still attend me, but no greater number.

I have already formed a depôt at Poonah, which consists of 4000 bags of rice, and I propose to keep it up to this quantity. This will be done either by purchases made at Poonah, or by rice forwarded from Panwell. The rice collected at Poonah will be brought on to the army in the field; either by my own cattle, which I shall send back for it, if they should live, or by cattle to be hired here by Col. Close for that service. The rice at Panwell I should wish to be forwarded upon cattle to be hired for that service below the ghauts. The larger the number of them, the more certain I shall be of supplies of grain. I wish, therefore, that instructions to the following purport may be given to the officer in charge of the store at Panwell.

1st. That he should hire as many cattle as he can procure, to carry grain and provision stores from Panwell to the army in the field, at a monthly hire for each head of cattle.

2ndly. That the bargain with the owners of these cattle is to be, that they are either to lodge at Poonah the loads received at Panwell, or to carry them on to the army; according to the orders which they will receive from the Resident, or the commanding officer of the troops stationed at Poonah.

3rdly. That the owners of the cattle are to make no unreasonable or unnecessary delay on the road, either from Panwell or in returning to that place; and in case it should appear to the commanding officer of the army, or to the Resident at Poonah, or to the storekeeper at Panwell, that there has been such unnecessary delay, either in marching from Panwell with loads, or in returning thither, a stoppage for a proportionate number of days is to be made from the hire of the bullocks whose owner may have delayed.

4thly. That whenever the storekeeper at Panwell may dispatch a number of bullocks from that place with grain or provision stores, he is to make a register of such bullocks according to the form enclosed. He is to send one copy of this register to the officer commanding at Poonah, and to give another to the owner of the cattle going with the grain, to be produced to the commanding officer or Resident at Poonah, when the cattle shall arrive there, or to the commanding officer of the army, when the cattle shall reach the army.

In case it should be thought proper at Poonah to order on the cattle to the army, the register will be sent on to the commanding officer of the army; and the Resident or the commanding officer at Poonah will insert in it any sums of money which they may advance to the owner of the cattle. All sums of money advanced on account of these bullocks hired at Panwell, either at Poonah or by the commanding officer of the army, will be carried to the account of the storekeeper of that place.

The article which I should wish to have forwarded by these bullocks is rice; but in case I should require any other articles, such as arrack or salt provisions, I shall apprise the officer in charge of the store at Panwell thereof. I shall immediately take measures to have boats on all the rivers in which there may be water to impede materially the march of the bullocks. The bullocks already hired by Capt. Young may be employed in this manner, and ought to be registered as soon as possible. It is needless to point out to you the mode in which the accounts of these bullocks ought to be settled; but there appears no difficulty, particularly if all the advances made are carried to the account of the storekeeper at Panwell, and as that officer may support his charge by means of the copies of the registers as vouchers.

Col. Murray will be here to-morrow, and I could march the next day, if the iron for the wheels had arrived; but it is not yet come.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 18th May, 1803.

I have received all your letters. Matters appear to have turned out nearly as we expected. It is unlucky that Holkar should have got any thing from Aurungabad; but under the circumstances of the treachery of the Soubahdar, of which I have no doubt, that was not to be avoided.

Meer Khan certainly intends to come over to the Nizam; and although it would give a decided turn to the general state of our affairs, if we could strike some one party a severe blow, I think he is the last whom I should wish to attack. His defection from the party will shake it as much as a defeat, and his numbers will add considerably to the strength of the Nizam's army. On the other hand, if you move against him, it is ten to

one if you can come up with him, so as to strike a blow of any consequence, and the movement may prevent his defection. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the best thing to do is to remain nearly where you are. Meer Khan cannot do much mischief to Aurungabad; and even if you should drive him off, the Soubahdar will do as much harm as ever Meer Khan could have done. I have recommended strongly that Meer Khan, with his whole party, may be taken into the Nizam's service, and the Resident has forwarded this information to the durbar.

You will have heard that a child is sick, and all business is stopped on that account; but I think that, in a day or two after you shall have received this letter, positive orders on the subject will come from Hyderabad. You may as well inform Noor ool Oomrah of these circumstances.

I think Hyderabad is now safe, and we must look immediately to crossing the Godavery. Col. Murray will be in here to-morrow, and I shall march from hence in a day or two afterwards: I wait only for some iron, expected from Bombay, to put tires on some new wheels which I have made.

I wish that you would send me a draft of your route to your present station; and insert in it the relative situations of Ahmednuggur, Aurungabad, Chandore, Burhampoor, as nearly as Colebrook can find them out. I am making boats here, and do you make as many as you can in the Nizam's territories, and try to get boatmen: for if we have boats, we shall always contrive to navigate them. Besides, I still hope to have the pon-

Lord Clive to Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort St. George, 19th May, 1803.

The considerations of a more active nature, which are connected with the immediate object of our operations for obtaining a settlement of the affairs of the Marhatta empire, are stated with great force by Major Gen. Wellesley and your Excellency; and the importance of those considerations has been heightened by the danger which now threatens the life of his Highness the Nizam. By the enclosed copy of a dispatch from the Resident at Hyderabad, your Excellency will perceive that danger to be extreme; and in this respect, independently of the menacing posture supposed to have been taken by Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I am of opinion that your Excellency's movement into the Dooab is a measure of prudence and expediency, for the purpose of giving effect to the arrangements dependent on the decease of the Nizam.

On these several grounds, I concur in the reasons stated by your Excellency, and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, for the movement of your army into the Dooab; and I entirely approve your Excellency's intention of taking up a position either at Moodgil, or on the banks of the Kistna, as circumstances may appear to render most advisable for the purposes of the movement.

It appears to be the opinion of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, that, if the supposed invasion should be conducted by Jeswunt Rao Holkar alone, the force under the command of Col. Stevenson will be adequate to the defence of the Nizam's territories: in this event, therefore, the British troops already in advance can require no aid from the main army. If Holkar and Scindiah should make an united attack, it is still probable, in the opinion of Major Gen. Wellesley, that the force under his own command, joined by that under the command of Col. Stevenson, will be sufficient to repel the invaders: it is probable, therefore, in these cases, that your position in the Dooab will be adequate to all the purposes suggested by the Resident at Poonah, or by Major Gen. Wellesley. But if the force to be eventually opposed to the British troops now in advance should be of such extent as to endanger the detachments under the command of Gen. Wellesley and Col. Stevenson, it will become indispensably requisite for your Excellency to advance without delay for the support of those corps.

toons for a bridge. Scindiah has moved on, and was, on the 12th, at Eedlabad, a place which you will find in Rennell's map, nearly at the junction of the territories of the Nizam, the Rajah of Berar, and the Marhattas. He marched also on the 13th, but I cannot find in the map the name of the place to which he marched.

Some of the medicines left this 3 days ago; the others are ready, but I have no carriage for them, and you must send for them.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 19th May, 1803.

I received, last night, your letter of the 16th. My opinion is, that you will do well to place yourself upon the Godavery, particularly provided your march to that river does not remove you more than 3 or 4 marches from me. Our further operations will certainly be on the other side of that river, and the sooner we show ourselves in strength the better. But we must be strong in reality, as well as in appearance; and, therefore, I should wish that, if possible, we should not be at too great a distance from each other.

In my opinion, Hyderabad is now safe; but you may as well still have an eye to that quarter. The Nizam is dangerously ill; and, although all the measures are prepared for the succession of Secundar Jah, the death of the old man, at this moment, may create some confusion, and, at all events, may be the cause of some intrigues. Keep up the communication with Meer Khan; and tell Noor ool Oomrah, that, although from circumstances there are delays in giving him his final answer, I have no doubt whatever that he and his whole party will be taken into the service.

By all means prevent the Nizam's troops from plundering the villages you mention. There is a story in the Northern ackbar of the plunder of Chumargoonda, a village of Scindiah, by his Highness' troops, which has created much dissatisfaction, and has been given as the ground of Holkar's plunder of Aurungabad. I presume that the plunder of the brinjaries, for which you punished them, is what is alluded to; but all this plunder must have a tendency to prevent an amicable settlement, which we must ever desire. Besides that, it deprives us of the means of subsisting ourselves and cattle, as we move through those countries. I beg, therefore, that you will forbid it in the most positive terms, and punish any disobedience of your orders on this head.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 20th May, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Col. Murray's corps arrived here yesterday, and they appear in good order, and to be well equipped.

All the iron, which I required for the repair of my carriages, is not yet arrived from Bombay, but it is coming in daily; and, before the carriages can be ready, I hope that I shall receive your answer to my letters.

There is nothing new from the northward. Scindiah has continued his march to the eastward, and was, on the 13th, at Eedlabad, a place which appears, in Rennell's map, to be near the junction of the boundaries of the Nizam, the Rajah of Berar, and the other Marhattas. It is certain that peace has not yet been made between Scindiah and Holkar, although it is talked of every where. Holkar is gone off towards Chandore, and it is

now said that he is to go to the Rajah of Berar. But it is a curious circumstance that it is currently reported that Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, intend to endeavor to seize Holkar, when he shall arrive in their neighbourhood. This shows how little dependence can be placed on any of these reports. It is now said that, even if the peace should be made between Holkar and Scindiah, and the three parties should confederate, their views are merely defensive, and I believe this to be true.

We do not know that the Rajah of Berar has marched from Nagpoor. The Peshwah gets on but slowly in his arrangements with his Chiefs. I have received a letter from Major Shawe, in which he tells me that the Governor General is going to send further instructions. It is very unlucky that he is not nearer to us.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 22nd May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 15th. I now enclose a copy of a dispatch that Col. Close received last night from Col. Collins, which gives rather a better account of affairs in general than we have had lately.

Lieut. Col. Close to the Governor General.

Poonah, 21st May, 1803.

1. Agreeably to the arrangement which had been previously adjusted, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley visited his Highness the Peshwah on the 14th inst., in Poonah. At this meeting the General recapitulated what he had formerly stated, and, with the view to inspire his Highness with confidence, went into an explanation of the principles which should invariably govern his conduct, in prosecuting the objects committed to his charge, connected with the interests of his Highness' government. He observed, that, although he felt it to be his duty to recommend to his Highness' notice and favor such of his sirdars as were distinguished by their attachment to the Poonah state, he had yet been careful not to make any promises to them from himself; assuring them only, that he should represent their conduct respectively to his Highness, in order to their being rewarded, or discountenanced, according to their merits; that he was certainly anxious that his Highness should afford relief to such of his meritorious servants as suffered from want, and adopt measures for conciliating others, who, from different circumstances, might require encouragement and confidence; but that, whatever his feelings might be in those respects, he would strictly adhere to the rule he had hitherto followed, by avoiding to make promises to any of the sirdars, and contenting himself with stating their merits to his Highness.

2. This declaration from the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley appeared to afford the Peshwah the highest satisfaction. He said, that nothing could be more just or pleasing to him than the principle which the General resolved to follow; and added, that he should be ever attentive to the recommendation of the General in favor of his sirdars, and indisposed towards those who, from misconduct, should incur the General's displeasure; and that, on these principles, it would be with the General to direct their efforts, and represent their services, and with the Poonah state to favor or discourage them according to his report.

3. His Highness went on to observe, that a few of the southern jaghiredars were still backward in affording their services; that, as it was requisite to call forth the whole force of the state, he would repeat his summons to those jaghiredars to attend, and would be happy if the General also would address them to the same effect. To this the General expressed his acquiescence; adding, that obedience to his Highness' authority from the subordinate sirdars of the state was indispensably necessary; and that in time it would be only proper to coerce such of them as should be obstinately refractory.

4. The General now observed that he should soon be prepared to march, and that he looked to be accompanied by his Highness' troops; that the Goklah and the Vinchoor jaghiredars stood in need of most aid from his Highness to enable them

Balloon Koonger has likewise written to the Peshwah, and says that Scindiah is himself much disinclined to break with his Highness and the English; and that his principal confidential servant, Jadoon Rao, entertains the same sentiments. Jadoon Rao is now absent on an embassy to the Rajah of Berar, and Ambajee Inglia appears to govern at that court. He, it is well known, is an enemy of the English, and he is personally much interested in keeping Scindiah to the southward, as, in his absence from Hindustan, he has carried on the government in those countries, whereby he has acquired vast riches and influence. In this state of affairs, Col. Collins and Balloon Koonger appear determined to delay carrying on their negotiations till Jadoon Rao shall have returned to Scindiah's camp. Balloon Koonger may be mistaken respecting the sentiments of Jadoon Rao; but he says positively that that minister is of the same opinion with himself, and would advise his master to acquiesce in the arrangements between the British government and the Peshwah; and it appears that Col. Collins entertains the same opinion of the sentiments of Jadoon Rao.

them to satisfy their troops; and that he would give in a memorandum respecting the claims of those sirdars, which, he trusted, would soon be satisfied. His Highness replied, that the wants of those sirdars should be immediately relieved; and that he would so adjust with the whole of the sirdars, as that they should encamp near the General by the time he should be ready to move, and willingly proceed on service under his orders.

5. A conversation now took place concerning the Putwurdun family, of whom Appah Saheb in particular has been averse to visit the Peshwah. After his claims had been discussed, it was agreed that an assurance should be given to him, that, on the Poonah affairs being finally settled, his Highness the Peshwah would examine into his claims, and proceed to arrange matters permanently on fair grounds between him and the Rajah of Kolapoor, who has gradually stripped the Putwurdun family of a large part of their possessions.

6. At every stage of the interview it was observable that his Highness' manner was less formal than usual. He showed no disinclination to converse largely on the business of his government; and at the close of the conference he told the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, with great cordiality, that he could not permit him to march till he should have the pleasure of giving him an entertainment.

7. It would now appear that the Peshwah derived the happiest impressions from the foregoing conference. His confidence has increased so much, that he does not hesitate to avail himself of the influence which the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has, from a variety of causes, acquired over the sirdars and jaghiredars of the state: his orders to them, on points of importance, are generally transmitted through the General, who enforces them by dispatches from himself; an united mode of proceeding which can scarcely fail of efficient operation.

8. His Highness, having arranged with Goklah, paid him a visit yesterday evening, and there is reason to believe that he has satisfied the jaghiredars of Vinchoor. Chintomny Rao, of the Putwurdun family, has visited the Peshwah a second time, but was received by his Highness with some reserve. Appah Saheb, it is hoped, will be prevailed on to pay his first visit in the course of a few days.

9. Major Gen. Wellesley talks of marching in 5 or 6 days, and there is every prospect that he will be accompanied by a handsome corps of Marhatta horse.

10. Amrut Rao has a party of troops at Sungum-nair, on this side of the Godavery; and the Peshwah has intelligence that a corps in his interest has lately invested the fort of Puttun, held by his Highness, and situated south-west of Sungum-nair.

* * See also the Wellesley Dispatches, the Gov. Gen. to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 20th June, 1803, vol. iii. p. 162.

The Peshwah saw our line out this morning, and was much gratified. Indeed I never saw the troops look better. When I march, which I expect will be in 3 or 4 days, as the iron for the wheels is arrived, I intend to leave here, under Col. Murray, the 5 companies of the 84th, one battalion of Native infantry, and the Bombay battalion; and I shall take with me the 78th regt.

I beg leave to suggest that the Resident at Hyderabad should run a tappall from Hyderabad to your camp at Moodgul. I believe that the tappall from Hyderabad and Gooty goes already by Raichore; in which case, he will only have to post runners on the road from Raichore to Moodgul. I shall speak to Col. Close about posting runners on the road from Poonah to Beejapoor. The postmaster in camp might post runners on the road from Moodgul to Beejapoor. By these means, our communications with you will be much shortened, and you will be able to direct all our operations.

The D.A.G. to Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 22nd May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you the accompanying papers, delivered to him by the Resident at Poonah, and to request that you will furnish him with an official account of any plunder which was committed by the British or the Nizam's troops, or their followers, during the time that you were encamped in the Marhatta territory, as stated by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 21st May, 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley was in hopes that after Capt. * * * had been released from his arrest, and admonished by order of the Commander in Chief, in respect to his conduct towards his commanding officer, Col. Chalmers, he would have cautiously avoided to offend him in future. It appears, however, in the instance recorded in the proceedings of the General Court Martial, published herewith, that Capt. * * * has forgot, not only the respect which is due to his immediate superior, but likewise the admonition and orders of the Commander in Chief of this army. He is hereby reprimanded.

Capt. * * * is positively forbid to write to his commanding officer, Lieut. Col. Chalmers, excepting on a subject which must be laid before the superior authorities of the army, and upon which a letter must be written according to the regulations.

Lieut. Col. Chalmers is also requested not to receive any note or letter from Capt. * * *, excepting one upon such a subject as is above described. He is also requested to avoid writing to Capt. * * *. The communication between these officers to be verbal; and it is recommended generally to commanding officers of corps, brigades, &c., to adopt this mode of communication with the officers under their command, in preference to that by letter.

His Highness the Peshwah is to see the troops in line to-morrow morning. The whole will be under arms at a quarter before 5 o'clock, and prepared to move to the ground which they will have to take up, according to orders which Col. Murray and the officers commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry will receive. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that they will be at his tent at that hour in the morning to receive those orders.

Col. Murray will put his corps in motion before he quits his camp. They are to move from their left by the road which goes by the left of the 19th dragoons towards head quarters. The guns are to accompany the corps, and those in the park to be in the centre of the line of infantry. Col. Murray's park is to be in its usual situation in his line. His tumbrils to be left in the camp.

The corps to parade as strong as possible. The pickets to join; but the quarter guards to stand fast. The tents of the picket are to be struck in the morning at daylight and sent off the ground.

When his Highness the Peshwah shall approach the right of the line, a salute of 19 guns is to be fired from the park of Major Gen. Wellesley's division. The corps are to present their arms. Officers to drop their swords by corps, and the regimental color to be dropped, as his Highness shall pass each. The music, trumpets, and drums to sound, and beat a march, when corps present arms.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 23rd May, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch received yesterday by Lieut. Col. Close. The orders contained therein will bring matters to a speedy issue; and, I judge, are entirely in conformity with your sentiments. The dispatch from me, to which the Governor General alludes in his letter to Col. Close, was a private letter which I wrote to him on the day that I was joined by Col. Stevenson, to inform him of that event, and the general situation of our affairs at that moment. I sent it by Hyderabad. I have this day received a private letter from Col. Collins, in which he tells me that, since he had asked leave to retire from Scindiah's camp, he had been treated by the ministers with increased politeness and respect; and that Scindiah's conduct towards him had been uniformly polite, and even kind. He says that Scindiah will certainly not think of marching to Poonah till after the rains, if he should then.

Col. Collins communicated to me a proposal of Holkar, that he should be permitted to send a news writer to my camp. I think that I shall permit this fellow to come, because, in fact, there is nothing to be communicated which I do not wish to have publicly known; secondly, because, if I refuse to allow the man to reside in my camp, he may be allowed to reside in that of the Marhattas; and, thirdly, because these news writers are generally a species of vakeel, and it may be important that I should have this mode of communicating with Holkar. I have sent the letter to Col. Close; but if I should get it back before the post goes out, I shall enclose a copy of it. At all events, I have above given you its purport.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 23rd May, 1803.

I enclose the answer from the killadar of Poonadur.

I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Ragonaut Rao, respecting the duties levied upon our bazaar people bringing provisions to camp. In consequence of this practice, which has been commenced only for the

G. O.

Poonah, 23rd May, 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests the commanding officers of the regiments of cavalry to peruse the following memorandums, and to communicate them to their adjutants and such other officers as they may think proper.

1. When corps of cavalry act together, one corps is generally appointed the leading corps, and all are to conform to the movements of that corps, unless otherwise ordered. The leading corps may be altered, and all corps are to attend and follow the movements of that newly ordered as the leading corps. The rule applies equally whether they are in line, or otherwise formed; but it is not intended that when a line is to be formed from column, or to change its front, all corps are to perform that operation in the same mode; each is to perform it in that mode in which it can be done with the greatest celerity, combined with the greatest accuracy.

2. When a number of regiments are in column, either with the right or left in front, the formation into line may be either to the front or rear of the column, to its proper or reverse flank, or oblique to the line of march.

3. If the column is one with the right in front, and its formation is to be made to the front, each corps disengages from the general column, as soon as the nature of the ground will admit, and goes to the left of the leading corps; the same mode is practised if the line is to be formed oblique to the line of march: in both these cases, the adjutants of different regiments move out quickly as soon as they learn that the line is to be formed, and mark the ground on which the left of their corps is to stand; *vice versa*, if the column be one with the left in front.

4. If the formation from a column with the right in front is to be made to the rear, all the corps in rear of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the general column

last 3 or 4 days, and of the difficulty and loss they experience from the refusal of all classes of people in the neighbourhood to take our Mysore coins, the bazaar people are becoming disgusted; and a large number of them went away this morning with their cattle, with Ram Rao, who is returning to Mysore. Will you remember the tappall to Beejapoor?

It is very desirable that we should have some knowledge of the nature of the fort of Ahmednuggur. I have set inquiries on foot regarding it; but the more we know of it the better, and I shall be obliged to you if you will have inquiries made. It is also very desirable that we should have some knowledge of the state of the rivers in this country during the rains. The points to which I am directing my inquiries on this subject are as follows; and I shall be obliged to you if you will have inquiries made to the same purport:

1st. What number of rivers are there between Poonah and Panwell, which are constantly full of water during the rains; their names and situation?

2ndly. What number of rivers are there between Poonah and the Godavery which are always full during the rains; their names and situation?

3rdly. How many branches of the Godavery are there which are full during the rains, before that river enters the Nizam's country?

4thly. Whether the rivers Goor, Seenah, and Mangeyra are always full during the rains?

I send you two letters, with enclosures, for Col. Stevenson; likewise a letter from Col. Collins. I think there will be no harm in allowing the news writer to come to my camp. I enclose a letter from Malcolm to Dallas.

column to their right; all the corps in front of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the general column to their left. The adjutants of the corps in the rear are to take up the ground on which their left is to stand; those of corps in front are to take up the ground on which their right is to stand; *vice versa*, if the column has its left in front.

5. If the line is to be formed from an open column with the right in front to the reverse flank, the corps follow their leaders, each wheeling up successively, as it reaches its ground, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which their left is to stand; *vice versa*, if the column is with the left in front.

6. When a column is marching upon an alignment, an object is generally given in front, on which the column is to march; the adjutants of corps are to assist in keeping the column in its true direction, by placing themselves in the line and waiting there each, till the corps to which he belongs shall have passed him. The officers leading divisions in an open column, marching on an alignment on which the line is to be formed, are to go close to the horse's head of the adjutant who is marking the ground: a regiment is not to deviate partially from the alignment marked by its adjutant, because the rear division of that in front of it may have done so.

7. When the line is to change its front and a new formation is to be made, all corps are to break towards that on which the new formation is to be made: if the corps is on the right, all the corps on the left break into an open column with the right in front, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which the left is to stand in the new line: if the corps is on the left, all the corps on the right are to break into a column with the left in front, and the adjutant is to mark the ground on which the right is to stand.

8. The general rule is, that the corps, whether in forming line from column, or in changing front from line, are to enter on the new line at the point marked for them by their adjutants, which is always where their rear will stand; but as that is the mode of forming which takes most time, the practice is for each corps to enter the new line, either where its head is to stand, or in a central spot. The commanding officers must, in that case, take care to send forward a person to mark a true point in the line, at which he will enter, and to bring up the head of his regiment square to the proposed formation.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 24th May, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copies of papers received this day by Col. Close, from the Governor General. These fully open his future plans and intentions in regard to this country.

I have before informed you that I propose to leave Col. Murray here for the present; and I shall be glad to know whom you would wish that I should leave in the command of the subsidiary force hereafter, supposing it to be possible to establish it at Poonah, on its original plan, in a short time, which I think by no means improbable. I know nobody more fit for such a situation than Col. Wallace; but I shall be glad to receive your instructions upon this point.

The D.A.G. to Col. Murray.

Camp at Poonah, 24th May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to request that you will prevent the Europeans of your detachment from going into the bazaar at Poonah, and place a guard on the bridge to prevent them from crossing the river. The General also requests that you will give out, in your detachment, orders that no European must be allowed to quit his lines, without being properly dressed as a soldier.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

I enclose the copy of a paper which I have received from Major Kirkpatrick, from which it appears that Mohiput Ram imagines that you have assured him that the British government will pay half the expense to be incurred by taking Meer Khan into the Nizam's service. I conclude that this is a misconception of Mohiput Ram; but the sooner he is undeceived the better. We have no right to engage that the British government shall pay one farthing of the expense to be incurred by the measures to be adopted for the defence of the Nizam's territories, beyond that incurred by our own armies in the field. The communication with Meer Khan ought to be kept up; and I have no doubt but that he and his whole force will be taken into the Nizam's service. But as it is impossible to send a person of any consequence to his camp, without its coming to the knowledge of every body there, and as then the negotiation must become known to Holkar, who will take measures to frustrate its effects, either by the removal of Meer Khan to a distance, or by falling upon his army, and weakening him considerably, I recommend that you should not send any body there again.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 15th and 19th inst.

I conclude that Rajah Mohiput Ram must have misunderstood Col. Stevenson's meaning, when he supposed that the Colonel told him that the British government would defray any part of the expenses of taking Meer Khan and his troops into the service of his Highness the Nizam.

When Col. Stevenson wrote to me upon this subject, I told him that I should write to you, and recommend that Meer Khan should be taken into his Highness' service, with all his troops. I desired him to apprise Noor ool Oomrah of this intention; and to urge that chief to keep open the negotiation with Meer Khan, until the determination of his Highness

the Nizam should be communicated to him. But I knew that you had positively objected to the proposal made by the Nizam's government, that the British government should defray any part of the expense to be incurred on this occasion. I recollected that, on the same principle, you objected to a proposal formerly made, that the British government should defray part of the expense of hiring the troops under Jetlingah Cawker; and I am fully sensible that it would be much better for the British government to incur lacs of expenses, to subdue a freebooter of this kind, than to purchase his forbearance from plunder; or his service at the moment at which he should threaten to plunder the country. For all these reasons, I should never have authorized any one to hint, much less to give assurances, that the British government would defray any part of the expense of hiring Meer Khan and his troops; and I conclude that, without such authority from you, or from me, Col. Stevenson would not give these assurances to Rajah Mohiput Ram.

I have been detained till now by the want of iron, which I expected from Bombay, for the repair of the wheels of my ordnance carriages; but this article is now arrived, and I intend to march in a few days. Col. Stevenson is now at Puttun.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Poonah, 26th May, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 17th, 18th, and 19th.

I have not received your secretary's letter upon the subject of Capt. Mackay; and I have therefore omitted to communicate to that officer your determination respecting him, as stated to me in your letter of the 17th. Capt. Mackay is an honest and zealous servant of the public, and he conducts his own important department in such a manner as always to have the cattle under his charge in a most efficient state for work; but he is the most unaccommodating public officer that I have met with. He has never failed to contrive to quarrel with the head of every other department with which he has been concerned; and I have always had the greatest difficulty in keeping matters between him and others in such a state, as that the service should not be impeded by their disputes. I imagine that the difficulties between Capt. Mackay and Major Symonds, to which you have alluded, are to be attributed to the state of Capt. Mackay's temper; and possibly, in some degree, to a want of accommodation on the part of Major Symonds. I make no doubt but that you will have observed that this officer also, although an excellent man, has more of the oak than the willow in his disposition.

Under these circumstances, and as it would be a matter of great difficulty to find an officer, at present, in whose hands I could with safety place Capt. Mackay's great charge, I shall be much obliged to you if you will delay, for a short time, to carry into execution your intention of removing him. When your secretary's letter shall arrive, I shall communicate to him your displeasure, and the causes of it; and I shall call upon him to make me acquainted with the circumstances which may have caused his error, and which he may be of opinion will induce you to alter your intentions.

I am getting an account of the state of all the rivers to the northward of the Kistna during the rains, which will enable you to decide regarding the propriety of your crossing the Kistna and the Beemah. I shall send it to you as soon as I get it. I believe that your position at Moodgul will be nearly central for all objects.

However, we have two points now depending at the durbar, which will set every thing right respecting the southern jaghiredars. One of them is to give Appah Saheb the Zereen Putka, provided a nuzzer of one or two lacs of rupees is received for it. The point on which there is a doubt is, whether Appah Saheb will give the nuzzer. But I think I shall be able to prevail upon him to do this. In respect to Amrut Rao, I have drawn from him a declaration and an engagement, that he has not at present, and that he never will have in future, any intercourse with the Peshwah's enemies. He has given this under his seal in the most formal manner, with a view to obtain our intercession with the Peshwah in his favor. These papers are now before the Peshwah, and I have requested him to let me know what answer I shall give him. It is not certain that we shall contrive to reconcile these brothers: but if we succeed in this object, we shall entirely settle the interior of this state, and we shall give a sad blow to the congress to the northward; and if we satisfy the Putwurdun family, we shall draw to the Peshwah's standard, not only that powerful family, but also that of Rastia, and several others who adhere to their politics. If we succeed in either object, we shall insure the tranquillity of the southern countries, during the supposed contest, which will set your mind at rest in respect to that important point.

I am much obliged to you for the money. That sum, together with what I brought with me, some dollars that I have received from Mr. Duncan, which I am coining in camp, and others which I have picked up for bills on Bombay, will enable me to pay the troops, &c., to the 1st Aug.

To Col Murray.

Camp, 26th May, 1803.

I have received your letter, and I am concerned that you did not speak to me upon the subject to which it relates, when I apprized you of the arrangements of which you now complain. It appears, however, that your complaint is not grounded upon your being left here in command of the troops, but upon the composition of the detachment to be under your command, and upon the state of uncertainty in which you are, respecting your prospect of commanding the corps to be stationed here in future. In regard to the detachment to be left here, I intend that it shall be composed of those troops; and that it shall have such equipments as will enable it to perform the service which I expect will be required from it: and in forming this detachment, as well as the division which will march from hence under my command, I have exercised a discretion for which I am aware that I am responsible to my superiors. But I do not see any necessity for altering these arrangements; and I should certainly deem it very improper to alter them, only that I might have an opportunity of gratifying the private feelings of the officer whom I should leave in command here, by giving him a better description of troops than I think will be required for the service.

In regard to your future prospect of commanding the corps to be stationed in the Peshwah's territories, I must decline at present to give any answer upon that subject. In general, I imagine that it is not intended by the Commander in Chief that an officer shall keep his leave of absence in his pocket, in order to avail himself of it at any moment that he may think proper, however inconvenient to the service. But I am aware that there is no use in detaining an officer in an employment to which he has a dislike; and therefore you will avail yourself of your leave when you may think proper; only I request you to give me timely notice of your intention.

In case you should have any thing further to say to me upon this subject, I request you to do me the favor to call upon me at any hour that may be convenient to you.

To the Governor General.

Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

I conclude that Col. Close keeps you acquainted with every thing as it occurs here, and therefore I do not write to you constantly.

It is evident that the Peshwah's confidence in us increases daily. He calls for our assistance frequently, to support and enforce, by our influence over the jaghiredars and other chiefs, his authority and orders; and he pays attention to our recommendation of their claims upon his government. He has consented to give Appah Saheb (the eldest son of Purshe-ram Bhow, and the chief of the Putwurdun family) the Zereen Putka to go out with me, provided that chief will present him with a nuzzer of one or two lacs of rupees. By this measure he shows his confidence in us; he secures to his cause this powerful family, and secures the tranquillity of the southern districts, if there should be a war; and as Appah Saheb is known to have been our friend, and the determined enemy of the Peshwah, all the chiefs of the Empire will know to what quarter they are to look in future for the favors and honors of the state. We do not know yet whether Appah Saheb will, or can, give the nuzzer which will be required from him; but I make no doubt that, if he can afford it, I shall be able to prevail upon him to give it.

I have had a correspondence with Amrut Rao, the result of which is, that he has written a letter, which he calls an engagement, regularly sealed, &c., as such; in which he promises, that from that moment he will separate himself from the Peshwah's enemies, and will have no further communication with them; and he requests that the British government will interfere to reconcile him to his brother, and to obtain for him a provision in the state.

All the former letters which passed between Amrut Rao and me were given to the Peshwah some time ago; and this last letter from Amrut Rao was given to him 3 days ago, with a request that he would take it into consideration, and let me know what answer he wished me to give to it. He was at the same time informed, that the British government was very desirous that he should be reconciled to Amrut Rao, and that that chief should have a provision in the state, as the best mode of insuring the internal tranquillity of his Highness' territories; and as we expected that he would urge Amrut Rao's disposition to intrigue, as an argument

against a reconciliation with him, we desired that it might be observed to him, that, now that his government was strengthened by an alliance with the Company, and that all his subjects saw that the British government was determined to support his lawful and accustomed authority, it was not probable that any of them would venture to enter into intrigues to disturb or overturn it, as they had done heretofore; or that, if they did, he had much to apprehend from those intrigues. We have not yet received his answer; but if we succeed in reconciling the Peshwah with Amrut Rao, the interior of this state will be settled as far as it can be at present; and this defection will shake the nerves of the members of the congress to the northward. This will be a greater object than the disposal of the Zereen Putka; but the two measures secure every thing within, in case of a contest.

Your instruction to Col. Collins, of the 5th, will have arrived just in the proper time. The treaty of Bassein is, in fact, a better security to Holkar and to Scindiah for the possessions which they have extorted from the Peshwah, and those lying to the southward of the Nerbudda, than either of those chiefs could have under any other arrangement which could secure the Peshwah's power. They will see that clearly; and their sense of their own interest will combine with their fears to prevent a war.

You will have seen Holkar's letter to me upon the subject of the plunder of Aurungabad. If matters are brought to a peaceable conclusion with Scindiah, and Holkar goes off to Hindustan, towards which quarter he is now moving, in my opinion, it will be most proper to take no further notice of the contribution levied upon Aurungabad; at least not to go to war to force Holkar to pay it back again. In fact, this chief is only a freebooter, and the Nizam's government allow that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had combined with him. They acknowledge that they were aware of the intercourse between Holkar and the soubahdar some time before the contribution was levied; but they were afraid to attempt to dismiss their own treacherous servant. Upon the whole, therefore, the levy of the contribution upon Aurungabad may be considered as the act of two rebels to the states of the Peshwah and of the Nizam.

In case Holkar should be considered in the light of a power in India, his conduct at Aurungabad affords ample ground for hostilities against him: but upon the whole, considering that the Marhattas have long been in the habit of plundering the Nizam's territories; that his Highness' government omit to take any measures for their defence; and that, in this particular instance, they were aware of the combination between their own servant and a Marhatta chief, and they were afraid to take the most obvious steps to frustrate their designs, I think that, if all parties acquiesce peaceably in the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein, it will not be worth while to commence a chase after Holkar to recover the plunder of Aurungabad.

I propose to march from hence in a few days. I am detained here only by the want of iron to repair the wheels of my ordnance carriages. If I should find that the congress to the northward determine upon war, my first operation will be to seize upon Ahmednuggur, by which Scindiah will lose a territory worth 9 lacs of rupees, and which he extorted some

years ago from the Peshwah. Malcolm is still very unwell: he was talking of going back to Mysore, but I have prevailed upon him to stay with me some time longer.

The letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor of Fort St. George is shocking. I hope that you do not propose to stay in India longer than the end of this year. Such masters do not deserve your services.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 27th May, 1803.

The hircarrah has positively no orders from me to require more than an answer, which I conclude he ought to receive.

It is possible that the other party may have desired him to urge Ball Kishen Gungurdhur to pay the money; and therefore it will be best that Ragonaut Rao should inform that chief that the hircarrah has no orders to require, or even to receive, more than an answer. I conclude, however, that the Peshwah will not support Ball Kishen Gungurdhur in a disobedience of his own orders, and that he will be forced to pay back this money; otherwise we must not expect either obedience or cordial co-operation in future. I return Col. Collins's letter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 27th May, 1803.

I have spoken to Govind Rao, and he seems to think that Appah Saheb does not wish for the proposed honor, and at all events would not pay for it. He said that, if it was given with full confidence, power, and treasure, he would of course be rejoiced to receive it; but not otherwise. He proposed to inquire further regarding his views to this office, and I shall know the result to-morrow. Appah Dessaye has sent to ask for his leave. He says that they propose to give him pay for only 1000, instead of 1500 horse, which number he has; and that, in fact, no determined engagement is made even for them.

I wish, also, that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao respecting the Darwar man, and the Rajah of Kittoor. The former sent 100 horse by my desire, and partly to attend upon his son: the other likewise sent 100 horse. But neither have any serinjaumy, and their troops are starving, and they want to go home. I gave the Rajah 500 pagodas some days ago; but it will be better to allow both parties to go back, unless some arrangement is made for their pay. Goklah also complains that he is not getting on, and has sent to ask for a passport for some of his horse that he is going to send back to Noolgoond.

I enclose you a letter from Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, in which he acknowledges that he took the money in question. Unless that money is repaid, we have no chance of putting the Putwurdun in any style.

P. S. Observe, that Ragonaut Rao first said that this money was taken as a debt due by Appah Saheb's carkoon; and since I told him that there never had been any transactions between the parties, and could be no debt, another reason has been found out and stated. There is really no getting on with such people.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

The brinjaries with this division have sustained great losses in cattle,

and they appear to apprehend still greater, and are very unwilling to continue with the troops. With these impressions on their minds, they have certainly prevented the brinjarries of this country from coming forward in our service; and these people have taken great pains to prevent all communications with the persons employed by me to endeavor to bring them forward for the service. Since the 20th April my brinjarries have sold nothing, as the troops have been subsisted entirely upon the produce of the country purchased in the bazaar. I have therefore thought it necessary, in order to secure their services and their good will, in the present situation of our affairs, to make them a present of 2 rupees for each bullock they may have. This is not unusual: Gen. Harris made them a present, nearly of a similar kind, at Seringapatam; and I have reason to believe that it may induce some of the country brinjarries to come forward.

I find the brinjarries, and indeed all the people of the Mysore country and the Carnatic, very averse to staying in this country. It is true that forage, and all kinds of provisions, are uncommonly dear: I therefore take the liberty of recommending to you to bring forward as many hired bullocks as possible, and to depend less upon the brinjarries for supplying your troops than I have. The more I see of them, the more I am convinced that we have entirely mistaken the character of these people; and that, unless they are permitted to plunder the country through which they pass, or to have profits such as the Native armies are able to give them from plunder, they will not follow the troops to any distance from the place at which they usually reside. I have had the greatest difficulties with them, and they have deceived me, and broken their engagements, upon every occasion. Col. Stevenson, who has another set, has been obliged to punish, and even to put some to death, for plunder in the Peshwah's country.

By a letter from the Governor General, of the 9th, I see that he has sent you copies of the notes of instructions to Col. Collins and Col. Close, which I had sent you.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. * * * **

Camp near Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

I have communicated the subject of your letter of the 21st inst. to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley; and I am directed by him to inform you that you are authorised to employ working parties of the troops under your command, to keep the post in the best state of repair at all times. The bills for the working money require the sanction of the Commander in Chief before payment, and the General does not choose to trouble his Excellency with them every week; but when the money amounts to any considerable sum, he will forward all the bills at once, and you may inform the sepoys that the money will be paid to them in due time.

Lieut. Stuart has reported that he has apprehended at Deogherry 39 men of different descriptions, who had left camp without leave, and had sent them on towards this detachment under a guard. They will soon arrive at your post, and the General desires that you will keep them under confinement, and subsist them according to the instructions already given you for the subsistence of prisoners, until the arrival of a detachment from the grand army escorting money to this detachment, when you will deliver them over to the officer commanding it, and show this letter to him as the General's orders for his taking charge of them and bringing them on to Poonah.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. * * * **

27th May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you the en-

closed translations of the narrative given this day by Ramanah Naig of the circumstances mentioned in the memorandum which I forwarded to you on the 4th inst.; also of a letter from Nago Sham Rao to his vakeel here on the same subject; and to say that they differ much from what your letter of the 11th had induced him to believe was the case, from these papers and the circumstances stated in your letter of the 23rd to have happened at the town of Manjorie, which also belongs to Nago Sham Rao. He is convinced that you have rendered yourself disagreeable to the inhabitants of that part of the country, and have done an incalculable injury to the British character by your interference in the disputes of the natives, which renders it absolutely necessary to remove you from Erroor; and the General therefore directs that you will immediately, on the receipt of this letter, deliver over the command of that post to Lieut. Allen, together with all public papers, money, and accounts in your hands, particularly the accounts of men sick in hospital; and that you will repair to Poonah without delay. I am also directed to intimate to you Major Gen. Wellesley's intention of causing a more strict inquiry to be made into the merits of Nago Sham Rao's complaint against you, if he shall find it necessary to do so, after you join this detachment. It is necessary that you should show this letter, and the narrative, &c., to Lieut. Allen, that he may be on his guard not to interfere in the concerns of the country in any manner. The General allows you to bring up as many of the recovered natives as may be able to march the stages which you will intend to make.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Allen, Erroor.

27th May, 1803.

Lieut. * * * * will deliver over the post of Erroor to you, as soon as he shall receive this letter, together with all public papers, money, and accounts in his custody. He will also show you his orders for so doing, containing the reasons for removing him from the command, which ought to put you on your guard against all interference in the concerns of the country. As it may happen that the recovered Europeans may assume more liberty under your command than they would do under that of one of their own officers, the General authorises you to punish, at your own discretion, the first and every instance of irregularity attempted by them. I have also to inform you that orders will be sent to-morrow for forwarding on to this division all Europeans, or Natives, who may be able to march along with a detachment from the grand army, which will soon arrive at Erroor.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. * * * **

28th May, 1803.

Your letter of the 20th only arrived yesterday morning. Major Gen. Wellesley had a perfect recollection of the circumstances to which you allude, and has directed me to inform you that the justice which he owes to the public service will not allow him to recommend to the notice of the Commander of the Forces an officer who left his station, not only without leave, but contrary to orders; and the General is very certain that, if Mr. * * * * had known these circumstances, he would not have given you an introduction to him.

The D.A.G. to the Officer commy. the brigade of Cavalry.

28th May, 1803.

The General desires me to inform you that some countrymen brought him a note this forenoon from Col. Close, mentioning that no less than 6 cart loads and 2 bullock loads of their hay had been taken from them, and they had not been paid for it. On giving the men an order, directing the hay to be paid for or returned, they received the price of 5 cart loads and the 2 bullock loads in the 19th lines; but the gentleman who took the other cart load says that it was not fully loaded, and he will not give the same price for it. It appears also that he cannot return the hay, as it was taken 3 days ago. The General therefore requests that you will see the men satisfied for their hay, and that you will give out an order to the brigade of cavalry, referring to the former orders on the subject of forage, and directing once for all that no one shall stop forage coming into or passing through camp, or take it out of the owner's possession, until he has been satisfied as to the price, and has received it.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Elwood, Goorgherry.

28th May, 1803.

I enclose, by order of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, a translation of a

note given to him by Ball Kishen Bhow; and I have to communicate the General's orders to you to recall such persons as are therein mentioned from Canapoor, if you have sent them; and, further, that you will invariably refrain from interfering in the disputes of the people of the country.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Cunningham, D.Q.M.G. in Mysore.

28th May, 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you for your information and guidance the accompanying copies of letters written by his order to Mr. Gordon, paymaster in Mysore; to Major Doolan, commanding at Hullihall; and to the officers commanding the posts established on the Toombuddra, at Huriyhur; on the Werdah, at Deogherry; on the Malpoorba, at Sungoly; on the Gutpurba, at Goorgherry; and on the Kistna, at Erroor, on the subject of establishing a fleet of boats upon each of those rivers, and for the providing for the payment of the boatmen to be employed, and other expenses incidental to the establishment. The General has, with the sanction of the Commander in Chief, appointed you to superintend the whole of this important department; and it is his desire that as soon as you have disposed of the remount horses, at present under your charge, according to the orders of the Commander in Chief, you will enter upon this new charge. You are authorised to entertain 4 chucklers and 2 basket makers for each river, whom you will send to their stations as soon as possible, with information to the officers of the rates of hire at which you have engaged them, and instructions for paying the men. You are authorised to draw on Mr. Gordon for the sums of money which will be required for the payment of the boat establishment on each river; and it is the General's wish that you will call for the accounts of disbursements at each station monthly, and make out one general account from them, and send it to him. It will be most convenient to Mr. Gordon to send the money required at Hurryhur and Deogherry from his office at Chittledroog; and that required at Sungoly, Goorgherry, and Erroor, from Hullihall, in Soonda, from whence he sends the pay of the detachments stationed there; and it will be necessary that you should specify, on your indents for this money, that it is on account of the boat establishments.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 29th May, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 25th, in which you inform me that you have entered into an engagement with Meer Khan, to take into the Nizam's service 5000 horse and 5000 foot. I am glad to observe that, before you adopted this measure, you referred to all my letters to you upon the subject of Meer Khan; and that you found, although I was fully aware of the benefit which was likely to be the result of the Nizam's taking that chief into his service, that I was exceedingly anxious that he should be employed, and requested you to urge Noor ool Oomrah to keep alive the negotiation. I gave you no authority to enter into any engagements with Meer Khan, and referred every thing to the answer to be expected from the Nizam's durbar. In fact, I could give you no authority to conclude with Meer Khan, because I have no such authority myself.

It is probable that, when you shall have received my letter, and its enclosure, of the 25th inst., you will have set the Nizam's servants right, respecting the share which they supposed the British government would bear in the expense of hiring Meer Khan and his troops; and they will have seen that the negotiation with Meer Khan is referrible only to them, although they have referred it to you, and you to my opinion. When they shall see this clearly, they will be best able to judge whether there

Mem.

29th May, 1803.

Orders have been sent out for all the public cattle to be brought into camp on the 2nd June, preparatory to a march.

are powers from the Nizam's government to conclude an arrangement with Meer Khan, such as that stated in the Persian paper, which you enclosed, of which I return a translation. If there are such powers from the Nizam's government, all is well; and I consider that a great advantage will have been gained by detaching Meer Khan from Holkar's service. But if there are no such powers from the Nizam's government, and the engagement is considered in every respect as one entered into by a British officer, acting on account of the British government, under my authority, I request you to write a letter to Meer Khan, to inform him that I have perused your letter addressed to him; that the British government are not in the habit of entertaining troops of the description of those under his command; that, as a British officer, therefore, I can enter into, and can authorise, no engagement for hiring his troops; that I have recommended to the Nizam's government that his Highness should take Meer Khan and his troops into his service; and that I must refer him, for a final answer upon this subject, to his Highness' durbar.

I enclose you the translation, which has been made for me, of your letter to Meer Khan, in order that you may see what I understand are its contents. It occurs to me, that you have entered into this engagement with Meer Khan under a strong impression of the benefit to be derived from drawing that chief from the service of Holkar, in which I participate; and under another equally strong, of the urgency of bringing him into the Nizam's service at the present moment, on account of the probability of a war with the confederated Marhatta Chiefs. Upon this point I have to observe, that it does not appear that this war is more probable, and it is not more talked of, at this moment, than it was 3 months ago; and it is my opinion that it will not take place.

You must not spare any party belonging to any Marhatta Chiefs that you find, or that may be within your reach, within the Nizam's territories; and you must also seize any fellow that you may hear of raising men within them.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Poonah, 29th May, 1803.

I have received a letter from Col. Stevenson, by which I learn that he has written a letter to Meer Khan, and has consented to take 5000 horse and 5000 foot, into the service; although upon a re-perusal and re-consideration of the different letters he had received upon the subject of that chief, he found that he had no authority from me to conclude such an arrangement. I have, in consequence, written to him a letter this day, of which the enclosed is a copy; and I send it to you, that you may have it in your power to show the Nizam's durbar that, as far as I may be supposed to have had authority to bind the government in a transaction of this kind, Col. Stevenson was not authorised by me.

Memorandum.

When Gen. Stuart stated his intention to appoint Capt. Mackay to do Major Symons's duty in this detachment, I apprised him of Capt. Mackay's objections to have to do with the accounts of the hired bullocks; and I understand, from the conversation which then passed between the

Commander in Chief, the Adj. Gen., and myself, that it was not his Excellency's intention that Capt. Mackay was to have any thing to do with the settlement of the bullock accounts, but that he was only to receive money on account of Major Symons, from the pay officer; that he was to pay money to the bullock owners on account of Major Symons, and under his directions; and that Major Symons alone was to be the responsible accountant to the public for all the hired cattle. If the intention had been different, it would have been better to have appointed a separate bullock agent for this detachment.

In respect to the form and mode of settling the accounts, it is my opinion that Major Symons can call upon Capt. Mackay to send the account of the money he disbursed, in any form he may think proper, provided that form does not occasion any evidently unnecessary trouble.

Although Capt. Mackay has not relied much upon the forms of the accounts required from him, I conclude that, provided the future responsibility is taken from him, he will be satisfied; and that the complaints of the forms in which the accounts are required are intended only to swell the catalogue of grievances.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 30th May, 1803.

I have received your secretary's letter of the 20th inst., upon the subject of the bullock accounts, to which I have replied this day. I am concerned that I should have been the cause of error in Capt. Mackay, respecting the accounts of the hired bullocks; but I wrote the memorandum, which is enclosed, to your secretary, from what I understood to be your intention in the conversation which I had with you, and in the G. O. regarding Capt. Mackay's appointment.

In respect to the Company's gun bullocks, I have the honor to enclose some papers, which I have received from Capt. Mackay, from which it appears that Capt. Mackay was not unwilling that Major Symons should interfere in that department, as far as he might think proper.

In Major Symons's letter of the 8th May, he calls for an additional voucher of the payments made in this department, which was not ordered by the Military Auditor Gen. This voucher may be a very necessary one, and it may be very proper to introduce it into the department, but it must be introduced by an order from superior authority; and, at all events, I believe that every day's experience of the service shows that the business of every department of the army has become so complicated, from the multiplicity and variety of checks and vouchers, that it is scarcely possible to carry on the duties of any one department exactly in the mode pointed out by the regulations. It is therefore better not to increase these vouchers in a department which has constantly proved itself to be more efficient than any other in the service.

From a perusal of these papers, I am convinced that, if these gentlemen chose to accommodate, the business would be very well carried on, without giving you further trouble; but, at all events, it must be carried on according to your orders.

As it appears, by the papers which I have enclosed, that Capt. Mackay wished that Major Symons should carry on the duties of the gun bullock

department, in any manner he might think proper, and as I was partly the cause of this error respecting the mode of settling the accounts of the hired bullocks, I did not inform him that it was your intention to dismiss him from his office; but he has since desired leave to resign it. I have refused to allow him leave to resign it: 1st, because, if you still think proper that he should be punished, I do not wish that he should evade that punishment by resigning the office, by which means he would certainly avoid the disgrace that would attend his dismissal: 2ndly, I should feel much inconvenienced in having to transfer that extensive concern, the Company's elephants and draught bullocks, as well as the hired cattle with this detachment, to other hands at the present moment. Indeed, the people attached to the gun bullocks appear so much under the influence of Capt. Mackay; they are so miserable on account of the smallness of their pay, and the high price of any article of provisions in this country; and so discontented on these accounts, as well as because they see a similar or a worse description of people, belonging to the Bombay army, receiving more than double their pay, that I should fear they would all desert, if Capt. Mackay lost his employment. This misery and discontent are so great, that I much fear, when the rains set in, to aggravate them; and that I shall be obliged to make a proposition to you to give the bullock drivers a temporary allowance as a gratuity, while serving in a part of the country in which provisions are so dear.

Although I have refused to receive Capt. Mackay's resignation, it is proper that you should be informed of the reasons for which he has offered it. I before informed you that the state of his health, as well as other causes, induce him to wish to go home, as soon as the service on which the troops are now employed shall be performed; and that was one reason for which he wished to have nothing to do with the accounts of the hired bullocks with this detachment, and they are to go to Major Symons. But Capt. Mackay will not be freed from this responsibility when he shall have sent these accounts to Major Symons, and that officer shall have approved of them; but he must still be responsible till the accounts shall have been passed by the proper officers at Madras.

Capt. Mackay would be perfectly satisfied to incur this responsibility, if his accounts had no connexion with Major Symons; but he urges that, although his accounts may be settled monthly, and may be perfectly correct, and made out according to Major Symons's wishes, he shall not be freed from his responsibility, and will not be able to leave the country, should you permit him to do so, until Major Symons's accounts be settled. Therefore, he wishes to resign the appointment he holds at the earliest possible period, in order that he may be responsible for the accounts of a smaller number of months. I beg to refer this subject to your consideration; and to request your orders whether I shall accept Capt. Mackay's resignation, or shall dismiss him. Knowing well the inconvenience which would be the consequence of his resigning the gun bullock and elephant departments, at the present moment, he has offered to keep the charge of these, without salary, till the service may be concluded.

I received a letter, last night, from Col. Stevenson, in which he informed me that the Nizam's commander, Mohiput Ram, had received

orders from Hyderabad, to agree to entertain Meer Khan and all his army, amounting to 30,000 men. Some time ago Col. Stevenson referred to me a letter from Meer Khan, in which that chief urged strongly the necessity that he should have an immediate answer to his proposition to be taken into the Nizam's service, with his whole army. I desired Col. Stevenson to keep up the communication with Meer Khan, and to inform the Nizam's commander, who appeared to be very anxious that he should be taken into the service, that I had recommended to Major Kirkpatrick that he and his whole party should be entertained. Many letters passed between me and Col. Stevenson upon the subject, in all of which he expressed how much he was pressed by Meer Khan for an answer. I always referred him to the Nizam's government; and desired him to inform the Nizam's commanders, that, owing to his Highness' indisposition, and that of one of his sons, all business at Hyderabad was stopped, which was one cause of the delay.

In the course of this correspondence, I received a letter from Major Kirkpatrick, in which he informed me that the Nizam's commanders conceived that the British government would defray half of the expense to be incurred by entertaining Meer Khan and his troops. I therefore immediately wrote to Col. Stevenson, to desire him to set them right upon that point; and to inform them that the whole question had been all along referrible, and referred, to the Nizam's government alone. Since I wrote that letter, I have received one from Col. Stevenson, in which he tells me, that, notwithstanding he had re-perused and re-considered my letters to him, and found that he had no authority whatever to conclude with Meer Khan, he had written to that chief to consent to take into the service 5000 horse, and 5000 foot, at an enormous expense. I immediately wrote to him to desire, that, if it was understood that he had bound the British government, in any manner, by that letter, he should write immediately to Meer Khan, to tell him that neither he nor I had any authority to enter into such an agreement.

Last night, however, I received his letter of the 26th, in which he tells me that Mohiput Ram has authority to entertain Meer Khan; and that it has been agreed that half the expense is to be paid by the Company, and half by the Nizam. I cannot comprehend what could have induced Col. Stevenson to write to Meer Khan the letter by which he engaged to hire the troops; for he positively says, in his letter, that he was aware that he had no authority to make such a bargain. But he appears to have been strongly impressed with a sense of the advantages of detaching that chief from Holkar, to whom, as well as to the supposed confederacy, it is a fatal blow; and to be very apprehensive of the combination of the northern Chiefs, of which he had read very late assurances from Major Kirkpatrick. This combination, however, I think now more unlikely than ever.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

30th May, 1803, 4 P.M.

Appah Dessaye has just sent to me to say that he wishes to call here to-morrow, and to take his leave; that they are doing nothing for him, &c. &c. Will you do me the favor to mention this to Ragonaut Rao? He is really one of the most deserving men I brought here: he was the

first that joined; and, if something is not done for him, I cannot pretend to stop him.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Harness, 4th brigade of infantry.

30th May, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has perused, with much surprise, Lieut. Col. ———'s letter to you, of this date, and his return of carriage now in readiness for the camp equipage, stores, and sick of the battalion under his command. After a halt of 6 weeks, during which time the public departments have procured nearly 3000 new bullocks, and the other officers of the army have purchased as many as they required, Lieut. Col. ——— came forward with two propositions, either to be allowed to leave his camp equipage behind, at the commencement of a campaign during the rainy season, or to have them carried for him at the public expense; and although he was informed that neither of them could possibly be admitted, he sends in a return of carriage 3 days before the time announced for marching, from which, if the carriage for his own tents, &c., be deducted, there may not remain above 12 or 15 bullocks for that of the tents, stores, and sick of the corps. Either Col. ——— must perform his contract, of which he has had the benefit, or the public must incur the expense of it upon the present occasion, or the tents and stores of the battalion must be left behind. Major Gen. Wellesley has no doubt respecting the alternative which ought to be adopted by every man who has a respect for his own character, or a desire to forward the service as well as his own interest. He knows his duty if that alternative is not adopted, and he will certainly perform it. The Major General therefore desires you will intimate to Lieut. Col. ———, that, if he has not sufficient carriage for the tents and stores of his battalion, when the detachment marches, he will deprive him of the contract, which he will give to another officer; and he will hold up Lieut. Col. ——— to the whole army as a man eager to reap all the benefit of that contract, but who has failed entirely to fulfil his part of it, when the service and the credit of the army required every exertion on his part, and under circumstances where so many other officers have fulfilled their contracts of a similar nature.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

After the Nizam's officers had informed Col. Stevenson that Meer Khan, with his whole army, was to be taken into the service, and that the expense was to be paid equally by the Company and the Nizam, they came forward on the following day with a paper, which they said required only the Colonel's signature, in order that they might conclude with Meer Khan. The purport of this paper was, that the Colonel engaged that the British government would defray half of the expense of entertaining Meer Khan and his troops. Col. Stevenson refused to sign this paper, and there the matter rested. In the mean time, he received a letter from me, of the 25th, in which I enclosed the copy of a report of moonshee Uzzeez Oollah, stating that the Nizam's minister had declared that Col. Stevenson had engaged that the British government would defray half the expense; and I desired Col. Stevenson to set the Nizam's servants right upon this subject.

The Colonel then drew from them a paper, being a copy of their letter to the minister, from which it appears clearly, not only that Col. Stevenson never did enter into these engagements, as stated by the Nizam's minister, but that his Highness' servants never thought that he did, and never wrote that he had. It appears, therefore, that the whole has been a trick, in which the Nizam and his minister have been concerned, and his officers the instruments to endeavor to draw some Englishmen into an engage-

Mem.

31st May, 1803.

The public cattle will not be brought into camp till the 3rd June, and the detachment will march on the following day.

ment to pay half the expense of hiring Meer Khan; and then to take advantage of our scrupulous adherence to our good faith, to make the government adhere to this engagement. However, it has entirely failed; and I think there is reason to hope that Col. Stevenson will not have dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, which I yesterday reported to you that he had written. I think we are not getting on so quickly at this durbar as we hoped we should. None of the sirdars have yet been satisfied, although great promises have been made.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 26th, 27th, and 28th. After reading that of the 26th, I was convinced that the proposition would be made to you, which you recite in that of the 27th; and I am glad that you resisted to comply with it with so much firmness. It appears, by your letter of the 28th, that mine of the 25th arrived just in time to show you the designs of the Nizam's servants; and I still hope, that, if you had not then sent off the letter to Meer Khan, you will have stopped it. My letter of the 25th, and its enclosures, will have shown you clearly the art of the Nizam's servants. They know how scrupulous we are regarding our faith; and they first endeavor to make Major Kirkpatrick believe you have pledged your faith that the British government would pay a part of the expense of hiring Meer Khan, in hopes thereby to draw him in to make some engagement.

When they found that would not answer, they come back upon you, and tell you that it is settled that 35,000 men of Meer Khan's are to be hired, and that the Company are to pay half of the expense; and then they call upon you to sign an agreement that that half shall be paid in the manner in which it had been settled. After all, when you were informed by me of what had passed at Hyderabad, it turns out to be a low trick, in which both the minister and the Nizam were concerned, and Mohiput Ram, and Noor ool Oomrah, the instruments to take you in to sign an engagement for which you had no authority; in hopes thereby to bind the British government to participate in an act, to which they know well they would never be able to prevail upon the Governor General to consent. What has passed is now all well; particularly if you have not sent your letter to Meer Khan. It ought, however, to be a lesson to us to beware not to involve ourselves in engagements either with, or in concert with, or on behalf of, people who have no faith, or no principle of honor or of honesty, or such as usually among us guide the conduct of gentlemen, unless duly and formally authorised by our government.

If you should have dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, the letter which I desired you to write to him will set all matters right, as far as the British government may be concerned. It will rest with the Nizam's servants, either to abide by the agreement made in that letter, or not, as they may think proper. For the sake of the Nizam's territories, I hope they will abide by it; but if there should be the most distant hint, or even idea, that the British government is bound by your letter to Meer Khan, I hope that you will have written him a second letter, as directed by me in my letter of the 29th.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Col. Stevenson, written in answer to one from me of the 26th inst., in which I sent him a copy of the report of moonshee Uzzeez Oollah, on the subject of the supposed consent by Col. Stevenson, that the British government should pay half of the expense to be incurred in hiring Meer Khan and his troops.

The transaction has not the appearance of a very candid one, either on the part of the government at Hyderabad, or on that of the Nizam's officers with Col. Stevenson. However, he resisted firmly all their attempts to induce him to sign a paper by which he should engage that the British government would pay half of the expense; and at last, when from my letter he discovered that the durbar alleged that he had engaged himself, he got from the Nizam's officers a paper, which proved clearly that even they had never thought so.

I cannot tell, from his letter of the 28th, whether he had dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, of which I sent you the translation. But if he had, an obedience to the orders given to him in my letter will prevent any inconvenience from that measure.

P. S. I enclose a copy of a second letter from Col. Stevenson, upon the subject of his communications with Mohiput Ram, which I have just received.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

I have the honor to inform you, that I proposed to march on the 3rd June, being fully prepared for that purpose. From the communications, however, which I have had with the different chiefs in the service of his Highness the Peshwah, who accompanied me before my march to this city, I find that, notwithstanding his Highness' positive promise to me in your presence, no steps have yet been taken to satisfy the claims of any of them. These chiefs, therefore, appear to entertain great anxiety upon the subject of my approaching march. Some of them have determined to ask for permission to return to their homes, and none are prepared to march with the British troops under my command. Under these circumstances, I think there is strong reason to apprehend, that the whole of the troops of his Highness the Peshwah will disband, when I shall commence my march from Poonah. You are well aware how strongly I am urged, by the situation of the affairs of the government of his Highness the Peshwah to the northward, and by the advanced state of the season, to commence my march at the earliest possible period. But in hopes that some arrangement will be made, I have no objection to halt till the 4th, on which day I must march.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Harness, commg. 4th brigade of Infantry. 31st May, 1803.

I have laid Lieut. —'s letter before Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, and I am directed by him to express his entire approbation of your having ordered that officer to fall into the rear of his company, when you found that he could not do the duty required from the officer at the head of it. You did no more upon this occasion than what the General has seen many times, and has practised himself frequently, in respect to officers of higher rank than Lieut. —;

and he requests that you will act in the same manner on any occasion on which you find it necessary. He directs that this letter may be communicated to Lieut. —.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Allen, Erroor.

31st May, 1803.

I enclose, by order of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, a copy of a letter received from Lieut. * * * *, which, with my letter to him of the 27th, will serve to point out to you the cause of the difficulties which the troops at Erroor probably experience at this time. The situation chosen for the hospital on the Kistna enjoyed advantages far superior to those possessed by the other posts occupied on the route of this detachment. It was surrounded by rich and populous towns, belonging to different chiefs, who were striving to outdo each other in their endeavors to recommend themselves to the Company's favor, and therefore afforded the fairest hope that the troops left there would be well treated and amply supplied; but such interference in the private concerns of the country as are imputed to Lieut. * * * *, and his inattention to see justice done to the inhabitants in their dealings with his troops, as appears by his letter, could not fail to excite a personal dislike to him throughout the whole district, and it will be lucky for the detachment if the consequences of that dislike should cease with his removal. In fact, the detachment is there through their toleration, and not through its own power to offend or defend. The sirdars of those districts who are here express themselves satisfied for what has been done by Lieut. * * * *s removal, and they have engaged to send fresh orders to all the villages depending upon them to furnish whatever the detachment wants, for payment. It will be your business to see that this single condition on the part of the detachment is performed. Major Gen. Wellesley directs that you will have all the recovered men, Europeans or Natives, who can march, ready to join a detachment from the army which will soon arrive at your post, and send them to Poonah along with it. For this purpose you will send the requisite number of tents for the Europeans from those attached to the hospital, with carriage, &c. It is supposed there will be from 20 to 24 Europeans, and 2 tents will serve them. One bullock load of arrack, at 1 dram a day, and 2 bullock loads of rice, with a little salt, will suffice, as more provisions will be sent from this place to meet them. Mr. Scott, who has charge of all the provisions, will deliver over the above, with a proportion of sheep, to the commanding officer of the detachment; and you must send 3 of the public bullocks, belonging to any corps or department, to carry the arrack and rice. These can return as soon as the party meets its fresh supply. The General authorises you to issue 6 seers of rice, *gratis*, to each of the recovered Native troops who may be able to march, which will subsist them at half a seer a day to this place. You will give Mr. Scott an extract of this letter as his authority for issuing the provisions, and one to the officer commanding the detachment, as Major Gen. Wellesley's authority for his taking charge of the recovered men. You will, at the same time, give him the enclosed route.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

I was concerned to hear, from Lieut. Col. Agnew, that you have suffered much from the heat of the weather. You will have received immediate relief from the removal to a house; and it is to be hoped that the rains, which we may expect every day, will enter the Doobah, and cool the weather, and that you will be able to return to camp. There is nothing new here.

I do not know that the Peshwah has concluded any thing for any of his sirdars, but he promised that they should have their sunnuds last night.

G. O.

1st June, 1803.

A field hospital will be established at Poonah previous to the march of the detachment. Mr. Gilmour will settle with the regimental surgeon, &c., the men who must be left in the hospital, and he will have the clothing and medicines required for them ready to be delivered over to the surgeon who shall be left in charge.

Commanding officers of corps will have all the accounts of their sick settled, and the requisite rolls and certificates ready to be delivered over with them at the shortest notice.

Col. Collins had asked for an audience from Scindiah, but he had not received an answer on the 27th May. It appears, from a conversation which passed between Ballojee Koonger, the Peshwah's vakeel with Scindiah, and a man of Col. Collins's, and from a letter from Ballojee Koonger to the durbar here, that the confederacy has now subsided into a plan to frighten the Peshwah; and, by working on his fears, to induce him to cede his lands in Guzerat to Scindiah, in order to conciliate that chief; but this will not answer.

Holkar is certainly moving off to the northward of the Taptee. It is said he intends to cross the Nerbudda likewise, and to enter Guzerat, but I doubt it: if he crosses the Nerbudda at all, it will be with a view to establish himself in the Holkar territory in Hindustan. I shall march on the 4th.

I have made 150 wheels since I came here; by which exertion, and the assistance I have got from Col. Murray's corps, I am better equipped, in respect to carriages, than I was on the day I quitted the army.

To the Sec. of Gov. Bombay.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st May, with its enclosures. I think it very desirable that the 40 pontoons, which I first mentioned, should leave Panwell as soon after the 8th inst. as may be possible. But I do not see any objection to making 10 additional pontoons, which may be sent afterwards, if it should be found necessary to require an additional number.

The report upon the trial of the pontoons does not state at what distance they were from each other; and, therefore, it is impossible for me to give an opinion whether the size of the balks ought to be increased.

To the Sec. of Gov. Bombay.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th May, in which you enclose the extract of a letter from the Military board, and a copy of a letter from the garrison storekeeper of Bombay to the Military board.

It is my opinion that it will not answer to form a depôt at Cundolla, on the top of the Bhore ghaut.

1st, it will not be possible to construct the buildings necessary to cover the stores before the rains shall set in.

2ndly, it will not be possible to procure cattle at Cundolla to remove the stores from thence to Poonah or to the army. Cattle must consequently be provided at Poonah, or must be sent from the army for this service. And, supposing them to be procurable at Poonah, it is better that they should be employed to carry on the stores from thence to the army; and, supposing that the cattle of the army should be able to return for stores, it is better that they should have to go no farther than Poonah for their loads.

3rdly, the intermediate depôt between Panwell and Poonah, even supposing that it was not liable to the objections above stated, would only create delay in forwarding supplies, and add to the confusion incident to the formation of all new establishments of this description.

I observe, in Capt. Moor's letter to the Military board, that he finds it difficult to adhere to the plan which I suggested to the Hon. the Governor in Council, in my letter of the 18th May, for forwarding the supplies from Panwell to Poonah or the army. If the owners of the hired cattle cannot be prevailed upon to agree to go farther than Poonah, of course they must not be forced to do so; but the only mode of inducing them by degrees to agree to a proposition which I consider as beneficial to the troops under my command, will be to hire them by the month, to accustom them to regular payments and strict justice, which ought to prevail in all the Company's transactions with the Natives of this country. Accordingly, to stop their pay if they delay unreasonably on the road; and then they will find it more advantageous for them to work their cattle in the upper country between Poonah and the army, than in the lower between Panwell and Poonah; as in the former they will be less exposed to the violence of the rains.

Instructions for Lient. Brown, 1st batt. Madras artillery.

3rd June, 1803.

1. Lient. Brown is to remain at Poonah, according to the G. O., for the purposes therein stated. He is first to complete with wheels all the carts left by Capt. Noble.

2. He is to make wheels for the 6 pounder carriages belonging to Major Gen. Wellesley's division, left at Poonah with Col. Murray's corps.

3. He is to make wheels for the tumbrils left at Poonah, belonging to Major Gen. Wellesley's division.

4. If seasoned timber of a proper description for naves can be procured, he is to make new wheels, including naves, for the 10 six pounders which march with Major Gen. Wellesley's division. The naves can be bored, and the brass boxes placed in them, when the wheels are to be put on the carriages.

5. Lient. Brown is to pay the artificers according to the instructions which he will receive from Capt. Noble.

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 3rd June, 1803.

The detachment to march to-morrow by the left, baggage on the left; the *general* to beat at 1, and the assembly at 5 o'clock; the cavalry to form the advance, followed by the new piquets; the park and the wheel carriages, and the provision department, to follow the line; the piquets now on duty to form the rear guard. The 78th regt. is to be in the 4th brigade.

While rice continues at the high price which it bears at present in the bazaar at Poonah, Col. Murray is authorised to issue to each Native officer, non-commissioned officer, drummer, fifer, and rank and file, one half of a *pucra seer*, *per diem, gratis*, and in this allowance gun lascars are included, but not store lascars. When rice shall fall in price, Col. Murray is ordered to apprise Major Gen. Wellesley thereof, and he shall then receive further orders.

In consequence of the representation made to the Commander in Chief of the great scarcity of green grass, and the dearth of dry hay upon the arrival of the troops at Poonah, his Excellency has been pleased to give his consent to a charge being made, upon honor, for the extra forage purchased for the troop horses, when the corps were under those circumstances of difficulty, which is not to exceed a *fanam* and a half for each horse daily.

The forage purchased on the 20th and 21st April has been already paid for; that purchased from the 22nd to the 28th April, inclusive, shall now be paid for according to the principle above stated. After the 28th, as the followers of the army generally procure forage without difficulty, the grass cutters of the army ought to have provided what may be requisite for the horses. Officers commanding troops to make out an account, to be countersigned by commanding officers of regiments, and it is then to be paid by the general agent cavalry supplies.

To Col. Murray.

Camp near Poonah, 3rd June, 1803.

When I march from Poonah, I shall have occasion to draw supplies from the depôt formed at that place; and I beg your attention to the following directions respecting it.

I wish that there should be in this depôt, at all times, 4000 bags of rice, of 72 pucca seers each, each seer of 2lbs. In respect to other articles of provision stores, which I may think it necessary from time to time to have in this depôt, I shall send orders occasionally respecting their being laid in.

Enclosed I have the honor to send an extract of a letter which I wrote to Mr. Duncan on the 18th May, to provide for filling the depôt at Poonah. It is probable that the storekeeper at Panwell will be able to hire a number of bullocks sufficient for the purpose, under the instructions which have been given to him, in consequence of that letter.

You will be so kind as to give directions that a committee be assembled to ascertain the quantities and quality of provision stores which may from time to time arrive at Poonah from Panwell. In consequence of these instructions, you will desire the officer in charge of the stores at Poonah to give a receipt for such quantity, specifying in what manner they came, and on what day they were dispatched from Panwell. In case the owners of the cattle which bring up the stores from Panwell should require advances of money on their arrival at Poonah, you will authorize the officer in charge of the stores at Poonah to make these advances on account of the storekeeper at Panwell; taking care to insert in the register, that he had made the advances according to the arrangements suggested to Mr. Duncan, in the letter of which the enclosed is a copy. He will also enter, at the bottom of the register, the date of the arrival of the stores at Poonah, the number of bullocks that arrived, and the number of loads they brought.

From your correspondence with the storekeeper at Panwell, you will be able to ascertain whether he can procure bullocks in such numbers as to keep the depôt at Poonah complete to 4000 bags; and if you should have reason to apprehend that he will not be able to do so, you will authorize the officer in charge of the depôt at Poonah to purchase rice in the bazaar of that place, to keep it complete to that quantity. But as rice is scarce and dear at Poonah, and as a large quantity has been already provided for the public service at Bombay and Panwell, it is desirable that the latter should be used, if possible, rather than that any should be purchased at Poonah. Having thus provided for keeping the depôt at Poonah as full as I think it necessary, I proceed to inform you in what mode I propose to draw the stores from it to the body of troops who will be in advance.

If the state of the public cattle will allow of it, I propose that they should return to Poonah for fresh loads, in proportion as those they shall now take from thence shall be consumed. When these shall arrive, they will have an indent, signed by the officer at the head of the department to which they belong, and countersigned by me, which will specify the quantities required. These indents are to be complied with. Advices will be sent to you by post when these cattle shall be dispatched from camp, by

which you will be informed of their numbers, and the quantities and quality of the stores which it is intended they should bring.

It is also possible that I may be able to prevail upon some of the Mysore brinjarries to return to Poonah for loads. These people will have orders signed by the superintendent of supplies for the quantities and quality of the stores which they will require; which orders are to be complied with, and the receipts of the brinjarries, or their mutaseddee, are to be taken for the stores. You will be advised of the departure of the brinjarry cattle from camp from time to time, and will be informed of the numbers sent to Poonah, and the quantities of stores they will take. I have had many conversations with the Resident respecting the hire of cattle at Poonah, to carry on provision stores to the body of troops in advance; and I still hope that the government may be able to prevail upon some of the Marhatta brinjarries to enter into engagements to perform that service. All the cattle which the people attached to the Residency may be able to procure will be handed over to the officer in charge of the store at Poonah; and they must be dispatched with loads of rice to the body of troops in advance, by routes, of which from time to time I shall give you the details. Before they are dispatched, however, they must be made to enter into the engagements proposed in the enclosed extract of a letter to Mr. Duncan, to be required from the owners of cattle hired at Panwell, for the service. And a register must be made according to the form thereunto annexed; and all the regulations therein suggested for the conduct of the storekeeper at Panwell must be observed by the officer in charge of the stores at Poonah, in forwarding them to the body of troops in advance. The sums of money which he may advance will be on his own account; and all the sums which it may be necessary to advance to the owners of the bullocks, when they shall reach the army, will also be charged to him, and entered in the register, which he will send with the owners of the cattle.

In case you should find it necessary to use any part of the dépôt of provisions formed at Poonah, for the consumption of the body of troops under your command, you will be so kind as to take care that it is replaced, so as to be kept complete to the quantity above stated. Should Lieut. Col. Close be able to procure bullocks to carry rice to the army, the owners of them may want bags. Those in which the rice is contained must be examined, and if they should not be found fit for the service, 2000 bullock gunny bags must be immediately provided, to contain the stores which it may be in the power of the officer in charge of the dépôt to send on.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

I marched from Poonah this morning, and shall proceed towards the Godavery. I am sorry to tell you that, notwithstanding our strong recommendation of the southern jaghiredars and the Peshwah's officers to his Highness; his solemn promise to me that he would satisfy their claims in order to secure their future services; and the assurances of his servants from time to time to Col. Close, that his Highness was taking measures to satisfy them, and to send out an army with me, I have not

got with me one Marhatta horseman. Ragonaut Rao, however, has told Col. Close that the Peshwah will give the Zereen Putka to Appah Saheb and will not make the demand of the nuzzer. Appah Saheb has visited him, and Bulwunt Rao Nagonath is in treaty with Appah Saheb respecting the satisfaction of his other claims. But the Peshwah trusts none of his ministers, and pretends to do his own business; although his time is much taken up by religious ceremonies and his pleasures, and he is very undecided. These faults in his character, added to a slowness natural to every Marhatta negotiator, render hopeless the conclusion of any important transaction.

In the mean time the season is advancing, the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will soon fill; and then, if I am not on the spot to urge the chiefs, to take all the trouble, and to make all the arrangements which are necessary to cross the rivers with the troops, months will elapse before they will overtake me; even if the Peshwah should settle their claims, as far as to induce them to march from Poonah at all. This conduct of the Peshwah would appear like treachery; but I declare that I do not suspect him of treachery. I really believe that he thinks his only safety is in the alliance with the Company, and that he wishes to carry into execution all the stipulations of the treaty. But he is incapable himself of doing business; he will not trust his ministers; and he is jealous of, and detests, his sirdars. The news which came from England yesterday makes it very desirable that we should break up in this quarter.

I have seen Col. Collins's letter to you of the 29th May; and as I think it possible that the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah may never meet, I have urged the Colonel to press Scindiah to name a day on which he will explain his intentions; and if Scindiah should decline to name a day, he should fix one for him, beyond which, in my opinion, he ought not to remain in his camp, if the explanation should not be satisfactory.

If Scindiah should move off, which I still think is very probable, I shall break up immediately. There must be troops in the Carnatic when the French arrive at Pondicherry. There will be none, unless Gen. Stuart's army can march to that quarter; and if he should move before Scindiah shall have declared himself, the movement may have much effect upon Scindiah's declaration. And if there should be a war, the operations of this body of troops, at such a distance from our own frontiers, will be unpleasant, unless Gen. Stuart's force should be so posted as to preserve tranquillity in our rear, and defend the Company's territories. Upon the whole, therefore, it is absolutely necessary that Scindiah should immediately declare himself, and that, if his declaration should be favorable to our wishes, we should break up. Holkar's army is melting away: he is

G. O.

Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

On marching days the bleasties and puckalies are to be warned to be ready on the reverse flank of their companies, when the regiments fall in. The doolies are to march at the same time with the regiments, and at such a distance as to be within call.

Detail for piquets of the different corps of infantry consists of 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, and 40 rank and file: the subaltern officer marches his piquet from the flank from which the line marches at the beating of the *general*, and is posted by the adjutant of the day.

gone to the northward of the Taptee, and it is reported that he is going into Hindustan.

I wish that there were powers here to act at once, and to direct the negotiations with the different Marhatta chiefs to certain points as they arise. These questions occur daily, and nearly six weeks elapse before your orders can be received upon every fresh occurrence. At this moment Col. Collins ought to be ordered to press Scindiah to give an answer, particularly as he has hinted that he is wavering between peace and war; and time, which is all that Scindiah requires, and which is fatal to us, will be gained by the necessity of waiting for your orders, unless Col. Collins should attend to my suggestion. A communication ought also to be opened with Holkar and the Rajah of Berar, upon the subject of the treaty of Bassein, and endeavors made to separate them from Scindiah; and the Peshwah ought to be made to show his correspondence with Scindiah. I conclude, however, that Col. Close will ascertain whether his Highness has written to that chief, as he asserts he has.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

I return Col. Collins's packet, and the letter from Mr. Duncan.

It is obvious that the object of Scindiah is to gain time, which we ought to prevent, if possible, under present circumstances. It is very unfortunate that we have not now an agent with the Rajah of Berar, and another with Holkar. Are there no means of discovering whether the Peshwah has or has not invited Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to Poonah? If he has, no dependence can be placed on him; and we must immediately decide what steps the British government ought to take for its own security; considering all the circumstances of our situation in India, with the prospect of a war in Europe.

In respect to Parchole, my opinion is, that without negotiating or offering money to Scindiah's amildars, or Scindiah's troops, Mr. Duncan ought—

1st: To prepare a body of troops to take possession of that district.

2ndly: To communicate to Scindiah's amildar the Peshwah's sunnud making over the district to the English, together with the note given by the Peshwah, stating that Ballojee Koonger had no authority to grant it to Scindiah.

3rdly: To require him to withdraw from the district instantly, and to attack him if he does not comply with this requisition.

If this question was to occur between any two powers excepting the Company and a Marhatta, I should be of opinion that it would be proper to call upon the employer of the amildar to desire him to withdraw. But in cases in which the Marhattas are concerned, this course of action would be too tedious, even if successful in the end; but it would probably terminate in the necessity of driving out the amildar, which I have recommended in the first instance. Mr. Duncan might as well make Col. Collins acquainted with all the circumstances of this case at an early period.

I have had an opportunity of seeing all my cattle this day. The gun bullocks are in excellent condition; the carriage cattle, in general, better than I ever expected to find them; that is to say, they can march, and, if

we can get a little forage, will live; but the brinjarry cattle are terribly out of condition. I think they cannot live; and, at all events, they will not be able to work, so as to feed the troops. In my opinion, we cannot venture to cross the Godavery, unless some cattle can be hired at Poonah to attend us.

I have received a letter from Col. Collins, but it contains nothing particular.

To Lieut Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch from Col. Collins. It is probable that the advance of the troops will draw a declaration from Dowlut Rao Scindiah: at all events, I have urged Col. Collins to press him to fix a time when he will make known his sentiments.

Our situation is rather critical in this country. The Peshwah has hitherto done nothing for his sirdars who came with me, and none of them have marched from Poonah. He has broken the treaty by not producing an army, and he has broken his word with me. He has told Col. Close that he has urged Dowlut Rao Scindiah not to come to Poonah; and that chief declares that he has invited him and the Rajah of Berar to his capital. The Peshwah went so far as to communicate to Col. Close a copy of the letter which he said he had written to Scindiah. I do not believe that the Peshwah is treacherous; on the contrary, I am convinced that he sees that his only safety is in the treaty with the Company: but he is incapable of transacting the business of his government; he is jealous of the influence we have acquired over his chiefs, although he knows that he owes to that influence his restoration to power; and his disposition is so vindictive, that he cannot be brought to pardon those who have injured him, or to whom he has done an injury.

Upon the whole, I am concerned that the alliance will not work on the footing of the treaty. But at all events, he has broken the treaty by not producing his army; and the British government must be considered as at liberty to act according to its sense of its own interests. It is difficult to determine what is its interest at the present moment. If Scindiah had made the declaration required of him, and had consented to withdraw his army, I should have no scruple in deciding what is the interest of the British government. In my opinion, it would be to break up the army in this quarter, and to leave that part of it under your immediate directions at liberty to move towards the Carnatic, in case the war with France should be renewed. The 6 battalions might be left at Poonah, and government might withdraw them or not, as they might think proper; and as for Holkar, he might be left in possession of the Peshwah's territories to the northward, till his Highness himself should think it proper to assemble an army to drive him out.

The troops moving from hence to the southward might be employed to take possession of the district of Savanore. But as long as Scindiah remains in his menacing position on the Nizam's northern frontier, and will let us know whether we are to have peace or war, only when he shall have had a conference with the Rajah of Berar, which may never take place, it is not possible to move away from our position in this country,

even if we never had a treaty with the Peshwah. I marched this morning, and propose to move on towards the Godavery. If I can get a little forage, the cattle will do well, excepting the brinjarry cattle, which, I am afraid, cannot live.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Bardoly, N. of the Beemah, 5th June, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 30th and 31st May. I marched from Poonah yesterday, and intend to continue my march till I get beyond the Goor river, on the road towards Ahmednuggur or Puttun. I must then halt for a few days, if I can procure forage, as well to rest and refresh the cattle, which have had no forage since the day before yesterday, as to bring forward the Marhatta chiefs, who are still at Poonah.

You have done right to cross the Godavery. It is uncertain whether the northern chiefs will confederate for the purpose of hostility against the British government. Scindiah has told Collins that he cannot make him acquainted with the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar, until he shall have had a meeting with that Rajah; and he hints that he has made peace with Holkar, which I do not believe to be true. But Holkar still remains to the northward of the river Taptee; and if this confederacy should take effect, and there should be a war, your force may be the first object of the confederates, before I can give you any assistance. I therefore recommend that you should not advance too great a distance from the Godavery. You must send a sufficient detachment to cut up Baba Phurkia, or any other Marhatta that may enter the Nizam's territories; but I recommend that you should not make the detachment of the Company's troops. The Nizam's troops will effect this service well; and I make no doubt that any detachment you may send on it will take care not to expose itself to the greater Marhatta armies. I am very anxious indeed that they should avoid plundering, either in their own or the Marhatta territory; and that they should not enter the latter, unless Baba Phurkia, or the chief of whom they may be in pursuit, should have entered the Nizam's territory, and that they are certain of striking an important blow by following him.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Bardoly, N. of the Beemah, 5th June, 1803.

We had no forage yesterday, and none again this day. But the villages in this quarter are full of inhabitants, and do not appear to have been plundered. The country was cultivated last season; but I am afraid that, either from the want of seed grain or of cattle, it will not be cultivated this year; as I observe small patches of cultivation scattered in different situations, which I conclude are intended to provide for the food of the unfortunate inhabitants.

We have lost some brinjarry cattle already; and I have been obliged to leave 500 loads belonging to the provision department on the ground which I quitted this morning. I wrote to Col. Murray regarding them,

G. O.

Camp at Bardoly, 5th June, 1803.

As the rainy weather may be expected, the officer commanding the 74th regt. will indent for a captain's tent for the use of the hospital of that corps; and the officer commanding the 78th regt. will indent for a field officer's tent for the same use. These officers will also indent for lascars, bamboo, coolies, and carriage bullocks for those tents.

and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire your man to give him every assistance in his power to hire cattle to bring them back to Poonah. All this shows the necessity that we should have some assistance from the country.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Col. Murray, upon the subject of the depôt formed at Poonah; and of the assistance of cattle, which I still hope you will have it in your power to afford us.

I shall march on in hopes that, as I get to a distance from Poonah, I may find something for the cattle to eat. Every thing near it, excepting to the westward, has been consumed. I shall, to-morrow or next day, write to you regarding the place at which the boats ought to be on the rivers Beemah and Goor, in order to keep up the communication with us.

Do you not think that I ought now to write to Holkar to communicate to him the treaty of Bassein, and to point out to him its nature, &c.? If you are of that opinion, it will be necessary that you should send me a copy of the treaty in English, and in one of the Native languages.

To Col. Murray.

North of the Beemah, 5th June, 1803.

The bullock owners informed me that they had more cattle for the service than they produced at muster on the 31st May; and as the muster was taken at the grazing ground, and they said that the additional number of cattle were at Poonah, I had no means of ascertaining the truth of their report till after yesterday's march. I then found that they had no more than had been produced at muster, and that I had given orders that they should receive more loads than they could carry. These loads, of which I now enclose a return, were left as therein stated. Those at Charowly are under charge of a jemidar's guard, and I intend that the whole of them should be taken into the depôt at Poonah.

I shall be obliged to you if, upon the receipt of this letter, you will be so kind as to send to Charowly a jemidar's guard, to relieve that left in charge of the provisions on the ground there; and if you will take measures to have these stores removed to the depôt at Poonah as soon as possible.

I have written to Col. Close to request that he will give you assistance in effecting this object.

We have had no forage yet, but I have hopes that we shall get some, when at a greater distance from Poonah.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 6th June, 1803.

I return your letters, and I am much obliged to you for the perusal of them. I am glad to see that our conduct in this quarter is approved of.

It is very desirable that you should bring on the chiefs, and I hope that you will succeed in your negotiations: but prevail upon them to hasten a little, as otherwise the Beemah will fill, and they will find it difficult and tedious to cross that river.

I have no forage yet; but I have hopes that I shall find some forward. We make very short marches, and our weather is delightful. If I could get a little food for the cattle, I should be easy.

My news from Holkar's camp is that he is in the greatest distress for

forage and grain; that he feeds his horses upon the leaves of mango trees, and has lost several. The hircarra who brought this intelligence left the camp on the 1st, and said that he had met an hircarra on the road, who was bringing an account of the death of the Rajah of Berar. I told the man that this story was not known in Scindiah's camp on the 30th May, but he insisted upon its truth.

Tell the Colonel that I am very anxious to receive the translations of the news given by his Malabar news writer.

I enclose a paper from the soubahdar of Aurungabad. Look over it, and see whether it is deserving the trouble of giving it a translation.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, Kendoortchywade, 6th June, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd, with its enclosures.

In my opinion, basket boats will answer all the purposes which I had in view, when I requested the Hon. the Governor to give orders that boats might be placed on the rivers on the road from Panwell to the Bhore ghaut; but these boats are difficult to manage, and indeed cannot be managed at all, excepting by persons accustomed to them, who, I imagine, cannot be found at Bombay. As common boats are used upon all the rivers above the ghauts, I conclude that they could likewise be used upon the rivers in the Konkan, and the boatmen at Bombay must be expert in managing them. They can likewise be immediately procured; but time will elapse before the basket boats can be made. As the basket boats are in general only 10 feet in diameter, they cannot contain the number of persons supposed by Mr. Anderson.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 7th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 6th, with enclosures, for which I am much obliged to you. I now send you a dispatch received this day from the Governor General, which I beg of you to return after perusal. You will see that there are more calls for our troops.

I got a little forage yesterday towards evening; and I see some now coming in. But we have sad losses of brinjarry cattle. I delay to write to you upon the subject of the boats till I cross the Goor river, which will not be till the day after to-morrow; as I purpose to halt here to-morrow, if we can feed at all. Amrut Rao's vakeel is very anxious for his answer.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 7th June, 1803.

I have received the Governor General's instructions (upon the subject of the probability that the French will endeavor to get possession of the Portuguese settlements in India and in China), addressed to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, of which I observe that a copy has been sent to you; and as I conceive that you will be desirous to have my opinion upon this subject, I lose no time in writing to you.

It appears to be the Governor General's intention, that, if the Viceroy of Goa will receive a British garrison, British troops should be sent to Goa without loss of time. I have nothing to say upon this part of the

subject. You are aware of the state of the garrisons in Canara, and of the number of troops in Malabar, and of the call for their services in the latter provinces. There are already at Goa 2 companies of the garrison of Hullahall, which, after making that detachment and the others to the posts on the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna, consists of 5 Native companies; and, in my opinion, that post ought to be kept at its present strength. But the Governor General anticipates the refusal of the Viceroy of Goa to receive the British troops at present, which I acknowledge I think more than probable; and in that case he wishes that troops should be so stationed as to prevent the French from carrying into execution their plans, or to drive them from Goa in case they should get into that place.

The question is, in what situation ought those troops to be placed?

The Governor General suggests Benkypoor as the station which may be fixed upon for the troops which are hereafter to occupy the Marhatta cessions to the southward. But Benkypoor is at a great distance indeed from Goa, very nearly as far as you are from it at this moment.

There are two situations which might be occupied with a view to the defence of Goa, but both are exceedingly inconvenient; the access to that place from both is difficult, and the march of the troops might be impeded with ease: one is Hullahall in Soonda, the other Seedasheeghur in Canara. I shall hereafter send you a particular account of the difficulties which occur on both roads.

Hullahall has now one advantage over Seedasheeghur, which is, that troops placed there give us general strength in this country; but, on the other hand, it is an unhealthy station, and more distant from Goa than Seedasheeghur. This place enjoys an important advantage over Hullahall, and that is, that the troops stationed there might almost see, and at all events could have instant intelligence of, an attack upon Goa; but under present circumstances such a body of troops must be taken from all other services, however much they press in all quarters, and must be allotted to the care and guard of Goa alone.

I have also to add that, before you will receive this letter, the march of the troops to Seedasheeghur will have been rendered almost impossible, by the setting in of the rains, and by the swelling of the numerous rivers in Canara.

Considering the advanced state of the season; that we know that the French had not sent from France their troops destined for India on the 4th or 7th March; that they will first go to Mauritius; and that it is very improbable that, even if they do intend to take possession of Goa, they will commence their career in India by that feat; or that they will venture with a large squadron upon the coast of Malabar during the western monsoon, I am of opinion that Goa is safe at least for a time.

It is true that some of these considerations may have occurred to the Governor General when he wrote the instructions; but all of them certainly did not; and he was not aware of the whole of our situation in this country, of the difficulties which would occur in defending Goa by means of troops placed in any neighbouring station, and of those which would attend the formation of a corps at Seedasheeghur, and of providing, at

the same time, for all other services and objects. But those who are to carry into execution his instructions, and who, being upon the spot, must know more at the moment than he does, must be considered to have the power of weighing probabilities, and adopting a course of action in conformity thereto; and upon this principle I am of opinion that you ought not to alter the position and operations which you have directed, in order to provide for this particular service. Your position at Moodgul is, in fact, as near to Goa as that at Benkypoor would be; and there is no material obstacle to impede your march to that place, at least as far as Hulihall in Soonda.

Consistently with some of the objects you had in view when you took that position, you might move in nearer to Goa; but then you would, in some degree, give up Hyderabad and the Nizam's country; and, after all, in these unsettled times, and in the present state of the Nizam's health, and the general weakness of his government, I am not quite certain that your firm support will not be required in that quarter sooner than in any other. Upon the whole, I take the liberty of giving you my opinion, that, unless the Viceroy of Goa will admit British troops into that settlement, it will be best that your arrangements should remain as they are for the present, with a view to all possible occurrences.

I have found but little forage yet, and have lost many brinjarry cattle; but we have found some forage this day, and I hope to have more as I advance to the northward and eastward.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Paglah, 7th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 3rd, and I regret exceedingly this fresh act of aggression on the part of Rajah Sookroodoor. It is really very important that conduct of this kind should be speedily checked; and, accordingly, I recommend that you should desire Rajah Mohiput Ram not to allow his Highness' troops to be employed without your directions. As there appears this disposition to plunder, it would be well not to give permission that the troops should be employed, excepting on very urgent occasions.

As this affair will certainly be a subject of complaint at Scindiah's durbar, I shall write upon the subject to the Resident at Hyderabad.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Paglah, 7th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 6th, and I now enclose a list of the articles left at Charowly, which ought to have gone to you yesterday.

I am astonished that the barracks are not sufficiently large to contain all your Europeans. They appeared to me large enough for a whole regiment; but I wish you would order a committee to measure them, and if I find that they do not afford the regulated space for the number of men, we must order additional buildings to be constructed.

Let Brown fit up his workshop, with Arcot roofs, in any manner he may think will best answer.

In respect to your cattle, I rather believe that the rain is not so heavy in this part of the country as to do them much injury, particularly as they get an allowance of grain; but even if it were certain that it would de-

stroy them, they are not worth the expense of a shed to cover them. The rain is much more heavy below the ghauts, where they would certainly die, as there is every reason to believe that they would have less chance than they have even now of getting their grain.

You will learn, from Col. Close, whether the rain is so heavy at Poonah as to render it necessary that you should have a shed for the gun cattle. If he should think it so, you will do well to construct one of Arcot roof. I wish that you would send 2 companies of the 2nd batt. of the 3rd regt. to the ghaut, to assist the pontoon carriages in getting up. You will learn, from Capt. Young, when they will leave Panwell; and send the companies from Poonah in such time that they meet them when they shall arrive at the bottom of the ghaut. I request you to correspond with Capt. Young upon this subject.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Paglah, 7th June, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Stevenson, with a copy of its enclosure. Col. Stevenson has already had occasion to complain of the conduct of Rajah Sookroodoor; and, although there was no cause for it, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has made a complaint, to Lieut. Col. Collins, of the conduct of the troops of his Highness the Nizam, in his districts bordering on the river Beemah. It is very desirable that nothing should be done by the British government, or its allies, which can tend to provoke hostilities at the present moment; and, above all, it should be the object of all regulated governments to prevent the unauthorised attacks of their subordinate officers upon the territories of each other, merely for their individual advantage. The Nizam's government, in particular, should discourage this species of warfare, in which his Highness must be a loser. Upon the whole, therefore, I request that you will exert your influence that Rajah Sookroodoor may be ordered to desist from these practices in future; and, in the mean time, I have recommended to Col. Stevenson to desire Rajah Mohiput Ram not to allow any of his Highness' troops to be employed, without previously apprizing the Colonel fully of the purpose for which their services are required.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay, agent for public cattle.

Camp, 7th June, 1803.

The cattle employed in carrying the camp equipage of the 78th regt. are so bad, and their drivers so inexperienced, that the tents of that corps are some hours later in being pitched than those of any other corps in camp, and the men suffer materially by being kept so long exposed to the weather. Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley has therefore resolved to provide camels, on account of the Bombay government, for the carriage of the camp equipage of the 78th regt.; and, as a foundation for that establishment, he authorises you to purchase 9 camels now offered for sale in the bazaar, at the price demanded for them, viz. 300, Chandore rupees each, provided you find them fit for the purpose intended. He also directs that you will keep the accounts of the expense of this establishment separate from those of the public cattle belonging to the Madras government, and transmit them to the officer in charge of the cattle belonging to the detachment of the Bombay army, in the same manner as directed in the orders of the 25th May for the accounts of the Bombay bullocks, handed over to you by Major Spens.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 8th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 7th. I am rather inclined to doubt

the delivery of Indore to Holkar's amildar. It does not appear that Col. Collins has the intelligence from any good authority.

My being in the field here, without any of the Peshwah sirdars, is rather an awkward circumstance; and, in my opinion, we must immediately take into consideration the general situation of our affairs, and to act in such manner as may appear best for the public interest. I have always thought the Peshwah to be incapable rather than disaffected; and I have imagined that he would send out an army with us, if he could: but two or three facts have occurred which rather warrant a conclusion to the contrary. One of these is, that he has not ordered out even Bappojee Vittell, whose troops were sent to encamp in my front, with great parade, on the day after I had the interview with his Highness; another is his shuffling backwards and forwards with Goklah and Appah Dessaye; and the third is his offer of the Zereen Putka to Appah Saheb, without the power attached to it, and, of course, without the honor. These are three stubborn facts, which we cannot conceal from ourselves, and which prove that there is something to prevent our having a Marhatta army in the field, besides his Highness' incapacity for business.

The present moment is critical. Our appearance in strength may prevent the threatened hostilities; but if it is clear that we are not strong at Poonah, which it must be to the whole world, if we continue in the field without even one Marhatta horseman, it is obvious that we are weak, not only in appearance, but in a military point of view. There can be no doubt but that a war with these confederated Marhattas would be rather a difficult undertaking, and attended with some kind of risk, if this body of troops be not accompanied by a corps of the light cavalry. The question is, whether, by our own influence and negotiations, we can bring forward immediately the body of cavalry, and the chiefs who came with me to Poonah, and, at the same time, keep up an appearance of an understanding with the Peshwah. If that can be effected in any manner, it is my opinion that the public interests imperiously demand it, and I shall do every thing to bring them forward. My objects in bringing them forward would be to give us such strength as would probably prevent hostilities, or, if the hostilities should take place, would give us a prospect of bringing them to a speedy conclusion. In either case, I am decidedly of opinion, that the alliance, in its present form, and with the present Peshwah, will never answer; and my efforts would be directed to withdrawing from it with honor and safety. If we cannot bring forward a body of this horse, and as, in my opinion, the alliance will not work in its present form, or at all with the present Peshwah, with whom it is not possible to have a community of interests, the question is, whether we ought not to alter the mode, and form, and object of our negotiations with Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. All these questions press for immediate decision, and I put them to you and Malcolm for your consideration.

I wrote to the Governor General on the 8th May, and suggested the necessity of his having powers on the spot to settle every thing regarding these Marhatta affairs. His answer may be expected in a day or two; and in the mean time, in my opinion, our minds cannot be better employed than in considering the line of conduct which ought to be pursued.

I shall be obliged to you if you will have every thing prepared to send off the boats. I hope to be across the Goor river to-morrow; and as it may be expected that the rivers will soon come down, I shall let you know where the boats ought to be placed.

Have you made any progress yet with the brinjarries? If you could prevail upon some of them, as many as 1000, to bring us loads of grain to the Goor river, something would be gained.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 8th June, 1803.

I have received your letter, in which you have given a more detailed account of the disaster which happened to Major Johnson. In my opinion, Scindiah ought to require that Rajah Sookroodoor should be punished; and, if he does make such a requisition to Col. Collins, and it is sent to me, I shall certainly urge it in the strongest manner to Major Kirkpatrick and the Nizam's durbar.

I observe, by the correspondence which Major Kirkpatrick has sent to Col. Close, that the Nizam is desirous that Suddoor ool Dien should be dismissed from the charge of Aurungabad; and that you should place some of Rajah Mohiput Ram's troops, and a proper person to command in concert with Rajah Mohiput Ram. I conceive this to be a very proper measure, and one of urgency at the present moment. It is probable that you will hear from Major Kirkpatrick upon this subject; but, in the mean time, that you may be prepared to carry into execution the Nizam's wishes, and that no time may be lost, you will do well to move towards Aurungabad. But you must keep the object of your march secret, and not take any steps to relieve the garrison till you hear from Major Kirkpatrick.

The Rajah of Berar and Scindiah were to meet between Mulcapoor and Chikly, where Scindiah's camp was on the 4th of this month.

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

Camp, 8th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 1st, upon the subject of the brinjarries. The sepoy is sent with each party, in order to urge them forward, and to prevent them from doing mischief in the country through which they pass. It frequently happens, as it has in the instance to which you have alluded, that the sepoy is of no use, and their presence deters the country magistrates from interfering, and keeping the brinjarries in order. But sometimes the brinjarries will not attend to the sepoy, and even beat them; as a party did lately some of my sepoy who urged them to move from Ramnee Bednore, where, by all accounts, I judge that they have been halted for about 2 months.

I see very clearly that we have been too indulgent to the brinjarries. It may be said that the harsh treatment which Purneah always recommended would have driven many out of the Mysore country; but, on the other hand, I have to acknowledge that the mild treatment which they have uniformly experienced has not brought them forward for the public service in the moment of need. They have deceived me in every instance; they have broken every engagement they have made; and I think it not unlikely that I shall be in some distress unless I can bring forward

some of the brinjarries of this country. Pray request Purneah to pay no attention to our sepoy, but desire the amildars to beat them well, whenever they find them loitering on the road, or doing mischief. Purneah ought to send the bills for the rice and grain, supported by the receipts of the officer who received those articles. Separate bills ought to be made for the rice and grain delivered to Mr. Gordon's servants at Hurryhur; and for the gram for the cavalry at the different stations to the eastward, at Bangalore, Sera, and Chittledroog, delivered to Capt. Walker's servants, or to the regiments of cavalry. Let the bills be sent to me, and I will sign them. You can settle with Mr. Gordon for the payment from his office, and I shall desire Capt. Walker to pay for the gram.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, N. of the Goor river, 9th June, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Collins. It would be desirable that the government of Fort St. George should take measures to supply me with money. When that sent under charge of Capt. Buchan shall arrive, I shall have a sufficiency to pay the troops on the 1st July and 1st Aug.; but no more. I cannot depend upon any supplies of money from Bombay. That which I have already received from thence was in dollars taken out of 2 Indiamen consigned with their cargoes to Fort St. George. The government of Bombay have no specie, and the general property of that place has been so completely destroyed by fire and its consequences, that none can be borrowed. The credit of the government also is not very good, as their treasury notes are circulated at a discount; and the Poonah soucars who have any money are unwilling to advance it for bills upon the government of Bombay, which they apprehend will be paid in their treasury notes. I recommend, therefore, that, if you cannot supply me from your tumbrils, the government of Fort St. George should immediately send to Bombay one lac of pagodas, either in silver or in Behaudry pagodas, for the use of this detachment; and another lac to arrive there in the month of August. Mr. Duncan will be able to send these up to me.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, N. of the Goor river, 9th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 8th, and I am happy to find that there is a chance of having some of the Marhatta chiefs with his body of troops.

We got a tolerable quantity of forage yesterday; but in the evening there was a fall of rain, by which we have lost numbers of cattle, as well belonging to the brinjarries as to the public departments. The cattle are so weak, in consequence of the want of forage near Poonah, and the bad quality of that which they get, that they are unable to stand the rain. It is difficult to decide what to do; we cannot march, and we cannot halt in the same place, because we soon destroy the little forage we find. I was obliged to move a few miles this morning, and have left 800 loads of grain. It is not possible to keep a body of troops in the field, at such a distance from our own country, unless we can get some assistance from that in which we are situated. If I could get the 2000 head of cattle which I required from Mr. Duncan, it would be something; or if we could get even a small number of the Poonah brinjarries to attend us.

We must be sparing of our money ; for, including that which is to be paid into your hands, and 20,000 rupees which were lent to Col. Murray, and which he promised to repay on the next day, I have not got more than enough to pay the troops in the next month. One lac of pagodas is on the road from Gen. Stuart's army ; but Capt. Buchan, who is in charge of it, does not appear to come on very quickly. He was only at Hoobly on the 3rd, although he marched from the Toombuddra on the 21st May.

I enclose a letter from Col. Collins, which I beg you to return to me after perusal. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Gen. Stuart upon the subject of the demand of troops for Goa. You will see therein all my reasons for thinking that Gen. Stuart's army ought not to be broken up, and ought not to quit its position near Moodgul. It is my opinion that the state of the Nizam's health, and the probable disturbances in his country which would be the consequence of his death, are the cement of the supposed confederacy at the present moment ; and that country would certainly be our weak point, if his Highness should die, particularly while the rivers continue full. Gen. Stuart, therefore, ought not to move from it. Malcolm will see that Moodgul is as near to Goa as Benkypoor is ; and, as for sending me reinforcements, I do not want them, as I cannot feed and equip all the troops I have at present.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Young, commissary of provisions.

Camp, 9th June, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley authorises you to destroy 467 empty arrack kegs, for which there is no carriage, owing to the great loss of cattle from the severity of the weather during the last 24 hours.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, N. of the Cookrah, 10th June, 1803.

I enclose you an account of the road from Poonah to the crossing place of the Goor river, by which the communication must hereafter be kept up with me. Besides the 2 boats now at Coraygaum, on the Beemah, we ought to have 4 basket boats there, and 4 at Seeroor, on the Goor. The Cookrah and Goor join before they reach Seeroor. There is now no river between me and the Godavery.

I long to hear what progress you make with the brinjarries. If they would engage to come forward even in a month, it would answer. I think that we might do some good by purchases of cattle at Poonah, particularly if the restriction on the sale of bullocks is taken off, and the government give encouragement, rather than discourage the purchase made by our agents.

If any thing of this kind could be done, I should wish the purchases to be made on account of the Company, by the officer in charge of the cattle with Col. Murray's corps ; that they should be taken care of by the drivers of the unserviceable bullocks now in the neighbourhood of Poonah ; and, whenever 100 are purchased, that they should be sent off to me in charge of a guard, and loaded with rice. The saddles belonging to the unserviceable bullocks will answer for those to be purchased. By this scheme I might get a few bullocks. But if the gentlemen of the Bombay establishment do not take care that the cattle which they shall buy are fed and looked after when they are at, or in the neighbourhood of, Poonah,

and do not make the attendants on the cattle do their duty, I shall have nothing for the large expense that will be incurred by carrying this plan into execution. I write to Col. Murray upon this subject: I desire him to consult you, and shall be obliged to you if you will give him a hint upon the necessity that the public money should not be thrown away in that service, by the inattention of those whose duty it will be to superintend the cattle after they are purchased.

I want to have some of the Peshwah's proclamations and orders authorizing goods to pass to my camp duty free, and that my coins may be taken at the Mysore rates of exchange.

To Col. Murray.

Camp N. of the Cookrah, 10th June, 1803.

The great disinclination of the Poonah brinjarries to come forward at all in the service of the British army, and the certainty which I have that, owing to the great distance from Mysore, and the difficulties of the road, which will be increased by the swelling of the rivers, I can expect no more of that class of people to join me from the Rajah's country, have induced me to turn my thoughts seriously to find out means of feeding the body of troops under my command till the month of October; at which period I may hope that the Poonah brinjarries may be induced to serve us, or that those still in Mysore may be brought forward.

One mode has occurred in which the officers and departments belonging to your corps may be essentially useful. It is, to purchase cattle at, and in the neighbourhood of, Poonah, by means of the officer in charge of the cattle with your detachment; to have those cattle attended and driven by the drivers attached to your unserviceable cattle, and equipped with their saddles; and to have them sent off to me, in proportion as they are purchased, by 100 at a time, in charge of a guard, each carrying a load of rice. I request you to consult Col. Close upon this subject, and to give orders to carry it into execution, in concert with him, if the plan should appear to be practicable or advisable.

I request you, however, to draw the attention of the gentlemen in charge of the cattle to the necessity that their cattle should be well taken care of during the time that they shall remain at, and in the neighbourhood of, Poonah; and that every practicable mode of insuring their subsistence, while on the road to join me, should be adopted. When they join me, my officers shall be responsible for them. It is obvious, however, that, if they are not well taken care of while they are at Poonah, and if they do not leave that place in good heart, I shall reap no advantage whatever from the expense which will be incurred upon this occasion. As under this arrangement it is not probable that there will ever be at Poonah more than 100 of those bullocks at a time, I recommend that a shed should be run up to cover that number of cattle; provided Col. Close should have informed you that such shelter is necessary, in consequence of the reference which I desired you to make to his opinion upon this subject, in relation to your gun cattle. Besides this resource, I expect that Mr. Duncan will send me 2000 bullocks, with their drivers, from Bombay; and when I hear that they are ready to start from Panwell, I shall send you directions respecting the loads which I wish they should carry.

You may as well order Capt. Young to send up some arrack by the first opportunity.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay, in charge of Bombay bullocks. Camp, 10th June, 1803.

As so many casualties have occurred among the Bombay carriage bullocks by death, and among their drivers by desertion, as well as among the hired carriage bullocks on the Madras establishment, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley finds it to be necessary for carrying on the public service, not only to recruit the Bombay bullocks to the number of 1000, which marched from Poonah, but also to increase that establishment to the greatest extent possible. And for that purpose he directs you to use every means in your power to procure bullocks, make up saddles, and hire drivers on the Bombay establishment.

To assist you in this duty, the General has caused notice to be given to the bazaar people that any carriage bullocks, which they may bring in for sale, will be purchased for the public service; and he accordingly desires that you will purchase from them such cattle as you may find fit for the service.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay, agent for cattle. Camp at Nigooz, 10th June, 1803.

In consequence of the very great labor performed by the inferior servants belonging to the Hon. Company's draught bullocks, the great price of provisions at present, and the very small pay which they receive (not more than half of what a similar description of people in the Bombay detachment receive, although much more qualified for their duty), the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has recommended to the Commander in Chief, and has obtained his Excellency's sanction, for granting to those people a small gratuity monthly, under the conditions hereafter mentioned. And you are accordingly authorised to pay each duffadar and driver, belonging to the establishment of draught bullocks present with this detachment, the sum of 2 rupees as a gratuity for the month of May, and the same sum monthly hereafter until further orders. You will explain fairly to them that it is granted for the particular reasons above stated, and is not to be adduced as any precedent, but will be discontinued, whenever the General may have reason to be dissatisfied with their conduct, or when the price of provisions becomes so low that he shall consider their net pay as sufficient for them.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Christie, Sungoly. Camp at Nigooz, 10th June, 1803.

A party of brinjarries from the Mysore country, consisting of about 2000 bullocks, which first crossed the Toombuddra on the 10th May, has been loitering some time between that river and the Werdah, and showing an unwillingness to come on. The officer commanding at Hurryhur sent a party of sepoys to make them proceed; and I have this day written to Lieut. Stuart, commanding at Deogherry, to inquire for any brinjarries who may be in his neighbourhood, and to send a sufficient guard to compel them to march. He will also relieve any guard that may come up with them from Hurryhur. Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley therefore directs me to request that you will inquire after any party of Mysore brinjarries, who may be in your neighbourhood, and relieve any guard of sepoys that may be with them from Hurryhur or Deogherry; and, if there should be no sepoys with them, that you will send a sufficient guard to oblige them to march at a moderate rate, on the route of this detachment, to Poonah. Your guard will be relieved at Goorgherry. Be so good as to inform me when any brinjarries arrive at and pass your post.

(Similar letters written to the officers commg. at other posts on the rivers.)

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Allen, Erroor. Camp at Nigooz, 10th June, 1803.

I have communicated your letter of the 4th, with its enclosures, to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Capt. Buchan has received orders to pay to you 500 pagodas on his arrival at Erroor for the disbursements of your post; and as he was at Hoobly on the 3rd inst., he may be expected soon after you will receive this letter. You may by corresponding with Lieut. Christie ascertain when you will receive this supply of cash, and regulate the sums you may take out of the money in your hands for the Europeans accordingly. If you give the

pioneers a bare subsistence, the balance of their allowance may be paid them when you have more money. I inclose some abstracts of the sick of Native corps at Errorr which have been sent to me; they will enable you to make out abstracts for others. The General directs me to request that you will send a small guard of sepoy on to Poonah with any party of Mysore brinjaries, with orders to compel them to make moderate marches, and not to loiter on the way. Some doolies and provisions for the recovered men, intended to be sent up from your post along with Capt. Buchan, have been despatched from Poonah, under a small Native guard, with orders to proceed on to Errorr and place themselves under your orders, if they should not meet Capt. Buchan on this side of Errorr. If it should be necessary for them to proceed so far, you will detain them till Capt. Buchan arrives, as the Europeans cannot be allowed at present to march through the country, excepting under the charge of an officer.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 11th June, 1803.

I am obliged to you for your letter of the 10th. You will see, by mine of this day to Col. Close, in what manner we stand. If the rain should not come with violence, I shall do tolerably well yet.

I wish these Marhattas were come, and that the Peshwah would write to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. It has great effect upon wavering minds to take away their pretence. I wish with you that the Peshwah would act as he speaks; but he is a terrible fellow, and I have no hopes from him.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 11th June, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 9th. Certainly your conference with the Peshwah was as satisfactory as words could be. However, I hope that he will write to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and that he will now enter heartily into the cause in which we are embarked for his government. The settlement with the chiefs will then advance with rapidity, and they will soon join me.

You misunderstood me regarding a depôt on the Goor river. I have no means to make such an establishment, and it would be very insecure if I could make it; and nearly useless, on account of its distance from the Godavery, beyond which river I must look forward. My idea was to bring forward 1000 bags of rice to the river Goor, upon which I am likely to be for some days yet; and either to take from them my consumption for the 10 days ensuing that on which they would arrive, or to take them into the departments. This plan has been partly knocked on the head by the loss of cattle on the night of the 8th. However, if you can send forward 1000 loads, I think that I can still dispose of them. More than that quantity, however, at the Goor river, would be thrown away.

I move a short distance daily, and get a little forage, and just keep alive: I dread a fall of rain, however. I am able now to carry on all my loads; and if I get the bullocks required from Bombay, and promised by Mr. Duncan, and those upon the subject of which I wrote yesterday to you and Col. Murray, I shall still weather all these little difficulties and mishaps. I have made arrangements also for recruiting in camp, and have people employed in making purchases for me in the Nizam's territories.

The pioneers know nothing about basket boats. I have always said, however, that there is nothing they cannot do when under their officers; but they are not so expert when left to themselves. There must be some

boat people at or in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and possibly high wages would tempt them to come forward; but if they will not serve in any manner whatever, we cannot help it: we must do the best we can for ourselves. You will observe, by the paper I sent you yesterday, that there are boats upon the river Beemah and the Goor, at the crossing places, which I propose to use. I hear that these boats are not in very good repair; possibly you might be able to get them repaired, and they would answer to carry over our tappall, and any small parties of troops. Notwithstanding the Peshwah's exertions, I cannot hope that we shall draw much besides from Poonah. If boatmen can be hired, they will be more useful upon the river Indoorowny, and upon the Beemah and Goor, than they would be in this camp. But if boatmen cannot be provided, I should be glad to have 6 or 8 boats, as soon as they can be procured. You will observe that it is desirable that boats should soon be forwarded to the Indoorowny, otherwise the communication with Panwell will be stopped.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 11th June, 1803.

I received this morning your letters of the 8th (which ought to have been dated the 9th, I believe) and of the 10th. Col. Close misunderstood me regarding the provisions which I wished to have forwarded to the Goor river. I have, however, explained myself to him fully upon that subject, in a letter which I have written him this day.

My letter of yesterday will have explained fully my views regarding the assistance which I expect from you in bullocks. I do not like to take your old bullocks, because Capt. Mackay, who understands the matter well, has reported that all those left behind are quite unfit for service. Cattle that are at all weak, and those that have sore backs, will not answer during a monsoon; and it is therefore much better that the plan, which I proposed in my letter of yesterday, should be carried into execution. There is, however, no harm in working out what remains of your old bullocks in carrying forward grain to this army. After delivering their loads they can be sent back, and their drivers may be employed in bringing forward the new bullocks which may have been purchased. Supposing that you are able now to send forward 800 old bullocks loaded, you will still have a sufficient number of drivers to take charge of, and bring forward, the new bullocks as they shall be purchased.

I have made arrangements with Mr. Duncan for placing boats upon the rivers below the ghauts, and I understand from him that they will be in their stations in good time. I fear that you will make no progress by means of coolies to bring forward provisions; and you must take care not to disgust your dooley bearers. Keep the pontoons at Poonah till Lieut. Goodfellow shall arrive, but give a hint to have the cattle taken care of.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 12th June, 1803.

I wrote to you fully yesterday respecting the boats. I can furnish no means of working them. In the first place, the pioneers do nothing when they are away from their officers: in the next place, a great proportion

are now employed in keeping alive my half-starved cattle; and even if they understood how to navigate, they could not be spared. If you cannot get boat people for them (and there must be some in the country), the best thing will be to depend upon the boats now in the rivers; and to send me those which are made, excepting such as are necessary to keep up the communication over the Indoorowny, between Poonah and the ghaut. For this number I should still hope that you will be able to supply boat people. Your progress with the brinjaries is capital; and if they only perform their engagement, I am indifferent respecting the confederacy.

The boats ought to be sent to the rivers as soon as possible.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 12th June, 1803.

I am sorry to hear so bad an account of the pontoons. I suspected that the roads would not be very good when the rains commenced; and for that reason, as well as because I expect that the rivers will fill between the 14th and 20th, I wished that the pontoons should leave Panwell on the 8th, at latest. You have done every thing you could do; and I dare say that, when Lieut. Goodfellow shall arrive at Panwell, many of the difficulties of which Capt. Young complains will be removed.

When we quitted Poonah, Capt. Graham was advancing rapidly with the soucars; and I make no doubt but that in a short time he will have been able to procure from them a sufficient supply for this body of troops; and I hoped that your paymaster would be able to make equal progress. You should not confine your dealings to one soucar. Open a communication with every soucar in Poonah, and take money from any man who will give it to you for bills upon Calcutta, Benares, Lucknow, or Madras: I can send them to you. If you find that you cannot get on with the shroffs, you must write to Mr. Duncan, and press him to send you money. He will be able to do so, as I know that lately the state of

Lieut. Col. Collins to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Chickley, 12th June, 1803.

When Col. Collins had the honor of an audience with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 6th of Safer (28th May), the Colonel, by order of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, urged many cogent reasons and persuasions to induce the Maharajah to declare, without delay or reserve, whether the late negotiations carried on between his court, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswant Rao Holkar had been entered into for the purpose of obstructing the completion of the engagements lately concluded at Bassein between his Highness the Peshwah and the British government.

But although Col. Collins was extremely urgent with the Maharajah to give him instant information on this important point, and although the Colonel particularly pointed out the line of conduct which the British government would be compelled to pursue, should the required explanation be withheld, yet the ministers of this durbar repeatedly declared that Col. Collins must not expect any satisfactory answer to this question until a meeting had taken place between the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar. Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah also said, that he could not, without a violation of his faith, give Col. Collins the satisfaction he demanded, until he (the Maharajah) had conversed with Ragojee Bhonslah; but that, after his interview with that Rajah, the Colonel should be informed whether there would be peace or war.

The proposed conference between Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah

the finances at Bombay has considerably mended; but if you want cash immediately for the purchase of the bullocks I mentioned to you in my letter, there is money of mine in the hands of Lieut. Col. Close, for which you may call for this purpose, in proportion as you may want it.

I have bought 27 camels to carry the camp equipage of the 78th regt., which I propose should be paid for by the government of Bombay. The people from whom I bought them have paid the money into my treasury, and have desired to have a bill upon Poonah for it: I have complied with their request, and have given them a bill for 4700 Chandore rupees upon Capt. Mathison. If it will distress Capt. Mathison to pay this bill, you may also take that sum from Col. Close. But the expense of these camels will appear hereafter in Capt. Mathison's accounts, and if he has that money he may as well pay it at present.

To Lieut. Col. Maxwell.

13th June, 1803.

I do not clearly comprehend the object of the papers which you showed me last night, and I wish to have it explained to me. In consequence of a representation from the officers of the cavalry, made by Col. Dallas, I obtained the permission of the Commander in Chief, that a limited expense should be incurred for forage for their horses, when the corps should be placed in situations where it might be impossible for the grass cutters to supply the necessary quantity; and I issued orders upon the subject on the 3rd June, in which, in obedience to the orders of the Commander in Chief, I limited the period that the public should pay to those days I thought the grass cutters might have found it difficult to procure the necessary supply of forage. It appears, however, that, notwithstanding the people attached to the gun bullocks procured forage for them, and that 200 pioneers employed to cut grass for the carriage bullocks procured forage for these animals, the officers commanding troops continued to purchase forage for the horses during the time the troops

Rajah of Berar having taken place, Col. Collins now expects that the Maharajah will, conformably to his promise, explicitly declare whether it is his design to obstruct the completion of the treaty of Bassein, either by means of his own power, or in conjunction with Ragojee Bhoonslah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and Col. Collins further requires that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will state, without reserve, whether it be his present wish and intention to maintain and preserve the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between his sirdar and the British government.

Finally, in performance of his duty, Col. Collins apprizes the Maharajah, that should he now refuse or delay to give explicit answers to the foregoing questions, and continue with his army south of the Nerbudda, such refusal or delay will be regarded by his Excellency as an avowal of hostile designs on the part of this court against the British government: Col. Collins therefore hopes that, motives of moderation and justice, as well as a proper sense of his own interests, will induce Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to act on the present occasion conformably with the relations of amity which have so long subsisted between the two states, and which have never been violated on the part of the English, and consistently with the declaration that he (the Maharajah) made to the Colonel on the 29th of Zeeadeh (24th March): but should the Maharajah decline giving Col. Collins the satisfaction which he now demands, in this case the Colonel requests that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will furnish him with a party of horse to escort him as far as Anrumbabad, together with supplies of grain sufficient for the subsistence of his sepoy and followers, until their arrival at that city.

were encamped near Chinchore. It is my opinion that the grass cutters ought also to have procured forage for the horses in the same situation, an opinion in which I am happy to find that you most fully agree; and that being the case, I cannot allow additional expense to be incurred by the public on account of forage during that period, without disobeying the orders of the Commander in Chief.

The object of the papers which you showed me last night was, I understood, to convince me that additional expense had been incurred during the period above alluded to, by the officers commanding troops, of which I have no doubt; and to apprize me that, as the expense was not to be paid for the period during which you and I are of opinion the grass cutters could and ought to have supplied the forage, as well as during that which they could not, the officers commanding troops were desirous not to receive any of it. It is unlucky that they did not fully explain, when they made their representation, that they wanted an additional permanent allowance to purchase forage, and not one merely to make good an expense incurred in consequence of extraordinary circumstances: but, at all events, I wish to know whether I now comprehend what was intended to be shown by those papers, as I propose to recall the order which I issued on the 3rd June.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 13th June, 1803.

I return Mr. Duncan's letter, and the copy of a paper received this day from Col. Stevenson. The latter appears to be a fiction. The demand of the contribution from Mulcapoor could not have been made. Gopal Rao Bhow could not have entered the Nizam's territories; and Ingolia could not have marched without Col. Collins's knowledge, and he says nothing of these events in his letter of the 6th to Malcolm.

I doubt Holkar's invasion of Guzerat, because the rains have set in, and he cannot remain in that country with his cavalry. It is very improbable that Scindiah's man would have yielded possession of Bulsaur quietly, on the very day that Holkar came into the country. It is more likely that the officer's cavalry was Scindiah's. The patel of Neemgaum, however, told me this day, that he had heard that Holkar marched from Chandore, 5 days ago, for the Casserbarry ghaut.

I learn from Mr. Duncan that he has not got for me one carriage bullock, and not all the draught wanted even for the bridge; and yet he requires me to march off at once to the Attavesy!!

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Angah, 14th June, 1803.

I received last night your letters of the 7th. I rather doubt the intel-

G. O.

13th June, 1803.

The detachment will halt to-morrow. The field officer of the day will be pleased to post men of the companies of Native infantry on piquet in the rear of the encampment every evening. The companies will encamp on the principal roads or commanding grounds, and detach small guards, so as to cover the whole rear: they are to prevent any person or persons from coming into or going out of camp during the night, without the parole and countersign, unless they may be known to belong to camp, or are bringing letters.

The advance piquet to cover the front, and the standard and quarter guards of corps on the right and left of the flanks of the encampment in the same manner.

ligence enclosed therein from Rajah Mohiput Ram. I have letters from Col. Collins, of a date as late as the 6th, in which he does not mention either of these events, with which he certainly would have been acquainted, and would have noticed, if they had been true. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, however, have certainly met; and a few days will, I think, bring to a decision the question of peace or war.

I am at present encamped about 20 miles to the southward of Ahmednuggur, and I intend to seize that place immediately, if there should be a war. I shall afterwards cross the Godavery, and act in co-operation with the troops under your command. I wish you to move towards Aurungabad, with a view to be prepared to make the arrangements at that place which I informed you the Nizam's government had in contemplation, as soon as you shall receive a communication of their wishes upon the subject. These arrangements will, it is to be hoped, secure that place, which is a very great object gained. In the mean time, if Baba Ingliah, or Gopal Rao Bhow, or any other Marhatta chief, should enter the Nizam's territories, he must be beaten out, and cut up, if possible. If such a one should come within a forced march or two of your cavalry, I recommend to you to dash at him, taking with you the Company's and the Nizam's cavalry.

I do not wish you to move your main body from Aurungabad, till that post shall have been secured: but even if the chiefs you have mentioned, or any other Marhatta chiefs, not having a greater number of troops than those stated, should presume to enter the Nizam's territories, at too great a distance for you to march with your Company's cavalry, I think that the fiery Nabobs ought to be slipped against them without loss of time. Indeed, in my opinion, it would be best if you were to keep the Nabobs in motion at some distance from you, at all events; and thus prevent these wandering small parties of Marhattas, who, I suspect, will be disavowed by all the great chiefs, from entering the Nizam's territories. If these small parties, or even the great chiefs, can be terrified into tranquillity for a short time, the game will be won: they will become tired, and will immediately disperse to seek for plunder elsewhere.

If the question of peace or war should remain undecided for any length of time, I must still remain to the southward of the Godavery, till I can seize Ahmednuggur. In that case, I shall be either on the road to Puttun, or on that from Poonah to Aurungabad; and your hircarrahs will find me on one or the other. I shall let you know which, as soon as I shall have found out on which there is most forage. If, by the slowness and indecision of all transactions in which the Marhattas are concerned, I should be detained on this side of the Godavery till that river shall have filled, which I think probable, I must get you to speak to Mohiput Ram and Sookroodoor to collect boats for me at Toka, at which place I propose to cross, if possible. Toka is, I believe, within the Nizam's territories, and is the place at which the last of the rivers that fill the Godavery falls into it. It is on the road from Poonah to Aurungabad.

P. S. I have just received your letters of the 8th and 9th, which make no alterations necessary in the above.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Angah, 14th June, 1803.

Nothing particular has occurred since I last wrote to you.

The Marhatta sirdars are still at Poonah, waiting, as I understood from Col. Close, to take leave of the Peshwah. But they all say that they will come forward, as soon as they shall have performed that ceremony. The Peshwah has promised to write to Scindiah to desire him not to advance to Poonah, but he had not yesterday written his letter. Matters remained nearly in the same state in Scindiah's camp; but the Rajah of Berar acknowledged, on the 5th, that he had received the letter written to him by the Governor General, with the treaty of Bassein.

I enclose a report which I received yesterday, written by a gentleman employed to take possession of the districts ceded to the Company to the northward of Surat. These districts had been occupied by an officer of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under a sunnud from Ballojee Koonger, Scindiah's vakeel, and the Peshwah's former minister. The possession was refused to the British government, by Scindiah's officer, and Mr. Inglis had that day obtained it partly by threats, and by showing a detachment under Capt. Horton, going to take possession of the fort of Parneira.

Along with this report there came another, written by a Native, on the 5th June, from the ghaut, stating that Holkar had gone towards Dhar, in Malwa. I know also that Holkar had not marched from the neighbourhood of Chandore on the 2nd. Upon the whole, therefore, I do not believe that Holkar is gone into Guzerat. It is my opinion, that, if he had been so near as is supposed, Scindiah's officer, who must have known it, would not have given up the districts on that same day to Mr. Inglis. Even if Scindiah and Holkar had not made peace, the officer would have known that the consequence of his entry must have been confusion, during which he could hold the district with impunity. It is much more probable that the party of horse seen by the officer of the 86th belonged to Scindiah, and that they were posted on the road to prevent Mr. Inglis from communicating with Surat; and, indeed, if they really had belonged to Holkar, they would either have cut up the officer of the 86th, or, if they did not do that, they would not have said that they were his troops. There is a letter also of the 7th, from Mr. Inglis to Mr. Duncan, in which not a word is said of the supposed irruption of Holkar, and no account of it has been received from Surat.

I have desired Col. Stevenson to move up to Aurungabad, in order to be prepared to secure that place from the present soubahdar, as soon as the Nizam shall express a wish to that effect.

I am now about 20 miles to the southward of Ahmednuggur. The country has suffered much, but I contrive to get a little forage.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Angah, 14th June, 1803.

I return your letter from Shawe, and others from Col. Close. I suppose

G. O.

Camp at Angah, 14th June, 1803.

There will be a muster of camp equipage to-morrow morning. The quarter masters of brigades will muster the camp equipage, &c., of the corps in the brigades of infantry, except the 78th regt., which is on the Bombay establishment; the quarter master of the 5th regt. those of the cavalry; the quarter master of brigade of the 4th brigade those in head quarter line, the pioneers and artillery, besides his own corps.

that they cannot commence the campaign in Oude till October, on account of the rain; but they forget that we are in the field in this season. The rain, it is true, may be more violent in Oude than it is in this country; but I doubt it. As far as I recollect, the rain in the northern provinces is very moderate.

It is certain that it would not be possible to do any thing from Midnapoor, but that is remedied by the detachment from Ganjam.

I told Col. Close yesterday that I did not believe the intelligence from Guzerat; and the letters from Mr. Inglis, which I have just perused, of the 7th, convince me that it could not be true. The 12 horse certainly belonged to Scindiah.

I have no intelligence from Holkar's camp since the 2nd. He was then at Doorup, near Chandore.

Make the Peshwah write to Scindiah; send out the Putwurduns; reconcile the Peshwah with Amrut Rao; and let me have here brinjarry bullocks and supplies; and there will be no confederacy yet. I wish that you would come out. You would certainly recover immediately.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 15th June, 1803.*

Amrut Rao's vakeel has just been with me, and has expressed a most anxious wish to have an answer to his letter. He says that Amrut Rao has seen a letter from Anund Rao Holkar to Jeswunt Rao, in which the former states that the Peshwah had informed him that Amrut Rao was in treaty with the English, and his Highness recommended that Jeswunt Rao Holkar should seize him. Amrut Rao, therefore, pretends to apprehend that he is in some danger in his present situation at Nassuck, and he has desired to have a letter from me, authorizing him to come to Sungumnair, or even to this camp, for protection; or that I should consent to his increasing his forces so as to provide for his own safety.

In answer I told him, that I saw clearly that Amrut Rao's situation was delicate, but that I could do no more than urge the Peshwah to state what answer should be given to this letter; that, if I advised him to go to Sungumnair, he might be disturbed by the Peshwah's troops; that, if I advised him to come here, I might be obliged to reduce him to the alternative of staying without a provision from the Peshwah, or of going off again, if his Highness should not consent to pardon him; and that,

* Lieut. Col. Close to the Governor General.

His Highness the Peshwah, having been made acquainted with the substance of the correspondence between Amrut Rao and Major Gen. Wellesley, is satisfied that his brother is disposed to return to his family, and to abandon the rebellious. The Peshwah, therefore, is inclined, from motives of mercy, to forget what has passed; and it is his intention to allow Amrut Rao (on his returning to the path of his duty) country to the amount of 4 lacs *per annum*, as long as he continues to obey the Peshwah's orders, and resides wherever he may be directed. This offer will be made to Amrut Rao by Major Gen. Wellesley, who will inform him, at the same time, that he must come up to camp in 10 days after the receipt of this offer, or else it will not be considered valid, and he will be then treated as a rebel, and an enemy to the state.

besides, his Highness might have some reason to complain, if I was to receive into my camp, as a friend, a person whom he should consider as an enemy. In respect to his proposal, that I would consent to his increasing his forces, I could not recommend that measure, as I knew that he must provide for them by the plunder of the country, which would only bring him into fresh difficulties.

The vakeel then remonstrated respecting the plunder of Amrut Rao's servants at Poonah, and other places within the Peshwah's reach, in which they resided. In answer to this I observed, that this misfortune was the consequence of the state of enmity in which the brothers were, and that their reconciliation would be the only remedy for it. In answer to his request, that we should interfere in their favor, I observed, that would produce no good, and might probably draw from the Peshwah an observation that we made friends of his enemies. The vakeel then said, we can retaliate, and have people in our power on whom we can be revenged. I answered, I could not recommend this, because it would be a breach of Amrut Rao's engagements with me, in consequence of which I had undertaken to make his peace with the Peshwah; that the principle of that measure was a desire on his part to be forgiven by his sovereign, which desire would be but ill manifested by an attack on his servants and adherents. It is very desirable, on many accounts, that this man should have an answer soon; and I shall be obliged to you if you will urge the Peshwah to come to a decision on the subject. The vakeel informed me that Holkar was about 10 coss from Chandore, and that he had built sheds to cover in his horses for the monsoon.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 15th June, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 14th, regarding our taking possession of the districts ceded to us to the southward. My opinion is that we have been premature in taking possession of those in Guzerat; and we shall be so, if we now take possession of those in Savanore.

You have stated one reason for forbearing from taking possession of them, and have proved that it no longer exists; but you have not considered another, viz. the want of force. It is agreed that Gen. Stuart's army ought not to be broken, and that he ought to remain in strength in his position at Moodgul: but unless that force is broken up, or these troops march back, where are the forces to take possession of Savanore? I object positively to any diversion of our force to any object whatever, till we know what is to become of the supposed confederacy to the northward. When we know how that stands, I don't care what becomes of the troops: they may be employed in any manner that may be thought proper.

You desire me to call upon the Putwurduns and Goklah for orders to their troops to evacuate the districts. In the first place, I did not know that those chiefs had left Poonah; and in the next, you and Col. Close have not fixed what districts the Company are to have. The first question upon this point is, what districts are in Savanore and Bancapoor, and what not? and the next is, which of the districts in those two talooks the Company are to have.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Griffin.

Camp at Angah, 15th June, 1803.

I have laid your letter of this date before Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, and I am directed to inform you that he cannot give orders that any forage which may have been secured for the public cattle shall be given up to you; but he has no objection to your purchasing forage in the same places, before it has been secured for the public cattle, or after they have been supplied, or wherever else it is to be found. I am further directed to remind you that all applications of a public nature ought to come through your Brigadier.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Angah, 16th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 14th. I sincerely hope that you may succeed in getting us some bullocks, and in bringing forward the brinjaries. I have got a few bullocks from the Nizam's country; but so few, that they do not replace the casualties even amongst the Bombay carriage bullocks. We have had rain, which has done much mischief to our weak cattle. In short, nothing but the required assistance from Poonah can keep us in the field.

I hear good accounts of Ahmednuggur: it is full of everything we want. The property of this country is lodged there. The capture of that place will relieve our immediate distresses, and will give every body spirits. But the resources of Poonah must keep us in the field during the rainy season. My people got there 3000 bullocks in one month, besides the cattle purchased by individuals and bazaar people.

Have you got any description of Ahmednuggur?

I received accounts of Holkar this morning. He was, with all his army, Meer Khan, &c., at Abhoona, on the 10th: this place is 15 coss to the northward of Doorup. The fall of rain had been very violent in that part of the country, and his army was in the greatest distress. It was still reported that he was going towards Guzerat. He had heard of my march from Poonah, and arrival upon the Goor river.

I had a letter yesterday from Col. Stevenson, of the 10th: he had received accounts from Scindiah's camp, stating it was reported there that it was intended to attempt to seize Holkar, if he should come to the proposed meeting. Col. Stevenson's man also writes him that the Nizam, the Rajah of Berar, and Scindiah are on good terms; and the Colonel appears to think that there was something in this report, as the Nizam's sirdars had not accompanied him on his march that day, on the ground of their cattle being out foraging. He therefore thinks of having recourse to the measure he proposed before, in order, as he calls it, to pledge the Nizam to his cause. Another reason for delaying to attempt to take possession of Savanore, till we are relieved from all apprehension to the northward, is the necessity of keeping my rear quiet. I may get orders from Goklah and Appah Saheb to their troops, but these will not obey them. A contest will follow to a certainty, unless we should be very strong, which we shall not be, without Gen. Stuart breaks up his army.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Angah, 17th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 15th, and I return the enclosure. I hear this morning, from Amrut Rao's vakeel, that Holkar has crossed the Taptee, with an intention of invading Guzerat. This intention may be

carried into execution hereafter, but cannot at present, I should imagine. It would be well, however, if Mr. Duncan were apprized of this movement of Holkar's army, in order that some troops may be placed between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, where, I believe, there are none at present.

The best mode of settling with the ferrymen upon the Beemah and Goor will be to give them a monthly payment for every body belonging to us, who, in consequence thereof, must be allowed to pass without paying toll. Will you be so kind as to have that matter settled? I am very anxious for some description of Ahmednuggur.

I suspect that the chiefs are coming forward; but they have spun out the time in order to allow the rivers to fill, and that they may be late in showing themselves with this army. If the rivers should fill before they march from Poonah, they ought still to be forced to march, and to cross the Beemah at different fords. One party as low down as Gardoon. The party that passes there will be clear of the Goor. The weather is still very bad, and distresses us much. I hope that the durbar will not deceive us respecting the brinjarries.

The D.A.G. to Col. Murray, Poonah.

Camp at Angah, 17th June, 1803.

Some of the bazaar people belonging to this detachment, who were out in the country in quest of grain, when it marched, returned to Poonah and sold their loads, from whence they have sent word that the reports of thefts and robberies on the road to camp prevent them from coming on; and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has sent the bearer to a party of these people, who have gone out by Talegaum in quest of rice, to inform them of the fact, viz., that the punishments inflicted on the culprits have put an end to such excesses; but, in case these people should still be under apprehensions, the General has directed me to request that you will send a naik and 6 sepoy along with the bearer, when he presents this letter, as an escort to such of the bazaar people to whom he is sent as may be desirous of coming on hither.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 18th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 16th. I apprized you yesterday of the intelligence I had received of Holkar's movements, which I believe to be authentic. A man came in from his camp this morning, who says that he left him on the 11th on his march to the northward; that he appeared to be in a hurry; that he was making long marches, leaving behind every body that could not keep up with him; and that it was reported in his camp, not only that he intended to cross the Taptee, but likewise the Nerbudda, and to go into the Holkar territory to the northward of that river. I think his crossing the Taptee at all, if he afterwards should cross the Nerbudda, looks very like a break up of the confederacy. I do not think it probable that Holkar would trust the defence of Chandore to Scindiah, if he is to be involved in hostilities with us. It appears by the map that Chickly is north of the Taptee: if that is the case, the confederates are all now north of that river; and we have nothing to apprehend at present for the safety of the Nizam's territories.

G. O.

17th June, 1803.

If the day continues fair, officers commanding corps will be so good as to order the tents to be struck for an hour, in order that the ground may dry before the men go to sleep upon it.

We are much distressed by the rain, and lose many cattle. If you find that you cannot depend upon the Poonah brinjaries, and if Collins still hangs on at Scindiah's durbar, and I cannot take a decided step regarding Ahmednuggur, and if I learn from Col. Stevenson that he can give me no assistance in cattle or provisions, I must recross the Beemah, in order to subsist. I do not think Col. Stevenson can give me any assistance, as I learn that rice sells in his camp at the rate of 4 seers for a rupee; and I have not got a grain of rice from the country since the 6th. Indeed, I am now shut out of the rice countries by the rivers. You see, therefore, that all depends upon your success at Poonah, unless we should have a war; in which case I expect that the capture of Ahmednuggur will set me up again.

It is very extraordinary that the Peshwah's government should have sent nobody to settle his country which runs from Poonah up to this place: the people are in the villages, but there appears no government, nor indeed any thing except thieving.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Angah, 18th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 15th.

I conclude that you continue to issue half a seer of rice *per diem, gratis*, to the Native troops; and if you do that, I think it very immaterial what the price of rice may be in the Poonah bazaar. If you should not have done so hitherto, you may as well now issue the rice to the troops at that rate. We have been much distressed by the rain, and I am very anxious indeed for the cattle.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Angah, 18th June, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst. and its enclosures. I had already directed Col. Stevenson to march upon Aurungabad, and I now enclose a copy of the instructions which I have given to that officer with a view to the future security of that place.

I understand that Meer Khan has withdrawn to the northward, and it is probable that he has heard of the disinclination of the Nizam's government to hire all his troops.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Angah, 18th June, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter, and a copy of its enclosure, which I have received from Major Kirkpatrick, from which it appears that it is the intention of the Nizam's government, that the person who has hitherto been in charge of the fort of Aurungabad should be deprived of his charge; that it should be delivered to the person who may appear to Rajah Mohiput Ram, and the British officers, to be most fit for the trust; and that such measures and arrangements should be adopted as will tend to the security of that fort, in case the course of operations should draw the troops in the field to a distance from it.

I observe that Rajah Mohiput Ram is referred to me upon all these points; but as some time must elapse before I can reach Aurungabad, and as it is a matter of the utmost importance that that place should be as secure as it can be made, at the earliest possible period of time, and as you know, as well as I do, what measures ought to be adopted upon this

occasion, I must beg you to consult with Rajah Mohiput Ram, and to make such arrangements for the security of Aurungabad as you may think best. I think it probable that the garrison at present in Aurungabad will refuse to give up the fort, unless an engagement is made to pay them their arrears. Rajah Mohiput Ram must determine whether the arrears are to be paid or not; but, at all events, I request that the intention to make a new arrangement for the defence of the fort may be kept secret, till all your measures shall have been prepared to take possession of it by force, if the garrison should refuse to give it up.

If Rajah Mohiput Ram should consent to pay the arrears, and the troops should desire that you would engage that they should be paid, you may make such an engagement, first taking care to have from Rajah Mohiput Ram a paper, by which he will engage that the Nizam's government shall pay the sum required within a month.

When you have settled this point with Rajah Mohiput Ram, you will call upon the commanding officer of the fort of Aurungabad to give it up, and you will give him two hours to consider of your demand.

If the garrison should refuse to give up the fort, on any grounds, you must attack it, and get possession of it by force; but I request you to give strict orders that the place may not be plundered, and that no disorder may be committed by our troops who may be employed on this service. The officers must recollect that many females of the Nizam's family are in Aurungabad, and that his Highness would be more sensible of any injuries that they may suffer from the licentiousness of the troops, than he will be of the benefit which his government might derive from their valor and discipline.

You will strongly urge Rajah Mohiput Ram to satisfy the present garrison of Aurungabad, regarding their arrears; and will point out to him, as a motive for attending to your recommendation, the possibility that disorders may be committed by the troops on taking possession of the place, if they should be obliged to take it by force. After obtaining possession of the place, you will examine it, and see what number of men, ordnance, stores, &c., are necessary for its defence; you will call upon Rajah Mohiput Ram to supply those men, &c., if possible without weakening the force which is with you in the field; and you will make an arrangement with him for the quantity of provisions that may be required, which he also must take measures to lodge in the fort.

It is reasonable to suppose that Rajah Mohiput Ram must know best to whom the Nizam is desirous of giving charge of this fort in future, and you will place there, as killadar, whoever he may point out. You will observe, by the enclosed paper, that the present killadar of Aurungabad is to be sent to Hyderabad: of course, care must be taken to secure his person, at the time that you will summon the fort to surrender, if he should be still in your camp. The troops in the fort may be suffered to depart whenever they please, or may be disposed of in such manner as Rajah Mohiput Ram may think proper.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Rooie, 19th June, 1803.

I was so anxious that you should get my letter of yesterday in good

time, that I did not detain your hircarrahs longer than the time necessary to fold it up.

I have suffered a great loss in carriage bullocks, and I find it difficult to replace them in this country, which is so exhausted. I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to get me some. Let them be purchased on account of the Company, and send them off to me in charge of any careful people you may have to spare. Even one or two hundred at a time would be of use, although I want as many thousands.

I want to hear from you soon respecting rice, particularly whether any of that grain is to be procured in the Kurmilla or Perinda district.

The accounts of my hircarrahs, from Holkar's camp, agree with those you have sent; excepting that mine say it is reported that he intends to cross the Taptee and the Nerbudda, and to go into his own (or rather the Holkar) territories. Amrut Rao's vakeel in this camp says that Holkar has crossed the Taptee, and is going to plunder Guzerat. I think it probable that, when he made those long marches, it was with a view to cross the Taptee before that river should fill, of which there was a great probability, from the rains which fell to the northward on the 7th, 8th, and 9th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 19th June, 1803.

Our distresses increase upon us for want of cattle. I was obliged to leave behind this morning 500 loads of stores, and 100 of provisions. You will be a judge of the mortality of cattle from the following statement. There was a muster on the 15th, and there were 500 good carriage bullocks, in the grain and provision department, more than were required for the loads, and a sufficiency in the stores. The consumption between the 15th and 18th was 250 loads of provisions; and yet on the 18th the deficiency of carriage is found to be 100, making the loss of cattle in the provision department, in 3 days, 850 bullocks. In the store department it has been, in the same period of time, about 600. The gun cattle keep up well, notwithstanding the bad weather; but it is by force of exertion.

Yesterday the drivers were out till 9 at night in quest of forage. We moved a short distance in the morning, and they must have been in motion at 3 o'clock, so that these people were on foot for 18 hours yesterday. I have been in difficulties of this kind before, and have surmounted them; and I shall surmount these, if I can get any assistance from Poonah, or if the Peshwah or his people will show any sign of our being here upon his business, or even with his knowledge or consent: or if he will not do that, if he will send any thing like an amildar to the country, or any body to take charge of the government, with whom I might communicate. But, under present circumstances, I am in a worse situation by far than I should be in an enemy's country: in such, I should act for myself, and should establish a government as I may go on. There is forage in the country, and grain also, but it is all hidden underground; and we are forced to dig for every thing we get, notwithstanding that we give a large price for it. I have written to Col. Stevenson for cattle. I have people employed in the Nizam's country to purchase, and in the neighbourhood of camp also. But our best chance is Poonah. I have just received your letter of the

17th. I have not got the copy of the dispatch of the 30th May; but I fancy I may get it, as I had yesterday a letter from Col. Stevenson, dated the 15th. However, as attempts were made to stop the hircarrah, it would be as well if you were to send me a copy of the dispatch.

I am very confident you will mention Amrut Rao's affairs, as soon as you may have a fair opportunity. The vakeel was with me again yesterday, and said, among other things, that, as the Peshwah would not do any thing for Amrut Rao, he and his adherents intended to throw themselves upon the mercy of the English government; and he asked whether, in that case, any thing would be done for him? I told him it was time enough to turn our thoughts to that subject, when we should find that the Peshwah would not pardon him. He told me that they were all in the very greatest distress, that they really had no subsistence.

P. S. I think it is very clear that Amrut Rao is not one of the confederates.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Rooie, 19th June, 1803.

I received accounts yesterday that Holkar has moved to the northward: it is reported in his camp, that he intends to cross the Taptee and the Nerbudda, and take up his quarters for the rains in the Holkar territories. It is also reported that his march to the northward was made with a view to approach Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar: Amrut Rao's vakeel, who is in this camp, informed me this day that Holkar had crossed the Taptee, and that it was his intention to enter that part of Guzerat lying between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda. He certainly moved off from the neighbourhood of Chandore very suddenly, and made long and forced marches, leaving behind every body and every thing that could not keep up. I know that the rains began to the northward on the 7th, and that it rained violently on the 8th, 9th, and 10th; and I concluded that his object in making these forced marches, at that very time, was to get across the Taptee before that river should fill, of which there must have been a great probability. I think that if Holkar has crossed the Taptee there will be no confederacy. There has been no further account of the irruption into Guzerat south of the Taptee, since that which I sent you on the 14th, and I conclude that my conjectures upon that subject are correct.

We have had much rain in this quarter, and I am sorry to say that I was obliged this day to leave behind 500 loads of stores, and 100 of provisions; notwithstanding that at a muster, taken on the 15th, both departments were complete, and the provision department had 500 bullocks more than there were loads. Since that day, that department has lost 850 bullocks, and the stores about 600.* Individuals, brinjarries, bazaar people, &c., have suffered in proportion, and the distress is very great. The gun cattle, however, are still in style, but it is the consequence of great exertion. I have experienced these difficulties before, and have surmounted them; and I shall surmount those which we at present feel,

* In the heavy rains in India the brinjarry and draught bullocks always suffer by exposure. They stick in the mud, hog their backs, droop their heads, and die.

if I can get any assistance from Poonah; or if the Peshwah will only send a man to take charge of the government of the country; or will give the smallest sign of our being friends, and here upon his business, and with his knowledge and consent. Under existing arrangements, there is no government in the country; the heads of villages do as they please: I can find nobody to communicate with, and, of course, cannot command its resources.

I do not know how the Peshwah manages his concerns; but we have not yet had the smallest assistance from Poonah of any kind. Notwithstanding my repeated requisitions to Col. Close, and his request to the government, none of the sirdars have joined us, and, as late as the 16th, had not quitted Poonah. The Peshwah's servants are very profuse in promises, but very sparing in performance; and we have enjoyed so little of the resources of the country, which it is so obviously the advantage of the inhabitants to supply to us, that I am almost induced to suspect counteraction on the part of the government. I shall be convinced of it, if the Peshwah omits much longer to write to Scindiah, of which I apprized you of the intention, but he has not yet written. If there are not now counteractions on the part of the Peshwah, certainly his government must be the weakest, and his people the most extraordinary, existing in India. It is his interest that this force should be enabled to keep the field; and that of his people to sell those of the resources of the country which are to enable us to do it. Yet we cannot get them; and I think it very probable that I shall be obliged to cross the Beemah to be able to subsist upon the stores which I have collected at Poonah.

I have written to all quarters for assistance in cattle, and I am doing every thing I can in this country. I have also inquired of Col. Stevenson, whether he can afford to share with me his supplies of rice. I shall struggle hard to avoid this movement; but I think it proper to apprise you of the possibility of it, and of the circumstances which may occasion it.

The troops are healthy, notwithstanding the rain to which they have been exposed, and the cavalry horses are in good order; but our great difficulty at the present moment is, to find grain for them: there is plenty in the country, but it is all hid in holes; and, notwithstanding the price we pay, we get none that we do not dig up: in short, we should be better off in an enemy's country, and so I have told Col. Close.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Vesey.

Camp at Rooie, 19th June, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to inform you that a number of platform carts, arrack bandies, elephants, camels, and bullocks, sufficient to bring up all the stores, and every article in the grain and provision departments, which were left behind under your charge to day, will be dispatched from this place early to-morrow morning for that purpose, escorted by a company of Native infantry. The General desires that you will have every thing in readiness to be laden upon the elephants, &c., as they shall arrive at your ground, and that you will send them off as fast as they shall be laden.

The column, on its return to this camp, must be led by a company of your battalion: 2 companies must be ordered to march about the centre of it; and you will bring up the rear with the remainder of your corps, and the company from this camp.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay.

Camp at Rooie, 19th June, 1803.

There are 500 bullock loads of stores and of grain and provisions upon the last ground, in charge of Capt. Vesey, and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to inform you that they are to be brought up to-morrow in the following manner, viz. 20 platform carts are to be prepared in the park, and 38 arrack carts are to be prepared in the provision department, for which you will allot those bullocks best able to work. Each of those carriages will bring 5 bullock loads. For the remainder you will send elephants (including the General's own elephant) and camels, and all the bullocks lately purchased on account of the Bombay government. If all those means should not be sufficient to bring up the 500 loads, a number of the best of the old Bombay bullocks, sufficient for that purpose, must be selected and sent with the rest.

All the arrack carts, elephants, camels, and bullocks must be at the park, ready to move off, under a company of Native infantry, at 4 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col Griffin.

Camp at Rooie, 19th June, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you the accompanying memorandum of a complaint made to him by a tindal and some lascars in your service; and to say, that whatever agreement was made with those people, as to their hire, ought to be adhered to, and that, if extra labor is required of them, they should be rewarded accordingly.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Rooie, 20th June, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 14th inst., in which you enclose one of the 13th, from the Military board, upon the subject of packs for bullocks. I was not aware that there was any difference between those intended to carry ammunition, and those intended to carry grain; but I conceive that the orders which have been given on that subject to the Commissary of stores will provide for the wants of carriage for either article.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Rooie, 20th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 18th, with the memorandum enclosed, and I agree almost entirely in the opinions which you have given. Till the question with the confederacy is decided, we must stick to our ground in this country, otherwise the Nizam, and we, eventually, must suffer; and, even supposing that by withdrawing now we could stop the hostilities, which I doubt, we should only defer them to a period at which, probably, we should be less prepared than we are at the present moment. But as soon as there shall be no threats of the confederacy, either by the withdrawing of Scindiah, or from the success of the war, it is my opinion that we ought either entirely to new model the alliance, or to withdraw from it. You are well acquainted with my opinions on this subject.

The greater experience I gain of Marhatta affairs, the more convinced I am that we have been mistaken entirely regarding the constitution of the Marhatta Empire. In fact, the Peshwah never has had exclusive power in the state: it is true, that all treaties have been negotiated under his authority, and have been concluded in his name; but the chiefs of the Empire have consented to them; and the want of this consent, on the part of any one of them, in this case, or of power in the head of the Empire, independent of these chiefs, is the difficulty of this case at the present moment. I put out of the question the consent of the Putwur-

duns, Goklah, &c., because I have always considered, and it must appear to every body to be one which proceeds from causes entirely independent of the treaty, and of the circumstances which occasioned it, and of the Peshwah himself. These chiefs act under the treaty, because they had a previous acquaintance with us; and because they saw some prospect of being relieved from their difficulties by our interference, and of becoming in some degree independent under our protection. Had it not been for this hope, not one of them would have been with us, and we should have had a treaty with a cipher, bearing the name of Peshwah, without a particle of power.

Whatever may be the result of the present crisis, we shall gain nothing by the treaty. Scindiah, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, and possibly others, will be separate and independent powers in India, very probably leagued for the present in a defensive alliance. We must look to that, and must not reduce our military establishments. Is the peace of India secured? I doubt it, as far as we are concerned. Supposing there should be no war with the confederates, the first consequence of the alliance must be to re-establish the government of the Peshwah in the northern countries, then to settle the Kolapoor question, &c.; and, supposing that we have another war with the French, there is no doubt but that we shall have a war with the Marhattas.

One bad consequence of these subsidiary treaties is, that they entirely annihilate the military power of the governments with which we contract them; and their reliance for their defence is exclusively upon us. This treaty with the Peshwah has certainly given us a good military position; but the question is, whether, in case the nation should be involved in a war with the French, which, in my opinion, is the hypothesis upon which all Indian politics should turn, the military position is so good that it cannot be forced; and whether we do not lose more by the risk of having all the powerful Marhattas against us, at such a time, than we should gain by having the Peshwah certainly on our side, and by the goodness of our military position. Upon this point I have to observe, that the more I see of the Marhattas, the more convinced I am that they never could have any alliance with the French. The French, on their arrival, would want equipments, which would cost money, or money to procure them; and there is not a Marhatta in the whole country, from the Peshwah down to the lowest horseman, who has a shilling, or who would not require assistance from them.

In what manner then ought the alliance to be modelled? In my opinion, we ought to withdraw from Poonah, and leave some chance that the principal chiefs may have the power of the state in their hands; we ought to keep up our connexion with the Peshwah, so as that he might not be trampled upon; at the same time, we ought to increase our influence over the chiefs of the Empire, in order that it may preponderate in all possible cases in which the state should be called upon to decide. In short, I would preserve the existence of the state; and guide its actions by the weight of British influence, rather than annihilate it, and establish new powers in India by the subsidiary treaty. In this consideration of the subject I have not touched upon the disinclination of the Peshwah to

the alliance, of which I have scarcely a doubt, and, at all events, upon his inability to perform the conditions to which he has bound himself. But he has not even performed those conditions which must be in his power. Has he not now daily communications with Scindiah's durbar, and even with Holkar, of which the British Resident has no knowledge whatever? His very letter to Scindiah, which has been extorted from him, almost by force, contains a breach of treaty. In it, he desires that chief to remain where he is, pointedly; whereas, he knows that the requisition of the Governor General, and the only event which can ensure peace, is Scindiah's recrossing the Nerbudda.

You may depend upon it, that, if Collins had not pushed the negotiation as he has done; and if Scindiah had any option besides moving into the Nizam's territories, or returning to his own to procure subsistence: in short, if he could procure subsistence where he is, he would remain there, in consequence of this paragraph in the Peshwah's letter. Besides, I see, in the ackbar, that he is going to send another vakeel to Scindiah. For what purpose? And let it be stated for what reason the Peshwah did not give his letter to the British minister to be forwarded to Scindiah, knowing that that Chief says the last did not reach him, instead of sending it through his own vakeel, whom he must mistrust. Upon the whole, I see no prospect under the present treaty, and I should decidedly alter it, when a fair opportunity may offer.

Collins is just in the right state. The fellow will explain himself, and will ask him to stay, and will pretend that he cannot move off on account of the rain, the swelling of the rivers, or because my troops are in this country; and thus the matter may hang on for some time longer. I think that, if the war had not been still doubtful, Collins would have got an answer inimical to his memorial. The truth is, they are all shaking; and, if the allies had come out of Poonah with me, there would be no war.

I wish you would take up money wherever you can get it, and not from me. The Company may be losers, but my treasury will be richer.

To Lieut Col. Close.

Camp, 20th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 18th, and return Col. Collins's dispatch, the copy of which I have not yet received. I shall be very anxious to receive the next he may write. I hope that you will be able to send us the brinjarries and the bullocks. We positively cannot stay without this assistance, and it really becomes more necessary every day. Send off the bullocks as they receive their loads. You can have no idea of our losses, or of the distress of every body.

If the head hircarrah, who knows Ahmednuggur, should be sent to you, I hope that you will examine him before you send him off, and get an account of the place, lest he should never come to me, or should be late. I have received an account of the place, which appears to be pretty strong, with a wet ditch and glacis, but no covered way. It would be desirable to know whether there are any passages over the ditch, and where, and the general height of the wall from the berm.

I have perused the letter from the killadar at Loghur, and I think it would be advisable for Col. Murray to have the place examined which he

recommends as a station for the cattle. If it answers, it would be proper to remove them thither.

If you send off any rice from Poonah, the store at that place must, of course, be increased from below; and probably the gentlemen there could contrive to fix upon fair moments to send off the rice from Panwell. I am very anxious about my money: the 15th was the day on which you ought to have received it all. I shall be obliged to you if you will give the gentry a hint upon this subject. We are approaching to pay day again, and have not money enough for more than half our disbursement.

I expect that Capt. Buchan, with a lac of pagodas, will be at Poonah by the 24th; which sum I intend to order forward, but still we require the rupees in this country. I think that it would be advisable to have 4 basket boats upon the Goor, particularly as there is no wooden boat there.

P. S. I enclose you the account I have got of Ahmednuggur. You will observe that the ditch is not broad, nor the wall high, nor the shape of the fort scientific. I shall be glad to know whether your man agrees in this story.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 21st June, 1803.

A man has arrived here from Holkar's camp this day: he left that chief on the other side of the Taptee, with his treasure, and 7000 or 8000 people, whom he calls maunkarries; one campoo was gone farther to the northward, 2 other campoos were on this side of the Taptee with the toshekhana, unable to move on account of the rain, and for want of cattle; and Meer Khan and Shahamut Khan were to the southward of those campoos: the distress in Holkar's camp was great, the loss of cattle had been immense, and grain as dear as 2 seers for a rupee; the people were deserting fast, and Holkar had been obliged to bury many cannon.

The reports of the camp are, that he is going to Guzerat, and that he is going to winter and recruit in the Holkar territories north of the Nerbudda: he has much treasure with him on elephants: the Taptee was filling. I trust you will be able to send us forward some supplies. If I can only remain on this side of the Beemah, the confederates will not be able to hold out during the monsoon.

It would be very desirable that we should make some arrangement with the people at the ferries to pass the Company's followers without fee. They might have a pass from you or from me, and would thus be immediately known. Our bullock drivers have never any money; and the very exaction of the fee at the ferry will be sufficient to prevent the bazaar people from attempting to cross it. Besides, I have not much faith in our own people, and I believe it will be found out that, if some of the boats at the ferry are allowed to take a fee, the whole will do the same; and even if they are more honest than I suppose them to be, the consequence of having some boats in which the duty is free, and others for the use of which a fee is to be paid, will be, that the former only will be used by our people, and there will be great delays at the ferries. The account of the pontoons is just like every other account I receive of a

Bombay concern. Only think of these stupid creatures sending off these carriages in the midst of that heavy rain! It is very clear, from those accounts of Col. Murray, that the equipment will not answer; you see that the carriages have broken before they have gone one stage.

Col. Murray writes that he fears the brinjarry naig, with whom the durbar are negotiating, will never come forward in the service. He says he is the same man who deceived every body before at Bassein; and he believes he is the cause of the desertion of the brinjarries from the corps under his command: if this be the case, our chance is but small.

In my opinion it would be advisable to get land in Bundelcund in preference to Savanore, particularly as the Governor General prefers that district. At all events, it would be most convenient to us not to pass the Werdah, even supposing we do take part of our jaedad to the southward of that river.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 21st June, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 18th and 19th. I rather believe that of the 19th ought to have been dated the 17th, as you mention in it that Mohiput Ram had sent for Capt. Johnson; and in that of the 18th, that you had sent that officer to him. The march of Mohiput Ram to Aurungabad has secured all the objects I had in view in ordering your corps there; and, as there is a scarcity of forage in that neighbourhood, I by no means wish that you should now take your troops there: but I think it advisable that, as the Nizam has referred the consideration of the future security of that city to the British officers, some of us should look at it, and form a determination respecting the garrison, stores, &c., which ought to be in it. I shall accordingly be obliged to you if you will take a ride over there.

If they do not think proper afterwards to place in Aurungabad a garrison, such as you are of opinion ought to be in the fort, it is their own affair, and they must stand by the loss. But it is proper that in the mean time we should give them an opinion, stating what we think necessary for the defence of the place.

It may appear strange, but I acknowledge that I still doubt whether there will be a war. Col. Collins had demanded his dismissal from Scindiah's camp on the 12th inst. and an escort of cavalry, and grain for his sepoys, to take him to Aurungabad; but he had not got this assistance on the 13th; and the ground of the Colonel's demand was rather a delay to give him satisfaction on certain points of inquiry regarding the existence of the confederacy, than a refusal of satisfaction. On the contrary, Scindiah said that he would satisfy him in 3 days, and the Colonel had opened a communication with the Rajah of Berar. Holkar himself has certainly crossed the Taptee; his army being in the greatest distress for want of provisions: there is, therefore, an end to all hopes of his junction with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in this season. The reports are that he is going into Guzerat, and that he is going to refresh in the Holkar territory. Amrut Rao says that he is going into Guzerat: he has a large treasure with him. Scindiah's camp is in the very greatest

distress for every thing ; but that, in my opinion, is the strongest motive for war.

I have no objection to your march to Roshungaum. From the account I have given you above of the state of affairs, you see that there is no chance of your being opposed or attacked by the whole confederacy ; and I look upon you to be fully equal to any part, particularly considering the superior state of your cattle and equipments compared with theirs. You must, however, confine yourself to the defensive till I can come to your support. By defensive I do not mean that you should wait in any particular place till you shall be attacked, but that you should attack any party that may come within the Nizam's territories and your reach. I mean only that you should not commence an operation which may take you to a great distance from Aurungabad, or from me, before I can cross the Godavery and give you support.

Till we have really a war, you must be cautious also regarding the places said to belong to the Nizam. His territories, and those of the Marhattas, are much intermixed ; nay, some districts are the joint property of both powers. That very place Badowly belongs partly to the Nizam, and partly to a Marhatta. Oomrawootty and Mulcapoor are in the same state. But, notwithstanding that this state of these countries is acknowledged by the Nizam's durbar, his officers would willingly seize them, and probably occasion in this manner a war which it may yet be possible to avoid. Your hircarrahs have been detained in Scindiah's camp, most probably by the rain, which has been very heavy in all parts of the country. The tappall still runs from thence.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 21st June, 1803.

The account of the pontoons is indeed very bad. It is unlucky that, when the rain came on, the gentlemen below the ghauts did not stop them till it ceased a little, which, by all accounts, it appears to have done now very generally. It is probable that, in fair weather, they would have found a smaller number of bullocks fully equal to move them. Lieut. Goodfellow, instead of making a trial at Bombay, as he was desired to do by Lieut. Col. Dallas, of the number of bullocks required, made a calculation upon very erroneous foundations, and then referred to the Madras regulations, which have nothing to do with the subject.

In my opinion it will be best to desire Capt. Young to desist from sending the pontoons till the weather shall have settled a little, and then to send them forward. From the breaking of carriages, however, before they have come one stage, and the deficiency and badness of the bullocks, I suspect that we shall derive but little benefit from this equipment, even if it should be able to get up the ghauts. If it had been ready to leave Panwell on the 8th June, which was the day I fixed for it, it might have had some chance ; but time, which is every thing, is not equally prized every where. Capt. Young must be directed to take advantage of the fair moments during the monsoon, to keep your magazine at Poonah full to the quantity I pointed out. From your account of the disposition of the brinjarries, I imagine that he will have no great difficulty in effecting this object.

It is extraordinary that your gentlemen should be so unsuccessful in the purchase of cattle, and that the government should be so likewise: my departments purchased 3000 there in one month. Individuals got as many more; and if there had not been a stop put to the sale of bullocks in Poonah, by a government or a police regulation, the 78th regt. would have completed themselves in one night: but I assure you I do not attribute this failure to want of exertion on your part; on the contrary, I am convinced that you do every thing in your power.

Two muccudums and 100 drivers of the carriage bullocks have deserted, notwithstanding that their pay is so much higher than that of any other description of followers in this camp. Indeed there is great desertion among the Bombay followers in general. I wish that you would send me 100 more drivers as soon as you can, and let a small guard come with them. I have a party of horse looking out for the deserters, and I may pick up some, but that is doubtful. I am obliged to you for the supply of arrack.

One would imagine that boats might be had at Bombay without much difficulty, and it is not impossible to transport them 15 or 16 miles to the rivers in the Konkan. I wrote to Mr. Duncan upon that subject long ago, but it appears that the boats are not yet forthcoming; but they will come, and the communications with Panwell may be kept up during the monsoon.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th. There appears certainly to have been a mistake or misunderstanding between Col. Stevenson and Rajah Mohiput Ram, in respect to the share of the expense of hiring the troops under Meer Khan, which it was supposed the British government would defray. In consequence of my orders, however, upon that subject, Col. Stevenson has set Meer Khan right, in regard to the British government being bound by his letter to that chief, by a second letter, written with the knowledge of the sirdars in the Nizam's service. It appears also that Meer Khan is not inclined to enter the Nizam's service, even with the number of troops which Col. Stevenson proposes to entertain. Upon the whole, therefore, I do not conceive that any inconvenience will result from these letters, or from the misunderstanding between Rajah Mohiput Ram and Col. Stevenson. It would certainly be desirable to discover whether Rajah Mohiput Ram really misunderstood Col. Stevenson's intention, or wilfully deceived his employers. But, considering all the circumstances of the present moment, I believe that it would be best to defer the inquiry to a future period.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

My brinjaries have been playing tricks as usual; and the consequence is, that I have not got one-third of the quantity of rice I ought to have.

I have accounts from Scindiah's camp of a date as late as the 14th. The negotiations are still in a state of uncertainty. Scindiah had written to Col. Collins to desire him to stay; and he promised an explanation after the meeting with the Rajah of Berar, which actually took place on

the 13th. We may therefore expect something definitive immediately. Either peace or war will relieve my distresses: peace, as it will enable me to approach my supplies at Poonah; war, as it will give me an opportunity of attacking Ahmednuggur, in which place I shall find plenty. There is another state, however, for which I must provide, viz. that of a continuance of these negotiations at Scindiah's camp: this I can do only by your assistance. I cannot depend upon the supplies promised and expected from Poonah. The characteristic of the Peshwah's government is deceit, and he has not yet made me one promise that he has not broken: I must therefore depend upon you.

Upon receipt of this letter, I request that you will send off 2000 bags of rice, with a guard, to meet me at Puttun; and let 1000 bags be from your grain departments, and 1000 from your brinjarries. You might replace the former from the rice at Aurungabad, and hire fresh bullocks to carry it. I point out Puttun, because it is the place nearest to you known to your people, and likewise nearest to me. It will likewise be as convenient a station for me to move to as any other, in case of this delay in the negotiations; and I can easily order the boats to be brought down again from Toka, in order that there may be no delay in our communications. I regret much the necessity which exists for calling upon you for assistance in supplies, but it is entirely owing to the disappointments I have experienced from this government.

P. S. I should wish the boats still to go to Toka, as I before pointed out.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

I enclose the letter I received from the Sec. of government at Fort William regarding the remuneration to the Rajah of Koorg, which contains, I believe, the instructions to the government of Fort St. George on this subject. Let the papers be copied which you require, and return the packet.

I am sorry to find the Putwurdun so backward. It is strange that, in proportion as the sirdars of the Marhatta state demonstrate a disinclination to come forward on the present service, they advance in the Peshwah's favor. I see by the ackbars that Chintomeny Rao, in particular, is now the constant companion of the Peshwah and his brother; and he appears to be the most backward of the family. I should like to know why Bappojee Vittell is not sent out.

The alleged want of bullocks at Poonah is too ridiculous. I make no doubt but that, in the town of Poonah alone, there are not a smaller number than 50,000 bullocks at this moment.

I have not written to the Governor General for a length of time. I don't like to communicate to him my sentiments of the Peshwah, nor do I wish to deceive him. I agree with you that strong measures are necessary, but how are they to be carried into execution?

Holkar has made one march from the Taptee. It is reported in his camp that the expedition to Guzerat is deferred for 2 months. He is now supposed to be going to Chooley Myhissur on the Nerbudda. This place appears to be not far from Ougein and Indore. It is very clear that the confederacy is not firm yet.

You'll see, by my letter to Col. Close of this day, that the brinjarries have been playing their old tricks to a very large amount, and that we are likely to meet with some distress. Is it not possible to make the Peshwah's government do something?

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 23rd June, 1803.

I return Col. Collins's dispatch of the 16th. It is rather less pacific than the last, but I think it probable that the confederates have not yet arranged their matters, that Holkar has not yet come into their views, and that for that reason they wish to delay the decision for some time longer. Holkar's object would appear to be to get hold of the Holkar territory, and his game to effect it by a war between Scindiah and us. If there should be no war between Scindiah and us, he will get hold of that territory, but not so certainly, either by a peace mediated by Ragojee Bhoonslah, and guaranteed by him, or by the continuation of the contest with Scindiah. Holkar's object must be, obviously, to keep himself out of the contest with us, and to urge the others into it. But it is probable that Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah perceive that inclination, and want to urge him to go hand in hand with them. They have now a fair opportunity of doing this, by apprizing him that he is to be attacked by the English; and upon this ground it is unfortunate that Col. Collins's moonshee should have said, and that the Peshwah should have written, that we intended to attack Holkar. In addition to the impolicy of such a declaration, at the present moment, it is any thing but true, and ought, in my opinion, under the instructions of the Governor General, to be firmly contradicted. If you should be of that opinion, it would be well if you were to make a suggestion upon the subject to Col. Collins.

I apprized you in my letter of yesterday of my want of grain. I started from Poonah with 5900 bags of rice, which, upon a moderate calculation, would have lasted me 59 days, and I might have spun it out to 90 days. The losses in cattle obliged me to leave some behind in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and to consume much larger quantities than were necessary in camp; but even with these drawbacks I ought to have had now a sufficiency to last me for a month, but the brinjarries have contrived to make away with two-thirds of it.

The critical circumstances of our situation are much increased by what I have above stated. I shall issue wheat flour to the troops, and the followers must live upon that likewise: but we depend for our existence upon the produce of the country in which we may be situated; and the necessity of being in or passing through a barren or exhausted country, or the increase of our numbers, will destroy us. In this view of the question I do not consider the probability of hostilities, which must of course render it more difficult to draw subsistence from the countries in which we may happen to be. The question is, what is to be done? In considering this question, I believe I must take it for granted that I shall get no assistance whatever from Poonah or Bombay.

If it is decided immediately that there is to be a war, the attack of Ahmednuggur is still feasible; and if I should succeed in getting possession of that place, I hope to find some relief there for my distresses. The

question rests entirely upon a consideration of the circumstances attending the state of doubt in which I think it probable that we shall be kept for some time longer. While this state of doubt exists, am I to go into the Nizam's country, south of the Godavery, and subsist there as well as I can? am I to cross the Godavery with my whole force? or am I to return across the Beemah, approach the supplies at Poonah, and endeavor to fit out again in case there should be a war? or am I to divide this body of troops, and send part of it to join Col. Stevenson, and part back to Poonah?

If I go into the Nizam's country, south of the Godavery, I am not certain that I shall be able to find subsistence, or, at all events, that I shall be able to re-establish myself in such manner as to take the field with a sufficient stock of provisions in store to feed the troops for any length of time. I may be reduced at last to the necessity of approaching the supplies at Poonah, and may suffer distress in doing so. Col. Stevenson tells me that there are provisions in Dharore and Kurdlah; but he has his reports from the Nizam's officers, who told him at the same time that none could be issued without his Highness' orders: it is therefore probable that there are no provisions in these places.

If I cross the Godavery with my whole force, I must live upon Col. Stevenson's supplies: the Colonel is in no want; the Nizam's government have supplied him well: but I know he has not more than he wants; and it is very probable that, when I come to double his consumption, I shall soon reduce him to the state in which I am myself. In the mean time, the contest may commence, and neither of the detachments will be in a condition to act. If I return across the Beemah, I shall subsist; and if I can keep alive my cattle, I have no doubt but that I should fit myself out again, and soon be in a situation to act with vigor. But a retrograde movement is always bad in this country; and it may be attended by the worst consequences in the present situation of our affairs. It is obvious now that there will be no war if Holkar will not join it; but if Holkar joins in it and repasses the Taptee, Col. Stevenson is no match for all the confederates put together, although he is fully equal to any two of them. I should be too distant to give him any assistance, having my corps on the other side of the Beemah, particularly in the crippled state in which it must be expected to be for some time to come.

The next point to be considered is, whether I shall divide, and send part to join Col. Stevenson, and part to the neighbourhood of Poonah. By this division I certainly strengthen Col. Stevenson, and provide for the subsistence of the whole; but shall we then be strong enough for the confederates? In this choice of difficulties we must do the best we can; and I think that, upon the whole, that will be the measure attended with the most advantage and least probable evil.

If the answer of Scindiah to Collins should be at all peaceable and friendly, in my opinion we ought to accept it; and I ought to inform him that I intend to recross the Beemah, and to break up the army, as soon as I find that he commences to recross the Nerbudda.

What has happened already, and the situation of this body of troops, are sufficient proofs that we cannot carry on a war in this country, after

having been 4 months from Seringapatam, and having marched nearly 700 miles, without having the assistance of the resources of Bombay and Poonah. The government of Bombay is unable (and always will be so with its present instruments) to afford us any assistance, and the Peshwah is both unable and unwilling. With half the means in their power, and without the assistance of the store collected at Poonah, it is pleasing to see how the Nizam's government have supported the army under Col. Stevenson; but, although the provision is at their door at Poonah, and brought there without the smallest aid from them, they will not give us a bullock to remove it.

I can have but one opinion upon this subject, and that is, that, supposing the Peshwah's inability to be of the lowest kind, there must be besides an unwillingness on his part, which has contributed to prevent us from enjoying any of the resources of Poonah. It is not to be believed that there are no cattle in that city. Let a house or a shop be produced in which there is not a bullock, and I will agree that I am mistaken; and the police can command every bullock in the place, particularly when it is known that we are willing to pay highly for all that we receive. But it is useless to search for proofs of the Peshwah's dissimulation to us, or of his unwillingness to come forward to our assistance in a contest in which we are likely to be involved from our interference in his favor. We must look for a remedy for these evils; and I acknowledge that I see none that are not of a nature more violent than are likely to be adopted.

The difficulties, however, in which this corps is likely to be involved will be an useful lesson to governments, and to us all: first, to avoid entering into a treaty with a prince, the only principle of whose character that is known is insincerity; and next, to avoid, if possible, to enter upon a campaign at the distance of 700 miles from our own resources; not only not having the government of the country on our side, but, in the shape of a friend, our worst enemy.

I hope that you have seen the Ahmednuggur hircarrah whom they promised to produce.

P. S. By a letter of the 20th, just come in from Col. Stevenson, I find that the grain in Dowlutabad (and probably that in Dharore and Kurd-lah) is dry. There is no rice to be got in Aurungabad.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Allen, Erroor.

Camp at Rooie, 23rd June, 1803.

I have submitted your letters of the 13th and 16th, together with the enclosures in the former, to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who directs me to say that he is much concerned at the difficulties which you still experience in procuring the necessary supplies; and the more so, as the distance of the Marhatta chiefs, who have authority in the country near Erroor, from his camp, leaves him no means of remedying your situation, which a little more discretion at the first occupying the post would have rendered quite the reverse of what you now find it. The General will remove the hospital and post, entirely, as soon as he can.

No complaints have been made to the General of any duties or customs being laid upon the articles of consumption at Erroor; the only privileged man left there was a servant of the arrack farmers, whose business was only the retail of that article, bang, and opium, and who might have been easily restrained if he presumed to exceed the limits of his duty. If any of the bazaar men have been induced to leave the post, it will be an incalculable disadvantage to every person remaining in it, far exceeding what may have been thought excessive profits to him.

Lieut. M'Arthur had not given any explanation of that part of his letter of the 25th May which you have noticed. If his report to the General that the forage had not been paid for sometimes was unfounded, the inhabitants of the villages around you cannot have been prejudiced against the troops by such a circumstance; and if their discontent had but one single cause, that being removed, you ought soon to find yourself comfortable among them.

You must have the regulations; and I can say nothing on the mode of your making out the abstracts of the sick at Erroor which may encourage the least deviation from them. I enclose abstract for the artillery, which has been sent me. No allowance for writers can be allowed, beyond the 10 pagodas for a man to assist in keeping the accounts of the boat people. You ought to transmit your accounts and vouchers to Capt. Graham as soon as possible.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 24th June, 1803.

I have received from Sir W. Clarke a copy of his letter to you of the 15th. I have no observation to make upon it, excepting in respect to the position which he recommends upon the Tenim ghaut. It might answer from the month of November to the month of May; but during the other months of the year, I imagine, indeed I know, that the rain is more violent in those ghauts than it is in the lower countries; and it is doubtful whether one European would survive being in camp there during the rainy season. The position upon the Tenim ghaut may be a good one hereafter, but it must be after the rains, and advantage must be taken of the ensuing fair season to build barracks, at least, for the European troops.

Lieut. Col. Close tells me that he sends you copies of the dispatches received from Col. Collins, so that I do not copy for you those that he transmits me for perusal. As far as the 18th, matters were still in an undecided state in that quarter. Holkar had certainly crossed the Taptee. A man of mine saw him cross that river, and after that he had made one march from it on the 15th, so that the confederacy had not then been formed. I am sorry to observe, however, from the report of a conference between Col. Collins's moonshee and the Rajah of Berar, that the former said that I was to attack Holkar; and I see that the Peshwah has written the same to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. These assertions are not founded in fact; and, as it is probable that Holkar holds off from the confederacy,

G. O.

24th June, 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley having been disappointed in his expectation of procuring additional supplies of rice from Poonah, he is under the necessity, for the present, of substituting wheat flour for part of that issued to the Native troops. Accordingly, when rice shall be issued to the Native troops, wheat flour will be issued to them for a similar number of days, at the rate of 1 seer per day to each man *gratis*.

It would, however, be inconvenient to the troops to receive large quantities of wheat flour at a time; and the Commissary of grain will accordingly issue only one, or at most two, days' allowance of wheat flour to any corps at one time; and he will apprise the corps of the periods at which he will issue what is due upon their indents, and the troops will attend to receive it at his requisition.

According to this arrangement, commanding officers will indent this day for 2 seers of rice and 3 seers of wheat flour per man *gratis*; which, at half a seer of rice and a seer of wheat flour per day, will subsist them from the 24th to the 30th inst. inclusive. The rice to be issued immediately, and the wheat flour according to the mode above pointed out.

The European troops, for the same reasons, are to receive alternately biscuit and rice, with their allowance of provisions; the biscuit at the rate of one pound *per diem* for each man.

A committee to assemble at the provision flag at 2 o'clock this afternoon, to see the above rice issued to the troops, and to ascertain the wastage since the last committee for that purpose.

they may be very impolitic at the present moment, as the belief of them may oblige that Chief to throw himself upon the others, as the only resource for his safety.

It is obvious, from all the proceedings at Scindiah's camp, that there is some consideration which operates upon that Chief and the Rajah of Berar, to induce them to delay the decision, whether there shall be a war or not. It cannot be a sense of the risk which they must incur in the contest; because they must be well aware that, although the treaty of Bassein interferes with their projects of ambition, it provides effectually for the security of each against the force of the Peshwah: I conclude, therefore, that the cause of the wished-for delay is, that Holkar has not yet consented to their plans. It is not improbable but that he insists upon certain cessions from Scindiah as the price of his becoming a member of the confederacy. If I am correct in this conjecture, the assertion that I was to attack Holkar may have very bad consequences. I think that it cannot be sufficiently lamented that we have not a communication with Holkar, or that the Governor General is not nearer the scene of operations and negotiations, or has not empowered some person to conclude with those chiefs at once. Our negotiators are able men, certainly: but in apparently trifling points I have observed that they have more than once deviated from the general plan of the negotiation; and when a fault has occurred, it has not been possible to apply a remedy without a reference to Bengal, which takes 2 months. That which I have above mentioned is one of those errors; and the pains which Col. Collins took for some time to persuade Scindiah to march towards Poonah is another.

I am sorry to tell you that my losses of cattle have been so great, and such the conduct of my brinjarries, that I am likely to be reduced to some distress. I marched from Poonah with 4400 brinjarry bullocks, loaded with rice, and 1550 loads of rice in the grain, and 100 loads, or 5 days' provisions, in the provision department. Besides this, the sepoys had 8 days' rice with them. By issuing a reasonable quantity daily to the bazaar, this rice would have lasted about 60 days; and if the supplies which I expected by means of the Poonah brinjarries did not come up, it was my intention to stop entirely the issue to the bazaar at the end of a month, and to depend upon the country for the consumption, and to give rice only to the troops.

The great loss of cattle, however, which we have had since the day we marched from Poonah obliged me to begin by leaving behind 500 loads, and to encourage, rather than discourage, the consumption of rice. Besides, the brinjarries have been obliged to leave behind some, and to dispose of other rice in the villages, for the relief of their cattle; and the result of every thing is, that I have not at this moment more rice in camp than will last the troops, at half a seer *per diem*, 18 days. We are, however, in a plentiful country, from which we get large supplies of wheat flour, and the bazaar is well supplied with that food. I propose also to issue that food to the sepoys alternately with rice.

Under all these circumstances, it is difficult to decide what steps are to be taken. In all views of the question I am afraid that I have no hopes of a supply from Poonah, although the means of that city are immense;

and although I have a depôt formed there, amounting to 8000 bags of rice, Col. Close has not yet been able either to purchase or hire one bullock to carry off a load of it, nor has one bazaar man or trader from Poonah attended this camp with supplies. It is not possible to believe this fact, and that the Peshwah is true to the cause: in fact, it must require more than mere apathy to prevent the traders of Poonah from following a course which must be so advantageous to them. But if I can expect nothing from Poonah, what must be my plan to save the troops from the distress which is hanging over them? We may be immediately involved in hostility, or the state of doubt may continue. If we are involved in hostility, I must attack and get possession of Scindiah's fort of Ahmednuggur, which will secure the resources of this country, and probably enable me to carry on war. From the account I have received of the state of that fort, I have no fear of the success of this project.

If this state of uncertainty is to continue, it appears absolutely necessary that I should keep my position north of the Beemah; but I have no resources to enable me to do it. I have written to Col. Stevenson to know exactly what his resources are, and I have desired him positively to send me a supply of rice to the Godavery. But it is obvious that, if I cross that river, I shall soon reduce him to the same level with myself; and it is possible that both detachments may be unable to carry on active operations at the moment at which their services may be required, unless Col. Stevenson's resources are much more ample than I suspect them to be. I have also thought of moving into the Nizam's country, to recruit the cattle during the time of this state of doubt; but there is no rice in the Nizam's country, and I may, at last, be obliged to return towards Poonah, in greater distress than I should be if I were to go back at present.

Another measure of which I have considered has been to divide this detachment, and send part to reinforce Col. Stevenson, and part back towards Poonah. This appears to be attended with most advantage, and liable to least inconvenience; but then the services of that part of the corps which will be sent back to Poonah would be lost for the campaign. Their junction again, even if it should be possible to recruit them with fresh supplies and means of moving them, would be very difficult, if not impossible. It is obvious that, in my determination upon this occasion, I must be guided, in a great degree, by what I hear from Col. Collins. To withdraw the whole corps across the Beemah may be most advisable under certain circumstances; whereas, under others, it would be most advisable to separate and reinforce Col. Stevenson with a part.

You may easily conceive how unpleasant it is to me to write you of these circumstances. Matters have turned out in the most unfortunate manner, and I have been disappointed in all the hopes of assistance which I had formed from Bombay, Poonah, &c. We have not got one bullock from Mr. Duncan. I formed a large depôt at Poonah, with the hope that I should be able to get some assistance from the Peshwah's government to carry it on, or that my own cattle would have been able to return for it. But I have above informed you of the degree of assistance which I have received from the Peshwah's government; and the forage of Poonah was so expensive, particularly after the Peshwah's arrival, that the cattle got but little: it was

of a bad kind, gave them little sustenance, and, when they began to march, they died immediately; so far, therefore, from being able to return for fresh loads, they are not able so carry on those they have got. In short, we have discovered once more, that, without assistance from the government of the country in which we are acting, we cannot carry on military operations at the distance of 700 miles from our supplies. I shall write to you again in a day or two.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 25th June, 1803.

I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from Col. Close: this, in addition to my letter of yesterday, will give you a tolerable idea of the state of affairs at Poonah.

I have just received your letter of the 15th. My former letters will have given answers to all the points contained therein. In my opinion, it would be best that all the money, whether for Col. Stevenson or me, should come to Poonah. It might come by the Beejapoor road, which it would open for our communication with you. From Poonah it might be forwarded in safety either to Col. Stevenson or me. I informed you, in my letter of the 9th, that the sum I should want was one lac of pagodas *per mensem*.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 25th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 23rd, and I am sorry to find that our prospects are so very bad: we must, however, do the best we can. In respect to your suggestion, that I should urge Col. Collins to quit Scindiah's camp, I have to observe, that I have already written to urge him to accelerate his negotiation. I have no direct communication with him; indeed, I never received from you the account of his dawd stages. The muttaseddee at Aurungabad occasionally sends me letters, but they are longer on the road than those which come by Poonah. Besides, I think it much to be doubted whether the negotiation with Scindiah, on the present footing, ought to be accelerated under present circumstances. It is true that we must go to war under any difficulties rather than lose our honor; but we must keep out of the war if it is practicable.

In my opinion, the state of affairs is much altered since the Governor General wrote the instructions under which Collins is acting at this moment. It was then supposed that we had the Peshwah with us. I think that is, at least, doubtful at the present moment; and the question is, whether, instead of urging forward Collins's negotiation, on the footing established under that notion, we ought not rather to procrastinate it; to report the state of the case at the present moment at the Peshwah's durbar to the Governor General, and ask for further orders. This opinion of mine, that the Peshwah is not with us, may, it is true, be erroneous. But it is founded upon the fact that his Highness has not yet taken any steps, recommended to him by the Company's government, or which a sense of his own interests would have suggested, either to prevent the combination of the northern chiefs, or to assist us, or to enable us to carry on the contest against them, if it should be formed; and his acts, as far as they have come to our knowledge, have tended rather to our prejudice. And if we

may believe Col. Collins and the assertion of Scindiah and his ministers, the Peshwah has a correspondence with Ballojee Koonger and Scindiah's durbar, of the nature of which we are entirely ignorant. I cannot but feel that, if we are to have a war under these circumstances, it will be one much more complicated than that expected to be the result of the course of action pointed out by the Governor General's instructions; but one to which our resources are, I trust, fully equal. It is a duty, however, that we owe to our country, to avoid it, if we can, with honor; and I should hope that, if timely measures are taken, it might be avoided.

Upon the ground of the Peshwah's duplicity, the question is, what line we ought to suggest to the Governor General? The first thing he ought to do should be to come to Bombay. As for the settlement of the Marhatta question, that appears to be beyond a possibility: in that case the best thing we can do is to restore matters nearly to the state in which they were when we entered the country, and allow them to fight out their own quarrels. The very hint of our taking this step would dissolve the confederacy at once. We should then have to defend the Nizam's country and our own territories, which, probably, they would never attack.

I send you a letter, which I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to Col. Collins.

Although I am much distressed for carriage, and my bullocks can but ill afford to take a trip to Poonah, I think it proper to send 500 of them to receive a corresponding number of loads of rice; in order to enable me, if possible, to stay a little longer, or to draw off with safety: they will leave this to-morrow morning, and will arrive at Coraygaum on the 29th.

It would be very desirable if they could find their loads at Coraygaum: 1st, because it would save them four marches; 2ndly, because it would save them the passage of the Beemah. This river is, I am told, full; and Lieut. M'Arthur, who has crossed it, says that there are 4 boats there, but only 2 sepoys to work them. It is astonishing that, for their own interest, the owners of the ferry boat will not put that in motion.

Two modes of sending in the rice to Coraygaum have suggested themselves to me: one, that coolies should be employed for the purpose; the other, that some of Col. Murray's rotten bullocks should attempt this service. But it will answer no purpose to employ, upon carrying the rice to Coraygaum, the coolies whom you may have hired to carry it on to camp. It will be best that they should come on. If the rice can be sent to Coraygaum, it will be desirable that measuring men and packers should be sent with it, in order that there may be no loss of time in the delivery. Will you be so kind as to arrange all this matter with Col. Murray? and tell him that I wish that, if the rice should be sent to Coraygaum, it should be in sufficient quantities to give 72 pucca seers for each load, instead of 60 pucca seers, according to the mode in which Capt. Moor has packed up the rice.

Whether the rice be sent to Coraygaum or not, it is very desirable that about 100 bundles of forage should be sent there to feed the cattle, otherwise they will not be able to come back. If it should not be possible to

send the rice to Coraygaum, I request you to have Lieut. Walker, the officer in charge of the party with the bullocks, apprized thereof, in order that he may go on to Poonah.

Col. Agnew writes to me that they have some difficulty in posting their tappall from the Kistna and Beejapoor, and has requested that our runners should go on as far as the river, in the direction of Moodgul, to meet theirs. Will you be so kind as to mention this matter to Mr. Frissell?

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 25th June, 1803.

Since writing to you this morning, it has occurred to me that Col. Murray's cattle are grazing at such a distance from Poonah, that it will not be possible to get them in at a period sufficiently early to allow of their arriving at Coraygaum with the rice on the 29th. It is, however, very desirable to avoid sending my cattle farther than that place; and I should therefore wish that Col. Murray would endeavor to prevail upon his dooley boys to carry some rice thither; and possibly he might be able to get a working party of sepoys to do something in the same way, as the distance is so small. These resources, with the assistance which you may be able to afford him, may enable him to send out the rice to Coraygaum; and thus save my cattle 4 marches over that desert, and 6 days of time, which, at this moment, is of the utmost consequence.

I pick up a few bullocks about the country, and have purchasers out in all directions. This resource, and the arrival this day of 250 bullocks, with loads of arrack, however tired they are, enable me to make this detachment to Poonah. But still, if I should be obliged to move, I must carry some of the loads on the horses of the cavalry.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay.

25th June, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will have 500 of the best of the Bombay carriage bullocks ready to proceed to Poonah at daybreak to-morrow, to bring up rice. A detachment of Native infantry, under Lieut. Walker of the 1st batt. 8th regt., will escort them. You will send 30 loads of chinna, and as much forage upon those bullocks, for their use, as you can spare, or may think proper. A further supply of chinna will be furnished at Poonah, or when the rice is delivered; and each bullock must carry three days' allowance of that for himself, besides his load of rice.

Capt. Young will send empty gunny bags for the rice, and will lend you some for the chinna, if you have occasion for them. He will also send a number of empty arrack kegs by these bullocks back to Poonah.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Walker, 1st batt. 8th regt. N.I.

Camp at Rooie, 25th June, 1803.

The detachment which you are appointed to command is intended to convoy 500 bullocks, which Capt. Mackay will have in readiness, to Poonah, from whence they are to bring up rice; and you will accordingly proceed by the enclosed route. Lieut. Col. Close has been written to, to forward the rice to Coraygaum, on the left bank of the Beemah river; and if you find it there, you will receive it, and return immediately to camp. If you should not find the rice there, you will proceed on to Poonah, take charge of it there, and return to camp.

Capt. Mackay will send a quantity of forage and grain for those bullocks, upon their own backs; but you will do all in your power to procure what more may be required on the road, especially on your return; and you will cause the bullock men to put three or four days' allowance of grain for the bullocks upon them, besides their full loads of rice, to feed them on the road back.

You will attend at the filling of the bags with rice, and see that the Commissary's servant puts 72 seers of rice into each; and whether you receive the rice at Coraygaum or at Poonah, there must be no delay in measuring or receiving it.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 26th June, 1803.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, my prospects have mended a little. I have been able to send off some bullocks to Poonah, for supplies; and I think that the means which I have employed will produce a larger number of these animals. I am in great hopes that I shall be able to hold my position on this side of the Beemah. I have just received a letter from the Sec. of government in Bengal, by which I am authorized to draw for money upon different collectors and officers under that government. Notwithstanding that I have received this authority, as I cannot get money for bills at Poonah, I shall want the supply respecting which I wrote to you on the 9th inst., and yesterday. There is no news from the northward.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 26th June, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th. You will perceive, by mine of yesterday, that I also have been enabled to send 500 cattle to bring loads; and from your letter of the 24th, and Malcolm's account of the number of coolies of which you have the command at Poonah, I have strong hopes that you will be able to send the loads to meet these bullocks at Coraygaum. I am exceedingly anxious upon this subject, and also to receive the fresh supplies of rice by the coolies; because I shall then be enabled to feed the troops on rice only, and leave the bazaars to the followers. We have scarcely been able to supply the consumption in the bazaars, since flour has been taken from them for the use of the troops; and it will be a great relief to be again able to give the troops rice. I am happy to tell you that the orders respecting the issue of flour were well received, and there have been no grumbling or complaints.

It appears, by the accounts received from Col. Murray, that the coolie carriage is as cheap as that by bullocks, and it is certainly equally expeditious. I do not, therefore, in any way object to it, excepting that it is not possible to get as many coolies as bullocks. I am getting a few bullocks, and have many means employed to procure more. I think that I

G. O. C. C.

26th June, 1803.

The Commander in Chief has recently learnt with much surprise that the sword and sash of a deceased officer, which by military usage are carried in funeral procession, has been claimed as a perquisite by the staff officers of a garrison; and that this claim has been asserted as a right derived from ancient custom, long practised in all, and still continued in some, garrisons and military stations under the Presidency of Fort St. George.

That the arms of a soldier, the symbols of his honor, and the most flattering memorial of affectionate esteem which a dying soldier can bequeath to surviving friends, should be indecently claimed, cannot but excite a sentiment of indignation in the minds of military men.

Without investigating the origin of this pretended right, and tracing the antiquity of a custom, which no event or precedent can stamp with the character of propriety, the Commander in Chief forbids the continuance of this disgraceful practice in any garrison, cantonment, or military station under the Presidency of Fort St. George.

He publishes to the army that no claim of right exists in any officer or soldier officiating at a military funeral to the arms of the deceased; and directs this order to be inserted in the standing orders of every garrison, cantonment, and military station under the Presidency of Fort St. George.

am now in a better state than I was a few days ago, and I hope to be able to hold my position.

You will observe, by my letter of the 23rd, that I am fully aware of the necessity of strengthening Col. Stevenson, if I should be obliged to draw off. Indeed, that measure is obviously so necessary, that I considered of the propriety of joining Col. Stevenson myself, with the whole corps; but the objection to that measure was, the danger of increasing his consumption, so far as to distress him for provisions, at the moment when we might be called upon to act. The detachments which you propose to add to him, you will observe, are nearly equal in strength, and will consume nearly as much as the whole of this body of troops; and as they would not have with them the excellent bazaars and means that I have of drawing subsistence from any country in which it can be found, they would fall still more upon Col. Stevenson's regular modes of supply for their consumption, and probably would distress him more than even the whole of this body of troops would. It is true, that you propose that further supplies should be brought forward from Hyderabad: but I have to observe, from the account I have received from Col. Stevenson of the state of his supplies, that it is necessary that further measures should be taken for his subsistence without the smallest loss of time, even supposing that he should not be reinforced; and I strongly suspect, that, when he comes to count bags, as I have done, he will find the quantity of rice to be much smaller than he imagined it.

Another objection to reinforcing Col. Stevenson at all, and that applies still more strongly to sending the large detachment from this corps which you have proposed, is the risk that, in consequence thereof, this corps may never be of sufficient strength, or so composed as to be able to march forward from Poonah, supposing that there should be a war. We should then be obliged to have recourse to one of two measures: to turn Col. Stevenson's attention to protecting and forming a junction with his corps; or to break up Gen. Stuart's army to make this corps so strong as to be again independent. Considering the call for Goa, the probability of the arrival of the French troops at Pondicherry, and the prospect of the renewal of the French war, the question is, would that be prudent? Would Gen. Stuart consent to that measure? We must certainly keep Col. Stevenson in such strength as to ensure his safety in his advanced position; but in deciding upon the degree of strength I must give him, and the nature of the troops I must send him, I must consider the circumstances above alluded to; the strength of the enemy, their present state, their probable future state, and their immediate designs. However, as I told you before, my prospects have improved so much within these last two days, that I have strong hopes that I shall be able to retain my position; and if any of my modes of procuring bullocks succeed, I shall entirely recover.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 26th June, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 24th, and I have seen Major Spens's report to Capt. Barclay, of the supply sent off upon coolies. This is, I assure you, very satisfactory to me. I approve of

your sending a party to Coraygaum, and of the instructions to the officer commanding it, excepting that there will be no occasion for his making a raft. In case Capt. Young should, according to your direction, send up any of the bullocks, found too small for the pontoons, loaded with rice, I request you to send them on with loads of rice to me, specifying that they are these bullocks, at the time you send them.

I called upon Mr. Duncan for 2000 carriage bullocks, which he promised me I should have at the end of May; but as they have not yet produced 500 draught bullocks, which I called for likewise, they have employed part of these 2000 carriage bullocks in drawing the pontoons. All those, therefore, unfit for this work must be sent on to me as carriage cattle.

Capt. Buchan is to return, to join the army. Instructions to that effect are gone to Poonah. I omitted to mention to you, that I observe Mr. Duncan has recommended that a person should be especially appointed to take charge of the cattle with your detachment. I have written to him, however, to say, that, although I complained of the state of condition of the cattle, I had no complaint to make of Major Spens: on the contrary, I have reason to be well satisfied with Major Spens in every respect.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 26th June, 1803.

Since I marched from Poonah, I have sustained a great loss in carriage cattle, employed in moving provisions and stores for the troops under my command; and the consequence is, that the stock of provisions which I had, and which would have lasted for 3 months, is much reduced.

From causes which it is not at present necessary to discuss, I have not been able to procure any assistance from the Peshwah's government, either to replace the loss of cattle which I have sustained, or to bring forward any part of the depôt of provisions which I had formed at Poonah, with a view to the possible want before the return of the fair season; and it appears clearly that I must find means of subsistence, and of bringing forward the provisions collected at Poonah, independently of the Peshwah's government.

Whatever may be my success in effecting these objects, I fear that, when I shall cross the Godavery, I shall be obliged to call upon Col. Stevenson for assistance; and having taken into consideration the state of his supplies, in order that I might be enabled to judge whether he could afford me the assistance which I might require, I find that, although the provision made for him is so ample as to secure his subsistence for 3 months at least, he will suffer inconvenience before that time, if he should be obliged to supply me with any part of it. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of sending towards Col. Stevenson's army about 5000 bullock loads of rice, as soon as it may be practicable; and that a further supply, of the same quantity, should be sent in the middle of the month of August.

The cause of the mortality among the cattle attached to the troops under my command has been the great length of the march they made from Seringapatam, in a very dry and hot season; during the greatest part of the march, the majority of them suffered from a disorder to which

all the cattle were liable in the last year, owing to the scarcity and badness of the forage at Poonah, and to the weather we have had since I marched from that place. The number of cattle lost by the brinjarries on this service has been so large, and the distance from Seringapatam is so great, that I much fear that I shall not be able to order up many more of this class of people from the Mysore country.

I have no reason to expect any assistance from the Peshwah's government, at least till the conclusion of the rainy season, even if I should receive any at that period; and you will therefore observe, that I must rely in a great measure upon the means which you may be able to prevail upon the Nizam's government to bring forward. While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform you, that, upon inquiry, I find that the store formed at Dowlutabad consists entirely of dry grain and flour; and I believe that those at Kurdlah and Dharore are of the same description. You are aware that our Native troops require rice.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 26th June, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Stevenson, from which you will be able to form a judgment of the measures taken by Rajah Mohiput Ram at Aurungabad, and of the state of defence in which that place will be hereafter.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Rooie, 28th June, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th. I am much obliged to you for the steps you have taken regarding bullocks for me, as mentioned in your letter of the 24th.

In respect to the rice, if you should deem that which Mohiput Ram may purchase to be in safety at Aurungabad, and that which Sookroodoor may purchase to be in safety at Puttun, it will be equally as convenient to me to have it at those places as in my camp; and more convenient than that the bullocks which you may purchase should be delayed to receive it. You are now so far from me, that it would be difficult to send you 20,000 rupees, or any other sum, to pay for this rice, or the bullocks; but you shall certainly be repaid any sums that you advance on account of this division of the army.

The money which is now coming from Gen. Stuart's camp is not intended for you, but for me. I have received a letter from Gen. Stuart, however, in which he tells me that he is to send you one lac of pagodas; and that sum may be sent to you, either with another lac of pagodas for me, through the Nizam's country, or it may go to Hyderabad, according to the wish expressed by you to Gen. Stuart, or it may come to Poonah with a lac of pagodas for me. Whenever Gen. Stuart shall apprise me of his determination upon this point, I shall write to you.

I think that it would be desirable to increase the guard in charge of the boats on the Godavery to an European officer and a company of Native infantry, in order to provide effectually for their security; and that I might have it in my power, by corresponding with him, to direct their meeting me at any part of the river I may think proper. This same officer might have under his charge the 1000 brinjarries, so

far as that he should know where to find them, in case I should want them.

The muttaseddee who conducts the Hindustany dawk for Col. Collins, and who resides, I believe, at Aurungabad, has complained of the want of a boat upon the Godavery, for the purpose of transporting the letters across. He has written to me to say, that Rajah Sookroodoor has taken away the boat which was formerly used for that purpose. If he has done so, it has been by your desire, and for my use; and, therefore, I cannot but approve of what he has done: but I think that it would be desirable that a basket boat should be upon the Godavery, at the place at which Col. Collins's dawk crosses, and which may be found out from the muttaseddee above mentioned, who resides at Aurungabad.

We have no accounts from Col. Collins since the 18th. I imagine that matters remain at Scindiah's camp nearly in the same state as when I wrote last to you.

I beg you to be cautious not to advance beyond Roshungaum; and not to go out of the Nizam's territories, or into those, the property of which is divided between the Nizam and the Marhattas; and not to act upon a report from any of the chiefs that Col. Collins has come away, until you are absolutely certain of it. All these chiefs have interested motives; and, where the Marhattas are concerned, their reports are to be received with doubts. Your situation is a most delicate one, and therefore I particularly caution you. It will be our duty to carry on the war with activity, when it shall begin; but it is equally so to avoid hostilities, if we possibly can; and by no means to take any step which can occasion them, or give a pretence for Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, to commence them.

I return Meer Khan's letter: you will perceive by this postscript that I have received your letter of the 26th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Rooie, 28th June, 1803.

From your letter of the 27th, which I have just received, I apprehend that there is some mistake respecting the bullocks which I sent off on the 26th for rice; and that I did not clearly explain myself. My wish was that these bullocks should, if possible, receive their loads at Coraygaum, where they would arrive on to-morrow, the 29th; and that, in order that the loads might be sent there from Poonah, I proposed either that Col. Murray's bullocks should be employed, or that coolies should be hired; or that, if coolies could not be hired, Col. Murray should endeavor to prevail upon his dooley bearers, or a working party of sepoys, to perform this service. At last, if the rice could not be sent out to Coraygaum, I requested that you would be so kind as to write to the officer in charge of the party, and I informed you that he would go on to Poonah for the rice. I was anxious, however, that your arrangements to send on rice to camp by coolies should not be disturbed, in order to send the rice to meet the party at Coraygaum.

In your postscript to your letter of the 27th, you say you 'will of course stop the march of the detachment with the bullocks to Coraygaum.' They will be there to-morrow morning, and I think it better that they

should march on, even to Poonah, than come back without loads. But this letter may reach you in time to enable you to make some arrangements for sending out their loads on to-morrow evening and the 30th, so as to enable them to commence their return to camp on the 1st July. If this should be the case, I request you to send off an express messenger to Lieut. Walker, the officer in charge of the detachment, to desire him to wait at Coraygaum for the loads.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Browne, 1st batt. 2nd regt. N.I.

28th June, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will march to-morrow morning to Seeroor, a village situated on the Goor river, and remain encamped in the neighbourhood of it. The object in sending you there is to give protection to the boats established on that river, and confidence to the people coming on with rice from Poonah, and to see that the boats are worked quickly and well.

You will employ yourself to obtain the accomplishment of those objects; and you will do everything in your power, also, to give confidence to the people of the village of Seeroor, to prevail upon them to open a bazaar for the supply of people passing backwards and forwards, and of your own detachment.

You will examine the village of Seeroor, and see whether it contains any building in which rice could be placed in security from the rains. If there should be such a one, you will endeavour to prevail upon the pattel of the place to allow you to use it in that manner, and you may engage that the pattel shall be paid any reasonable sum by way of price for the use of the place.

Instructions will be sent to you hereafter regarding an arrangement which Major Gen. Wellesley has in contemplation for bringing forward to Seeroor some of the rice in store at Poonah.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Rooie, 29th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 27th June, and I conclude that you will have sent the rice to meet the bullocks at Coraygaum. I shall write to you respecting sending on rice to us hereafter, as soon as I see the first coolies you sent come into camp. They are not yet arrived, but the first asses have arrived.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me 500 bullock saddles upon coolies' heads. I have been tolerably successful in getting bullocks, and want saddles for them. Let me know also what progress Major Spens has made in getting the gunny bags.

It would be desirable that a note should be written to the officer in charge at Coraygaum, and to Lieut. Brown, whom I have placed for the present at Seeroor, upon the Goor, to apprise those gentlemen when you shall dispatch any thing from Poonah.

Lieut. Stirling ought also to be directed to inform Lieut. Brown when any thing passes his post. I shall direct Lieut. Brown to let me know when the same may pass the Goor. We shall thus have our supplies constantly in our view.

If your bullock saddles should be supposed to be good, let some be purchased in Poonah.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 30th June, 1803.

Since I wrote to you last, I have received a letter from Col. Collins, dated the 22nd, from which it appears very improbable that he should have quitted Scindiah's camp before the 28th; and it is even probable

that he will yet be there for some time longer. *The question of peace or war still remains in the same undecided state. I mention this to you just to show the necessity of caution in giving credit to the reports you may hear.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 30th June, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 27th and 28th. None of the coolies that have been sent off from Poonah have yet arrived in camp. It is possible that they may have been detained by the rivers; but I request that no more may be sent till I see these come in. I have written a letter to Collins, in which I have urged him to press forward the negotiation with Scindiah. We cannot shrink from the contest into which we must enter, if Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will not remove from the Nizam's frontier.

My plan of operations was to attack Ahmednuggur with my corps, and to keep Col. Stevenson with his on the defensive, beyond the Godavery, till I should have got possession of Ahmednuggur, and then that both corps should co-operate.

You appear to be of opinion that Col. Stevenson would not be sufficiently strong, opposed to the whole confederacy, in which I agree; but, in fact, there is no reason to believe that he will be opposed to the whole confederacy. We know that Holkar has crossed the Taptee, with all, or the greatest part of, his force; and that both his army and Scindiah's are much crippled, and at present very ill equipped for a campaign. Therefore, even supposing that Holkar could recross the Taptee, so as to join in a combined operation against Col. Stevenson, before I should have made such progress at Ahmednuggur as to give the Colonel some assistance, it is not probable that the confederates would be able to bring such a force upon him, as to give us any reason to be apprehensive of the consequences. But, even supposing that Col. Stevenson is weak, I do not see in what manner I can reinforce him. I cannot send him cavalry, because it is my opinion that the measure which Scindiah will adopt for the defence of Ahmednuggur may be to send a body of cavalry to cut off my communication with Poonah; and I shall want all the troops of that description which I have got. Indeed, I have heard that a small body of pindarries are already arrived in the country. I shall want all the infantry I have for the operation upon Ahmednuggur.

On the other hand, I might bring Col. Stevenson across the Godavery; and certainly, if I thought he was in any danger, that would be the measure which I should adopt: but it would be attended by the entire ruin of the Nizam's territories north of that river, and with the loss of our own reputation, for which evils our success at Ahmednuggur would hardly compensate. Therefore, it is my opinion, considering the divided and crippled state of the enemy at the present moment, and the little chance there is that this state will mend before I can cross the Godavery, that I ought to leave Col. Stevenson north of that river, at least to keep all small plundering parties in check. In my opinion, the great difficulty I shall have to contend with will be to check the Colonel himself. However, I have sent him the most positive orders not to quit the Nizam's

territories. I wrote to Mr. Duncan to keep the depôts at Poonah and Panwell well supplied.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 30th June, 1803.

None of the coolies are yet arrived, but I have sent out to look for them. In case the depôt at Poonah should fall below 4000 bags, you should purchase; but I make no doubt that Capt. Young will be able to keep it up to double that amount. Mr. Duncan will easily have it in his power to keep the store full at Panwell. I do not wish you to issue flour to the sepoys; in fact, it would not be cheaper than half a seer of rice: it introduces a new practice into the service, which is bad if it is not necessary; and as every change of food causes sickness, it may be prejudicial to their health.

I have this instant received a letter from Lieut. Walker, who went with the bullocks to Coraygaum: he did not attend to his instructions, and arrived there on the 27th, instead of the 29th. He met there some of the coolies whom you dispatched on the 25th; he took from them their loads, and was waiting to retake the loads of others, who, he heard, were on the road. All this is contrary to his instructions: 190 of the bullocks are come into the camp already, and God knows when Lieut. Walker will arrive with the others. I have sent off a messenger to him, however, with orders to come on with the bullocks which he will have loaded, and to bring with him all the coolies that may be at Coraygaum. I think, however, it is very probable that, as the coolies will have found that the loads of some have been taken from them at Coraygaum, none of them will proceed farther than that place, and they will lay down their loads there. I request you to write to Lieut. Stirling, to inquire whether this is the case; and if it should be so, send coolies from Poonah to carry their loads on to camp; and be so kind as to send an hircarra with each party that you shall send off.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Walker.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 30th June, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter of the 28th inst., and directs me to inform you that you have acted in every instance contrary to your instructions, as you have not proceeded to Coraygaum, and you have stopped and loaded your bullocks with rice which was coming on to camp by coolies and cattle engaged and paid their full hire for coming all the way, whereas the rice which you were eventually to have received from Col. Close at Coraygaum was to be sent out thither by the dooley bearers and bullock drivers of Col. Murray's detachment, who are directed to proceed no farther. As Major Gen. Wellesley conceives that you will have loaded all your bullocks before this letter will reach you, he desires that you will return to camp with them, after giving directions to such coolies or bullockmen as may be remaining with the loads which you will not have taken to accompany you; and also that you will leave a havildar's guard, with orders to direct all such other coolies or bullockmen as may arrive after your march to follow you to camp. The havildar to remain 2 days, and then come up to the detachment with his guard.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 1st July, 1803.

The first coolies dispatched from Poonah are dropping into camp; and, notwithstanding the mistake made by Lieut. Walker, of which Col. Murray will have informed you, I think that we shall do pretty well. I

shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that 2000 more coolies loaded with rice may be sent to camp. An hircarra and one or two sepoy's ought to come with each party, in order to keep them together and show them the road.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Allen.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 1st July, 1803.

I have laid your letter of the 26th ult. before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who directs me to inform you that you ought not in any case to interfere in the disputes of one sirdar with another, and you acted properly in declining to give the amildar of Dadwar a sepoy to protect him against the demands of the Kola-poor Rajah's people.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 2nd July, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 30th June. The scaling ladders would be very useful to me, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire that they may be brought up from Panwell, and sent forward to camp. I also agree in opinion with Lieut. Col. Close, that the iron 18 pounders might be very useful, and indeed necessary; and, at all events, there is no harm in having them at Poonah; but in what manner are they and the stores to be brought up the ghaut? I see no mode at present of effecting this object.

I wish that you would look at my bullocks, of which Lieut. Brown has charge, and see whether they are at all in a state for work; and, if they are, whether they could draw your two 12 pounders and 2 howitzers with their stores from Poonah. I am well satisfied with the equipment I have, in case it should be necessary to attack the fort of Ahmednuggur; but there is no harm in having a larger one, and the howitzers in particular may be very useful. If, therefore, you should be of opinion that Lieut. Brown's bullocks can work, I should wish you to send forward all these pieces; but if only sufficient for the howitzers, and in condition, send them. You may send a guard with them, and I will look out for them from Seeroor.

As the pontoons cannot be wanted till after we have got Ahmednuggur; and as, at all events, I suspect that, from the state of their equipments and the breaking of their carriages already, they will be of little use in this campaign, I believe it would be best to send for some of their bullocks to move the 12 pounders and howitzers, with their tumbrils, in these under Lieut. Brown's charge are not equal to that work. If you should be able to send these pieces of ordnance, I should wish you to send with them about 20 artillery men. Of course these, with the ordnance, will be returned to you, as soon as the operation at Ahmednuggur shall be concluded.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 3rd July, 1803.

I received last night your letter of the 20th June, regarding Mr. Mackenzie.

G. O.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 3rd July, 1803.

Lieut. * * *, of the 2nd batt. 5th regt. Bombay N. I., having been put in arrest by his commanding officer, Capt. Skelton, for disrespect towards him, but having since made an apology for his conduct, with which Capt. Skelton and the commanding officer in Malabar and Canara are satisfied, he is to be released from his arrest.

In exercising the power given to me by government, in regard to the subsidiary force at Poonah, I shall consider it a duty, and it certainly is my inclination, to select those officers for the situations which are to be filled who may be agreeable to you. The gentleman you now have recommended to me is one for whom I have a respect, and in whose advancement and welfare I am materially interested; as he has been frequently recommended to me in the strongest terms by his relation, Gen. Mackenzie, a very old friend of mine. But both you and I, my dear Colonel, must attend to claims of a superior nature to those brought forward, either in consequence of our private feelings of friendship or of recommendation. Of this nature are the claims founded upon service.

Mr. Gilmour, the Staff surgeon with this division of the army, quitted a situation of emolument at Seringapatam, in order to take the field with the troops, when it was determined that the detachment should march to Poonah under my command, and when Mr. Anderson joined the head quarters. Mr. Gilmour was selected to be at the head of the medical department of that detachment, and his allowances were, by order of the Commander in Chief, fixed on the same scale with those of the Staff surgeon with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. Since that time, Mr. Gilmour has done all the duty of the Staff surgeon greatly to my satisfaction and the general good; and when the subsidiary force comes to be established at Poonah, I think that I could not disappoint the expectation which he has had a right to form, that he would be its permanent Staff surgeon, without doing him great injustice, and, in his person, violating a principle which ought always to guide those who have the disposal of military patronage, viz. that those who do the duty of the army ought to be promoted, and also ought to enjoy its benefits and advantages.

To Lieut Col. Close.

Camp, 4th July, 1803.

Malcolm has communicated to me your letter to him. I acknowledge that, in the event of a war, I have no fears for Col. Stevenson's safety; considering that the enemy's force is certainly divided, that they cannot bring it to bear upon the Colonel till I shall be within reach of him, and that therefore which they can bring upon him is not very well equipped. If I am mistaken upon this point, I must make up my mind to forego one of two objects, either the capture of Ahmednuggur, or the security of the Nizam's frontier. I do not think it would be proper to try the siege of Ahmednuggur, excepting in full force; and if Col. Stevenson is not in sufficient force, I must either reinforce him, at the expense of leaving Ahmednuggur in the hands of the enemy; or I must draw him back to the Godavery, possibly across that river, and leave the Nizam's territories beyond that river defenceless.

The only part of my force that it has ever been supposed I could send him, consistently with the plan of attacking Ahmednuggur, is the cavalry. But, considering the state of my supplies, and the total deficiency of country cavalry with this division, from the failure of the sirdars, that is the part of my corps which I may most want.

From the last letters from Col. Collins of the 29th June, I think it probable that we may expect from him something which will give us a

tolerably clear idea of the views and intentions of the chiefs. Circumstances have certainly altered materially since Col. Collins commenced his negotiation on the 28th May. He has remained in Scindiah's camp, and it is not impossible but that he may be drawn into a negotiation, to be carried on while these chiefs are seated upon the Nizam's frontier. The question whether it will be prudent or not to negotiate on the demands of the chiefs, or even to grant them, may depend upon their being forced to quit the Nizam's frontier; and that being the case, it will occur, are they more likely to withdraw from the Nizam's frontier, being threatened by an attack from the whole of our forces, or by an attack upon Ahmednuggur?

Upon this point I have to observe, that the threat of the attack upon Ahmednuggur, combined with Col. Collins's remaining in Scindiah's camp, has hitherto produced no effect; and that to carry it into execution will certainly bring on hostilities. The threat of the attack of our whole force upon their camp may induce them to retire, and thus prevent the war altogether. On the other hand, it is obvious that the objections to this measure, referrible to subsistence, exist; and that, in case there should be a war, I must return upon Ahmednuggur, or must lose my communication with Poonah. In short, the receipt of Col. Collins's next dispatch must determine my conduct.

I observe, from your dispatch to Malcolm, that you are of opinion that the Coast battalion at Poonah is not wanted there. If that should be the case, I wish that you would desire Col. Murray to send it to camp, as its arrival will enable me to detach a corps to the Godavery; and thus, at all events, secure the boats and a passage over that river. They may take with them 5 seers of rice for each man.

I have got a party at Secroor; but it is best to send the coolies with the rice on to camp, as long as they will come.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 4th July, 1803.

I have received this morning your letter of the 2nd. I am under no apprehensions respecting the *depôt* wearing out. It consisted of about 16,000 half-bags, of which you may have sent me 5000. I take your consumption to be about 30 half-bags a day; and, at this estimate, you may have consumed 1000 half-bags. There will still remain there 10,000. I should certainly wish, if possible, to have more rice sent up; and I think it very probable that, in some of the intervals of fair weather, Capt. Young may have it in his power to send some, and that Mr. Duncan may be able to assist him. But I do not think that the want of rice is at present, or is likely to be, so pressing, or that it is necessary to take the means from the pontoons to carry it up.

You will always have the bazaar of Poonah for your force, and you will, of course, use it as soon as the stock in the *depôt* comes to 4000 double bags. I think there is but little hope that I shall be able to move that quantity of rice from Poonah, till long after it will be in the power of Capt. Young to send up an additional supply.

I certainly do not expect much benefit from the pontoons in this campaign, for many reasons; but I consider a bridge to be a very necessary

part of the equipment of a corps stationed on this frontier, the operations of which, as connected with other corps, are so liable to be cramped during a great part of the year by rivers not fordable: therefore, though I may not have the use of the bridge, it is very proper that it should be brought up, that we should examine it and its equipments, in how far they are calculated to answer the purpose intended, and how the equipments, carriages, &c., can be improved. This can be only done in the rainy season; and persons who have been in the habit of seeing carriages moved in all situations must be considered the most competent judges on these points; and I must employ some of those in my camp to examine this equipment. Therefore, although I am not in a hurry about the bridge, under present circumstances, I should not like to forego all prospect of getting it up; excepting that the coolies employed in that work may be employed in bringing up rice, which, after all, I think I shall not be able to move away.

The bags which I wished that Major Spens should get are bullock gunny bags, made of the best gunny, and capable of containing grain. The Bombay bags which you mean are, I believe, those which came up from Panwell, with rice, or double bags made of the same kind of gunny. These are not used to carry rice on the backs of bullocks.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay.

4th July, 1803.

I have laid before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley the statement which you left with me, of the number of loads which the owners of the hired carriage bullocks in the store and provision departments engaged to carry, after an examination into the state of their cattle on the evening of the 4th June, and of the loads which they alleged, on the 7th June, that they could carry; and I am directed to desire that you will only pay the owners for the number of loads, and spare cattle in proportion, which they engaged to carry on the 4th, because he was obliged to send back to Poonah about 600 loads which they pretended not to be able to carry that day; and as it is known that they procured no new bullocks between that day and the 7th, they are more deserving of punishment than a reward for coming forward to say that they could carry more loads with their old cattle, when they knew that there were none to give them

To the Adj. General.

Camp, 6th July, 1803.

Affairs in this country have remained nearly in the same state for the last 2 months.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar has withdrawn gradually from the frontiers of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and has at last crossed the river Taptee, with the greatest part of his army. Scindiah has remained encamped in the same place, in the neighbourhood of Mulcapoor, since the beginning of May; towards the latter end of which month his army was joined by that of the Rajah of Berar. It is reported, that both Chiefs moved farther to the southward in the end of June; but I have received no accounts of their movements since the 27th June. The existence of the combination of those chiefs with Holkar is still reported, but it is certain that there is no confidence yet among them.

Col. Stevenson crossed the Godavery, near Puttun, when I marched from Poonah, and he is now encamped in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad.

The detachment has suffered a considerable loss in cattle since it marched from Poonah, occasioned immediately by the rain, but remotely by the length of the march which the cattle had made, the dearness and bad quality of the forage at Poonah, and by the want of care of the owners of the hired cattle. The brinjarrics, also, have lost vast numbers of cattle: they consequently left behind, and sold their grain in the villages; and there was some risk that I should be distressed for the want of rice.

In a letter which I addressed to government on the 24th June, 1800, I pointed out to them the evils which attended the system in practice of hiring cattle for the service, of which evils the Commander in Chief has had experience in this campaign. It cannot be expected that it will answer for light detachments, or, indeed, for any body of troops which is obliged to move to any distance; and the expense which is incurred affords no security that the troops will enjoy, in the moment of need, the advantages of the stores and provisions for which the carriage is provided. On these grounds, when it has been necessary to procure additional bullocks, I have not made advances for them to the owners of the hired cattle; but I have preferred to increase the establishment of cattle belonging to the government of Bombay, which I have brought with me, as you will observe by the orders of the 25th May, enclosed herewith. The cattle will be purchased for the sum which I should be obliged to advance to the owners of the hired cattle, to replace their losses; and, at least, I shall be certain of having some service for the expense incurred.

I have been very successful in the purchase of bullocks, and have got nearly as many as will carry the stores I have in camp at present. I have also the pleasure to inform you, that I have been able to bring up from Poonah such quantities of rice as have enabled me to issue that grain entirely to the troops again, and have removed all apprehension of want.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Young, commissary of grain and provisions.

6th July, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you the accompanying extracts of the regulations under which Major Spens sends forward the supplies of grain, &c., from Poonah to this detachment, and to desire that you will ascertain, when any division of coolies or cattle arrive, whether the numbers of them and of their loads correspond with those in the duplicate register which they will bring with them, and give a receipt upon the register accordingly. Should there be any deficiency in the number of coolies, cattle, or loads, you will ascertain in the division of what owner named in the register it has occurred, and will notice the same in the receipt which you will grant.

It will not be necessary to grant a receipt for the quantity of grain, &c., received, until it has been ascertained by a committee, which will be ordered to assemble for that purpose. You will invariably send away the coolies and cattle as soon as possible.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 7th July, 1803.

I hope that you will not have sent off any more rice after the dispatch of the 2000 bags, as we shall have rather more than we can carry.

I had written to Col. Close, to ask his opinion whether the Coast Native battalion could be spared from Poonah for a time, as I thought it possible that I should be obliged to detach a battalion to secure the boats on the Godavery. This is still a great object: but I doubt much the propriety

of drawing the battalion from Poonah at present; because I have this day received a letter from Gen. Stuart, by which I learn that, in consequence of the probability of the renewal of the war with France, and of the landing of some French troops at Pondicherry, with the expected arrival of others, he had determined to cross the Toombuddra. This measure weakens us most considerably, and your part of the force in particular; and it may possibly be attended by many inconvenient consequences, as well in the Nizam's territories, as in those of the Marhattas bordering on the Kistna and the Toombuddra: therefore, I think it will be best not to send the 2nd of the 3rd from Poonah. All the expenses attending the forwarding of the supplies from Poonah are to appear in Major Spens's accounts, are to be paid by Capt. Mathison, and are to be sent to the government of Bombay. But if Capt. Mathison should require money for that or any other service, of course he must take up some of that belonging to me in Col. Close's hands, and that account can be adjusted between him and Capt. Graham.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 7th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 26th and 27th June.

I have requested the postmaster of the Residency at Poonah to post his runners on as far as the Kistna from Beejapoor, and I have no doubt but that they will have been posted by this time.

I have already written to you respecting the position of the troops in the Tenim ghaut: Seedasheegur will answer best until the monsoon in some degree shall be over.

By my letter to the Adj. Gen. of yesterday's date, you will observe that my situation is much improved. In fact, I am enabled to move again; and, if I am tolerably fortunate in respect to forage, in which my prospects improve daily, as the green forage is coming in, I hope to be able to get on well.

Before you receive this letter, you will have seen how matters stood at Scindiah's camp on the 29th June. I have not since heard from Col. Collins; but I know that Scindiah had not moved farther to the southward on the 1st July. Holkar was across the Taptec, with all his army; and Scindiah had sent 2 brigades, and a brigade of Ambajee Inglia, across that river likewise, and the Nerbudda, as it was said, to Ougein. The report of the camp was, that Holkar was unwilling to join Scindiah; to which measure both Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar were pressing him most anxiously.

It appears now, either that we shall have a war immediately, or a protracted negotiation with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, seated upon the Nizam's frontier. If there should be war, I must proceed according to the original plan: if there should be a negotiation, I think that I should cross the Godavery, in order to press the conclusion and the result before the breaking up of the monsoon, and the fall of the rivers.

I regret most exceedingly the necessity of your abandoning the excellent position which you had taken at Moodgul. It was that which gave us all strength and security, and provided effectually for the tranquillity

of Hyderabad and the Nizam's territories, notwithstanding the absence of the army and the expectation of the Nizam's death; and also for that of Poonah and the Marhatta territories, notwithstanding the weakness and the wavering conduct of the Peshwah. It threatened Meritch, by which the Putwurdun family and all the southern chiefs are kept at least in a state of neutrality; and it provided effectually for the security and tranquillity of the territories of the Company and the Rajah of Mysore.

All these benefits, which are not attributed entirely, as they ought to be, to your position, will be lost when you shall recross the Toombuddra; and then, if we should have a war, our situation in this country will be uncomfortable. I should still hope, however, that government will take this subject into their consideration, and will allot something like a corps of reserve for the security of the objects for which your commanding position at Moodgul has hitherto so well provided.

To the Gov. Gen.

Camp at Peepulgaum, 8th July, 1803.

I have not written to you since the day I marched from Poonah, because, in fact, matters have remained exactly in the same state; indeed, Col. Collins's negotiations have not advanced one step since the day on which Scindiah marched from Burhampoor to meet the Rajah of Berar.

Holkar has crossed the river Taptee, with his whole army, and appears disinclined, and I hear has positively refused, to trust his person in the same camp with Scindiah.

Notwithstanding Col. Collins's assertion, Indore has not been given over to Holkar; and I believe that the peace which the Colonel supposed to have been concluded is only a cessation of hostilities, which Scindiah has been prevailed upon to grant by Ragojee Bhoomslah, in order to gain time for the negotiation of a peace; and of which Holkar has taken advantage, in order to place the Taptee between his army and that of Scindiah.

In the mean time, we, who were ready on the 4th June, have lost that month and part of this for our operations; and, unless Col. Collins has attended to a second representation, which I made to him in the end of June, we are as far from our point as we were in the month of May. The Colonel has gone upon a false notion from the beginning. He has supposed that peace was concluded between Holkar and Scindiah, because Scindiah's ministers had told him so; and he has had no other information, and has never produced any one proof of the fact, the truth of which he believed, and invariably asserted. Under this notion, he has been timid, and has afforded them time to conclude the peace, and to intrigue, which is all that they desired.

Matters also at Poonah are nearly in the same state in which they were when I marched. The Peshwah promises every thing, and performs nothing. The Marhatta sirdars are still in that city, excepting Goklah, who is encamped at a small distance from me. The Peshwah has not satisfied them, and they wait to see the result of the first operations against Scindiah, and who has the upper hand. They are prevented from joining the confederates at present by Gen. Stuart's position at Moodgul in the Dooab. I observe, however, that Gen. Stuart is inclined to withdraw

from this position, in consequence of the arrival of the French at Pondicherry. But I have written to represent to him the advantage which we all derive from it. I have shown him that he keeps in tranquillity the territories of the Nizam and Hyderabad, notwithstanding his Highness' sickness, the probability of his death, and the absence of all his troops beyond the Godavery; that he awes Poonah, and keeps in tranquillity all the Marhatta territory south of the Beemah, notwithstanding the conduct of the Peshwah, which must appear to his subjects like treachery, and a desire to break his treaty with the British government; that, by threatening Meritch and Darwar, he secures at least the neutrality of the Putwurduns, and the continuance of the cessation of hostilities between that family and the Rajah of Kolapoor, which is so necessary to the existence of my communications; and that he defends the Company's territories, and those of the Rajah of Mysore, and secures their tranquillity. At the same time, in the event of the Nizam's death and consequent disturbance of Hyderabad, he can reach that capital in a few marches; or in the event of any accidents happening to the troops in this quarter, he has equal facility in moving to Poonah. In short, I may call Gen. Stuart's position the mainstay of all our operations; and it is that which, in case of a war with the Marhattas, will prevent a general insurrection in the territories of the Company, the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore, and the southern Marhatta Chiefs. It was with a view to these advantages that I first recommended to Gen. Stuart to take it up; and every day's experience has shown the benefits which we have derived from it.

I have been in some distress in consequence of a great loss of bullocks; but I have recovered so as to be able to move again with a very good stock of provisions, and I have made arrangements to receive further supplies north of the Godavery. I have always been equal to the siege of Ahmednuggur, in which place I believe that I should have found plenty of all that I required.

I have not written to the Sec. of State since the middle of May. Indeed, upon a review of our situation, I found that I could tell him nothing, excepting that we were in the same state in which we were at the time I before wrote, unless that I had moved across the Beemah, and that I was disappointed in my expectations of having with me the Marhatta sirdars.

P. S. Since writing this letter, I have seen a copy of Col. Collins's dispatch of the 2nd. I think matters look better than they did; but I see that he has again allowed Scindiah to delay giving him an answer.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Peeplugaum, 9th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th June, and I am infinitely obliged to you for the assistance which you propose to send to me. The road which Major Dallas will take will be convenient; and I believe that he will find more forage upon it than he could upon that on the other side of the Beemah. I shall send orders to meet him at Perinda.

You will have observed by my last letters that I am much recruited; but the supplies which you have sent are of the utmost consequence.

There was a letter yesterday of the 2nd, which gives more hopes of peace than we have had hitherto. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had separated, and the latter gone back to Mulcapoor: as he says, for want of carriage for his baggage; as Col. Collins supposes, to afford another pretext for delay; but, as I believe, it is the prelude of their breaking up entirely. Col. Close sends you a copy of this dispatch.

There is no doubt but that Holkar is across the Taptee; and the ackbars from Scindiah's camp do not now conceal that the peace between those two chiefs is not concluded.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Kettle, Goorgherry.

9th July, 1803.

Lieut. Elwood's letters of the 1st and 3rd inst. have been received and laid before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who directs me to inform you that you are not to prevent the amildar of Goorgherry from plying his own boat on the Gutpurba, or the inhabitant of Padshapoor from plying his boat on the nullah at that place, or from levying such duties on the passengers as have been usual, or he may think proper to exact; but you must keep the boat sent to the nullah at Padshapoor, and as many boats as may be required on the Gutpurba, constantly ready and employed for the transport of all travellers whatever coming up from or going down towards the Mysore country, from whom no duty or toll must be exacted.

The D.A.G. to the Officer commg. at Toka.

9th July, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to inform you that he has detached the bearer, Yenket Rao, in command of 400 horse in the service of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore, to join and to co-operate with you for the defence of the boats under your charge, for keeping up a communication between you and the general camp, or for any other duty connected with the service on which you are employed.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Oliver, Toka.

9th July, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter of the 7th inst., and directs me to desire that you will have the rice lodged in such a place as that you may be able to guard it and the boats in the most effectual manner.

You will take especial care that the boats may not be carried away by force, nor burnt or cut away during the night. You will allow a sufficient number of them to be used for the accommodation of the unarmed inhabitants of the country passing up or down, and these must have guards in them; but you will not allow any armed men, horse or foot, to pass the river by those boats, excepting such as may have passports from Major Gen. Wellesley, or from Col. Stevenson. The General has this day detached a party of 400 Mysore horse under Yenket Rao to join and co-operate with you for the preservation of the boats, keeping up a communication with this camp, or in any other duty connected with the service on which you are employed. He requests that you will send an account of the number, quality, and state of repair of the boats; the number of men, horses, or bullocks which they may be able to transport at a time; and also of the number of men kept in readiness for working them, or that you can learn may be procured in the neighbourhood of Toka.

To Lieut. Col. Close

Camp at Baungaum, 10th July, 1803.

I return your letters. In my opinion, Col. Collins has not accounted in a satisfactory manner, either for his own assertion that peace has been made between Scindiah and Holkar, or for that of his moonshee, that we should attack the latter. In this extraordinary dispatch, one of the most extraordinary parts is, that he has given as a proof of a peace between those chiefs, that Scindiah has made sacrifices of territory to Holkar; whereas that fact requires proof, as well as every other part of the letter.

Goklah has just paid me a visit. He has expressed a most anxious desire to hoist the Peshwah's colors in a village called Mandegaon, belonging to Holkar, and one of the ancient possessions of the Holkar family. I have requested him most earnestly to desist from this measure for some days, as I wish to be at peace with Holkar, and do not intend to attack that chief, unless he should attack the Company or their allies.

Goklah is rather anxious upon this subject, as he received the Peshwah's orders to hoist his colors in all the possessions of the Holkar family, near which he should march. I wish that you would explain that I have prevented him from taking possession of this village. Goklah is also very anxious respecting his pay. I wish that you would urge the durbār to make some permanent provision for him. If they would promise that we should be repaid the sums which we should advance him, we might contrive to keep him afloat, by means of bills upon Bombay or Bengal, upon which he would be able to get money. Consider this subject, as it is really very desirable that we should have this body of troops paid.

To Col Murray.

Camp at Sangwee, 12th July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 9th. It appears that you intend immediately to bring up the 18 pounders. It is certainly desirable to have 2 pieces of ordnance of that kind at Poonah; and they may as well be brought up when matters do not press: but it is of so little importance to bring them up at present, that I do not wish that any of the cattle should be turned to that service from any other that is going on. Besides draught cattle, I dare say that it will take not less than 500 carriage bullocks to carry up the stores for the 18 pounders, without which they will be useless. Indeed, I should almost doubt whether the stores are in a state of preparation to move; that is, whether there are gunny bags for the shot, powder, &c.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Sangwee, 13th July, 1803.

Many days have elapsed since I have written to you; but in fact I had nothing interesting to communicate.

Matters in Scindiah's camp remain nearly as they were. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have each written a friendly letter to the Governor General, in which each has declared his intention to remain at peace with the Company and their allies; but they are going to take up their station at the Adjuttee ghaut, not to attack the Nizam, as they say, nor to march to Poonah.

This movement is entirely inconsistent with their pacific declarations; and I have accordingly written a letter to Scindiah, in which I tell him that I must consider it as hostile; and that advantage will be taken of the position of the British troops to attack him on those points where he is most exposed, unless he shall withdraw within his own territories, and to his usual stations. You shall be made acquainted with his answer, and with my consequent determination. I think it probable that he will withdraw, and that we shall have peace.

In respect to Rajah Mohiput Ram's proposal, that you should move nearer to the Adjuttee ghaut, I object to it on this ground, that, when you

shall once have advanced, you cannot retire again; and the negotiations to induce Scindiah to withdraw may take much time, and you may be distressed for forage in your advanced position.

It is also my intention, if we should commence hostilities, to desire you to approach the ghaut as near as you can, with convenience, in order to check Scindiah in his endeavors to ascend it with his guns; and it will be necessary that you should have as much fresh forage in your power as possible, at this time. I therefore think that, upon the whole, it is best that you should not approach the ghaut, or move from your present position, till you shall hear further from me.

I have no objection to Salabut Khan's correspondence with Ragojee Bhonslah, and advantage might be taken of it to recommend peace; you ought, however, to see his correspondence. If you are sure that Gopal Bhew, &c., are within the Nizam's territories, and if you think that you can get at them, I recommend that you should dash at them with the cavalry, and cut them up.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sangwee, 13th July, 1803.

I return the dispatches from Mr. Duncan. It does not appear to me to be very clear that Songhur has been attacked, or that Shamunt Khan is the person in the neighbourhood of that fort. I understood that there was an English garrison there; and we might expect that the officer commanding would write to somebody. But, in the usual style, I suppose that the English officer is under the orders of the black man.

It is not possible to give Mr. Duncan any assistance at present. He has increased his territories, and, of course, the demands upon his government for the service of troops, and the means of paying them, most enormously. But he has never contemplated the necessity of making a corresponding increase of his army. This is the cause of the present difficulty, and I can give no hopes that I shall be able to relieve it.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 13th July, 1803.

I think it proper to communicate to you a piece of intelligence, which one of my hircarrahs brought me yesterday. He says that, in consequence of discontent and want of money in the service of Holkar and Meer Khan, 4000 Patans, who had been in the army under the command of the latter, had quitted camp, under pretence of returning to their homes in the Cuddapa, &c., countries south of the Toombuddra. The hircarraha came with them, from the camp, as far as the neighbourhood of Toka, on the Godavery; where, hearing that I had a guard at Toka, over the boats, with a body of Mysore horse to watch the river, they turned off, intending to cross it below Puttur, in the Nizam's territories. They intended to separate, and pass through those territories in different small parties. I have sent out to look after them, and, if they should be within my reach, I will try to take up some of them; but I fancy that they will keep at a distance from me. The name of the principal sirdar with them is Abdoolah Khan, and he belongs to Cuddapa.

It may happen that the story they have told of themselves is true, and that they are going to their homes; as it is very certain that the distress in

Holkar's camp, particularly in that commanded by Meer Khan, is great. When Col. Stevenson's hircarrah went to him lately with a letter, he found him surrounded with armed men, some of whom had their swords and daggers at his throat, threatening to put him to death, if he did not produce money to satisfy their demands; and I have accounts that this was not the first time that he had been threatened in the same manner.

But, on the other hand, it is hardly possible to believe that Meer Khan, Holkar, or even Scindiah, would allow those Patans, who are the best troops in the Marhatta armies, to depart, while there is a chance of a war with the Company's government, or a continuance of the contests between Holkar and Scindiah; which must be the case, if there should be no war with the Company. I am, therefore, induced to suspect that these Patans are sent to the southward for purposes entirely different from those given out, and that their object is to head a disturbance either in the Nizam's territories or in the Ceded districts. At all events, their residence in the Ceded districts, while we shall be engaged in a war with the Marhattas, is not desirable; and, even if it should be permitted, they ought to be closely watched. You will be the best judge whether the force which will remain in the Ceded districts will enable you to seize the horses in that country, or to enforce a regulation to prevent horsemen from travelling through the country without a passport from the collector. At all events, this Abdoolah Khan ought to be closely watched.

You will see, by the letter from Col. Collins of the 6th,* which Col. Close will send you, that the declarations of Scindiah, as well as of the Rajah of Berar, are pacific; but those chiefs still intend to remain upon the Nizam's frontier.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Cunningham, D.Q.M.G. in Mysore.

13th July, 1803.

I have laid your letter of the 3rd before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, and am directed by him to desire that you will order the supernumerary boatmen at Deggherry to any of the other stations where the numbers required are not complete, and send the peons with the bramin back to the Ceded districts, unless you find that the bramin has been particularly directed by Major Munro to remain with the boatmen sent from the Ceded districts, in which case you may station him at the place where most of them are kept, but you will recollect that his pay cannot be entered in your account.

When you have seen the boats at all the stations put in order, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will join this detachment, leaving orders with the officers commanding the several stations, to send the accounts to you, and to correspond with you on every subject relative to the boat establishment. It is also necessary that you should take care that the supplies of money for the payment of the boatmen should be ample and arrive regularly.

To Lieut Col Collins.

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst, and I have taken into consideration the subject upon which you have desired that I should communicate to you my opinion.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared, in their letters to the Governor General,† that they have no intention to obstruct

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 236: Lieut. Col. Collins to the Gov. Gen.

† Ibid. p. 250.

the arrangement concluded at Bassein between the British government and the Peshwah; and that they are desirous of maintaining the relations of amity which so long subsisted between the British government and them, and that they will not ascend the Adjuttee ghaut, or march towards Poonah. I am sorry to observe, however, that they still intend to advance with their armies to the Adjuttee ghaut, upon the Nizam's frontier, notwithstanding their peaceable declarations. These declarations have been preceded by others of a directly opposite tendency. The chiefs have declared that they were united for the purpose of attacking the British government and their allies; and Scindiah, in particular, has said that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the English. Is the advance to the Adjuttee ghaut, which is the acknowledged boundary between the Marhattas and the Nizam, consistent with the hostile or with the pacific declaration? Upon this point there can be no doubt; there can be no use in assembling an army upon the Nizam's frontier, particularly at the present moment, when their services must be required elsewhere, excepting to attack the Nizam.

But it may be asked, for what reason should these chiefs endeavor to deceive the British government, if their intentions are hostile? To this, I answer, that their measures are not prepared; they have not yet brought Holkar into them; the British troops are prepared for action, and they are not; some vulnerable points in Scindiah's territories are exposed to the attacks of the British troops; and the British territories, and those of their allies, are defended at present at all points. By the delay of the commencement of hostilities, they hope to have matters better prepared; the rivers will fall, and Scindiah will have it in his power to make better arrangements for the defence of his territories; and, on the other hand, those belonging to the Company and their allies will lose the protection which all the forces give them at the present moment. Therefore, I conclude that the advantage of delay is theirs; that they have made their pacific declarations in order to gain time; and that their real intentions are to be known only from their actions.

If there had been no hostile declarations from Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, common prudence would have prevented us from viewing, with indifference, the assembly of their armies upon the Nizam's frontier, and the British government must have insisted upon their withdrawing. Pacific declarations would not, in that case, have been deemed sufficient security for the Nizam; nor can they, in that at present under consideration, particularly as I have, above, pointed out the great advantages which those Chiefs will derive from delaying to commence hostilities.

I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that, if the Rajah of Berar does not withdraw to Nagpoor, and if Scindiah does not remove his army to stations usually occupied by his troops, north of the river Nerbudda, their intentions must be considered hostile, and we ought to take advantage of our position to attack them without loss of time. Accordingly, I have written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I enclose, together with a translation of it.

If you should find that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar remain encamped in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, I request

you to deliver that letter, unless you should be of opinion that a verbal communication from yourself of my sentiments and intentions would be more likely to induce that chief to withdraw; or unless you should have other solid grounds for believing that he is sincere in his last declaration, and that his intentions are pacific. But, in my opinion, his declaration and his intentions cannot be trusted, unless he separates from the Rajah of Berar, removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences his march to Nagpooor.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

Since writing you the enclosed letter, I have received your two letters of the 11th. Major Kirkpatrick was mistaken. Gen. Stuart has sent off 5000 bullocks towards my camp, 2000 of them loaded with rice. But even if he should have sent none, I conceive that the troops with you must be well fed, as well as those with me; and you certainly now are more in want than I am, or than I am likely to be. Therefore I request that you will make use of the rice laid in for my use at Aurungabad and Puttun.

But, viewing these distresses of yours, and the disappointments which both of us have met with from the brinjarries, and knowing that these people are not to be depended upon, I strongly recommend that you should urge Mohiput Ram to collect as much rice for you as he can; and that you should establish a grain department in your detachment, consisting of at least 2000 loaded bullocks. You will then be always sure of having a certain quantity for your troops; and the misbehaviour of your brinjarries will not be so fatal as it would prove under these circumstances. I do not think that I shall want any more bullocks from Rajah Mohiput Ram, particularly if those sent and expected from Kurdlah are good. I think the price not very material: we must pay well in order to be well served, and with celerity. But, with respect to the rice, I think that you ought to call upon the Rajah's officers for an account of its prime cost, and all the expenses of carriage, &c., to the places where it is lodged; and not pay more for it than that amount.

I approve of the orders you have given Mohiput Ram, as reported in your letter of the 11th. I see, by the ackbar from Scindiah's camp, that Gopal Bhow is not within the Nizam's territories; you should, therefore, be cautious about attacking him, according to the suggestion contained in the enclosed letter of yesterday.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

I have received a letter from Col. Close, from which I learn that a brinjarry has engaged to attend this body of troops with 5000 bullocks at monthly hire; that these bullocks are, in the first instance, to receive their loads at Panwell, and to proceed thence to join me. The loads which I should wish them to receive are rice; but it will be necessary that some arrangement should be made respecting the packing of it. The small Bombay bags ought to contain 60lbs., or 2 mercalls, 6 seers: but, according to our measurement, they do not contain, some of them, more than 2 mercalls, 2½ seers; and some of them not that quantity. At all

events, these small bags are inconvenient for carriage on bullocks' backs, and, in case of bad weather, the rice receives damage in them.

In general, the brinjarries have bags of their own, and it is possible that those now hired may have them; but, if they should not, it would be necessary that 5000 good bullock rice bags should be prepared at Bombay. I shall be obliged to you if you will ascertain whether the brinjarries have bags; and, if they should not have them, I request you to write to Bombay to order them as soon as possible. The small bags, if they should be filled up, each to the full amount of 3 mercials, or 72 lbs., would answer well to be placed in the other bags, one on each side, and would be an additional protection to the grain; but, if they cannot be filled to that amount, it would be best (particularly if care be taken to make the new bags of the best gunny) to start the rice into the new bags, and to take care to put on each bullock full 6 mercials, or 72 seers. By the present arrangement we lose, in each bullock's load, 12 seers at least, supposing the small bags to contain $2\frac{1}{2}$ mercials: but, in general, they contain only 2 mercials, $2\frac{1}{2}$ seers, and we therefore lose 20 seers upon a bullock load, which would feed a soldier 40 days. From this statement, you may conceive what the loss would be upon 5000 bullock loads. I shall be obliged to you if you will give the necessary directions upon this subject to Capt. Young. I beg that you will send to camp the 1000 gunny bags which are completed.

Capt. Barclay writes to Poonah this day upon the subject of receiving grain from some Mysore brinjarries, on their road between the river Kistna and Poonah, and delivering to them rice in lieu thereof.

Since writing the above, I have received your letter of the 12th.

I approve of the bargain you have made with the brinjarry naig. But you will observe that there is a still stronger necessity for having proper gunny bags; and these bullocks must carry the full loads for which they were engaged.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

Appah Dessaye paid me a visit this morning, and entered much in detail into the situation of his affairs. He represented that he had not been able to obtain possession of any one of the places which had been made over to him by the Peshwah in jaghire, and that, when his amildars had gone to the villages with the Peshwah's sunnuds, they had been ill treated, their troops attacked, and his Highness' sunnuds torn. He said that the Peshwah's ministers had refused to consent to incur the expense of paying a proportion of the troops which had marched with me to Poonah. He had been obliged to discharge, and pay the arrears of, all above the number of 1000, for which he obtained grants of *serinjauuny* lands; and that, in order to pay those arrears, he had disposed of all the valuable property in his possession. That, under these circumstances, he had no means of paying his troops. He said that he had represented to the Peshwah's ministers the probability that he should not be able to obtain possession of the districts for which he had sunnuds; and that, at all events, if he should obtain possession of them, the lands would be in an uncultivated state, the villages deserted, and that he should derive no

benefit from them for some time; and he requested that he might receive 25,000 rupees *per mensem* to pay his troops, until he should derive some benefit from his jaghire. They had consented to his proposal, but, hitherto, they have paid him nothing.

I request you to ascertain from the Peshwah's ministers, whether they did give Appah Dessaye to understand that he should receive 25,000 rupees *per mensem*, till he should be in the receipt of the revenues expected from his jaghire. If they did, I beg of you to urge them to pay him the money. At all events, whether they did or did not consent to this arrangement, it is very obvious that this body of the Peshwah's troops has no fund from which it can draw its subsistence; and I request you to urge the Peshwah's ministers to allot one which shall be available. If the Peshwah's ministers should avow that they had encouraged Appah Dessaye to expect that they would provide funds for the subsistence of his troops, till he should receive the benefits to be expected from his jaghire; or if, in consequence of the representation which I now send you, they should consent to provide funds for the payment of Appah Dessaye's troops, I will endeavor to assist that chief, and trust to future arrangements with the Peshwah for repayment of the sums which I may advance him. I beg you to represent these matters to the Peshwah's ministers, and to take every opportunity to urge them to provide means for the payment of his Highness' troops.

In the course of the conference which I had with him this morning, Appah Dessaye produced an order which he had received from Suddasheo Munkaiseer, to proceed, in concert with Bappojee Gonceish Goklah, to attack the troops of Amrut Rao, and dislodge them from some stations which they had occupied between Poonah and Nassuck, and to go as far even as to the latter place, to give assistance to the troops stationed there.

I beg you to remind the Peshwah's ministers that his Highness is bound, by his treaty with the British government, to produce an army of 16,000 men, to act with the British troops; instead of which number only 3000 men have been sent, and no provision has been made for the payment even of that number. You will be so kind as to represent to them,

1st. That, when a large body of the enemy's troops are assembled upon the frontiers, and when the Rajah of Berar has in a public manner asserted his hereditary claim to his Highness' musnud, it appears to be prudent not to fritter away the small force which his Highness has produced.

2ndly. That, as long as those armies are assembled upon the frontiers, his Highness may depend upon it that his government will not settle, his orders and sunnuds will not be attended to, and his enemies will remain in possession of the lands which they have seized.

3rdly. That no partial operation against Amrut Rao, or any other chief, even if it should be successful, can be attended by the benefits which must result from removing to a distance from the frontier the hostile armies which have assembled in the neighbourhood; but that this expedition against Amrut Rao's troops cannot be successful, as, in fact, there are twice the number of them that there are of the Peshwah's.

4thly. That the only chance of success against the hostile armies which have joined upon the frontier is, that our troops should be united, and

that they should have no other object excepting to attack the enemy in the front.

5thly. That many rivers will divide these detachments with Goklah and Appah Dessaye from the British troops; that their co-operation with the latter will become impracticable; and that, upon the whole, I have taken upon me to prevent Appah Dessaye from going upon this expedition.

It appears, by a letter from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that he has marched upon the expedition against Amrut Rao: although, in a letter which he wrote to me, he said that he removed to a distance from my camp only for the sake of forage. I propose, however, to endeavor to stop that chief likewise, of which I beg you to apprise the Peshwah's ministers.

To Dowlat Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

In consequence of the reports that you had confederated with other chiefs to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein, between the Hon. Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; of your military preparations, and your advance to the frontiers of the Nizam; and, above all, of your declaration to the British Resident with your camp, that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the Company; I received the orders of his Excellency the Governor General to move with the troops to the frontiers, to take means of precaution, and to be prepared to act if you should carry your threats into execution.

The treaty of Bassein has since been communicated to you, and you must have observed that it provides amply for your security; and that, in consequence of this instrument, you will hold your territories in the Deccan by the same secure tenure that you have long held those in Hindustan, bordering upon the Company's frontier, notwithstanding your absence from them with your armies.

I perceive, by your letter to his Excellency the Governor General,* of which Col. Collins has communicated to me a copy, that you have declared that you have no intention to commence hostilities against the Company or their allies, or to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein by the parties who had a right to enter into it.

I have, accordingly, the greatest pleasure in contemplating the probability of the duration of peace between the Hon. Company and your government, which has long subsisted with much benefit to both parties. But, if you are sincere in this declaration of your friendly intentions, there appears to be no occasion for assembling your army, and joining it with that of the Rajah of Berar, on the Nizam's frontier. That measure, uncombined with other circumstances, would, at any time, render necessary corresponding measures of precaution, the result of which would be either your removal from the frontier of the Company's ally, or an appeal to arms; but when it has been accompanied by declarations of an hostile nature, when you have declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war between the Company and your government, it becomes more necessary that you should remove your troops to their usual stations.

* See the Wellesley Despatches, vol. iii. p. 250.

Whatever respect I may have for your word, so solemnly pledged, as it is, in your letter to the Governor General to which I have alluded, common prudence requires that I should not trust to that alone for the security of the Company and their allies, which has been given to my charge. Accordingly, I call upon you, if your professions are sincere, to withdraw, with your troops, to their usual stations across the river Nerbudda.

You were the first, by your hostile measures and declarations, and the expression of doubts of the duration of the peace between the Hon. Company and your government, and by the movement of your troops, to render necessary corresponding measures of precaution by the Company's government; and you ought to be the first to withdraw your troops, if your intentions are really as pacific as you profess them to be. When you shall have withdrawn your troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I also shall draw back those under my command to their usual stations.

But if, unfortunately, I should have learnt that, after the receipt of this letter, you have advanced towards the territories of the Nizam, or if I find that you do not commence the march of your troops towards their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I must consider your intentions to be hostile, notwithstanding your professions, as there can be no use in keeping your armies in the country, excepting for the purposes of hostility; and I shall immediately carry on those operations against you which are in my power, in consequence of the advantageous position of the Company's armies.

In your letter to the Governor General, you have declared that you do not intend to oppose the arrangement concluded at Bassein, provided the arrangements of the Peshwah with you and Ragojee Bhoonslah, and other chiefs of the Marhatta Empire, are respected. The treaty of Bassein secures your interests; and it is not consistent with that treaty, or with the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty: you may, therefore, be satisfied on that head.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 15th July, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Close. He will have sent you one from Col. Collins, in which the latter requires the opinion of Col. Close and myself, respecting the security which it might be necessary that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should give of the sincerity of their pacific declarations. In consequence of the receipt of that letter from Col. Collins, and of that of the 10th July from Col. Close, a copy of which is enclosed, I have thought proper to address a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of which I enclose a translation, and also a copy of a letter to Col. Collins. It is my opinion, that, if matters had been brought to this short issue a month ago, we should have had peace to a certainty; and I think it very probable that we shall still have it.

Major Malcolm has received a letter from Mr. Piele, in which he informs him that he has a lac of pagodas in his chest. Have you any objection that this lac should be sent to me? If you should not have any,

I shall be obliged to you if you will intimate it to Mr. Piele, and he will prevail upon Purneah to send the money upon some of his horse. Our expenses have increased a little from the advanced price of grain for the horses of the cavalry, &c.; and our disbursements from the tumbrils are vastly greater than they were 2 months ago. Last month scarcely any money was received from officers for bills; the cause of which is the great expense incurred by every individual literally for the support of himself, his cattle, and followers. The commanding officers of corps have suffered great losses of cattle; and some of the subaltern officers have been obliged to leave behind their tents, for want of carriage to move them, or of means to purchase cattle.

Under these circumstances, every man draws his full pay from the tumbrils in camp; and, although the expense of the detachment to the public is also materially increased by the higher price of grain for the horses, &c., the disbursement from the tumbrils is much greater than it was, and now exceeds a lac of pagodas monthly.

I have no hopes from Mr. Duncan: indeed, the Bombay detachment at Poonah runs away with all the money which I should get in that city for my bills, if that detachment were not there, or that Mr. Duncan could supply them with cash from Bombay. I am, therefore, desirous to have this Mysore lac, if you should not want it for other purposes.

Several of the subaltern officers have inquired from me, whether, having been obliged to leave behind their tents, in consequence of the loss of their cattle, and of the circumstances which have prevented them from purchasing fresh cattle, (of which I am perfectly aware,) they should be permitted to draw their tent allowance, although they should not have produced their tents and cattle at muster? I am aware of the inconvenience which may be the result of granting this request; but I should hope, that, if the bill for the tent allowance were accompanied by a certificate of the commanding officer of the corps and of the detachment, stating the unavoidable causes of the loss of cattle incurred, and the circumstances which prevented them being replaced, the payment would not be brought forward as a precedent hereafter, upon which an abuse could be founded. I have also to observe, that, if the officers who have lost their tents should immediately lose their tent allowance, there is not a chance that they will be able to replace them.

In obedience to the orders of the 22nd Sept., 1802, I had determined to order a committee to assemble for the inspection of the bazaar accounts; but I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give me your orders whether I am to charge against the fund all the expenses attending the collection of the brinjarries.

As there are no duties upon grain or provisions of any kind, or indeed upon any thing excepting intoxicating drugs, it is my opinion that the expenses attending the collection of the brinjarries, any more than those attending the formation of any depôt for the consumption of the troops in the field, ought not to fall upon the fund. I shall also be obliged to you to let me know whether I shall send the amount of the produce direct to the treasury or to your camp, in order that it may be disposed of under your orders.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 15th July, 1803.

I received, last night, your letter of the 12th, enclosing one from Salabut Khan. You express your opinion, in this letter, that the Rajah of Berar is likely to endeavor to make peace, through the means of Salabut Khan; and I beg you to communicate my sentiments to Salabut Khan upon this subject in the following terms:

The Rajah of Berar and the Company have always been on the most friendly terms; and there is, at this moment, no cause of quarrel between the two powers. The Rajah of Berar has declared his determination not to obstruct the treaty, concluded at Bassein, between the Company and the Peshwah. But the Rajah of Berar has collected his forces, and has united them with those of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in a station close to the Nizam's frontier. This can have been done only with an intention to attack the Nizam or his subjects; and the Company are bound, by treaty, to assist the Nizam, and protect his territories and subjects, whenever they may be attacked. The Company will always adhere to this treaty, and the enemies of the Nizam will always be the enemies of the Company.

If the Rajah of Berar intends peace, it depends entirely upon him. The peace which has lasted so long will still be maintained, and the friendship between the two governments will even become stronger, if he will remove his army from the Nizam's frontier; but if he does not do so, he cannot expect a continuance of the peace. If the Rajah has any demands to make upon the Company's government, the best mode of obtaining them will be to remove his army from the Nizam's frontier, and to return to his own capital. The British government have always been, and will always be, ready to attend to those who express their wishes in a friendly and peaceable manner.

The D.A.G. to Major Dallas.

Camp near Gogegaum, 15th July, 1803.

Since writing you yesterday, some circumstances of a suspicious nature, on the part of the killadar of Perinda, have come to the knowledge of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, and have induced him to order Badamy Bistnapah, the commander of the Mysore cavalry, with other detachments, to march forthwith to join you at Perinda. He will have about 1500 men well mounted; and in case of any opposition to your progress, on the part of the killadar of Perinda, you may employ Bistnapah and his troops in repelling it in any manner that you may find necessary. As he marches without baggage, the General requests that, after you have made 2 marches from Perinda towards this place, you will allow him to push on in advance to join his baggage, if you find no particular reason for detaining him longer.

To Amrut Rao.

Camp at Sangwer, 16th July, 1803.

I was in hopes that, before this time, I should have been enabled to communicate to you the final result of the repeated recommendation of your situation which I have made to the Peshwah; but, hitherto, his Highness has come to no decision in respect to your case. I feel most sensibly the difficulties under which you labor, and you must be convinced that I have done every thing in my power to remove them.

However, although I cannot at present tell you that any thing is absolutely settled for you with the Peshwah, you may depend upon it that the British government will take care that you shall have such a provision as

will be gratifying to you, provided you continue in the manner in which you have conducted yourself since you last wrote to me.

To Jeswant Rao Holkar.

Camp, 16th July, 1803.

Much time has elapsed since I have had the pleasure of hearing from you, although I am anxious to cultivate the good understanding which has subsisted between the Hon. Company's government and you. With this view, I now send you a copy of the treaty concluded at Bassein, between the Hon. Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; from the general defensive tenor of which you will observe that the peace and security of India are provided for. You will also perceive, that the 12th article provides effectually for the security of all the great Marhatta jaghiredars, and that those of the Holkar family are particularly named. This article will satisfy your mind, notwithstanding the endeavors which have been made to raise your doubts; and you will see that the interest and security of your family are connected with this treaty, and that, in fact, they can be provided for in no other manner. That being the case, whatever others may do, I have little doubt but that you will conduct yourself in the manner which your own interests will dictate, and that you will continue in peace with the Company.

I send this letter in charge of Kawder Nawaz Khan, a respectable officer, who enjoys my confidence, and who will explain any thing you desire to know respecting my wishes.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Sangwee, 16th July, 1803.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that 200 bullock loads of arrack may be sent to me. It will be well to make a bargain with the people who are to carry this arrack, that they must take back the empty arrack kegs in camp.

I also recommend to you to send down to Panwell, not only these empty arrack kegs, but those you may have at Poonah, as I suspect that the government of Bombay have not many more prepared.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 16th July, 1803.

There was a report in this camp yesterday, stating that the officer in command of a detachment coming from the Kalachabootra ghaut on the river Kistna, with supplies of money and provisions, had been stopped at Perinda in consequence of a dispute between some of the troops under his command, and those belonging to that fort. I knew that, as Major Dallas had not crossed the Kistna on the 5th, it was not possible that this report could be founded in fact; but as it proved, at least, that the march of the detachment was known, and was a subject of conversation in the country, and as it is imagined that the killadar of Perinda is not faithful to the Nizam's government, and he may have formed the plan to stop the detachment, which the report supposes that he has carried into execution,

G. M. O.

Camp at Sangwee, 16th July, 1803

Two privates from each corps of Native infantry in camp to be sent immediately as additional orderlies to Major Gen. Wellesley.

I have thought it proper to detach a body of Mysore horse, under the command of Bistnapah Punt, to Perinda, to join Major Dallas.

I mention these circumstances to you in order that you may apprise the Nizam's government of them, in case any notice should be taken of the entry into his Highness' territories of the body of horse under Bistnapah Punt.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 4th July.

The difficulties under which I labored when I wrote to you on the 26th June have been relieved in some degree by the supplies which I have received from Poonah, and by the success which I have had in the purchase of cattle in the country. The arrival of the cattle sent by Gen. Stuart, if they should be in tolerable condition, will remove them entirely. I have, besides, expectations of the arrival of a convoy now on its road from Mysore; and the prospect that I shall bring forward the Poonah brinjarries is better than it was.

But still it is very desirable that Col. Stevenson should receive some further supplies from Hyderabad. He will have informed you that, upon reckoning bags in his camp, he found that he had not a supply of rice for his troops for more than 20 days; and, in consequence of this failure, I desired him to take for the use of his detachment the rice which had been collected at Moongy Puttun and Aurungabad for the use of my troops. He had also made an advance to the brinjarries for 5000 loads of rice.

The supply sent to me by Gen. Stuart is of 2000 bags of rice; but I shall be able to get rice at Poonah to load the remainder of the bullocks.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Oliver, Toka.

Sangwee, 16th July, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter of the 14th. I wrote to you, by his order, yesterday to allow Dazicbah Deshmook and Kistna Bhuwarry, with their respective suites, to pass the river by means of the boats under your charge; but this order is not to prevent you from attending strictly to the orders 'not to allow armed men to pass by those boats, unless they have passports from the General or Col. Stevenson.'

You are to consider the security of the boats as the principal object for which you have been detached, and to which every other object must give way when necessary.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th inst., enclosing the copy of one which you had written to Lieut. Col. Collins on that day.

When I heard the report that the northern Marhatta chiefs intended to confederate, for the purpose of obstructing the treaty of Bassein between the Hon. Company and his Highness the Peshwah, I was of opinion that it was necessary for the British government to lose no time in bringing those chiefs to a decision, whether there should be peace or war, and in obliging each of them to place his troops in their ordinary position.

The grounds of this opinion were, that two of the chiefs, at least, were in a state of determined and inveterate hostility against each other, which it would require time to pacify. The season in which the rivers fill was approaching, during which the Marhatta armies find it difficult to carry on operations; and some of the most valuable of the territories belonging

to Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be exposed to our attacks. On the other hand, the rivers would cover the territories of the Company and of their allies, in a great degree, from the incursions of the Marhatta horse, and would protect our convoys.

The most proper time, therefore, to press Dowlut Rao Scindiah to decide whether he would remain at peace with the Company, and to induce him to withdraw his army to Hindustan, as the only proof which he could give of his pacific intentions, would have been in the month of May; and, as it appears that the peace between that chief and Jeswunt Rao Holkar is not yet concluded, and, at all events, that Holkar is not yet united in councils with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, it is very probable, that, if Scindiah had been obliged to decide between peace and immediate hostility, he would have found himself under the necessity of adopting the former alternative. Since that period, six weeks of valuable time have elapsed; during which some progress must have been made in pacifying the hostility between Scindiah and Holkar, and in uniting their councils. We have gained nothing: on the contrary, we have consumed our resources, and the supposed enemy is nearer than he was to the frontier which we have to defend. But still, to bring the question of peace or war to an immediate issue is attended with many advantages.

It is certain that the councils of the chiefs are not yet united. Holkar's army is to the northward of the Taptee; and, supposing him to be inclined to hostility with the Company, which, I think, there is reason to doubt, it is not possible that he can bring his forces to co-operate with those of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for a length of time. The swelling of the rivers still exposes to an attack many vulnerable points in Scindiah's possessions, and protects the territories of the Company and those of their allies, and the convoys going to the British armies.

It is obvious, however, that every day's delay to bring Scindiah to a decision, and to force him to give the only proof of his pacific intentions, deprives us of part of these advantages; and, therefore, no time should be lost.

The declarations which have been drawn from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in their letters to the Governor General, are favorable, so far as they deprive those chiefs of their favorite pretence of hostility, viz. the injury they apprehended from the treaty of Bassein. They prove also most clearly, that the chiefs are aware of the disadvantages under which they will labor by the immediate commencement of hostilities. According to these sentiments, and finding, by your letter of the 10th inst., that you agreed in opinion with me, I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a letter, a copy and translation of which have been already transmitted to you, and one to Lieut. Col. Collins, of which also you have a copy. You will observe that, in the former, I have apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah of my intention to take advantage of the position of the Company's troops to attack his possessions, if he should advance one step towards the Nizam's frontier after the receipt of my letter; or if I found that he did not withdraw his troops to their usual stations north of the river Nerbudda.

I have not fixed when he should withdraw: 1st, because I wish to keep

in my own breast the period at which hostilities will be commenced; by which advantage it becomes more probable that I shall strike the first blow, if I should find hostile operations to be necessary: 2ndly, there is every reason to expect instructions from the Governor General, applicable to the present situation of affairs in India, as well as in Europe. His Excellency must have received, by the 20th June, the dispatches from England of the month of March, the intelligence of my march from Poonah, of the state of affairs at the Peshwah's durbar at that period, and of the state of the negotiation with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the end of May.

Excepting that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have made a public declaration, the sincerity of which must be doubted as long as their actions are not conformable thereto; that those chiefs have approached nearer to the Nizam's frontier; that more progress has been made in effecting the pacification between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Holkar, and more of the resources of the British troops have been consumed; circumstances are nearly in the state in which they were at the period of which the Governor General then received accounts. By availing to fix a day on which Scindiah must retire, I have it in my power to alter my course of action, in conformity to these instructions, in case that measure should be necessary.

To Lieut. Col. Collins.

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have received from his Excellency the Governor General,* from a perusal of which you will perceive that his Excellency has been pleased to intrust to me extraordinary powers, for the purpose of concluding whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. I request you to be so kind as to communicate this circumstance to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

You will be so kind, at the same time, to inform those Chiefs that, consistently with the principles and uniform practice of the British government, I am perfectly ready to attend to their interests, and to enter into negotiations with them upon objects by which they may suppose those interests to be affected. But they must first withdraw their troops from the position which they have taken up on the Nizam's frontier, and return to their usual stations in Hindustan and Berar respectively; and, on my part, I will withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. You will point out to those Chiefs, that, as they have declared they have no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, to withdraw their troops to their several stations is only consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they are sincere. On the other hand, to retain their position upon the Nizam's frontier is the strongest proof they can give of the insincerity of those declarations. You will, therefore, again call upon them to retire, as being the only measure by which the peace between the British government and them can be preserved.

* See Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 149, 26th June, 1803.

It may happen that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will urge the difficulty of crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, as an excuse for not withdrawing his troops at the present moment; that excuse will not apply at all to the Rajah of Berar, to whose return to Nagpoor there are no impediments whatever, and therefore his march to his capital is indispensable. It might be disputed in respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; for it is certain, that the passage of the army of that chief over those rivers will be attended with some difficulties. Those difficulties, however, are to be surmounted; and, at all events, there is nothing to prevent his retiring to Burhampoor, and commencing to send his troops across the Taptee, and making arrangements for sending them across the Nerbudda. If he should urge these difficulties, you will make known to him my sentiments upon them as above stated, and you will require him to give a proof that his declarations are not insincere, by falling back to Burhampoor, and by commencing to pass his troops over the Taptee, and his arrangements for crossing the Nerbudda.

If the Rajah of Berar should return to Nagpoor, and Scindiah should adopt the measures above pointed out, as preparatory to his crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, I shall be satisfied. But if you should find those chiefs obstinately determined to remain in their positions upon the Nizam's frontier, you will be so good as to inform them, that I have requested you to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and, accordingly, you will leave it on the following day.

In that case you might proceed to Col. Stevenson's camp, which you will find about 10 coss to the northward of Aurungabad, and from thence the Colonel will furnish you with an escort to enable you to join me.

If you should find it necessary to quit Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, I request you to take the earliest opportunity to acquaint Col. Stevenson thereof; as I have directed him to take up a position in the neighbourhood of the ghaut, from which he will be able to attack, with a superior force, any party of Scindiah's that may ascend it, and thus prevent that chief from deploying his army above the ghaut, till I shall have brought to a close the operations I have in contemplation south of the Godavery, and shall be enabled to join Col. Stevenson.

I have reports from hircarrahs that 2 brigades of Scindiah's, with guns, are at the Adjutant ghaut, at this moment; and that Gopal Rao's detachment of cavalry are above the ghaut. But the latter have received orders to retire, which they appear inclined to disobey. Before you quit Scindiah's camp, it would be very desirable that you should endeavor to ascertain the general position of his troops, and the numbers and description in each station, and by whom commanded. Indeed, this measure would be desirable at all events, whether that chief consents to retire or not; as, supposing that he should retire, you cannot be certain that he will have withdrawn all his troops, unless you are acquainted with their numbers, and the stations they at present occupy.

I request you also to endeavor to ascertain the same circumstances respecting the troops of the Rajah of Berar, and to communicate the intelligence you will receive regarding the troops of each chief to Col. Stevenson, as well as to me.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

I return your letter enclosed with yours of the 16th. The cowlamah ought to be taken away from Shunawass Rao. He has turned it to no good purpose, and he ought not to have shown it to any body. I likewise return the dispatches from the Governor General. I apprized you yesterday of the steps I had already taken.

This day I have written to Collins, to desire him to withdraw, if he cannot prevail upon Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to move away. I have also desired Col. Stevenson to move forward, if he finds that Col. Collins comes away; and to watch the ghauts, so as to attack Scindiah with advantage, if he should attempt to pass through them.

I have written most fully to Gen. Stuart upon the subject of his crossing the Toombuddra. He is of opinion that he ought to adopt that measure; but whether he will adopt it or not depends upon the orders he will receive from Madras.

You have a translation of a letter that I have written to Appah Sahib, which I think will make an impression upon him. I shall write again this afternoon. I do not know well what we can do, excepting we give money to Appah Sahib, to bring him forward; for all his objects were promised to him, and he still holds off. Chintomeny and Rastia depend upon him.

The young vakeel arrived in camp some days ago, and does neither harm nor good. We are most plentifully supplied. I do not believe a word of Sir W. Clarke's intelligence, because I have a man upon the spot to report every thing, and he does not mention it: but I have no doubt that, if we delay much longer in the way in which we are, we shall have the Rajah of Kolapoor upon our communications.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

Having received from his Excellency the Governor General full powers to conclude whatever arrangement may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war, I have written to Lieut. Col. Collins to request that he will urge Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to withdraw their troops from the stations which they have occupied in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier; and I have requested him to come away from Scindiah's camp, if those chiefs should refuse to give that proof of the sincerity of the pacific declarations which they have made. I have likewise requested the Colonel to give you the earliest intimation of his coming away from Scindiah's camp, if that measure should be necessary.

If you should receive notice from Col. Collins that he has withdrawn from Scindiah's camp, you will be so kind as immediately to take up a position as near to the Adjutee ghaut, which leads into the Nizam's territories, as the conveniences of water and forage will permit. From this position you will watch with vigilance the designs and movements of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. If you should find that those chiefs attempt to ascend that, or any other ghaut, you will fall upon them immediately, before they shall have time to deploy their forces above the ghaut.

I do not, however, propose that your troops should descend the ghaut, but only that they should attack that part of the enemy which shall ascend, before the remainder can come to their assistance. It is possible that they may leave the Adjuntée ghaut, and endeavor to penetrate by the Casserbarry ghaut, towards Aurungabad. You will, in that case, move towards the latter, and place yourself in such manner as to attack them with advantage, if they attempt to pass there.

My object is to avoid, if possible, that your troops should be engaged with the whole of Scindiah's infantry, with his guns, before my operations to the southward of the Godavery shall be so far advanced as to enable me to reinforce you. Your efforts to prevent Scindiah from penetrating by some one of the passages may not be successful; and, indeed, it is probable that they must finally fail: but the delay of a few days is all I require, and that I conceive must be gained.

I have, however, no apprehension of the result, even if you should be engaged with the whole of Scindiah's force. I have received your letters of the 18th.

To Col. Murray.

18th July, 1803.

The only objections which I have to your making the gunny bags at Poonah are, that I fear they will not be at Panwell before the bullocks will be there, which are to carry away the rice; and that the expense of them may be greater than those made at Bombay. You must advert to the circumstance that the expense of the carriage to Panwell must be added to that of the manufacture at Poonah. However, you will act in this respect as you may think will answer best in regard to the goodness of the bags, the time at which they will be at Poonah, and their cheapness.

I wish that you would desire Capt. Spens to order the coolies to come on to camp, wherever it may be. We have removed from Peepulgaum, and are now upon the Seenah river; and they have left at the former place bullocks, saddles, rice, &c., and gone back to Poonah.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

You will have observed, by a letter addressed to me by his Excellency the Governor General, on the 26th June,* that his Excellency has thought proper to trust me with certain full powers to conclude whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war; and to appoint me to the command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies, in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Nizam, or of any of the Marhatta states.

The troops serving in the territories of the Guickwar are included among those placed under my command; and I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that I may receive from Bombay returns of the strength and state of the equipment of those forces, their present distribution, an account of the state of defence of the posts which they occupy, and the names of the officers who command them.

I am also desirous of having a sketch of the territories of the Guickwar, which it is intended that the troops should defend; and any general topo-

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii., p. 149.

graphical account of the country from which I may be able to form a judgment respecting its great communications, as well with the seacoast as with the territories of the Holkar family, of Scindiah, &c., and with those lately ceded to the Company by the Peshwah. With the assistance of these documents, I hope to be able to form a system for the defence of those territories, which will tend to their security. It is accordingly desirable that the officer in command in the Company's territories should communicate with me, and with the officer in command in the territories of the Guickwar. While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should urge a request before made by the Resident at Poonah, that Lieut. Col. Reynolds might be ordered to send me a map of the countries which are at present, or may be, the scene of the operation of the troops under my command.

You will have received, from the Resident at Poonah, copies and translations of the letters by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, and his Excellency the Governor General, in which those chiefs have declared their intentions not to obstruct the treaty of Bassein, not to march to Poonah, and not to enter the territories of the Nizam. They still, however, remain in their position upon the Nizam's frontier. I have, in consequence, written to Lieut. Col. Collins this day, to request that he would call upon them to withdraw from that position to the stations usually occupied by their troops within their own territories; and that he would promise them, that I also would order the Company's troops to retire to their usual stations.

In case they should refuse to adopt these measures, I have requested Lieut. Col. Collins to quit Scindiah's camp; and it is my intention to commence hostilities against that chief without loss of time. I shall make you acquainted with the result of Lieut. Col. Collins's conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon this subject; and I beg leave to recommend that you should give orders to the commanding officer in the territories of the Guickwar, to be prepared to attack Baroach without loss of time.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 20th July, 1803.

I am sorry to tell you that Gen. Stuart will have crossed the Toombuddra before this time, by order from the government of Fort St. George.

It is impossible to do any thing for Ball Kishen Bhow at this time; but it would be very desirable to see him firmly seated in his soubahdarry, if it could be effected without a contest in our rear. I shall write to him upon this subject.

I have seen your letter to Malcolm. I think it a matter of indifference whether Salabut Khan corresponds with Ragojee Bhoonslah or does not. At all events, we cannot prevent it; and for this reason, I have told Col. Stevenson that I have no objection to it. I also desired him to tell Salabut Khan, that, if Ragojee Bhoonslah wished for peace with the English, he must return to his own countries, and that nothing else would insure that object.

What has passed in Guzerat is disgusting to a degree. The English name is disgraced, and the worst of it is, that endeavors are made to conceal the disgrace, under an hypocritical cant about humanity; and those feelings which are brought forward so repeatedly respecting the garrison

of Parneira are entirely forgotten in respect to the unfortunate British soldiers of the 75th and 84th regts, who, unlike the gentlemen, submitting to be humbugged by a parcel of blackguards, are suffering in the rains.

I am more than ever convinced that no attempt ought to have been made to get possession of the Ceded countries, till the question of the Confederacy was settled. A little delay would have enabled us to have a good detachment in a field cantonment near Songhur, which would have saved that province. As matters stand now, our forces are frittered away, and we have none for any efficient purpose. The country will be overrun, and, after all our haste, we shall get no revenue from it.

To Lieut. Cols. Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell.

Camp, 20th July, 1803.

I have to inform you, that it is generally reported in camp, that the late Capt. B——, of the 78th regt., was shot in a duel; and a letter addressed to me, which I enclose, and which was found among Capt. B——'s papers, tends to confirm the truth of that report; I therefore request you will meet and ascertain the cause of the death of the late Capt. B——. You will call upon the surgeon who attended him in his last moments, to give you an account of the state in which he was when he first saw him, and of the symptoms which attended his sickness and death.

You will also require the attendance of any other person whom you may think proper, to give an account of any transactions which immediately preceded the death of Capt. B——, particularly those who saw him a short time previous to his decease.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 20th July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 18th.

I am concerned to hear of the desertion of the soldiers of the 84th, and I dare say that they are come to Ahmednuggur; but, possibly, I shall shortly be able to give a good account of them. It is now too late to send out to look for them. If you can catch the people who enticed them to go away, let me know, and I will send you an order to assemble a General Court Martial to try them. They shall certainly be hanged, if to punish them in that manner be allowed by the sentence of the Court Martial.

In the mean time, I recommend that you should take this opportunity of forbidding your soldiers to go into Poonah at all, and punish any man who goes there. Also take up and punish any low European or half caste man, or the attendant upon such an one, such as a strange cook boy, whom you find about the bazaar, or barracks, or the lines, or any where in communication with the soldiers. When first I came to the Marhatta territory, these animals flocked about my camp, but I seized and punished them, and sent all I caught to Bombay, to be returned to Goa by the first opportunity. By these means I have not lost one European deserter.

I long to hear of your catching the palanquin gentleman. If you can prove against him that he enticed away your soldiers, you may seize and punish him, if you find him in your bazaar, and send him a prisoner to Bombay: that measure will stop this trade.

Ty the thieves by a Line Court Martial, and punish them.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 21st July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 12th, and its enclosures. I had already received from the Chief Sec. of the government of Fort St. George a copy of the letter which he addressed to you on the 5th inst. In my answer, I apprized him of the state of the money market at Poonah at the present moment, and pointed out the facts which had prevented my reaping much benefit from the permission which I had received to draw bills upon the principal treasuries in the Company's territories, and in those of their allies.

These are, principally, the want of cash at Bombay, which has rendered it necessary for the detachment of the Bombay army, stationed at Poonah, to subsist entirely upon the money resources of that place, and the small amount of those resources at the present moment. I have written to Mr. Buchan to request that, if possible, he will supply the detachment of the Bombay army with cash, which will leave the resources of Poonah for the use of this division; and I have hopes that these resources will increase, as it is certain that many of the soucars found means either to remove their money, or to conceal it there during the Peshwah's absence, and that they had not brought back their treasures when I marched from that city. It is to be hoped, therefore, that a greater proportion of the money resources of Poonah will be available for the use of this division of the army hereafter than we have had hitherto; but I still doubt whether I shall be able to procure any large sums of money for bills upon any other treasury excepting Bombay. Hitherto I have procured only two small sums for bills upon Benares, although I have apprized the shroffs and soucars that I could give them bills upon any part of India in which it might be convenient to them to make payments.

I am of opinion, however, that it will be very convenient to have at Hyderabad the lac of pagodas to that place from Masulipatam; and that that sum should be increased, as far as may be practicable; as, even if I should not be able to procure money at Poonah for bills upon Hyderabad, there will be no difficulty in transporting the money from that city to camp.

I am much indebted to you for the attention which it appears you have given to this important subject, as well as to the supply of an additional quantity of Batavia arrack, at an advanced station. I have the pleasure to inform you, however, that I am well supplied with that article from Bombay, *vid* Poonah; and as the distance to that settlement will always be shorter than to any port on the eastern coast, I think it will be better to depend solely upon Bombay for that article. The western coast is deficient principally in bullocks and rice; and I must, therefore, depend principally for those articles on the territories to the eastward.

I am very sensible of the trouble which you have taken to send forward additional supplies of rice to Col. Stevenson's detachment. The brinjaries are so unmanageable, unless their profits are enormous, which the circumstances of the present moment will not allow us to give; and they have behaved so ill to Col. Stevenson, as well as to me, and, from the nature and state of their cattle, they must be so useless in a campaign carried on by troops lightly equipped, that I prefer the hired cattle.

Their owners must at least obey orders. The time which you have agreed to give is very reasonable; and, for the reasons you have stated, it is more advantageous to give monthly hire, than a sum of money for a trip to any place. It will be desirable to send those bullocks to Aurungabad, in the first instance, and they can afterwards be ordered to any place at which it would be convenient to have them.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 21st July, 1803.

Since writing to you this morning, I have received your letter of the 13th. If the bullock owners, to whom you allude, refuse positively to go farther than Aurungabad, it would be the best and cheapest bargain to pay them 11 rupees for the trip; and, in that case, I recommend this measure particularly, because there is reason to hope that they will be a shorter time on the road, if paid by the trip, than they would be if paid monthly hire.

But it would be desirable, if possible, to prevail upon them to allow their cattle to go a little farther than Aurungabad; and, on this ground, I would recommend that you should propose to them to go, on monthly hire, as far as Col. Stevenson's detachment, provided they did not quit the territories of the Nizam. If they should not agree to this proposal, I recommend that, at all events, they should be sent with rice to Aurungabad, hired, as proposed, for the trip; as, although the rice, when laid down at that city, will cost nearly a rupee for 4 seers, it can be got in that neighbourhood in such small quantities, that it is better that it should be sent even at that price.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 22nd July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 20th. You will receive this day orders to carry into execution the sentence of the General Court Martial, which tried a Bombay sepoy, who deserted some time ago; and orders to assemble a Native General Court Martial, to try the deserters you mention. If there is evidence of the desertion, with their arms and accoutrements, of the three men, I beg that they may be all tried: if there should not be evidence, one of them may be admitted to give evidence against the others. But I should think that there will be no want of evidence that they left their corps, and were brought back prisoners. They shall be shot also, if the Court Martial should sentence that punishment.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 22nd July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst.; and I am much obliged to you for the additional supply of bullocks, which you have sent under Lieut. Griffiths.

You are aware, I believe, of the state of Perinda and its neighbourhood. That place and the Nizam's frontier, as far as Aurungabad, were under the government of Nizam Nawaz Jung, a sirdar who was, I believe, discovered to have had improper communications with Holkar. He is in confinement at Hyderabad. His brother has been deprived of his charge at Aurungabad; and orders have been given to deprive his officers of the fort of Perinda, which they have still held out against the Nizam's troops.

There was a report in this camp, some days ago, that Nizam Nawaz Jung's killadar of Perinda had attacked the convoy under Major Dallas, coming from the Kalachabootra ghaut. I knew that this report could not be well founded, as Major Dallas could not have reached Perinda at the time he was supposed to have been attacked. But as it was possible that a design might have been formed to intercept this important convoy; and, at all events, as this design was a subject of conversation in the country, I thought it as well to send Bistnapah Pundit, with his cavalry, to join Major Dallas, which would secure him against any insult.

Bistnapah Pundit arrived at Perinda some days ago, and found the new killadar in the pettah, and the old killadar in the fort; and, as usual, a negotiation on foot for the delivery of the fort to the former, in obedience to the Nizam's orders. He sent on a party of horse from thence, to gain intelligence of Major Dallas's detachment, but they were stopped before they had gone far, by a body of troops, in a place called Bursee, and 4 of them were taken prisoners. This is a place which lies to the eastward of Perinda, but belongs to the Peshwah; and was taken possession of by Baba Phurkia, when he went on his embassy from Holkar to the Nizam, and his troops have remained there ever since.

The killadar of Bursee has since released the 4 men, the moment, as he says, he found they belonged to me. I have desired Bistnapah Pundit to go on till he joins Major Dallas; and I have sent by him a letter, which has been addressed to Lieut. Griffiths, in which orders are given to that officer to strike off from the road on which Major Dallas will have marched, as soon as possible after he shall have reached Culburga, to proceed from thence to Nuldroog, and from Nuldroog to Taunkie to the eastward of Toljapoor, thence to Sirpoor on the Mangeyra river, and then to Kurdllah, at which place he shall find further orders from me. By this route he will avoid the frontier, which, you will observe, is on both sides in a state of confusion. Lieut. Griffiths's party shall also be reinforced; but as I do not yet know that I may not have more occasion for Bistnapah Pundit's cavalry than for any of the other troops, I doubt whether I shall be able to send them. Any other convoys that come had better take the Beejapoor road. We have a tappall upon it, and shall always know from the runners of any collection of troops upon that road; and by this time the forage has every where improved.

The state of the frontiers of our allies is rather curious. The garrisons on the Nizam's frontier are in the hands of a traitor, who will not deliver them up. The Peshwah's frontier has been seized by a rebel; and although that country has been given in jaghire to Suddasheo Munkaiseer, the Dewan and prime minister, he has neither troops nor money to take possession of them.

You will have seen, from Col. Collins's dispatch of the 18th, that the language in Scindiah's camp is most pacific. My letter to Scindiah, of which I sent you a translation, will have arrived on that day, and he must consider it as the answer he expects from the Governor General. One to a similar purport has been written to the Rajah of Berar.

The ackbars mention the probability of a meeting between Holkar and Scindiah; but from the last hircarra accounts that I have had, it does not appear that Holkar had repassed the Taptee.

I omitted to mention in my letter to the Adj. Gen., upon the subject of the duel between Capt. — and Capt. —, that I had put the latter in arrest.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 23rd July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 21st, in which you enclose one from Appah Saheb. This last contains nothing excepting an assertion that he had not moved from Colridze with any intention to go to the southward, but with a view to procuring better forage. He promises fidelity to the Peshwah, but complains of the state of his health, and does not say that he will join.

It is obvious that this chief is looking forward to the result of the expected contests; and nothing will induce him, or any one of those not at present in camp, to come forward, till they see which party is likely to prevail. It will, therefore, be useless to offer to him money, or additional jaghires or honors. If I was sure that Gen. Stuart's army would be applicable to the Marhatta service, I would request you to desire the Peshwah to send an order to Appah Saheb to move him forward; I would then make offers to him, and threaten him with the attack of Meritch, if he did not obey the Peshwah's orders. But as Gen. Stuart is now crossing the Toombuddra, to send the order would only have the effect of creating an enemy in that quarter, in which one would be most inconvenient, and at a point in which we are likely to be least guarded. Upon the whole, therefore, all I can hope for the present is to keep Appah Saheb in a state of neutrality, to be turned hereafter into active hostility, either towards us or towards the enemy, according as there may be appearance of success on our side or on that of the enemy, in the commencement of the expected contest. I believe I may say the same also of every Marhatta sirdar, excepting possibly those now in the camp. These two we must keep, and I shall go into a consideration of Appah Dessaye's affairs, in an interview which I am to have with that chief to-morrow. I expect your answer soon respecting the three lacs for Goklah.

The frontiers of the Peshwah and the Nizam are in a terrible state. Nizam Nawaz Jung's killadar is still in Perinda, and Baba Phurkia's troops hold the Peshwah's districts bordering on the Nizam's, which I believe have been given in jaghire to Suddasheo Munkaiseer. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what are the forts and countries belonging to the Peshwah, which have been seized by Holkar and his adherents; specifying where they are situated, to what chief they belonged, and to what chief the Peshwah wishes that they should be delivered hereafter. I have heard nothing yet of Major Dallas, but I have Bistnapah looking out for him.

G. O.

23rd July, 1803.

A committee to assemble on the lines of the 74th regt., at 4 o'clock this afternoon, to survey the public camp equipage in use with that corps, to ascertain the repairs required, and to estimate the materials necessary for that purpose.

Acting D. Q. M. General, President.

Quarter masters of Brigade (members); Quarter master of 74th.

Major Gen. Wellesley directs that it may be particularly explained to all corps, that men sent as safeguards to villages are not entitled to demand or receive any thing whatever, as a reward for their trouble, or as batta.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 23rd July, 1803

Lieut. Gen. Stuart will have informed you that he had sent forward from the Grand Army a second convoy under Lieut. Griffiths on the 12th inst., with orders to proceed by the road on which Major Dallas will have marched. That road follows the line of the frontier, and passes through districts which belong to the Peshwah, as well as others belonging to the Nizam. The districts belonging to both powers are in a state of confusion. Baba Phurkia seized those belonging to the Peshwah bordering on the Beemah, when he went on his embassy to Hyderabad, and has kept them ever since; and Nizam Nawaz Jung's troops are still in possession of the fort of Perinda, and his amildar of some of the neighbouring districts. Under these circumstances, the second convoy, under Lieut. Griffiths, would not be in security on the road by which Major Dallas may have marched; and it may happen to be very inconvenient to me to detach the Mysore cavalry to escort it. I have therefore directed Lieut. Griffiths to alter his route. The route by which he will now march is from Culburga to Nuldroog, thence to Taunkie, leaving Toljapoor a few miles on his left; thence to Sirpoor, on the Mangeyra river, and along that river to Kurdlah. I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to procure orders written in triplicate to the Nizam's amildars in that part of the country, to supply Lieut. Griffiths with whatever he may want, and to give him assistance if he should require it, and to send these orders to meet him at Nuldroog, Taunkie near Toljapoor, and Sirpoor.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter, in which you enclose copies of the orders which you had received from his Excellency the Governor General, relative to the succession of Secundar Jah.

Sec. of the Bombay Govt. to Major Gen. O. Nicolls. Bombay Castle, 23rd July, 1803.

1. I am directed by the Hon. the Governor in Council to signify to you, that his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has been pleased to institute, in the person of the Hon. Major Gen. A. Wellesley, a temporary authority to conclude (in view to the present situation of affairs above the ghauts) whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the prosecution of war, appointing him (Gen. Wellesley) for this purpose to the chief command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies, serving in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Nizam, or of any of the Marhatta states or chiefs, subject only to the orders of his Excellency Lieut. Gen. Stuart, or of his Excellency Gen. Lake; and that the Government of Bombay have been directed to assist the General, and to co-operate with him on all points connected with the efficient exercise of the powers with which he is thus vested.

2. By his Excellency's further instructions, a copy of these commands has been transmitted to Major Walker, the Resident at Baroda, accompanied by a signification of his Excellency's desire that he will conform to the directions which he may receive from Major Gen. Wellesley, on all points connected with the duties committed to that officer's charge by the tenor of those instructions.

3. Gen. Wellesley has, since the receipt of the said instructions, advised the Governor, that the command of the troops in the Guickwar territories has thus been vested in him; and desired that, for the further promotion of the service, a co-operation may be directed between the troops in the Guickwar's territories and those in the Company's (by which is understood those at Surat); and the proper local authorities may be directed to communicate with him on the means of defence in the event of a war breaking out, all which has been ordered accordingly.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Saugwee, 24th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letters of the 26th and 27th June.*

Before they had reached me, in obedience to your Excellency's orders of the 8th and 30th May, and in consequence of a reference made to me by Col. Collins, I had written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to require that chief to separate himself from the Rajah of Berar, and to retire with his troops across the river Nerbudda. A copy of that, and a copy of the letter which I wrote on the 14th inst. to Col. Collins, have been already transmitted by Lieut. Col. Close, to be laid before your Excellency.

From the day on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah was called upon, in the name of your Excellency, to declare his views in his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that he was urged not to advance to Poonah, it was obvious that his only design was to gain time. He had not concluded his negotiations with Jeswunt Rao Holkar till a late period in this month; and he, as well as the Rajah of Berar, saw clearly the disadvantages under which they would commence hostilities during the season in which the rivers are full. Those disadvantages were so great, particularly as the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar were to the northward of the river Taptee, that it was probable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar would separate, and order their troops to their usual stations. In this they incur the risks of those evils which must result from the commencement of hostilities at that moment. I therefore thought it proper to urge forward the decision, whether there should be peace or war; and at the same time that I gave Dowlut Rao Scindiah every assurance of the pacific views and intentions of the British government, I called upon him to adopt that measure, which your Excellency conceived would give the British government a security that the peace would last.

On the 18th I received your Excellency's letter of the 26th June; and I wrote a letter to Col. Collins, of which I enclosed a copy, in which I desired that officer to apprize Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar of the powers with which your Excellency has been pleased to trust me. I requested him again to call upon those chiefs to separate, and to send their troops to their usual stations; and to inform them that, if they refused to do so, he had been directed to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the following day. Since I have written that letter, I have received your Excellency's letter of the 27th; and I am induced to hope that you will approve of all the steps taken till that moment, to bring to a decision the question of peace or war.

I have perused a copy of Col. Collins's dispatch to your Excellency, of the 18th, which contains a recognition on the part of Scindiah of the benefits which he will derive from the treaty of Bassein, and other symptoms of a change of councils in the durbar of that chief. But, notwithstanding the contents of that dispatch, the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah cannot be considered pacific, unless they shall separate, and each shall withdraw his troops to their usual stations. I

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. pp. 119 and 153.

have therefore made no alteration in the instructions which I gave to Col. Collins on the 18th, and he will certainly depart from Scindah's camp if he finds that the chiefs will not retire.

If, however, they should retire, I consider that the British government will have security for the duration of the peace, as amply as it can have while the power of these chiefs shall last. On the one hand, it will be obvious that fear of the power of the British government was the cause of their retreat; on the other, it will be equally obvious that the power which will have removed these formidable armies to a distance must increase; that no circumstances of distress from European enemies can prevent the growth of the strength of the British government in this quarter, and therefore that an attempt to attack it hereafter must be hopeless.

The difficulties under which the force of the British government labors at the present moment, and which give the greatest encouragement to the confederate chiefs, are the state of weakness and confusion of the Peshwah's government; the general unsettled and ruinous state of the country; and the wavering disposition of the majority of the southern jaghiredars, who alone preserve the appearance and relations of fidelity towards the Peshwah.

The weak and confused state of the Peshwah's government is to be attributed principally to his personal character, but also, in a great degree, to the rebellions and disturbances which have prevailed throughout the Mubatta Empire for the last 7 years. It could not be expected that even a government regularly organized would be able to resume its functions and its powers immediately after a revolution such as that effected by the victories of Jeswant Rao Holkar, preceded as they were by the long usurpation of Dowlut Rao Scindah, much less one conducted by a man so weak as Bajee Rao. But it may be reasonably expected this state of affairs will improve with the assistance of the British government, and that the Peshwah will have an authority for which there will be some respect.

The whole of the Marhatta territory is unsettled and in ruins. Holkar's armies consumed the produce of the last year, and, owing to their plunder and extortion, entire districts were depopulated, and the habitations of the people destroyed. But it is obvious that, for a series of years, the government, and even jaghiredars, can have received but little, if any, revenue; and both have been obliged to wink at, and even authorize, the plunder of their own territories, for the subsistence of their troops. The consequence is, that every man is a plunderer and a thief; and no man, who can find any thing to seize or to steal, will cultivate the land for his subsistence. The jaghires and forts, many of them close to Poonah, are in the hands of the adherents of Holkar, who are rebels to the government of the Peshwah. His Highness has passed orders for the resumption of these forts and jaghires; but there is no strength to carry them into execution; and thus a set of rebels and adherents of the confederate chiefs are in the midst of his possessions.

The state of affairs must improve, indeed it has improved already in those parts of the country in which the British army has been; and where

the necessity of employing the troops to oppose the confederate chiefs will no longer exist, it will be possible to enforce the Peshwah's orders for the resumption of the forts and jaghires, and to place in them those who will be faithful to his Highness' government. But the possession of these countries by the adherents of the Peshwah's enemies, at the present moment, must encourage the confederates.

The chiefs of the Marhatta Empire have been accustomed to look at a confederacy of the greater powers among them, as a force which nothing could withstand. They recollect its success against the British government in former times, and they anticipate the same success in the expected contest. They do not compare the strength of the British government at this time with its former weakness; nor do they consider the difficulties under which the British government labored at the time of the former contest; nor do they compare their own strength at that time with their weakness at the present moment.

The southern chiefs, and all those connected with Amrut Rao, wish well to the British government, and see clearly that the only chance of security they have is in the establishment of the power of the Peshwah under British protection. But they dread the power of the confederated chiefs, and fear to venture into the contest, till they shall see which side is likely to be successful. The first success in the contest will bring those forward who may not be rebels to the Peshwah's government; and will preserve Amrut Rao and his adherents in a state of neutrality, till they can make terms for themselves. But if the confederates should withdraw, the southern chiefs will be convinced that the northern chiefs have no confidence in their own strength, opposed to the British government; and in case of any future contest, they will not be unwilling to come forward in the support of a power to which they will attribute many of the advantages which they might enjoy. The Peshwah's government, also, as it will have more strength, will have more power to enforce obedience to its orders than it has at the present moment; and they will be more fearful of the consequences of disobedience. The confederates are well aware of this wavering disposition of the southern chiefs, and it is a strong inducement to them to go to war.

Another circumstance of difficulty, at the present moment, which probably could not exist hereafter, is the state of the Guickwar government. The rebels have only lately been expelled from that country, and the government has not yet had time to gain strength. The hopes of the confederates must be founded, in some degree, upon the certainty of a renewal of the rebellion in the case of a war.

The precarious state of the Nizam's health is another circumstance of encouragement to the confederates, which it is probable would not exist at any future period. It does not weigh as a difficulty upon the British force now, and Major Kirkpatrick writes with confidence, that Hyderabad will not be disturbed if his Highness the Nizam should die. But in the event of a war, particularly if there should not be speedily a signal success on the part of the British troops, it must be expected that the Nizam's death will be attended by the assumption of independence by some of his chiefs, and by confusion and disturbance in parts of his Highness' territo-

ries. It may be very certain that the confederates will encourage any symptoms of these evils; and that the hope of success in producing confusion in the Nizam's territories is one of the principal inducements to go to war at the present moment.

Your Excellency will observe, in this view of the question, the improvement of the British strength in this quarter will be owing, and in proportion, to the improvement in the state of the government of the allies, to that of the country, to that of its interior state, and to the confidence which the southern jaghiredars will have in the superior strength of the British government, from contemplating the effect which that strength will now have upon the northern confederated chiefs.

No war in which the British government can be involved with an European power can shake this strength. As long as the British troops maintain their formidable position in the territories of the Peshwah, the Nizam, and Guzerat, it must increase with the strength and prosperity of those governments to which it gives protection; and there will be daily a smaller prospect that the northern chiefs will venture to confederate against it. The breaking up of the confederacy, therefore, as it will add so much to the strength and reputation of the British government, will be the best security for the duration of the peace.

Although, in considering the various advantages which must result from the retreat of the confederates, and must add to the strength of the British government, I have pointed out to your Excellency certain disadvantages under which we labor at the present moment, I do not wish to impress your Excellency with the notion that I consider them to be of such magnitude as to render doubtful the event of a contest. They are certainly inconvenient, and we should be stronger if the Peshwah's government was in strength: but if we can strike such a blow during the rains as will give us the superiority, and keep our rear in tranquillity, we shall not probably feel those inconveniences further than in the want of pecuniary resources by the Peshwah's government.

Lieut. Col. Close has laid before your Excellency the correspondence which passed between Amrut Rao and me, since my arrival at Poonah; and the memorandum which he proposed to the Peshwah's ministers that his Highness should give to me, by which his Highness was to consent to give to Amrut Rao a revenue amounting to 4 lacs of rupees *per annum*. The Peshwah would not agree to the proposed arrangement, but, on his departure to Wahy, referred the subject to his ministers, who made a proposition to Lieut. Col. Close respecting Amrut Rao, which he will have laid before your Excellency. This proposition appeared to me inadmissible; it went to place Amrut Rao in the state of a prisoner, under the most degrading circumstances; and I was convinced that, if I had communicated it to the vakeel of that chief, he would have instantly joined the confederates. In the mean time, however, this vakeel pressed me for a decision on his employer's case. He urged that, at my desire, Amrut Rao had separated himself from the councils of Holkar and of Scindiah nearly 3 months ago; that those chiefs were become his enemies; that, in his position beyond the Godavery, he was liable to be attacked by them; and that he was not at peace with the Peshwah.

As, in the Memorandum received from the Peshwah's ministers, they consented to give 4 lacs of rupees *per annum* to Amrut Rao, (although the gift was to be attended by conditions to which Amrut Rao would never consent,) I thought it proper to write that chief a letter, of which the enclosed is a translation, in which I gave him assurances that the British government would take care that he should have a provision which would be agreeable to him.

I am convinced that, excepting in the event of the retreat of the confederates, Amrut Rao will not be satisfied with a jaghire of that amount; but I am also of opinion that nothing will induce him to come forward in support of the British government, excepting his conviction that, in case of a contest with the confederates, the former will be successful.

The promise of some provision will be sufficient to keep him in a state of neutrality for a time; and hereafter, (when it shall be certain that he will come forward in support of the British cause,) will be the proper season to fix the amount of the jaghire which he is to have.

I enclose the translation of a letter which I sent to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with a copy of the treaty of Bassein. I sent this letter by soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan, of the Native cavalry, with orders to write to Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Amrut Rao's camp, to inform him that he had a letter from me, which he would deliver in person, if Jeswunt Rao chose to receive him. I instructed the soubahdar to tell Jeswunt Rao Holkar that the British government had no intention to injure or interfere with him; that I was much pleased at his having crossed the Taptee, and that I should be still more pleased to hear that he had gone across the Ner-budda into the territories of his family.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 24th July, 1803.

Appah Dessaye paid me a visit this morning, and entered much in detail into the situation of his affairs. He represented that he had not been able to obtain possession of any one of the places which had been made over to him by the Peshwah in jaghire; and that, when his amildars had gone to the villages with the Peshwah's sunnuds, they had been ill treated, their troops attacked, and his Highness' sunnuds torn. He said that, as the Peshwah's ministers had refused to consent to incur the expense of paying a proportion of the troops which had marched with me to Poonah, he had been obliged to discharge and pay the arrears of all above the number of 1000, for which he obtained grants of *serinjaumy* lands; and that, in order to pay those arrears, he had disposed of all the valuable property in his possession; that, under these circumstances, he had no means of paying his troops. He said that he had represented to the Peshwah's ministers the probability that he should not be able to obtain possession of the districts for which he had sunnuds; and that, at all events, if he should obtain possession of them, the lands would be in an uncultivated state, the villages deserted, and that he should derive no benefit from them for some time; and he requested that he might receive 25,000 rupees *per mensem* to pay his troops, until he should derive some benefit from his jaghires. They had consented to this proposal, but hitherto they had paid him nothing.

I request you to ascertain, from the Peshwah's ministers, whether they did give Appah Dessaye to understand that he should receive 25,000 rupees *per mensem*, till he should be in the receipt of the revenues expected from his jaghires. If they did, I beg you to urge them to pay him the money: at all events, whether they did or did not consent to this arrangement, it is very obvious that this body of the Peshwah's troops has no fund from which it can draw its subsistence; and I request you to urge the Peshwah's ministers to allot one which shall be available.

If the Peshwah's ministers should avow that they had encouraged Appah Dessaye to expect that they would provide funds for the subsistence of his troops, till he should receive the benefits to be expected from his jaghires; or if, in consequence of the representation which I now send you, they should consent to provide funds for the payment of Appah Dessaye's troops, I will endeavor to assist that chief, and trust to future arrangements with the Peshwah for repayment of the sums which I may advance him. I beg you to represent these matters to the Peshwah's ministers, and to take every opportunity to urge them to provide means for the payment of his Highness' troops.

In the course of the conference which I had with him this morning, Appah Dessaye produced an order which he had received from Suddasheo Munkaiseer to proceed, in concert with Bappojee Goneish Goklah, to attack the troops of Amrut Rao, and dislodge them from some stations which they had occupied between Poonah and Nassuck; and to go as far even as the latter place, to give assistance to the troops stationed there.

I beg you to remind the Peshwah's ministers, that his Highness is bound, by his treaty with the British government, to produce an army of 16,000 men, to act with the British troops; instead of which number, only 3000 men have been sent, and no provision has been made for the payment even of that number. You will be so kind as to represent to them that, when a large body of the enemy's troops are assembled upon the frontier, when the Rajah of Berar has in a public manner asserted his hereditary claim to his Highness' musnud, it appears to be prudent not to fritter away the small force which his Highness has produced. That, as long as those armies are assembled upon the frontier, his Highness may depend upon it that his government will not settle; his orders and sunnuds will not be attended to; and his enemies will remain in possession of the lands which they have seized: that no partial operation against Amrut Rao, or any other chief, even if it should be successful, can be attended by the benefits which must result from removing to a distance from the frontier the hostile armies which have assembled in the neighbourhood. But that this expedition against Amrut Rao's troops cannot be successful, as, in fact, there are twice the number of them that there are of the Peshwah's; that the only chance of success against the hostile armies which have joined upon the frontier is, that our troops should be united, and that they should have no other object excepting to attack the enemy in their front; that many rivers will divide these detachments under Goklah and Appah Dessaye from the British troops; and that their co-operation with the latter will become impracticable; and that, upon

the whole, I have taken upon me to prevent Appah Dessaye from going upon this expedition.

It appears, by a letter from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that he has marched upon the expedition against Amrut Rao; although, in a letter which he wrote to me, he said that he removed to a distance from my camp only for the sake of forage.

I propose, however, to endeavor to stop that chief likewise, of which I beg you to apprise the Peshwah's ministers.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 24th July, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd. I had already written to request that you would take the rice collected at Aurungabad and Puttun for my use. The quantity at the two places will, I should imagine, amount to above 1000 loads. I have, besides, written to the officer at Toka, to send back to you the 500 loads of rice which you sent there for me.

You can have no difficulty in getting the rice out of Aurungabad; and I recommend that you should send either the bullocks of your departments, or those belonging to the brinjarries, to bring that at Moongy Puttun. If you should send those belonging to the brinjarries, it will be necessary that you should either make an arrangement with them for the hire; or that you should sell them the rice at the price at which they would get grain in the country, and afterwards take it from them as wanted, at the camp price. Do in this as you may think proper: at all events, the rice is at your service.

I told you before, that Gen. Stuart sent me only 2000 loads of rice, but he sent 5000 bullocks; 2000 loads more are following. Major Kirkpatrick also writes word that 2000 loads will leave Hyderabad for Aurungabad at the end of the month: this also will be applicable to the consumption of your detachment. But you must make your own arrangements for moving it forward to your camp from Aurungabad. Before all this can be consumed, your brinjarries will have filled again. Care must be taken to watch them closely, and to make them fill as fast as they shall empty their bags.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 24th July, 1803.

I have this morning received your letter of the 21st and 22nd. I return your paper containing the deposition of the soldiers against the foreigners, supposed to have enticed away the three men of the 84th who are missing; and, although they may not be the persons who took those three men away, it is very clear that their occupation is to entice the British soldiers to desert. I request, therefore, that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will punish these men publicly in the bazaar and lines of the detachment under your command: you will afterwards keep them in confinement till an opportunity shall offer, when you will send them to Bombay, in charge of a guard, and report to the Governor that they are sent as deserters from the Portuguese service and from the ships. You will also request that they may be sent to Goa. If you should be able to catch the third man, let him be treated in the same manner; and if any European

or half caste man should hereafter appear in your lines, let him also be taken up and sent down to Bombay. Be so kind as to give to each of the soldiers employed in taking those men 5 pagodas.

Let me know the day on which Capt. Douglas takes charge of the bullocks, in order that the accounts here may be made out in his name from that day.

It is very necessary that you should keep the depôt of Poonah full; and I am clearly of opinion that it is better to send coolies down to Panwell for rice than to purchase in the bazaar at Poonah more than your former consumption, according to my former direction, as soon as the quantity in the depôt shall not amount to more than 4000 bullock bags. If, therefore, Capt. Young cannot procure coolies or bullocks to keep the depôt full, you ought to hire as many people as you can, with convenience, for that purpose. However, I acknowledge that I have not much fear that the depôt will fail. If the war should be carried on in such a manner as that the communication between Poonah and Panwell shall be cut off (which, by the by, is not very probable, for at least 2 months, unless the killadar of Loghur should enter into it), the communication between me and Poonah will likewise be interrupted. It follows, then, that I shall not be able to draw anything from Poonah, the depôt at which place will be applicable solely to your detachment, and I believe that it will last them for many months. However, it may as well be kept full. I think also that you ought to get up some gunpowder, some 6 and 12 pounder shot, $4\frac{1}{2}$ and $5\frac{1}{4}$ inch shells, fuzes, &c., for the 12 pounders and howitzers. Your stock in these articles is much more likely to be consumed than your provisions.

The Mysore brinjarry will be at Poonah about the end of the month.

The D.A.G. to Col. White Locke, Chittledroog.

Camp, 24th July, 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to remind you of a letter which he wrote to you on the 30th of April last, in answer to an address from the officers of the garrison of Chittledroog, on the subject of the dearness of provisions there; and to inform you that he has never received any acknowledgment from you of the receipt of that letter, or intimation whether cause of complaint really existed, or whether any steps were taken to remove the cause of the complaint, if any existed.

The General has also observed, by the return for June of the 1st batt. 13th regt., that Lieut. Smith of that battalion had been in arrest by your order since the 24th of that month: on which subject, also, he has received no report from you. He has, therefore, directed me to furnish you with a duplicate of the order of the 9th March last, and to inform you that he hopes you have paid particular attention to that order; but as he has not received any communication from you on any subject whatever relating to the garrison under your command, it is his intention to make an inquiry hereafter into the public transactions of that garrison since he quitted Mysore, in order to ascertain whether due attention has been paid to that order in particular, and to the regulations of the service in general.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 25th July, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I wrote yesterday to the Governor General, with copies of its enclosures. I have received no answer from Col. Collins to my letter of the 18th. He had sent my letter of the 14th to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but I have not heard that he had received an answer. Hircarrahs report that Holkar had re-

fused to join, even after Kundee Rao Holkar had been delivered over to him, unless he also got possession of the Holkar territories. I have, as yet, heard nothing of Major Dallas.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 25th July, 1803.

The Peshwah's vakeel called upon me yesterday, and desired that I would write to one of the Nizam's amildars to pay choute to Bulwunt Rao Nagonath for a particular village, which he named, in this neighbourhood.

I am very anxious to oblige Bulwunt Rao Nagonath, and shall certainly write to the amildar, if it should be proper; but I wish first to know whether the choute claimed is disputable by the Nizam's government; and whether it comes under the head of those disputed claims which are referred to the arbitration of the British government by the treaty of Bassein. If it does, Bulwunt Rao Nagonath must see that I cannot write to the amildar to satisfy the claim, without taking upon me to decide a disputed question before I shall have heard both parties. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this subject to him. Appah Dessaye also has some claims of choute among his serinjaumy grants. But I have written to Col. Stevenson to desire that he will speak to Rajah Sookroodoor about them, who will certainly object to pay them, if they can be disputed. If they cannot be disputed, Col. Stevenson will make him pay them.

I send you, with this, a letter to Lord Clive. It contains the copy of a dispatch which I wrote yesterday to the Governor General, of which I request you to send a copy to Mr. Duncan.

Goklah has escaped from me to the distance of 28 coss; but I have ordered him back again.

To Major A. Walker.

Camp, 26th July, 1803.

From the tenor of letters which I have this day received from Col. Collins, it is probable that that officer will have departed from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by this time; and if that should be the case, I propose to commence hostilities against that chief and the Rajah of Berar immediately.

From papers received from the government of Bombay, I understand that you have directed that preparations should be made in Guzerat for the attack of Baroach. I request you to urge forward those preparations as much as possible, and to desire the officer in command of the troops to be in such a state and position as to be able to make his attack upon Baroach, as soon as I shall send him notice that I have commenced hostilities in this quarter.

Mem.

26th July, 1803

The halt to-morrow is on account of the unsettled state of the weather; and it is intended to march on the day following.

G. A. O.

28th July, 1803

An armourer and bellows boy, from each corps of infantry on the Madras establishment, are to be sent to the park at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning, with their tools complete, to assist in repairing some arms belonging to the 78th regt., which the officer commanding that corps will be pleased to send over to the park at that hour: he will also give directions for their being taken away in the evening.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Adams.

26th July, 1803.

A report stating an accident to have happened to a battalion of Bombay sepoys in Guzerat has reached the General, and you are mentioned as having received the first account, and as having given currency to the report in this camp. The General will be much obliged to you if you will inform him of the particulars, and of the authority upon which you have mentioned them.

To the Governor General.

29th July, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose copies of letters of the 24th and 25th inst., which I have received from Col. Collins, and the copy of a letter which I have written to that officer this day.

Correspondence relating to the Negotiations.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Camp, Julgong, 20th July, 1803.

1. Yesterday I had the honor to receive your favor of the 14th inst., covering a letter to the address of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with copies thereof in Persian and English.

2. As the 19th paragraph of my instructions from his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, under date the 3rd ult., directs me to accept of no proof of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's determination to refrain from any attempt to obstruct the complete operation of the Treaty of Bassein, but such as shall be satisfactory to you and to Col. Close; and it being your opinion, in which Col. Close concurs, that the declarations and intentions of Scindiah cannot be trusted unless he separates from the Rajah of Berar, removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences his route to Nagpore: influenced by these opinions, I felt no hesitation in resolving to present your address to Dowlut Rao Scindiah without delay.

3. Accordingly, I yesterday apprized Jadoon Rao Bhow, that, having a matter of importance to communicate to the Maharajah, I requested he would name an early hour for my moonshee to attend at the durbar. Jadoon Rao replied, that the Maharajah was then engaged in the performance of some religious ceremony, and had in consequence appointed the afternoon of the following day for the attendance of Mirza Bauker Khan.

4. As the procrastinating spirit which so much prevails at this court may probably prevent an immediate decision on your requisition to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I shall not wait to learn the result of my moonshee's conference, but immediately forward this letter, that you may be speedily apprized of my having received the remonstrance which you addressed to the Maharajah, as well as my intention to have the same fully explained to him without delay.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Julgong, 21st July, 1803.

1. A few hours after I had sent off my letter to you of yesterday's date, I received 2 dispatches from Mr. Sec. Edmonstone, of the 27th and 28th ult.; the former containing a copy of the instructions of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General to you, under date the 26th of last June, accompanied by orders from his Excellency for the guidance of my conduct, in consequence of the powers delegated to you by those instructions; the latter enclosing an extract of a letter from the Most Noble the Governor General to your address, dated the 27th ult. •

2. I trust, Sir, it would be needless in me to offer any assurances that I shall have great pleasure in obeying the orders I have received on this occasion; and which direct me to comply with such intimations as you may convey to me, in conformity to the powers lately delegated to you by his Excellency, as well as to afford you every degree of practicable aid in the exercise of those powers.

3. I shall now proceed to state the result of the communication made by moonshee Mirza Bauker Khan of the contents of the letter addressed by you to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Jadoon Rao Bhow being the only minister at this court who possesses influence and ability, I directed Mirza Bauker to call on him, previously to his repairing to the durbar, and to represent as follows:

“That Col. Collins, regarding Jadoon Rao Bhow as a man of understanding,
and

To Col. Collins.

Camp at Sangwee, 29th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 24th and 25th inst.

I am happy to observe, from the tenor of the last, that the confidence of that minister, who has been most active in negotiating the supposed confederacy among the northern Marhatta chiefs, is shaken respecting

and as one desirous of preventing hostilities between the two Sircars, had sent to apprise him of the contents of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley's letter, before it was presented to the Maharajah, in order that Jadoon Rao might consider maturely its important tendency, and be enabled to give his prince such advice as the present critical situation of his affairs so immediately required. Mirza Bauker then proceeded to state, that Gen. Wellesley's letter contained a confirmation of what Col. Collins had so repeatedly stated to this durbar; namely, that the continuance of the united forces of the Maharajah, and of the Rajah of Berar, in this quarter, would speedily involve those chieftains in a war with the English, since their present position could have been assumed for no other purpose than that of menacing the territories of our ally, the Nabob Nizam. That the observations which the Hon. General has made, as well on the conduct as on the language of the Maharajah, were indisputably just; as was also the inference which the General had drawn therefrom, that the offer of Gen. Wellesley to withdraw the British forces whenever Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah should repair to their respective capitals, was a most convincing proof, on his part, of pacific intentions: consequently, that, should the Marhatta chiefs refuse to comply with the General's reasonable requisition, it would be apparent to every power in Hindustan that their designs had all along been hostile towards the British government and its allies, notwithstanding their late friendly professions; that the assurance contained in the last paragraph of Gen. Wellesley's letter to the Maharajah was so liberal and explicit, as to leave Scindiah and the Bhoonslah no possible excuse for delaying their march towards their respective countries; and lastly, that the Hon. General was of a character not to be trifled with, and therefore Jadoon Rao might depend on it as a positive certainty, that, in the event either of evasion or of procrastination in the present instance, the British troops would enter upon action without further delay.

4. The foregoing discourse appeared to make a deep impression upon Jadoon Rao Bhow, who acknowledged that the assurance contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah was very satisfactory. He likewise told Mirza Bauker, that he was much obliged by the confidence I had placed in him. Jadoon Rao then proposed that they should both attend the durbar, and advised the Mirza to repeat the foregoing arguments in the presence of the Maharajah. This was accordingly done, after your letter had been fully explained to Scindiah; and Jadoon Rao took this occasion to observe, that, considering the rank, authority, and connexion of the English sirdar who had written to the Maharajah, no doubt could be entertained but that his assurances would be confirmed by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General; and then asked permission of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to wait on the Rajah of Berar with your letter, in order to consult with that chief on its important contents. Scindiah having consented to this proposal, Jadoon Rao immediately set off towards the camp of Ragojee Bhoonslah; and I expected to be informed of the result of his visit during the course of this day.

5. Early this morning, Mirza Bauker Khan repaired to the camp of the Berar Rajah, in order to make a representation to that chieftain, and to Sereedhur Punt, exactly similar to that which he had yesterday offered to the consideration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and I must confess that the late change in the language of the ministers of the Maharajah induces me to hope that your requisition will shortly be complied with.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Julgong, 22nd July, 1803.

1. I had the honor to apprise you, in my letter of yesterday's date, that moonshree Mirza Bauker Khan had been sent to the camp of the Rajah of Berar for the purpose of representing to that chief the necessity of his repairing to his capital without delay.

2. Mirza

the strength and power of that confederacy, and that even he is apprehensive of the consequences of a contest with the British government. It is probable that the apprehension of this contest, which will be commenced under great advantages on our side, if not delayed, is general in the durbars of those chiefs; but still they and their servants must feel sensibly

2. Mirza Banker Khan returned from this visit early yesterday, and I am concerned to state, that he did not find Ragojee Bhoonslah well disposed to comply with your requisition, although the Mirza did not fail to urge the same arguments which had apparently made a due impression on the minds of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jadoon Rao Bhow. The Bhoonslah admitted, however, that the assurance contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter to Scindiah was fully satisfactory, so far as it related to the intention of the British government; but he insisted on it as proper that his Highness the Peshwah should give similar assurances, as well to Dowlut Rao Scindiah as to himself, before their forces separated, or quitted their present position. The conversation on this occasion was carried on for several hours: at the conclusion Ragojee said, that he would consult personally with Scindiah in the evening, after which a reply should be given to your letter. Accordingly, the Maharajah waited on the Berar Rajah last night, and the conference between these chieftains lasted several hours. In consequence of the above intelligence, I this morning addressed a note to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, copies of which, in English and Persian, I do myself the honor to enclose for your perusal.

3. It being, I think, probable, from the conversation which passed between Mirza Banker and the Bhoonslah, that Scindiah may be induced to refuse or to evade compliance with your requisition; and as it appears by the extract of the letter to your address from his Excellency the Governor General, under date the 27th ult., transmitted to me by Mr. Sec. Edmonstone, that I am not at liberty to leave this court unless by your desire, I have to request your instructions for the guidance of my conduct in the event of refusal or procrastination on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of Ragojee, to separate and retire with their forces to their respective countries.

4. As I am anxious to learn your resolve on the above question, I shall close this letter without waiting for a reply to the note which I just now addressed to the Maharajah.

Col. Collins to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 22nd July, 1803.

As Col. Collins understands that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah held a conference with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah last night, for the purpose of determining on the answer that should be given to the letter addressed to the Maharajah by the Hon. Gen. Wellesley, Col. Collins requests that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will favor him with a communication of the result of that conference; and as the Hon. Gen. Wellesley expects an early reply to his letter, the Colonel trusts that the Maharajah will no longer delay writing to the General, in order to satisfy him that his requisitions will be immediately complied with.

Col. Collins to the Governor General.

Julgong, 23rd July, 1803.

1. Since I had the honor to address your Excellency on the 17th inst., I have been favored with the reply of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley to the reference that I made to Col. Close in my letter of the 9th of this month, a copy of which formed a part of my dispatch to your Lordship of the same date.

2. As the Hon. Gen. Wellesley has given a very clear and decided opinion on the necessity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's withdrawing his troops from the Nizam's frontier, and, in consequence of this opinion, has addressed a representation to the Maharajah, calculated to induce that chief and the Berar Rajah to retire to their respective capitals, I deem it my duty to forward to your Excellency copies of the letters which have passed between the Hon. General and me on that important subject.

3. Dowlut Rao Scindiah has not yet replied to the note that I addressed to him yesterday morning, a transcript of which is contained in the enclosure. Indeed, I understand that the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah are as yet undecided whe-

the disgrace and disadvantage which must be the consequence of their retreat to their own territories, after all their preparations for hostilities, and their boast that they would commence them.

Under these impressions, it is probable that they will have promised you that they will separate and retire to their own territories, but they

ther to comply with, or refuse, the requisition of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley. In order, however, to hasten their determination, I shall this day demand an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the express purpose of obtaining an answer to the General's letter.

4. Col. Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg have marched with their corps towards Hindustan, conformably to the intimation which I had the honor to communicate to your Excellency on the 17th inst. ; but I must beg leave to correct a mistake that I then made respecting the strength of Col. Doudernaigue's brigade, which consists of 7 battalions of infantry and 500 cavalry, instead of 8 battalions, as before stated.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Julgong, 24th July, 1803.

1. I had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th inst. yesterday morning, and, conformably to the instructions contained therein, I addressed memorials to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in which every argument and observation you have furnished me with were stated nearly in your own words. I do myself the honor to enclose copies in English and Persian of my memorial to Scindiah ; that to Ragojee Bhoonslah was precisely the same, except in one passage, which is noticed in the enclosure.

2. Yesterday at noon I sent a message to the Maharajah, intimating, that, as he had not replied to my note of the 22nd June, I expected he would grant me an audience that evening ; but Scindiah was then engaged at a nouth, and could not be spoken with. This morning early I sent Mirza Banker Khan to the durbar, in order to explain the contents of my memorial, and at the same time insist on my having a conference with the Maharajah in the course of the day. The Mirza repaired to the camp of Scindiah at 7 o'clock, but is not yet returned, although it is now 2 in the afternoon.

3. If, after another conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, I should find them actually determined to retain their present positions on the Nizam's frontier, I shall, in compliance with your instructions, inform those chieftains that I have been directed by you to leave the camp of the Maharajah ; and, in this event, I shall instantly apprize Col. Stevenson of thy departure.

4. The troops which your hircarrahs saw at the Adjutec ghaut were sepoy battalions in the service of the Berar Rajah. These corps have been since withdrawn, and are returned to the camp of Ragojee Bhoonslah. They were commanded by a Native officer named Beny Sing : 22 guns were attached to these corps.

5. In my address to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, under date the 17th inst., I mentioned that Scindiah had detached Col. Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg, with the corps which they commanded, towards Hindustan. This intelligence was true, but I made a mistake with respect to the strength of Col. Doudernaigue's brigade, which consists of 7 battalions and 500 cavalry, instead of 8 sepoy battalions, erroneously stated in my letter to his Excellency.

6. Allow me, Sir, to remind you, that I formerly gave you very particular statements as well of Scindiah's forces as of the Bhoonslah's ; and although those statements are communicated in private letters, yet I conceived they might have proved sufficiently satisfactory : I shall, however, take an early opportunity of transmitting to you an official report on this subject, conformably to your wishes. In the mean time I can assure you that Scindiah has only 11 battalions of infantry with him at present, and that no brigade of his was ever posted at the Adjutec ghaut : my last advices from the camp of Col. Doudernaigue mentioned, that he had marched 20 coss on the direct route towards Burhampoor.

7. I have the honor to enclose a copy and translate of a note I this instant received from the Berar Rajah.

Col.

may still have kept their armies in one body, and may have delayed that event, which can alone give security to the British government for the duration of the peace: on the other hand, if they should not be sincere in their intentions of retiring, we shall lose the advantages which we possess at present for the commencement of hostilities.

Col. Collins to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 23rd July, 1803.

Col. Collins apprizes Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has been pleased to delegate the direction and control of all political and military affairs in Hindustan and the Deccan to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who is also vested with full powers to conclude a negotiation with the Marhatta chieftains and jaghiredars, on the part of the British government. Col. Collins further informs the Maharajah, that all engagements which Gen. Wellesley may conclude will be confirmed by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has, in consequence, instructed Col. Collins to assure Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that he is perfectly ready to attend to the interests of the Maharajah, and to enter into a negotiation with him upon objects by which the Maharajah may suppose those interests to be effected; but that, in the first place, the General expects that the troops of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall withdraw from their present position upon the Nizam's frontier, and return to their usual stations in Hindustan, in which case the General, on his part, will withdraw the Hon. Company's force to their usual station. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has likewise directed Col. Collins to observe, that, since the Maharajah has declared he has no intention to obstruct the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, to withdraw his troops to their usual stations would only be consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they were sincere; while, on the other hand, should the forces of the Maharajah retain their present position upon the Nizam's frontier, after the friendly representations which the Hon. Gen. Wellesley has made on the subject, such a proceeding would be the strongest proof which the Maharajah could give of the insincerity of those declarations; the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has therefore instructed Col. Collins to repeat his former application to the Maharajah to retire with his troops from the Nizam's frontier, that being the only measure by which the peace between the British government and his Sircar can be preserved.

N. B. A similar representation was presented to the Rajah of Berar, with the exception of one passage, in which he is required to withdraw his troops from the Nizam's frontier, and return to Nagpoor.

Rajah Ragojee Bhoomslah to Col. Collins.

The letter which you sent to me is received, and the particulars of its contents thoroughly understood; the answer to it depends on a meeting between me and Dowlut Rao Scindiah Behauder: after we shall have met and personally discussed the subject of it, the reply will then be certainly committed to writing.

Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Col. Collins.

24th July, 1803.

Your letter is received, and its contents understood.

Whenever Senah Saheb Soubah Rajah Ragojee Bhoomslah and I shall meet and be seated together in the same place, you will then be requested to attend; and whatever is to be stated will then be discussed: an interview between the Rajah and me is indispensable on this occasion. If you are resolved on having an audience, come to-morrow, when only two ghurces of the day shall remain. My house is your own.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Julgong, 25th July, 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a copy and translate of a note which I received last night from Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

The Maharajah was not visible yesterday, in consequence of his having sat up at a nouth during the whole of the preceding night. But Mirza Banker Khan had a long conference with Jadoon Rao Bhow, on the subject of my last memorial to

If they should not have manifested their intentions to separate and retire to their own territories, you will of course have quitted the camp, according to my letter of the 18th inst.; but if they should have declared their intention, and should still be joined, and should have made no movement towards their own territories, or if they should delay their marches

to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and although this minister did not appear altogether pleased at the idea of his master being compelled to retire from his present position, yet, from the general tenor of his discourse on this occasion, Mirza Bauker inferred, that Jadoon Rao was of opinion it would be more advisable for Scindiah to withdraw his forces from the Nizam's frontier than to hazard a rupture with the British government.

I have the honor to forward a statement of the forces of the Maharajah and of the Rajah of Berar, in which their respective positions are particularly ascribed.

The Force with Dowlut Rao Scindiah: Julgong, 25th July, 1803.

	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.		ORDNANCE.	
	Hindustanny.	Deccanny.	Sepoy battalions.	Matchlock men.	Heavy guns.	Field pieces.
Under the command of Col. Pohlman	500	..	7	500	8	40
Under the command of Col. Soliever, in the pay of Begum Sumroo	4	..	2	30
Under the command of different Native Sirdars	12,000	2000
Under the command of Bappojee Scindiah, which joined the Maharajah on the 23rd May last	4,000
Park of artillery	25	100
	16,500	2000	11	500	35	170

N. B. Each sepoy battalion consists of 700 rank and file.

The Force of the Rajah of Berar: 25th July, 1803.

	CAVALRY.	INFANTRY.	ORDNANCE.			
			Heavy guns.	Field pieces.	Rockets.	Sutanants.
Under the command of different Native Sirdars	20,000
Under the command of Beny Sing	6000	..	35
Camels carrying rockets	500	..
Camels carrying Sutanants	500
	20,000	6000	..	35	500	500

The Maharajah, with the whole of his cavalry, is encamped to the north of the range of hills, called the Adjunttee ghaut, 10 coss from the pass of Ferdapoor, and 9 from

under any pretences whatever, I request you will write letters to inform them that I can trust them no longer; and that, if they do not separate on the following day, and move each towards his own territories, it is my intention to commence my operations, for which I am fully prepared: that I have sent orders to the troops to approach to Baroach, against which

9 from Adjuttee, which is impassable for guns. On the right of the Maharajah, at the distance of 2 coss, Col. Pohlman, with his brigade, is posted; and about one coss in the rear of Col. Pohlman, Col. Soliever, with the corps of Begum Sumroo, is posted.

Gopal Bhow having been left in the Deccan by Scindiah, on his return to Hindustan in 1801, and the strength of his detachment having at different times varied according to circumstances, the exact number of his forces cannot be ascertained. It is, however, certain that he has been repeatedly and positively ordered to join the Maharajah.

The Rajah of Berar is encamped 2 coss on the left of Scindiah, with the whole of his artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

Col. J. Shepherd, with the whole of the regular infantry and guns of Ambajee Rao, has already crossed the Nerbudda.

Col. Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg, with 11 battalions of sepoy, and a large park of artillery, marched from Julgong towards the Nerbudda on the 18th inst.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Julgong, 26th July, 1803.

1. Conformably to the intimation which I had the honor to give you in my letter of the 25th inst., I waited on Dowlut Rao Scindiah yesterday afternoon, accompanied by Capt. Bradshaw and Banker Khan: Ambajee Inglia, Jadoon Rao Bhow, Unna Bhasker, Suddasheo Eitul Punt, and moonshee Kavel Nyn, were present at the darbar on the part of the Maharajah.

2. After an interchange of compliments, I asked Scindiah whether the contents of your letter had been explained to him, and whether he fully comprehended the substance of my last memorial? Scindiah replied, that the contents of both those papers had been particularly explained to him, and that he perfectly understood the nature of your requisition, as well as the motives which had induced the same. Notwithstanding this positive assurance, I recapitulated every argument and observation with which you had furnished me, and then advised the Maharajah, as he regarded his own interests, to afford you the satisfaction you required, without delay.

3. Jadoon Rao Bhow, in reply, entered into a long discussion on the subject of your requisition, of which what follows is an abstract: That the forces of Dowlut Rao and of the Rajah of Berar were encamped in their own territories: that those chieftains had solemnly promised not to ascend the Adjuttee ghaut, nor to march to Poonah: that they had already given his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General assurances in writing, under their own seals, that they never would attempt to subvert the treaty of Bassein, which assurances were unequivocal proofs of their friendly intention: that they proposed sending vakeels to the Peshwah, in order to obtain an assurance from his Highness similar to that which they had lately received from the Hon. Gen. Wellesley: lastly, that the treaty now negotiating between Scindiah and Holkar was not completely settled, and that, until it was finally concluded, the Maharajah could not return to Hindustan.

4. In answer to these objections on the part of Jadoon Rao, I observed, that the Hon. Gen. Wellesley had already pointed out to Dowlut Rao Scindiah how impossible it was that he (the General) should trust to promises alone for the security of the Hon. Company and their allies, whilst two large armies occupied a position so near the frontier of the Nabob Nizam: I said, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah derived any advantage from his present position, or if it were in the least necessary for the defence of his possessions, in either of these supposed cases Gen. Wellesley would have made proper allowances; but it was notorious that the Maharajah had no enemies in this quarter, and was so far from deriving any advantage, that he incurred a most intolerable expense in his present situation, and therefore

place also operations will be commenced; and that I have apprized his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and the officer commanding the troops in the Ganjam district, of the present state of affairs, in order that they also may be prepared to commence their operations. You will also be so kind as to withdraw from Scindiah's camp; and you will apprise

therefore his retaining it could be only ascribed to hostile designs against the British government or its allies.

5. Pursuing my discourse, I reminded Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that, at the time when it was proposed at this durbār to give assurances in writing to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, of the intentions of the Berar Rajah and of the Maharajah to respect the treaty of Bassein, I had then said, that his Excellency would yield no credit to the sincerity of their promises, unless those chiefs returned to their respective capitals; and that, on this occasion, I had further declared, that I would not be responsible for the Hon. Gen. Wellesley abstaining from hostilities, if their troops did not immediately retire from the Nizam's frontier. I then remarked, that, as Gen. Wellesley was now vested with full powers, as well political as military, the assurance contained in his letter to the Maharajah was of equal validity as if given by the Most Noble the Governor General, and, consequently, ought to satisfy all doubts whatever; however, that Gen. Wellesley would have no objection to the sending vakeels to the court of Poonah, provided Scindiah and the Bhoonslah would, in the first instance, retire from the frontier of the Nabob Nizam: lastly, I observed, that, if any part of the treaty of Jeswant Rao Holkar still remained unadjusted, that Burhampoor was a much more eligible situation for carrying on a negotiation than the Nizam's frontier; and I concluded with insisting on an immediate and distinct reply to the requisition of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley.

6. As Jadoon Rao Bhow appeared at a loss to answer the foregoing observations and arguments, he evaded the subject, by promising to give me the satisfaction I demanded in the course of a few days. I replied, that Gen. Wellesley's letter had been presented to the Maharajah 5 days since, consequently, that there had been time sufficient for Scindiah and his ministers to consider maturely its contents; and, therefore, I should not submit to further procrastination on the part of this court on this head. There was some altercation; but at length Scindiah and his ministers, having solemnly pledged their words that I should have a distinct and pleasing answer on the 28th of this month, in the presence of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, I consented to wait till then for their ultimate decision.

7. Last night I was favored with your letter of the 21st inst., enclosing a khareetah to the address of the Rajah of Berar, which I, this morning, forwarded to the Rajah, accompanied by a note from myself.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Jalgong, 30th July, 1803

1. On the morning of the 28th inst, I addressed a note to Jadoon Rao Bhow, requesting he would inform me what hour of the day would be most convenient and agreeable to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to grant me the promised audience. The enclosed (No. 1) contains a copy and translate of the answer of Jadoon Rao Bhow to the foregoing request; and No. 2, transcript (in English and Persian) of my reply to that minister.

2. In consequence of the intimation conveyed in No. 2, Jadoon Rao Bhow appointed the afternoon of the following day for me to wait on the Maharajah; and, as I was desirous to make one more effort, in order to induce Scindiah to comply with your requisition, I consented to postpone my departure; partly from the consideration already stated, and partly with a view of resting the responsibility upon this court, in the event of hostilities.

3. Accordingly, I waited upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah yesterday afternoon, accompanied by Capt. Bradshaw and moonshee Banker Khan. The usual servants of the Maharajah attended on this occasion. The Peshwah's vakeels, Ballojer Koonger and Kistnaje Blunwarry, were likewise present. But, contrary to agreement, Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah absented himself from this conference.

4. I commenced the discourse by observing on the absence of the Berar Rajah, whom

that chief that I have made this request, in case he should not immediately separate from the Rajah of Berar, and should not retire towards Hindustan.

I have received a letter from Col. Stevenson, from which I observe, that, having had occasion to write a letter to Gopal Bhow, to desire that

whom I expected to have seen at the durbar, conformably to the promise I had received, as well from the Maharajah as from Jadoon Rao. I then said that, no doubt, Dowlut Rao Scindiah was fully apprized of the real opinion of Ragojee Bhonslah, with whom he had held a conference the preceding day; consequently, that I expected to be informed of the sentiments and intentions of both those chieftains on the subject of your requisitions.

5. Instead of giving me any direct reply, Jadoon Rao Bhow merely recapitulated the objections which he had urged at our conference of the 25th inst., against withdrawing the troops of the Maharajah and of the Rajah of Berar from their present position; and my replies to his objections were exactly similar to those which I had the honor to communicate to you in my letter of the 26th inst. In fact, every argument that could be adduced on this question had been already exhausted: this I remarked to Jadoon Rao, and at the same time told him that he had not brought forward a single new observation.

6. Scindiah's minister then said, that his Highness the Peshwah had lately deputed a vakeel to the Maharajah, and that it was indispensably requisite that I should be informed of the objects of his mission. I replied, that I should most readily attend to any report which the vakeel of his Highness might make, and desired that Kistnajee Bhuwarry (the person alluded to) would state whatever he had to propose on the part of the Peshwah. They called Kistnajee, who said that he had been deputed by Rao Pundit Pordhaun to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah of his having entered into new engagements with the British government to prevent the completion, and to compose any differences that might have arisen between the English and those chieftains.

7. When Kistnajee Bhuwarry had finished his discourse, I observed to Jadoon Rao, that the friendly intentions of his Highness the Peshwah were very apparent, and that it only remained with the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah to give them effect, by withdrawing their troops from the Nizami's frontier, in which event all doubts would be removed, and friendship re-established between those chiefs and the British government. I further said, that the Hon. Major General's proposal by no means tended to degrade Dowlut Rao Scindiah or Ragojee Bhonslah, since, at the same time that the General required of those chieftains to retire with their forces to their respective countries, the Hon. General had likewise promised, in the event of their compliance, to withdraw his troops to their usual stations; and, in conclusion, I strongly urged both the Maharajah and Jadoon Rao not to suffer a trifling punctilio to be the cause of involving their share in a war with the British government. But Scindiah's minister persisted in declaring that his master must again consult with the Rajah of Berar, before he could give any decided answer to your requisition, and requested that I would defer my departure for 2 or 3 days longer. I replied, that, as I now was satisfied this count only wanted to gain time for some particular purpose of its own, I should be deemed inexcusable were I to suffer myself to be further amused. But, independent of this consideration, I was positively directed by the Hon. Gen. Wellesley to leave the camp of the Maharajah as soon as ever I had reason to be convinced that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhonslah were determined to retain their present position on the frontier of the Nabob Nizam; that, accordingly, on the 30th inst. I should send off my peshkhana and heavy baggage 5 coss on the road towards Aurungabad, and proceed myself on my journey thither early in the morning of the next day.

8. As Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jadoon Rao Bhow repeatedly declared that they would not permit me to depart hence, I was obliged to explain to them, that, although their opposing my departure might subject me to some inconvenience, on account of the difficulty of procuring supplies of grain, yet that they might be assured no personal consideration whatever shall prevent me from paying implicit obedience to the orders of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley. After saying thus, I made

my

chief to withdraw from the Nizam's territories, he made use of an expression which is not commonly used to a person of that description, which appears to have offended Gopal Bhow. It is very certain that that chief ought not to have entered the Nizam's territories, and that, if he had not retired from them, and beyond Col. Stevenson's reach, that officer

my farewell compliments to the Maharajah in the most respectful manner, and immediately withdrew from the durbar.

9. As the Berar Rajah was not present at my last audience with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I thought it proper to apprise him of my determination to leave this camp, and accordingly did so, in a memorial, of which the enclosed contains a copy in English and Persian.

10. My peshkhana has been sent on 5 coss, and I shall follow to-morrow morning at daylight, unless the Marhatta chieftains should, contrary to expectation, assure me of their resolution to comply with your requisition. But, as such an assurance would be consistent with good faith and good sense, I almost despair of receiving it. However, I shall not close this letter until sunset.

Jadoon Rao Bhow to Col. Collins.

28th July, 1803.

Your kind reply to my friendly letter, with which I have been favored, has increased our friendship. With respect to your request for an answer to the points in question, and that I would repair to the durbar at the time I should appoint: my friend, yesterday was fixed on for the Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to visit the Maharajah; but the interview was prevented by the continuance of the rain. The Rajah will certainly come to-day, and the matter in agitation will be debated, for which reason it will not be proper for you to visit the durbar this day. Should it be necessary for you to attend, I will undoubtedly acquaint you with it, otherwise you shall be apprized of the time that may be settled for this purpose; but to-day is not the 9th: you shall, however, have intimation sent to you at the time that may be agreed on.

Col. Collins to Jadoon Rao.

28th July, 1803.

The friendly letter of the Maharajah, along with yours, in reply to my notes, have reached me; and I comprehend their contents, which plainly manifest both indifference and procrastination on the part of the durbar of the Maharajah; for, on Monday it was agreed upon, that on the 3rd day both sirdars, Ragojee Bhoonslah and the Maharajah, would meet together, and desire my attendance at once; whereas the contrary has now taken place. If the Maharajah was desirous of giving me an explicit answer, it is not possible that he would again put it off till to-morrow, which is Friday. But the Maharajah has written to prohibit me from being present at the interview which is to take place this day between him and Ragojee Bhoonslah, from which I conclude that it is not the intention of the Maharajah to give me an explicit answer. Besides this, it is now the 9th day since the khareetah from the Hon. Gen. Wellesley was presented to the Maharajah: I shall, therefore, wait till 12 o'clock to-morrow for an explicit answer from the Maharajah. After that, I shall send my peshkhana on the road towards Aurungabad, and take my departure from this on the following day, pursuant to the orders of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley. Of this I trust you will inform the Maharajah, with my best respects.

Col. Collins to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah.

30th July,* 1803.

On the 4th of Rubec-ul-Saunee (24th July) a memorial was delivered to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the part of Col. Collins, of which the enclosure is a copy.* Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah acknowledged the receipt of this memorial in a note to Col. Collins, dated the same day, in which the Rajah informed the Colonel, that the answer to this memorial depended on a meeting between him and Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and that, after they should have met, and personally discussed the subject of it, a reply would then certainly be committed to writing.

On the 6th of Rubec-ul-Saunee (26th July) Col. Collins sent a letter to Rajah Ragojee

* See page 585.

would have shown him that the British army was capable of protecting the territories of an ally of the British government.

However, I cannot approve of the expression inadvertently used in Col. Stevenson's letter, and I have desired that officer to take an opportunity of writing to Gopal Bhow to explain it.

Ragojee Bhoonslah, written by the Hon. Gen. Wellesley, and addressed to the Rajah. This letter was accompanied by a note from the Colonel, in which he requested that Rajah Ragojee would return a speedy and a proper answer to it. But the Rajah has not, to this hour, replied to that note, or to the letter of Gen. Wellesley, although Sereedhur Punt immediately acknowledged to Mirza Bauker Khan the receipt of both these papers.

On the 8th of Rubee-ul-Saunee, Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah had a conference with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and, notwithstanding the Maharajah had promised to give Col. Collins a distinct reply to the requisition of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley on that day, in the presence of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, yet Jadoon Rao Bhow, the chief minister of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, apprized the Colonel that it would not be proper for him to attend on that occasion.

Yesterday, Col. Collins had an audience of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, when the Colonel expected to receive a satisfactory answer to the requisition of Gen. Wellesley, and declared, that, if it were not then given, he (the Colonel) should send off his peshkhana and baggage the next day, and proceed himself towards Aurungabad early on the morning of the 11th Rubee-ul-Saunee; yet Jadoon Rao Bhow insisted that no determinate reply could be given to the letter of Gen. Wellesley until the Maharajah had held another conference with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah. Col. Collins then explained that he had been directed by the Hon. Gen. Wellesley to leave the camp of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, should the Colonel perceive that the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar were determined not to comply with his (the General's) requisition; and that, in consequence of the refusal of Jadoon Rao Bhow to give a direct answer thereto, Col. Collins should certainly send off his peshkhana the next day, and proceed early in the morning of the 11th Rubee-ul-Saunee towards Aurungabad.

Col. Collins deems it necessary to recapitulate the foregoing particulars, in order that Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah may be fully apprized that the Colonel cannot, without being guilty of disobedience of orders, remain longer than to-morrow morning in the camp of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; unless the Colonel should receive assurances, in the intermediate time, from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, and from the Maharajah, of their intentions to comply with the requisition of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley.

In conclusion, Col. Collins requests an immediate answer to this memorial, a copy of which will be sent to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Julgong, 1st Aug. 1803.

1. I little thought I should have the honor of addressing you again from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but the very heavy and incessant rains which have fallen since I wrote to you on the 30th ult. rendered it impossible for me to proceed on my journey.

2. About 4 o'clock yesterday morning, Capt. Lyons, who commands my escort, came to my tent and stated, that, in consequence of the great quantity of rain which had fallen since 11 o'clock the preceding night, the roads were become impassable for guns: although I was perfectly satisfied of the justness of this representation, yet I deemed it necessary, for your information, to desire Capt. Lyons to address an official report to me on this subject in writing, and I have now the honor to enclose it.

3. On the 30th ult., at 10 o'clock at night, Dowlut Rao Scindiah sent me a note, a copy and translation of which I herewith forward. At the time when I received it, the weather had cleared up, and I had not a doubt of being able to march on the following morning; I, therefore, told the person who brought the note from the Maharajah, that I would reply to it the next day after my arrival at Tondapoor, to which place my peshkhana and baggage had been sent, and where they still remain.

4. Having,

It is probable that this expression may be made a subject of complaint in Scindiah's durbar, and I mention the circumstance in order that you may inform the ministers of the steps which have been taken in consequence of it.

4. Having, however, been necessarily detained here the whole of yesterday, and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah having prepared a request similar to that contained in the one from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, (No. 2,) I conceived it might be giving those chiefs an advantage, were I to refuse the interview which they so pressingly solicited, and in this idea I returned an assenting answer. The enclosure (No. 3) contains a copy and translation of my reply to both chieftains.

5. I arrived at the tent of the Berar Rajah at 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon, but not without considerable difficulty, on account of the extreme heaviness of the roads. Capt. Paris Bradshaw and Mirza Banker Khan attended me on this occasion, and I was received with great politeness, as well by Scindiah as by Ragojee Bhoonslah, in the fullest durbar that I have yet seen.

6. Although our conference lasted more than 4 hours, yet, as the arguments on the part of the Marhatta ministers contained no new matter whatever, and as my replies were, of course, the same as I had so often given at our former interviews, I shall not trouble you with a repetition thereof, but proceed to state the propositions that were made to me by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, after numberless evasions and much disagreeable altercation.

1st Proposition. That the united forces of the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah should retire to Burhampoor, and that the Hon. Gen. Wellesley should withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. This proposition I rejected, as altogether inadmissible, inasmuch as it was in opposition both to the letter and spirit of your requisition, which demanded that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Nerbudda, and the Berar Rajah return to Nagpoor. As this proposal was strongly contested on their part, I said, at length, that, if Ragojee Bhoonslah would repair to his own capital, and Scindiah to Burhampoor, I would not, in such case, leave the camp of the Maharajah until I received your further instructions. But this concession did not satisfy those chieftains, who then introduced a second proposition.

2nd Proposition. That I should fix on a day for their marching hence with their respective forces, and at the same time pledge myself that the Hon. Gen. Wellesley should withdraw his troops on the precise day that they moved towards their usual stations. I replied that you required, in the first instance, the removal of the Marhatta armies from their present menacing position on the frontier of our ally, the Nabob Nizam; and, exclusive of this condition, I observed, that, as the political and military authorities were vested in the Hon. Gen. Wellesley, I could not be responsible for the execution of any measure but such as the Hon. General had particularized in his instructions to me, and in his letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah. This remark produced their third and last proposition, and from which they positively declared they would not recede.

3rd Proposition. That Scindiah and the Bhoonslah would propose to the Hon. Gen. Wellesley, by letter, that he should speedily fix some particular day for withdrawing his armies, and for the removal of theirs from their present position on the Nizam's frontier; and that, on the day so specified, they would assuredly commence their march. These Chieftains further said that they would also request of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley, in the same letter, to name the time when the forces under his command might be expected to reach their usual station; and that they (Scindiah and the Bhoonslah) would so regulate their marches as to arrive at their usual stations precisely at the same period of time.

7. I objected to this proposal, on the ground of its being different, in one particular, from your requisition, which demanded, in the first instance, the removal of the Marhatta armies from the Nizam's frontier. But as Scindiah's ministers declared that, unless you consented to this proposition, their prince could not retire without an indelible stain on his honor, and as the servants of the Berar Rajah maintained the same sentiments with great firmness, I at last agreed to refer the point in question to your consideration, and to remain with the Maharajah

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 29th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 16th, 18th, and 20th, but I defer to reply to them till to-morrow.

I now enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor General,* with copies of its enclosures. I think we shall settle matters with the northern Chiefs yet.

* Dated 24th July, p. 572.

rajah until I received your determination on this proposition, provided letters to your address were sent me for transmission before noon on the following day, and provided those letters were expressed conformably with the terms which they had then proposed. Here the conference ended, and I took my leave, after the usual compliments of attar and paun.

8 It rained during the whole of yesterday, and until the present hour, which is 11 o'clock in the forenoon. Whatever, therefore, may be the line of conduct pursued by the Marhatta Chieftains, with respect to the proposed letters to your address, it will be utterly impracticable for me to proceed towards Aurangabad until an interval of fair weather, as well on account of the heavy roads as of the overflowing of the nullah, about midway between this and Tondapoor.

9. I have just received a letter to your address, from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, in which this Chief proposes to retire to Buiampoor with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, instead of returning to Nagpoor, conformably to the proposition that his own minister, Sercedhur Punt, first brought forward. I am too much accustomed to Marhatta tergiversations to be surprised at the disingenuous conduct of the Berar Rajah on the present occasion; but I must confess that I feel extremely hurt at my inability to leave the camp of the Maharajah this very day. I have acknowledged the receipt of the Bhoonslah's kharectah, and told him that I should march from this the instant that the roads were passable.

P.S. I have the honor to enclose the Bhoonslah's letter.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Col. Collins.

30th July, 1803.

I have received your letter, together with a copy of your address to Senah Saheb Soubah Behauder, and thoroughly understood the contents of both.

In consequence of the haste with which you require an answer, and urge your departure, Senah Saheb Behauder came to-day to my tent, where we had an interview. I shall return Senah Saheb Behauder's visit at 12 o'clock to-morrow, on which day do you also repair to his tent, when only 6 ghurries of daylight shall remain, that we may, in the presence of each other, discourse of whatever is to be discussed. It is not proper for you to hurry your march. Do not depart, but come to-morrow, at the time appointed, to the tents of Senah Saheb Soubah Behauder. Your going off with such expedition is repugnant to good sense.

Note. A letter, nearly to the same purport, was likewise written by Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to Col. Collins, which was received at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 31st July, 1803.

Col. Collins to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

6 A.M., 31st July, 1803.

I have received your favor, and understand its contents. In obedience to the commands of the Hon. Gen. Wellesley, it was my positive determination to march hence early this morning; but Capt. Lyons, the commanding officer of my escort, having represented to me that the roads were impassable for guns, on account of the heavy rains, I am necessarily obliged to halt here to-day. It is my chief wish to preserve the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between the two states; and this accident affords me an opportunity of complying with your desire of meeting me at the tent of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah this afternoon, at 3 o'clock.

Note. A letter, nearly to the same purport, was likewise written to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah by Col. Collins.

To Gen. Lake.

Sangwee, 29th July, 1803.

You will have received copies of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General addressed to me on the 26th and 27th ult., by which you will have been made acquainted with the means by which his Excellency proposed to bring to a close the important questions at present depending with the northern Marhatta chiefs.

I had long been of opinion that the only mode by which those questions could be brought to a close was to urge forward the decision whether there should be peace or war. This opinion was founded upon the knowledge I had that the territories of the Company and the allies would be protected, during the monsoon, by the temporary swelling of the rivers which rise in the western ghauts; that several important points in the territories of our enemies were exposed to our attacks during the same period; and that, from the nature of their troops and mode of warfare, compared with ours, that season was most unfavorable to their operations, and, although inconvenient in some respects, most favorable to ours. As soon, therefore, as I received the Governor General's instructions of the 26th June, I wrote to Col. Collins to desire that he would call upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to separate their armies, and retire to their own territories from the position which they had taken up contiguous to the Nizam's frontier, and to withdraw from their camp if he should find them disinclined to attend to this requisition.

I had previously written to Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon this subject, and had given him every assurance which he had required in his different conferences with Col. Collins upon points on which he stated that he entertained doubts; and from the result of different conferences between Scindiah's ministers and Col. Collins's Native servants, I am induced to hope that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will retire to their respective territories. In one, in particular, which Col. Collins's moonshee had with Scindiah's ministers on the 24th, it appeared that he was not confident in the strength and power of the confederates to contend with the British government, although he had been the person most anxious to form the confederacy; and he appeared to prefer the disgrace and disadvantage of a retreat at the present moment, of the extent of which he was perfectly aware, to the risk to be incurred in a contest with the British government.

But although the confederates may promise to break up and retire, it will not answer to allow them to delay that measure: particularly as, if they should not be sincere in their intentions to perform their promise, we shall lose the advantages which we now hold. I have, therefore, this day written to Col. Collins to desire that he will write to apprise them, that, if they do not separate and retire to their own territories on the day after they receive that letter, I shall commence operations in this quarter; and that I should acquaint your Excellency, and the officer commanding the troops in the Ganjam district, of this my intention, and of the circumstances which had occasioned it.

The troops under my command are stationed as follows: the Nizam's army, including the subsidiary force, are posted at Aurungabad, north of the river Godavery. The corps under my immediate command, including about 3000 Marhatta horse, and 2000 excellent horse belonging to the

Rajah of Mysore, are at Sangwee upon the Seenah, about 20 miles south eastward from Ahmednuggur, in which fort there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah; and there are 2 battalions of Native infantry under the command of Col. Murray at Poonah.

In the present season it is impossible for the enemy to make any impression on Guzerat; but since the troops in that province have been placed under my command, I have not been able to get a return of their number or disposition. I know, however, that the fort of Songhur, which is contiguous to the principal entrance into Guzerat, south of the Taptee, is occupied by our troops; and that a corps is in readiness in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda, to commence operations against Baroach, in which place there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah.

The enemy is posted in the following manner. The whole of Holkar's army is to the northward of the river Taptee: his troops are in the greatest distress, and I am informed that he has repeatedly refused to join Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. Scindiah is encamped at Julgong with 18,000 horse, 11 battalions of infantry, and 150 guns. The Rajah of Berar has likewise 20,000 horse, 6000 infantry, and 40 guns. Julgong is in the rear of the Adjuttee pass, near the Nizam's territories. Scindiah has an advanced corps of a few thousand horse in the Adjuttee hills.

My plan of operations, in case of hostilities, is to attack Ahmednuggur with my own corps, by the possession of which place I shall secure the communication with Poonah and Bombay, and keep the Nizam's army on the defensive upon his Highness' frontier. When I shall have finished that operation, and have crossed the Godavery, I shall then, if possible, bring the enemy to action.

As the passes through the Adjuttee hills are difficult, particularly for the large quantities of artillery which the enemy have, it is probable that Col. Stevenson may be able to succeed in preventing them from deploying their force on this side of the hills till I shall have joined him. If he should not, he is strong enough to defend himself, and the enemy will find it very difficult to pass through the hills again after I shall have crossed the Godavery.

The corps in Guzerat will attack Baroach, and, after having got possession of that place, I intend that the troops in that province should be collected as fast as circumstances may render necessary.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 29th July, 1803.

The letters which I send you this day will show you how matters stand in Scindiah's camp. I think it very probable that that Chief and the Rajah of Berar will retire immediately after Col. Collins shall have received my letter of this day, if they should have been suffered to remain in their positions so long. However, we may yet be disappointed; but if we should succeed in driving them off without striking a blow, I shall think we have accomplished a great object, and we shall have gained it by our steady perseverance in the plan of action originally laid down.

By letters which I have received from Gen. Stuart, I observe that he is much annoyed by the arrival of the French at their settlements on the

eastern coast; and the late disgraceful issue of the folly in Ceylon has increased his difficulties and his alarms.

The arrival of the Royal artillery at Trincomalee has been a fortunate event, and has, in some degree, made up for the loss sustained in the ill-fated expedition to Kandi: but still there is a great deficiency of the number of troops necessary for the defence of the island of Ceylon, particularly of Colombo and Pointe de Galle, in case there should be a French war; and this deficiency can be made up only from the establishment of Fort St. George.

The corps lately ordered to be raised at Fort St. George will not be fit for service for a great length of time; and even if we should have peace in this quarter, the necessity of providing for the security of Goa, of taking possession of the districts ceded by the Peshwah, of having some force in the Carnatic to guard against the French designs (particularly if there should be a war), and of checking the rebellion in Malabar, create demands for troops, which will render it quite impossible to supply the deficiency in the island of Ceylon.

Under these circumstances, it has occurred to me, that it would be advisable to collect 6 battalions of Bengal sepoy at Midnapore, as soon as the season will permit; to march them at the earliest possible period towards Hyderabad, to be stationed there; and then, as soon as they shall approach the Nizam's eastern frontier, either the corps allotted for Hyderabad, or that for Poonah, might fall back upon Mysore or the Ceded districts, to be at the disposal of the government of Fort St. George. This measure would give strength in the Deccan in the month of November, when it might be wanted; besides that, it would place, in the month of January, 6 good battalions at the disposal of the government of Fort St. George. It would also be attended by other advantages referrible to the Bengal establishment. The only question is, whether the troops can be spared from Bengal, of which I can be no judge: but I suggest the measure as a preventive of serious inconveniences for want of troops likely to be felt at Fort St. George, in case it should not be inconvenient in Bengal.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Sangwee, 29th July, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 26th. The expression inadvertently used in your letter to Gopal Bhow was unfortunate, to a chief of his rank, particularly at this moment. By a letter from Col. Collins, of the 25th, I observe that there was then the fairest prospect of peace; and it would be very unfortunate if this prospect were to be overturned by a mistake of this kind. Gopal Bhow appears sore about the expression, and it is probable he will complain to his sircar of it, and it may become a question of difficulty. I wish, therefore, that you would take an opportunity of explaining it: you might tell him that you had come unattended by the moonshee who usually writes your letters, and had made use of one whom you found in the village of Roora, who inserted in the letter an expression which you did not intend to use to a sirdar of his rank, in the service of a chief at peace with the British government. That you had heard that, notwithstanding the existence of the peace, he had entered the

Nizam's territories with his troops, and that you had advanced to defend them; and that, if fortunately he had not retired from them, your duty would have obliged you to adopt measures very disagreeable to you; but that you intended to explain that intention to him, and by no means to use an expression which could be offensive to, or hurt the feelings of, any individual.

I am happy to observe that your prospects in supplies are so much better than they were. Remember, however, that you cannot have too much, and I beg you to send out your brinjarries, &c., to get fresh loads as fast as you shall consume those they now have. I do not know how you have arranged your brinjarries: if you allow them to sell rice in the bazaar, the best thing you can do is to buy rice there for your grain department, and issue it at half a seer *per diem*, *gratis*, to the troops, and buy the grain from the brinjarries. I recommend, at all events, that you should not issue more, at any time, than half a seer to the troops; and, unless you should be hard pressed for rice, it is better always to issue that quantity. I do not know how you manage to give money in lieu of rice to the sepoys; for you know that they have already a fanam batta in lieu of rice. I therefore recommend that, when you find it necessary to stop the issue of rice, you should issue a sufficient quantity of some other grain, *gratis*, which you can buy in the bazaar, rather than give the money. You must take care to keep the company at Toka fed.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 30th July, 1803.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 16th, 18th, and 20th.

The tragical result of the military operations in Ceylon has added considerably to the difficulties of the present moment, for want of troops. There is no doubt but that Mr. North will require reinforcements from the government of Fort St. George, but I cannot imagine from what quarter they are to be sent.

I have certainly recovered much in point of means of moving; and I have not received any very great injury from the late rains. When the cattle which you have sent shall reach me, I shall be well supplied. I have besides some hopes, founded, however, upon promises, that I shall be able to bring forward the services of a large number of the Poonah brinjarries.

G. O.

30th July, 1803.

Inlying piquets of the infantry to mount at sunset this evening, and in future at the same time as the quarter guards mount, consisting of a company of each regiment and battalion, under the command of a subaltern officer. A captain of the day to mount in each brigade of infantry, who will have the immediate command of the inlying piquets of his brigade, under the orders of the field officer of the day. He will make himself acquainted with the particular situation of the company of each corps on this duty.

The officer commanding the companies will turn them out frequently during the day and night, to see that they are at all times present and accoutred. The captain of the day in each brigade will do the same, at least once during his tour of duty, and the field officer of the day is requested to inspect them. A brigade of 6 pounders, with its complement of artillerymen, gun lascars, and bullocks, to be held in readiness in the park to join the inlying piquets, when called for by the field officer of the day.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that the followers of the camp may not be sent near to Ahmednuggur for forage.

I have written to the Rajah of Kolapoor, and have spoken very seriously to his vakeel in this camp, respecting the conduct of Succaram Ghautky; and I think that the Rajah will be tranquil, and will not impede our communication. My letter to you upon the subject of the communication through the Nizam's country will have shown you that it is not much more secure than that which goes by Meritch. Indeed, as I know the Rajah of Kolapoor, and he knows us, I believe that we have a better hold upon him than we have upon the petty chiefs in the Nizam's territories. However, I shall alter the line of communication, if I should find it liable to be materially interrupted.

The departure of the French fleet is a sign either that war was declared when the corvette which arrived at Pondicherry left France, or that the declaration of war was expected immediately. The French Admiral may be expected to return to India, as soon as he shall be joined by his reinforcements. I hope that Adm. Rainier will also receive reinforcements.

I am infinitely obliged to you for the further reinforcement and supply, which you state in your letter of the 20th that you intended to send me. This makes me quite easy respecting the enemy in our front; and the position of Gen. Campbell's division secures my communication with, and the tranquillity of, the countries in my rear.

You will have observed, by my letter of the 7th, that I had thoughts of the measure you have suggested; but I persevered in the original plan, because, in fact, in the event of war, it is the best and most secure, and places all our further operations beyond a risk. I learned from Col. Collins's correspondence that my position caused the greatest uneasiness in Scindiah's camp; and, therefore, it was more likely to influence the result of the negotiation than any that I could take up beyond the Godavery; and, besides these two reasons for still maintaining it, it was necessary that I should look out for the important convoy expected under Major Dallas, of the march of which I received intelligence at the very time that I had it in contemplation to move across the Godavery. All these reasons still operate for adhering to the original plan; and I have besides to observe, that, as Scindiah has detached a part of his army to Hindustan, and as we now know, from his own ministers, that he has not yet arranged his peace with Holkar, there does not appear to be any chance of his being joined by the forces of that Chief, and, by this junction, becoming superior to Col. Stevenson. The Colonel has actually in his camp 23,000 men, all of whom are better troops than those of the enemy, and nearly 8000 of whom are probably the best troops in the Company's army. Upon the whole, therefore, I think it best to adhere to the original plan.

I shall attend particularly to your orders respecting any requisitions I may have to make upon Gen. Campbell's corps. Indeed, my former letters, as well as this, will show you, that I think a corps posted in the Doab is of greater importance than an increase to our forces in this quarter.

I have again to return you my thanks for your great kindness and attention to me in the arrangement which you propose to make, in case I should find it necessary to make a requisition upon Gen. Campbell: but, at all events, I am convinced that the General and I shall carry on the

service together with the harmony which you would wish ; and I shall certainly pay him every attention in my power. I conclude, however, that you intend that I should continue to keep you regularly informed of every thing that occurs here, although you have moved into the Carnatic.

I have received a letter from Col. Montresor, from which I observe, that the detachment intended for the security of Goa is marching through Canara, and is to move up one of the ghauts into Soonda, and march through that province to the Tenim ghaut. You are already apprized of my opinion, that they ought not to be posted on the Tenim ghaut till the month of October ; because the rains are more violent there than in the lower country, and will not cease till that period. But, at all events, I doubt whether it is practicable to move guns up any of the northern ghauts from Canara, excepting the Tenim ghaut ; and I am convinced that, if they can be moved by any of those roads, the troops will suffer much from bad weather and fatigue, as well as from want of supplies.

It is therefore my opinion, that the best mode of bringing the troops into the upper country is either by the Soobramany or by the Kindighul ghauts, from Mangalore into Mysore, and thence through the Savanore and Darwar countries to Hullihall in Soonda. If they should have passed Mangalore, they might come up the Hyderghur or Bilghy ghauts into the Nuggur country. If they come by the former they move by Shikarpoor and Massoor, through the Dooab of the Werdah and Toombuddra to Deogherry : if they come by the latter, they move by Chandergooty and Bonawassi, north of the Werdah, to Hoongul, near Bancapoor, and thence through the Savanore and Darwar countries to Hullihall.

I do not send any orders on this subject to Col. Spry, who commands these troops, because I do not know what orders you may have given him ; but I beg leave to recommend that they should be ordered to march by one of the roads I have above mentioned. The Bilghy ghaut is better than the Hyderghur.

I enclose a copy of a letter I received this day from Col. Collins. The Colonel has not done exactly as I desired him, but I think we shall yet have peace.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 30th July, 1803.

Upon the whole, I think that it will be as well to send down coolies from Poonah, and bring up a supply of rice from Panwell, if Capt. Young has it not in his power to send you one. The Mysore brinjaries will, I dare say, take 1200 bullock bags ; and 600, lately ordered to camp, will reduce your stock very much.

I have no fear of any of the forts between Poonah and Panwell ; and Angria will, I think, be as quiet as the others, if we are tolerably successful at first : much depends upon the first blow. I have no intention to keep the howitzers, or the 12 pounders. Gen. Campbell has taken up a position with a corps in the Dooab of the Kistna and Toombuddra, which relieves me from all anxiety respecting my rear and your position at Poonah. I should now wish, therefore, to secure the boats upon the Godavery rather better than they are secured at present, by sending for-

ward a battalion to that river. But I cannot venture to do that till I am joined by a battalion from Poonah. I wish therefore that you would order forward the 2nd batt. of the 3rd. They shall return to you, with the ordnance and artillery, as soon as the siege of Ahmednuggur is concluded. Capt. Campbell shall return after to-morrow's march, with the Bombay company.

To Col. Collins.

Roorie, on the Seenah, 31st July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th inst.* I am concerned that there should have been any fresh delay on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to engage to depart with his troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, and particularly that the ministers of that Chief should have given such futile reasons for refusing to comply with my requisition that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should retire.

Although the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are encamped within their own territories, they are in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier, and they have taken up that position after having threatened the Nizam's government, and after Scindiah had declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war. The assembly of so large a body of troops in such a station would at all times have been a subject of discussion between the British government and those Chiefs, and would have caused hostilities if the troops were not removed; but, under present circumstances, it is particularly necessary that they should withdraw; and any pacific declaration, not accompanied by a corresponding act, must be considered insincere, and intended only to gain time.

I have observed that the Chiefs have declared that they would not ascend the Adjunttee ghaut, or march towards Poonah, or attempt to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein; and they are satisfied with the assurance which I had given them, that the British government has no intention to interfere with them, and will never encourage or give support to the breach of treaties by the Peshwah, or by any of its allies. They now pretend that they want the same assurance from the Peshwah, although they must know that his Highness has no power to do them any injury, excepting that which he derives from the support of his government by the British troops.

In respect to the treaty between Scindiah and Holkar, notwithstanding the boasted union, it now appears that the peace is not yet concluded. But that can be no reason why Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should be allowed to remain encamped in a position in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier; on the contrary, it ought to be a reason for which Scindiah at least should be induced to move with his troops into those territories which he ought to guard against Holkar's depredations. These futile reasons for remaining with their troops in their positions on the Nizam's frontier are the strongest proofs of the insincerity of the declarations which the Chiefs have made; and I hope that, if they should not have satisfied you in your interview, you would have withdrawn from their camp, according to the request conveyed in my letter of the 11th inst.

* See p. 587.

But in case you should still be in their camp when this letter shall arrive there, I repeat the request which I made in my letter of the 29th, that you will withdraw forthwith, if they should not commence their march, with all their troops, towards their usual stations. The fact that Scindiah has not concluded his peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which is now acknowledged, is the strongest reason for pressing forward at the present moment the decision, whether there shall be peace with security, or war: besides, it is in conformity with the instructions from his Excellency the Governor General.

To the Gov. of Bombay.

Rooie, on the Seenah, 31st July, 1803.

1. Lieut. Col. Close has communicated to me the letters from the Sec. to the government of Bombay of the 17th and 23rd inst., with their enclosures, and I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd inst.

2. I shall take an early opportunity of replying to the letter; but I now think it proper to address you upon some subjects to which the enclosures in the former relate.

3. I observe that, by the proceedings of the Committee at Surat, of the 15th inst., nothing had been done till that day towards throwing into Songhur supplies of provision or ammunition. Reference had been made to European and Native officers, but no decided step had been taken.

4. It appears that the garrison which Lieut. Col. Callander has proposed to allot to that place is to be 150 European troops and 100 Native troops; and it appears that the Committee have information, upon which they place reliance, that there are no provisions whatever for this force. It surely requires no reference to find out the quantity of provisions which it will be necessary to place in Songhur for the use of the description and number of troops, for any given number of months; and long before the meeting of the 15th inst. the provisions for those small bodies might have been sent off.

5. I also observe, that the Committee are disposed to attend to the report upon the state of the ordnance and ammunition at Songhur, although they have taken no measures to remedy the inconveniences reported.

6. They ought, at all events, to have taken measures to supply the deficiencies of musket ammunition and ordnance carriages, which they believed existed; and it might be proper to send an officer of the engineers or artillery, or any one who might be supposed to be qualified to give an opinion, to examine this fort, and to report particularly on its state.

7. I advert to this circumstance particularly, because it is my opinion that the fort of Songhur is most important for the defence of the Attavasy, and for the security of Surat itself.

8. I have also to observe upon the minute of Lieut. Col. Callander, upon the subject of the retreat of Capt. Bates. I am not certain in what part of the country that officer was stationed; or whether he falls under my command, according to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General: if he should be so, I request to have all the documents upon the subject; and if I find there are grounds for it, I shall order a General Court Martial to inquire into Capt. Bates' conduct.

9. If you should be of opinion that he is not under my command, I beg leave to recommend to you to have an inquiry into his conduct.

10. I advert to this circumstance particularly, because it has been reported in a manner very disadvantageous to the credit and honor of the British arms in this country; and I considered it of so much importance, that I took the trouble of tracing the report to its source, and was on the point of bringing to trial the officer who had reported, as I supposed, without foundation, so disgraceful an occurrence.

11. I have perused the letter from the killadar of Loghur, of the 19th inst., and I beg you to inform him, that, provided he and the family of Nana Furnavees give no assistance to the enemies of the Peshwah or of the British government, and he pays the accustomed obedience to the Peshwah's orders, they shall receive no molestation.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug. 1803.

I have approached towards Ahmednuggur, in order to urge forward the negotiation in Scindiah's camp; and I learn that some of the troops have been sent out from that place. I suspect that they may have been sent with a view to annoy the company that has charge of my boats on the river; and therefore I shall send there three more companies to-morrow morning. I wish, however, that they had a gun, and shall be much obliged to you if you will send them one, as, considering the operation that I have in view, I have none to spare. I also hope that you will send them 100 bags of rice.

I wish that you would open a communication, by means of cossids, with the officer commanding a detachment of British troops in the fort of Songhur. This fort is in a ghaut which leads down to Surat, and is on this side of the Taptee. It is beyond Chandore. Take into pay 2 or 3 pairs of hircarrahs that well know the road, and have them in readiness to start when I shall send you letters. Send a few loads of musket ammunition to the detachment at Toka, as well as rice.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug. 1803.

I enclose a paper which I received yesterday from Col. Stevenson. It is the copy of a letter written to Salabut Khan by an agent of his in the Bhoonslah's camp.

Some days ago, Salabut Khan asked whether there was any objection to his writing to, and receiving letters from, Ragojee Bhoonslah? To which question I answered that I had none, as it was very clear that, even if I should object to this correspondence, I could not prevent it, if the parties should choose to carry it on. Salabut Khan said that he thought that Ragojee wished to commence a correspondence with him, in order to try if he could preserve peace; and I desired Col. Stevenson to tell Salabut Khan that, if Ragojee Bhoonslah wished for peace, there was one mode, and but one mode, of insuring it, and that was for him to return with his troops to Nagpoor; and that if he did not return to that place he would certainly be attacked.

The enclosed paper is probably an answer to that letter, written by Salabut Khan, and what I have above stated will account for part of its

contents. But that is not the most material part; for it likewise contains intelligence that the Peshwah is treating with the enemy. I should pass unnoticed this intelligence, if I had not observed that Salabut Khan's correspondent in Ragojee Bhoomslah's camp is far more intelligent than the general run of these news writers; and I know that he writes accounts of almost every thing that passes in the durbar of that chief. But whether the intelligence is true or false, it is very certain that we have not the smallest knowledge of the nature or the objects of the communications between the Peshwah and Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar; notwithstanding the obvious necessity that we should have that knowledge, as well as the stipulations of the treaty which provide for it. Indeed, the Peshwah's ministers in Scindiah's durbar, instead of acting in co-operation or communication with the British Resident, have recommended to Col. Collins a line of conduct which, in the opinion of all the persons employed by the British government, must lead to a war, to be carried on under very disadvantageous circumstances.

I most earnestly request you to adopt all means in your power to find out what passes in the Peshwah's durbar; and particularly the nature and objects of his communications with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. If representations founded on the treaty will not produce the effect of disclosing what we must know, let other means be adopted; let expense be incurred to gain the necessary intelligence; and if you should find that Ragonaut Rao will not disclose to you all that he knows, it is my opinion that you ought to hold no further communication with him, as it is very obvious that he has no influence over his employer. If he does not disclose all, he is not honest to the British cause; and his communications have uniformly been found to be false.

I am aware that, although you may make a friend of Ragonaut Rao, and even of Suddasheo Munkaiseer, you will not be able to guide the Peshwah's councils; because, in fact, he is guided by nothing, excepting his own caprice and resentment. But you will have intelligence of what is passing in the durbar, upon which we can rely, instead of groping our way in the dark, as we do at present. If the Peshwah should be really carrying on a correspondence with Scindiah, in breach of the treaty, we may in this manner have it in our power to lay hold of it, and thus have a ground for making a solid arrangement of the Poonah government.

Goklah has approached me: but a carkoon, whom he sent to me this morning, says that Suddasheo Munkaiseer reproaches him, in a letter written 4 days ago, for not advancing; and says that he has had 2 months' pay, and now wants a third, for which he has done nothing. Goklah, however, says that he will not move unless I shall desire it; and I have taken the most effectual steps to prevent his moving, as I have told him that, if he does march upon Sungumnair, Amrut Rao, who is stronger than him, will beat him back. The object of the expedition against Amrut Rao is not to prevent the plunder of the Peshwah's countries by that chief, but to seize Sungumnair.

A letter came in from Amrut Rao's camp this morning, (the *vakeel* writes it,) and says that his master is under some apprehension in consequence of the approach of Gopal Bhow towards Nassuck. This chief,

however, has probably gone that way only to avoid Col. Stevenson. If he is gone to attack Amrut Rao, there is strong ground to suspect the Peshwah of communicating with Scindiah, on subjects of which we are not aware. I intend to write to Amrut Rao to desire him to come to my camp, if he should have reason to fear Gopal Bhow.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug. 1803.

From the copies of the correspondence between the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and myself, which will have been sent to you, you will have observed that the question, whether there will be peace or war, will be decided in a few days. I think that there is some reason to hope that we may have peace, but we may also be obliged to commence hostilities: even in this event, some time will elapse before any impression can be made on the Nizam's territories; but, as I observe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are sending away their infantry to Hindustan, and retaining, with their camps, only their cavalry and some of their guns, it is probable that, if there should be a war, they will carry on their operations with those troops only. Even if this should be their plan, I have no apprehensions for the result of the contest; but it becomes more necessary to guard against all sudden attacks on points of importance. Notwithstanding the best intelligence of the enemy's designs, and the best arrangements, it is obvious that a body of cavalry may pass one of our armies, and that much mischief may be done before a remedy can be applied, unless every point of importance is in some degree guarded. If places of this description should be guarded and prepared for their defence at all, this mode of operation, which I have supposed that the confederates have in their contemplation, cannot have any permanent effect, and will do but little temporary injury to the country.

I therefore most earnestly recommend that garrisons, even of peons, should be placed in all the principal posts and forts in the Nizam's territories, particularly Aurungabad, Moongy Puttun, Kurdlah, Bheer, Perinda, Beeder, &c. &c., and that a body of troops should be collected at Hyderabad. Even if the enemy should be able to pass our armies, the adoption of these means will prevent them from gaining any thing by this invasion: the village peons alone will render their subsistence difficult and precarious, and they will be obliged to retire.

But I recommend these measures not only with a view to the defeat of the enemy's designs, but to insure the tranquillity of the country in the event of the Nizam's death. The establishment of the British troops at Hyderabad has been the cause of a great diminution of the numbers of his Highness' army, and many, who subsisted on the pay they received in his Highness' service, have been obliged to look for subsistence in other employments not so agreeable to them. There must be many discontented people in those countries, all of whom would be ready to join the standard of any chief who might be desirous to take advantage of the weakness of the new government, and of the moment in which the British troops and those of his Highness should be employed against the enemy upon the frontier, to assume independence. Considering the ambition of the Natives in general, it will not be denied that there may be chiefs disposed

to adopt this line of conduct; but the measures of precaution which I have recommended will give employment to a great proportion of the military classes of the community, and will prevent such chiefs from finding instruments to carry their purposes into execution.

Gen. Stuart will have informed you, that a reserve, under the command of Major Gen. Campbell, has been left in the Dooab of the Kistna and Toombuddra, the object of which is in some degree to check the designs of the discontented chiefs, in the event of the Nizam's death; but still no measure can check them with so much certainty as to deprive them of the instrument which they could use to carry them into execution.

I observe, that the fort of Perinda is still held by Nizam Nawaz Jung's killadar, and he refuses to give it up to the persons sent there by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to take possession of it. In case Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should retire, according to my requisition, and we should consequently have peace, I have reason to believe that it will not be inconvenient to me to send a detachment to assist Rajah Mohiput Ram's killadar, and if possible put him in possession of that fort.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Oliver, Toka.

Walker, 1st Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley intends to detach 3 companies of sepoy tomorrow morning, under the command of Capt. Campbell, in order to reinforce the guard over the boats on the Godavery, at present under your charge; and he reckons that they will be 3 days in reaching you. He has no information of any danger threatening the boats, but sends the above detachment from hence, and will write to Col. Stevenson to send down a gun, as measures of precaution; and until those reinforcements arrive he recommends that you should transport your company and the boats (which he concludes you will have already drawn up into the Prowerah) to the left bank of that river; that is, into the dooab between it and the Godavery. On the arrival of Capt. Campbell's detachment you will place yourself under the orders of that officer.

You will please to acknowledge the receipt of this letter and all others which you may receive on this service.

Capt. Campbell will proceed by the Saulmulla Ghaut. Desire Yenket Rao to send a party of horse off immediately to meet him upon that road, and give the party a note from you to announce who they are.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Campbell, H.M. 84th regt.

Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will march at an early hour tomorrow morning, with the detachment detailed in the orders of this day, by the route which has been delivered to you, and endeavour to reach Toka on the Godavery in 3 marches. Lieut. Oliver is there at present, with a company of the 1st batt. 6th regt. from Col. Stevenson's detachment, guarding a number of boats collected there for eventual service, with orders not to allow any armed men, horse or foot, to cross the river by means of those boats, without an order in writing from Major Gen. Wellesley or Col. Stevenson; and he has been lately directed to draw those boats up into the Prowerah River, which is to the southward of the Godavery, and to transport his detachment to the left bank of the Prowerah. He has a party of 400 Mysore cavalry with him, has been apprized of your march and route, and directed to send out a detachment of the cavalry to meet you.

On your joining Lieut. Oliver you will take the command of the 2 detachments; and the General recommends that you keep the boats on the Prowerah high enough up to be out of reach of shot across the Godavery, and that you keep your detachment in the dooab between those rivers. He has no information of any body of men on this side of the Godavery having guns, and he therefore conceives that you will be perfectly secure in the above position; but constant inquiry and

vigilance will be necessary, as the safety of the boats is a matter of great importance. With a view to further that object, he has directed a gun to be sent to you from Aurungabad, as well as some musket ammunition and provisions; and in case of necessity he recommends your embarking your detachment and proceeding in the boats to any plain up or down the river that may be necessary.

In addition to the instruction already given to Lieut. Oliver, he requests that you will not attend to any order, either by himself or Col. Stevenson, for allowing any armed men to pass the river by the boats, unless the same shall be presented within 2 days of its date. He also requests that you will inquire when any more boats may be on the Godavery or Prowerah, and report to him, with your opinion of the mode and practicability of seizing them and bringing them to your station, but you are not to attempt to do so without his orders.

The orders on this head do not apply to European officers or parties of the Company's troops. Hircarrahs having a note from me, or probably only my initials, R. B., on a bit of paper, to be always passed over without delay. There are many, however, out now who have no credentials of that sort, but will pass as unarmed men.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 31st.

The rice is not yet come in, but if we should find it damaged, we must call for an additional quantity. In the mean time, however, I requested you, in my letter of the 24th of July, to take measures to keep the depôt at Poonah full.

You will receive, by this day's post, orders to carry into execution the sentence of the General Court Martial on the 2 sepoys. Lieut. Burnes' letter is a curious production; and I beg that you will do me the favor to inform him, that, for reasons which I thought valid, but which I do not think it necessary to communicate to him, I thought it proper to bring the prisoners, Hurry Sing and Hurry Rao, to trial for the crime of desertion only; and that, in future, I beg that he will do me the favor to confine his attention to his own business, and leave my duty to be done by myself and the officers appointed to assist me.

I omitted to inform you that I had written to Mr. Duncan, to request that the dollars which he has, of the value of nearly 20 lacs of rupees, might be sent to Poonah, in order to be coined into rupees for your use.

P. S. Let your communication with Lieut. Burnes be verbal, as I wish to avoid all future correspondence upon this subject. Indeed, that mode of communication is to be preferred on all occasions.

To the Gov. of Bombay.

Camp, 2nd Aug. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th July, in which you have enclosed the copy of a letter of the 1st July, from his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon, in which his Excellency desires to have from Surat the assistance of a regiment of European infantry.

You will have observed, from my late correspondence with Col. Collins, copies of which have been transmitted to you, that the question of peace or war with the northern Marhatta Chiefs is not yet decided: if there

G. O.

Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that the officers will not ride out much beyond the piquets in the direction of Ahmednuggur; as their going near the fort or pettah may be disagreeable to the killadar, and they may meet with interruption from his men stationed in the intermediate villages.

should be a war, there are not more troops in Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, than are absolutely necessary for their defence; and if there should be peace, as some time will elapse before the large Marhatta armies which are now collected upon the frontier will disperse, and as, in obedience to the order of his Excellency the Governor General, it will be necessary to observe the designs of the French upon Damaun, and to have the means of preventing them from carrying them into execution, I conceive that you ought not to weaken your forces in that quarter.

I am very sensible of the importance of Trincomalee, and regret the misfortunes which have endangered the safety of that place; but I observe, that a very large detachment of the Royal artillery had arrived there, with which event it is probable that his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon had not been acquainted when he wrote to you on the 1st July, as that reinforcement, in fact, makes the garrison stronger in European troops than it was before the detachment of the 19th regt. marched upon the expedition to Kandi. I have also heard, through private channels, that the Malay troops did not desert to the enemy, as was first reported; but that, finding the officer determined to lay down his arms, and being aware of the treachery and cruelty of the Kandians, they expected the disastrous consequences which followed, and fled to the jungles, and that several of them had since arrived with their arms at Trincomalee. If this account should be true, that garrison, reinforced as it has been by the detachment of the Royal artillery, will be in no danger.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd July; and having taken into consideration the measures to be adopted for the defence of Guzerat, and of the districts depending upon Surat, I proceed to detail my ideas upon that subject.

2. The line for which a defence is to be provided extends from the marsh which divides Cutch from Guzerat to Parneira, across several large rivers; and the countries which it is to cover are liable to be attacked by different enemies, operating at the same time from different quarters.

3. The forces allotted for the defence of these countries, are:

			<i>Eur.</i>	<i>Nat.</i>
Artillery . . .	Surat . .	78		
	Guzerat . .	110	188	
Gun lascars . .	Surat . .	139		
	Guzerat . .	200		330
H. M.'s 61st regt. .	Surat . .	45		
	Guzerat . .	109		
— 65th . .	Surat . .	763		
— 75th . .	Surat . .	573		
• — 84th . .	Surat . .	272		
• — 86th . .	Guzerat . .	815		
— 88th . .	Surat . .	148	2725	
1st batt. 1st regt. N. I.	Guzerat . .	625		
2nd batt. 1st regt. do.	Guzerat . .	697		
1st batt. 6th regt. do.	Surat . .	1218		
	Guzerat . .	101		
2nd batt. 6th regt. do.	Guzerat . .	763		
2nd batt. 7th regt. do.	Guzerat . .	696		4100
			2913	4439

making a total of rank and file, including sick, of 2913 Europeans, and 4439 Natives.

4. Besides these troops, Rajah Anund Rao, I conclude, has a body of cavalry, with the number of which I am unacquainted, and possibly some infantry.

5. It appears, by a paper drawn up by Col. Reynolds, which I have received from Lieut. Col. Close, that the districts depending upon Surat can be entered by an army from the eastward only by the road which leads by Songhur.

6. There are other ghauts, but they are not practicable for wheel carriages; and the whole range of mountains is in the possession of Bheels, whose exertions would prevent the invasion of any party of marauding horse.

7. This fact points out the necessity of cultivating a good understanding with, and encouraging, the Bheels, so as to attach them to our cause.

8. When that object shall have been attended to, there will remain to provide for the roads into the districts depending upon Surat, from the Peshwah's district to the southward, and from the eastward by Songhur.

9. It appears, by the papers transmitted by Col. Reynolds, that there is no passage for an army coming from the eastward through the Shatpoor hills, between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, excepting by skirting the province of Malwa; but, as far as I can learn, the country is open north of the river Nerbudda.

10. Besides these principal passages into these districts, which are to be defended, it appears that the following objects are to be provided for:

- 1st. The security of Surat.
- 2nd. A garrison for Baroda.
- 3rd. A garrison for Cambay.
- 4th. A garrison for Kanah.
- 5th. A garrison for Kurrah.
- 6th. Eventually a garrison for Baroach.

Garrisons are also required for Songhur on the eastern frontier, and Parneira on the southern, in order to guard those inlets into the districts south of the Taptee.

11. It is my opinion that the troops in the districts under Surat, and those in the districts under Anund Rao, ought to be placed under one commanding officer, whose head quarters ought to be at Surat: they ought all to be liable to be moved from one district to the other, according as he might find it necessary for the security of any part from impending invasion.

12. From the topographical description of the country received from Col. Reynolds, to which I have above alluded, it is obvious that the armies which may invade Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, can penetrate either from the northward of the Nerbudda, or the southward of the Taptee, by Songhur only. It is very improbable that a serious invasion will be made from both quarters at the same time. The chief most likely to invade those territories has not forces sufficient to form two armies, either of them capable of meeting the disposable force in the districts, when joined by Rajah Anund Rao's cavalry. Whenever

a serious invasion therefore is made, it will be by a large army in one quarter, and by light plundering parties in the other. But if there is one commanding authority in the districts, he cannot be without intelligence of the force and disposition of the enemy's troops; and before the enemy can pass round the Shatpoor hills, he can make a disposition of all the troops to repel the northern or the southern invasion, according to his intelligence of the enemy's disposition.

13. In my opinion, therefore, the following arrangement ought to be made:

1st. One officer of rank ought to be appointed to command in the Attavesy and Guzerat. Lieut. Col. Woodington may still command the troops immediately north of the Nerbudda, under such officer.

2ndly. The works of the castle of Surat ought to be put in a state of repair. If the castle of Surat is in such a position as that it is commanded by the neighbouring grounds, it ought to be destroyed; and field works to be erected in a commanding situation, without loss of time, for the defence of the troops allotted for the security of that important city:

Detachment of artillery	.	.	.	30
H. M.'s 75th regt.	.	.	.	573
1st batt. 6th regt. N. I.	.	.	.	500—1103

ought to be the troops allotted for the security of Surat.

3rdly. The garrison of Baroda ought to be:

Artillery	.	.	.	20
Detachment of H. M.'s 61st regt.	.	.	.	151
Detachment of H. M.'s 88th regt.	.	.	.	100
2nd batt. 7th regt. N. I.	.	.	.	696—970

giving detachments as hereafter stated to other garrisons, and leaving 411 Native infantry in Baroda.

4th. The garrison of Cambay ought to be, as at present, 25 rank and file, from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

5th. The garrison at Kairah ought to be 3 artillerymen and 100 rank and file, as at present, from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

6th. The garrison at Kurrah, 60 rank and file, as at present, from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

7th. The garrison for Baroach, eventually 48 rank and file of the 88th, 12 artillery, and 100 rank and file from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

8th. The garrison of Songhur ought to be 12 rank and file, artillery; 100 rank and file of the 84th; and 100 rank and file of the 1st batt. 6th regt.

9th. The garrison of Parneira ought to be 12 rank and file, artillery; 172 rank and file of the 84th; and 200 rank and file 1st batt. of the 6th.

14. I do not see the advantage of the posts in Dholluah and Gogo, or at Rampore, or of the small detachments, according to the returns, situated in any of the places in the districts ceded by the Peshwah. The officer appointed to command will, however, be the best judge upon this subject, and will post detachments in those places, if he should think it proper: these small detachments are ruinous to the discipline and spirit of the troops; they weaken the corps to such a degree, that they are unfit

for service in the field, and they answer no adequate purpose. In my opinion, in time of war, and particularly in such a war as one with the Marhattas, it would be best to authorize the collectors to raise secondary troops for these services: the expenses would be but trifling, and, in fact, cannot bear a comparison with the benefit which must be derived from the measure.

15. In all parts of India, particularly in those territories which have belonged to the Marhattas, there is a numerous class of people, whose only occupation and only mode of procuring subsistence has been the military service. This class is usually entirely deprived of subsistence by the transfer of the government of those countries to the Company; and they are driven to seek for it either in rebellion at those moments when the British troops are engaged in foreign wars, or in the armies of our enemies: these they are ready to lead into our districts, with all the knowledge derived from long residence and service within them, and they become, in fact, our most dangerous enemies.

16. The employment of these people, therefore, at such time, as secondary, is advantageous, not only as it saves the regular troops, and gives a larger body of troops for field service, and prevents the loss of their discipline, but because it lessens the number of idle and discontented at the time of general invasion and confusion, and that of our most dangerous enemies.

17. Having thus provided for the principal garrisons and stations in Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, there will remain for service in the field:

Artillery	99
H. M.'s 65th regt.	763
----- 86th	815
1st batt 1st .. N. I.	625
2nd do .. do	697
1st 6th .. do.	519
2nd do. . do.	763

18. These corps ought to be divided into two detachments, one, consisting of 50 artillery, the 86th regt., and 2 Native battalions, to be stationed in a convenient situation north of the Nerbudda, and in front of Baroda. the other, consisting of 49 artillery, the 65th regt., and 2 Native battalions, at another south of the Taptee, between Surat and Songhur.

19. In the cantonments with these two detachments ought to be the necessary proportion of ordnance and stores. namely, two 6 pounders for each corps, and two 12 pounders, and two 5½ inch howitzers, for each detachment. Camp equipage for these detachments ought to be in readiness at Baroda and Surat.

20. In case the commanding officer should receive intelligence that an invasion was threatened to the northward, he should move the southern detachment across the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, and collect all his troops in that quarter; excepting one battalion, which he might leave at Songhur, to operate upon the enemy's marauding parties, if the Bheels should be friendly, and should have engaged to stop the passages by the other ghauts; or to be thrown into Surat, to reinforce that garrison, if they should not.

21. On the other hand, if he should be obliged, from circumstances, to

bringing the northern detachment to the southward, he might leave one battalion to reinforce the garrison of Baroda, and to operate, with Rajah Anund Rao's horse, upon the enemy's marauding parties, who might attempt to penetrate in the absence of the detachment.

22. In this manner, and by bringing forward Rajah Anund Rao's horse and infantry, there would be a disposable force for the field purposes in those districts, which, in the most essential parts of a British army, namely, British soldiers, would be stronger than at present under my immediate command; and, with the aid of Anund Rao's horse, and supported by the strong places, they would in that country be equal to any thing that could be brought against them.

23. I have also to observe that, under this arrangement, all the principal points in the country are secured

24. It is true that, in the absence of the detachment from either the northern or the southern division, that in which there are no troops is in some degree liable to be injured by marauding horse. That is an evil which cannot be entirely avoided, so long as the British armies are composed entirely of infantry, and those of the enemy of cavalry; but, if the forts in the country are kept up, and in times of war the security of the country are hired and paid, even that evil must be of short duration, as it is well known that no number of horse can find their way into a fort without the assistance of guns.

25. Having thus considered the disposition and distribution of the troops in these districts, it is proper that I should advert to their means of subsistence.

26. It is my opinion that, when the commanding officer shall have reason to believe that he may have occasion to employ these troops in the field, sufficient carriage for one month's provisions ought immediately to be provided for them. Besides this carriage, magazines ought to be formed, and always ready, at Parneira, Soughur, Surat, Cambay, Baroach, Baroda, Kairah, and Kurrach, of all those species of provisions and stores required for the troops, which might be scarce in the country in case of invasion; particularly arrack and biscuit for the Europeans, and rice for the Natives.

27. These would be necessary even for defensive operations: those of an offensive nature would require different measures, and more extensive arrangement, which must be ordered at the time when those operations are in contemplation.

28. This arrangement, when carried into execution, will be applicable to all purposes, will put the troops in the Guzerat and Attavesy in a state and shape for service, and I shall know how to avail myself of their services in the course of the campaign; accordingly, I request, if you should approve of it, that you will give orders that it may be carried into execution as soon as possible.

29. As his Excellency the Governor General has been pleased to give orders, in his letter to you of the 9th July, that the troops in those districts should be placed under my command, I imagine that Major Gen. Jones will return to Bombay; and, as it will be necessary that the officer who will have that extensive charge should be one of character, capacity,

and rank, upon reference to the list of the Bombay army, I should think that Sir W. Clarke and Col. Murray are the most fit for such an employment.

30. The former already fills a situation, from which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to relieve him immediately; and, if you approve of the latter, I should recommend him.

31. When he shall undertake this important charge, it will be necessary that he should have the full confidence of government, all the military power that they can give him, for the exercise of which he should be responsible to them and the Commander in Chief, and therein supported on all occasions.

32. He ought to be desired to attend to the requisitions of the Resident at Baroda, and of the civil authority of Surat, as far as circumstances will permit him; but, as his attention will be entirely engrossed by his military duties, and by the defence of the countries committed to his charge, it does not appear to me to be necessary that he should belong to the committee or commission at Surat, or that he should be troubled with their civil duties or arrangements.

33. On the other hand, they all have nothing to do with his duties, excepting to make requisitions upon him for military assistance when they may require it.

34. I cannot conclude this letter without requesting that you will urge the gentlemen at Surat to keep on terms with the Bheels: these appear to be a race of the same description with those who inhabit the hills in all parts of India. By conciliation, and refraining from an interference with their concerns, they will prove our best friends; and a contrary line of conduct will make them our worst enemies. It must not be expected that we should involve ourselves in the affairs of these Bheels, or press them for tribute.

The number of troops I have above detailed will be sufficient for the protection of the valuable territory of which you have got possession: they will not be sufficient for the subjection even of one of their rajahs; and, from what I have seen of the service in other parts of India, I have no hesitation in declaring my opinion, that, as a measure of economy, it would be better to give up all claims of tribute that the Company might have upon any of these rajahs, than to receive it at the risk of the expense of being obliged to enforce its payment at some future day.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas, Actg. Judge Advocate.

Walker, 2nd Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter, covering the proceedings of the Native General Court Martial, which assembled at Poonah on the 22nd ult.

When the Court is re-assembled in order that the confirmed sentence may be read to the prisoners, the General requests that you will inform the president and members that he would have been happy to attend to their recommendation of the prisoners for mercy, but that he has observed the crime of which they have been convicted is so common as to require an example; and also because it appears, by their own confession, that they were concerned in the theft committed in an officer's tent at Poonah, which is among the most unpardonable of all crimes which soldiers can be guilty of; and he has therefore felt it to be his duty to order the execution of the sentence, so justly awarded to the prisoners.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Walkee, 3rd Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch for the Governor General, which I request you to peruse and forward to his Excellency.

I have just received your letter of the 25th July. I think that the plan according to which you propose, in the 5th paragraph, to send forward any bullocks you may be able to hire at Hyderabad, will answer well. But it would be desirable that Col. Stevenson or I should be apprised of the departure from Hyderabad of any more of these cattle.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Walkee, 3rd Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch dated the 30th July, and copies of its enclosures,* which I received this day from Col. Collins.

I am at present encamped within 6 miles of the fort of Ahmednuggur, which place I am fully prepared to attack as soon as I shall learn that Col. Collins has quitted the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

To Ramchunder Pursheram.

3rd Aug. 1803.

I am concerned to find that, notwithstanding you were satisfied on all the points which you referred to me at different times, in your march in company with the troops under my command from the river Kistna to Poonah, and your repeated promises to Major Malcolm, conveyed to me from time to time, stating that you would march from Poonah to join me, you have hitherto remained behind: and at last you have moved to the southward, to a greater distance from the city; and, in disobedience of the orders of his Highness the Peshwah, in breach of your promises to me, and in opposition to the remonstrances of Lieut. Col. Close, you intend to return to your residence in the neighbourhood of the river Kistna. You know well that there is no occasion for your presence in that quarter; because, since I have interfered between you and the Rajah of Kolapoor, all matters there have been in a state of greater tranquillity than has been known for years: your presence in that quarter, therefore, may be more hurtful than beneficial to your own interests.

But that consideration is trifling in comparison with the evils which your interests must sustain from a breach of the solemn promises you have made to me. A performance of these would insure to you, at all times, the powerful protection of the Company's government: your interests would always be considered as their own, and, as their friend in this state, you must have risen to the honors which your ancestors enjoyed. But the crooked policy which you appear disposed to adopt must preclude all hope of those advantages; and, on the other hand, you are much mistaken if you suppose that it can lead to your advantage, under any contingency. Therefore, for your own sake, I most anxiously entreat you to review your situation; to consider well your own interests and future prospects; and adopt at once a decided line of conduct, and join this army. I write to you as a friend who knows your interests well, and also has an anxious desire to see your affairs prosper.

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 250. Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Governor General, 31st July, 1803.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 3rd Aug. 1803.

I enclose a packet for Mr. Duncan, which I request you to peruse and forward: likewise one containing a dispatch from Col. Collins, of the 30th; from the perusal of which there appears a probability that the Colonel quitted the camp on the 31st. Have a copy taken of that dispatch, and send it to Mr. Duncan.

We must take a convenient opportunity of bringing Appah Saheb to his senses: in the mean time, if the Peshwah admits his objection to be valid, he ought to take some other mode of producing his 16,000 men according to the treaty. The question about Bulwunt Rao Nagonath's claim of choute is still in obscurity. Is it a claim which has always been admitted, or one which is disputed, and liable to arbitration?

In respect to the choute paid to Amrut Rao during his usurpation, the Peshwah must stand to the loss of that revenue, as well as to that of every other seized by force in the same manner. He cannot have a right to two choutes, any more than two revenues from any village in the same year; and as choute is a claim which, above all others, depends upon the sword, I do not think that it would be reasonable to demand a second payment of it, in favour of a man who appears incapable of using one.

You will observe, by my letter to Mr. Duncan, that I propose to take Col. Murray away from Poonah: Col. Colman will command there for the present, and I think that he will conduct the business well. However, I shall keep up a constant correspondence with him, and will keep him right.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Harness, comm. the 4th brigade.

3rd Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you the accompanying letter from the agent for public cattle, reporting another indent for the exchange of puckaly bullocks for the 78th regt.

As it is notorious that puckaly bullocks, with all other corps, last much longer than bullocks employed in any other manner whatever, it is evident that the numbers destroyed on that duty in the 78th regt. must be owing to the want of care, or to the animals being overworked. The General, therefore, requests that you will give orders that the puckaly bullocks employed with the 78th regt. may be placed under the management of the quarter master, who will be held responsible that proper care is taken of them, and that they are not made to bring more water, or do any other work, than is prescribed by the regulations.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Kettle, Goorgherry.

4th Aug. 1803.

I have laid your letter of the 28th ult. before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, and enclose a letter from him to the amildar or head man of the village of Bug-warrie, commanding him to release the tappall peons and give up the sticks, and threatening him with the severest punishment, if the tappall peons are again molested at his village. I request you will send the letter to him, and forward any answer which he may send, as well as inform me of his future behaviour.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 5th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 3rd. It is very desirable that we should have the Governor General's opinion on the proposition which I made to you; but time must elapse before we can receive it, and the critical moment will pass by, in which we should derive all the benefits that I expect from the adoption of the measure. You have stated two objections to it: one, that Ragonaut Rao has never made any advances, since

you informed him that the British government would reward his services; the other, that the ministers at the Nizam's durbar were pensioned, with the knowledge of his Highness, from which I conclude that you are of opinion that the same course ought to be adopted in respect to the rewards to be given to those of the Peshwah.

In respect to the first objection, I have to observe that Ragonaut Rao has lately urged a request that he might be considered by the British government, in case his enemies should prevail, and should drive him from the situation which he at present fills; but, supposing that he had not urged this request, it is not possible that a better opportunity should offer of bringing this subject forward, than that which suggested it to me some days ago.

You might, in my opinion, communicate to Ragonaut Rao the ackbar from Scindiah's camp, which states that the Peshwah had written a letter to that Chief, and that which I sent to you, which states that he was dissatisfied with his alliance with the British government; the uneasiness which I, and every person concerned on the part of the British government, felt upon this subject; particularly, as we all observe that there was a constant, nay, a daily intercourse, between the Peshwah and the northern Chiefs; and that, notwithstanding the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, not only we were unacquainted with the nature and objects of these communications, but we could get no account whatever of them from the Peshwah or his ministers. On these grounds, in my opinion, you might urge Ragonaut Rao to a disclosure of the objects of this correspondence; and might tell him that you should reward him, if you found that he was so far a friend to the alliance, as to make you acquainted with all that passed at the Peshwah's durbar, of which you ought to have a knowledge.

It will not be objected to this measure, that a Marhatta, bred at Madras, particularly after he has solicited the rewards of the British government, will be hurt or offended at this proposition: but you may be of opinion, that as he knows that you have promised him a reward, and that he must be equally satisfied with that engagement as he would be with the possession of the reward, to give it is attended with risk, and may produce no benefit. In answer, I have to observe that no Native ever trusts to a promise; and, as the bribery of the ministers of a Native durbar is so very common, it is astonishing that you should have been able to transact any business at the Peshwah's durbar to this moment, without having had recourse to it.

In respect to the example of the Nizam's durbar, it is my opinion that, in the whole of the transactions at Poonah, we have adhered too closely to what has been done at Hyderabad. The constitution and customs of two governments cannot be more different than those of Poonah and Hyderabad are; and they differ materially in the circumstances which ought to guide our decision upon this question.

In the Nizam's durbar, the minister has all the power; and it must be a matter of indifference to us what passes in the interior, provided the result of the exercise of that power is favorable to our views. The minister is pensioned to produce that result; and the Nizam has been told that that pension is the sum which the minister would have received from the southern districts, if they had not been ceded to the Company. The

Nizam also, it is to be supposed, is so well satisfied with the administration of the government by his minister, and with the tranquillity which it enjoys, that he entertains no jealousy on account of the receipt of this pension.

But how is it with the Peshwah? He has no minister; no person has influence over him, and he is only guided by his own caprices. He cannot be paid, in order that he may conduct his government according to our views; and it would be useless to pay his ministers for that object, because they can render no corresponding service. But, although they cannot conduct him and his government, they can let you know in what manner he conducts it, and for that they ought to be paid. That for which they ought to be paid, is for making you acquainted with every thing that passes that comes to their knowledge; in order that you may have an opportunity of forming a judgment whether the Peshwah adheres to the alliance or not, and of checking him by remonstrances, if his actions should tend to a breach of its stipulations. But, if they are to be paid with his knowledge, it is obvious that he will keep secret from them all that he wishes you should not know; and that he will, in fact, have two sets of ministers, one set to deceive the British Resident, and another to conduct the real business of his government. Upon the whole, I am convinced that it is absolutely necessary that you should have an accurate knowledge of all that passes in the Peshwah's durbar; that it is not possible that you should have that knowledge without paying for it; that you will not obtain it if you pay for it with the consent of the Peshwah; and that you ought forthwith to pay Ragonaut Rao.

In my last, I believe I told you the reason for which I attended to the news sent by Salabut Khan's writer. He has always given accurate reports of what passed in Col. Collins's conferences with the northern chiefs, and of other matters, which I knew to be true; I therefore conclude that he has some good source of intelligence. I do not think it possible to find out the foundation he has for writing the story. If you should send this letter to the Governor General, I recommend that it should be by a private channel, as the subject to which it relates is not a very proper one to meet the public eye, however necessary it may be to consider it.

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

6th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter. [Here the contents are recapitulated.] You will recollect that the British government did not threaten to commence hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against the British government and its allies; and, when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; and, in conformity with your threats, and your declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier.

On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were sincere; but, instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs, and that you and the Rajah of Berar should

le suffered to remain, with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence.

This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible; and you must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt, in order to repel your aggressions. I offered you peace on terms of equality, and honorable to all parties: you have chosen war, and are responsible for all consequences.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Walkee, 6th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose copies of a letter, and its enclosures, dated the 1st inst., which I received last night from Col. Collins, and the copy of a letter dated the 3rd inst., which I have received this day. I likewise enclose a translation of the letter I received yesterday from the Rajah of Berar, and the translation of one which I have written this day to that Chief and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is written in the same terms as that received from the Rajah of Berar. Col. Stevenson has already got orders to move forward, and I have received a letter from him, by which I learn that he proposes to march from Aurungabad on this day. I have sent orders to the officer in command of the troops in the territories of Anund Rao Guickwar, to commence his operations against Baroach, and not to suffer them to be interrupted by any negotiations.

It has rained violently in this part of the country the last 3 days, and the roads from this place to Ahmednuggur are at present impracticable. But if the weather should become more favorable in the course of the evening or night, and the roads should be tolerably good in the morning, I propose to move to that place.

I have written to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George, to suggest that the officer in command of the troops of the Ganjam district should receive orders, if possible, to commence his operations against Cuttack.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Walkee, 6th Aug. 1803.

The perusal of the papers received from Col. Collins, which I enclosed to you this day, will have shown you that it is impossible to delay any longer the commencement of hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, without sacrificing the public interests; and that I have given orders that hostilities be commenced against those Chiefs, and I propose to attack Ahmednuggur as soon as circumstances will permit. It is proper that the Peshwah should be apprised of this state of affairs, that you should communicate to his Highness what has passed lately in Scindiah's camp, the moderate proposition made by me, the adoption of which would have produced peace, and the answers given by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, notwithstanding that they declared themselves satisfied with the assurances which I gave them, and that the former considered my requisition, that he should withdraw, reasonable.

Under the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, it is necessary that his Highness the Peshwah should now consider Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar as his enemies, and that he should cease to hold any com-

munication with those Chiefs. His Highness will also observe how necessary it is that he should complete the quota of troops which he is bound by that treaty to furnish, and that he should adopt every measure that is practicable to forward the success of the operations against the common enemy.

Memorandum.

6th Aug. 1803.

His Highness the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, having been obliged to quit his capital, concluded at Bassein, with the Hon. Company, a treaty, by which the British government bound itself to defend his Highness, his rights and interests, against all who should attack him.

The contracting parties had a full right to enter into this treaty, which is purely defensive; and it contains an express stipulation that the British troops shall not be employed to attack the great Marhatta jaghiredars, unless they should first commit hostilities against the allies.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah called upon the British government to give assistance to the Peshwah to recover his musnud: subsequently, when informed that the relations between the Hon. Company and Pundit Purdhaun had been improved, he expressed his satisfaction at that event; and he declared, on the 2nd March, to the British Resident in his camp, in his public durbar, in the most formal manner, that he had no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to commit hostilities against the British government or its allies. Notwithstanding this declaration, accounts reached the British government, from various quarters, stating that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had combined with the Rajah of Berar, and with other chiefs, for the purpose of hostility against the British government and its allies.

The treaty of Bassein was communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 27th May; and that Chief was called upon to state his objections to it, if he had any. He was also desired to make known the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and other chiefs; and was called upon to retire with his troops to their usual stations, if his designs were not hostile to the British government or its allies.

In answer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah declared to the British Resident, that, until he had a meeting with the Rajah of Berar, he could not decide whether there should be 'peace or war;' but that the British Resident should be made acquainted with the determination of the united Chiefs, as soon as their meeting should take place.

The Chiefs met in the neighbourhood of Mulcapoor on the 3rd June; and from that day, notwithstanding that the defensive and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein was repeatedly explained to them, and that they had never stated the smallest objection to it, they evaded to give any answer to the just demands of the British government till the 8th July.

Both Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar then declared, that they had no intentions to attack the Company or their allies; or to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, provided the Hon. Company would not prevent the execution of the treaties subsisting between his Highness the Peshwah and those Chiefs: they still, however, manifested an intention

of advancing towards the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, and of remaining with their troops in a station contiguous to his Highness' boundary.

Major Gen. Wellesley, therefore, on the 14th July, wrote a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which he apprised that Chief, that he could not consider his actions to be consistent with his declarations, if he did not separate his troops from those of the Rajah of Berar, and if both Chiefs did not retire with their troops to the stations they usually occupied. He promised that the British troops should also retire to their usual stations, when the united Chiefs should have retired: but he informed them, that, if Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should remain with their troops in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, Major Gen. Wellesley would be obliged to take advantage of the positions which the British troops had taken up, to attack their possessions; an event which he most anxiously deprecated.

Major Gen. Wellesley at the same time declared to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, 'that it was not consistent with the treaty of Bassein, or the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty;' and, therefore, he might be satisfied regarding the treaties between the Peshwah and his government.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared themselves to be satisfied with this declaration; and the former acquiesced in the justice of the demand of Major Gen. Wellesley, that he should retire with his troops to the stations which they usually occupy: but, instead of retiring with their troops, these Chiefs have persevered in retaining the position which they took up for the purposes of hostility against the British government and their allies; and they have written letters to propose to Major Gen. Wellesley that he should withdraw to Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay, the troops which had been assembled for the purpose of repelling their aggressions, and of defending the rights and territories of the allies; while they should keep their troops united in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, and in readiness to take advantage of the absence of the troops of the British government and its allies, to carry into execution their hostile designs.

Major Gen. Wellesley offered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar peace on terms of equality, and honorable to all parties: they have preferred war, and they alone must be considered responsible for the consequences.

Under these circumstances, Major Gen. Wellesley is obliged to commence operations against them, in order to secure the interests of the British government and its allies.

To Officer comm. in the territories of Anund Rao Guickwar.

6th Aug. 1803.

Upon the receipt of this letter, you will commence your operations against Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fort of Baroach.

You will not suffer these operations to be interrupted or delayed by any negotiation whatever. You will send the Governor of Bombay a copy of the report which you will transmit to me, of the measures which you shall have adopted in consequence of this order.

To Lord Clive.

6th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose copies of a letter of the 1st inst., with its enclosures, received last night, and of a letter of the 3rd inst., and its enclosures, received this day from Col. Collins,* with a translation of the letters from the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which are written in the same terms; and a translation of a letter which I have written this day to those Chiefs.

I have sent orders to the officer commanding the troops in the territories of Anund Rao Guickwar, to commence his operations against the fort of Baroach. It has rained violently, in this part of the country, for the last 3 days, and the roads from hence to Ahmednuggur are at present impassable; but, if the weather should become more favorable in the course of the evening or night, and the roads should be tolerably good in the morning, I propose to move to that place.

I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship to order the officer in command of the troops in the Ganjam district now to make his attack upon Cuttack, if it should be practicable.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp at Walkee, 6th Aug. 1803.

As you will by this time have arrived at your station in the neighbourhood of Moodgul, you will be desirous of learning from me the state of affairs in this quarter.

I am sorry to tell you, that our negotiations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have not produced the desired effect of inducing those Chiefs to withdraw from the position which they had taken contiguous to the Nizam's frontier.

* Col. Collins to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Tondapoor, 3rd Aug. 1803

1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, under date the 29th ult., and to apprise you of my having left the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

2. In my conference with the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar, on the 31st ult., when I observed to those chieftains that, if they did not instantly retire from the frontier of the Nabob Nizam, you would no longer delay taking advantage of your present position, Sereedhur Punt, without hesitation, replied, that, should the Hon. Gen. Wellesley commence hostilities, or order the British forces to advance towards the Adjuntee ghaut, in either of these events, Ragojee Bhoonslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah would consider themselves at liberty to march their troops in whatever direction they might think proper.

3. Although the weather began to clear up yesterday at noon, and no rain fell during the night, yet I found the road to this place exceedingly deep. It is now one o'clock in the afternoon, and my escort is not yet arrived, though it marched at half past 4 this morning. I propose ascending the Tondapoor ghaut to-morrow morning, and proceeding as far as the town of Adjuntee, provided the gun bullocks are in a condition to perform the journey.

I have apprised Col. Stevenson that I should this day leave the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in consequence of his refusal to retire from his present position, and of my intention to prosecute my march to Aurungabad with all practicable expedition.

5. Last night, at 10 o'clock, I received the enclosed khareeta, to your address, from Dowlut Rao Scindiah. No copy of this letter was sent to me; but I believe it is to the same purport as that which I had the honor to forward to you on the 1st instant from the Rajah of Berar.

P.S. You have acknowledged the receipt of my official dispatches under date the 24th and 25th ult. I hope my public letters of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd have not miscarried.

Rajah

By letters which I have received from Col. Collins this day, I find that, instead of withdrawing their troops, they have proposed that I should withdraw the British troops, even to Madras; and they propose to remain assembled at Burhampoor, from which place they would have a fine opportunity of plundering the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, as soon as I should have withdrawn. However, that plan will not answer, and I propose to march to the attack of Ahmednuggur as soon as the weather shall clear up a little. I have given directions that Scindiah's posts in Guzerat shall be immediately attacked; and I learn from Col. Stevenson that he has moved forward this day.

I learn, from Gen. Stuart, that one of the objects for which he has posted you at Moodgul, is to keep in check the sirdars who have jaghires in the neighbourhood of the river Kistna.

The principal family in that part of the country is that of Pursheram Bhow; and their principal residence and stronghold is at Meritch, about 20 miles from Erroor, on the Kistna, at which place we have a small fort. Appah Saheb, who is at the head of that family, marched to Poonah with me, and is at present at that city with his troops. In my opinion, he wishes well to the British government; but he is of that wavering disposition which is almost characteristic of the Marhattas, so that he fears to take any part in this contest, till he shall see which side is likely to be successful. He will not join us, but I do not think he will do us any mischief, unless we should meet with some heavy misfortune. There are several chiefs in the neighbourhood, and to the southward of the Kistna,

Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

6th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letters [here the contents of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley's letters are recapitulated] from Col. Collins; and, from the Colonel's verbal communication, I have been further assured of your friendship. No doubt, where the foundations of union and amity have so long subsisted, they must be firm and solid; and there can be no apprehension or suspicion admitted between parties so connected. By the blessing of God, both armies are, to this moment, on their own territory, and no aggression or excesses have been committed on the countries of his Highness the Nizam. However, to satisfy your mind, and to dispel your alarms, it has been resolved upon, in the presence of Col. Collins, that the armies now encamped here shall retire towards Burhampoor, on condition that the armies now assembled here, and those of the English government and the Nizam, shall commence their retreat upon the same date, and that each of the armies shall arrive at their usual stations on a date previously settled; that is, that the army of the English and of the Nizam, now encamped near Aurungabad, the army of the English encamped near the Kistna, and you also with your army, shall all march towards their stations on the same date that the armies move from their encampment; and on the same date that all those different armies reach their respective stations at Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay, Scindiah and myself will reach Burhampoor.

In this manner has it been agreed and settled, in presence of Col. Collins; and I have written it for your information.

It was written in your letter, that the English government and the Peshwah would never destroy the relations and engagements that have long subsisted between the Peshwah, myself, Scindiah, and the other sirdars of the Marhatta Empire. This assurance has made me most happy, and tends to confirm friendship. Col. Collins will satisfy you further upon this subject.

Continue to write me accounts of your health

[The letter from Scindiah is verbatim the same as that from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah.]

who follow the politics of this family : such as Madhoo Rao Rastia, whose possessions are about Beejapoor, Bauggrecotta, and Badamy ; the Goorparah family about the Gutpurba ; Gunput Rao Paunseah, and some others, all of whom, in my opinion, will be neutral.

On the other hand, the Rajah of Kolapoor, whose districts lie along the western ghauts, at no great distance from Meritch, is connected by marriage, and by old ties, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This chief is independent of the Peshwah, being a descendant from Sevajee, and a Rajah in his own right. He has long been at war with the family of Pursheram Bhow, and he killed that chief in a most barbarous manner, after having taken him prisoner.

The contest between Appah Saheb and the Rajah of Kolapoor was going on, when I passed Meritch in April last ; and I prevailed upon the two chiefs to suspend their acts of hostility, which have ceased almost entirely ever since, although their enmity is as great as ever. The Rajah of Kolapoor also knows that the Company have claims upon him, for acts of piracy committed on the seas upon the coast of Malabar ; and that his territories in that quarter must always be exposed to their troops ; and that the smallest assistance, given by the Company's government to Appah Saheb, would entirely destroy him. I therefore think it probable that he also will remain neutral : indeed, I am not quite certain that his neutrality would not continue, notwithstanding his connexions with Scindiah, if Appah Saheb should take part against us. There are many polygars in the districts lying between the rivers Kistna, Gutpurba, and Malpoorba, who are in general connected with the Rajah of Kolapoor, all of whom will follow his politics.

I shall keep you acquainted with every thing that occurs here deserving of your attention ; and I shall always be happy to give you any information which you may think I may have regarding matters in your quarter.

The D.A.G. to Col. Murray, Poonah.

Camp at Walkee, 6th Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to request that you will give the necessary instructions to Major Spens for dispatching rice to this camp equal to 600 bullock loads at 6 mercials each. He requests that the people who contract for the carriage may be engaged to deliver the rice in camp, wherever it may be, on condition that they shall receive additional hire for the distance they may have to travel beyond this place, to which Major Spens knows the distance, and can make a positive agreement.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 7th Aug. 1803.

I have received a letter from Mr. Duncan of the 3rd, by which I find that, in consequence of my recommendation, he has sent you 73,000 dollars, and has referred you to me for instructions respecting them. The only instructions I have to give you are to desire Capt. Mathison to make the same bargain with the mints at Poonah and Chinchore, for coining these dollars into Chandore rupees, that Capt. Graham made for coining the dollars which I received from Bombay, when I was at Poonah. I will desire Capt. Graham to write to Capt. Mathison upon this subject.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 7th Aug. 1803.

I have been detained here this day by the badness of the weather, but I hope to be able to march to-morrow.

I am delighted with your letter of the 5th, respecting the Peshwah's intentions and Ragonaut Rao's disposition. This will be the time for the Peshwah to declare himself. If he is firm in his durbar, and makes a stiff declaration that Scindiah, being our enemy, is his; that he is determined to stand by the alliance; and if he orders away his minister, Kistna Rowanny, the Putwurduns and others may be induced to come forward: at all events, they will not like to venture upon hostilities against their own master.

I enclose a translation of a memorandum, which I intend to circulate among the chiefs. You shall have a Marhatta translation, to show to Ragonaut Rao. I do not know what to say to the coercion of Appah Saheb: it might have good consequences; but, on the other hand, it might produce a contest on the frontier of Mysore, which would be ruinous. I am decidedly against any measure of coercion, unless the Peshwah is stout, and speaks firmly, and withdraws his minister. Even then, I almost doubt whether it would not do more harm than good. No accounts yet of Major Dallas. Continue to get as much money as you can.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Walkee, 7th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 4th. Major Dallas left the Kalachabootra ghaut on the 16th July, with a convoy of treasure for you and for me; but I have not heard of him since, although Bistnapah Pundit is looking out for him about Perinda, with the Mysore horse. I am afraid that his march is impeded by the badness of the weather, and that he may not arrive at Perinda till the middle of this month. This is very inconvenient, for I shall not have it in my power to assist you with money till he arrives.

You must encourage and urge your brinjarries to fill their bags again with any grain, as soon as possible; for we must all depend upon their exertions.

Keep a good look out upon the enemy; and, if possible, do not allow them to enter the Nizam's territory. They are not in strength, and are sadly equipped.

G. A. O.

Camp at Walkee, 7th Aug. 1803

One of the officers commanding brigades to mount daily as Brigadier of the day till further orders.

The detachment to march to-morrow by the left; baggage on the left. Heads of departments, commanding officers of corps, and others, are requested to take measures for having their departments and baggage loaded and marched off before assembly beating.

The cavalry, with the exception of one Native regiment and its guns, to form the advance, followed by the new piquets, which are to be reinforced by the flank companies of the 74th and 78th regts. The piquets and flank companies to carry 60 rounds of ammunition, and to be under the immediate command of the Brigadier of the day. The 4 iron 12 pounders, with one tumbril of ammunition for each gun, to follow the advance guard of infantry.

Capt. Heitland will have particular instructions for the distribution of the pioneers to-morrow. The park and provision department to march as usual; the piquets now on duty, with their guns, and a regiment of Native cavalry with its guns, to form the rear guard. Quarter masters, &c., to march at the head of the column of infantry until ordered on by the Acting D. Q. M. G.

Proclamation by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Camp near Ahmednuggur, 7th Aug. 1803.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having threatened with hostilities the British government and their allies, Rao Pundit Purdhaun, and the Nabob Nizam Aly; and, in pursuance of those threats, having advanced with their large armies to a position contiguous to the frontiers, and having refused to depart from it, notwithstanding the repeated representations and entreaties of Major Gen. Wellesley, as the only mode of preserving peace, he at last finds himself obliged to commence hostilities against those Chiefs. He does not, however, intend to make war upon the inhabitants; and, accordingly, all amildars and others are required to remain quietly in their stations, and obey the orders they will receive; and if they do no injury to the British armies, none will be done to them. But notice is hereby given, that if any of the inhabitants of the country either abandon their dwellings, or do any injury to the British armies or their followers, they will be treated as enemies, and suffer accordingly.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Campbell, Toka.

10th Aug. 1803.

I have received, and laid before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, your letters of the 5th and 8th inst.

Col. Stevenson will give orders for the removal of the rice at Toka, and also for the future supply of your detachment. You ought to inform him of its strength, and also of the periods to which the Europeans and Natives are provided.

As Lieut. Oliver has an account already with the paymaster of Col. Stevenson's force for boatmen's hire and other contingencies of that nature, let him continue to make such disbursements, for which he will receive further advances from Capt. Dacre when necessary. Steps will be taken in time for providing a greater number of boatmen when they are likely to be wanted. The boatmen at present in employ ought to be paid liberally, so as to make them inclined to stay in the service; but unless the common rate of the country is communicated, no specific order can be given on this head.

G. O.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 8th Aug. 1803

The outlying piquets to be reinforced immediately by a non-commissioned officer and 13 rank and file from each corps of infantry: they are to parade in front of the 74th regt., from whence the adjutant of the day will send the details from each corps to the station of its own company.

G. M. O.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 9th Aug 1803.

The 19th regt. of dragoons, with its guns, 100 European rank and file, with a proportion of officers of the 4th brigade, and a battalion of Native infantry of the 5th brigade, with its guns, to parade on the top in the front of the right at 9 o'clock this morning, to accompany Major Gen. Wellesley reconnoitring.

G. O.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 9th Aug. 1803

The outlying piquets to return to their companies at sunset this evening: they are to be discontinued till further orders.

Quarter guards of corps to be moved well forward, and the rear guards to be placed in the rear of the camp so as to protect the rear entirely.

The inlying piquets to continue as usual: Capt. Noble will pay 3 single fanams for every cannon ball brought to him at the park.

G. O.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 10th Aug. 1803.

A working party, consisting of 50 rank and file of the 78th regt., with a proportion of officers, and 200 rank and file of the 1st batt. 8th regt., with a proportion of European and Native officers, to be employed under the engineers to-night, and to follow the troops for the relief of the trenches.

A working party, consisting of 100 rank and file of the 1st batt. 3rd regt., with a proportion of European and Native officers, to parade at the park at sunset, where they will receive further orders through Capt. Noble.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 12th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch for the Governor General, which contains a detailed account of my operations to this day. When you make the Nizam's government acquainted with the capture of Ahmednuggur, I beg that you will point out to them the security which his Highness' frontier in this quarter must derive from this conquest.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th Aug. 1803.

The weather cleared up so much on the 7th inst. as to allow me to march to this place on the 8th. I had, in the morning, dispatched a messenger to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, to require him to surrender his fort; and, on my arrival in the neighbourhood of the pettah, I offered cowle to the inhabitants. This was refused, as the pettah was held by a body of Arabs, who were supported by a battalion of Scindiah's regular infantry and a body of horse, encamped in an open space between the pettah and the fort.

I immediately attacked the pettah with the piquets of the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regt., under the command of Lieut. Col. Harness; in another place, with the 74th regt. and 1st batt. of the 8th, under the command of Lieut. Col. Wallace; and, in a third, with the flank companies of the 74th, and the 1st batt. 3rd regt., under the command of Capt. Vesey. The pettah wall was very lofty, and defended by towers, and had no rampart: so that, when the troops had ascended to the attack, they had no ground on which they could stand; and the Arabs, who occupied the towers, defended their posts with the utmost obstinacy.

At length, they were obliged to quit the wall, and fled to the houses, from which they continued a destructive fire upon the troops. Scindiah's regular infantry also attacked our troops, after they had entered the pettah. In a short time, however, after a brisk and gallant contest, we were completely masters of it; but with the loss of some brave officers and soldiers, as your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return. The enemy's loss was, from the nature of the contest, necessarily much greater than ours; and, on the night of the 8th, all that part of their force which was not required for the defence of the fort went off to the northward; including all the Arabs who survived the contest in the pettah, excepting a small number who attended one of their wounded chiefs, who could not be removed farther than the fort.

On the 9th, I reconnoitred the ground in the neighbourhood of the fort; and, on that evening, Lieut. Col. Wallace, with 5 companies of the 74th regt., and the 2nd batt. 12th regt., seized a position within 400 yards of it; on which, in the course of that night, a battery was constructed for 4 guns, to take off the defences on the side on which I proposed to make my attack. This opened at daylight on the 10th; and it was so advantageously placed, and fired with such effect, as to induce the killadar to desire that I should cease firing, in order that he might send a person to treat for his surrender. In my answer, I told him that I should not cease firing till I should have taken the fort, or he should have surrendered it; but that I would listen to whatever he was desirous to communicate. Yesterday morning he sent out two vakeels to propose to surrender the fort, on

condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison, and that he should have his private property.

Although I consented to this proposal, it was 5 in the evening before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence I refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According to his engagement, however, the killadar marched out of the fort this morning, with a garrison consisting of 1400 men, and the troops under my command took possession of it.

In this manner has this fort fallen into our hands: our loss since the 8th has been trifling, which I attribute much to the spirit with which our attacks on that day were carried on.

I have to draw your Excellency's notice towards the conduct of the troops particularly on that occasion, and towards Lieut. Cols. Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, who commanded in the trenches; Capt. Beauman, commanding the artillery; Capt. Johnson, of the engineers; and Capt. Heitland, of the pioneers, in the short subsequent siege.

Your Excellency must be well acquainted with the advantageous situation of the fort of Ahmednuggur, on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, covering Poonah, and as an important point of support to all our future operations to the northward. It is considered, in this country, as one of the strongest forts; and, excepting Vellore, in the Carnatic, is the strongest country fort that I have seen. It is in excellent repair, excepting in the part exposed to the fire of the British troops.

I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency an account of the ordnance, stores, and grain which it contains.

I propose to cross the Godavery immediately; and I shall, in a future dispatch, lay before your Excellency the measures which I have in contemplation for getting Scindiah's possessions south of that river, depending upon Ahmednuggur, and for securing their resources for the use of the British troops.

Return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, during the siege of the fort of Ahmednuggur, on the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Aug. 1803.

			Captains.	Subalterns	Sergeants.	Drummer.	R. and F
19th light dragoons . . .	Europeans	{ Killed	2	2	1	1	12
Artillery			{ Wounded . . .	—	2	1	—
H. M. 74th regt.							
78th							

			Soubahdar	Havildars.	Naiks.	Sepoys.
5th regt. cavalry	Natives	{ Killed	—	1	1	10
1st batt. 2nd regt. N. I.			{ Wounded	1	7	3
1st 3rd do.						
1st 8th do.						
2nd 12th do.						
2nd 18th do.						
1st Pioneers do.						

Proclamation.

13th Aug. 1803.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having manifested an intention of attacking the British government and its allies, Rao Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam Aly, Major Gen. Wellesley, as a measure of defence, has attacked the fort of Ahmednuggur, and his brave troops have got possession of it.

He has appointed Capt. Graham to take charge, for the use of the British government and Rao Pundit Purdhaun, of all the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, depending upon that fort, and he calls upon all amildars and others to attend to and obey his orders, and those of no other persons, at their peril. Capt. Graham will be at Ahmednuggur.

G. O.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th Aug. 1803.

A troop of Native cavalry to be sent immediately to drive all the camp followers who are down near the fort of Ahmednuggur back into camp, and to prevent any more of them from going towards the fort. The troop above ordered is to cut down any follower who does not instantly retire to camp. The 78th regt., and 1st batt. 2nd regt., with their guns, to parade immediately with 60 rounds of ammunition.

Major Gen. Wellesley congratulates the troops upon the result of the operations carried on against the fort of Ahmednuggur. His thanks are particularly due to the troops who made the brisk and gallant attack upon the city on the 8th instant. To Lieut. Cols. Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, commanding brigades, Capt. Beauman of the artillery, Capt. Johnson of the engineers, and Capt. Heitland of the pioneers.

A Royal salute to be fired immediately upon the occasion of taking possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur; and, upon the receipt of this order, in all the garrisons and detachments of troops under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley in the territories of the Company, the Rajah of Mysore, his Highness the Nizam, and the Marhattas.

(A committee of 3 artillery officers ordered to survey and fix a valuation on all the ordnance and military stores in the fort and city.)

(Another to survey and value the grain and provisions.)

(The engineers to survey and report upon the buildings.)

One of the terms on which the killadar capitulated was, that he and his garrison should have their private property. Major Gen. Wellesley is convinced that there is no good soldier in this detachment who would infringe this capitulation, and he is determined that it shall not be infringed, and he will punish with the utmost severity any person that may be found plundering in the fort of Ahmednuggur.

The Brigadier of the day to be discontinued.

(The detachment ordered to move ground next day.)

G. O. G. G.

Fort William, 8th Sept. 1803.

The Governor General in Council, having received from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley the official account of the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur, by the forces under the command of that officer, is pleased to signify the high approbation with which his Excellency in Council has observed the judgment, promptitude, and skill manifested by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, in directing the operations of the forces under his command on that critical occasion.

His Excellency in Council is pleased to direct Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley to notify to the troops under his command, that the Governor General in Council has derived the most cordial satisfaction from the distinguished alacrity, gallantry, and spirit which they displayed in the attack upon the pettah, and in the subsequent siege of the fort of Ahmednuggur; and the Governor General in Council has remarked, with particular approbation, the conduct of Lieut. Cols. Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, of Capt. Beauman of the artillery, of Capt. Johnson of the engineers, and of Capt. Heitland of the pioneers.

The Governor General in Council deeply laments the loss of Cpts. Grant and Humberstone, of Lieuts. Anderson and Plenderleath, and of the brave soldiers who fell in the successful contest of the 8th Aug. The memory of these gallant officers and soldiers, who have fallen with honor in the public service, will be regarded with affection and respect by their sovereign and their country.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 13th Aug. 1803.

1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th inst.

2. Upon a perusal of the proceedings of the Committee at Surat, I observe that, even till the 21st July, nothing had been done for the relief of the wants of the troops at Songhur; the subject had been under discussion repeatedly; but, although well canvassed and considered, and the want ascertained, it does not appear that till that day any step had been taken to relieve it.

I also observe, that it is proposed that the quarter master of the 75th regt. should have a contract for feeding the regiment, while detached to Songhur. The quarter master is properly an officer of check upon the Commissary, and it is his duty to see that the provisions received for the troops are of a good quality; he, therefore, of all other officers, ought not to be the contractor to supply those provisions: but, in my opinion, if it is necessary that there should be a body of European troops in garrison at Songhur, it is necessary that there should be a store of provisions for their supply, and the quarter master, or any other private contractor, must be considered incapable of performing the service for which he may contract. If the European troops should be shut up in Songhur, it is my opinion that, under this contract, they will be obliged either to march out, or to surrender for want of provisions.

3. In respect to Capt. Bates, my reason for wishing that he might be brought to a court martial was, that I wished that the whole case might be made public: for it appeared to me, upon a perusal of the papers, that, although this officer commanded a detachment at some distance from Surat, he was subsisting on provisions brought daily, or every 2 or 3 days, from that place; and, if my notion be correct upon this subject, it is probable that he could have been justified for having retired, and that those who sent out a detachment so supplied would have been blamable.

4. The service cannot be carried on in this manner; the troops must have regular supplies of provisions at command, or misfortune and disgrace will be the result.

5. In consequence of the success of the troops under my command, and as it is my intention to pass the Godavery immediately, by which means I shall check the operations of any enemy by Songhur towards Surat; and as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has passed the Nerbudda, and it being reported that he intends to attack Guzerat, I should wish, if you approve of the plan which I proposed for the organization of the troops, and the defence of those provinces, and the supply, for this purpose, of the requisite stores and provisions, that you would allow them all, excepting those allotted for the defence of Surat, Songhur, and Parneira, to move towards the river Nerbudda as soon as possible.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 13th Aug. 1803.

I request that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will send off to this detachment, wherever it may be on this side of the river Godavery, 600 bullock loads of rice. Make the people who carry this rice understand that they are not to stop at Ahmednuggur, but to come on as far as the river Godavery, if the troops should be so far advanced.

I also request you to send to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops whom I shall have in that fort, 600 bullock loads of rice, 50 of salt provisions, and 100 of arrack. This supply is for immediate consumption;

Lieut. Gen. Stuart to the Governor General.

Camp at Cuddapa, 8th Aug. 1803.

Considerable changes in the disposition of the army under my immediate command have recently occurred; and although I am sensible that they have been regularly communicated to your Excellency, yet I judge it proper to submit to your Lordship a short detail of the considerations which have produced them, and of the actual state of the army under this government.

It became an important question for consideration, when the conduct of the principal Marhatta Chiefs suggested the probability of a war, whether the forces under the immediate command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley were equal to the early prosecution of successful operations against the confederates.

The capture of Ahmednuggur, and the possession of the Adjunttee pass, were deemed the first objects of Gen. Wellesley's proceedings; and to enable him to secure these, and to pursue his subsequent advantages over the confederates with proper celerity, a reinforcement of 2 battalions appeared to Col. Close and to Lord Clive to be requisite; and although Gen. Wellesley made no application to me for an augmentation to his strength, yet I judged it advisable to detach 2 battalions to join his army. Those corps marched, at different periods, in the month of July, and escorted considerable supplies of treasure, bullocks, and grain, which I forwarded for the use of the troops in advance.

The total want of disposable troops in the Carnatic, the Ceded districts, and Mysore, the arrival of a French armament in India, and the apparent probability of the renewal of the war with France, excited a great degree of solicitude in the minds of Lord Clive and myself, regarding the means of opposing the designs which might be meditated by that nation. A considerable French force might effect a landing at almost any point of the Carnatic; upwards of 6 weeks must have elapsed before a detachment could be collected to repel them, and during that time they might accomplish many important purposes, and occasion most serious evils.

Those considerations induced Lord Clive, in the latter end of June, to request that the army under my command might recross the Toombuddra; and they have since induced his Lordship, in concurrence with my opinion, to order a division of the army to return to the Carnatic.

The remaining part of the army, consisting of one regiment of Native cavalry, 5 companies of European infantry, and 3 battalions of sepoy, with 5 brigades of 6 pounders, and their complement of artillerymen, under the orders of Major Gen. Campbell, has been stationed near Moodgul, in the Dooab, for the purposes of covering the frontier, and ensuring the internal tranquillity of Mysore and the Ceded districts, of overawing the southern Marhatta jaghiredars, of supporting the British interests at Hyderabad, and affording every practicable degree of security to the communication with Major Gen. Wellesley's army. Major Gen. Campbell has received explicit instructions for his guidance, and has been directed to detach the force under his command, or a part of it, to join the troops in advance, or to Hyderabad, on receiving an application to that effect from Major Gen. Wellesley, or Major Kirkpatrick; but Major Gen. Campbell is ordered, in either of these cases, to return himself to the Ceded districts, as the priority of his rank to that of Major Gen. Wellesley would render his presence to the northward of the Kistna incompatible with a due exercise of the powers which your Excellency has delegated to the latter officer.

Those dispositions have produced a separation of the army under my immediate command; and I am authorized, by your Lordship's instructions, to assume the immediate command of the army in advance. The experience gained by Major Gen. Wellesley during his former operations in the Marhatta territories, the extensive knowledge and influence which he has acquired in the present campaign, and his eminent military talents, enable him better than any other officer to prosecute, with success, the service which he has hitherto conducted with so much ability; and I have chosen to relinquish the gratification which I should derive from the command of an army, probably destined to undertake very distinguished services.

but, as we must have forwarded up from Panwell a very large proportion of the stores collected there and at Bombay, I wish you to write immediately to Mr. Duncan and Capt. Young, to request that coolies, and bullocks, and every animal that can be procured of the description of a beast

services, in order to continue that important charge in the hands of the officer best qualified, in my judgment, to exercise it with advantage to the public.

The situation of affairs in the Peninsula, and the necessity of providing means to check the progress of the rebellion in Malabar, and repel the attempts of the French, require my presence at the Presidency; and I have accordingly, with the approbation of the Rt. Hon. Lord Clive, proceeded on my route thither. The troops returning to the Carnatic amount to 400 European, and 400 Native cavalry, 1000 European infantry, and 80 artillery.

In the present state of the army it is nearly impracticable to increase that strength, should circumstances require a greater force. In the month of March I suggested the expediency of forming 3 extra battalions, and raising 200 sepoy, to be added to each battalion within the British dominions under the Presidency of Fort St. George; and, in the beginning of this month, I recommended that those additional sepoy, who increased our battalions to an unwieldy and unmanageable extent, should be formed into 4 other extra corps. Both these proposals were adopted by government. They add 7 additional battalions to this army; but the great difficulty of procuring recruits on the coast will prevent them from being completed, or applicable to any purpose of the service, for a considerable length of time.

The force in advance of the Toombuddra, from the army of this establishment, amounts to 7 regts. of cavalry, 2½ regts. of European infantry, and 19 battalions of sepoy, with their proper equipment of ordnance and artillerymen. One regiment of European infantry, and 3 battalions of sepoy, have been detached from the duties of Malabar, for the eventual protection of Goa.

I have already stated to your Excellency, that the troops remaining within the territories dependent on this government cannot furnish a field detachment, exclusive of the corps on its return from the frontier; and, in Malabar, the troops find it difficult to prevent the extension of the rebellion. These inconveniences will be alleviated when the 7 extra battalions shall be completed; but even this reinforcement will be scarcely sufficient, if a war occurs, to supply the place of the troops removed from the internal defence of this Presidency.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has experienced difficulties in supplying his losses of cattle, and in procuring treasure for the use of his army. I have judged it an object of the first importance that his troops should be placed on the most efficient footing; and, with this view, I have forwarded to the army in advance, during the months of June and July, 7 lacs of pagodas (exclusive of a lac of pagodas, which Mr. Pielé, acting in the absence of the Resident of Mysore, is now forwarding, by Purneah's means, and Gen. Wellesley's suggestion, to Poonah), and 11,000 hired bullocks, with 4000 loads of rice, and 3000 brinjarry bullocks, also carrying rice.

I have also dispatched 2700 hired bullocks to the Resident at Hyderabad, for the purpose of carrying loads to the army, as Major Kirkpatrick informed me that he was unable to procure cattle of that description in the Nizam's dominions. I trust that these arrangements will obviate, for a considerable length of time, the want of supplies during the prosecution of the operations which may become necessary against the confederated Marhatta Chiefs.

The Nizam Soubahdar of the Deccan to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Hyderabad, 8th Aug. 1803.

By the blessing of Providence, all the affairs of the two states are perfectly identified; and we, confidently relying on your judgment and ability, have been pleased to address orders to all our military commanders, placing them under your authority, and to obey all your requisitions until the termination of the present service; and we hereby invest you with the authority even of maintaining or displacing any officers of our government.

Rajah

of burthen, may be hired, and ready to be sent up to Ahmednuggur, with loads of military and provision stores, of which I will send the detail hereafter. These must be exclusive of the 5000 bullocks hired to attend

Rajah Mohiput Ram, the talookdar of Aurungabad, &c., and Rajah Sookroodoor, the talookdar of Bheer, Perinda, &c., have also been instructed to consider themselves subject to your authority, and to recollect that your censure or your approbation of their conduct will prove equally efficacious, to the extent even of dismission from their employments, if you should signify to us your displeasure against them in any instance.

You will consider yourself as invested with full authority on all affairs during the continuance of the present service, as we repose in you the most unbounded confidence. What more need be written?

Orders by Azim ool Omrah to Rajahs Mohiput Ram and Sookroodoor.

In consideration of the identity of the British government and that of his Highness the Nizam, his Highness has been pleased to address to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, under his own seal, a letter, of which a copy is enclosed to you. It is requisite that you should display an entire obedience to the tenor of that letter, and that you should direct all the military commanders in the army of his Highness to comply, without hesitation or demur, with the pleasure of his Highness therein communicated.

To inform you was indispensable: what more need be written?

The Gov. Gen. to the Court of Directors.* (*Extract.*)

25th Sept. 1803.

164. The force under the immediate command of Major Gen. Wellesley consists of

CAVALRY.	H. M.'s 19th light dragoons	384	}	. . .	1731
	4th, 5th, and 7th regts. Native cavalry	1347			
	Artillery				
INFANTRY.	H. M.'s 74th and 78th regts.	1368	}	. . .	6999
	1st batt. 2nd regt. N. I.				
	1st do. 3rd do.				
	2nd do. 3rd do.				
	1st do. 8th do.	5631			
	2nd do. 12th do.				
	2nd do. 18th do.				8903

exclusive of European artillerymen, and 653 pioneers of the establishment of Fort St. George, 2100 cavalry, belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, and about 3000 Marhatta horse. Two battalions of sepoys were detached in the month of July, with a large convoy of treasure, bullocks, and grain, from the army under the command of Lieut. Gen. Stuart to the division under Major Gen. Wellesley.

The British force remaining at Poonah, for the protection of that capital, consists of

H. M.'s 84th regt, 5 companies	470
European artillery	93
Native infantry	1215
1778	

With Bombay lascars, and a small park of artillery.

165. The forces under the command of Col. Stevenson consist of the whole subsidiary force, amounting to 7920 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and about 16,000 men, cavalry and infantry, of his Highness the Nizam's troops.

CAVALRY.	3rd and 6th regts. Native cavalry	909	}	. . .	120
	Artillery				
INFANTRY.	H. M.'s Scotch brigade	778	}	. . .	6891
	2nd batt. 2nd regt. N. I.				
	1st do. 6th do.				
	2nd do. 7th do.				
	2nd do. 9th do.	6113			
	1st do. 11th do.				
	2nd do. 11th do.				7920

With 276 gun lascars, and 212 pioneers.

* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 330.

this body of troops, which I conclude are by this time about to commence their march from Panwell.

Until the wounded men, whom I leave at Ahmednuggur, shall recover, I must have 30 of the 84th here, and I wish you to send them as soon as you can: they shall go back as soon as my wounded may be fit for duty.

I intend to send you one of the Coast battalions now coming from the frontier: this, with the fort of Ahmednuggur in your front, and Gen. Campbell, on the Kistna, in your rear, will make you very strong. I intend to keep your $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch howitzers, but to send back the brass 12 pounders. You need not be in a hurry to bring up the 18 pounders. Depend upon it that 12 pound shot will breach any wall in this country.

Let 4000 good bullock gunny bags be made at Poonah immediately, and forwarded to the stores at Ahmednuggur.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, near Ahmednuggur, 13th Aug. 1803.

I send herewith a dispatch for Major Kirkpatrick, which contains a letter for the Governor General, with a detail of our operations, which I beg you to peruse and forward, sending a copy of it to Mr. Duncan. I also return Mr. Duncan's papers.

Guzerat is now the point of my greatest anxiety. I wish that the arrangements proposed in my public letter were carried into execution: but I observe that, on the 20th July, nothing had been done for Songhur, and it was proposed that the Europeans going there should be fed by contract with their quarter master. This man ought to be the check upon the Commissary in the issue of provisions, instead of being the Commissary himself; and, at all events, it is not to be expected that any private contractor of this kind can furnish the provisions for the troops in a garrison which is likely to be attacked.

I am very anxious that the Peshwah should feel no jealousy about this place. I have, however, taken possession of it in the names of the Company and the Peshwah, and I shall take possession of the country in the same manner. I intend to appoint Capt. Graham to manage the latter. I wish that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao upon this subject: point out to him how necessary the place is for us, and that the country should be kept quiet by means of the management of a gentleman in the Company's service. You may also assure him, that a faithful account shall be kept of the revenues, and credit given to the Peshwah for his proportion of them. You might take the opportunity of again urging him to bring forward his troops.

I write to Col. Murray this day, to desire him to forward certain articles; but, in case he should have gone off, I wish you to desire Colman to open the letter, and act according to the orders which it contains. The cavalry will march to-morrow.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 14th Aug. 1803.

You will observe, by this day's order, that I have appointed you to act as collector to the districts heretofore belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, south of the river Godavery. I have sent directions to Govind Rao to

give you all the information that he has been able to collect, by my desire, regarding these districts; and I enclose two proclamations, which I recommend that you should transmit to each, with the persons whom you will send to establish in them the Company's authority. The officer commanding in Ahmednuggur will have orders to afford you every assistance in his power which you may require; and I have given directions that a body of horse, and a body of peons, shall be raised, who are to be under your orders.

You have already so much experience in the revenue duties, that I cannot think it necessary to send you any detailed instructions. I should wish that the accounts may be kept according to the forms which are in use with the government of Fort St. George, and have been approved of by government; and you will transmit them to me at the regular periods, in order that I may lay them before his Excellency the Governor General. I wish, however, that you would bear in mind the fact, that to keep this country in a state of tranquillity, and to secure for the use of the troops under my command its resources, and a free communication through it with Poonah and Bombay, are objects of far greater importance than to collect, at present, a large revenue from it.

I wish you, therefore, to refrain from pressing the country, with a view to raising the collections as high as they can go. Indeed, as these districts have been the scene of the operations of the different Marhatta armies for many years, it is probable that they will not be able to pay much revenue. You will correspond with me in the performance of the duty now intrusted to you, and I will forward your reports, to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 14th Aug. 1803.

Since writing to you yesterday, it has occurred to me that it would be better not to hold out to the Peshwah any promise or prospect of having half the revenue of Ahmednuggur, but to tell him, generally, that the revenues shall be applied to pay the expenses of the war, and that the accounts of them shall be communicated to him. One great object, however, is to reconcile his mind to our keeping possession of the country, which is absolutely necessary for our communications with Poonah; and, provided that is effected, I think it immaterial whether he has half the revenues or not. It is probable that, if he does not get half, he will not think of sending his aumils into the country; and that, if he does, he will send them. I beg you to turn this subject over in your mind, and to act in conformity to the sentiments I have above expressed. I will delay to write you a public letter upon it till I shall receive your answer.

We heard from Major Dallas yesterday. He is by this time at Perinda; but I am sorry to tell you that he had lost 3000 out of 5000 bullocks.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 14th Aug. 1803.

I am much concerned to hear of your losses and want of cattle, particularly as I know not how to relieve them. Major Dallas, on his march from the Kistna, as far only as Toljapoor, had lost 3000 out of 5000; and I also have lost many in the late rains. I hope, however, that we shall

still do well ; and I have ordered forward to Toka, this day, the cavalry, and a battalion, and I shall follow with the remainder in a day or two.

What I shall most want is dry grain and flour, for the consumption of the bazaars ; and I should be glad to know from you, whether there are any quantities of these articles at Aurungabad, or at any places in the neighbourhood. At all events, Mohiput Ram ought to be desired to lose no time in collecting quantities of chinna and flour, in every place in which it can be stored with safety.

The D.A.G. to the Officer commg. at Ahmednuggur.

14th Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to inform you that he has authorised Capt. Fraser of the 78th, and Capt. Fowler of the artillery, to proceed to the fort with a carkoon, sent by the late killadar, to ascertain what property now in the fort belongs to the killadar or his late garrison, and what belongs to the Circar. And the General desires that you will allow all such property as the abovenamed 2 officers will set apart as belonging to the killadar and his garrison, to be carried out by the pioneers who will be sent for that purpose. And he also desires that you will furnish such guards or sentinels as may be necessary for the security of the public or Circar property.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Griffiths, commg. a detachment.

14th Aug. 1803.

Major Dallas has been obliged to leave 1400 bullock loads of rice behind him in the village of Moorum ; and as you marched with 2000 unloaded bullocks, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley entertains hopes that you may be able to bring up that grain by their means : he therefore directs me to request that, as you will pass Moorum, you will take up the whole of that rice, if your cattle can carry it, and, taking the guard of Major Dallas's corps along with you, proceed by the route heretofore given you to Kurdlah. If the state of your cattle will not allow you to bring off the whole of the above grain, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will leave half of the guard of Major Dallas's battalion in charge of what you cannot carry, and send the accompanying letter to Major Hill, who is coming up with the 1st batt. 4th regt.

The D.A.G. to Major Hill, 1st batt. 4th regt.

14th Aug. 1803.

Major Dallas having been obliged, by the loss of bullocks, to leave 1400 loads of rice in the village of Moorum, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has directed Lieut. Griffiths, as he passes that place, to bring up the grain by means of the spare bullocks with him ; and has instructed him, in case he cannot carry off the whole, to send this letter to you ; and in the event of its being sent to you, he requests that you will take up, by means of your spare bullocks, whatever quantity Lieut. Griffiths may be obliged to leave behind.

To Lieut. Col. Collins.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th Aug. 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 13th. It is not true that the dawks of Dowlut Rao Scindiah have received the smallest interruption from me, or from any person acting by my orders. But he may depend upon it, that, if he should interrupt your dawk, I will not allow him to pass through any part on the Godavery.

Col. Stevenson has my directions to watch closely the movements of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and attack immediately the troops of either of those Chiefs which may move towards him : he will, of course, move towards the Badowly ghaut, if he should find that they intend to penetrate by that road.

It is impossible for me to say that Holkar is not on his march to join those Chiefs ; but if Rajah Mohiput Ram is the soubahdar of Aurungabad,

and you have received that intelligence from him, I think it is to be doubted. But, even if it should be true, as my cavalry commenced their march from hence yesterday, and the infantry will arrive upon the river before the cavalry will have passed it, I expect that I shall join Col. Stevenson at least as soon as Holkar will have joined the other Chiefs.

The Marhattas have long boasted that they would carry on a predatory war against us : they will find that mode of warfare not very practicable at the present moment. At all events, supposing that they can carry their design into execution, unless they find the British officers and soldiers to be in the same corrupted, enervated state in which their predecessors found the mussulmann in the last century, they cannot expect much success from it. A system of predatory war must have some foundation in strength of some kind or other. But when the Chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field ; when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies, upon which the remainder depend, to a distance, lest it should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act ; and still less of the British officers, if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 13th, in which you have enclosed the dispatch to the Governor General of that date. I approve entirely of the proposed change. There is every reason to believe that the people and chiefs of Bundelcund wish to pass under the British government, and the transfer can be made immediately, without the smallest difficulty. The transfer of the other districts to the southward is very remote, and will be attended with difficulties.

I also approve of the proposed mode of raising 5000 Marhatta horse, and I am almost inclined to request you to take measures for raising them immediately. They would be very useful indeed to us.

I wrote you a few lines last night respecting money for Goklah. I have given him already 10,000 rupees, and, if you will send on the money you have got, I will give him 35,000 more. You might give Ballojee Punt an order upon Bombay, Benares, or Hyderabad, for 30,000 more, making the full 75,000 rupees.

But I can give no money until I receive some from Poonah ; and if you send that, it is obvious that you can give none : but I have no doubt that Ballojee Punt will find money for one of your bills.

I have arranged the garrison for this place. It will consist of a battalion, a detail of artillery, and 30 Europeans, which I have ordered from Poonah. Besides this, I propose to have a large body of peons in the district, and a body of horse under Ghazy Khan's son. These last to be under the direction of the collector, Capt. Graham, in order to keep the peace in the district, and the communications free with Poonah. The fort is in a sad dirty state, and in the utmost confusion. It will not be possible, at present, to do more than arrange its contents, and have them in such a style that we may readily command them. Hereafter, if the

Company should keep the fort, the works might be re-formed with great advantage, and the inside ought to be cleared of all the old buildings with which it is at present crowded. The quantities of stores here are astonishing: the powder is so good, that I have replaced from the magazines that which I consumed at the siege.

I enclose letters from Appah Saheb and Chintomeny Rao, which may have some effect. They contain copies of the memorandum which I sent you. I beg you to transmit them. Malcolm will let you know that we have made an agreement with Amrut Rao. I do not now state the purport of it, as I have not got a translation; but I expect one from Malcolm, when I shall write to you a letter, in which I will tell you what I wish you to communicate to the durbar.

I have written letters to Prittee Niddee and Madhoo Rao Rastia, which I will send you if they should be ready by the time the post leaves.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th Aug. 1803.

I received a letter from Col. Collins last night, in which he tells me that Holkar was on his march to join Scindiah; and that he thought the invasion of the Nizam's territories would be by the Badowly ghaut. Of course I conclude that you watch all the ghauts as well as you can. I have only to request that you will dash with your cavalry at any party that may come within your reach: do not mind to whom it belongs. I shall soon be with you. The cavalry marched yesterday, and the infantry will be at Toka before they shall have crossed the river.

The D.A.G. to Col. Montrevor, commg. in Malabar and Canara.

15th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to transmit to you extracts from the proceedings of the Native General Court Martial, which assembled at Tilleaherry on the 19th and 21st days of July last, containing the confirmed sentences passed by the Court upon Sombajee Jadoo, jemidar of the 2nd batt. 2nd regt., and Sheek Mohamed Junnery, soubahdar in the 2nd batt. 4th regt.; also an extract from the proceedings of the European General Court Martial, which assembled at Tellicherry on the 25th of July, containing the confirmed sentence passed upon Ensign A—.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to request that you will order the above General Court Martial to re-assemble at such times and places as you may find convenient, in order that the confirmed sentences may be pronounced in the Courts which passed them, in presence of the prisoners to whom they severally relate. After which the General authorises you to publish them to the troops in Malabar and Canara, and he directs that the term of suspension from rank and pay of Ensign A— and soubahdar Sheek Mohamed Junnery shall commence from the date of the publication of the sentences awarding the same.

Certificates of the sentences having been pronounced to the prisoners in open Court, and copies of your orders publishing the extracts, will be required to accompany the proceedings on the trials to head quarters.

When you transmit the extract from the proceedings of the European General Court Martial to Lieut. Col. Boles, the President, in order that the sentence may be read in open Court to Ensign A—, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will also send him the enclosed letter to his address.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Boles, Pres. of a Gen. Court Martial.

15th Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to acknowledge his receipt of your letter of the 26th of July last, accompanying the proceedings of the General Court

Martial of which you are president, on the trial of Ensign A——, and to assure you that he would have had great pleasure in attending to the recommendation of the Court for a mitigation of the sentence on Mr. A——; but that, on perusing the proceedings of the Court on this trial, he has observed that Ensign A—— attempted to justify his own conduct, instead of showing the smallest sign of his being convinced that he had done wrong; and as the point of duty, viz., that officers should remain with their guards, which Major Wallace had endeavored to enforce by so many various orders, all tending to the same thing, is essential to the good order of every corps, and to the safety of every station.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 16th Aug. 1803.

I enclose the copy of the translation of the engagement made with Amrut Rao, which I received this morning from Malcolm. In my opinion, it will not be proper to communicate this instrument to the Peshwah's government. The best thing to do will be to inform Ragonaut Rao that I had reason to expect that Amrut Rao would join the British army, and in that case I was very desirous that the Peshwah should cease all hostility against him; and that I would engage for Amrut Rao's conduct. If you approve of this plan, I request you to adopt it.

Appah Dessaye has sent to me this day to inform me that the Peshwah is in negotiation with Neelkund Rao Scindiah and Goorparah, to give one of them his place of Manowly and Moorgoor. He likewise has fears that he may be attacked in that quarter by the Rajah of Kolapoor and Succaram Ghautky. I wish that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao upon this subject; but Appah Dessaye is anxious that it should not be known that he has informed me of the above particulars. In respect to the Rajah of Kolapoor, I will send him a letter which may have the effect of stopping him.

Treaty between Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley and Sreemunt Amrut Rao.

Art. 1st. It is agreed that, during the natural life of Amrut Rao, and that of his son Venaik Rao Bappoo Saheb, he, Amrut Rao (and his son after his decease), shall be ensured the enjoyment of a revenue of 7 lacs of rupees. This shall either be granted in territory or in cash. The English government considers itself responsible for its payment.

The revenue of all such districts as are at present in Amrut Rao's possession must be included in the amount of his annual revenue, and he shall receive the difference between their amount and the sum fixed on for his support, of 7 lacs of rupees.

Art. 2nd. As a proof that Amrut Rao is sincere in his profession of friendship to the English government, he must meet Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, who means to advance to Aurungabad.

Art. 3rd. Amrut Rao must, on all occasions, exert himself cordially to forward the interests of the Hon. Company and of his Highness the Peshwah.

Art. 4th. Whatever friends and adherents may attend, Amrut Rao may be satisfied of their perfect safety; and be assured that they shall receive no injury from any quarter whatever, as they will be under the protection of the British government. After the meeting between Major Gen. the

Hon. A. Wellesley and Amrut Rao shall have taken place, some arrangement will be made for their support.

Note. This article refers to Muraba Dada, and other sirdars now with Amrut Rao, who are particularly obnoxious to the Peshwah. It is from delicacy to his Highness, as well as a regard to the interests of the parties, that they are not specified.

Art. 5th. When Amrut Rao joins Gen. Wellesley, the more force both in cavalry and infantry that accompany him, the more will be the General's satisfaction.

Art. 6th. When Amrut Rao proceeds to join Gen. Wellesley's army, he will send his wife and all his family to the fort of Ahmednuggur, or to Bombay or Salsette, or to such other place, within the territories of the Hon. Company, as he may more approve; and the English government will adopt the necessary measures for their full protection and efficient security.

Art. 7th. The meeting between Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley and Amrut Rao must take place 19 days after this date.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 16th Aug. 1803.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Stuart. Your money is arrived here, and I wish to know from you whether you wish to have it sent to you, or whether I shall give you a bill for it upon Bombay. It would be convenient to me to have it at present, as it would enable me to make advances to Goklah, as well as Appah Dessaye, before I march. Send your answer back by the bearer, so that I may receive it to-morrow evening. I hope to be able to march on the next morning, if all the rice should have arrived.

Goklah was here this morning. I showed him the fort, and he was well pleased, and promised to march forward when I should. There is no news, excepting a report from Stevenson that a party of cavalry had come up the Adjuttee ghaut.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug. 1803.

If Ragonaut Rao should be satisfied with a general assurance that the conquered territory is to be applied to the benefit of the allies, it will be most convenient, as that assurance leaves the question open for future discussion, and for a decision according to the circumstances of the war. But I consider it to be an object of the utmost importance that the Peshwah's mind should be satisfied as far as possible, in order that there may appear no wavering in his intention to adhere to the alliance on which the southern jaghiredars might found acts of hostility against the Company.

I know well that the Marhattas have a particular aversion to the Nizam's government; and I thought it not improbable but that the Peshwah and all the Marhatta chiefs would feel very uncomfortable under the notion that the Nizam was to get any territory so near to Poonah as Ahmednuggur is; particularly as this territory is forced from one of their own chiefs by a body of troops acting in the name, and on the part, of the Peshwah. Although, therefore, the benefit of the war must be divided, according to certain principles, among the allies, and the Nizam will undoubtedly be entitled to a better share of the spoils than

the Peshwah, I cannot think that it would be politic, or consistent with the attention which we ought to have for the feelings of the Marhattas, to allow the Nizam to have any part of Ahmednuggur. He might have compensation elsewhere, either to the northward or the southward. On this ground it is that I have kept his name out of sight all along in my transactions here; and on this ground I should have no objections, if you find it necessary for the satisfaction of the Peshwah's mind, to assure him that he shall hereafter enjoy a share of this conquest, and that he shall see the account of the manner in which the present profits resulting from it are disposed of.

I shall march to-morrow, and arrive at Toka about the time at which the cavalry will have crossed.

I have received rather unpleasant accounts from Col. Stevenson. On the 13th he heard that a party of horse was passing the Adjuttee hills, but, instead of dashing at them, he called in a battalion of infantry and some horse which were in his front: he afterwards, however, countermanded these orders, and sent forward Salabut Khan and Noor ool Oomrah, and intended to move out with the piquets on the 14th. He had a variety of plans in contemplation, of none of which I entirely approved, because they led him into a long defensive operation, in which he must be a loser. I have therefore desired him to move forward himself with the Company's and the Nizam's cavalry; to leave the infantry in a central situation for his supplies to collect upon; and to dash at the first party that comes into his neighbourhood. In this manner he will, at all events, have his supplies, and if he cuts up, or only drives off, a good body of horse, the campaign is our own.

We must get the upper hand, and, if once we have that, we shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys which are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress.

P.S. I send you letters for Prittee Niddee and Madhoo Rao Rastia, which I wish you to forward.

I think that it would be advisable to hold out to the killadar of Loghur a prospect that he should be allowed to settle at Bombay, and that his property should be escorted thither for him, provided he remained faithful during the war, and kept the road to Panwell clear for our use. He would make the best check we could have upon Angria and the other blackguards in that quarter. If you should be of opinion that this measure would be of no inconvenience hereafter, I wish that you would send to the Loghur man, and give him a promise in my name accordingly.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug. 1803.

Before you will receive this letter, you will have heard that I took possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur, by capitulation, on the 12th inst. I did not send you the details of my attack upon the pettah on the 8th, or of the subsequent operations against the fort, because I feared that the dawk direct through Hindustan would have been stopped, and I knew that the Governor General would send them to you from Calcutta. The same

reasons prevent my going into any details upon the subject of my operations at the present moment. I shall only tell you, that I have possession of all Scindiah's territories south of the Godavery; that my troops are in march towards the Godavery, and I expect to cross that river immediately in force.

I write to recommend to your patronage Mr. Tew,* to whom I understood you did intend to give an ensigncy. He accompanied the 74th regt. on this service, by permission of Lieut. Gen. Stuart, and distinguished himself in the attack of the pettah of Ahmednuggur on the 8th inst. He has been particularly recommended by Lieut. Col. Wallace, of the 74th reg., and Lieut. Col. Harness, who commanded the division of which the company he belonged to on that day formed a part.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th, the last of which is more satisfactory than the first. In my opinion, the best thing you can do is, to move forward yourself with the Company's cavalry, and all the Nizam's, and a battalion, and dash at the first party that comes into your neighbourhood. You will either cut them up or drive them off; and, in either case, you will provide more effectually for the security of your convoys, than by detaching your troops to bring them in. Keep the infantry collected in a central situation, and let all your supplies collect upon them. If you adopt this plan, and succeed in cutting up, or in driving to a distance, one good party, the campaign will be our own. A long defensive war would ruin us, and will answer no purpose whatever. By any other plan than that above proposed, we shall lose our supplies, do what we will. The cavalry will reach the river this day. I shall march with the infantry to-morrow; and shall be at Toka before they will have crossed, and with you a few days afterwards.

I shall order Major Hill's battalion, which is coming with supplies from the Kistna to Kurdlah, to march upon Moongy Puttum: this will give security to every thing there. They will not be at Moongy Puttum for a fortnight, at soonest.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, N. of the Nimderah ghaut, 18th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 16th. I shall give Goklah 35,000 rupees of the 80,000 you have sent off; and I beg you to give Ballojee Punt a draft for the remainder of the money, namely, 30,000. If you should not have money to pay the draft in favor of Appah Dessaye, the best thing to do will be to borrow it from Col. Colman, who, by the time the draft reaches Poonah, will have received dollars from Bombay.

The Peshwah's feelings respecting the proposed meeting with Amrut Rao are unpleasant; but I do not think that, under present circumstances, the meeting can be avoided. His Highness must recollect that he was repeatedly informed that the British government would be obliged to adopt the measures which might appear necessary for its own security, unless he should perform his treaty, and this agreement with Amrut Rao is one of those measures. His Highness has no ground on which he can

* Afterwards killed at Assye.

found an objection to this agreement, excepting one sought for in his own implacable resentments. I can never admit these as rational grounds either for the adoption, or for the rejection, of any political measure. The benefits or the evils which the public interest will derive or suffer from such a measure are alone what must decide whether it is to be adopted or rejected.

But in his Highness' conduct respecting Amrut Rao, there appears to be caprice as well as resentment; for it must be recollected, that, when his Highness was at Bassein, he offered to be reconciled to his brother. It is true that Amrut Rao then rejected the offer, by which his Highness' feelings may have been wounded: but, considering the reconciliation as a measure of political expediency, and putting private feelings out of the question, I think it full as necessary at this time, as it was when his Highness was at Bassein; and, excepting that the reconciliation was then refused by Amrut Rao, there is nothing in it more injurious to his feelings at the present moment than there was at that period. However, all that is asked from his Highness is to refrain from hostility against Amrut Rao, and not to increase the number of his or our enemies. I will engage for Amrut Rao's conduct; and I will take care in my intercourse with that Chief to do nothing which is inconsistent with the treaty between the British government and the Peshwah.

I have received from Hyderabad bad accounts of Major Hill: he had lost one third of his bullocks before he had even begun to cross the Kistna. I have got no accounts of Lieut. Griffiths, who is travelling between Major Dallas and Major Hill. If you should buy any bullocks, and they should have no saddles, let them call at Ahmednuggur for them.

I have written to Colman to request that he will endeavor to remove the hospital from Erroor on the Kistna; and in case he should be able to make his arrangements to effect that object, it would be very desirable that a party of about 100 of the Peshwah's horse should go down with the doolies, and return with the sick. Will you endeavor to arrange that matter with Ragonaut Rao?

I am sorry to tell you that the boats at Erroor are in great want of repairs, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send some people there to repair them.

P. S. I have just heard that Major Dallas arrived at Perinda on the 15th.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp N. of the Nimderah ghaut, 18th Aug. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 7th, 8th, and 10th inst., and I congratulate you upon the peaceable succession of his Highness Secundar Jah to the musnud of the Deccan. I have given orders, of which I enclose a copy, that a Royal salute may be fired in this camp, and in all detachments and garrisons under my command in the territories of the Hon. Company, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Rajah of Mysore, and the Marhattas, upon this occasion, excepting in those stations in which salutes may have been fired in honor of this event by orders from other authorities previously received.

The powers enclosed in your letter of the 8th are ample: if they were more extensive they would create jealousy, and I should find it inconve-

nient and difficult to exercise them. The administration of the government now remains in the hands of his Highness' servants, and I have only to direct their attention to those objects which I may think useful or necessary for the service.

The excuses of Rajah Mohiput Ram and Rajah Sookroodoor, for not procuring large supplies of rice, are well founded. In fact, the country does not produce rice in such quantities as to supply the consumption of one of our armies. That grain is never used in the armies of the Marhattas, or of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, excepting by persons of a higher class; although the Company's sepoys, who are inhabitants of the countries bordering on the sea, in which the general produce and the common consumption is rice, become dissatisfied, and even unhealthy, if they use any other grain. However, I have great hopes that there will be no want of that grain for their consumption, and the Soubahdar's servants can have no excuse for not bringing forward sufficient quantities of the dry grains, the produce of those countries, for the common consumption of the camps.

The Soubahdar's servants cannot be too frequently urged to provide for the defence of the forts and large cities in his Highness' territories. I understand, that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have sent away their guns, but if his Highness' places are well guarded, they must starve, even if they should escape from our swords and the effects of our fire.

I am now on my march to Toka, on the Godavery, where my cavalry are crossing that river. I shall be at Aurungabad in a few days, and his Highness may depend upon it that I will do all in my power to save his territories from the enemy's depredations.

I should wish to be made acquainted with your sentiments regarding the objects which, in the event of a peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, his Highness would have in view, supposing that the war should be as successful in its progress as it has been in its commencement. I do not mean that this is the proper time to consult the ministers upon this question, but I wish you to take it into consideration, and make me acquainted with your sentiments.

It appears to me that it would be very desirable for the Soubahdar of the Deccan to be freed from the interference and participation of the Marhattas in the government and revenues of several districts on his frontiers. I should wish to know the names of the districts under the divided government, and the amount of the claim for the revenue of each party, if it should be practicable to procure such information. I should also wish to know what districts in the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar it would be most convenient for his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan to receive, supposing that the operations of the war should be so successful as to enable us to demand sacrifices as the price of peace.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 19th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 17th. I intended that you should debit the paymaster with the sums of which you sent me the account some time ago. I was always of opinion that the Bombay government

was not sufficiently strong in troops. In fact, notwithstanding the treaties with the Guickwar, and the consequent demands for service, the increase of territory to the northward, the detachment of the Bombay army at Poonah, and the war with the Marhattas, the Bombay army has not been increased one man.

But, as far as I am concerned, I do not conceive that I want more troops. I only wish that those in Guzerat were complete in numbers, that the army there was properly organized, well equipped, and supplied with provisions in a regular manner from certain sources; and I should feel very easy, not only regarding the fate of that province, but the result of the war itself.

Under these circumstances, I can give no opinion respecting the proposed alteration, particularly as the Governor General has positively ordered that the Bombay army should not be increased; and, indeed, after all, I do not conceive that the army would gain much in point of numbers by the alteration of the Fencible battalion into a regular one. What we want in Guzerat is organization, equipment, and regular sources of supplies. If we should be able to arrange that, and Holkar should enter into the war, I will lay that corps upon the back of Indore and Ougein, in such a manner as probably will induce the gentry to turn their thoughts to the defence of their own territories, instead of the annoyance of ours.

The capture of Ahmednuggur has made an entire alteration in the nature of Scindiah's connexion with the Deccan, of which Mr. Duncan does not appear to be aware. Each of the southern chiefs must now see that he has no power, and no means of bringing an army here, excepting as a freebooter; and they will be less likely to interfere in the war, at least on his side. Angria, in particular, who must know that he is exposed to attack in the manner Mr. Duncan points out, will consider the matter well before he ventures to attack us. Till he shows an inclination to attack us, I am decidedly against interfering with him: 1st, because the existence of the contest will disturb the communications; 2ndly, we have not a body of troops for the service on which we can depend: and 3rdly, because, without such a body of troops, the success is doubtful.

Mr. Duncan talks of seamen, artillery, and sepoy. But he has an opinion of Col. Murray's judgment; and I beg that he may ask that officer what he thinks of Angria's forts, and whether a force so composed could get possession of them. Besides, I do not believe they are upon the sea-coast, and there must be an equipment of heavy guns, stores, provisions, &c. &c., not one of which has been contemplated. For my part, I will have nothing to do with the expedition, and shall object to all such, for which I do not see sufficient means provided.

In respect to Scindiah's vakeel at Bombay, it is my opinion that Mr. Duncan ought to write to Angria to inform him that, in consequence of Scindiah's aggression, the Company were at war with that chief, and have already expelled him from the hold he had in the Deccan; that, under these circumstances, it was not consistent with the established usage that Scindiah should have a vakeel at Bombay; that, however, Mr. Duncan felt uneasy respecting the dismissal of this man, as he was also the vakeel

of Angria, and that he requested that Angria would appoint some other person to act at Bombay on his behalf. In this manner Mr. Duncan will get rid of the vakeel, and it will not be necessary to quarrel with Angria.

I wish you would try to procure for me some accounts of Chandore, in case it should be necessary to attack that place.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Kantere, 19th Aug. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th, and I am happy to find that you approve of my letter to the Governor General of the 24th July.

I informed you in my last, that the cavalry marched from Ahmednuggur on the 14th. I shall join them, with the infantry, on the Godavery, to-morrow or the day after, and hope to find the boats at liberty to cross the infantry.

I have taken possession of all Scindiah's territories south of the Godavery, of which I have appointed Capt. Graham to be the collector. I have raised a body of peons to occupy the tannahs; and I have employed one of the sirdars of the Mysore cavalry to raise a body of horse; by means of which I propose to keep the country in tranquillity, and the communication through it open and free.

I shall send you copies of all the letters, orders, &c., which I have given upon this subject.

I have appointed Lieut. Bellingham to act as Paymaster, and Lieut. Campbell,* of the 78th regt., as my Brigade Major.

I have put the 2nd of the 3rd, with 30 men of the 84th regt., and artillerymen for a brigade of guns, into the garrison of Ahmednuggur.

I have appointed Capt. Fisher Commissary of stores, and Lieut. Carfrae Dep. Paymaster and Garrison storekeeper. These two officers are most important to arrange the provisions and military stores already in the garrison, and those which I have ordered up from Bombay. Capt. Fisher is well qualified for his office, having been Commissary at Goa, and having lately arranged the stores at Hullihall. Lieut. Carfrae is the fittest for his in his corps: having been heretofore a Staff officer at Chittledroog, he must have some knowledge of the duties required from him; and I thought it better to employ him in the situation, than to take any other officer away from his duty in the field.

I have ordered up but a small quantity of military stores, as the garrison appears already well supplied with them; but I have ordered up a large supply of provisions, viz. 10,000 bullock loads of rice, a large quantity of arrack, biscuit, and salt provisions and salt.

The repairs of the fort are already commenced; but, in the mean time, the fort is secure; as, before I left it, the rubbish was cleared away from the ditch, and I gave particular orders that it might be done daily, so that, even when the wall shall be cut down as low as the place at which our fire damaged it, it will still be so high as to make me free from all apprehension that the place can be assaulted.

Major Dallas was at Perinda on the 15th. He will be at Ahmednuggur

* Lieut. Gen. Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.

in 3 or 4 days. I have not heard of Lieut. Griffiths, excepting from Major Dallas, that he was ten days' march behind him. I have ordered him to march upon Moongy Puttun, on the Godavery, from Kurdiah. I have heard, from the Resident at Hyderabad, that Major Hill had not crossed the Kistna on the 6th, and had lost one third of his bullocks by the effects of the rain. I before informed you that Major Dallas had lost 3000 of the 5000 that he had, by the same rain. This rain appears to have been universal. It detained me in my camp at Walkee till the 8th. It was very violent in Scindiah's camp, and it destroyed many of Col. Stevenson's cattle. I only hope that the enemy has equally suffered. I have since had fine weather, and I hope that this has been equally general.

Scindiah moved on the 12th or 13th towards the Adjutec ghaut: but Col. Stevenson's advanced guard was in the neighbourhood; and the Colonel writes, on the 15th, that all the troops which have been near Adjutec, below the ghaut, had moved to the eastward, and that the plan was to enter the Nizam's territory near Jaffierabad. He intended to move that way. I cannot say yet whether Holkar will join Scindiah.

The capture of Ahmednuggur has made a great impression at Poonah and to the southward; and, if it should make an equal one on Holkar, he will, at least, be neutral.

Amrut Rao's vakeel has promised that his master shall join me by the end of this month at Aurungabad.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 20th Aug. 1803

It is necessary that we should take possession of a village belonging to the Rajah of Berar, by name Neemgaum, about 30 miles south east from Ahmednuggur, and not far from the ground on which we were encamped for a length of time, near Sangwee. This village may be of some strength, and there are some horse in it. I have accordingly desired Capt. Lucas to send three companies with the two 6 pounders, and Bistnapah Pundit to place 600 horse at your disposal; and I recommend that they should be sent off as soon as possible after you receive this letter, as Major Dallas is now upon the road; and his being in the neighbourhood, with his battalion, may have the effect of producing the quiet surrender of the place.

I enclose herewith a letter to the headman at Neemgaum, which might as well be sent on an hour or two before the party, by a person who could take an opportunity of looking at the gate of the village, and would see whether it could be blown open; likewise proclamations, &c., to the same purport as those issued respecting Scindiah's villages.

The bearer has likewise a letter for Bistnapah Pundit, to desire him to place 600 horse at your disposal. These are to join me again as soon as they shall have performed this service. You will send peons with the party to remain in Neemgaum as the tannah.

P.S. Since writing the above, Bistnapah Pundit has come into camp, but the horse will go off to Ahmednuggur in the morning. Let the infantry commence their march to Neemgaum, and the horse can follow them.

I wish you would send 100 peons to take post in the Nimderrah pass,

through which we marched, in order to hold in check the Bheels in that quarter, and keep the road open for our supplies. They should patrol the road up to the village of Waumborry, belonging to the Peshwah, and 6 miles from the pass.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Carwoondy, 20th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 17th. There is only one part of your plan which I should wish to see altered; and that is, your intention to retire to Moongy Puttun. Depend upon it, that no pindarries or straggling horse will venture to your rear, so long as you can keep the enemy in check, and your detachment well in advance. Dash at the first fellows that make their appearance, and the campaign will be our own. I enclose you an extraordinary letter from Capt. Munt. I have written to desire him to forbear from using any force or threats towards the servants of the Nizam's government.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Carwoondy, 20th Aug. 1803.

I enclose two letters received from Kawder Nawaz Khan, one of which contains a curious piece of intelligence respecting Gopal Bhow. If, upon my arrival at the river, which will be to-morrow, I should find that he is still on it, I shall endeavor to beat him up. It is extraordinary that the old woman gave us intelligence of Gopal Bhow's coming, during the siege of Ahmednuggur, and desired us to make haste to finish it before he should arrive.

You will see all my late letters to Col. Close, in which I have discussed various subjects.

The cavalry are across the river, and I shall be there to-morrow. Scindiah had not moved on the 16th; the 17th was a great feast; so that it was supposed that the 18th would be the day on which he would move. I send with this two letters which I have opened. I don't recollect the memorandum of the 4th, and I wish you to send me a copy of it.

To the Governor General

Camp at Senboogaum, 21st Aug. 1803.

Since the capture of Ahmednuggur I have taken possession of the districts belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in this quarter depending upon that fortress, in the name of the Hon. Company and the Peshwah, and I have appointed Capt. Graham, who was heretofore a collector of the revenue under the government of Fort St. George, to manage them.

I have the honor to enclose a list of the districts,* and an estimate of their value, upon which, however, little reliance can be placed. I like-

* Estimate of the gross revenue of the conquered province of Ahmednuggur, late under the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; taken from the verbal communication of the principal zemindar, immediately after the conquest.

Pergunnahs	Villages.	Rupers.
South of the Godavery	116	337,000
North of the Godavery	71	297,000—634,000

Much reliance cannot be placed on the accuracy of this statement. I think it probable that the revenues are rather under than over-rated. The dispersed state of the late official servants, as well as the records, will, for some time, prevent us from acquiring a correct insight into the actual revenue resources of the province. An account of the number of villages in each pergunnah cannot be immediately obtained.

wise enclose a copy of a letter of instructions which I have written to Capt. Graham. The reasons for which I have taken possession of these districts are, that the troops under my command should enjoy their resources; that they should be speedily transferred from the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and that they should be kept in a state of tranquillity, while the British troops are in advance. I should have been disappointed in my expectations of enjoying these advantages, if I had delivered the districts to the management of the Peshwah's amildar. As, however, they are part of the territories of the Peshwah, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah held them only as a chief of the Marhatta Empire; and as the fort of Ahmednuggur is most important for the security of Poonah; and the districts are intermixed with those belonging to the Peshwah, I thought it probable that his Highness would desire to have them. I therefore requested Lieut. Col. Close to explain the causes for which I have placed the districts under the management of a British officer, in case he should find that the Peshwah entertained such a wish; and to assure his Highness that their produce should be applied to defray the expenses of the war, and that the accounts of its expenditure should be laid before him.

Although his Highness the Nizam, or his representative, the present Soubahdar of the Deccan, would have a better claim, from the exertions which that government has made to produce an army in the field, than the Peshwah, to a share of the benefits to be expected from the successful prosecution of the war, I have not included his name in the proclamation by which I have taken possession of the country: because I was aware of the jealousies of the Marhattas respecting the possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur, and of the countries depending upon it, so immediately in the neighbourhood of Poonah, which I was desirous not to excite. And as it will remain in your Excellency's power to dispose of the fort, the districts, and their revenue, in any manner you may think proper, it is a matter of immaterial importance to the interests of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, whether his Highness' name is included in the proclamation, although to have inserted it would certainly have excited the jealousy of the Marhattas.

Your Excellency will observe, from a perusal of the orders which I have given to Capt. Graham, that it is probable that the nett produce of these districts will be but trifling; but I imagine that the resources of money which might be derived from their revenue will not be wanting. I have every reason to hope that the measures which I have therein directed will preserve the tranquillity of the country, and secure, during the war, the communication between Poonah and Ahmednuggur, and also on forward to Aurungabad, than which the troops cannot enjoy a greater benefit.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the cavalry of my division have passed the Godavery, and the infantry are now crossing.* The enemy had not entered the Nizam's territories on the 18th inst.

* The Godavery was very wide, and the army was passed over it in wicker boats, made by the troops from the jungle, and covered with bullock skins, described at p. 308.

The armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had been in the neighbourhood of the Adjutee ghaut, but had marched to the eastward, towards the Badowly ghaut. Col. Stevenson had intelligence of their movement, and had marched towards Jaffierabad. I have no intelligence that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has recrossed the Nerbudda.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Senboogaum, 21st Aug. 1803.

You will receive from Mr. Duncan a copy of my letter to him of the 2nd inst., detailing my ideas regarding the organization of the troops and the defence of Guzerat: in addition to which I have but little to say. The calculations of numbers, which I have made in that letter, have included sick, of which, I am sorry to observe, there is a vast number at Surat. I recommend this point to your attention and inquiry; and if you should have reason to believe that the station in which are the barracks of the European troops is unhealthy, you will recommend to government that it may be altered; and that, in the mean time, the troops may be encamped in a healthy situation. Every attention must be paid to economy, but I consider nothing in this country so valuable as the life and health of the British soldier, and nothing so expensive as soldiers in hospital. On this ground, it is worth while to incur almost any expense to preserve their lives and their health. I also request you to pay particular attention to their discipline and regularity, and to prevent their getting intoxicating liquors, which tend to their destruction.

You will observe, in my letter of the 2nd, that I have proposed that 2 detachments should be formed, one in front of Surat, the other in front of Baroda. The sick of the southern detachment may be left in Surat, to the strength of which place they will add in time; those of the northern detachment, in Baroda.

I have perhaps made Parneira too strong, but I did so because it was near Damaun, upon which place it is supposed that the French have an eye. With a view to the necessity of operations at Damaun, to frustrate the designs of the French, I have proposed that there should be a magazine of provisions at Parneira. In other respects, that post is too far to the southward ever to be of any use.

As soon as Baroach shall be taken, I recommend that you should collect your troops in a station in front of Baroda, north of the Nerbudda. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as far as I can learn, is still north of that river, and should he enter into the war, of which I have no certainty, it is most probable that he will attempt to invade the province of Guzerat from Indore. If he should do that, you must attack him immediately. If he should return to the southward, and cross the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee, you might move your corps across these rivers likewise; and you will certainly be beforehand with him, as you will not have one third of the distance to march. However, this return to the southward must depend upon circumstances. We must recollect, that Canojee and Mulhar Rao, although enemies of an inferior order, will take advantage of the absence of the troops, and prosecute their designs from the northward, and that Anund Rao's troops may not be able to contend with them. It may also happen that, although Jeswunt Rao Holkar might return to the southward,

he may not intend to enter the Attavesy, and, even if he should, he could not do it without my being close behind him. This state of the case may, indeed, entirely prevent the invasion by the Songhur, or road south of the Taptee, and may leave you at liberty to act as you please.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Toka, 22nd Aug. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th, enclosing two of the 7th inst. from Major Walker. I have also received a letter from Mr. Duncan of the 17th; and Lieut. Col. Close has forwarded to me copies of a correspondence between Mr. Duncan and Major Walker, in which an important question is discussed, respecting the nature of the alliance between the Hon. Company and the Guickwar state, and how far the latter is obliged to enter into the war with Scindiah, with whose government he is in 'close alliance.'

2. Before I proceed to the consideration of the papers transmitted by Major Walker, it is proper that I should advert to this question; for if it be true that the Guickwar state is not obliged to take part in the war with the Marhatta chiefs, the question respecting the defence of the Guickwar territories is not referrible to me.

3. I have seen copies of two treaties between the Company and the Guickwar, by which the latter has agreed to subsidize one company of artillery and 2 battalions of Native infantry: both governments have agreed that there should be true friendship and good understanding between them; and the British government have agreed to give Anund Rao countenance and protection in all his public concerns, as may appear for the good of the country.

4. Although it is not immediately specified, it can never have been intended that the Company should protect the Guickwar state, unless the Guickwar should also assist the Company with its forces against the enemies of the British government. Indeed, I cannot understand the words 'true friendship and good understanding' in any other manner. If it were otherwise, the consequence would be, that the Company would be involved in perpetual war for the protection of the Guickwar state, without any adequate compensation, excepting that of repayment of the expenses incurred; and the connexion between the two governments would be one not very creditable to the Hon. Company. If this doctrine be admitted, it would be such as the petty states in Germany have occasionally had with His Majesty, the foundation of which was the use of their troops for hire, with this additional disadvantage, that the Company is bound to protect the Guickwar state, at all risks, for repayment of the expenses incurred.

5. If the British government are not to have the assistance of Anund Rao against our enemies, I cannot see what advantage it is to us to support his power against Canojee or any other pretender. It certainly will not be considered as an advantage, when weighed with the inconvenience of allotting to that service a large body of European troops, at a moment when the service of every soldier is required.

6. But although Major Walker has brought forward this construction upon the treaties, I cannot believe that he thinks it correct. In the 13th

and 14th paragraphs of the paper enclosed with your letter of the 16th, he talks of the advantage to which we may still look forward, and he recommends that we should give our military aid 'promptly, liberally, and extensively,' whenever the necessities of the Guickwar state may require it. He has not stated precisely what the advantages are which may result from giving it; but I conclude that he must expect some other advantage besides the mere payment of the hire of the troops.

7. He has, indeed, mentioned one consequence of our affording our military aid in the manner he has pointed out, as an advantage, viz. that it will disgust the Guickwar state with their own troops, and render them useless and contemptible; but I can never consider that an advantage. It is certainly an inconvenient consequence of a subsidiary alliance between the British government in India and a Native power. But whether we consider these alliances as intended to give real strength to the empire, or, according to the new doctrine, to be only a mode of hiring out our troops, as we are bound by them all to protect the territories of those powers who pay us subsidies, it cannot be good policy to render contemptible, and destroy entirely, their own military resources.

8. Indeed, all the subsidiary engagements, excepting that with the Guickwar state, show that the policy is different; for they all provide that the Native governments with which they are contracted shall have a force to act with the British troops.

9. Upon the whole, as I cannot conceive that the only object in concluding the treaties with the Guickwar state was to obtain payment for the service of a body of British troops; as that construction of the treaties would be discreditable to the reputation to the British government, the treaties affording no advantage adequate to the inconvenience of protecting the government of Anund Rao; and as Major Walker does not appear to be of opinion that the construction is correct, although he has brought it forward, I am decidedly of opinion that the engagement must be considered to be mutual; that the enemies of one state are the enemies of the other; and the Guickwar state is bound to co-operate in a war in which the British government have been forced in their own defence.

10. The next point to consider is the plan of operations to be carried on in the prosecution of that war. The Governor General has positively ordered, and there is no doubt whatever of the expediency, that operations should be commenced in Guzerat, by the siege of Baroach. This place is of no strength whatever. Major Walker declares that its garrison is weak: if preparations were made as suggested in my letter of the 26th July to Major Walker, and if the attack has been made as ordered in my letter of the 6th Aug., it will certainly be in our possession before any of the particular enemies of the Guickwar state, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar, can know of the war.

11. After that operation shall have been effected, the orders of the Governor General, as well as expediency, point out the necessity of attacking Champaneer, and any other hold that Dowlut Rao Scindiah may have in Guzerat; and I have to observe, that, if the operations against that place are pushed forward, it is very probable that it will be in our possession before the season will permit the enemy to disturb them.

12. On the 2nd inst. I had the honor of addressing the Governor of Bombay; and I proposed a distribution and organization of the troops in Guzerat, and the countries depending on Surat, which, in my opinion, were likely to secure the defence of the whole. I again addressed him on the 13th, and urged that the disposable troops in those countries should be posted, as in the case supposed, in my letter of the 2nd, of an invasion, north of the Nerbudda, as soon as possible; as Jeswunt Rao Holkar was gone to the northward, and there was no immediate prospect of an irruption by the southern road of Songhur.

13. I again urged this measure yesterday, in a letter which I wrote to Col. Murray; and I repeat, that, till the troops are regularly disposed of; till it is decided which of them are intended for the field, and which for garrison; till regular and certain means of feeding them are provided in all parts of the country in which their operations can be required, it is impossible to undertake the defence of Guzerat.

14. Major Walker has proposed a variety of operations, viz., 1st. An expedition against Canojee: 2nd. An expedition against Mulhar Rao: 3rd. An expedition into the Kattywar, combined with one against Bhooj and the Dwarka pirates.

15. I cannot enter into these operations: 1st. Because the Governor General has given orders, and it is expedient, that Scindiah's fort of Baroach should be attacked, and that he should be deprived of his possessions in that quarter. 2nd. Because I do not see adequate resources of men or means for any of these operations. 3rd. Because it is by no means certain that Holkar will not join the confederates; and if the troops should be employed against Canojee, or Mulhar Rao, or in Kattywar, the whole province will be left defenceless to his ravages.

16. Upon a perusal of the paper B., enclosed in your letter of the 16th, I observe, that, after provision shall be made for the carriage of the tents which are in store, and which will be required if the troops take the field, there will not remain 300 bullocks for the carriage of the provisions and military stores: with such an equipment, the troops, so far from being prepared for the offensive operations proposed by Major Walker, could not, if opposed by an enemy, make even one march from their magazine.

17. The plan of operations which I should prefer in Guzerat would be to collect the troops, as proposed in my letter of the 2nd inst., with a view to an invasion from the northward, as soon as they should have taken Baroach, and Scindiah's other possessions; that the magazines should be prepared and collected for them in the different parts of the country in which they might be called upon to act; that they should have with them the means of moving one month's provisions and a good proportion of stores; that those troops, so collected, should fall at once with their whole strength upon the strongest of the parties expected to invade Guzerat, whenever the invasion should take place.

18. When employed in this service, some of the weaker enemies may invade the country and may do some mischief; but that is a temporary evil, one trifling in its nature, and which, at all events, cannot be prevented.

19. To disperse the troops in three different divisions, to make head against the three expected attacks, will not answer. None of the divisions

can be strong enough to act with vigor: the consequence must be, that the whole country will be plundered, and very possibly some misfortune may happen to one of the divisions, which might give the enemy a permanent settlement within it.

20. Under the plan which I proposed, no permanent settlement can be made by an enemy in any part of the country; and if the collected force should be so fortunate as to beat and drive out Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Canojee and Mulhar Rao will certainly not remain in the country: the consequence may be, the possibility of attacking Indore or Ougein; or, if Jeswunt Rao Holkar should not enter Guzerat, and the efforts of our collected force should be directed against Canojee and Mulhar Rao, it will be sufficiently large to make such an impression upon them, as entirely to put an end to all apprehensions of future invasions by those enemies.

21. These are my sentiments upon the plan of operations for Guzerat. I can have but little local knowledge of that country, and Major Walker must have much; but I object, upon military principles, to the separation of our small forces in that quarter, and to undertaking many distinct operations with inadequate means. If the Hon. the Governor in Council should think it proper to adopt the suggestions of Major Walker, they must be carried into execution, and I hope that I shall not be considered responsible for the consequences.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Toka, 23rd Aug. 1803.

I received a copy of Mr. Edmonstone's letter to you of the 27th July yesterday.

I am informed that Meer Khan has crossed the Nerbudda with his troops, and that he is gone into the province of Malwa. I heard lately that there had been a dispute between him and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, relative to the amount, or the situation, or the jaghire which he was to have in the Holkar territories; and his march into Malwa may have been made with a view to taking possession of, or settling, the jaghire given to him; or to be in a proper situation to carry into execution the designs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar for the opening campaign. In either case, he is at too great a distance, and the difficulty of communicating with him is too great, to think of opening a negotiation with him at present. But, in my opinion, you will do well to communicate with the Soubahdar's government upon this subject immediately, and ascertain to what extent of expense his Highness will go, and it may not be difficult to negotiate with Meer Khan hereafter.

As an inducement to the Soubahdar to enter into the plan of taking Meer Khan into his pay, it will be proper to hint to him, that it is possible that affairs may take such a turn as that the Marhattas shall be obliged to make sacrifices of territory for peace, which had been so repeatedly offered to them; and that, in that case, the justice of the Governor General will induce him to consider, in a favorable manner, the pretensions of those of the allies who shall have made the greatest exertions.

For the reasons stated in my dispatch to the Governor General, I have not included his Highness' name in the proclamations which I have

issued on taking possession of the districts depending on Ahmednuggur; and I think that it would not be proper to encourage his Highness to expect either that fort or any of those districts. But compensation might be given to him from other parts of the Marhatta territories, for his claims on this conquest.

Rajah Mohiput Ram has already seized some of the districts depending upon Ahmednuggur, as he says, by desire of Col. Stevenson. As, whatever may be the fate of these districts hereafter, it is essential to the British troops that they should be under the authority of the British officers during the continuance of the war, I have written to Rajah Mohiput Ram to request that he will produce the authority of Col. Stevenson for seizing the districts in question, and I propose hereafter to desire him to give them up. In my opinion, you will find it necessary to make an advance of money to the Nabob of Kurnool, to enable him to take the field; and if he should demand it, I recommend that it should be made, as the services of his troops will be very useful.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas, Ahmednuggur.

23rd Aug. 1803.

There are some of the robbers, called Bheels, in this part of the country, in the hills about the Nimderrah ghaut, and they have twice plundered the bazaarmen coming on to camp. Capt. Graham has been written to to send a party of peons to that ghaut sufficient to drive the Bheels out of that neighbourhood, and to keep the road open and safe for all travellers; and until he can send such a party thither, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to desire that you will send a company of sepoy to encamp near the ghaut, and protect all passengers from the depredations of those robbers.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Toka, 24th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the translation of an agreement * into which I have entered with Amrut Rao's vakeel, to which I have every reason to believe that chief will give his consent.

Amrut Rao had formerly, under the Peshwah's government, lands in jaghire which produced between 6 and 7 lacs of rupees *per annum*: of

* See p. 637.

G. O.

Camp, left bank of the Godavery, 24th Aug. 1803.

Lieut. Monin to superintend the boats from daylight to-morrow morning till noon, when Lieut. Campbell will relieve him.

Major Gen. Wellesley has observed several instances of a delay, and in some cases an entire omission, to obey orders, from their not being communicated to those whom they concern. In future the following regulations are to be attended to:

1st. All the orders given out are to be entered in the regimental orderly books; and the commanding officer of every regiment, battalion, or detachment, is responsible that they are made known to the officers and men under his command.

2nd. When a pass order is sent round, the receipt of it is to be signed by the Brigade Major on the back of the order. It is to be communicated immediately by the Brigade Majors to those concerned, who are to sign a receipt for it, and afterwards, as soon as possible, to all the corps in the brigade. The adjutants, when they receive it, are likewise to sign receipts for it.

3rd. There must be in each brigade an adjutant of the day, and when the Brigade Major has occasion to quit his tent he must leave there an orderly to take all orders, reports, &c., to the adjutant of the day of the brigade, whose duty it will be to sign receipts for the orders, and to circulate them as above directed.

4th. In like manner the orderly officer in each corps must do the duty of the adjutant, when he may be absent from his lines. When an order is received, there must be no delay in obeying it, and for this the commanding officers of corps are responsible.

these, part have been ceded to the Company in Guzerat, under the treaty of Bassein; and two districts to the southward of the Malpoorba have been given to Appah Dessaye, a chief who is serving with the British troops under my command. The remainder of the lands about Sungumnair, and bordering on the Godavery, to the amount of about 4 lacs of rupees *per annum*, are still in Amrut Rao's hands, although the Peshwah has given orders that they may be seized.

I have requested Lieut. Col. Close to inform the Peshwah, that I have made an agreement with Amrut Rao, and expected that chief would join me at Aurungabad; and that, under these circumstances, I requested his Highness to suspend all hostilities against his brother. I did not deem it expedient to apprise his Highness of the particulars of the agreement which I have made with Amrut Rao, at least till I should know whether he would comply with my request to suspend his hostilities. If he should comply with my request, the deficiency of revenue to be made up for Amrut Rao will be about 3 lacs of rupees *per annum*, respecting which I hope there will be no difficulty hereafter: in the mean time, Amrut Rao's jaghire on the Godavery connects well with the districts under Ahmednuggur, and, being in the hands of a friendly chief, adds much to the security of Poonah.

I am concerned to have to inform your Excellency that Major Malcolm has been obliged to quit camp and go to Bombay on account of his health: he has hopes that he will be able to rejoin me in the course of a month; but in the interval I shall suffer some inconvenience from the want of information and assistance, which he is so capable of affording me.

The troops under my command have passed the Godavery. Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had not entered the Nizam's territories on the 20th: they have moved from the Adjuttee ghaut to the eastward, towards the Badowly ghaut. Col. Stevenson was at Jaffierabad, at no great distance from them.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Toka, 24th Aug. 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 2nd and 3rd.

Adverting to the Governor General's instructions to Mr. Mercer, and the plan of the campaign, and observing from Col. Close's dispatch to the Governor General that he had referred to my opinion, and that of Mr. Duncan, the Peshwah's proposal to cede lands in Bundelcund in lieu of those in Savanore, I have to tell you, that I approve much of that plan. As, according to the plan of the campaign, the Governor General intends to take Bundelcund, it may be supposed that we shall lose, by the adoption of it, all that we should have gained in Savanore and Bancapoor. But I think that the Governor General would alter his plan respecting Bundelcund, as soon as he should find that it belonged to the Peshwah; and that, in fact, if we should take Savanore and Guzerat, it is almost the only resource of his Highness' government.

The question, then, respecting Bundelcund, and the whole of the proposition from the Peshwah, contained in Col. Close's dispatch, will stand exactly as it would if the Governor General had not determined on the seizure of that province, as a part of the plan of the campaign.

In my opinion, it would have been inconvenient to take Savanore. The southern chiefs, most of whom are at this moment in a state of neutrality, have all an interest in that province: it would require a large body of troops to take possession of it; and, as none can be allotted for that service at present, it must be delayed, at least, till the conclusion of the war.

The resources of the Peshwah's government are but very small indeed. His sirsoubah cannot venture to go into Savanore to take possession of those countries which remain to his Highness, until the Company's troops can be spared to take possession of those which have been ceded: the Peshwah's lands about Poonah are waste, and he has only what remains to him of Guzerat, and a part of the Konkan. The addition to his revenues of 16 lacs of rupees from Savanore, which he has never enjoyed, will attach him to the Company's government.

Lieut. Col. Close has explained the situation of the Vinchoor jaghiredar in his public dispatch, and has stated the strong desire of the Peshwah, that he should retain his jaghire of Oolpar, near Surat. In fact, this chief is the only one in the Empire who has been from the commencement faithful to the cause of the Peshwah. While fighting in this cause against Holkar, his troops were entirely cut to pieces, he and his son were wounded, his jaghire of Vinchoor was destroyed, and Oolpar alone remained of all that he possessed, and this was ceded to the Company. I certainly think it desirable that this chief should get back that district. But Mr. Duncan contends, that to return it will be inconvenient to Surat, and that it would be better to provide for Vittell Seo Deo elsewhere. This chief declares that he never will consent to relinquish his jaghire, and gives several reasons for this determination, referrible to his family, his honor, &c. &c. The fact is, that he sees that this district is likely to be in tranquillity, and to be productive, from its neighbourhood to Surat, and the Company's districts in the Attavesy, and from the connexion between the Company and the Guickwar, and, therefore, he is desirous to keep it. I acknowledge, that I think it would be preferable to suffer a little inconvenience at Surat, and to attach to the British government's connexion such a servant as Vittell Seo Deo, and to gain the credit in the Marhatta Empire of rewarding his services and fidelity to his master, to keeping the district only for the convenience of the city of Surat. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the proposal of the Peshwah respecting Bundelcund ought to be accepted.

I come now to consider the memoranda included in your letter of the 3rd. In case I should have an opportunity of negotiating a peace, I will attend to the first two articles. In respect to the third, I have no idea that the Peshwah will attempt to fly from Poonah; or that, if he should be so inclined, he could carry his plan into execution without the knowledge of his ministers. You will have observed, from my letters to Col. Close, that I have urged him to pay the ministers, in order to have accurate information of what passes.

We cannot contrive to settle the government at Poonah till the conclusion of the war. Bad as the situation of the government is, it must be allowed to continue. If we were to attempt to alter it now, we should

have a contest in our rear, which would be ruinous. It is impossible to foresee exactly in what situation the conclusion of the war will leave us, or what the settlement at Poonah ought to be. The Governor General knows, however, that I have concluded an arrangement with Amrut Rao, and I have opened a negotiation with Holkar, in which I have proposed that he should combine his interests with those of the British government. I have not yet had an answer to my first letter to that chief; but a hircarrah, come from Amrut Rao's camp this morning, says that it was reported there, that Holkar had gone to Indore; and if that be the case, it is probable that he proposes to remain neutral till he shall see which party is most likely to be successful. This hircarrah also reported that Amrut Rao was coming to join me at Aurungabad.

In respect to the 4th article, before you have received this, the Governor General will have heard that the southern chiefs have kept aloof; and that all that we can expect from them is their neutrality during the war. I have written to them since the fall of Ahmednuggur, but I have, as yet, received no answer. If I should find them disposed to join, upon condition that their possessions shall be confirmed and guaranteed to them, I will enter into engagements accordingly.

Mr. Duncan has been particularly anxious to seize Angria's possessions; a measure which I have vehemently opposed, and in which I have declared that I will not co-operate, for the following reasons:

1st: Till we establish a plentiful depôt at Ahmednuggur, it is absolutely necessary that we should keep up our communication with Panwell and Bombay, and it would be desirable to keep it up at all events. The road passes through Angria's country, and he has hitherto suffered the communication to be carried on undisturbed. He will not resign his possessions without a contest; during the existence of which, the road would be interrupted, and he might continue to make it inconvenient, even after he should be driven out.

2ndly: Mr. Duncan has no means of carrying on this expedition: he talks of seamen, artillerymen, and 300 or 400 sepoy, but Angria has 2 or 3 very strong hill forts in the Konkan, not immediately on the sea coast; these must be regularly attacked heavy equipments must be formed for these attacks, and there must be something better to carry them on than the troops proposed by Mr. Duncan.

3rdly: The situation of Scindiah, relatively to Angria and all the southern chiefs, has been materially altered by the fall of Ahmednuggur. They must now see that he has no means of moving a regular army into the Deccan: he may come in with a few horse as a freebooter, and he will be driven out again, but he can do them no harm. On the other hand, they must also perceive that there is no fort so strong as that the British troops cannot get into it: they are all much attached to, and place great reliance on, their forts; and Angria in particular, who must, from his situation, feel himself exposed to the constant attacks of the British government, will not like to venture to offend us, by taking advantage of his situation to cut off our communication with Bombay.

Upon the whole, therefore, I am decidedly of opinion, that Angria ought not to be touched; and indeed, generally, I am induced to oppose

these little expeditions of Mr. Duncan, for the success of which I never see adequate means provided.

I will write to Col. Close respecting the 6th article in the memoranda.

With respect to the 7th article, I have to tell you, that the confederates have moved to the eastward, and Col. Stevenson has moved in a parallel line with them, and he will fall upon them as soon as he can. He will continue that course even to Nagpoor, if it should be necessary; and I shall be able to move in a day or two, which will probably induce Scindiah at least to return. The confederates cannot make any serious impression upon the Nizam's territories, till the middle of October, when it may be expected that the river Godavery will fall; and I have strongly recommended to the Resident at Hyderabad, that a corps should be collected at that city, to protect it effectually, in case the enemy should contrive to pass round us. If they should go to the northward to invade Bengal, some of us must follow them. In case of peace, I will attend to the 8th article.

Twelve days have elapsed since I took Ahmednuggur; and in that time I have marched nearly 50 miles, and have crossed the river Godavery: having settled our conquests south of that river, I hope to get on equally well in future; but I tremble for the want of the common country grains for the followers and cattle. The country is completely exhausted, the villages depopulated, and large tracts of excellent land uncultivated. Indeed, I believe that these facts are the principal causes of Holkar's keeping aloof from the confederates. We have lost such numbers of cattle by the length of our march and starvation, that we have none to carry grain for our followers; and I learn that we have lost vast numbers of those coming from Gen. Stuart's army: I believe nearly one half of the whole number. However, large numbers of dealers attend the camp, who came with me from Mysore; and if the Nizam's servants afford us any supplies, we shall still do tolerably well. I have plenty for the troops, and it may be depended upon that I will do every thing in my power to procure what is wanted for the followers.

I do not like our situation in Guzerat: we have plenty of troops for the defence of that province, but they are not organized or commanded, one party being under the command of a committee, consisting of a collector, a judge, and Col. Callander; and the other, under that of Major Walker: they are not equipped or provided. I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan, for the organization and equipment of the troops, and for the general defence of Guzerat. But although he cannot disapprove of it, it interferes with all his little prejudices, plans of operation, mooluckghery, conquests in Kattywar, &c. &c.; and I see plainly that it never will be carried into execution, as it ought; and that, in fact, it will be thwarted. Under these circumstances, I had serious thoughts of writing to the Governor General, to request him to relieve me from the command in Guzerat; but I have refrained from doing so, and shall persevere as long as I can.

What do you think of Mr. Duncan and Major Walker doubting whether Anund Rao's troops, and even the subsidiary force, should go on the expedition to Baroach (which, by the by, after all, I believe they have not

sent), as the Guickwar government was in 'close alliance' with Dowlut Rao Scindiah? Then they have their troops scattered in companies in ten thousand different directions. They have 3 complete regiments of Europeans, and parts of 3 others, in those countries, but none collected; and they have neither provisions, ammunition, cattle, magazines, nor any one equipment that the troops want.

The fort of Songhur, an important post for the security of Surat, was attacked by a banditti in the beginning of July: there were 100 sepoys and an officer in it. After the attack, the committee of Surat found out that the officer had neither ammunition nor provisions. They deliberated upon the subject, considered it well, referred it to Col. Callander, to Bombay, and to the officer at Songhur; but as late as the 21st July, they had not sent off the provisions or ammunition; and, as far as I know, they may not yet have been sent. Every thing is to be apprehended from such people.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Toka, 24th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose herewith a letter for Lord Clive, which contains a dispatch for the Governor General. An hircarrah came in from Amrut Rao's camp this morning, who declares that, after the receipt of my agreement, of which the enclosed contains a translation, he determined upon marching to join me as proposed. The same hircarrah also tells me that Holkar had gone to Indore.

Major Dallas will be here to-morrow. Lieut. Griffiths was 30 miles south of Culburga on the 8th; and Major Hill did not expect to march from the Kistna till the 13th.

We find the country much destroyed and exhausted; but I hope that we shall get on well, if the Nizam's servants supply us at all.

Before we left Ahmednuggur, some looking glasses, swords, pistols, fowling pieces, &c., belonging to Scindiah, were found in the fort. The place in which these articles were was wanted; and I ordered that they might be sold. As soon as I shall have ascertained what there was, and what grain and stores there are, I propose to recommend to the Governor General that the value of them should be given to the troops as prize. The expense will be trifling, and they certainly deserve this encouragement.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

24th Aug. 1803.

Govind Rao has told the General this afternoon that he has received a letter from Deshmook Sham Rao, of Ahmednuggur, informing him that he is imprisoned by a man named Ram Rao, and required to give an account of his management under Govind Rao. And he has reminded the General that he collected the grain that was lying in the deserted houses, and by his order gave some away in charity, and expended the greater part in the payment of coolies, employed in collecting timber and taking down the gates, and of peons collected there; and he left the remainder in the cutwahl's choultry. The grain was neither measured when found or given out, and no particular account can be given of it. The man claims the protection of Govind Rao, upon whose faith he came forward, in the time of fear and distress. And Govind Rao declares his readiness to answer to any complaint that may be made against his management in Ahmednuggur, and only requests that the man, through whose means he was enabled to render any

service there, may not be harshly treated. The man at Nuggur adds that he is prevented from going to you to represent his case.

The General has desired me to mention all these circumstances to you, and to request that you will prevent the man called Ram Rao from doing any thing of the nature reported above, without your knowledge. There is also a report of some horse plundering about Sogaum, and he requests that you will send Hyder Khan that way as soon as possible.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp N. of the Godavery, 25th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a letter for his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, in answer to that which he did me the honor to write to me, which I request you to send to his Highness. I likewise enclose a copy of it for your information.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and I congratulate you upon the peaceable manner in which every thing has gone on at Hyderabad.

The enemy had not entered the Nizam's territories on the 22d, and on that day had returned from Badowly towards Burhampoor.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 25th Aug. 1803.

Goklah received 45,000 rupees a few days ago, and now he wants 75,000 more. He says that this sum was due 8 days, and that it ought to have been paid on the 16th of this month. I shall be obliged to you if you will inquire at the durbar upon this subject, and let me know whether Goklah is to have this money. I have desired Bellingham to write to you, to request that 25,000 rupees, for which I signed a bill yesterday, might be sent to Ahmednuggur, to Lieut. Carfrae, the paymaster at that place. If Goklah is to have these 75,000 rupees, it will be necessary that you should send me on as much money as you can conveniently get, besides that sum which is still to go to Ahmednuggur.

Major Dallas has come in, but I have not yet seen him, or learnt the number of cattle he has brought with him. On the 22d, the enemy marched from the neighbourhood of the Badowly ghaut, back towards Goompeepre, between Adjunttee and Burhampoor, and about 10 coss from the former: Col. Stevenson was at Dewal ghaut, about 10 miles from the Badowly ghaut.

I hear that Gopal Bhow went off from the Casserbarry ghaut on the 23d, but of this I am not certain: an hircarrah, who came yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, and left Amrut Rao's camp on the 22d, reported that Amrut Rao intended to come to join me. He also said, that Amrut Rao had received accounts that Holkar had gone to Indore: this last report is confirmed by one of a similar purport from Chandore.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 26th Aug. 1803.

I enclose papers which I have received from Appah Dessaye, regarding the difficulties of his situation. I have sent him word that I have crossed the river, and am about to advance; and that, until he joins, I can do nothing for him. It is really necessary that something should be determined about the payment of these two parties.

My whole time and attention, which are required by many other objects, are taken up in disputing with Goklah and Appah Dessaye about their

pay. The latter swears that he cannot get possession of his jaghires, and that, till he does get them, his troops must have money; and certainly what he says upon this subject appears reasonable. But if they must have money, how much are they to have, and who is to pay them? If the Company are to pay them, it would be better for me to hire an equal number of troops at the same expense, than to have these fellows, whom we must always suspect of sending intelligence to the enemy, and from whom I doubt that we shall have but little service; or at once to take them into the Company's service at certain rates of pay.

At all events, if we are to pay them, (and I do not see how they can keep the field unless we do,) we must either have some assistance from the Peshwah of money, or of influence in procuring it from the soucars for our drafts. We ought also to have a small detachment of his cavalry to accompany the escort which will march occasionally with the treasure from Poonah. Only conceive what a drain upon my resources of money 75,000 rupees monthly to Goklah and 60,000 monthly to Appah Dessaye will be; besides the force collecting at Ahmednuggur, for which provision must be made, as the collection cannot be expected for many months, and 2 additional battalions coming from the frontier.

I wish you to turn these points over in your mind. It is useless to say that Goklah ought to serve for his jaghire in Savanore, and Appah Dessaye for his in various other places; for they neither can, nor will, serve at such a distance from those places, particularly the latter, who has never got possession of the lands allotted to him. Either they must have money, or they must be sent back; and I wish to have the question decided, as I cannot give up my time daily to argue with these chiefs, and their carkoons, upon these points, with which, after all, I ought to have nothing to do.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, N. of the Godavery, 26th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 23d. Gopal Bhow is certainly gone off. I have a letter from Col. Stevenson, in which he informs me that the enemy had returned to Goompeepre on the 22d. He had sent a detachment down the ghaut to ascertain the fact, and it cut off some of the enemy's supplies. He intended to move, on the night of the 23d, upon a detachment of Ragojee Bhoonslah, gone to the eastward; and at the same time he sent a body of infantry to Jaffierabad, to keep in check the enemy, in case they should design to come up by Adjunttee or Ferdapoor. I think it is capital that we should have begun to play the Marhatta game upon themselves; and that, at all events, Col. Stevenson alone should have contrived to have kept them out of the Nizam's territories, and in their own exhausted countries, for above a fortnight since the commencement of hostilities.

Major Walker's intelligence is much exaggerated, much of it false, and in many instances contradictory. He knows that well, and argues frequently against the probability of the story which he transmits to Bombay. Yet he continues to send out these same hircarrahs, and it does not appear that they are punished for bringing false intelligence, or rewarded for telling the truth. I will give Col. Murray a hint upon the subject of the nature of this intelligence.

Upon the whole, I think it will be best that the bullocks you send should have saddles, and should bring 200 of the loads of arrack and the remainder loads of rice from Poonah. They must also have drivers. I am, however, concerned to observe, that the drivers we get in the country are very bad, and desert constantly.

Capt. Graham has informed me that the Peshwah's vakeel, young Rastia, has ordered some of the head men of villages in our districts to attend him. He must have done this by order from the durbar. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this circumstance to the ministers, and tell them that, if the Peshwah is satisfied with the arrangement which has been made at Ahmednuggur, he ought not to interfere in the arrangement of the country in any manner, as a double local authority will never answer. If he is not satisfied, let him state his wishes, and I will let him know whether I can comply with them. But if there should be any more of this underhand opposition to the management, after it had been approved, I shall be obliged to alter my proclamation, and to take possession of the country solely in the name of the Company.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, N. of the Godavery, 26th Aug. 1803.

I wish to warn you particularly against the volumes of false intelligence which you will receive when you go into Guzerat. Major Walker sends out hircarrahs, who return and tell him what they please; he writes the whole down, and sends it off to Mr. Duncan, by whom it is circulated. In frequent instances, Major Walker discovers that his hircarrahs have told him falsehoods; but I doubt whether they are punished when they bring intelligence which is false, or rewarded when they bring that which is true, or consistent with other facts or intelligence.

Very lately, an instance has occurred, in which two cossids relate that they had been to Holkar's camp, on the Taptee, and he was positively at Myhissur on the day that they said they saw his camp. They also swore that he had 160,000 horse, and vast quantities of guns and military equipments: yet there is no fact better established, than that Holkar's losses of cattle had been so great, that he was obliged to leave behind and bury his guns and military equipment; and as for his horse, I know that his principal partisans, Meer Khan and Nago Jewajee, are gone into Malwa, probably to take possession of the countries allotted for the subsistence of their troops. I mention these circumstances only to show you how little dependence is to be placed upon these stories, when the people who tell them have no fear of punishment, nor hope of reward; and I am going to mention another fact, to show you what can be done by activity.

Since the beginning of the war, Col. Stevenson has been exposed, single handed, to the united armies of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, which, I dare say, have been reported to Major Walker to consist of 200,000 men. Not a Marhatta horseman has been able to show himself in the Nizam's territories; and Col. Stevenson, on the 23d, played the Marhatta trick upon them, by cutting off some of their supplies.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, N. of the Godavery, 26th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose to you a return of the bullocks taken at

muster this morning, which arrived yesterday with Major Dallas. Capt. Mackay tells me that they are Carnatic maistries, so that I imagine the Werdy cattle are coming with Lieut. Griffiths.

Col. Stevenson followed the enemy to the Badowly ghaut, as I before informed you. They fell back to Goompeepre, half way between Burhampoor and Adjuttee, on the 22d; and, on the 23d, Col. Stevenson, having sent a detachment down the ghaut to examine the road, and find out whether the intelligence he had received of their movement was correct, took some horses and bullocks loaded with supplies which were following the enemy's army. On the 23d, at night, he was to march with a body of cavalry to endeavor to surprise a small body of the enemy who were upon his right towards Berar. Gopal Bhow, who was in my front with a body called 10,000 horse, has gone off to the northward to join Scindiah. Not a man has yet entered the Nizam's territories; and I believe, from the Godavery to the Toombuddra, that the Marhatta territory was never in such tranquillity.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp at Toka, 26th Aug. 1803.

I received, yesterday, your letters of the 23d and 24th, and I congratulate you upon the success at Neemgaum.

You shall have 100 horse, besides the party with Hyder Khan, for the present; but he should recruit quickly, and make them active, as I find that there are parties of horse prowling about in different directions, who may be very inconvenient hereafter. There is one party in particular, in the neighbourhood of Sogaum, respecting which Govind Rao wrote to you the other day.

I approve of the pay and establishment for the peons, but I think the horse expensive. The pay of the jemidars and duffadars is very proper, but that for the horsemen ought not to exceed 25 rupees; indeed, that for the duffadars ought not to exceed 35 rupees. However, upon this point, we must trust, in a great measure, to Hyder Khan; but I beg of you to communicate to him my sentiments, and try to get the horse at the price above stated. The 1500 peons will possibly be sufficient; however, I do not wish to stint the service: 1000 horse also will be as much as can be required.

I have requested Col. Close to keep Mr. Carfrae supplied with money, and you will indent upon him for such sums as you may want, until your own collections shall commence. In the mean time, Mr. Carfrae may want some of the money, to make his payments, of what you have already; and, if that be the case, I request you to let him have some.

I shall write to Appah Dessaye upon the subject which you have mentioned. I wish that you had stated the names of the villages from which he carried off the people, and that you would attend to this circumstance in future.

Rastia is the Peshwah's vakeel with me. It is not improbable that he has been desired to act as he has done; but I shall write to Col. Close upon that subject.

The Nizam's officers have seized some of the districts north of the Godavery; but I shall settle that matter with them when I go to Aurungabad

I should willingly give you an assistant; and shall do so hereafter, as your business may increase; but, at present, our districts are so little extensive, that I doubt whether such an addition to our revenue establishment would be approved of.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 26th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 23d. Nothing can have been more satisfactory than the result of your operations; and I think it capital that you should have played their own game upon the Marhattas, and should have been the first to cut off the supplies going to their camp. As they are now gone to the westward, I think you will do well to turn your attention to that quarter likewise. But I also shall march on the day after to-morrow.

Gopal Bhow has gone off to the northward, it is said, to join Scindiah, near Adjuttee. We must now try whether we cannot drive these fellows into the Taptee, you by one road, I by another. I should wish to hear from you any account you may have of the Ferdapoor, Adjuttee, Badowly, or other ghauts, through the hills which bound the Nizam's territories to the northward. I am well supplied and equipped with every thing, excepting dry grain for the followers and cattle; but I have an excellent bazaar, and many cattle attached to it.

How are your brinjaries supplied with dry grain?

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Whitechoke, Chittledroog.

26th Aug. 1803.

It has been mentioned in the camp that it was intended to relieve Lieut. Langford in the command of Huriyhur, after he had been in that situation 6 months; the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has therefore directed me to inform you that Lieut. Langford is specially appointed to that command, and is not to be relieved without his orders.

To the Governor of Bonibay.

Camp, 27th Aug. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst.

2. It is to be hoped, that the orders which I have already given, and the measures which you have adopted, will have put the Hon. Company's troops in possession of the fort of Baroach before this time. It will remain with you to appoint a person to manage and collect the revenues of the districts depending upon Baroach; and I recommend that a body of peons should be raised to take possession of the different tannahs in behalf of the Hon. Company.

3 In respect to the fort of Powanghur, I shall send directions that it may be attacked as soon as I find that the troops are assembled north of the river Nerbudda, and in a state of equipment fit to undertake that operation.

4. It does not appear that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has any territories south of the Nerbudda, bordering upon the sea coast, which would become the object of the operations of the troops in Guzerat.

5. In respect to the Patans, said to be in the neighbourhood of Songhur, I have strong reasons to doubt their being in that quarter at all, and, certainly, not in the numbers stated by the hircarrahs employed by Major Walker.

6. It is by no means certain, though very possible, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar will become a party in the war ; and, for that reason, I am desirous not to attack or molest any of the troops supposed to belong to that Chief, at least for a short time.

P.S. I have the honor to return herewith the plan of Surat, which you were so kind as to send me some time ago.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

27th Aug. 1803.

As Capt. Graham has already sent 10 peons to the Nimderrah ghaut for the safety of travellers, it is not necessary that you should detach a company of sepoys thither, unless it should happen that the peons are not sufficient.

The hay in the covered way must not be sold on any account. It is reserved for exigencies of the public service.

The reports of all your committees of survey must be given to the receiving officer as his voucher.

An officer has been appointed to the charge of the sick in the hospital at Ahmednuggur.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Julgaon, 28th Aug. 1803.

I have received intelligence that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar ascended the Adjunttee ghaut on the 24th, and that those Chiefs are now within the Nizam's territories. I think it probable, however, that Col. Stevenson will have returned to Jaffierabad on the 25th ; and, as he will then be at no great distance from them, and as they must have received intelligence of my having crossed the river, it is possible they may retire. I shall be at Aurungabad to-morrow.

I also received, yesterday, a report from one of my hircarrahs, come in from Holkar's camp, stating that that Chief had made a march from the neighbourhood of Myhissur to join Scindiah. He was one march beyond the Dowhote ghaut, on the road from Hindustan to Burhampoor, on the 18th.

This account does not agree with that which I received some days ago from Amrut Rao's camp, (which I mentioned to you in one of my late letters,) that Holkar had gone to Indore, which was also confirmed by the report of an hircarrah come from Chandore. But whether he is coming, or not, to join Scindiah, it is possible that part of the army may be coming.

We never were in better marching trim, notwithstanding all our losses by rain, &c. The horses of the cavalry and the cattle in general are in excellent condition. I shall endeavor immediately to strike a blow on one of these parties of horse ; and I acknowledge that I do not think it is to be regretted that they have come near us ; as, in the exhausted state of the country, it would have been very difficult for us to go near them.

Major Dallas's corps is in fine order, and I intend to keep it in the field ; and I believe I shall do the like with Major Hill's. I must, however, send a battalion to Poonah, and I am rather at a loss to determine which it shall be. The men of the 2nd of the 18th have deserted in vast numbers, and I am really apprehensive that, when they shall be at all involved in difficulties, this evil will increase, and this ought to be the corps in the fixed station at Poonah. But Lieut. Col. Chalmers, who commands the 18th, is senior to Lieut. Col. Colman, who, since he has

commanded at Poonah, has managed all the concerns there in a very satisfactory manner; and it would be a great inconvenience to replace him by Col. Chalmers.

I am very badly off for officers to command corps; excepting Col. McLeod and Major Dallas, lately arrived, there is not one upon whom I can depend. Col. Griffin, of the 1st of the 2nd, is entirely unfit for the service from incapacity and sickness, and he would be the most proper person to send to Poonah with the 2nd of the 18th. I think it probable that I shall receive your answer to this letter, before I shall send any corps to Poonah, as it will not be necessary to reinforce that station till the middle of October, when the rivers will fall; and I do not think of doing it till Major Hill shall join. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will let me know whether you have any objection to my removing Col. Chalmers to the 1st of the 2nd, and Col. Griffin to the 2nd of the 18th.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp at Julgaon, 28th Aug. 1803.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 16th this morning, for which I am much obliged to you.

I have received intelligence that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the Nizam's territories by the Adjuntee ghaut on the 24th inst. Col. Stevenson was likely to return to Jaffierabad on the 25th, from an excursion which he made on the night of the 23rd, to the eastward, to surprise a detachment from the Rajah of Berar's army, under his nephew. My division has crossed the Godavery, and will be at Aungabad to-morrow; so that I think it probable the enemy will not deem their position very secure, and will retire. It is reported that Jeswunt Rao Holkar is on his march for Myhissur, on the Nerbudda, to join Scindiah; but there are some grounds for believing this report to be, at least, premature.

I have no intelligence of any movement to the southward; on the contrary, the communication is open, and my brinjaries are travelling in all parts of the road between Poonah and Hurryhur. I shall keep you apprized of every thing interesting that may occur.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 20th Aug. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd inst.

2. When I proposed, for your consideration, a plan for the military organization of the troops in Guzerat Proper, and the Attavesy, and for the defence of those provinces, I did not intend to lessen the authority of, or the respect due to, the Resident at Baroda; and I proposed the plan for the subsidiary force in Guzerat, such as at this moment is in force in respect to the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

3. It appeared to me, from your letter of the 12th, that you approved of that plan; and you desired that I would recommend Col. Murray for the situation which I proposed he should fill, if you should adopt it; but I learn, by your letter of the 23rd, that you disapprove of it, and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution.

4. I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure

which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service. But the measures in question are of a general nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our military situation in the Attavesy and Guzerat. You, who must have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those districts, are of opinion that they are not, and you object to them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous, indeed, if, after such an opinion, I were to persist in ordering the adoption of these measures, and I should well deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might happen.

5. At the same time, I have to observe to you, that the communication between me and the troops in those provinces is necessarily very long; that circumstances may render it longer, and may prevent it entirely; and, therefore, I request that you will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act for the public service, without any reference to me.

6. In case the circumstances of the war should hereafter enable me to approach nearer those provinces, I shall apprise the authorities there of the manner in which I may be of opinion that they can co-operate with me in forwarding the public service.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Aurungabad, 29th Aug. 1803.

I have received your 2 letters of the 23rd. Mr. Duncan's objection to the proposed arrangement in Guzerat and the Attavesy has surprised me as much as it has you. You probably saw only his private letter to me of the 23rd; had you seen the public letter of that date, you would have been better acquainted with his sentiments.

With the knowledge that you had, I am not astonished that you should have consented to act under the arrangement, and I am convinced that you would have done every thing in your power to carry it into execution. But you will be surprised when I tell you that part of that arrangement is to keep Gen. Jones at Surat, and Major Walker in the command of the troops in Guzerat, and the two commands separate.

It is my decided opinion that Guzerat, and even Surat itself, cannot be saved, unless there is an efficient military organization of the troops in those districts; unless there is one general authority to control the whole, and combine the movements of all the troops to one object; and unless regular and substantial means of supply are established. Mr. Duncan talks highly of the merits of the committee of Surat, because they have taken possession of a province ceded to them by treaty without opposition. I hope he will allow equal merit to my peons, who have taken possession of all Scindiah's and Ragojee Bhoonslah's territories south of, and bordering on, the Godavery.

After having objected to my plan, in principle as well as in detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. I am not afraid of responsibility, God knows! and I am ready to incur any personal risk for the public service; but, under such circumstances, I should be mad if I were to order this plan to be carried into execution. I have, therefore, requested Mr. Duncan to desire the public authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to

act as they may think best for the public service, without reference to me, and I propose not to have anything to do with the troops in those provinces.

I am concerned that you should have been disappointed, particularly after having gone from Poonah, to which situation you will probably wish to return. But I am convinced you will agree in opinion with me, that, under all the circumstances of this case, I could not order the execution of my plans; and that, at this distance from the scene of action, and under the difficulties of the communication, I could not pretend to conduct so disjointed a piece of machinery as the military duties at Guzerat and the Attavesy. I have no objection to your seeing all the correspondence upon this subject if you can; and if you do not see it at Bombay, I will take an opportunity of showing it to you, but it is very voluminous, and too troublesome to copy in these busy times.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Bulgaum, 30th Aug. 1803.

I have just received yours of the 27th. There appears a mistake at Poonah respecting the coolies you mention to have been forced to go on to the army. Not one cooley has come in from Poonah since we quitted Ahmednuggur. The rice brought in has come upon asses. The coolies who were paid, and intended for the army, stopped at Ahmednuggur, and threw down their loads; and these the brinjarries, whom I left behind to bring on 600 other loads, are now bringing on.

I have a good opinion of Goklah, but it will not answer to increase his party. The effect will be to increase the sum to be paid to him monthly,

G. O.

Bulgaum, 30th Aug. 1803.

It may be necessary for Major Gen. Wellesley to order the cavalry, and the 2nd batt. 12th regt. of Native infantry, and 100 pioneers, in advance; and, therefore, till further orders, the following arrangements are to be made daily for the march:

1st. Each of the troopers of the Native cavalry, and each dragoon, will carry with him one day's feed of chinnu or jowarry.

2nd. The gram agent general, or the quarter masters of regiments, will have as many bullocks laden with half loads of chinnu and jowarry as may be empty.

3rd. Two arrack carts, each drawn by 6 of the best bullocks, are to follow the cavalry.

4th. The tents of the dragoons are to be carried on the camels attached to the 78th regt., 2 on each camel; those of the 78th regt. on the elephants and on bullocks.

5th. Gen. Wellesley's hircanah camels are to be laden, each with 4 casks of salt provisions for the use of the dragoons, and Capt. Young will prepare 20 bullocks with half loads of rice. A conicoply must attend this provision.

6th. The officers of the cavalry, and those of the 2nd batt. 12th regt., are to make their arrangements to move out from the line as lightly equipped as possible, in case Major Gen. Wellesley should find an opportunity of ordering it with advantage. In such an event, only one half of the tents of the dragoons, all the doolies, excepting such as contain sick men, the provision and arrack above ordered, grain, in half loads, the guns and tumbrils of the 2nd batt. 12th regt., and spare ammunition, will be the only public stores to accompany the detachment.

7th. Accordingly, the public stores above mentioned, and such a proportion of tents for the Native troops as commanding officers of corps may think proper; and such private baggage as the officers of the cavalry, and of the 2nd batt. 12th regt., may choose to take with them (and which it is very desirable should be as little as possible), and the horse keepers and grass cutters of the cavalry, and such parts of the regimental bazaars of the cavalry as commanding officers may think will be useful, will move in advance with the baggage flag of the cavalry, which is blue.

8th. Officers and heads of departments will be very particular in giving orders that the other baggage may keep with the baggage flag of either of the brigades of infantry.

not the number of our force for service. You shall have blank bills for the shroffs; and I request you to send copies of them as you may grant them, in order that the sums received may be carried regularly to account. Jadon Rao, and all Scindiah's dependants, ought to be deprived of their jaghires forthwith, otherwise we ought not to have taken Ahmednuggur, or the countries dependent upon that place, all of which were in jaghire to somebody. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the Nizam's territories, as I before informed you, on the 24th, with their horse only. I do not believe they have done much harm, but they are advancing by long stages towards the Godavery, with an intention to cross that river. They took advantage of Col. Stevenson's absence to the eastward to enter the country. The Godavery filled again before I left it, but it may have become fordable; and, if that is the case, they declare it to be their intention to go to Hyderabad. I have passed to the eastward of Aurungabad, and shall make a march to-morrow to the southward, and I think it probable that I shall reach the Godavery with the cavalry. If the river be not fallen, they will move off either to the northward or eastward, which will afford time to secure our convoys travelling up from the Kistna. I think they will not attempt to cross the river by boats (indeed they are all secured) while I am at all near them. Col. Stevenson is at Jaffierabad, and I am afraid that he has been deceived by the Mussulmann.

I have not heard of any thing in my rear, or at all near me, yet. Flour in Scindiah's camp is at $2\frac{1}{2}$ seers for a rupee, so that we have still the most-plentiful supplies of the two armies. We must complete the storing of Ahmednuggur as expeditiously as possible. If the river falls, which certainly would be very extraordinary at this season of the year, that operation may be attended with difficulty.

P. S. It is reported that Holkar is coming forward, but I think that the report wants confirmation. Will you send this letter, with the enclosed, to Malcolm? Mr. Duncan, after having acquiesced in the plan suggested by me for the organization of the troops, and the plan of operations in Guzerat, has informed me that 'acquiescence' did not mean 'approbation'; and he has detailed his objections to the general system, as well as to the particulars of the plan, which go to fundamentals. He has, however, informed me that I may take upon myself to order its execution, if I think proper. I cannot understand the nice distinction between the 'acquiescence' of a Governor in a plan for the defence of the provinces under his government, and his 'approbation' of that plan. However, be that as it may, I cannot take upon myself to order the execution of measures which circumstances may render unfortunate, even if they should be regulated as I wish, but to which I am certain that every opposition in the power of every officer in the government will be given, particularly after I have been informed that those measures are decidedly disapproved of by the Governor. Neither can I, at this distance, undertake to conduct the details of a piece of machinery so disjointed as would be the military duties in Guzerat and the Attavesy, under the separated authorities of the Resident at Baroda and the Committee of Surat: I have, therefore, requested to be relieved from all interference in those concerns.

To Lieut. Col. Munro.

Camp, 20 miles E. of Aurungabad, 30th Aug. 1803.

Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have entered the Nizam's territories, have passed Col. Stevenson with an army of horse only, and propose to be upon the river Godavery this day. If the river should be fordable, they may be able to get to the southward; and I give you notice, that you may have your tannahs prepared in your villages, and desire them to defend them. They are starving: already flour and grain sell $2\frac{1}{2}$ seers for a rupee in their camp, because the inhabitants, finding that they have no guns, and that the horse cannot get over their walls, do not choose to give up their property upon the first requisition, and they have no leisure to wait long in any particular place.

I have received intelligence that a fellow, by name Mahtab Khan, who was formerly in Tippoo's service, is employed by the Rajah of Berar to raise horse at Cuddapa. You may probably find this fellow out; and I recommend that he be treated as he deserves. I beg you to keep the Werdy bullocks in the service. I shall write to Gen. Campbell regarding them.

I hope to be able to strike a blow against their myriads of horse in a few days, if I should not be so unlucky as to have the Godavery become fordable about 6 weeks sooner than usual.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Bulgaum, 30th Aug. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 28th and 29th. I am glad to inform you that your treasure is safe at Aurungabad, being 3 lacs of rupees from Hyderabad, and one lac of pagodas from Gen. Stuart.

I marched this morning from Aurungabad to the eastward, and intend to turn towards the Godavery to-morrow, in order to cover the advance of the supplies from Hyderabad and the Kistna. It is said that the enemy intend to cross the Godavery; but, as the river filled again before I quitted it, I imagine that they will not attempt that operation while I am so near them.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Bulgaum, 30th Aug. 1803.

You will have heard that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the Nizam's territories, by the Adjuttee ghaut, on the 24th inst. They have since advanced gradually with cavalry only; and, I understand, were to be this day upon the river Godavery.

The report in circulation is, that they intend to march upon Hyderabad; but as I shall be upon the river to-morrow with my cavalry, if I should find they have gone there this day, I think it probable that they will not attempt to cross unless the river should be fordable. It had risen considerably on the day that I left it, and was not fordable. I do not believe it is so now, but, if it should be so, I shall cross it as well as the enemy; and, although I cannot promise to be at Hyderabad as soon as they will, I can assure you that I shall lose no time upon the road. I expect to be able to hurry them on in such a manner, as that they will not have time to do any material injury to the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. They have spread their pindarries over this country, but it does not appear that they have done it much injury. They have been

chiefly in Scindiah's districts of Jalnapoor; and the amildar of Budnapoor has resisted them successfully in his village, and has set an example therein, which I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to urge the inhabitants of the countries on both sides of the Godavery to follow.

Notwithstanding this predatory invasion, the enemy are much distressed, and flour and grain sell in their camp at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ seers for a rupee. This fact is a strong proof of the measures adopted by the inhabitants for their defence; and shows that, if they become general, and are persevered in, they must quit the country for want of subsistence. You should write to durbar to issue a proclamation to inform the inhabitants that the enemy have no guns, to require them to defend the villages and property, and to assure them that I am coming to their assistance.

The D.A.G. to Major Hill, 1st batt. 4th regt.

30th Aug. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to inform you that the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah have entered the Nizani's territories with large bodies of horse, and, by reports, are moving towards the Godavery. The General has, in consequence, sent orders to Lieut. Griffith, who is in advance of you, to take post at Kurdiah, or in the first strong village or ghurru on his route after he receives the order, and maintain himself there till you arrive, when he will join you. And the General desires that, unless, from good information, you should reckon the enemy's force too great for you, you will advance to Moongy Puttun, on the Godavery, and wait for his further orders. He requests that you will endeavor to give him constant information of your motions. This detachment has made two marches from Aurungabad in quest of the Mahratta armies.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

30th Aug. 1803.

The Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah have entered the Nizam's territories with large bodies of horse, and, by last accounts, are pushing for the Godavery. If they are able to cross it, they may send parties of their troops into your neighbourhood. It is, therefore, necessary that you observe the greatest degree of watchfulness for the security of the fort.

The company at Toka ought to be joined immediately by all its detached or recovered men, and a quantity of rice should be sent over to it, for which Mr. Barret will send indent.

(A similar letter to the Officer commanding at Toka.)

To Major Shawe.

Camp near Unterwarry, 31st Aug. 1803.

Since I wrote to you last the enemy have taken advantage of Col. Stevenson's march to the eastward, of which I apprised you: they returned suddenly to the westward, and entered the Nizam's territories, by the ghaut of Adjuntee, on the 24th, with horse only: they advanced with some rapidity from thence, I conclude, in order to avoid Col. Stevenson, who returned to Jaffierabad, I believe, on the 25th; and they have been, for the last 2 days, in the neighbourhood of Jaulna, a fort in the district of Jalnapoor, which belongs to Scindiah.

The pindarries have been spread, as usual, to plunder; but, as far as I can learn, they have done but little mischief, and in many instances (particularly at a place called Budnapoor) they have been beaten off by the inhabitants. Grain is consequently very dear in their army, being at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ seers for a rupee.

I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th; I marched from thence to the eastward yesterday, and have to-day come down towards the Godavery, as

it was reported that the enemy had made a march to the southward, and intended to cross that river, to go towards Hyderabad. The Godavery, which had fallen so much as to be fordable on the 26th, for a day or two, has risen again, so that I conclude that plan is laid aside for the present, as the passage of the river, unless it can be forded, would be a dangerous experiment. But I conclude that it will be resumed hereafter; and, if they attempt to put it in execution, I shall move there likewise, taking care to detach to Poonah a force which will secure every thing in that quarter. At the same time I have in contemplation an expedition into Berar, which will give the Rajah something to do in his own country; and this shall be carried into execution as soon as we have sufficient supplies collected to ensure the subsistence of the troops on this service.

Col. Stevenson is, at present, at a place called Donegaum, about 20 coss north east from Aurungabad. I have desired him to move, with expedition, upon the enemy; and I shall do the same, as soon as I have secured my baggage at this place.

I saw Col. Collins at Aurungabad, and had a long conversation with him, from which it appears clearly that the war was inevitable, and that the Rajah of Berar urged it on, in order to find a place for the subsistence of Scindiah's and Holkar's troops, which must otherwise have entered his countries. The state of Hindustan, and indeed of all the countries in which Holkar and Scindiah have carried on their operations, is shocking. I have a report that Holkar is coming to join the enemy; but it is not confirmed, although it may possibly be true.

I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relinquish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had acquiesced in my plan for the organization of the troops, and the system to be adopted for the defence of those territories, he has written to me to say that 'acquiescence' is not 'approbation;' and he had objected to the principle, as well as to the detail, of the measures which I had recommended. But he says that, if I choose to be responsible for the consequences, they shall be carried into execution. I do not exactly see the distinction between the 'acquiescence in,' and 'approbation of,' a system for the defence of the provinces under his government by a governor.

I should have no objection to taking upon myself to be answerable for any measures that I have recommended, provided I was certain that they would be carried into execution. But I know that these would be impeded; and I should doubly incur blame when I should not deserve it: first, on account of the failure of a system not properly carried into execution; and, secondly, for persisting in ordering the adoption of that system, when I knew that it was contrary to the sentiments and inclinations of the Governor. I have, therefore, thought it best to request Mr. Duncan to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and the Attavasy to act as they might think best for the public service, without reference to me;

G. O.

Baumungaum, 31st Aug. 1803

One half of the puckalies of all the corps in camp to be sent immediately to Capt. Heuland as a working party, at the village of Baumungaum, and the other half to be sent thither on the same duty at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning.

and I have had less scruple in taking this step, because, at this distance from the scene of action, and, under all the difficulties of the communications, I am entirely incapable of directing the operations of a piece of machinery so disjointed as the separate commands of the Committee of Surat and the Resident at Baroda. I should send you all the papers upon this subject, only that they are very voluminous; and I know that the Governor General will receive a letter from Mr. Duncan, with numerous accompaniments, regarding it.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp near Unterwarry, 31st Aug. 1803.

Since I wrote to you last, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have entered the Nizam's territories, with a body of horse only, by the Adjuttee ghaut. These have not yet done much mischief; indeed, they have been principally in a district belonging to Scindiah, called Jalnapoor. The inhabitants of some of the villages which their pindarries have attacked have defended themselves and their property. The consequence is, that rice, in their army, is at $2\frac{1}{2}$ seers for a rupee.

The enemy entered the country on the 24th, when Col. Stevenson was in pursuit of a party which had come in by one of the eastern ghauts. Col. Stevenson marched yesterday from Jaffierabad to Donegaum, to favor the junction of a detachment from Aurungabad with treasure; and I marched from Aurungabad yesterday and this day to the southward towards the Godavery, having received intelligence that the enemy intended to march in that direction, to cross the river, and proceed to Hyderabad. The river was fordable for a day or two before I quitted Toka, but it rose again. It is probable, the intelligence that it had fallen occasioned the plan and report that they intended to cross; and the intelligence, that it had risen again, has been the cause of the plan being laid aside, for they have certainly not moved this way. I have ordered Col. Stevenson to move upon them quickly, which I shall do also as soon as I shall have made some arrangements for the security of my baggage.

I do not believe that any of the pindarries have crossed the Godavery. If they attempt to cross the river before it falls, they will lose a great part of their army, as one of our divisions will be close to them; and, if they should attempt this expedition to Hyderabad, after the rivers shall fall, I propose to follow them, detaching a sufficient force to Poonah to secure every thing there; and, as soon as Col. Stevenson shall have collected his treasure and some brinjarries still in his rear, I propose to send him to attack a fort in the territories of the Rajah of Berar, where he keeps his treasures, by which operation I hope to make a powerful diversion in favor of the Nizam. This invasion, by horse, is unpleasant, and will become more so, as these bodies shall increase. But if the people of the country will defend their villages and property, I hope yet that we shall be able to drive them out. I have no intelligence of Holkar.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp near Unterwarry, 31st Aug. 1803.

I marched here this morning, with a view to check the operations of the enemy to the southward. I rather believe that he was encamped yesterday at Caulaygaum, to the south of Jaulna. He did not march before 12. I have

not heard from his camp since. We must endeavor to drive him out of the Nizam's country, or he will certainly oblige us to draw nearer to our supplies. More pindarries will follow those already come in. They will penetrate to the south of the river; and then I, at least, must recross to subside. I do not expect that we shall be able to bring the enemy to an action, but we must try to keep him in movement, and tire him out.

I cannot permanently move to the eastward at present, for several reasons: one of the most pressing is, that I am obliged to look out for a battalion marching from the Kistna with bullocks, treasures, &c., &c. Besides, I do not think it impossible but that Holkar may come down and increase the number of our enemies; and I must return to impede his progress. I propose, therefore, to leave my baggage and heavy stores here in an intrenched camp, with a battalion, and to move forward with a light army. I shall march upon this plan on the day after to-morrow; and I shall keep as nearly as I can, in a due E. direction from hence, between Jaulna and the river. I recommend that you also should march with your cavalry only, if you think yourself sufficiently strong in that description of troops, and a battalion with its guns, on the same plan, on the day after to-morrow. You might direct your march immediately upon the enemy: we shall frighten him, at least, if we do not hurt him; we shall drive him from the territories of the Nabob, and oblige him to retire into those of the Rajah of Berar. If we succeed in this plan, the parties will possibly become tired of the game; and, at all events, we shall have gained time by it for my supplies to come up.

Your infantry might remain in your camp at Donegaun, for your treasures, &c., to collect upon; and they would be a check upon the return of the enemy to this quarter. Keep your intentions secret. None of the Natives can be trusted with the secrets of our plans in this war, till our success is decided.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Boyé.

Camp at Baumungaum, 31st Aug. 1803.

I have received and laid your letter of the 23rd inst., with its enclosure, before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, and am directed by him to inform you that Lieut. Col. Colman, having succeeded to the command of the brigade at Poonah, on Col. Murray's appointment to Guzerat, was afterwards furnished with instructions on various subjects relating to the present service, and has entered upon the execution of them in a manner very much to the General's satisfaction and to the advantage of the service. He therefore considers that it will be highly inconvenient to supersede Lieut. Col. Colman in the command at Poonah, and he desires that you will take the command of the detail of the 1st batt. 3rd regt. at Panwell. As the General is actuated on this occasion solely by motives of public utility, he desires me to inform you further, that, if it will be a matter of gratification to you, or if it will be otherwise advantageous to you, he will order the head quarters of the battalion to Panwell.

To the Sec. of Gov. Bombay.

Unterwarry, 1st Sept. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd Aug., in which you have enclosed the copy of a dispatch from the envoy at Goa. In my opinion, none of the troops in this part of India can be spared to add to the means of defence of Goa, and particularly not the 84th regt.; unless the detachments of that corps, stationed at Poonah and at Parneira, can be replaced by similar detachments of European troops.

2. I observe that Sir W. Clarke, in calculating his means of defence for Goa, has not included either the fleet under Adm. Rainier, or the Portuguese troops. It is not very probable that an attack can be made by such a force as will render necessary the extensive defensive operations for which such a large body of European troops is required, without the knowledge of Adm. Rainier, and his proceeding with his fleet in the direction of Goa. However bad the Portuguese troops may be, they cannot be entirely useless in forts which must be garrisoned, particularly if mixed with the British troops, and if the supposed attack should not be made by a force so large as to attract the notice and consequent co-operation of Adm. Rainier.

G. O.

Camp near Unterwarry, 1st Sept. 1803.

The detachment, with the exception of the 2nd batt. 11th regt., with its guns, and the details hereafter specified, to march to-morrow morning by the right (the remainder as usual).

Lieut. Col. Chalmers will take up a position on this ground of encampment to-morrow morning, which Capt. Johnson will point out to him, with the 2nd batt. 18th regt., 100 pioneers, a proportion of ordnance and artillery, respecting which Capt. Beauman will receive instructions.

The military stores and store department, respecting which Capt. Noble will receive instructions.

A proportion of the grain and provision department, respecting which Capt. Young will receive instructions.

A proportion of the grain department, respecting which Lieut. Monteith will receive instructions; and all the baggage, followers, and bazaaris.

Half the number of tents usually allowed to European troops will accompany the detachment on the march, and one tent per troop or company for each native corps.

The remainder of the tents to be left here, in charge of the convalescents of the corps to which they belong.

Capt. Mackay (agent for public cattle) will take care to arrange that there may be a carriage left behind for the tents belonging to the European troops. The sick, convalescents, and weakly men, are to be left behind, and doolies for those men who require them to be moved, and a surgeon from each brigade to take care of the sick; the remainder of the doolies to accompany the troops.

Officers are requested to take with them as little baggage and as few tents as possible.

A quarter master serjeant from each brigade, and a non-commissioned officer, to remain in charge of the baggage of each corps. The line serjeant to remain in charge of the camp equipage and baggage of head quarters.

Those quarter master serjeants and non-commissioned officers must have a note from their commanding officers to Lieut. Col. Chalmers, to point them out to that officer, whose orders they must obey in every particular.

Carriage must be left for every thing that stays behind, as it is possible the baggage may be ordered to march, and that the troops may not return to it.

Each man who marches to have about him 60 rounds of musket ammunition, for the deficiency of which officers commanding corps will send indents this day. They are to be complied with, without waiting for Major Gen. Wellesley's signature.

The forage guard for European corps, and for the park and provision departments, are struck off.

The 2d batt. 18th regt. must send a havildar's guard to the park, 1 naig and 4 sepoys to the grain agent, and 1 naig and 4 sepoys to the Provost, at *general* beating to-morrow morning, to relieve the guards with those departments, which will immediately join their corps, and Lieut. Col. Chalmers will allot such guards for them afterwards as he may think necessary.

Capt. Noble is authorised to increase his establishment, as assistant commissary of stores, to the proportion allowed for 40 pieces of ordnance.

G. A. O.

Camp at Unterwarry, 1st Sept. 1803.

The whole detachment will march to-morrow by the right in the usual order.

200 pioneers to be sent in at daybreak to destroy the redoubts constructed for the battalion intended to have remained, and 2 companies of the 1st batt. 3rd regt. to be left to cover those pioneers: the whole to follow the line as soon as the work is performed.

3. I have the honor to enclose further indents for medical stores from the corps forming the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. You will observe that two corps have not yet indented; but I request that the articles for which I now transmit indents may be prepared and packed up for each corps separately, and that preparations may be made to send the whole off to Ahmednuggur as soon as possible, in charge of a medical gentleman. They might leave Panwell immediately, and the stores for the corps which have not yet indented might follow when their indents shall be sent.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp near Unterwarry, 1st Sept. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 29th Aug. It is certainly true that I do not expect much service from Goklah or Appah Dessaye. Indeed, I have received some extraordinary messages from the former within these few days, pressing me for further advances of money, in such a manner that I was obliged to alter an intention I had formed to go out with the cavalry alone; and, instead thereof, to make preparations for moving with a light force of infantry, as well as cavalry. This I shall carry into execution to-morrow morning, if I should find, by my intelligence of this day, that the enemy had not moved off to a very great distance. Appah Dessaye is arrived in camp.

The circumstances mentioned by you are very unpleasant; and, most undoubtedly, if I knew how to dispense with the services of Goklah and Appah Dessaye, I would forthwith send them about their business. But, bad as they are, and weak as my expectations are from them, I must determine upon keeping them, at least for the present, even at the large expense stated. If they were to go, we should be surrounded in our camp and on our marches by pindarries, and we should lose even the name of a body of cavalry. I shall, therefore, pay Goklah this month, and give Appah Dessaye some money; and I shall continue the payment as long as I can, which must be on account, to be settled hereafter with the Peshwah.

The only difficulty I have upon this subject is the money. However, the blank bills have been sent to you, and I hope that you will be able to feed our wants in some degree. I intend also to write to the Governor General to send a supply of money; and to Gen. Stuart to arrange that the revenues of Canara, which I know are generally paid in gold, and will soon be paid, may be applicable to the service of this body of troops. I think that I have now, and I expect soon to have, as much as will keep me going till these resources come in. I recommend that the money from Poonah should not be sent farther than Ahmednuggur at present. We do not know exactly whether there are many pindarries south of the Godavery; and, at all events, it may be inconvenient to look out for it north of the river.

In respect to Appah Dessaye's demands, the pretence of the Peshwah's government, that he ought to serve for his serinjaumy, is too ridiculous. The fact is, that the man cannot get possession of his lands, and either some other mode of paying his troops must be adopted, or they must be disbanded. The question is, upon whom ought this expense to fall?

Certainly upon the Peshwah; and it would be a great improvement to the new treaty with him, if it were to contain a clause that he would make a forfeit monthly of 30 rupees for every horseman deficient of the number which he has engaged to supply. Upon the whole, I cannot well do without Goklah and Appah Dessaye. I have not time to argue and dispute with the latter, whether he ought to serve for the rent of lands of which he has never got possession. I must, therefore, determine to pay these chiefs myself.

The D. A. G. to Lieut. Barrett, Toka.

Peepulgaum, 2nd Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that, on receipt of this letter, you will embark your company, with the tents, stores, &c., on board the 6 boats under your charge, and proceed down the river with them to this place as quick as possible. The detachment halts here to-morrow, and, if you have not arrived before the next morning, orders will be left for you at the village of Rackisbaum, on the right bank of the river, opposite to this place.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Rackisbaum, 3rd Sept. 1803.

The enemy, having found it impossible to seize any of the districts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan, or to plunder them to any extent, have seized the persons of some of the principal inhabitants of the towns near which they have passed, and have detained them as securities for the payment of certain sums which they have required from the districts.

In order to put a stop to this practice, it is necessary to retaliate upon them: accordingly, I request you will be so kind as to give directions that the mother and relations of Jadoon Rao Bhow may be seized, and that they may be informed that they will be detained as securities for the persons of the hostages seized in this unjustifiable manner by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

In case there should be at Baroach, or in Guzerat, or the Attavesy, or in any of the countries which may come into the hands of the Hon. Company's troops, any other persons of consequence or respectability, related to or connected with Scindiah's ministers, or belonging to that Chief, I request that they may be also seized and detained for the same reasons.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Rackisbaum, 3rd Sept. 1803.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan, in which I have requested that certain persons belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and residing in Guzerat, the Attavesy, and at Baroach, may be seized and detained in retaliation of injuries of a similar nature done to persons residing in the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan.

As there may be some persons of riches and respectability belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar residing at Poonah, I request you to urge the Peshwah to have their persons secured, and delivered over to the officer commanding the British troops.

This mode of warfare is most unjustifiable. In passing through the country as a freebooter, Dowlut Rao Scindiah may seize the property he can find, and take it away; but he has no right to seize the persons of the inhabitants, in order thereby to secure the property which he cannot

otherwise touch. There is no mode of guarding against this evil, or of relieving the Soubah's government from its consequences, except by retaliating upon persons connected with his government. On this ground I request, that, if there should be any such persons at Poonah, you will urge the Peshwah that they may be delivered up.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Rackisbaum, 3rd Sept. 1803.

Since my arrival in this part of the country, having found that the district of Jalnapoor did not depend upon Ahmednuggur, and was surrounded by districts belonging to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, with which it connected better than with those under Ahmednuggur, I thought it proper to give it in charge to his Highness' officers; and, accordingly, I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to take possession.

Although the enemy have not been able to do much mischief to his Highness' territories, and their bodies of horse have been in general beat off by the peons in the villages which they have attacked, yet they have contrived to seize some principal inhabitants as hostages for the payment of sums of money by the districts through which they have passed. This mode of warfare is entirely unjustifiable; they have no right to the resources of the country which they are not able to seize and secure; and it can be resisted, and its evils compensated to the Soubahdar's government, only by a system of retaliation. Accordingly, I have written letters to Mr. Duncan and Colonel Close, of which I enclose copies, in order that persons belonging to the enemy residing in Poonah, and in the territories to the westward, may be seized. I request you to take an opportunity of informing the Soubahdar's ministers of the circumstances above mentioned.

Upon hearing of my arrival at Aurungabad, the enemy moved a considerable distance to the eastward of Jalnapoor, to a place called Ambergaum. They halted there the day before yesterday. Col. Stevenson was yesterday at Jalnapoor, and, I believe, took that place. The enemy have nothing but cavalry, and, I am informed, are considerably distressed. They have been kept out of the fortified villages by the peons; and I have circulated letters to the different amildars, in which I have promised rewards to those jemidars who oppose them. I marched to the river yesterday, and I propose to remain on its bank. By this position, I hope to secure the junction of all the supplies, to check the incursions of the enemy into the southern countries; and, as I shall have my boats upon the river, it will be in my power either to fall upon the enemy's troops as they are crossing, if they should attempt to cross it in boats, or to cross it myself, if they should be able to ford it. At the same time, I shall draw near to them, and, if an opportunity of striking a blow should offer, I shall seize it.

Col. Stevenson is well placed at Jalnapoor to impede the junction of some of their troops, particularly of their infantry and guns. But I cannot hope to remove this body of horse from the Nizam's territories, till either Col. Stevenson or I am enabled to commence an offensive operation against the territories of the Rajah of Berar, by the junction of our supplies. These have been much delayed, indeed I may add almost destroyed,

by the badness of the weather; but still I hope that some of them may soon arrive.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 3rd Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 30th Aug. The distribution of peons appears to be very proper. I hope that Hyder Khan is getting on with his horse. You must keep him actively employed, and drive all the rascals to a distance from you. Take care that the peons in all the tannahs are supplied with ammunition. Tell them that the enemy have no guns; that they must not admit him into their tannahs.

I find that some of the people in our districts keep up a correspondence with others in the enemy's camp. I send you a proclamation, which I wish to have published in Ahmednuggur, and other places. This correspondence must be stopped.

You must beat up the Bheels, and destroy them. Money will be sent to Lieut. Carfrae by Lieut. Col. Close. He will have orders to supply your wants. The necessity of your supplying him is only momentary.

I find the district of Jalnapoor to be so much surrounded by the Nizam's districts, and so little connected with Ahmednuggur (to which place, in fact, it never belonged), that I have determined to give it over to the Nizam's servant: you will, therefore, not interfere with it. I shall report this determination to the Governor General.

I have given orders for running our tappall to this place instead of Toka.

I wish that you would endeavor to find out where is the late killadar of Ahmednuggur.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Rackishaum, 4th Sept. 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Col. Stevenson took the fort of Jalnapoor on the 2nd. I have not received from him the details of the affair, therefore I cannot tell you what loss he has sustained.

The enemy are to the eastward at Purtoor. They still talk of crossing the Godavery, and of marching upon Hyderabad; and although the river is fordable in many places, which was never known before at this season of the year, they see, by my position upon it, that I shall cross it likewise; and they are apprehensive of the consequences of being cut off from their own territories, and exposed alone to my attacks when the river shall rise again, of which there are no doubts.

Begum Sumroo's campoo has come up the ghauts; and, I am afraid, has passed the Soubah's camp, and joined Scindiah yesterday. Two deserters from it, who went into Aurungabad on the 2nd, declared that Pohlman's campoo was following it, and 2 days' march in its rear; but I doubt this, as I believe that Pohlman's campoo was sent to Hindustan. The arrival of these campoos will retard the enemy's movements, and give us something more solid than cavalry to operate upon; but I think we shall not be able effectually to relieve the Soubah's country till we can invade Berar; and I am endeavoring to arrange an expedition into that country. Whether I shall be able to effect it, or not, will depend much upon the state of Col. Stevenson's equipments, and upon the assist-

ance of grain and provisions which he is to receive from Salabut Khan, the jaghiredar of Ellichpoor.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Holkar has called Kawder Nawaz Khan to his camp: I have, therefore, some hopes that he does not propose to join the confederates.

I request you to mention to the Governor, that, in case the revenues of Canara, which will soon come in, are not wanted for the payment of the troops at Goa and in Malabar, it would be very desirable that the money should be packed in strong bags, and sent to Bombay, for the use of this body of troops. Besides our former expenses, 2 battalions have been added to our force; and I have been obliged to advance money to the parties of the Peshwah's troops under Goklah and Appah Dessaye, and I shall be obliged to make advances to them monthly. This will cost about a lac of rupees monthly. I rather believe, also, that the lac of pagodas which you sent to Col. Stevenson, and 3 lacs of rupees which have been sent from Hyderabad, will do no more than pay his troops for July and August what is due to them; and I do not think that I can send the Colonel upon the expedition into Berar without 2 months' pay in hand. I wrote to the Governor General to request him to send some Bengal gold mohurs to Bombay for my use.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th Sept. 1803.

I received, last night, your letter of the 2nd, informing me of your success at Jalnapoor, upon which I congratulate you. We heard the firing in the morning, while on our march.

I have desired Rajah Mohiput Ram to place the Soubah's tannahs in the forts and districts of Jalnapoor; and I request you to give them over to him. I hear that the enemy have moved towards the Godavery, although they are somewhat annoyed at my having come upon that river likewise. They know that it must rise again, and that it probably will continue full till towards the end of October; and they do not relish the thought of being entirely cut off from their own countries.

It is certain that Begum Sumroo's campoo is above the ghauts: 2 deserters from it have come in to Aurungabad, and I think it probable that this body will have joined Scindiah's cavalry yesterday. The deserters say, likewise, that Col. Pohlman's campoo followed that of Begum Sumroo, and was at the distance of 2 marches in its rear. I do not know whether that is true. I thought that Pohlman's campoo had gone to Hindustan.

The arrival of these campoos will give us something more solid than we have hitherto had to operate upon, and they will retard the enemy's motions. "I am afraid, however, that we shall not be able to make any effectual impression upon them till we can arrange an offensive expedition into Berar. The Rajah of Berar is at the head of the confederacy. An invasion of his country would, at all events, make a seasonable diversion in favor of the Soubah of the Deccan; and might eventually bring about peace.

In my opinion your corps is the best situated and best equipped for this service, particularly after you shall be joined by your brinjaries from

Buswunt. However, in order to decide this question, I request to have from you information upon the following points:

1st. What quantity of ammunition have you got for the heavy guns belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan?

2nd. Can Salabut Khan collect grain for you at Ellichpoor, to serve for a depôt for this expedition?

3rd. Your troops are now 2 months in arrears of pay. For what length of time, beyond those 2 months, will the $6\frac{1}{2}$ lacs of rupees (which Col. Desse will take to you) pay them?

My idea is, to attack the fort of Gawilghur, which appears in the maps a short distance north of Ellichpoor, in which place I am told that the Rajah of Berar keeps his treasures, and then to proceed to Nagpoor.

If your heavy guns are not sufficiently supplied with ammunition, or if you should want money, you must send a battalion to me as an escort to 4 iron twelves, with their ammunition, and money, which I will send you. I wish you to send for these articles, because I may be obliged to move to the southward, if the enemy do so; and, in that case, I must make a large detachment to Poonah. If we should undertake this expedition, some events will happen, for which, in the mean time, we may as well be prepared.

One of these is the loss of Aurungabad. I consider that event to be certain, unless you can afford to reinforce that place with a battalion of the Company's infantry; and march on the expedition with 5 instead of 6 battalions. Even if you can do so, its security may be doubtful; but, upon this point, you must be the best judge. If you should be of opinion that you cannot secure Aurungabad, it would be proper to remove the hospital, &c. &c., from that place to Jaulna, which I take to be one of greater security. Till you shall have been joined by my heavy ordnance and money, if you should require them, you may as well turn your mind to these points, and make your arrangements, either for the further security of Aurungabad, or for the removal from thence of the sick, &c.

You must decide whether the Soubah's infantry ought to be withdrawn from the place, if you should determine not to give it further security. In the decision upon this point you must be guided by your knowledge of the importance of which they consider it; and whether it is true that many of the females of the Soubah's family really reside there. Till you shall be prepared to set out upon the proposed expedition, I do not think that you can be in a better situation than at Jalnapoor. You are just between the enemy and the ghauts; and you will take every opportunity of falling upon any of the parties coming to join him, particularly any of his campoos.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th Sept. 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Col. Stevenson took the fort of Jalnapoor on the 2nd. I have not received the details of the affair, and therefore I cannot tell you whether he sustained any loss.

Since I wrote to you on the 31st, I have received intelligence that the enemy have moved to a still greater distance to the southward and eastward. I therefore relinquished the plan which I had formed of moving

upon them with a light army; and I came down to the Godavery, although they still talk of marching to Hyderabad. This movement has disconcerted their measures in some degree; and as they see that I intend to pass the Godavery likewise, they fear to cross it, being certain that the river will rise again, that they may be cut off from their own countries, and be liable to my attacks. The river is now fordable in many places, a circumstance which has never been known before at this season of the year: but I hope, by my position, to check the proposed expedition to Hyderabad; and, at all events, it will not have any very bad effects.

Two deserters came in to Aurungabad, from Begum Sumroo's campoo, on the 2nd; and, from their story, I am afraid that that campoo will have passed the Soubah's camp, and will have joined Scindiah, either yesterday or this day. They say, likewise, that Col. Pohlman's campoo was following them, at the distance of 2 days' march; but I doubt it, as I believe it was sent to Hindustan.

If these campoos should join Scindiah in safety, they will retard his movements, and give us something more substantial to operate upon than the cavalry which we have had hitherto; and we may, by good luck, bring them to an action.

Holkar has sent for the vakeel whom I dispatched to him in the month of July, and who has been waiting in Amrut Rao's camp, ever since, for his passports. It appears, by the papers which have been sent to me, that Holkar has been very anxious that this man should reach him in safety. He wrote them after he had heard that Col. Collins had quitted Scindiah's camp.

I have heard nothing of the movements of Holkar's army since I last wrote to you. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention to the Governor General, that I think it will be very desirable that he should send round to Bombay, for the use of this body of troops, as soon as may be possible, 7 lacs of rupees, at least, in gold mohurs. Our expenses increase; and I am obliged to find means of paying the Peshwah's troops serving with me, as well as my own. Since my arrival in this part of the country, I have found the district of Jalnapoor to be surrounded by others belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan, and to be at a great distance from, and entirely independent of, Ahmednuggur. I have, therefore, desired the Soubah's servants to take possession of it, and manage it. I shall report this arrangement to the Governor General.

P.S. I still intend to carry on the expedition into Berar, if Col. Stevenson's corps can be sufficiently equipped; or if Salabut Khan, the jaghiredar of Ellichpoor, will give us any assistance in grain.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th Sept. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th inst.
2. I am happy to find that the servants of Anund Rao Guickwar did not bring forward the claim that he should be neutral in the existing war between the Company and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which was anticipated by Major Walker. It appears that they consider his engagements with the Company in the same light as I do; and I have no doubt but that, when all the engagements between the Company and that Chieftain shall

be consolidated in one treaty, there will be no objection, on the part of his government, to bind himself in terms in the manner in which his servants and I consider him to be bound by his present engagements.

3. If it should be thought material, I beg to observe that I never doubted the policy of the treaties with the Guickwar state, provided the engagements were considered to be mutual. My doubts upon the subject were grounded upon those of the Resident, whether the Rajah Anund Rao would take part in the existing war.

4. The letter which I had the honor of addressing to the Governor on the 29th, contains an answer to the 7th paragraph of your letter of the 28th. The Governor in Council has disapproved of the plans which I proposed to him, on the 2nd Aug., for the defence of Guzerat and the Attavasy; and I cannot think that it would be proper for me to order that those plans should be carried into execution, in contradiction to his declared opinion. If I were in Guzerat, or at Surat, and could be in constant communication with the Resident at Baroda, or the Committee, I should most willingly endeavor to carry on the military duties in the manner preferred by the Governor; but as I am at a great distance, and as the communication may be impeded, it is best for the public service that I should not undertake to conduct business of which it is not possible I should have any knowledge.

5. Upon a perusal of Major Walker's paper upon the subject of Guzerat, I observe that the operations recommended therein were connected with the prospect of a war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that the siege of Baroach is particularly adverted to.

6. I objected to those operations on the grounds stated in my letter of the 22nd.

To Lient. Col. Close.

Camp, 4th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 31st Aug., which contains news that is very satisfactory.

I have promised Appah Dessaye to give him 25,000 rupees, and I shall repeat the same every month. I will write you a public letter upon the subject, and I request that you will make some arrangement with the durbar for the repayment of this sum, as well as of 75,000 rupees to be paid to Goklah.

I have not yet got a return of the ordnance of Ahmednuggur; but, although there are above 60 pieces at that place, I believe that there are not many serviceable. I therefore recommend that you should make an application to Bombay for ordnance, as well as gunpowder, although I know that there are large quantities of the latter at Ahmednuggur, and some of it very good. If I could give guns to the Peshwah, I could not give him carriages to remove them; for Capt. Brown will tell you that he is now employed in the construction of carriages for the guns on the works at Ahmednuggur.

Col. Stevenson took Jalnapoor on the 2nd. The enemy are at Purtoor, and, it is said, design to cross the Godavery, and to march upon Hyderabad. Begum Sumroo's campoo have come up the ghauts, and I am afraid have passed by the Nizam's camp at Jalnapoor, and joined the

enemy yesterday. They are much annoyed by my position on the Godavery, as, although the river is now fordable in many places, which was never known before at this season of the year, they are certain that it will rise again, and they do not relish being entirely cut off from their own countries, and exposed alone to me.

I am endeavoring to arrange an expedition into Berar, which will succeed, if Salabut Khan is honest. This will create a diversion in favor of the Soubah, and will possibly draw, at least, Ragojee Bhoonslah to his own territories. If I can arrange that expedition, I propose to reinforce Poonah with 3 battalions, and 5 companies of the 84th regt., and to march myself with the remainder of the force towards Hyderabad. If I cannot arrange that expedition, we must go on as we are doing now; and I shall send Col. Stevenson towards Hyderabad. Nothing but an expedition into Berar will save the Soubah's country.

Lieut. Griffiths is coming on remarkably well, and is by this time at Kurillah. Major Hill is also about Toljapoor. The former has all his cattle, having replaced his casualties: the latter has lost many. Mr. Duncan has made a curious kind of half arrangement respecting the command in Guzerat, and I am convinced that the consequence of it will be that we shall lose all that we have got in that province. However, he is decidedly against my plan, and I shall have nothing to say to the province.

The D. A. G. to Lieut. Griffiths.

Camp at Hisnapoor, 5th Sept. 1803.

I have received and laid your letter of the 1st inst. before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who is much pleased with the report of your having so nearly recruited your bullocks to the number which originally marched with you. He approves of your having advanced the 200 pagodas to the brinjaries, for their immediate subsistence, and to save the public grain.

The General now desires that you will move on from Kurdlah to Dharore, and wait there for further orders.

(A similar letter to Major Hill, commanding a detachment.)

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 6th Sept. 1803.

I received this morning, on the march, your letter of the 5th. Before I send you my 12 pounders, or the money, I wish to know from you what quantity of ammunition you have for the Soubah's 18 pounders. I should also wish you to ascertain, from Salabut Khan, whether he can give you any assistance in 18 pound shot, or in gunpowder, at Ellichpoor: as, although you must have my guns, if your own should not be sufficiently equipped, or if you should not be able to get any assistance at Ellichpoor, to part with them will certainly cripple my force materially, and may have unpleasant consequences in the course of the campaign. I therefore wish to have the most complete information regarding the equipments of your own ordnance, before I send them away.

In respect to money, I wish to know how much you will have in hand, (after paying your troops for July and August, which I understand to be

G. O.

Camp at Hisnapoor, 5th Sept. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley recommends to the officers in the detachment to urge their servants to provide themselves with as much grain as they have the means of carrying, and to keep it by them in case the bazaars should at any time be ill supplied.

due to them;) and how long that sum will last you. I understand that your expenses are about 50,000 pagodas *per mensem*. If that be the case, you ought still to have enough to pay the troops for September and October.

Your brinjaries have not joined me; and, by a letter from Major Kirkpatrick, I learn that some of them went to load in the countries in which he was purchasing rice for you, in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad. Some rice for you, however, crossed the river at Puttun, and some other at Shawghur, a day or two before I arrived at it, and went on to join you.

In respect to pay for Soubahan Khan, I have to observe that no provision whatever has been made for a demand of this kind; and I cannot comply with it, at all events, unless it comes from Hyderabad: but, even in that case, I shall experience some difficulty in doing so, as I am obliged to pay the few Marhatta horse who are serving with me, besides my own troops. If you are of opinion that Soubahan Khan is really distressed, it will be best to represent his case to the durbar; and if he is so much so as to be unable to accompany you, you might send him to join me.

I hear that Scindiah marched yesterday upon Jalnapoor, and left the Rajah of Berar at Caulaygaum. I fancy that this march must have been intended to facilitate the junction of Begum Sumroo's infantry and guns.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 6th Sept. 1803.

I have not written to you for some time, but I have had much to do, and I knew that you would see the letters which I have written to Col. Close and Mr. Duncan. I shall, however, endeavor to give you, in this letter, an idea of our situation.

G. O.

Camp at Kurka, 6th Sept. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that gentlemen will refrain from shooting on the line of march, or in the neighbourhood of the camp, till further orders.

G. A. O.

Camp at Kurka, 6th Sept. 1803.

It may be necessary to march with a part of the troops during the night. In which case, a long roll will be beat at the D. A. G.'s tent (without any previous taps), which must be passed by the orderly drummers of the Brigade Majors and adjutants. In one hour afterwards, another long roll will beat, which must be passed as above, when all the corps will be paraded, and must wait the orders to move.

The camp is to be struck, and the baggage, &c., laden between the drums, and to be ready to move to a place which will be occupied by 2 battalions for its defence.

Corps are to move without tents, and no baggage, excepting what each soldier carries for himself, and 4 casks of arrack and biscuit for the Europeans, sent on by the Commissary. Cavalry to carry 1 day's feed of grain.

Each corps will have its proportion of guns, tumbrils, and spare ammunition; and Capt. Noble will send 100 bullock loads of spare ammunition on the best bullocks in the camp. Doolies, except such as are occupied by sick men, to accompany corps.

Two corps will be named on the parade for the protection of the camp, &c. Their details now on picket will join them. The details of the other corps will form a rear guard. The new pickets and pioneers will parade in front of the park immediately after the first long roll, whence the details which march will be sent to the marching flank.

One half of the pioneers will remain behind to fortify the camp to-morrow.

Mem.

7th Sept., 4 past 4 A.M.

The beats of the drum for the usual march are deferred for some time. The detachment to remain in readiness.

Mem.

Halt.

4 past 6 A.M.

The enemy deceived Col. Stevenson in the march they made to the eastward on the 20th and 21st of last month; and, finding that they had induced him to pass Jaffierabad, they returned to the westward on the 22nd, and ascended the Adjuttee ghaut on the 23rd and 24th. On the 23rd, Col. Stevenson sent a patrol down the Badowly ghaut, which picked up some bullocks and horses loaded with grain; and on the 23rd, at night, he had intended to go still farther to the eastward, in quest of a detachment, under a relation of the Rajah of Berar, which had gone that route. I did not receive his letters written about that time; and I cannot say exactly what he was doing between the 23rd and 29th; but the enemy penetrated into the country, and passed between him and Jalnapoor; and I have seen letters from his camp, which say that one of the brigades lost its baggage on the march to Jaffierabad; that the pindarry horse were very troublesome, and that the Moguls did not behave as they ought. This is probably true; otherwise the pindarries would not have come near the troops a second time.

On the 28th, a party of pindarries came to Aurungabad, but were driven off by the Nizam's infantry stationed there; and, on the 29th, I arrived at Aurungabad. Scindiah was at that time at Jalnapoor, a fort and district belonging to himself, about 40 miles east from Aurungabad; and he tried, whilst there, to plunder Budnapoor, a fortified village of the Nizam, from which he was beaten off. As soon as he heard of my arrival at Aurungabad, he marched off still farther to the eastward and southward, and went to the neighbourhood of a place called Purtoor, belonging to Soubahan Khan. Col. Stevenson moved down to Jalnapoor on the 1st, and took it on the 2nd; and I moved to the southward, towards the Godavery, on the road to Hyderabad, having found that, contrary to all former experience, at this season of the year, the river had fallen, and was fordable in many places. We were all stationary on the 3rd and 4th. Scindiah has evidently been waiting for Begum Sumroo's infantry, and, they say, the brigade under Pohlman: the former of which has certainly come up the ghaut, and, it is supposed, the latter. He has made various detachments towards this body, and at last moved himself yesterday to Jalnapoor, leaving Ragojee about 5 coss in his rear, with the little baggage they have, and a body of horse.

Col. Stevenson moved yesterday also towards Aurungabad, as he tells me, in order to meet Rajah Mohiput Ram; but it is either to be hoped or feared that this movement may be considered as a retreat, and will encourage the enemy to come to an action. At all events, it ensures the secure junction of the campoos.

I made a march yesterday, and another this day, to the eastward from Rackisbaun; and I am now about 6 miles north of the Godavery, and shall have a fair start with the enemy for Hyderabad. The enemy have done but little mischief hitherto to the country. The pindarries have been driven away from many villages; grain is very dear in their army, which is a certain sign that they get but little plunder; they are terribly alarmed, and, I am told, much dissatisfied. They certainly intend to avoid an action with either of us, if they can, unless Col. Stevenson's movement of yesterday towards Aurungabad should encourage them to come to

blows with him; and I believe it is their intention to cross the Godavery, now that the river is fordable, and to make a dash to the southward, although it is certain that they do not like my position upon that river, and my readiness to cross with them. They know that the river must rise again, and they do not like to be cut off from their own countries, and all assistance.

Whether they go to Hyderabad or not, I have determined to commence an offensive operation against Berar; and I have accordingly arranged that Col. Stevenson shall march with his corps towards Ellichpoor, and thence to attack the Rajah's fort of Gawile, or Gawilghur, and possibly plunder Nagpoor. If they should march upon Hyderabad, I intend to reinforce Poonah with 3 battalions, and move to Hyderabad with the remainder of my corps. If they do not, I shall endeavor to bring them to an action on this side of the river; and if I find that they lead me far to the eastward, I shall still detach to Poonah.

Holkar has not yet come down, and you will observe that he has called Kawder Nawaz Khan to him; and that he wrote him the letter about the 7th or 8th Aug., after he must have heard that Collins had come away from Scindiah's camp. It is impossible to be certain what a fellow of this kind will do, but I augur well from this circumstance; and I met this morning the Nizam's vakeel returning to Hyderabad from Ragojee Bhoomslah, (from his conversation, I suspect him to have been Major Kirkpatrick's intelligencer,) who told Govind Rao that Scindiah had not yet settled his affairs with Holkar.

If Holkar joins, Poonah will be safe with 4 battalions and 5 companies of Europeans; but the countries thereabout will be exposed to his ravages, while I am engaged with Scindiah and Ragojee towards Hyderabad. But I think it better to risk that, than to remove Gen. Campbell's corps from Moodgul towards Hyderabad. The consequence of that would be the invasion of the Ceded districts, and probably Mysore, by the Putwurduns and Holkar, who, we must expect, would be able to pass by me, notwithstanding all my efforts to prevent it. By keeping Gen. Campbell at Moodgul, we certainly have a check upon the Putwurduns; and it is possible that Holkar would not much like to leave behind him the force at Poonah, and move down upon Gen. Campbell.

I have some hopes, however, that the invasion of Berar will check the expedition to Hyderabad. Collins, whom I saw at Aurungabad, declares that Ragojee is the only one of the three who cares one pin about his country, or who has any thing to lose by an invasion of it; and I declare that, from what Collins told me, I am of opinion that we are involved in this war because Ragojee saw plainly, that, if the Marhatta armies did not subsist this year in the Nizam's country, they must have subsisted in his.

As I have before me such active operations, you will be glad to hear that I never was in such marching trim. I marched the other day 23 miles in $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours; and all our marches are now made at the rate of 3 miles an hour.

You will have seen, by my letter to Mr. Duncan, that I have relinquished the command in Guzerat. Mr. Duncan 'acquiesced' in my arrangement; and although he stated some objections to it in his private

letters, I concluded that he 'approved' of it; for it never occurred to me that it was possible for a Governor to 'acquiesce' in a proposed system of military operations, for the defence of provinces under his government, of which he did not 'approve.' However, he afterwards informed me that he did not approve of my propositions, and he entered into detailed arguments against the principle, as well as the execution, of them; but he told me that I might order that they might be carried into execution if I should think proper. Without flying in his face, and being guilty of the greatest presumption, I could not give such orders; and at this distance from Guzerat, and with such imperfect, and so long a communication, I could not take upon me to conduct a machine so complicated and disjointed as the military commands of the Committee of Surat, and the Resident of Baroda, and I therefore resigned the whole concern. I was much annoyed, for several reasons, at finding myself obliged to take this step; but I found that to keep the command would have involved me in constant hot water, would have taken my attention away from other objects here, and would have answered no good public end whatever.

I have received the copy of a public letter from the Governor General to Gen. Lake, from the tenor of which I fear that he does not approve of my letter to him of the 24th July. I wish you would let me know what Shawc says about that letter. I hope you are getting better, and that you will soon come back. If Holkar negotiates, I should wish to send you to him with *carte blanche*.

We are again unlucky in the early fall of the Godavery, and in the enemy having contrived to pass to the southward and eastward of Col. Stevenson; particularly if it be true that the Moguls have not behaved well. Otherwise our affairs are in a good state. I have Appah Dessaye and Goklah with me, and have promised to pay them. This will be one lac of rupees *per mensem*. Amrut Rao and followers will probably cost half a lac more. Besides these heavy drains, Col. Stevenson has no money, and the Nizam's troops begin to call out for pay. All this is bad; but I have taken measures to increase our supplies of cash from Poonah, and I have written both to Madras and Calcutta for supplies. Griffiths and Hill are getting on well, and will be in safety at Dharore in a few days. Amrut Rao is not come yet, but you will observe what his vakeel and Kawder Nawaz Khan said about his troops.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

Camp, 6th Sept. 1803.

A party of brinjarries from Mysore for this detachment will soon arrive at Ahmednuggur, accompanied by a muttaseddee, named Pormall. They have some bullocks unladen; and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will direct the garrison storekeeper to issue as much rice to that party of brinjarries as will load all their bullocks, taking the above Pormall's receipt in duplicate for the quantity, one copy of which you will cause to be transmitted to me, and the storekeeper will retain the other as his voucher. After receiving the rice, the brinjarries are to proceed to Dharore, on or near the Mangeyra river, and wait there for further orders.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 7th Sept. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st inst., in which you have enclosed the copy of one of the 27th Aug. from the Military board.

I am apprehensive that my letter to the Hon. the Governor in Council, of the 2nd Aug., has not been understood as I intended it should, in respect to the provisions for the troops. My idea was, that the troops should have with them in the field, at all times, one month's provisions: but as it was possible that the country might be overrun by a body of horse, and, consequently, as it might become difficult, if not impossible, to procure, in those parts in which the troops might be called upon to act, additional and sufficient supplies, I proposed that magazines should be formed, at several stations in different parts, of all those species of provision stores required for the troops, which might be scarce in the country in case of invasion.

I observe, however, upon a perusal of the letter from the Military board of the 27th Aug., that the magazines at the several stations mentioned in my letter of the 2nd Aug. will contain provisions only for one month for the garrisons which will occupy them. The sufficiency of this supply might be doubted, even for these bodies of troops; as, in the case of an extensive invasion of Guzerat, it must be expected that more time than a month will elapse before relief can be afforded to any station that may be attacked; and, at all events, when the relief might arrive, it may be doubtful whether it would be practicable to throw in additional supplies of provisions. But, as you will observe, upon a reference to my letter of the 2nd Aug., I wished to provide for much more than the garrison at each of the places mentioned; and, as I know that want of supplies is that which is most to be dreaded in the existing war, I wished to provide effectually against it by the formation of plentiful magazines (not for the garrisons, but for the troops in the field) in the forts situated in the different parts of the country in which the troops might be called upon to act.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Kurka, 7th Sept. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th Aug., and I shall bear in mind the information it contains, to be applied in due time.

Since I wrote to you on the 3rd, the enemy have made a movement to the northward, with a view, I imagine, of effecting a junction with Begum Sumroo's camp, who has certainly ascended the Adjunttee ghaut, followed, as it is reported, by the brigade under Col. Pohlman. My division is to the southward of the enemy; but, although their movements will certainly be retarded by their infantry and guns, I cannot be certain that they will not be able to pass to the southward of my division.

The river Godavery is fordable, at present, in many places, a circumstance never before known at this season of the year; but it is certain that it will rise again. I have no doubt but that the enemy, at first, intended to cross the river with their cavalry, and that they were prevented from carrying this intention into execution by my march to the river, the certainty that I should pass it at the same time, and the probability that they would be exposed to my attacks, unsupported, during the period that the river Godavery would remain full. They are now bringing on their infantry and their guns, and it is possible that they may attempt to carry

the same plan into execution. But, if they do, it may be depended upon that I shall not be very distant from them, that they will not have it in their power to undertake any enterprise of importance, and that I shall attack them whenever I may have an opportunity.

I recommend that the 2 battalions stationed at Hyderabad should be encamped in a commanding situation, and the camp should be entrenched. It would be very desirable that the Soubah should go into his tents; and as there are strange reports in Scindiah's camp, respecting the communications between the enemy and some of the Soubah's brothers, which, I doubt not, are unfounded, it might, perhaps, be proper that these Princes should reside for a time in the fortress of Golconda, as a security for their persons. However, you must be the best judge of the necessity of this measure, as well as of the propriety of urging it at the present moment.

I recommend that a small store of rice should be prepared for the 2 battalions; and, as it is possible that the enemy may endeavor to impede the arrival of the supplies at the city of Hyderabad, it would be proper that the public granaries, if there be any, should be filled. If, however, the Soubah's cavalry will lay out and attack the pindarries, wherever they find them at a distance from their camp, the supplies for the city of Hyderabad will continue to be as plentiful as they have been heretofore.

I have determined to send Col. Stevenson to attack the Rajah of Berar's fort of Gawilghur, and, eventually, Nagpoor. This attack will be a diversion in favor of the Soubah's country; and I think I may induce the Rajah of Berar, at least, to return to the northward. Col. Stevenson has informed me that Soubahan Khan's troops are in great distress for want of pay. I have desired him to mention the subject to you; and if he should find that they are so much distressed as that they cannot accompany him upon the expedition into Berar, to send Soubahan Khan and his troops to join me.

I recommend that orders should be given to the amildars, killadars, &c., generally throughout the country, to lay in store as much grain as they can procure. It will be of use to the British troops, if it is not so to those in the Soubah's service: it will save the grain, and distress the enemy; and, at all events, the loss to the Soubah's government will be but trifling. I have written to the amildars and killadars of some of the western districts and forts, to request that they would collect, and keep in them, certain quantities of grain for the use of the troops under my command. The quantities which I have thus required are not very large, as I had no mode of sending them money; and I wish to ascertain their inclination to take any trouble on my behalf, before I give orders that the magazines which I may want might be collected.

They will certainly be more likely to obey the orders of the Soubah's government, and I shall be glad to hear that they are issued, upon this subject.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Kurka, 7th Sept. 1803.

In my letter of the 4th I informed you that I intended to watch the enemy's movements to the southward. It is not possible for me, there-

fore, to send the guns to Moongy Puttun. Indeed, as I am not more than 20 miles from Budnapoor, and about 40 from Moongy Puttun, it would be more convenient to me to send the guns to the former than to the latter. But, under present circumstances, it would not answer for me to be delayed by having any detachment out.

Surely the battalion had better be directed to come to me for the guns; and you might send some of your horse for the articles you expect to find at Moongy Puttun. You have not told me what your monthly expenses are. Inquire from Salabut Khan whether he can give you 12 lb. shot, as well as 18 lbs.

Camp at Kurka, 7th Sept. 1803.

To Col. Stevenson.

Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received your letter, without a date, but which I understand left your camp yesterday morning.

Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah left their camp, in the neighbourhood of Purtoor, last night, as soon as they heard of my arrival, and went to a place called Scindkeira, supposed to be to the northward and eastward of Jaulna, distant about 9 coss. They have a body of horse, however, at Jaulna.

It appears to me that they press upon your corps too closely; and I am much afraid that you will find them inconvenient neighbours, unless you force them to keep at a greater distance. I am very anxious, therefore, that you should move out of your camp, and give them an alert; and, to tell you the truth, I am of opinion that, if you do not take this step, you will be attacked in your camp.

The Mogul horse do not appear very active, otherwise they ought certainly to keep the pindarries at a greater distance. I wish you would move out to attack those at Jaulna. It is almost immaterial whether you find them or not. If you do, you will beat them: if you do not, they will see that they cannot lie so close to you.

If you think that you are not so strong as you should wish, let me know it, and I will go to your assistance; but, if you are sufficiently strong, I am desirous to remain in this quarter, to cover the advance of Major Hill, with money, and a large convoy of bullocks, and to check the operations of the enemy towards Hyderabad. However, I consider it to be so important that the enemy should be kept at a distance from you, that, if you require my assistance to attack them, I will sacrifice every thing else to that object.

Camp at Kurka, 7th Sept. 1803.

The D.A.G. to Major Doolan, Hullihall.

Ranojee Goorparah, a sirdar in the service of Bappoojee Goneish Goklah, has 2 ladies indisposed in his family, and he proposes to carry them to Hullihall for the benefit of medical assistance. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will desire the surgeon attached to your battalion to attend those ladies, who will reside at Hullihall as long as may be necessary.

Camp at Kurka, 8th Sept. 1803.

To the Governor General.

I have received a letter from Lieut. Col. Woodington, commanding the troops in the territories of the Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar in which he

informs me that the fort of Baroach was taken by storm on the 29th Aug., with little loss.

I have not yet received a detailed account of the attack upon Baroach, but Lieut. Col. Woodington mentions that the troops behaved with great gallantry.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan on the 24th Aug., by the ghaut of Adjutee, with a large body of horse only. They passed between Col. Stevenson's corps, which had moved to the eastward towards Badowly ghaut and Aurungabad, and they came to the neighbourhood of Jalnapoor, a small fort, the capital of a district of the same name, about 40 miles east from Aurungabad.

I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th. As soon as the enemy heard of my arrival they moved farther off to the southward and eastward, with an intention, as it was reported, to cross the Godavery, and march upon Hyderabad. I continued my march back to that river, and have since marched to the eastward along its left bank. The river is, at present, fordable every where, a circumstance never before known at this season of the year. By these movements I have checked the enemy's operations to the southward, and they have returned again to the northward of Jalnapoor; and, by the position which I occupy at present, I give protection to two important convoys on their march to join me from the river Kistna.

Col. Stevenson took Jalnapoor on the 2nd Sept. He is, at present, between that place and Aurungabad.

The brigade of infantry belonging to Begum Sumroo has ascended the Adjutee ghaut, and it is supposed that another, under the command of Col. Pohlman, has followed it; but neither of them had joined the enemy's

G. O.

Camp at Kurka, 8th Sept. 1803.

As it may be necessary at times to move at a very short notice, and, at all events, it is necessary to prevent the enemy from having intelligence of the intended marches of this division, the following arrangements are to be made:

1. The intention, whether to march or to halt, will never be announced in the orders of the day.
 2. The piquets of the infantry are at all times to parade at *reveillé* beating in front of the park.
 3. All departments which require any preparations to be made, previous to the beating of the *general*, on a marching day are to make them every morning at such hour as they may think necessary: in case of a halt, notice will be sent to such departments.
 4. If there should be a march, the *general* will be beat at half past 4, and the assembly at half past 5. The piquets will, in that case, parade as soon as possible in front of the park. Notice will be sent to them, and to the officers commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry, to inform them by which flank the troops will march.
 5. If there should be a halt, early notice will be given thereof in a pass order.
 6. It may at times be necessary to march suddenly, either in the day or night, without baggage; and it may not be possible, or may be improper, to give notice thereof to the troops, &c. In such a case, the long roll will be beat, when preparations are to be made as ordered for the march on the night of the 6th instant; and in an hour and a half afterwards another long roll, when the troops are to be prepared to march off.
- The following orders to be observed by the inlying piquets, whenever there is an alarm in camp:
1. The inlying piquets, as well of cavalry as of infantry, are to turn out.
 2. When the inlying piquets are turned out upon the occasion of an alarm, the remainder of troops are to commence to get in readiness, viz.: the cavalry to saddle their horses, and the infantry to put on their clothes and accoutrements, and the whole to be in readiness to fall into their ranks at a moment's notice.

head quarters on the night of the 6th. The junction of their troops will considerably retard their movements, and I hope that I shall find an opportunity of bringing them to a general action; but, at all events, I am apprehensive that I shall not be able to relieve the Soubah's territories entirely from their invasion, unless I can send an expedition into Berar. I am making preparations for this expedition, and I propose to send it as soon as possible. I do not find that the enemy's pindarries have done much mischief to the country: the villages have, in many instances, been defended by the peons stationed in them, and the inhabitants; and grain has sold at a very high price in their camp.

Upon my arrival in this part of the country, having found that the district of Jalnapoor did not depend upon the fort of Ahmednuggur, and that it was entirely surrounded by districts belonging to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, I gave it over to the management of his Highness' servants. Your Excellency will see the value of this district stated in the paper which I enclosed with my letter of the 21st Aug. Amrut Rao has not yet joined me: it appears that his march has been delayed by certain ceremonies to be performed on the occasion of the recent death of Moraba Furnavees.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar encamped, on the 2nd inst., in a situation between the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee. He has sent for the vakeel whom I dispatched to him in the month of July, and who has been waiting for his passports in Amrut Rao's camp ever since that time. From the tenor of the passports, it appears that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was very anxious that this person should reach his camp in safety, and that he sent for him at a time when he must have known that Col. Collins had quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp. I understand that Baba Phurkia has joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Kurka, 8th Sept. 1803.

I enclose a letter for Lord Clive, which contains a copy of my dispatch of this date to the Governor General. It has no news which I have not before written to you, excepting that of the fall of Baroach, and of the enemy returning to the northward of Jalnapoor. They appear to be much afraid of this division, and very little so of Col. Stevenson's. They will not allow me to come within 40 miles of them, and I have not yet seen one pindarry. They have been very near to Col. Stevenson, and their pindarries very troublesome to him. It is fortunate that they have chosen his division, as he is better supplied with brinjaries than I am, and depends less on the country. But I imagine that the Soubah's horse, although very fine, are inactive, and difficult to be moved out of camp; whereas, I believe the few Marhattas I have are, or have the reputation of being, very active. I am sorry to tell you, also, that it is reported, and generally believed in the enemy's camp, that the Soubah's horse are not true to the cause, or to be depended upon by us. I think this may be one cause of their giving Col. Stevenson so much trouble. I have apprised him of the report, and have desired him to bring the matter speedily to a test, if he can.

It is impossible for troops to be in better order than those under my

command. My marches are made at the rate of 3 miles in an hour; and a few days ago I marched $22\frac{1}{2}$ miles in $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours; and I want only to be joined by Major Hill's and Lieut. Griffith's companies. These, I hope, are now at no great distance from the fort of Dharore, to which I have ordered them.

I have preferred returning with my division to the northward of the Godavery, in case of the march of the enemy upon Hyderabad, to bringing up Gen. Campbell; because it is possible that Holkar may come across the Taptee, and pass the force at Poonah, and, in communication with the Putwurduns, invade the territories of the Company or of the Rajah of Mysore, which in that case would be exposed without defence.

The invasion of Berar by Col. Stevenson may possibly bring back the Rajah. I say possibly, because the principle and cause of the war are, the fact that the countries of the confederated Marhattas are in such a state that they are not worth having; and that the Rajah of Berar has forced it on, because he saw clearly that if the armies of Scindiah and Holkar did not subsist in the Nizam's territories during the next season, they must have subsisted in his. If the Rajah of Berar should be induced to go back to defend his capital, Scindiah will not remain alone in the Nizam's territories. He has but few horse, and they are very bad, and he will follow the Rajah. In that case Holkar may remain neutral. But if they should persevere in their advance upon Hyderabad, notwithstanding the invasion of Berar, we must expect and provide for an attack upon the Company's territories; and I see no way of doing that, excepting to leave Gen. Campbell's corps applicable to that service. I shall have at Poonah a sufficient force for its defence. The Peshwah's country will be overrun, it is true, but it cannot be worse than it is; and as Holkar would hurry through it if he should come, he would not be able to do it material injury.

If, instead of this course of operation, I were to make a requisition upon Gen. Campbell to come to the assistance of Hyderabad, I should be obliged to go down to the southward with Holkar: I could not expect to move as fast as he would, and the country would be exposed, at all events, till my arrival. In this hypothesis I have not considered the Putwurduns. If they should enter into the confederacy, the Company's territories would be exposed to their attacks, from the moment that Gen. Campbell should commence his march to Hyderabad, till I could reach them. Upon the whole, I think I have determined upon what is best for the general good. It may happen that Holkar will come into the Nizam's territories, and that the whole will be exposed to me alone. In that case I shall require some of Gen. Campbell's cavalry, and possibly a battalion to give additional security to Hyderabad. But I shall not take a man from him that I do not absolutely require.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 8th Sept. 1803.

There are very strong reports in Scindiah's camp of the existence of treachery among the Soubah's sirdars; particularly, that Sookroodoor is not true to our cause. In consequence of the existence of this treachery, the conversation respecting an attack upon you is very general.

It may be true or false that the Soubah's servants are treacherous, or that the enemy intend to attack you; but I have no doubt whatever of the existence of the reports or of the conversations which I have above mentioned. The best remedy for this will be to adopt the measure which I recommended to you in my letter of yesterday.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

Camp at Kurka, 8th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th inst., and have laid them before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley.

It is part of artillerymen's duty to work in the magazines without additional pay. It is discretionary with you to order an extra dram upon extraordinary occasions.

There are general regulations for men who are regimentally removed, such as the jemadar at Poonah being permitted to join his station.

The company of the 2nd batt. 3rd regt. at the Bhore ghaut will join its corps when the duty it is now employed upon will allow.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will direct the garrison storekeeper to dispose of the captured wheat and doll (which is returned by the committees of survey as damaged, not unserviceable), in order to make room for the provision stores coming up from Poonah; and until these two descriptions of damaged captured grain can be disposed of, they may be removed into other store rooms.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Griffiths.

8th Sept. 1803.

I have received and laid your letter of the 7th before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley. It appears that neither of two letters which I wrote you lately, by the G. O., directing you to wait for Major Hill, have reached you: but as you have come up so far, and there are none of the enemy's horse known to be across the river, or near it, at present, the General desires that you will come on by as long marches as you can conveniently make, directing your route upon Ramusgaum Seuta, on the Godavery. The army is only a few coss from that place, which lies to the eastward of Rackisbaum, at which the army was encamped, and to which the General supposes that you directed your march from Mahnoor. He begs to hear from you every day by a horseman.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 9th Sept. 1803.

I received your letter of the 7th this morning, and I am glad to find that you have given the enemy an alert. One of my hircarrahs reported the matter to me last night, and said that you had repeated the attack on the evening of the 7th.

I can give you no assistance in arrack. I have many Europeans, and but little conveyance for that article, and scarcely any now in camp; so that you must wait for your own supplies.

Upon considering the state of the ordnance and ammunition with both divisions, I have determined not to send you my guns. I have only 1350 shot; you have 300, and a field equipment for your 12 pounders, which I suppose to be 100 for each, making in the whole 2050 shot. If you had

G. O.

Camp, 9th Sept. 1803.

It appears from the evidence produced at the above Court Martial that some soldiers purchased the arrack from the conicopoly. The troops will understand that, if the Native servants employed about the arrack are tempted to sell part of it, they will certainly endeavor to make up the deficiency in the quantity, by putting water in the casks and adulterating the liquor; and in such case the troops are not to expect that the liquor so adulterated will be allowed to be condemned or thrown away: on the contrary, the quantity that ought to be in store by the Commissary's books shall be served out.

no equipment whatever for your 18 pounders, my 12 pounders would be necessary for battering; but as it is, you will have a breaching battery of two 18 pounders and one 12 pounder, tolerably supplied with ammunition, which is certainly better than four 12 pounders. The only advantage, then, that you would derive from getting my guns would be, that you would have iron guns instead of brass for your enfilade. This advantage is not of importance; and when compared with the additional weight which it will throw upon you, and with the inconvenience which it may be to me to part with the guns, which I cannot replace, although I can the ammunition, it may not be deemed one: I have therefore determined to keep the guns.

I send you, however, some ammunition, together with one lac of pagodas. The convoy leaves camp this evening, to meet Capt. Maitland's battalion, either at Rackisbaum or Moongy Puttun. Colebrook goes with it. I do not think that it will be necessary for you to be in a hurry to march upon this expedition. You had better wait till you are joined by your arrack, and every thing you want.

If you used your 18 pounders at Jalnapoor, you might be able to pick the shot out of the breached wall. I was obliged to do this at Ahmednuggur, otherwise I should not have had even the equipment that I have at present, as the stores were in confusion, and concealed in extraordinary places, and could not be readily found.

Lieut. Palmer has not joined me: when he comes, he shall be sent to join his company. Repeat your attacks upon the pindarries: they must not be allowed to remain near your camp.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 9th Sept. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 3rd. I agree in every syllable of your letters to Mr. Duncan. You cannot say more than I feel of respect towards him, or of a desire to conduct my public duties, connected with his government, according to his wishes. But I have now done with Guzerat, so that there will be an end to all contention, or rather difference of opinion, between us.

Col. Stevenson beat up a pindarry camp on the night of the 6th; but, from private accounts from his camp, I suspect that the Soubah's cavalry are very bad and very useless. What do you think of the piquets having been obliged to defend themselves with cannon during the whole of the 6th? I believe the same thing happened yesterday, as one of my hircarrahs has reported that he saw an action between our infantry and the enemy's cavalry yesterday morning, in which there was much firing of cannon; and the latter were driven off; but Col. Stevenson, from whom I have just received a letter of the 8th, does not mention it.

The enemy are far distant to the northward. The sirdars of the silladar are much discontented, and swear that they will not serve unless the campoos are brought forward. It is said that Scindiah is going to Burhampoor. Not a horseman has been near me yet. Indeed, they will not allow me to get within 40 miles of them.

Every hircarrah who comes in brings accounts of reports of the *Filtar* of the Nizam's sirdars, particularly of Sookroodoor.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Maitland, 1st batt. 6th regt. N.I.

Kurka, 9th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter, dated Moongy Puttun, 8th Sept., 4 P.M., and directs me to inform you that he intends sending off the ammunition and treasure destined for the subsidiary force at 4 o'clock this afternoon, under an escort of a company of sepoys. They will reach the village of Hisnapoor, on the route of this detachment, from Rackisbaum, this night, and will proceed on to Rackisbaum to-morrow morning, unless they should meet you on the march; but, as you will have to return to Moongy Puttun, the General recommends that you should remain at Rackisbaum till the convoy joins you there. There are no guns to be sent to Col. Stevenson, of which he has been apprised.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Denton, for detachment.

Camp at Kurka, 9th Sept. 1803.

You will receive charge of 185 bullock loads of military stores from Capt. Noble, and of 10 bullock loads of treasure from Capt. Bellingham, with a proportion of spare bullocks; and you will march with them at 4 o'clock this afternoon to the village of Hisnapoor, where the army encamped on its route from Rackisbaum to this place; and you will halt there only as long as may be necessary to refresh the men and cattle, and proceed to Rackisbaum, so as to arrive there before the heat gets powerful to-morrow forenoon.

The stores and treasure, together with the bullocks which are to carry them, are to be delivered over to Capt. Maitland, commanding 1st batt. 6th regt. Native infantry, who will certainly be at Rackisbaum to-morrow, and may possibly march from it early in the morning for this place. It is therefore necessary that you should inquire of any travellers you may meet, if they have heard of any troops on the road; and also to send out men to some distance on both flanks to inquire of passengers and to look out for the corps, so as that you may not let it pass you. You will deliver over the stores, treasure, and bullocks to Capt. Maitland, wherever you may meet him, and will return with all practicable expedition to this place, where orders will be left for you, if the army marches before your return.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Fisher, commissy. of stores, Ahmednuggur.

Camp, 9th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will prepare 4000 12-lb. shot, and a proportion of gunpowder for them, at the rate of 4 lbs. of powder for each shot, and have the whole ready to be dispatched to the army when they may be required. The powder must be of the best quality in Ahmednuggur, and dried and sifted, and put up in such boxes or barrels as you have there. Should you not have the quantity of powder or number of shot above mentioned, you will inform Col. Colman, commanding at Poonah, of the deficiency.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lewis, Judge Adv. in Malabar.

Camp at Kurka, 9th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to inform you that the sentence passed by the Native General Court Martial, now sitting in Malabar, upon Ebraimjee Israel, soubahdar in the 2nd batt. 8th Bombay Native regt., will require the confirmation of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and I therefore return the proceedings on his trial to you, in order that you may forward them to the Judge Adv. Gen. at Fort St. George, to be by him laid before the Commander in Chief, agreeably to the regulations of the service. A letter of recommendation may be sent along with the proceedings.

To Lieut. Col. Munro.

Camp, 10th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 28th Aug. I have arranged the conquest of Ahmednuggur exactly as you have suggested. I have appointed Capt. Graham to be collector, and I have given him a large body of peons and of horse to forward supplies, and preserve tranquillity in my rear. I should have wished to have had you in that situation, but you were not on the spot; and it is not impossible but your services will be required in your own districts. I have already put you on your guard.

Since I wrote to you last, I have given the enemy a turn. By a few

rapid marches to the southward, I have shown them that they could not go alone to Hyderabad; and I have, consequently, forced them to return to the northward. I do not know whether they will come back again, but it is reported that they are going back to Burhampoor; that the sillardars are much discontented, and swear that they will not serve unless supported by the infantry and guns. It cannot be expected, however, that I shall be able to march with celerity equal to that of an army of horse only; and some of these may enter your districts. But, on the other hand, it is probable that I may stop them.

The Bengal army has commenced offensive operations, and will cross the Jumna. The troops in Guzerat took Baroach by storm on the 29th Aug. Col. Stevenson beat up a horse camp on the night of the 6th; and he tells me that he proposed to repeat the attack upon another last night. I have not yet heard whether he did so or not. No enemy has elsewhere come within 40 miles of him.

The D.A.G. to Major Hill, 1st batt. 4th regt.

10th Sept. 1803.

Lieut. Griffith neither received the letter, directing him to wait for you at Kurdlah, nor to proceed to Dharore and wait there for you; and came so far on upon his route to Moongy Puttun that the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley sent him orders, on the 8th, to proceed with all expedition to Ramusgaum Seuta, on the Godavery, and only 3 coss from the camp. The General now requests that you will proceed by the subjoined route to the same place on the Godavery, where orders will be left for you when the army marches from this neighbourhood. He begs to hear from you every day, by hircarrahs.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Griffith.

Camp at Heedgaum, 11th Sept. 1803.

The army has marched in a north westerly direction from Kurka. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will cross the river to-morrow, and secure yourself, with your men, bullocks, horses, and grain, in the village of Ramusgaum, until you receive further orders. It may be necessary for the horses and bullocks to go out to graze, but a very little distance will be sufficient, and you must protect them while they are out.

P.S. Your letter of the 18th has been received. It may not be possible to put the bullocks into the village with convenience. In that case they must be picketed outside, close to the wall, with sufficient guards.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Vaughan.

Camp, 11th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter, enclosing copies of Lieut. Col. Colman's orders for you to make the best of your way to Ahmednuggur, and to remain there with the brinjarries until further orders; but I have not seen the order putting you in charge of them. Orders were dispatched, on the 6th inst., to Capt. Lucas, to give the same party of brinjarries a quantity of rice, upon the receipt of Pormall, the muttaseddee, who is with them, and to send them to Dharore. I imagine that will have been done, and that you have proceeded with them to that place. If it has not been done, I have now to communicate the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley's directions that you will apply to Capt. Lucas for the rice required to load all the bullocks, for which the muttaseddee will grant his receipt, and that you will proceed directly to Dharore with the brinjarries, by which route you will now have the best chance of joining your corps.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.

Camp, 11th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a warrant for your officiating as Judge Adv. at the Native General Court Martial ordered to assemble in camp to-morrow; also a warrant to be filled up with the name of the senior soubahdar, as President; and crimes against the following sepoys: Mahomed Isack and Sheek David, 1st batt.

10th regt.; Mahomed Reza, 2nd batt. 12th regt.; Sheek Nussein and Bahauder Khan, 2nd batt. 18th regt.; who are to be tried in the above order. The first two are in the provost's guard, and shall be sent to the Court with two men who captured them. The other witnesses against them, and the other prisoners, will be sent by the commanding officers of corps.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Green.

11th Sept. 1803.

You will march with your detachment, which will be joined immediately by 200 Mysore cavalry, to Ramusgaum Seuta, on the Godavery, where you will find Lieut. Griffith, with 2 companies of sepoys and a large convoy of cattle, and 200 horse. The senior officer will then take the command of the whole, and will march early to-morrow morning for this place, unless he shall receive orders to the contrary in the mean time.

It will be necessary that the whole convoy of bullocks be put in motion at once, and kept in the most collected state possible, in order that the horse and infantry may be able to protect them against any attempts of the pindarry horse.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Heedgaom, 12th Sept. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst., in which you have enclosed the draft of the instructions which you have given to Col. Murray.

2. It appears to me that these instructions provide for every thing. Col. Murray will be intrusted with sufficient military authority to enable him to conduct the military duties in the territories which he will have to defend; and the Resident at Baroda will continue to exercise as much military authority as is necessary, under present circumstances, and as will ensure the continuance of the respect of the Natives for the person filling his office.

3. I shall be happy to contribute every thing in my power to forward this system, and I will correspond constantly with Col. Murray, and suggest to him whatever may occur to me for the public benefit. At this distance from the Colonel, however, I cannot take upon me to do more

Mem.

11th Sept. 1803.

As it appears that some of the enemy's pindarries are in the neighbourhood, Major Gen. Wellesley desires that cattle may not be sent far out to graze.

G. O.

Heedgaom, 11th Sept. 1803.

The field officer of the day for the infantry coming off duty to march with the rear guard.

G. M. O.

Heedgaom, 12th Sept. 1803.

One half of the puckalies, with all the corps in camp, to be sent as a working party immediately to Capt. Johnson at the village in front of the park.

G. O.

Heedgaom, 12th Sept. 1803

Mr. W. Fallowfield, assistant surgeon, 10th regt., is appointed to take medical charge of the wounded men of the Mysore troops, those in the service of his Highness the Peshwah and other Natives, not provided with medical assistance, upon a salary of 40 pagodas a month, in lieu of all charges on this account.

G. A. O.

Heedgaom, 12th Sept. 1803.

Until further orders, a company of Native infantry under an European officer to go out every day with the public elephants and camels for forage. When the drum has beat, indicating a halt, the company to proceed to the elephant karkhana at daylight; and on marching days it is to proceed thither one hour after coming to the new ground. A sepoy with his musket is to be mounted on every elephant. When the agent for public cattle finds that he can forage within the camp, he will send notice in writing to the corps detailed to furnish the company, which, on such occasions, need not proceed to the karkhana,

than give him a general outline; and I must refer him to my letter to you of the 2nd Aug., and others of a more recent date.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 12th Sept. 1803.

I find that the enemy have moved off from Jaulna, and are now to the northward of Budnapoor. Some of my light troops fell in with some of theirs on the night before last; in consequence of which I imagine that they found out my intended march and went off. I doubt, however, whether my movement will have been of any benefit to you, as they appear equally near to you, only to the northward.

The doubt expressed in the latter part of your letter of yesterday has annoyed me a good deal, as I am afraid that it will oblige me to alter my plan, at least till we shall have brought the enemy to an action. The fact is, if you are not sufficiently strong for them, when they have neither their infantry nor their guns, and when they have not been joined by Holkar, I cannot expect that you will be able to undertake a siege while they can keep the field against you. It is true that your movement towards the territories of the Rajah of Berar will create a diversion in favor of those of the Soubah of the Deccan; but if you are not strong enough it may be one which will cost us an army. I wish to have your sentiments upon this subject.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 12th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and return Shawe's to you. I am perfectly satisfied with the instructions to Col. Murray. I don't want to knock up the Resident at Baroda: all I want is an efficient military authority, one that will and can be made responsible for its military actions, in the Guzerat and Attavesy, for the purposes of the war. That is provided for, and I am satisfied.

I am glad to find that you are so much better, but you must restrain your pen.

Stevenson attacked the enemy again on the night of the 9th, and did great damage, as the hircarrahs come from their camp say; not much in his opinion. They have some pindarries in my neighbourhood now, who have done us but little mischief themselves; but they have set the village people a-going, and these have attacked our supplies; but a gallows or two will remedy that evil. The main body keep away from me, and remain to the northward, about 50 miles from hence, and not far from the passes.

I enclose you a curious letter which I got last night. I made the movement therein suggested yesterday morning, and accordingly they went off. But this letter, however contradictory, has annoyed me considerably, as it gives room for doubt whether the plan I had in contemplation for the campaign is practicable. If the doubts contained in the last paragraph are founded, it certainly is not.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 12th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the papers which contain a detailed

account of the attack upon, and capture of Baroach.* I beg to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the troops employed on this service; particularly to that of Lieut. Col. Woodington, who commanded, to that of Major Cuyler and Captain Richardson of the 86th regt., and of Capt. Cliffe of the Bombay engineers.

* Lieut. Col. Woodington to Major Gen. Hon. A. Wellesley. Baroach, 25th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that I have this morning attacked and taken possession of the pettah, on the western face of the fort of Baroach. The battery for two 18 pounders I hope to have finished in the course of the night, and that I shall be able to begin to batter to-morrow morning, when I flatter myself a speedy reduction of the fort will ensue.

Agreeably to my communication to you, I marched from Baroda on the 21st, and encamped within 2 coss of Baroach on the 23rd. It was my intention to have attacked the pettah (on the outside of which I was informed they had brought their whole force) on the morning of the 24th, expecting to have found the *Fury* schooner, with two 18 pounders, at anchor about a coss from the fort, agreeably to the intimation I had received; but early in the morning of the 24th, one of my cossids, who had been dispatched to Lieut. Hewitson, the commander of the vessel, to give him notice of my approach, brought me the information from him that, on account of the shallowness of the water, it would be utterly impracticable to get his vessel to Baroach until the springs, and that he was at anchor at Bargood, 5 coss off. On this intelligence I marched to Bargood on the 24th, and made an arrangement to bring the 18 pounders and stores up in boats, and I am happy to acquaint you they are just arrived. We found the enemy in front of the pettah, as I expected, to receive us, and with great ease forced them to a precipitate retreat into the fort.

Our loss in killed and wounded is not great; no European officer is hurt. I should have the honor of sending a return of the killed and wounded, but have not had time yet to collect them, from the troops being so much employed. The loss of the enemy I have not yet ascertained.

P. S. My detachment consists of 500 rank and file of Europeans, and about the same number of the grenadier battalion of Native infantry: 2 howitzers, two 6 pounders, and the two 18 pounders brought in the *Fury*. I marched from Baroda with two 12 pounders, but I left them behind after the first day's march, on receiving certain intelligence of the *Fury's* arrival in Baroach river, as our march would have been very considerably delayed by bringing them on.

Lieut. Col. Woodington to Major Gen. Hon. A. Wellesley. Baroach, 29th Aug. 1803.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that at 3 o'clock, p.m., I stormed the fort of Baroach, and carried it with little loss, although the Arabs made considerable resistance, particularly on our entering the breach. The Arabs have suffered very considerably, and we have taken a great many stand of colors. A more steep ascent to the breach, and of such length, is seldom seen. I cannot express myself in sufficient terms on the gallantry of the officers and men I have the honor to command. I shall have the honor to address you more fully to-morrow. I write this for your early information, immediately after we got possession of the place, which will, I hope, be an excuse for haste.

Lieut. Col. Woodington to Major Gen. Hon. A. Wellesley. Baroach, 30th Aug. 1803.

I wrote to you yesterday evening, after we had stormed and taken possession of the fort of Baroach. I have now the honor of acquainting you more fully with the subject.

The breach was reported practicable by the engineer at 11, a.m., when I determined to storm; but delayed it until 3 o'clock, not only that I might benefit by the assistance of the *Fury* and an armed boat, which I expected would arrive in time to take their stations opposite the fort, but as I thought that a very likely hour to find the enemy off their guard. The vessel and armed boat, however, did not arrive in time to afford any assistance.

The enclosed orders for the storm will inform you of the disposition I made, as
will

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, 1st batt. 2nd regt. N.I.

12th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to return to you the copy of your letter to Lieut. Col. Harness, and your address to himself, of this date, which you have irregularly transmitted to him. He directs me to add that he will sanction no deviation from the orders of your Brigadier, or the G. O. of the Commander in Chief; and he particularly desires that you will not address him either on trivial subjects, or in an irregular manner, in future.

will the accompanying profile and elevation of the western front of the fort. The enemy made a desperate attack in opposing our entrance into the breach; but, by the valor and spirit of the troops, were speedily repulsed, and my orders were carried into full execution. After Capt. Richardson had obtained possession of the first gate, Major Cuyler pushed on so rapidly, that he overtook the Arabs before the greatest part, both horse and foot, could get out of the gate, and put to death about 200 of them. Many horses were also killed.

I beg leave to submit to your notice the ready co-operation of Major Cuyler throughout every part of the service, his gallantry and conduct in the command of the storm; as also of Capt. Richardson, who led. The whole of the officers and men employed on this service have conducted themselves so much to my satisfaction, that I cannot express myself too strongly in their commendation.

I am now employed in establishing some order in the fort, in getting the 18 pounders, and every thing we do not want to move with, into it; also in burying the enemy's dead, amounting to about 250.

I have great pleasure in informing you that our loss is small. Capt. M'Laurin, of H. M.'s 86th, is the only officer wounded, and not badly. I inclose a return of the killed and wounded in the storm, as also a general return of the killed and wounded during the siege.

We have taken at least 20 stand of colors from the Arabs and Scindians. I have only been able to collect 10 at present, which, together with the colors of the fort, I shall have the pleasure to send to the Presidency by the earliest opportunity.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have had 3 more stand of Arab colors brought to me; besides which, I have, at Major Cuyler's particular request, permitted the 86th regt. to keep 2, making in all 15.

Orders by Lieut. Col. Woodington.

Baroach, 29th Aug. 1803.

The breach being reported practicable, the fort will be stormed at 3 o'clock.

Storming party under the command of Major Cuyler.

Foilorn Hope. A serjeant and 12 volunteers of H. M.'s 86th regt.

1st party to lead under Capt. Richardson. 100 rank and file of H. M.'s 86th regt., including one flank company; and 100 rank and file of the grenadier battalion, including one flank company.

2d party under Major Cuyler. 150 rank and file of H. M.'s 86th regt., including one flank company; and 150 rank and file of the grenadier battalion, including one flank company; each party to have hoes, pickaxes, and crow's with them, carried by soldiers: the scaling ladders (to be used if necessary) to be also carried by soldiers.

Reserve under Capt. Bethune. 100 rank and file of H. M.'s 86th regt., and 100 rank and file of the grenadier battalion.

These parties will parade and be formed in the streets the troops occupy at 2 o'clock, and then be completed to 36 rounds and well flinted; after which they will be marched up the rear of the battery under cover from the view of the fort, and wait in the utmost silence until the signal from two 6 pounders, fired quick one after the other, direct their advance to storm the breach. The reserve will follow the storming party; and, after having entered the breach, Capt. Bethune will immediately form his men, and wait to act as circumstances may direct. Twenty boxes of musket ammunition to be taken in with Capt. Bethune's party.

On entering the breach, Capt. Richardson will turn to the left, and march by the works to take possession of the Cuttoopoor gate. Major Cuyler's party will follow, and push on also by the works to take possession of the Jarraseer gate. When these gates are obtained, the works are to be cleared of any parties of the enemy

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 13th Sept. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 2nd inst. From the length of time which has elapsed since you wrote it, I apprehend that there is some irregularity in the dawd, and, indeed, that some of your letters have missed me entirely. I set down in the margin the dates of all those which I have received from you since the 1st Aug. Whatever may be the state of the Soubahdar's treasury, I hope that he will not omit to collect a force at Hyderabad for the protection of that city. If its defence should not be

enemy in their vicinity, and the men to be kept under arms ready to act at a moment's warning.

Return of the killed and wounded in the pettah, and during the siege and storm of Baroach on the 20th Aug. under the command of Lieut. Col. Woodington.						
		Capt.		Serg. Rank and File.		
Artillery . . .	Europeans.	Killed		1	2	4
H. M.'s 61st reg.		Wounded		2	1	12
86th do.						
					Havil.	Sepoys.
Grenadier batt.	Natives.	Killed		—	—	8
		Wounded		—	3	36

G. O. G. G.

Fort William, 14th Oct. 1803.

The Governor General in Council derives great satisfaction from the intelligence which he has received of the reduction of the fort and city of Baroach, on the 29th Aug.; and of the ability, promptitude, and gallantry with which that important service was accomplished by the brave officers and troops under the command of Lieut. Col. Woodington of the establishment of Bombay.

His Excellency in Council highly approves the conduct of Lieut. Col. Woodington, in his judicious and spirited exertions for the early reduction of the place; in directing the operations of the siege; in his reasonable determination to assault the fort; and in the disposition which he made of the troops under his command, with a view to secure the rapid success of that gallant attack.

The Governor General in Council signifies his particular approbation of the valor and judgment manifested by Major Cuyler, of H. M.'s 86th regt., throughout the service at Baroach, and in commanding the storm of the fort; and by Capt. Richardson, of the same corps, in leading the assault. His Excellency in Council also observes, with particular satisfaction, the conduct of Capt. Cliffe of the engineers of Bombay.

To all the officers and troops, European and Native, employed on this honorable occasion, his Excellency in Council signifies his high commendation.

The Governor General in Council laments the loss of Capt. W. Semple of H. M.'s 86th regt., killed on the 25th Aug., and of the few brave men who fell before Baroach. It is a great satisfaction, however, to observe, that an acquisition so important should have been secured with the loss of only one officer, and of so few soldiers.

In bearing a due testimony to the merits of the officers and troops employed in the reduction of Baroach on the 29th Aug., the Governor General in Council remarks, that on the same day, distinguished by the commencement of the victorious career of the army of Bengal, under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, upon the frontier of Oude, the army of Bombay at the western extremity of the peninsula of India effected a service of the most arduous nature, with a similar spirit of alacrity and courage.

In the course of an extensive and complicated system of military operations, the glorious success of our arms since the commencement of this war has been uniform in every part of India. The able and gallant officers and troops of His Majesty's service, and of the several establishments of the three Presidencies, have been actuated by equal sentiments of public spirit and honor, and have co-operated with equal ardor and success, in an united effort to accomplish the just objects of the allies. The Governor General in Council confides in the justice of our cause, in the unanimous zeal of the three Presidencies, and in the continued co-operation of their respective resources and power, that the views of the confederate Chieftains will be speedily frustrated by the complete restoration of peace and tranquillity to the provinces of Hindustan and the Deccan, which have been disturbed by the ambition and violence of the enemy.

The Governor General in Council directs that copies of this Order be transmitted to the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council at Fort St. George, and to the Hon. the Governor in Council at Bombay, to be published to the army of those Presidencies respectively.

better provided for than I imagine it is at present, I apprehend that some misfortune may happen to it.

I am happy to observe that you have noticed to the Soubah's servants the want of boats at the Kalachabootra ghaut. I feel the consequences of the deficiency of their numbers at this moment, as I am obliged to wait for the supplies on their march to join me, instead of being employed in an offensive operation against the enemy. If there had been on the river Kistna even one third of the number of boats which the Nizam's amildars gave Gen. Stuart reason to believe that they had provided, the supplies would have joined me many days ago. I have, however, the pleasure to inform you, that the enemy are gone off to the northward, and that they are in considerable alarm; the camps of detachments which they had sent to the neighbourhood of the division under the command of Col. Stevenson having been attacked by the Colonel twice in the night, and the enemy having lost, upon those occasions, many men and horses.

Although it is necessary that there should be boats on the Kistna, and that Gen. Campbell's troops should be prepared to cross that river if it should be necessary, I do not think that it will be proper to call them across the Kistna under present circumstances. I conceive that the 2 battalions already at Hyderabad, with the force which the Soubahdar's ministers proposed to collect at that city, would ensure its security, till assistance would be sent to it from hence.

If Gen. Campbell's corps should move up to Hyderabad, the territories of the Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore, will be left without defence. They are liable to the same predatory attacks as those of the Soubah of the Deccan, and, in that case, can be relieved only by the march of a division from this quarter. It is obvious that our troops cannot march with so much celerity as the enemy's horse; and much mischief would be done before our troops would arrive. The same reasoning does not apply to Hyderabad. The security of that place is, in some degree, provided for. At all events, the enemy cannot do much mischief without the assistance of artillery; and if accompanied by guns, their arrival will not precede that of a division of British troops. I am also of opinion, that if Gen. Campbell's corps shall be drawn off from its present position, before a decided advantage shall be gained over the enemy, the southern jaghiredars will be inclined to join the confederates.

In case you should send forward either money or grain, I request you to let me know when the convoy will leave Hyderabad, and to desire the officer in charge of it to direct his march either upon Bheer or Dharore, giving me notice, from time to time, of his progress, and not to quit either of those places till he receives orders from me. I request that orders may be sent to the killadars of those forts, to give protection to any of our convoys that may go near them. I have ordered Lieut. Browne, of the 2nd batt. 10th regt., to return to Hyderabad, with the detachment under his command, without loss of time.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 13th Sept. 1803.

It is very true that it is unfortunate that we should be obliged to look after our convoys and supplies, instead of following up the enemy; but

so it is. However, I expect immediately to be joined by Major Hill, with money; and, when that shall arrive, I do not care how far I go to the northward. I shall take my chance for the dry grains.

The enemy have not yet got up all their guns, and are badly supplied with cattle. I do not think that it is to be regretted that they have brought them up, as it gives us a better chance of coming up with them, and of bringing affairs to a decision. I recommend that you should not fall back. Let Capt. Maitland collect your supplies, and bring them up to you. I have made an arrangement of this kind for those which I shall receive hereafter.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Maxwell.

13th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will move out with the brigade of cavalry at daylight this morning (leaving the in-lying piquets for the protection of the camp), and proceed 4 miles on the road to Ramusgaum Seuta, and send forward a regiment from thence till it meets a convoy of grain, &c., coming from that place, escorted by some companies of sepoys with a brigade of guns and a party of Mysore cavalry; the whole of which you will see safe into camp. A guide attends to conduct you towards Ramusgaum Seuta.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.

13th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will take all the empty brinjarries' bullocks, and all the bazaar people's bullocks, which will join you to-morrow morning, and escort them to Rackisbaum; whence, if there be no report of the enemy on that side of the river, you will disperse them to whatever place they can most readily load their cattle, and desire them to return to Rackisbaum, where you will meet them again and escort them to camp. While they are absent, you can make a trip up to camp with such brinjarries or bazaar people as you may find ready or can collect at Rackisbaum, who will immediately dispose of their grain in camp, and return with you the day following.

If you learn at Rackisbaum that the enemy's horse are across the river, and the brinjarries, &c., cannot speed themselves to load, you will ascertain the nearest place where they may be able to do so, and proceed thither with them for that purpose, and return afterwards to camp with as little delay as possible. To accelerate your movements, 4 spare bullocks are attached to each gun. 200 of the Mysore cavalry will be placed under your orders.

You will take such of the Golah peons as you think necessary for communicating with the brinjarries. Some of the cutwahl peons will be sent for conveying your orders to the bazaar people. One of the Company's hircarrahs will attend you; and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley authorises you to employ such people as you may find necessary to procure intelligence of the state of the country, and to pay them for their labor.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

13th Sept. 1803.

Capt. Graham has represented to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley the necessity of employing some troops to take possession of Chumargoonda and Rasingaam; and the General directs me to request that you will inform yourself particularly of the strength of the places from Capt. Graham, and detach such a part of the 2nd batt. 3rd regt., with its guns, as you may reckon will be sufficient to put the collector's peons in possession of those places; after which the detachment and guns will return to Ahmednuggur.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

13th Sept. 1803.

Capt. Graham has represented to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley that the late killadar of Ahmednuggur is collecting some troops at Rasingaam, near Chumargoonda, and proposed attacking him. The General therefore requests that, upon Capt. Graham's requisition, you will detach 3 or 4 companies of the 2nd batt. 3rd regt., with the battalion's guns, for that purpose. Send 400 kegs of arrack to Rackisbaum on the Godavary.

The D.A.G. to Major Hill.

Heedgaom, 13th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has ordered the bearer to proceed from hence to Rackisbaum, and from thence on the route to Dharore, until he meets you, with 200 of the Mysore cavalry. He requests that you will send off 2 or 3 horsemen (or more if you find it necessary) every day, with a report of your progress; and that you will proceed by the route sent you on the 10th, with all expedition, to Ramusgaum Seuta, and from thence to this place, unless you receive contrary orders.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp, 14th Sept. 1803.

I have but little intelligence to give you from this quarter. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are within the Nizam's territories, and at first manifested an intention to cross the Godavery, which river is fordable every where. I marched down, however, to that river from Aurungabad, and stopped them; and they have returned to the northward, and are at no great distance from the Adjuttee ghaut, by which they entered the country. They have kept at a very great distance from me, but have approached Col. Stevenson, and the pindarries have been troublesome to him. But he has had opportunities of attacking their camps twice in the night, with some effect. It is said that they are bringing up their infantry, and we have a chance of striking an important blow. I hope that the Godavery will soon rise again.

I have received civil answers from the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, and Madhoo Rao Rastia, to my letters, in which I informed them of the war, and of the circumstances which led to it. They all say that they hope to be considered as friends, but they are not to be trusted. I therefore recommend that you should keep a strict watch upon them. Madhoo Rao Rastia mentions, in his letter, that he is going to levy the usual tribute from the Solapoor polygar; and as this operation is likely to keep him and the polygar employed, it is better not to interfere in it at all. I can easily stir up the quarrel between the Kolapoor Rajah and the Putwurduns, if either party should manifest an inclination to interfere in the war. I hope, therefore, that I may look to the northward only for our enemies.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 14th Sept. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th.

My letter of the 23rd Aug. will have shown you that I was of opinion that Meer Khan was then at too great a distance, to hope for any success by opening a negotiation with him. Some of the sirdars and troops in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar have since been collected at Burhampoor, or in its neighbourhood; but I have not heard that Meer Khan is among them, or that he has, since I wrote, returned from Hindustan. There is still, therefore, but little reason to hope for success from a negotiation with Meer Khan. I am decidedly of opinion, that the services of Meer Khan would be more useful than those of the 6000 cavalry and 2000 in-

G. O.

Heedgaom, 14th Sept. 1803.

As the long roll has been made a general signal from head quarters, it is recommended to those corps who use it as a regimental beat, to discontinue it regimentally during the present service.

fantry which have been offered by the Soubahdar's government, and this defection from the enemy would distress them considerably. But I acknowledge that I have some doubts whether Meer Khan was ever serious in his intention to enter the Nizam's service; and, even supposing that he was so formerly, whether he would quit the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, having received from that Chief the reward of his services, and a jaghire for the maintenance of his troops within the Holkar territories. Therefore, although the services of Meer Khan would be very desirable, he is at such distance as to render it almost impossible to open a negotiation to obtain them; and if such negotiation could be opened, its success is doubtful. I have no doubt, therefore, of the propriety of accepting the services of the 6000 cavalry and 2000 infantry. I conceive that the acceptance of their services will not necessarily prevent you from urging the Soubahdar's servants to bear a part of the expense of entertaining Meer Khan. The measure will certainly be desirable, and may have the effect of shortening the duration of the war, even although the Soubahdar should furnish these additional men.

The question, whether you ought to press the Soubahdar to bear part of the expense, will, in my opinion, depend upon the state of his finances. Under the treaty, he is obliged to make every exertion in his power; and the knowledge of the state of his finances alone can enable you to decide how far the British government can press him to make additional efforts in the common cause. If the Soubahdar's government should be found to be incapable of making further exertions, we are not precluded from negotiating with Meer Khan, or from taking him into the British service during the war. But I should hope that his Highness will be able to allot lands for the support of his troops hereafter, when the war shall be concluded.

In my opinion, the Nabob of Kurnool's horse ought to be sent to join Gen. Campbell. The duty of conveying our supplies of grain and treasure is the most delicate in which the troops can be employed. The safe arrival of a convoy will frequently depend on the celerity and secrecy of the march; and no troops ought to be employed on that duty, excepting those on which we can place the fullest reliance.

I beg that you will be so kind as to inform the Soubahdar's government that I have never interfered, in any way whatever, with the brinjarries attached to his Highness' troops, or with those belonging to Col. Stevenson. I have not at this moment a single brinjarry in my camp, excepting a few hundred who came with me from Mysore. I cannot conceive what the ground of complaint can be; but I suspect it is that the Soubahdar's officer used the grain with which the brinjarries were laden during the time the troops were stationed on the frontier, that they have neglected to replenish the loads, and that they make these complaints to cover their own omission. However, I shall make inquiries on the subject.

I shall be obliged to you if you will send forward 4 lacs of rupees, of the 8 lacs which you report that you have in your treasury, in your letter to his Excellency the Governor General of the 5th inst. The sum of money might come forward, in charge of an officer's party, as far as Bheer or Dharore according to the intelligence of the enemy's movements which

the officer may receive. I will send for it to one of those places. He might bring with him a convoy of grain at the same time. He ought to be directed to consider the treasure particularly the object of his care, to march with all practicable celerity, to take post every night, if possible, in a walled village, and to conceal, if possible, the fact that he has treasure under his charge. I request to be apprised when he will quit Hyderabad, and, as often as circumstances will permit, of his further progress.

I do not comprehend the object of Sirjee Rao Ghautky's proposal, or what he offers to effect for the large sums of money which he has required.

To Lieut. Col. Woodington.

Camp, 14th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 29th and 30th Aug., and I have already expressed in the G. O. my sense of your conduct, and that of the troops under your command, in the attack of Baroach. I wish to have from you, as soon as possible, a return of the stores, provisions, &c., which were found in that fort when captured.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 14th Sept. 1803.

I have lately received Mr. Duncan's instructions to you, issued subsequently to the command of the troops in the territories of the Rajah Anund Rao having been placed in your hands. The system therein laid down will, I think, answer; and I have no objection to undertake the superintendence of it. I shall therefore be glad to hear from you upon all subjects which you may think proper to refer to my opinion. I write to you this day upon the subject of certain officers in arrest.

The enemy have made no progress in this quarter; they had intended to cross the Godavery, but, finding that I was in their way, they have returned to the northward, and are now at no great distance from the Adjunttee ghaut. They have kept at a great distance from me, but they have not treated Col. Stevenson with so much ceremony. He has, consequently, had opportunities of attacking their camp twice in the night, with some effect.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 14th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a charge against Capt. H——, of the Bombay artillery, which has been sent to me by Lieut. Col. W——. In order that a General Court Martial may be ordered for the trial of Capt. H——, it is necessary that the original crime should be sent to me.

Upon the perusal of the papers which have been sent to me upon this subject, I observe that the origin of this difference between Lieut. Col. W—— and Capt. H—— is what appeared on a former trial of Capt. H—— by a General Court Martial. Whatever may be the opinion of Capt. H—— upon the subject of the falsehood and malignity of the charge brought against him on that occasion, it does not appear that the Commander in Chief considered it to be false or malicious, otherwise he would have ordered Lieut. Col. W—— to be brought to trial. This charge against Col. W—— must therefore be considered the consequence of private pique.

The other charge, founded upon Col. W——'s levy of taxes from the

bazaar, may, I am afraid, be traced to the same source. It appears by the letters of Col. W——, upon the subject of these charges, that he had long levied these taxes with the knowledge of the government of Bombay. If he has levied them for a length of time, Capt. H—— must have known it; but he never thought of bringing forward the subject, till he was relieved from the state of suspension in which he has been placed by the sentence of a General Court Martial. I am afraid, therefore, that this charge also may be attributed to private pique.

I have long observed that the subjects which have come under the consideration of General Courts Martial in this country are in general referrible to private quarrels and differences, with which the public have no concern whatever. The character of the officers of the army is undoubtedly a public concern; but, in many instances, it would be much more proper, and more creditable for both parties, to settle these differences by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the public, by making them the subject of investigation before a General Court Martial. This period appears to me to be one in which it is probable that the exertions and abilities of every officer in the army will be required for the protection of the rights and interests of their country; and I cannot think it will be the most proper time to take up the attention of officers with the investigation and discussion of subjects which have been submitted to, and have been decided upon, by a General Court Martial, or for the gratification of any private pique.

I therefore most anxiously deprecate this trial; and I beg you to inform Capt. H——, that I recommend him to withdraw his letters and his charges against Lieut. Col. W——, and make that officer such an apology as will induce him to consent to his being released from arrest. I enclose you all the papers which I received upon this subject.

I likewise enclose copies of charges brought against Lieut. M——, and Lieut. P——, by Col. C——. The original crimes must be sent before I can order these officers to be brought to trial. The Articles of War require that when a charge of ungentlemanlike conduct is brought against an officer, the fact on which it is grounded shall be specified. This has been omitted in the crime against Lieut. M——, and it must be amended. I observe that these officers are in arrest for conduct referrible to their private life, rather than to their duty as officers of the army; and the observations on the arrest of Capt. H—— are applicable, in a great degree, to them. I therefore recommend that Lieut. P——, in particular, should be desired to make such an apology to Lieut. Col. C——, as to induce that officer to apply that he may be released from his arrest; and that the same desire should be communicated to Lieut. M——; if, upon inquiry, you should find that the fact of which he is supposed to have been guilty is of a nature to allow of its being thus passed over.

If these gentlemen should insist upon being brought to trial, you will be so kind as to send them away from the detachment in the field, and from Surat, Baroda, or any other garrison or post which may be liable to be attacked by the enemy; and they are to remain at the place at which you will order them, till it shall suit the public convenience to assemble a General Court Martial for their trial.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Barrett, in charge of boats at Rackisbaum.

14th Sept. 1803.

In the event of the river rising so as to become impassable for men or cattle, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will immediately send down 3 of the boats, under a sufficient guard of your company, to Ramusgaum Seuta, for the use of Major Hill's detachment.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 15th Sept. 1803.

Matters remain nearly as they were when I wrote to you last. I hear that the enemy are bringing their infantry up the ghaut, and I am waiting only for Major Hill, to move upon them.

Col. Stevenson made two attempts upon their camps at night, by which they have been much alarmed; but they still remain in the neighbourhood of his camp in the daytime. Some of the pindarries have also appeared in my neighbourhood, but they have done us but little mischief.

The Nizam's horse are very useless, which annoys me a good deal, and creates a doubt of the propriety of sending Col. Stevenson on the proposed expedition into Berar; at least till we shall have beaten the enemy in the field. If they were all to follow Col. Stevenson into Berar, we should effectually relieve the Nizam's territories; but we might meet with a misfortune, of which there could not be a chance if the cavalry were worth any thing. They are bringing their infantry up the ghauts, in what numbers I do not know. Holkar's army is in the neighbourhood of the river Taptee, but he is gone to Myhissur on account of some feast. It appears to be generally doubted now whether he will join the other confederates.

I enclose you the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Harness, which will show you his opinion of Col. Griffin. It relates to a complaint which Col. Griffin sent to me of Col. Harness, for having given orders that the corps under his command should parade regularly.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 15th Sept. 1803.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, there has been some appearances of a re-commencement of the rain, and there is, consequently, reason to believe that the river Godavery will rise again. If it should rise, I should wish to take advantage of the security which it will afford to bring on to Dharore as much of the treasure now at Hyderabad as can be spared from your treasury. Although, therefore, I do not wish at present to have a larger sum on the road than 4 lacs of rupees, I shall be obliged to you if you will have preparations made to send as much more as the state of your treasury can afford, as soon as I shall give you notice that the river has risen.

Advantage might be taken of the same security to forward on as much of the grain as carriage may have been provided for.

G. O.

Heedgaom, 15th Sept. 1803.

The guard for the elephants and camels when going for forage is to be augmented to 2 companies of Native infantry; with which one European officer will be sufficient. Particular instructions for his guidance will be lodged with Capt. Mackay, who will deliver them every morning to the officers when going out, and will receive them back from him on his return. It is requested that all the camels in camp may be sent with the above guard.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 15th Sept. 1803.

It occurs to me that it might be possible to make some arrangement with Canojee in Guzerat. I wish that you would turn your mind to that subject, and see if something cannot be done to relieve our troops in that country from a domestic war. If we cannot succeed in doing so, we really lose by our situation in Guzerat all the advantage which we should gain by having the troops, now employed in that country, employed in an offensive operation against the enemy in another quarter. We might possibly gain over Canojee by giving him a pension out of the Baroach lands, or those about Powanghur. I will give him neither land nor fort. If we could do that, and bring Col. Murray upon Ougein, we should soon put an end to the war. It is really worth trial.

The Nizam's troops behave so ill, and the enemy appear to be so little afraid of Col. Stevenson's corps, that I almost doubt the propriety of sending him into Berar. However, they are now bringing up their infantry: in consequence of which, we may have an opportunity of striking a blow before it will be necessary to detach him.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Harness, commg. 4th brigade.

15th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will order Major Dallas to march immediately, with such part of his battalion as is off duty, and with his guns and one tumbril, to the village of Tulwahrah, said to be 3 coss from camp, and near to which the bazaar people were plundered yesterday by a number of men on foot.

Direct Major Dallas to seize upon the head man, and 10 or 12 of the other principal men of the place, and bring them prisoners to camp. If resistance be made, let him use the force at his command; and when he has secured the people, let him make known to the inhabitants that he carries them off to answer for the plunder of the camp bazaar men near that village. Tripasan, a man of the party plundered, will conduct the battalion.

Capt. Mackay has been desired to send gun bullocks.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 16th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 5th. Before you will receive this you will have got Mr. Duncan's further instructions, which will have settled all matters.

If you find Surat too weak in Europeans, I recommend that you should draw the European part of the garrison from Parneira: that fort is out of the way at present, and is not likely to be attacked. I approve of your suggestion to raise a local battalion for Surat, which I have seen in one of your public letters to Mr. Duncan, but not instead of sebundies. Let the sebundies be raised for the purpose of taking care of the country tannahs, and of collecting the revenue, as well as the local battalion to increase the garrison of Surat. In short, every thing must be done to increase our force at all points, and to render most efficient that part of it in the field. You will now be able to alter Col. Woodington's Baroach arrangement. I recommend it to you not to leave there the Native garrison which he has allotted to that place. I have no doubt but that force is necessary for the defence of Baroach; but the question is, is Baroach likely to be attacked, and are not the men required in another place, viz., the field? As soon, therefore, as the conquest is settled, and every thing in tranquillity, you might reduce the garrison to the number stated in my letter

of the 2nd Aug.; and if the collector and magistrate of the town and district want more troops, desire them to raise sebundies.

Major Walker's plan to get possession of Futty Sing's person, before paying his ransom, I consider, between ourselves, to be one of the most unfortunate that has occurred. It may be called what they please; but as the patans must have brought Futty Sing to Berar with a small escort, with the hope of receiving the ransom, and in the certainty that they would not be attacked, it is, in fact, a breach of faith, than which nothing can be more unfortunate and injurious to us at the present moment. Besides, the consequence of it will most probably be, that Hurky Khan, and a parcel of blackguards who are hanging upon the ghauts, and waiting only for Holkar's signal to begin their operations, will enter the Attavesy upon the excellent pretence of punishing this act of perfidy of the English, and of collecting the ransom which had been promised to them. Thus they will find us unprepared; and whatever may be the result of our negotiations with Holkar, we shall be engaged with some of his chiefs. I do not impute any blame to you or Col. Watson; you acted with propriety in complying with the Resident's requisition, but I tremble for the result. Make friends of the Bleels by all means.

These Courts Martial are distressing indeed at present. I wrote you a long letter upon the subject the other day, and I shall not repeat now what I said then. We must endeavor to stop these trifling disputes, and turn the attention of the officers of the army to public matters, rather than to their private concerns.

It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in your quarter: this must be put an end to; and there is only one mode of effecting this, and that is for the commanding officer to be of no side excepting that of the public, to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve the public, be they who they may, or in whatever service. The consequence will be that the service will go on; all parties will join in forwarding it, and in respecting him; there will be an end to their petty disputes about trifles; and the commanding officer will be at the head of an army instead of a party. I heard yesterday that Holkar had crossed the Nerbudda, 5 days ago, at Myhissur, but my vakeel is with him: there has not yet been an act of hostilities between him and me, and I am by no means certain that he will join the other confederates.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 16th Sept. 1803.

I have received a letter from Major Hill, by which I learn that the killadar of Dharore would not allow him to encamp in the neighbourhood of that fort, so as to derive any protection from it for his convoy. This conduct is of little consequence at present, as the enemy have been obliged to draw off to the northward; but it might have had consequences hereafter, particularly if it should be imitated by the killadars of other forts.

I have written a letter to the killadar of Dharore, in which I have enclosed a copy of the Soubahdar's letter to me, by which his Highness has given me authority to issue orders to the civil and military officers in his service, and I have desired the killadar to allow the British troops to

encamp near his fort, and to give every protection and assistance in his power to the convoys of which they shall have charge. But as no attention has been paid, indeed no answer has been returned to letters which I addressed above a fortnight ago to this and other killadars, in which I desired them to store grain for the use of the troops, I suspect that no attention will be paid to this letter; and I therefore request you to apprise the durbar of the conduct of the killadar of Dharore towards Major Hill, and urge the Soubahdar's ministers to send positive orders to the killadars of all his Highness' forts, and the commanding officers and heads of all his walled towns and villages, to give all the protection and assistance in their power to the Company's troops and their convoys passing in their neighbourhood, and to communicate, to the officer commanding a detachment, any intelligence they may have of the enemy's motions. If we are not considered and treated as friends in the Soubahdar's territories, we shall find it very difficult, if not impossible, to bring up any important convoy, and his Highness' interests must suffer materially.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 16th Sept. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th Sept., enclosing an extract of one from the Military board, upon the subject of Capt. Mackay's accounts. I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to me the objections made by the Auditor to Capt. Mackay's accounts, in order that I may see them rectified according to the regulations of government. If, however, the objection to these accounts is the want of a muster roll of the drivers of the cattle, I have to tell you, that I fear it is impossible to furnish it, as prescribed by the regulations. Of all the drivers sent from Bombay, who marched from Poona with this division of the army, or who have joined it since, I believe not one remains at this moment. It has more than once happened that soubahdars and mucudums, and between 60 and 100 drivers, have deserted in one night; and there is scarcely a night in which 9 or 10 do not desert. They have been replaced regularly, by hiring other persons from the country, or from the bazaar in camp. But it must be obvious that it would not be possible to make out a muster roll in which the names of all these casualties could be entered; and to send a muster roll, containing the names of a certain number of soubahdars, mucudums, and drivers, would only be deceiving government, and would answer none of the purposes expected to be derived from the detailed muster roll containing the names of the drivers.

The same facts and reasoning apply to every description of public followers received from Bombay. The dooley bearers with the 78th regt. have been frequently replaced.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 16th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 13th and 15th. I rejoice to find that you approve of the conduct of Capt. Dickson. He has been particularly recommended to me, and I have more than once had opportunities of forwarding his views in the service. I doubt, however, whether you will derive any advantage from the appointment which you propose to give him, at all adequate to its expense.

I rather believe that your quarter masters have 1000 bullocks for each regiment, and, if that is the case, the system is a better one than that proposed. If you wish to increase the quantity of gram to be carried with your cavalry, the best way of doing it would be to increase the number of bullocks attached to the regiments under the quarter masters. By this mode you will have the advantage of having two purchasers instead of one, which is not small. I have here a Dep. Gram agent General. My corps of cavalry, which in point of number of horses does not, I believe, exceed yours, has cost in some months 50,000 pagodas. The quarter masters have a bullock for each horse, and the Gram agent General has a large number besides; and the state of my gram in camp, at this moment, is 7 days' feed. Besides this, there is the old scramble between the Gram agent General and the bazaar, for every grain brought into camp. So much for the Gram agent General system, which is certainly the most expensive, and, I believe, will turn out the most inefficient of any that has yet been introduced into the cavalry. I therefore strongly recommend, upon public grounds, that you should not adopt it.

I am glad to find that your supplies are coming on. By the by, the Nizam's sirdars have complained at Hyderabad, that their brinjaries are taken from them. How does this matter stand? The minister says that they ought to have 20,000. I have been scrupulously exact upon this subject, and have not allowed a single dealer to sell in my camp who did not belong to me.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 16th Sept. 1803.

It will not answer at present to have Bombay troops at Poonah. The decision upon this question must be deferred till we see in what state the war leaves us.

Reports of hircarrahs sent round from Surat give reason to believe that Holkar has already connected himself with Canoojee Rao; and the plan suggested in my letter of yesterday will, therefore, most probably fail. Col. Stevenson sent me a report yesterday, that Holkar had crossed the Nerbudda, near Myhissur, 5 days ago, in consequence of an alarm he had taken upon the advance of a British army from the northward. I do not know what to make of this story.

The enemy are quiet to the northward. We are all in tranquillity in this quarter. But I propose to disturb this general tranquillity in a day or two, as soon as I shall be joined by Hill.

I think that Major Walker's attempt to seize Futty Sing Guickwar, without paying the promised ransom, is likely to cause an irruption into the Attarysy by Kuley Khan and the other blackguards who are hanging about the ghauts. I do not approve of this attempt. The money ought certainly to be first paid. If we lose our character for truth and good faith, we shall have but little to stand upon in this country.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 16th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 8th inst., with its enclosures, regarding the fort of Parneira.

I have not by me at present the proceedings of the Committee at Surat,

which contained a copy of the estimated expense of the repairs of the fort of Parneira, nor do I recollect the amount of the expense. It appears to me, however, that that fort is necessary for the defence of the Company's territories in that quarter, and highly useful as a post to watch the neighbouring Portuguese settlement of Damaun, to which the attention of the Hon. the Governor in Council has been called by his Excellency the Governor General, in consequence of instructions from the government at home.

If Parneira is to be occupied by troops, with a view to the advantages above described as likely to result from the possession of that fort, those troops will require quarters, and other conveniences, and the fort must be put in a proper state of defence. Major Gen. Nicholson, who may be supposed to be well qualified to give an opinion upon this subject, has stated that the expense estimated is reasonable; and I should suppose that the Military board at Bombay must have data to enable them to decide whether it is what ought to be charged for the work required to be performed. The Governor in Council must decide whether it is of that magnitude that it cannot be undertaken without the sanction of the Court of Directors; but I have to observe, that this is a case which could not have been in contemplation when the orders of the Court of Directors alluded to were given, and that the Court of Directors must expect that the territories lately ceded to them on the west side of India will be defended, and that their defence cannot be adequately provided for by the means formerly in the power of the government.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay.

16th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will pay the bullock owners, arrived with Lieut. Griffith, the gratuity granted by the Commander in Chief for every bullock which they produced at muster. He further authorises you to pay them for the month of July for the number of bullocks with which they started, according to Major Symons's register; and, for the month of August, according to the muster taken by you on the 15th inst.

You will transfer 1000 of those bullocks, with their maistries, owners, and accounts, to the Cavalry grain agent's department, and hand over the remainder to the Commissary of grain and provisions.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Barrett.

16th Sept. 1803.

It appears that the most direct road to this camp from the principal marts for grain, on the other side of the Godavery, is by Goondy, near Hisnapoor, about 12 miles below Rackisbaum. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley therefore desires that you will move down there with the 6 boats, and afterwards detach 3 to Ramusgaum Seuta for Major Hill, if the river rises before you hear of his having passed. While you remain at Goondy, you will afford protection to all the bazaar men and brinjaries who may assemble there waiting for Capt. Baynes.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 17th Sept. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th. I agree entirely in opinion with you, that the Nabob of Kurnool's infantry will be useless; and I recommend that they should not be employed, excepting it should be to increase the force at Hyderabad. I am still of opinion that it would be most advisable to send the cavalry to join Gen. Campbell.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Goondy, 17th Sept. 1803.

In my letter of yesterday, in which I proposed that you should send to

my camp for money and heavy artillery, if you should want them for the expedition into Berar, I omitted to tell you where the detachment coming for these articles would find me. I am still encamped upon the Godavery, and am marching to the eastward. I am this day at Goondy, at the junction of the Godavery and Galatty; and purpose to move on daily to the eastward, till the enemy shall cross the river, when I shall cross likewise. It is obvious that I cannot tell you at what place: but if you direct the march of the detachment from your corps on this place, or on Ramusgaum on the Godavery, it will certainly find me. Let me know by what route your detachment will march.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley. Camp, 20 miles N. of the Godavery, 17th Sept. 1803.

I have not written to you since I was at Poonah, in the month of May, because, in fact, till I took Ahmednuggur in the last month, I had nothing to tell you at all deserving your attention. As you will see the Governor General's dispatches, it is useless to enter much into detail of the course of events which ended in Col. Collins's withdrawing from Scindiah's camp in the beginning of August: but I shall give you an outline of them. When I wrote to you in May, Holkar had withdrawn from Aurungabad, in compliance with my request: he drew off gradually to the northward, crossed the river Taptee in the beginning of June, when it filled, and was a sufficient barrier between his army and Scindiah's; and he has remained between the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee ever since, having detached across the Nerbudda and Taptee the troops which were necessary to take possession of the territories belonging to his family.

Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the Taptee in the beginning of May, and he joined the Rajah of Berar towards the end of that month, at Mulcapoor, a place not far from the Nizam's frontier, about 40 miles south of the Taptee. The object of the junction of the armies of those chiefs, as declared by their friends and adherents in all parts of India, and by the ministers at the Nizam's durbar, was to attack the British government and its allies. But it was first necessary to reconcile the differences existing between Holkar and Scindiah; and in order to obtain time to effect this object, it was necessary to conceal their hostile intentions, by pacific and amicable declarations, and by every species of dissimulation, at the same time that large armies were assembled in the neighbourhood of the frontier of our ally the Nizam.

In the end of May, Col. Collins received the Governor General's order to demand an explanation of the views and intentions of Scindiah in assembling his army and joining with the Rajah of Berar, in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier; and to require him to retire with his troops across the Nerbudda, if his intentions were pacific. At first Scindiah told him that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war: afterwards he and the Rajah of Berar found it probable that Collins would quit Scindiah's camp, and that we should attack them, at a season at which they could not escape, and before they should have made their peace with Holkar; and they wrote a letter to the Governor General, on the 8th July, in which they declared they had no intentions to attack the British

government or their allies, or to impede the treaty of Bassein, provided the British government did not interfere with their treaties with the Peshwah. The object of this letter was to gain 6 weeks' more time; they imagined that it would have been referred to the Governor General, and that that time would have elapsed before his answers could have arrived. In the mean time, however, I received full powers and instructions from the Governor General to bring the negotiation to a conclusion. I wrote letters to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in which I pointed out to those Chiefs the necessity there was that they should withdraw their armies from the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, if they were sincere in their pacific declarations, contained in their letter to the Governor General of the 8th July; and I promised that I would withdraw the British troops, as soon as I should find that they had commenced withdrawing their troops. In answer to this letter, after much delay and evasion, they made an impudent proposition that I should withdraw first, and fix the day on which the British troops should arrive at Seringapatam, Madras, and Bombay; and they promised that they would arrive at Burhampoor, 40 miles from their stations, on the same day. I then commenced hostilities. Their object throughout the negotiation was to gain time to negotiate the peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and to pass over the rainy season, which was the least favorable for the commencement of their operations. Our object ought to have been to press them to a decision, whether they would retire or not, at a period when they had not had time to make peace with Holkar, and in the commencement of the rainy season, in the course of which we should have made ourselves masters of almost all their valuable posts. A perusal of the correspondence will show you which party succeeded best in the negotiation, and I now proceed to give you an account of our military operations.

On the 4th June, I marched from Poonah towards the Nizam's frontier; on the same day Col. Stevenson crossed the Godavery, and proceeded towards Aurungabad. I remained on the Nizam's frontier, south of the Godavery, waiting the result of Col. Collins's negotiations, till the beginning of August. On the 8th I attacked and carried by storm the pettah of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fort of Ahmednuggur. On the 9th, at night, I broke ground before the fort, and on the 12th got possession of it by capitulation. This is a place of great note, had been frequently attacked, but never taken. It is, in fact, the strongest country fort I have ever seen, excepting Vellore in the Carnatic, has an excellent ditch, and cannot be surpris'd. It covers Poonah and the Nizam's western frontier south of the Godavery: the possession of it gives us an excellent *dépôt*, cuts Scindiah off from all connexion with the southern chiefs, and has given us all his territories south of the Godavery.

Col. Stevenson prevented Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from entering the Nizam's territories till the 24th Aug.: they entered on that day, however, with large bodies of horse, and marched to the south eastward, apparently with an intention of crossing the Godavery, and of proceeding towards Hyderabad. I crossed the Godavery on the 24th, after taking possession of the Ahmednuggur territories, and stopped their progress to the southward; and since that they have retired gradually towards the

ghauts by which they entered. They have kept at a distance from me, but Col. Stevenson has had two or three skirmishes with them. I shall move forward to attack them in a day or two, as soon as I have been joined by my supplies of money and provisions coming from the southward.

The troops in Guzerat took the fort of Baroach, on the 29th August. A detachment marched against Cuttack from Ganjam on the 1st Sept.; and Gen. Lake was likely to attack M. Peron, at Coel, about the end of August.

I have made a treaty with Amrut Rao, by which I have engaged that he shall have 7 lacs of rupees *per annum* from the Peshwah, provided he joins me. I also think it possible that Holkar will not join the other confederates, as it is certain that he had no confidence in Scindiah; and since he has known that Col. Collins has withdrawn from Scindiah's camp he has sent for an agent of mine, who had been waiting in Amrut Rao's camp for passports to go to him. This man had not joined him a week ago. None of his troops had joined Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar.

I have not with me any of the great southern Marhatta chiefs, and only about 4000 of the Peshwah's troops, under two sirdars of no very great note. But the greater chiefs are neutral in the contest, and if we continue to be as successful as we have been hitherto, they will continue neutral, if they do not join me. Every thing in my rear is in tranquillity. Indeed, the loss of Ahmednuggur has cut Scindiah off from the Deccan, and has entirely altered his relations with the southern chiefs. The weakness of the Peshwah's character, and of his government, are partly the causes through which I have not been supported by the southern chiefs. But I think I may attribute the want of their services in some degree also to their desire to see which party will be the strongest, before they join either. They have a high idea of Scindiah's strength, and they will hardly believe that we are equal to him. If they should remain quiet, if Gen. Lake should be tolerably successful, or if I can bring the enemy opposed to me to a general action, the war will be of short duration.

The rains have been very severe, and I have lost large numbers of cattle; but I am well equipped at present, and the troops are in high health and spirits.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Snow, adjt. 2nd batt. 12th regt.

Camp, 17th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to transmit the crime against Coopah naik, who is the only prisoner to be tried by the Line Court Martial, which you are desired to superintend. The evidences on both sides have been examined.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to desire that you will not allow either party to bring forward any thing of their private disputes or matters of accounts; but confine them and the evidences to the two points in the charge, viz. the beating of Appoo Pullah and his brother, and making a riot in camp during the night. On this latter point Capt. Young will mention the guard he employed to quell the riot, the men of which will give further evidence, if necessary.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 18th Sept. 1803.

I enclose a letter which I wish you would send in the first ship that sails. Major Hill is arrived, and has brought about 2400 bullocks. I have in camp nearly 6000 loads of rice; and I have made arrangements to procure supplies of dry grains, under which I hope that I shall not want.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 19th Sept. 1803.

Major Hill is arrived with my money, &c., and I intend to make a movement to the northward to-morrow. I shall encamp at Golah Pangree on the Doodna. I shall continue my march to the northward on the following day; but I cannot yet say whether I shall pass to the eastward or westward of Jaulna.

On the 21st you might begin to move upon the enemy, and push them towards Adjuntee, while I march towards the eastern passes of Badowly and Laakenwarra, by Jaffierabad. If I should find that they collect to the westward, about the Adjuntee pass, I shall go nearer to you. If they move towards the latter passes, you might approach me. We must take care that they do not pass to the southward between us.

It is said that Holkar's troops will enter the Nizam's territories by the Casserharry ghaut, which, during this movement, will be on our left and rear: but provided there is a good garrison in Moongy Puttun, that is of little consequence.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 19th Sept. 1803.

Major Hill arrived yesterday, and has brought 2405 bullocks, of which 2277 are serviceable, and 128 unserviceable. I have not yet got an account of the brinjaries with him; but those who left our camp with Lieut. Griffiths joined him, and I believe that altogether he has about 2800. Lieut. Griffiths brought 2887 serviceable bullocks, and 57 unserviceable. 138 cows are included in the serviceable. I shall send off 2 corps to Poonah to-morrow.

The enemy have kept to the northward, in the neighbourhood of the Adjuntee pass. I have not got a clear account of their infantry, but I believe it is above the ghauts. I shall march towards them to-morrow; and Col. Stevenson and I will move upon them in separate divisions, in hopes either to bring them to an action, or to drive them out of the country. I have got plenty of provisions for the fighting men, and have made arrangements for having dry grains for the followers, horses, and cattle. The Nizam's country is fertile, and I hope that I may succeed; but it is but little better than an enemy's country. We get every thing with the greatest difficulty; and the magazines which, by treaty, ought to be full, are, I believe, empty. At all events they will not allow us to see them, much less to have the use of them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 19th Sept. 1803.

I enclose some papers which Goklah sent me yesterday. They contain orders to employ his troops in seizing villages in the districts of Gundapor and Byzapoor. I shall be obliged to you if you will make arrangements with the Peshwah's government that the few troops (of the number specified in the treaty) which he has furnished, and which we pay, may not be employed otherwise than as the exigencies of the war may require,

G. O.

Heedgaon, 19th Sept. 1803.

The weekly states of corps for the D. A. G. to be collected by the Major of Brigade, and sent to his office every Monday by 9 o'clock in the morning, if the detachment be halting; and an hour after coming to the ground, if it has marched.

and that they may not be diverted from this service by the orders from Poonah. To-morrow morning 2 corps go from hence on their road to Poonah, with their field pieces. They will arrive in Poonah in the first day in October.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

I received last night your Excellency's orders of the 30th Aug., and I have now the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written this day to Major Gen. Campbell.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

1. I have received a dispatch from his Excellency the Governor General, in which his Excellency has ordered me to convey to you my sentiments upon the object and expediency of reducing the number of the troops under your command at the present moment: in order to do this, it will be necessary to review our situation in this country.

2. The Company are involved in a war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; Holkar's troops have not yet committed hostilities against the Company or their allies, but the confederated Marhattas declare that that Chief will join them, and, from the difficulty of communicating with him, I cannot say what line of conduct he will adopt.

3. When the enemy first entered the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, they appeared disposed to carry on a predatory war; their movements were checked; and they have been since joined by a body of infantry, with artillery: it is to be hoped, therefore, that this plan has been relinquished, and it is probable that it will be in our power to conduct our operations in such a manner as to make some impression upon the enemy in a short space of time. If Holkar should co-operate in the war, I think it most probable he will not join his troops with those commanded by Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar: he will probably carry on a distinct operation, and keep at a distance from our troops; he is most likely to carry on a predatory war.

4. In my opinion, he will move to the southward, keeping as far to the westward from my corps as he can: with a view to this operation, I have reinforced Poonah, which place will be quite secure; but there is nothing to prevent him from passing on to the southward of the Kistna, and invading the Company's territories, excepting the division under your command. I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that that division ought to retain its position, at least till it shall be seen what part Holkar takes in the contest, and what plan of operations he will adopt, if he should be an enemy.

5. Supposing that, under present circumstances, we might be able to make any important impression on the other two members of the confederacy, it would still be necessary to guard against this supposed operation of Holkar. If he should enter into the war at all, he would be more likely to carry it into execution.

G. O.

Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

The detachment is referred to the orders of the 8th inst., regarding the necessary state of preparation for marching on the signal of the drum, without further notice, and the other points therein specified.

6. Success against the other confederates would certainly leave more troops, of those now in this quarter, at our disposal, to watch and check Holkar's operations; but still, as his movements would be much more rapid than those of the Company's troops, the Company's territories would be exposed to his depredations, if your corps were withdrawn.

7. All the southern chiefs have written me friendly letters, in answer to those that I wrote, in which I informed them of the commencement of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of its causes. Their situation, in relation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is much altered since the fall of Ahmednuggur; and, at all events, I believe they are aware that they have no chance of retaining their possessions, excepting under the English protection. Their actions have hitherto been in conformity with their professions, as supplies for my camp have been suffered to pass through their countries since the commencement of the war.

8. These Chiefs, however, are all either declared or concealed enemies of the Peshwah. I know, also, that they have been strongly urged by the confederates to join in the contest. We cannot conceal from ourselves, that our cause in this war is very unpopular among those who generally guide the councils and conduct of these Chiefs; and that each individual of them is strongly urged by every motive of national and family pride to oppose the British government, in a war which will certainly destroy the national power of the Marhattas.

9. These facts and arguments are laid before them upon all occasions; and although they see that their personal interest depends in a great measure upon the success of the British government, and they are aware that there is every reason to believe that the British government will be successful in this contest, I doubt much whether they would not enter into the war, if they did not see your corps encamped at their gates, ready to fall upon and destroy them the moment they should appear as enemies; at all events, supposing that their hatred of the Peshwah, the solicitations of the confederates, and their notions of family and national honor, which I have above noticed, should have no effect upon their minds, and that they are sensible that their interests are involved in the success of the British government, the position of your corps at least affords them a plausible excuse for declining to join their countrymen in the war.

10. The greatest difficulties with which we shall have to contend throughout this war, will be the want of power and authority by the allied governments of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. Every kil-ladar, and the head of almost every village and district, acts as he thinks proper, and this conduct may have very unpleasant consequences: your division, the position of which is well known, tends to check this disposition.

11. Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion, that a body of troops, in the position occupied by the division under your command, is absolutely necessary for the security of the Company's territories; that they render probable the continuance of the neutrality of a class of people who might do us much mischief, and that they check the dispositions of the officers of the government of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan to assume independence.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

I marched this morning, and shall continue to push at the enemy. I sent yesterday two battalions to Poonah, one of them the 1st of the 3rd. I had long been bored by Capt. ———'s growling, and at last he came one morning to grumble because the sepoys were paid in star pagodas. I told him that a star pagoda was the Company's coin, and, if it did not exchange for the number of Chandore rupees that might be wished, I could not help it, and could not give a man 3 star pagodas whose pay was only 2. He was not satisfied, but said that he would put down his complaint in writing. Upon this I told him that I was going to reinforce Poonah, and, as I had not leisure to attend to his grumbling, his should be the corps to go there. I know that you are interested about this corps, and therefore I mention the facts particularly. I have kept with me your relation, Little, till you come back.

When you come, you should come from Poonah to Ahmednuggur, thence to Rackisbaum on the Godavery, from Rackisbaum to Goondy, 10 miles lower down the river, where we have a company. You will there fall in with a detachment which I have formed to go backwards and forwards between the Bheer and Dharore districts and the army, to secure our supplies; and you may join with it. Capt. Baynes commands it.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

Camp at Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

Between 900 and 1000 of the Company's hired carriage bullocks left the army this morning with two battalions of sepoys, which will pass Ahmednuggur and leave the bullocks there. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will have so many of the new gunny bags, received from Poonah, filled with rice at 6 morealls each.

A sum of money, sent from Mysore under charge of Sree Navas Rao, and an escort of Mysore horse and peons, and 1000 brinjarry bullocks loaded in Mysore, all left Poonah on the 17th or 18th, and they will probably arrive at Ahmednuggur at the same time, or nearly so, as the bullocks from the army. As soon as the whole have arrived, and the bullocks from the army are prepared to start, they are to be sent, under the escort of 3 companies of the 2nd batt. 3rd regt., with the 2 6-pounders attached to that corps, to Rackisbaum on the Godavery, and from Rackisbaum to Goondy, about 10 miles lower down on the same river, where Mr. Barrett is posted. At Goondy the officer will receive further orders from Major Gen. Wellesley.

In case the officer should hear of any party of horse, on his road to Rackisbaum, which he may think too numerous for him, he must take post in any strong village he may find, or go to the Nizam's fort of Bheer, which will be to the southward of his route.

Any money that may be at Ahmednuggur at the time this convoy comes off, beyond what is necessary for the current expenses of the garrison, is to be sent off at the same time on trusty coolies, or such other carriage as Capt. Graham can procure. The Mysore horse and peons, now with the treasure on the road from Poonah, are to accompany the detachment.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Mackay.

Camp at Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley authorises you to pay the bullock owners, who have arrived in camp with Major Hill's detachment, for 15 days in Sept., according to the muster taken by Lieut. Dalzel on the 1st of that month; and, for the remaining 15 days, according to the muster taken by you yesterday. He also authorises you to pay them the gratuity granted by the Commander in Chief for the total number produced at that muster.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 21st Sept. 1803.

I am happy to hear of Lieut. Lister's success, as reported in your letter of the 18th.

You must urge Hyder Khan to make haste and raise his horse; and, as soon as they are raised, they must keep the country quiet in the neighbourhood of Neemgaum. It will not answer to have the Company's troops in a place of that kind hereafter, particularly if there is any probability of its being attacked with cannon.

The killadar of Ahmednuggur is in Scindiah's camp, and not at Haskin. But, at all events, that fort is too strong for us at present, and I want the troops and guns to escort grain from Ahmednuggur to the Godavery, as you will hear from Capt. Lucas. I do not believe that Haskin belongs to the Company, but to the Nizam. If that be the case, we ought not to meddle with it; but keep the people who are in the place in check, by means of Hyder Khan's cavalry.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Sailgaon, 21st Sept. 1803.

1. I have perused the papers sent from the Resident, enclosed with your letter of the 14th inst., and I beg leave to offer the following suggestions upon the subject of Futtu Sing Rao and his mother, to which they relate. They may be of service, if not received at too late a period. If the question should be decided before this letter should be received, they will not be worth the consideration of the Hon. the Governor in Council.

2. It is my decided opinion, that the offer of Futtu Sing Rao and his mother to come to Baroda, provided a ransom is paid for their release, is sincere. I formed this opinion upon the fact, that they have entered the Company's territories attended but by a small party of horse. If their intentions were hostile, or if they had any intention excepting that of being released from the hands of the Patans, they would have brought with them a much larger body of troops; and the conduct of this body of troops would have been very different from that observed by those troops at present with Futtu Sing Rao.

3. Upon a perusal of the papers transmitted by Major Walker, I do not see the slightest ground for a belief that the intentions of Futtu Sing and his mother are different from those which they have declared that they entertain.

4. But whether it be true or not that Futtu Sing Rao and his mother have evil intentions, in my opinion, it is necessary first to determine whether it is worth 50,000 rupees to have possession of their persons. If that should be determined in the negative, those persons and the Patans ought to be desired forthwith to withdraw from the Company's territories; and they ought to be driven out, if they should refuse to comply with this desire.

5. If it should be determined that the ransom ought to be paid, respecting which, in my opinion, there can be no doubt, the money ought to be prepared without loss of time, and sent in charge of a sufficient body of

G. M. O.

Pangree, 21st Sept. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that officers and heads of departments will cause their servants to load their baggage and departments, so as to have the whole in motion before assembly beating.

troops to meet the Patans. Futtu Sing Rao and his mother should then be called upon to deliver themselves over to the British troops, and the money ought to be paid upon their arrival in the British camp. If they should decline to deliver themselves over, or there should be any difficulties on the part of the Patans, or if they should refuse to retire after having delivered over the persons of Futtu Sing Rao and his mother, they ought to be attacked and driven out.

6. In my opinion, however, every attempt to procure the release of Futtu Sing Rao and his mother, without paying the demanded ransom, or after paying a part of it, is inconsistent with the scrupulous good faith which ought to direct all our transactions with the Natives. It is true that the Guickwar government did not consent in terms to pay the 50,000 rupees for the release of Futtu Sing Rao and his mother: but when that ransom was demanded, and the government were informed that these persons were coming down the ghauts with 500 Patans, and the government admitted them into the country, they virtually consented to pay the ransom for which they came; and every attempt to get possession of the persons of Futtu Sing Rao and his mother, without paying any ransom, or after paying only a part, is a direct breach of faith. If the government did not intend to pay the ransom, they ought not to have admitted the Patans into the country.

7. While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid expressing my approbation of the prudent conduct of Lieut. Col. Watson at Barreah.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Sailgaon, 21st Sept. 1803.

Although more rain has fallen, the river Godavery still continues to fall, and I am afraid that it will not fill again in this season. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it will not be proper to send off from Hyderabad a greater sum than the 4 lacs of rupees I originally requested from you.

The D.A.G. to Officer comm. 1st batt. 4th regt. N.I. Camp near Assye, 23rd Sept. 1803.

A report has been brought in, by 2 grain dealers attached to this camp, that they have 1000 bullocks loaded with grain at the village of Sailgaon, 10 coss distant from hence, and by the way of Jaffierabad. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley deems it necessary to send an escort to bring up that grain safe to camp, and has ordered the battalion under your command, and 500 of the Mysore cavalry, for that service. He sends the 2 grain dealers to be your guides, and requests that you will march at daylight to-morrow morning, with such part of your corps as may be off duty, with its guns, and the Mysore cavalry above mentioned, and proceed to Sailgaon, if you find it only a moderate march, and return to this place with the grain the next day; but if you find the distance too much for one march, you may make one march and a half thither, or two marches, and return in the same time to this place; unless you receive intimation in the mean time that the army has marched, in which case you will take your route accordingly.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

I was joined by Major Hill, with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna, on the 18th; and on the 20th was enabled to move forward towards the enemy, who had been joined, in the course of the last 7 or 8 days, by the infantry under Col. Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose

commander* I have not ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad.

I was near Col. Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our command on the 24th, in the morning; and we marched on the 22nd, Col. Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna.

On the 23rd, I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about 6 miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and, having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual: accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna, on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack: it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the infantry and the 74th regt., which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regt., at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken infantry; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

Lieut. Col. Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body

* M. Dupont.

of infantry, which had retired, and was formed again, in which operation he was killed; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands 90 pieces of cannon. The victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive, by the enclosed return,* that our loss in officers and men has

* A return of the killed, wounded, and missing at the battle of Assye, against the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 23rd Sept. 1803.

H M.'s 19th Lt. D.	Europeans.						
1st bat. Madras art.	F O.	Cap.	Sub.	Seij.	Drum.	R. & F.	Horses.
2nd do. do.	Killed 1	6	7	9	—	141	77
Det. Bombay do.	Wounded 3	6	20	33	6	313	3
H M.'s 71th regt.	Missing —	—	—	—	—	8	—
— 78th ..							
4th regt. cavalry	Natives.						
5th do. do.		Soub.	Jem.	Havil.	Trum.	R. & F.	Horses.
7th do. do.	Killed —	5	3	13	—	224	228
1st bat. 2nd N.I.	Wounded —	12	16	39	6	1138	75
1st do. 4th ..	Missing —	—	—	—	—	18	1
1st do. 8th ..							
1st do. 10th ..							
2nd do. 12th ..							
Pioneers.							

G. M. O.

Camp near Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

Returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the battle of the 23rd, to be sent to the D. A. G., by corps, as soon as the commanding officers can conveniently do so.

As the enemy's gun bullocks taken yesterday are absolutely necessary for the public service, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will have an account taken immediately of the numbers received by the people belonging to the corps respectively, and send a report thereof to the D. A. G. The people in whose possession they are at present to be directed to take care of them till to-morrow, when orders will be issued respecting them, and they will be paid for every bullock which may be found fit for the service, and taken from them.

G. O.

24th Sept. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley returns his thanks to the troops for their conduct in the action of yesterday, the result of which is so honorable to them, and likely to be so advantageous to the public interest. He requests Lieut. Col. Harness and Lieut. Col. Wallace, in particular, will accept his acknowledgments for the manner in which they conducted their respective brigades.

Major Gen. Wellesley has also every reason to applaud the conduct of the cavalry, particularly that of the 19th dragoons, and to express the deep regret he feels at the loss of Lieut. Col. Maxwell, who led them.

A Royal salute to be fired in camp this afternoon upon the occasion of the victory earned over the enemy's army yesterday; and a Royal salute to be fired on the same occasion, on the receipt of this order, in each of the detachments, and in each of the cantonments under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley, in the territories of the Company, of the Subah of the Deccan, of the Peshwah, and of the Rajah Anund Rao Quikwar.

The whole of the 1st batt. of the 2nd regt., with a proportion of European and Native officers, to parade as a working party in front of the park at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning, to be employed under Capt. Beauman's directions in bringing the captured guns into the lines.

G. A. O.

24th Sept. 1803.

The field officer of the day will order such details of the Native infantry to occupy posts in rear of the camp this evening as he may think proper, in lieu of the companies of the outlying pickets usually detached on that duty.

Memorandum.

Fifty bags of rice to be issued at the moodee khann to-night, at 5 seers per rupee, which will be divided as follows: 2½ bags to each regimental bazaar, and the remainder to the head quarter bazaar; the 74th cutwahl receives for that regiment and the 78th: this rice must be retained at 1½ seers per rupee.

been very great ; and, in that of Lieut. Col. Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.

I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops ; they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet ; and, notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut. Col. Harness and Lieut. Col. Wallace, for the manner in which they conducted their brigades ; and to all the officers of the staff, for the assistance I received from them. The officers commanding brigades, nearly all those of the staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry, had their horses shot under them. I have also to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry conducted by Lieut. Col. Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons.

The enemy are gone off towards the Adjuttee ghaut, and I propose to follow them, as soon as I can place my captured guns and wounded in security. Col. Stevenson arrived this morning at Bokerdun, and I imagine that he will be here this evening.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to inform you that I beat the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday, but sustained a very considerable loss in the action. As the shortest mode of making you acquainted with the particulars of the action, I have the honor to enclose the copy of the report which I have made on the subject to his Excellency the Governor General.

I have desired the commanding officers of regiments to recommend officers to your notice for promotion, in consequence of the vacancies which have occurred ; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity to recommend to your favor Major Kennedy, of the 19th light dragoons, who commanded the regiment during the action ; as also the officers of the 74th regt., the majority of whom, I am sorry to say, are wounded.

Lieut. Col. Wallace, who is also Major of the 74th regt., has applied to me to request that I would recommend him to you to obtain one of the vacant Lieut. Colonelcies in the 19th dragoons, as it is understood that the establishment of that regiment is now 2 Lieut. Colonels. I have requested the Colonel to give me a memorandum of his services, which I have now the honor to enclose ; and I have only to add thereto the testimony of my perfect approbation of Col. Wallace's conduct since he has been detached with me, and of my knowledge that the facts alluded to in the enclosed memorandum are true.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

I marched on the 20th from the ground which I had occupied in the neighbourhood, waiting for the junction of Major Hill ; and on the 21st I was near to, and had a conference with, Col. Stevenson, in which I

arranged that we should attack the enemy this day. But on my arrival on my ground yesterday, I received accounts that the enemy's cavalry had marched off, that their infantry were preparing to follow, and that the latter were only 6 miles from my proposed camp. It was so important to our interests at this moment to strike a blow, that I thought there was no time to be lost: accordingly, I determined to march on to attack them, and I sent notice of this determination to Col. Stevenson.

I found the whole army encamped, and made my arrangements to attack their infantry, which was upon their left flank. The fire from their cannon was the hottest that has been known in this country, and we lost a great number of officers and men in advancing to the attack; Col. Maxwell, among others, killed. At length we drove them off, and have taken about 60 pieces of cannon, nearly all brass, of the largest calibres. Their infantry, of which there were 3 campoos, fought well, and stood by their guns to the last. Their execution, however, was principally by their cannon. Col. Wallace, Col. Harness, and I, had horses killed under us. I lost 2 horses, one shot and the other piked; and the staff officers have lost one or two each. I believe the enemy did not get away more than 2 guns, and I am doubtful whether they even have that number, as the number that we have taken agrees with that which my hircarrahs have reported they had previous to the action. Their cavalry did us but little mischief. A body made an attempt to charge the 74th, and were cut up by the 19th dragoons. As soon as I can get accurate accounts of the killed and wounded, I shall send you all the details of the action.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Assye, 21th Sept. 1803.

I have just time to inform you that I attacked the enemy's army with my division yesterday, the result of which was, that I took about 60 pieces of cannon, and defeated them. I have lost many men.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Assye, 21th Sept. 1803.

I have now the honor to enclose my report to the Governor General, of the details of the action of the 23rd inst. It is my opinion that there will be no occasion for Major Irton to entrench his camp: but I acknowledge that I am very desirous that the Soubahdar of the Deccan should take the field; as, independently of the effect which this measure will have upon our foreign enemies, it will tend materially to preserve the tranquillity of his Highness' territories.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Assye, 21th Sept. 1803.

I attacked the united armies of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday with my division, and the result is, that I have taken about 60 pieces of cannon. The action was very brisk indeed, the fire from the enemy's cannon the hottest that has been known in this country for some time; and our loss in officers and men has been very great. Among others, your brother in the 74th is wounded; Col. Maxwell was killed; Col. Harness, Col. Wallace, and I, and I believe every officer of the staff, had horses shot under us. Scindiah's infantry behaved remarkably well, and stood to their guns to the last; but their execution was with them only.

I do not believe that they carried away more than 2, and I doubt whether they have got even that number.

I shall write to the Governor General in detail upon the subject of this action, as soon as I can get accurate returns of the killed and wounded, and of the ordnance taken.

P. S. The enemy fled towards the Adjuttee ghaut, and, I believe, have descended it.

Memorandum on the Battle of Assye. Subsequently transmitted.

1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out Natives in the Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

2. All the hircarrahs reported that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Col. Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun. I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted; and Col. Stevenson their right. Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above 6 miles to Assye, where was its left: it was all in the district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

3. My march of the 23rd was so directed as that I should be within 12 or 14 miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within 6 miles of them. I there received intelligence that they were going off; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnaitred. I could not have reconnaitred without taking the whole of my small force; and, when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.

4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, 3 or 4 times my number of infantry only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning, according to the plan.

5. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and, as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and, at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During the attack

of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was; and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it.

6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Col. Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make the attack.

7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed, from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd, with my camp, baggage, &c.

8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaum and Waroor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaum. I intended at that time to throw my right up to Assye.

9. For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye, and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye; but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaum: if they had, I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must fall when the right should be beat. Orders were given accordingly.

11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assye: the 74th regt., which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support the piquets, followed them. There was a large break in our line between these corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible cannonade from Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the camposos; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regt. we sustained the greatest part of our loss. One company of the piquets, of one officer and 50 rank and file, lost the officer and 44 rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah.

12. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right; and, luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was thus brought into the cannonade; horses and men were lost: it charged among broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the victory still more complete than it was.

13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked

upon by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.

14. The annexed plan* is correct, excepting in the following instances: 1st, we came upon the enemy farther to the westward (it ought to be where I have marked in pencil). 2ndly, the formation of the Marhatta and Mysore horse ought to be as I have marked in pencil. 3rdly, our left, when we formed and advanced, was nearer the Kaitna; and the 74th was not in an *échelon*, as represented in the plan. 4thly, the enemy had more than one line of infantry.

N.B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 25th Sept. 1803.

You will be surprised to see, in my report to the Governor General, that we have taken 90 pieces of cannon, instead of 60, as I told you. The fact is, that I counted 67 myself, on the morning of the 24th; I was not certain that I was correct; but now I believe that we have taken nearer 100 than 90 pieces. I know that we have got 70 brass guns and howitzers, and above 20 iron. I intend to destroy the latter, and to send the former first to Dowlutabad, and then to Ahmednuggur.

The enemy are down the ghauts in great consternation. Col. Stevenson follows them to-morrow. I must halt till I can get back my doolies, after placing the sick in Dowlutabad. Your brother's wound is doing well. He will not be obliged to quit the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 25th Sept. 1803.

You will readily believe that I have much to do at present, and therefore I hope you will pardon the liberty I take in sending you the copy of my report to the Governor General, containing the details of the action of the 23rd, instead of writing a particular one through the Adj. Gen. of the army. The wounded are, in general, doing well. Many soldiers will, I am afraid, be disabled; but, on the other hand, many will immediately be again fit for service.

I have appointed Capt. Young to Capt. Mackay's office; and I propose to appoint Major Robertson to Capt. Young's. In the mean time, I shall put some steady officer in charge of Major Robertson's department. I shall be much obliged to you if you will desire Major Robertson to join

* The plan, corrected agreeably to this suggestion, is to be found in the Appendix to the Marhatta War.

G. M. O.

Camp at Assye, 25th Sept. 1803.

The agent for public cattle will purchase all the draught bullocks, at 3½ clock this afternoon, which have been secured by commanding officers of corps, agreeably to the orders of yesterday, at the rate of 6 star pagodas each; they are to be sent down to the karkhana at the above hour; and all such cattle as may be found hereafter with Scindiah's mark upon them will be seized and applied to the public service without payment.

G. A. O.

25th Sept. 1803.

Half allowance of salt to be issued to the Europeans till further orders, and money to be paid in lieu of the other.

me as soon as he can. I hope I shall be able to purchase horses to remount the cavalry. Col. Stevenson has joined me in order to assist in placing my wounded and the captured ordnance in a place of security.

P.S. I find that we have got 90 guns instead of 60, as I imagined when I wrote to you yesterday: 67 of them are brass, the remainder iron.*

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Assye, 25th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a packet of papers which I have received from Lieut. Procter, the Fort adjutant of Surat. I beg that you will let him know that I cannot receive any letter from him, unless sent through his commanding officer; and, at all events, I cannot order a Court Martial to assemble for the trial of an officer for conduct at his (Lieut. Procter's) trial, the proceedings of which have been approved of by the Commander in Chief at Bombay. It appears to me that Lieut. Procter is of a very litigious disposition, and a very improper person to fill the situation of Fort adjutant at Surat. If you should be of this opinion, I request you to report it to the government of Bombay, and recommend that another officer may be appointed.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 26th Sept. 1803.

Col. Close will have informed you of our victory on the 23rd. Our loss has been very severe; but we have got more than 90 guns, 70 of which are the finest brass ordnance I have ever seen. The enemy, in great consternation, are gone down the ghauts; Stevenson follows them to-morrow. I am obliged to halt, to move my wounded to Dowlutabad. It is reported that Jadoon Rao is missing. They say that Scindiah and Ragojee are stupified by their defeat. They don't know what to do, and reproach each other. Their baggage was plundered by their own people, and many of their troops are gone off.

I return your letter. I send Mr. Duncan this day a copy of my letter to the Governor General, in which you will see a detail of the action.

The bay horse was shot under me, and Diomed was piked, so that I am not now sufficiently mounted. Will you let me have the grey Arab? I must also request you to get for me two good saddles and bridles.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Assye, 26th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 18th, so that the missing tappall is come in. In consequence of what you say respecting your strength at Poonah, and of Scindiah's defeat, I shall call back one of the battalions which I had sent away. You will therefore have only one.

I do not think any thing with cannon will venture near us again. I believe we have taken 100 pieces of ordnance. They have gone down the ghauts: Jadoon Rao is said to be missing. I shall be obliged to send my wounded, and the captured guns, to Dowlutabad. I have got about 1000 of the enemy's draught bullocks, by means of which I hope to be able to move all the latter to Ahmednuggur. I intend to destroy all the iron

* See another letter on the battle of Assye to Lieut. Col. Munro, 1st Nov. 1803, p. 820.

guns. Col. Stevenson follows the enemy, while I remain here waiting for the return of the doolies and bullocks from Aurungabad.

I enclose the account of the capture of Baroach.*

To Lieut. Col. Griffin.

Camp at Assye, 26th Sept. 1803.

Upon the receipt of this letter, I request you to detach from under your orders the 1st batt. 3rd regt., and ordnance and artillerymen attached to that corps, including the tumbril with the 6 pounder ammunition, and that you will allow Capt. Vesey to proceed according to instructions which are enclosed.

You are to proceed to Poonah with the 2nd batt. 18th regt., and the ordnance and artillerymen attached, according to the orders which you have heretofore received.

To Capt. Vesey.

Camp at Assye, 26th Sept. 1803.

The corps under your command, with the ordnance and artillerymen attached thereto, are to return to join the army.

If this letter should reach you at Ahmednuggur, you will take charge of a convoy which I ordered to march from thence under charge of a detachment of the 2nd of the 3rd; and you will proceed with that convoy in the manner pointed out in the instructions for the officer commanding it, which will be given to you by the officer commanding at Ahmednuggur. You will also be joined by the companies of the 2nd of the 3rd, which I intend should hereafter form Capt. Baynes's detachment.

If this letter should reach you after you shall have passed Ahmednuggur, you must return to that place without loss of time. If the convoy should not have marched, you are to take charge of it according to the instructions contained in the preceding paragraph. If it has marched, you are to follow it; and if you should overtake it, you are to take charge of it. You are to leave at Ahmednuggur the guns attached to your corps, as there will be guns with the detachment of the 2nd of the 3rd, with the convoy which will be hereafter attached to your corps. You will receive further orders at Goondy, on the Godavery.

I request you to indent for 10 days' rice for your battalion on the stores at Ahmednuggur, and to give your abstracts, and receive the pay of your battalion from the Paymaster at that station.

To the Officer comm. at Ahmednuggur.

Camp at Assye, 26th Sept. 1803.

I beg you to peruse the enclosed letters, and deliver them to Col. Griffin, if he should have arrived at Ahmednuggur; or send them after him with all expedition, if he should have marched on to Poonah. If Col. Griffin should be at Ahmednuggur, or should not have reached that place when you receive this letter, Capt. Vesey, with his battalion, will take charge of the convoy which you were directed to send to Goondy on the

* See page 700.

G. O.

Camp at Assye, 26th Sept. 1803.

A salute of 21 guns to be fired in the park this evening on account of the Dussarali feast.

Godavery, under charge of a detachment of the 2nd batt. of the 3rd. In that case, you are to detach 3 companies of the 2nd of the 3rd from the garrison under your command, which detachment will not return to Ahmednuggur for some time. If Col. Griffin should have passed Ahmednuggur, and you should have reason to believe that Capt. Vesey will be able to return speedily, and the convoy should not have marched, you will desire them to halt till Capt. Vesey shall return; and you will dispatch them under his orders, with 3 companies of the 2nd batt. of the 3rd regt.

If the convoy should have marched, you will allow them to proceed on their route; but they will return to Ahmednuggur, excepting 3 companies of the 2nd batt. of the 3rd, as soon as they shall be joined by Capt. Vesey. The Mysore horse and peons, with treasure, are to proceed with the convoy under Capt. Vesey's command.

I attacked the enemy's army with my division at this place, on the 23rd, and defeated them, having taken 90 pieces of cannon. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the garrison under your command will be in security, notwithstanding this large permanent detachment from it.

P.S. You will give Capt. Vesey the instructions sent to you for the conduct of the convoy. In case the convoy should have marched before Capt. Vesey shall return to Ahmednuggur, he will send his guns into that place; as, upon referring to your instructions, I observe that you were ordered to detach only three companies with the convoy, and the guns might not return alone in safety.

Answers to Queries from Capt. Marriott, at Mysore.

Assye, 26th Sept. 1803.

1. It is my opinion that the pensions allotted to the Princes ought to be continued to their families in the following manner:

One half of the pension of each ought to be allotted to the support of his mahal; and this half ought to fall to the Company as soon as there should be no longer any woman in the mahal to be supported, in the same manner as the sum now allotted to the support of Tippoo's mahal will fall to the Company.

Care ought to be taken that, after the death of any of the Princes, no woman should be introduced into his mahal. The other half of the pension ought to be allotted to his children, to be divided among them in equal proportions, according to the mussulmann law.

The children ought to remain in the mahal to be supported and educated at the expense of the Company, till 15 years of age, at which period they ought to be removed from it, and their share of the father's pension allotted to them, together with a sum of money to set them out.

2. There ought to be no restriction whatever upon the Princes taking as many women, either as wives or concubines, as they may think proper. They cannot employ their money in a more harmless way; and the consideration of the future expense of the support of a few more women, after their death, is trifling. Let them marry whom they please. Their marriages with mussulmann families only create an additional number of dependents and poor connexions, and additional modes of spending their money.

3. It would be very proper to adopt this proposition.

4. The Princesses ought not to be allowed to marry. A mussulmann would found a pretension either to a large pension, or even to the government of Mysore, upon his connexion with one of Tippoo's daughters. It is as well to avoid this, and, therefore, these ladies must continue in their present state. They ought, however, to have any additional comfort or allowance which can make them happy, and reconcile them to their fate. I do not think the same objection will exist hereafter to allowing the Princes to marry their daughters to whomsoever they please.

5. In respect to the women of the mahals of Hyder Aly Khan and Tippoo Sultaun, I think that those of the higher classes should have their shawls, and that the allowance recommended by Capt. Marriott should be extended to those who have not hitherto received it. This indulgence will not be expensive; and the whole establishment is so creditable to the Company's government, that a small expense ought not to be suffered to operate in preventing it being made as complete as circumstances will permit, and in reality a most comfortable provision for the objects of it. Besides, the greater indulgence shown to the women in the mahals at present, the more easy and comfortable will the Princes feel under the notion of leaving their families behind them under the care of the Company.

To Major Kunkpatrick.

Camp at Assyc, 27th Sept. 1803.

I am concerned to be under the necessity of making a formal complaint of any of the officers in the service of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, but, justice to the troops under my command, and to the service, the conduct of which is intrusted to me, obliges me to do so.

Some time ago, having observed that the city of Aurungabad was by no means in a state fit for defence, and as it was probable that the course of the operations of the war would draw the troops to a distance from it, I desired Col. Stevenson to remove the hospital to Dowlutabad, and to place the sick in the lower fort. Application was accordingly made to the killadar, in my name, by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to admit the hospital into the place proposed for them, and he positively refused to receive them.

Rajah Mohiput Ram has made a report upon the subject to the durbar, and possibly orders may be sent in consequence of this report. But I think it proper to mention the subject to you now, as the consequence of this refusal to admit the sick and wounded troops into Dowlutabad at present is, that I must either send them to Ahmednuggur, and thereby delay my operations for a month, or I must leave these brave men exposed in an open place to the violence and ferocity of a barbarous enemy. I have also with me above 70 pieces of brass ordnance, having destroyed the iron ordnance captured. These must likewise be sent to Ahmednuggur, or I must leave them exposed to be retaken in Aurungabad.

While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform you that I am by no means satisfied with Rajah Sookroodoor. He throws all kinds of difficulties in the way of my people sent into the districts under his management to purchase supplies of dry grain; he has not yet taken any steps whatever to collect the magazines which I requested him to prepare in different situations in the end of last month; and when I spoke

to him upon the subject, he sent me a paper which contains an account of the value of grain which he says the Soubahdar's government have laid in at different forts, no part of which, however, can be got for the service of the troops.

I have also to mention to you, that there is a man in charge of this part of the country, on the part of Rajah Ragotim Rao, by name, I believe, Anund Rao, whose conduct, if it were guided by Scindiah's ministers, could not be more inimical to us than it has been. It is reported that this man has fled with the enemy's army; and I sincerely hope that he will not return.

We may win battles, and may drive the enemy before us; but all that I can do will not save the Soubah's country from destruction, if his servants are not true to his cause, if they do not exert themselves in his service, if the British troops are not treated with confidence as friends, and if they do not enjoy the resources which the country can afford.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 27th Sept. 1803.

1. As nearly all the men who were wounded in the action between the British troops and the united armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, on the 23rd inst., were struck by cannon shot, and it is probable that some of them will be disabled entirely, it will be a great convenience if an early opportunity is taken of removing those of this description from the field hospital to Bombay. From hence the Europeans may be sent to England, and the Natives to the coast of Coromandel, as opportunities may offer.

2. I cannot at present say the number of cases of this description which there will be, but I think it almost certain that there will not be less than 100; neither can I state exactly the place at which I shall establish the hospital, on account of the difficulty of prevailing upon the killadars of the forts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan to receive our wounded soldiers, or the time at which the men will be sufficiently recovered to be moved without injury.

3. But I request you to have 100 doolies prepared to be sent off to such place as I may hereafter point out; and to have all the arrangements

G. O.

Camp at Assye, 27th Sept. 1803.

1. Officers commanding corps will prepare, as soon as circumstances will permit them, returns of their wounded men whom it is desirable to send to a field hospital.

2. How many of that number require dooley carriage, how many can go in carts, how many upon elephants, how many upon horses or bullocks, and how many can walk.

3. Numbers of wounded men who may be kept with the army, without detriment to them.

Major Gen. Wellesley wishes to have this return as soon as possible, in order that no time may be lost in making arrangements to send off the wounded men; and he requests that officers commanding Native corps will let Mr. Gilmour (superintending surgeon) have a note of the carriages they have got, so that it may be seen what quantity is available for the service.

The following alterations will take place to-morrow in the details for the infantry piquets, and continue until further orders. The 74th regt. is to be struck off the roster; the adjutant of the day to be furnished by a roster of corps, and the adjutant of the day in the brigade to be discontinued; 3 subaltern officers to mount piquet, to be furnished by a general roster; and the inlying piquets of each brigade to be under a subaltern officer of the brigade furnished by a roster.

made for procuring bearers for those doolies, so that no time may be lost in sending them from Bombay, when I may find it necessary to call for them.

4. I am greatly in want of medical assistants, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give orders that 6 assistant surgeons may be sent to Ahmednuggur without loss of time, to place themselves under my orders.

5. The cavalry lost many horses in the late action, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that as many as 400 may be purchased at Bombay to remount the cavalry. When purchased, I request that they may be sent under charge of a careful officer, and provided with proper attendants, to Ahmednuggur, where the officer will receive further orders from me.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 28th Sept. 1803.

I have received a letter from Mr. T. Pakenham, a writer on the Bengal establishment, respecting whom I am particularly interested. He is the son of Adm. Pakenham, a very old friend of Lord Wellesley and of mine. I believe him to be very young and inexperienced; I, therefore, most anxiously recommend him to your care and attention. I have also given him a letter of recommendation to my friend Mr. Ross, whom I have requested to have an eye upon his conduct, and, above all things, to prevent him from keeping bad company. Should the college last, of course he will attend that institution; if not, I have desired him to acquire a knowledge of the country languages. I request you to urge him particularly upon this point, and do not allow him to be idle. Desire him to show you the letter which I have written to him. Do not allow him to run in debt; if he should want money, I have desired him to apply to David Ross or you. Pray supply his wants, if he should require it, and apply to David Ross for any sums you may give him.

I have nothing new to tell you. The destruction of the enemy's army was almost complete. It is now said that they had in their camp 128 guns, of which number a few were at Scindiah's quarters, which, being in the cavalry camp, were not attacked. These few were taken off: they have lost the remainder, amounting to 120. Of these we have got about 100. The remainder are thrown into nullahs, and scattered along the road between this place and Adjunttee; and they will be destroyed by Col. Stevenson on his march in pursuit of the enemy. Their cavalry are dispersed in different directions, plundering each other and their own bazaar. There were not more than 200 of their infantry collected in their camp below the ghauts yesterday morning when they marched towards Burhampoor. It is said that they lost 1200 men killed; the wounded and dying are scattered throughout the country in all directions.

I give you the hircarrah reports. God knows whether they are true, but I believe they are.

The Nizam's servants are behaving ill, and I cannot get a place of security for my wounded soldiers. This delays my advance; but Col. Stevenson has gone after the enemy, and will push them with activity as far as possible.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 28th Sept. 1803.

I enclose a letter which I have received from the killadar of Dharore, in answer to one which I wrote to him, in which I remonstrated against his conduct to Major Hill, and requested that, when any of my troops or convoys should go near his fort, he would give them the protection they might require.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, to complain of the conduct of the Soubahdar's servants, another instance of their hostility has been communicated to me. The killadar or amildar of Budnapoor fired upon a detachment of British troops under Capt. Baynes, on his march to join me with a convoy. I attribute these repeated instances of hostility to a disaffection to the cause, and to our own forbearance. But they certainly require the notice of the Soubahdar's government; and if they are continued, I shall be reduced to the necessity of treating the country as an enemy's, or of withdrawing from it altogether.

At this moment I am in the greatest distress for the want of dry grain, because Rajah Sookroodoor will not permit the people in his districts to sell what they have got.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Assye, 28th Sept. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 21st and 23rd. In my opinion, the best arrangement will be to get the Ahmedabad farm into our hands, if we can defray the expense incurred for Goklah and Appah Dessaye: if we cannot do that, we must endeavor to get a mortgage upon it from the Peshwah, and to get the payments regularly from the Guickwar government; if that cannot be done, and the expenses of Goklah and Appah Dessaye are to fall eventually upon the Company, we must reckon their numbers among the 5000. In the mean time, you will do well to begin to raise men, but I must have plenty of money to pay them.

I think that Oolpar must be given to Vittell Seo Deo: it might be well, in so doing, to take from him an engagement that he would exchange it for an equivalent at the peace, if one could be found which would suit him. I doubt, however, whether he would enter into this engagement: if he would not, I recommend that he should have the district at all events.

Lord Wellesley has taken up the question of paying the Peshwah's ministers upon a great scale. The Peshwah is certainly sincere in his intentions to adhere to the alliance; but there is a crookedness in his policy, and the feelings of his mind are so far different from those which guide our conduct, that, with the best intentions, it must be expected we shall frequently clash. Besides, under the instructions from the Governor General, we have adopted measures in respect to Anrut Rao and Holkar,

G. O.

Camp at Assye, 28th Sept. 1803.

The regiments of cavalry will retain in the service all their horse keepers, grass cutters, and grain bullocks, although some may be supernumerary to their present number of horses, as measures will be taken for replacing the casualties among the horses without delay.

While the 78th regt. is employed with the detachment of the army, serving under the government of Fort St. George, the paymaster of the Bombay army will calculate their King's pay and subsistence in pounds, shillings, and pence; and the amount thereof is to be turned into star pagodas at the rate of 8s. the pagoda, without being previously turned into rupees, according to the custom which prevails at present.

which must be highly disagreeable to him, and might occasion a desire to alter the alliance. The Peshwah has no ministers. He is every thing himself, and every thing is little. In my opinion, therefore, we ought to pay those who are supposed to be and are called his ministers, not to keep the machine of government in motion, in consistence with the objects of the alliance, as we do at Hyderabad, but to have intelligence of what passes in the Peshwah's secret councils, in order that we may check him in time when it may be necessary.

The defeat of the enemy is most complete. Not half of their army is yet collected. They had not above 200 infantry when they marched yesterday morning from the bottom of the ghaut towards Burhampoor. They had 1200 men killed here, and the wounded and dying are in all parts of the country. I have 100 guns, and many more are on the road between this and Adjutee, which I have ordered Col Stevenson to destroy.

I am still much distressed for dry grains. The Nizam's aumils behave very ill, and his killadar of Dowlatabad refuses to receive our wounded, so that I have been obliged either to leave my brave fellows exposed in an open town, or to send them to Ahmednuggur, and to wait till I can get my doolies, &c., back again. Thus are all our best plans thwarted, and yet these are the best of our allies!!!

Amrut Rao's vakeel is here. I have not yet conversed with him, but I will do so this day: I shall speak to him upon the subject of his troops in the Konkan.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 28th Sept. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th inst., in which you have enclosed certain papers regarding property captured at Baroach, upon which the Hon. the Governor in Council has desired to receive any observations that I may have to make. As the commanding officer of the troops employed at the siege of Baroach acted upon that occasion under my immediate orders, I consider that I have a claim to a proportion of any benefit that may accrue to those troops from the capture of that place. As a party in the case, therefore, my opinion can have little weight, and I beg leave to decline giving it.

The Governor General is the superior power in this country on the part of the King and the Hon. Company; and I beg leave to recommend to the Hon. the Governor in Council, that he should require from Lieut. Col. Woodington such further information regarding the property in question as may appear to be necessary; particularly whether any steps had been taken by the enemy to secure it, or whether it was in such a situation with respect to Baroach, as that it could not be brought away by the British merchants, so long as the fort remained in the hands of the enemy; and that he should then refer the case for the opinion of his Excellency. In the mean time the property ought to be disposed of, in such a manner as that the owners, or the captors, supposing that the law shall allow the Governor General to give it to them, will not be losers.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp at Assye, 28th Sept. 1803.

I wish that the troops may not be sent out of the garrison of Ahmed-

nuggur, excepting in a case of emergency, such as if one of the tannahs should be attacked by a force which your horse are not equal to; or if one of the convoys coming from Poonah, or going to the army, should be pressed. Lieut. Lister's retreat has not been very handsome, and might have been fatal.

The peace of your districts must be kept by your horse and peons. Let the former be raised as soon as possible, and you will then be secure. These rascals will be quiet enough, now that we have settled their principals in this quarter. Our victory has been very complete, and the enemy are all gone to Burhampoor.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 28th Sept. 1803.

I return your letters, and send you a letter from Webbe. Our victory of the 23rd has been very complete. The enemy lost 1200 men killed, and their wounded and dying are on all parts of the road from hence to Adjuttee. They marched yesterday morning from the bottom of the ghaut towards Burhampoor: they had not then 200 infantry in camp, and their cavalry is dispersed over the country. They have plundered their own baggage and bazaars; and the Bheels in the ghaut have cut up vast numbers of them. Col. Stevenson is gone after them.

I am tied by the heels by the necessity of sending away my doolies with my wounded men. The Nizam's killadar would not allow me to put the wounded into Dowlutabad; and the consequence will be, that I shall be either obliged to send them to Ahmednuggur, and wait a month for the return of the doolies; or to leave them in the almost open town of Aurungabad. The Nizam's people have behaved very ill in every respect: there is nothing but counteraction on their part.

As the enemy have still several brigades undefeated, I almost doubt the propriety of the expedition into Berar, by one of our divisions only. Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own; and they and their equipments far surpass Tippoo's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I much doubted at one time whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably: the sepoys astonished me.

These circumstances, and the vast loss which I sustained, make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless we have something nearer an equality of numbers. However, the expedition into Berar may go on; but I must keep up with it, in order to cover the siege of Gawilghur, and th.† both our divisions may join, in case they should bring down another corps of infantry.

I have called back the 1st of the 3rd. Poonah is now in no danger. I hope that you are getting well, and that I shall soon see you. There are strong reports in the enemy's camp that they are disposed to make peace.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 28th Sept. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22nd inst., with which you have enclosed the copy of one from Major Walker, upon the subject of the mode in which he proposes to take possession of, and

manage the districts belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Guzerat. That mode appears to me to be very judicious; and I am decidedly of opinion that it is of much more importance to secure the tranquillity of the country, and its resources, for the use of the troops in the field at this moment, by increasing the sebundy, than to attempt to draw a large revenue from the districts.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

28th Sept. 1803.

I have communicated your letter of the 23rd inst. to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley. He desires that you will take the opportunity of the first convoy leaving Ahmednuggur, under a European officer, after the receipt of this letter, to send the recovered men, of all the corps in camp, to join. The Europeans must have provisions sent along with them, and the Natives must have as many days' grain, at half-allowance, as they can conveniently carry.

The General does not imagine that Capt. Vaughan, or any one else, could entertain a thought of his proceeding to Dharore, after the receipt of the order at Ahmednuggur for a subsequent tandah of brinjaries being sent straight on to the Godavery; and he expects that Capt. Vaughan will proceed with the convoy to Rackisbaum (or Goondy), as it had not been deemed safe for him to march, according to former instructions, before the orders were received for that convoy.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 29th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a list of officers, whose horses have been killed under them in the action of the 23rd Sept., exclusive of those of the cavalry, respecting whom there is a regulation. Upon this subject I have to observe, that Lord Cornwallis paid the officers commanding brigades and regiments, and the general, brigade, and regimental staff, for their horses when lost in his battles; and it appears reasonable that those officers should be paid for their horses who were obliged to be mounted under the regulations of the service, and who, indeed, cannot otherwise do their duty.

The case of Lieut. Fraser, of the 2nd of the 10th, is very particular. The adjutant of that corps was adjutant of the day, and on duty with the advanced piquets, with which he lost his horse. Lieut. Fraser was officer of the day, and did the duty of adjutant with the battalion, according to

G. O.

Camp at Assye, 29th Sept. 1803.

Returns of the horses belonging to the field and staff officers, exclusive of cavalry officers, which were killed at the battle of Assye on the 23rd instant, to be sent in by Brigadiers to the D. A. G. this afternoon.

A field hospital to be established at Adjuntee. The superintending surgeon will allot the doolies in camp to carry 297 wounded men on the day after to-morrow, in the morning. The men to be sent must be those to whom the least injury will be done by being moved. One bandy belonging to the 4th Native cavalry, 3 belonging to the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 4 to the 1st batt. 10th regt., will carry away as many wounded men belonging to their corps respectively as they can take. Three bandies belonging to the 1st batt. 2nd regt. will carry away as many wounded men as they can take of the 2nd batt. 12th regt.; 22 bullocks belonging to the 1st batt. 10th regt. are to carry 22 men of the 1st batt. 8th regt.; 20 bullocks of the 2nd batt. 12th regt. to carry 20 men of that corps; 10 bullocks of the 1st batt. 4th regt. to carry 10 men of that corps; and 8 bullocks of the pioneers to carry 8 men of that corps. All the wounded men of the different corps who can walk are to accompany the first detachment.

Money to be taken upon receipts from the paymaster, and all the wounded men to be paid up for this month in the course of to-morrow; and the requisite rolls of them by corps and certificates to be prepared and held in readiness to be sent to the officer who is to take charge of the wounded men.

the rules of the service, and was mounted, and he lost his horse. Upon the whole, considering the precedent in Lord Cornwallis's war, that, in fact, the rules of the service and their duty require that certain officers should be mounted, as well as those of the cavalry; and that no body of troops, or of officers, can deserve the favor of government more than these for their gallantry in this last action, I hope that you will be so kind as to recommend that they may be paid for their lost horses, in the same manner as the officers of the cavalry.

Our victory has been very complete. The enemy have gone down the ghauts. The troops plundered their own baggage and bazaar, and have dispersed in different directions. They had 1200 men killed in the action; and their wounded and dying are in all parts of the country. We have got 76 brass guns, and have burst 26 iron, making, in all, 102. I believe their loss amounts to 120, which they have left in different parts of the road, and all their ammunition tumbrils. I really believe it was one of the most furious battles that has ever been fought in this country.

We have taken 7 stands of colors, which I have sent off to Ahmednuggur.

I shall have to send 700 men to the hospital which I must establish at Adjuttee, upon the extreme frontier, as the Nizam's killadar of Dowlutabad will not admit one sick or wounded into that place; and I must either put them into Adjuttee, or send them to Ahmednuggur, which will delay my operations at least for a month. At the same time, to place the sick at Adjuttee is very inconvenient. Col. Stevenson, who has gone down the Adjuttee ghaut, says that it is a place of security; but I am much afraid that, if we should move to a distance from it, the wounded may be exposed. But owing to the obstinacy of the killadar of Dowlutabad, I can do nothing better for them without great inconvenience.

I hope I shall be able to send some of the captured guns to Ahmednuggur, as I have got a great number of the enemy's bullocks. The carriages of a few are so much destroyed by our shot, as to render it necessary to move them upon our own to Adjuttee; and carriages must be sent for them from Ahmednuggur to bring them down. I have bought some horses to remount the cavalry, and I hope to get more. But considering that we want money, that we have the campaign before us, and that 6 regiments are to be supplied, I have written to Mr. Duncan to request that he would give orders that 400 horses might be purchased and sent to Ahmednuggur.

I have ordered the 1st of the 3rd to join the army, which will make up my losses of Native infantry. I wish I could say as much for my Europeans. However, they are, in general, doing well, and I hope still that some of them will be fit for service. As the disabled men recover, whether Natives or Europeans, I intend to send them down to Bombay; and to request Mr. Duncan to send them to the coast of Coromandel by sea, as opportunities may offer. I have already arranged to have doolies sent from Bombay to receive them.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 29th Sept. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th.

2. Since the commencement of the war with the northern Marhatta Chiefs, every hircarra who has come in from the enemy's camp, every intelligencer who has written news, has stated that Rajah Sookroodoor was in communication with the enemy; and the vakeels and Mysore and Marhatta Chiefs not connected with that person (for many of the latter are connected with him) have repeatedly advised me to put Col. Stevenson on his guard, in order that the public interests might not suffer from his defection.

3. Although there was no proof of Rajah Sookroodoor's treachery, I did apprise Col. Stevenson of the reports, and desired him to watch Rajah Sookroodoor closely; and I am clearly of opinion that Col. Stevenson would not have done his duty, if he had suffered him to quit his camp with his troops at that moment, under the pretence of escorting grain, particularly as those troops, having been in the service of Nizam Nawaz Jung, are by no means free from suspicion of being disaffected towards the government of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

4. I have besides to observe, that although there is no positive proof that Rajah Sookroodoor was in correspondence with the enemy, there are unanswerable proofs, not only that he has omitted to supply the British armies with the resources of the country, but that he has taken measures to prevent them from procuring them: in which he has done, and may do, more mischief than if he were to go off to the enemy with his troops.

5. Notwithstanding these reports, and this conduct, I do not believe that Col. Stevenson put any restraint on the person of Rajah Sookroodoor. Col. Stevenson and I having resided together for some years, and having been in habits of intimacy, our communication is generally carried on by private notes or letters, in none of which he ever mentioned that circumstance. I reviewed his division at Budnapoor on the 21st, and on that day I recollect he told me that he had detained Rajah Sookroodoor, contrary to his inclination, when his troops had gone for the grain, and that he had pitched a small tent for him in the neighbourhood of his own: he added, that he had been strongly inclined to place a guard over him, but had refrained from that measure, not to create fears and jealousies among the troops. I am, therefore, induced to believe that the story told by Rajah Sookroodoor's brother is, at least, considerably exaggerated.

6. While writing upon this subject, it is necessary that I should advert to the situation of Col. Stevenson and myself in respect to the sirdars in the service of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

7. It would be very agreeable to me, and would be, by far, the best arrangement, if a person were appointed by the Soubahdar, and vested with full powers to control all his killadars, amildars, sirdars, &c. He might reside either with Col. Stevenson or me, as might be most convenient; but if his Highness cannot find a subject whom he can trust with such power, or if he will not move up to the army himself, he must expect either that Col. Stevenson or I will use the military power with which we are intrusted by the Company's government, to secure the public interests, rather than they should suffer by the delay which must attend a reference to Hyderabad upon every subject of complaint.

8. The powers which I hold from the Nizam's government are entirely nugatory; not a man in the country pays the smallest attention to them. The letter which I sent you yesterday from the killadar of Dharore shows that it is thought necessary by that person to make a reference to Hyderabad before he will comply with my request to give an asylum, under the guns of his fort, to a convoy coming up to the army, notwithstanding that with the request I sent him a copy of the Soubahdar's letter. The killadar of Dowlutabad also has refused to receive our sick and wounded into that fort.

9. Under these circumstances, I earnestly entreat that a native, with full powers over every body, may be appointed by the Soubahdar's government to reside in the army; and if that is objected to, I beg that you will apprise the Soubahdar's ministers, that in cases which, from their urgency, cannot wait for a reference to Hyderabad, they must expect that Col. Stevenson and I will use the power which we have in our hands for the security of the public interests.

10. I observe in the 6th paragraph of your dispatch to his Excellency the Governor General, that the Soubahdar's minister complains of the loss of revenue by this Marhatta warfare. In case this complaint should be brought forward again, it may be proper to inform them, that, in fact, the enemy have not been with the main body of their troops at all in the Soubahdar's country, excepting for a few days at Purtoor, in the jaghire of Soubahan Khan, and their pindarries have done but little mischief. Since they ascended the ghauts, they have been generally in Jalnapoor, or other districts to the northward, belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

11. They may possibly allude to the loss sustained by the plunder of Aurungabad in April last, by Jeswunt Rao Holkar. But I cannot think that that loss can be attributed to the war, particularly as I believe it is strongly suspected it was occasioned by the treachery and misconduct of the person in charge of the city and district.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 30th Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose an account of the ordnance taken from the enemy in the action of the 23rd inst.* I have reason to believe that there

* A Return of Ordnance of different calibres, taken from the enemy in the battle of the 23rd Sept. 1803.

Camp, 29th Sept. 1803.

Brass howitzers.	Brass guns.	Iron guns.	Total.
7	69	22	98

The number of tumbrils, and quantity of ammunition and stores, taken, cannot be ascertained, as, after the action, and during the night, a great number of the tumbrils were blown up.

G. O. G. G.

Fort William, 30th Oct. 1803.

The Governor General in Council has this day received from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley the official report of the signal and splendid victory obtained by the troops under the personal command of that distinguished officer, on the 23rd Sept., at Assye in the Deccan, over the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success and glory in every quarter of India, this transcendent victory demands a testimony of public honor, equal to any which the justice of the British government in India has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

The

are still 4 more guns, which were thrown into the river by the enemy in their retreat. We have taken 7 stand of colors, and the enemy lost all

The Governor General in Council highly approves the skilful plan formed by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley on the 21st Sept. for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action. His Excellency in Council also signifies his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment with which Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23rd Sept. During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled and never surpassed.

The Governor General in Council signifies his warmest applause of the exemplary order and steadiness with which the troops advanced, under a most destructive fire, against a body of the enemy's infantry considerably superior in number, and determined to oppose a vigorous resistance to our attack. The numerous infantry of the enemy were driven from their powerful artillery at the point of the bayonet, with an alacrity and resolution truly worthy of British soldiers; and the firmness and discipline manifested by our bare infantry, in repelling the great body of the enemy's cavalry, merit the highest commendation.

The Governor General in Council has remarked, with great satisfaction, the gallant and skilful conduct of the cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Maxwell, and particularly of H. M.'s 19th regt. of light dragoons, a corps distinguished by a long and uninterrupted course of arduous service, and of progressive honor.

His Excellency in Council directs Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley to signify to all the officers and troops employed on this glorious occasion, and especially to Lieut. Col. Harness and to Lieut. Col. Wallace, who commanded brigades, and to the officers of the staff, the high sense entertained by the Governor General in Council of their eminent and honorable services.

The important benefits arising from the triumph of our arms in the battle of Assye are not inferior to the splendor of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate Chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of a hostile and predatory army from the territory of our ally, the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the enemy.

The prosperous result of these advantages must be accelerated by the auspicious progress of our arms in other provinces of India, and it may reasonably be expected that the decisive victories gained at Delhi and Assye, on the 11th and 23rd Sept., will speedily compel the enemy to restore peace to Hindustan and to the Deccan.

The achievements of our commanders, officers, and troops, during this campaign, and especially in the signal victories of Delhi and of Assye, must inspire a general sentiment of just confidence in the vigor of our military resources, and in the stability of our dominion and power. Our uniform success in frustrating every advantage of superior numbers, of powerful artillery, and even of obstinate resistance opposed by the enemy, constitutes a satisfactory proof of the established superiority of British discipline, experience, and valor; and demonstrates that the glorious progress of our arms is not the accidental result of a temporary or transient advantage, but the natural and certain effect of a permanent cause.

From these reflections, consolation is to be derived for the loss of those lamented and honored officers and soldiers, who, animated by the gallant spirit of their General, and emulating the noble example of his zeal and courage, sacrificed their lives to the honor and interests of their country.

The Governor General in Council greatly regrets the loss of Lieut. Col. Maxwell, of H. M.'s 19th dragoons, who fell at the head of the British cavalry, bravely chasing a large body of the enemy's infantry. With the utmost concern his Excellency in Council records the names of the valuable and excellent officers who have fallen with glory at the battle of Assye, in achieving the complete defeat of the enemy, and in establishing the triumph of the British arms in the Deccan: Lieut. Col. Maxwell; Capts. R. Boyle, H. Mackay, D. Aytone, A. Dyce, R. Macleod, and T. Maxwell; Capt.-Lieuts. Steele and Fowler; Lieuts. Bonomi, Griffith, J. Campbell, J. M. Campbell, J. Grant, R. Neilson, L. Campbell, M. Morris, and J. Douglas; Lieuts. Brown, Mayor, Perrie, and Volunteer Tew (a). In testimony of the high honor acquired by the army under the personal command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, at the battle of Assye, the Governor General in Council is

(a) Mr. Tew had been recommended by Major Gen. Wellesley to the Commander in Chief, for his conduct at Ahmednuggur.—See *Letter to Gen. Lake, 17th Aug. 1803*, p. 640.

their ammunition, although, the tumbrils having blown up, some during the preceding night, we have got nothing but the shot. The ordnance

is pleased to order, that honorary colors, with a device properly suited to commemorate that signal and splendid victory, be presented to the corps of cavalry and infantry employed on that glorious occasion. The names of the brave officers and men who fell at the battle of Assye will be commemorated, together with the circumstances of the action, upon the public monument to be erected at Fort William, to the memory of those who have fallen in the public service during the present campaign. The honorary colors granted by these orders to H. M.'s 19th regt. of dragoons, and to the 74th and 78th regts. of foot, are to be used by those corps while they shall continue in India, or until His Majesty's most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, Captain General, and Commander in Chief of all the land forces serving in the East Indies, is pleased to direct, that these orders be publicly read to the troops under arms, at every station of the land forces in the East Indies, and that the European officers of the Native corps do cause the same to be explained to the Native officers and troops.

The Governor General to the Court of Directors.

Fort William, 31st Oct. 1803

52. A copy of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley's dispatch, containing the details of the most brilliant and important victory of Assye, is enclosed for your Hon. Committee's information, together with a copy of the G. O.s issued by the Governor General in Council on that memorable occasion. The Governor General in Council solicits the particular notice of your Hon. Committee, and of the Hon. Court of Directors, to the distinguished merits of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, and of the officers and troops under his command, in that extraordinary exertion of British discipline, valor, and skill.

53. The satisfaction with which the Governor General in Council contemplates the late rapid and glorious success of the British arms, in every direction in which they have been opposed to the enemy's forces, is augmented by the reflection, that, under the pressure of accumulated defeat, with aggravated loss of resources, power, reputation, military strength, and dominion, in every quarter of India, the confederate Chieftains must speedily be compelled to accede to such reasonable terms of pacification as shall sufficiently provide for the safety of our allies, for the future serenity of the Hon. Company's possessions, and for the permanent establishment of tranquillity in Hindustan and the Deccan.

56. The public duty of the Governor General in Council also demands a testimony of justice to the conduct of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. The attention of your Hon. Committee has already been solicited to the merits of Major Gen. Wellesley, in conducting the British troops from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah; in establishing his Highness the Peshwah upon the musnad; and in the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednugur. The conduct of Major Gen. Wellesley, in the exercise of the extensive political and military powers vested in him by the Governor General in Council, also deserves the highest approbation of your Hon. Committee, and of the Hon. Court of Directors.

57. At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success and glory, in every quarter of India, the transcendent victory obtained at Assye, in the Deccan, on the 23rd Sept., appeared to the Governor General in Council to demand a testimony of public honor equal to any which the justice of the British government in India has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

58. The Governor General in Council highly approved the skilful plan formed by Major Gen. Wellesley on the 21st Sept., for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action.

59. His Excellency in Council also signified his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment with which Major Gen. Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23rd Sept.

60. During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major Gen. Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled, and never surpassed.

61. The important benefits resulting from the triumph of our arms in the battle of Assye are not inferior to the splendor of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate Chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of a predatory and hostile army from the territory of our ally, the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the enemy.

62. Under these circumstances, the Governor General in Council is induced to recommend the conduct of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley to the particular approbation of the Hon. Court of Directors, and to the gracious notice of His Majesty.

is very fine; but I have destroyed the iron guns, and shall put the brass guns in a place of security.

The enemy lost 1200 men killed in the field of battle, and their wounded are scattered in all parts of the country. It is reported that Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's principal minister, received a wound, of which he died the day before yesterday. Their army is in the greatest confusion, and retiring to Burhampoor. Col. Stevenson has followed them down the Adjuttee ghaut, and I propose to descend the ghauts, as soon as I shall have placed the wounded soldiers in security.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 30th Sept. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd inst.
2. The enemy appear to be much alarmed, and are gone towards Burhampoor. It is probable that some time will elapse before they can equip another army for the invasion of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and indeed, that they will not be able to do so at all, if I can establish my wounded soldiers in a place of security at an early period. I therefore think that it would be advisable to send off the remaining 4 lacs of rupees to Dharore as soon as may be convenient.
3. I have perused your letter of the 21st Aug., and its enclosures. The hircarrahs from the enemy's camp report, and I believe it to be true, that Jadoon Rao died on the day before yesterday, of a wound that he received in the action of the 23rd. I had before heard that he was missing, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had sent persons to seek for his body in the field of battle.
4. If it be true that this man is dead, it is probable that Sirjee Rao Ghautky may regain his lost influence in Scindiah's durbar. At all events, it is very desirable that you should keep up a communication with him, not only with a view to that event, but because Sirjee Rao Ghautky has considerable influence over the Rajah of Sholapoor.
5. The territories of this chief are upon the Kistna, and the road by which I communicate with Mysore leads through them. It is therefore of importance to me, that he should remain at least in a state of neutrality. I have some means of controlling his actions, and I have but little doubt that he will not interfere in this contest; but it is as well to add to those means by keeping up our communication with Sirjee Rao Ghautky.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp, 30th Sept. 1803

I have the honor to enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by Lieut. Campbell,* of H. M.'s 78th regt. This officer is already known to you, and his claims upon the service, in consequence of the misfortunes of his family, have been acknowledged. I am concerned to say, that another instance of this misfortune occurred in the action of the 23rd inst. From the conduct of Lieut. Campbell at the attack of the pettah of Ahmednuggur, I was induced to appoint him to act as my Brigade Major; and since that time, and particularly in the action of the 23rd, he has conducted himself much to my satisfaction. He had 2 horses killed under

* Lieut. Gen. Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., &c.

him, and was struck himself in that action ; I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your favor.

Since I last addressed you, the enemy has continued their retreat in confusion and disorder towards Burhampoor, on the Taptee. Their loss has been very considerable in men, as well as in ordnance and ammunition. Among others, it is reported that Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's prime minister, and the principal negotiator and cement of the confederacy, died on the 28th, of wounds he received on the 23rd. Col. Stevenson has pursued them with his division. I am still detained by the difficulty of finding a place of security for my wounded soldiers.

To Lieut. Col. Munro.

Camp, 1st Oct. 1803.

I enclose a memorandum which I have received from Bistnapah Pundit, the commander of the Rajah of Mysore's horse, serving with me, relative to a claim which he has upon the Rajah of Harponelly. It appears that the Rajah gave him a village in enaum, which he has now taken from him ; Mr. Cochrane knew that the grant had been made, and confirmed it ; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will inquire into the circumstances, and let Bistnapah keep his village, if possible.

I entirely agree in the opinions expressed in your letter upon the subject of offensive and defensive war : however, I think that you are mistaken respecting the possibility of checking, by defensive measures, a predatory war, carried on by horse only ; indeed, I have done it already in

G. M. O.

Camp at Assye, 30th Sept. 1804.

The carpenters, smiths, and bellows boys, belonging to the corps of infantry in camp, to be sent to the park immediately with their tools, to be employed in making yokes and repairing them, &c., for the captured guns.

G. O.

30th Sept 1803.

The 1st batt. 10th regt. and 2nd batt. 12th regt. are to furnish each a dresser for the field hospital.

The staff surgeon is to furnish servants, European medicines, wine, and clothing, as far as the state of his stores will admit ; he is also authorised to purchase 10 dozens of Madena wine at the public expense : 20 pioneers to be employed under the surgeon with the field hospital.

The Native troops who will be sent to the field hospital are to continue to receive $\frac{1}{2}$ a seer of rice *per diem* each man, in the same manner as those in the field. The commissary of grain is to send down to Adjuttee 200 bags of rice for this purpose : he is also to send 200 bags of rice, 1600 sheep, 300 measures of salt, 400 gallons of arrack, into Adjuttee, to be handed over to the surgeon in charge for the use of the European sick. The men who are to set out for the field hospital to-morrow, under the orders of yesterday, are to march at daylight under an escort of 5 companies of the 2nd batt. 11th regt. with their guns. Each corps is to send tents for its sick into the field hospital, in the proportion of 1 tent for every 10 men. Officers commanding European corps will take care to give notice to the agent for public cattle of the number of elephants and camels they will require for this purpose.

The captured guns will be moved to-morrow, according to instructions which the commanding officer of artillery and commissary of stores have received. The commissary of stores will communicate with the agent for public cattle respecting the number of bullocks required to move them. Two companies 2nd batt. 11th regt. will march to-morrow morning, according to instructions which the commanding officer will receive. Two parties, of 50 pioneers each, to be in readiness to march to-morrow with the captured guns.

A guard of one Native commissioned officer and a detail of 10 N. I. to accompany the cattle when they go to graze daily until further orders, when an order is beat indicating a halt : the guard to proceed to the karkhana at daybreak ; and on marching days it is to proceed thither an hour after coming to the new ground.

this campaign. The fact is, that a predatory war is not to be carried on now as it was formerly. All the principal villages in the country are fortified (excepting in our happy country, in which our wise men have found out that fortifications are of no use); a few peons keep the horse out; and it is consequently necessary that they should have a camp and a bazaar to resort to for subsistence, in which every thing they get is very dear; besides, this necessity of seeking subsistence in the camp prevents them from extending their excursions so far as they ought, to do any material injury.

The camp, on the resources of which an army of this kind must subsist must be rather heavy: besides, there are great personages in it. They must have tents, elephants, and other sewary; and must have with them a sufficient body of troops to guard their persons. The number of cavalry retained in such a camp must consequently be very large.

Large bodies move slowly, and it is not difficult to gain intelligence of their motions. A few rapid and well combined movements, made not directly upon them, but with a view to prevent the execution of any favourite design, or its mischievous consequences, soon bring them to their bearings: they stop, look about them, begin to feel restless, and are obliged to go off. In this manner I lately stopped the march of the enemy upon Hyderabad, which they certainly intended: they were obliged to return, and bring up and join their infantry; and you will have heard that, in a most furious action which I had with their whole army, with one division only, on the 23rd Sept., I completely defeated them, taking about 100 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, &c. They fled in the greatest confusion to Burhampoor. Take my word for it, that a body of light troops will not act, unless supported by a heavy body that will fight; and what is more, they cannot act, because they cannot subsist in the greater part of India at the present day.

It is reported that Gen. Lake has defeated Perron. After that, he will of course open a communication with the Rajpoot chiefs, and will move into Berar. I have designs upon that quarter also. The only difficulty I feel now is the entire want of magazines in the Rajah's territories, but I shall surmount that difficulty. I wish that I could have you with me; but I see no mode of effecting that object.

G. O.

Camp at Assye, 1st Oct. 1803.

Officers commanding corps of infantry are requested to cause inquiry to be made throughout their lines for accoutrements, arms, or horses' appointments belonging to the cavalry, and to send such as may be found to head quarters.

As all the patients sent to the field hospital at Adjunttee are wounded men, and the officers also are wounded who are ordered to take charge of them, they are each to be allowed a writer at 10 pagodas a month for keeping the accounts (one officer appointed for the Europeans, another for the Natives).

Memorandum.

Any returns of horses killed in the battle of the 23rd, which were omitted to be sent in on the 29th, will be received this afternoon.

G. A. O.

1st Oct. 1803.

A squadron of Native cavalry to join the elephant and camel forage guard as it passes the left of the line, at sunrise to-morrow morning, as the cattle are going a considerable distance for forage.

P. S. We have taken Powanghur,* a strong hill fort belonging to Scindiah, in Guzerat.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 2nd Oct. 1803.

I am much distressed by the disaster which has happened to Lieut. Morgan, the extent of which was not known when Capt. Fisher wrote to me on the 29th. The sepoys must not be employed upon these light troop services; they are entirely unfit for them, particularly the corps at Ahmednuggur. I attribute this disaster to Lieut. Lister's retreat; and the consequence of another such will be, that we shall entirely lose our credit, and shall never be able to put our noses out of our garrison of Ahmednuggur without a battalion of infantry.

I wish you would raise your horse, and keep the peace of your district by means of them and your peons. If they are beaten, it is of no consequence. If the sepoys are beaten, although in such small bodies, we lose the opinion in our favor, which is our principal hold in this country. I have been obliged to order 3 companies from Ahmednuggur to escort the captured guns from Goondy, on the Godavery. It is necessary, therefore, that the company at Sogaum should be called in, at least, till the garrison is reinforced from Poonah. I have sent orders, accordingly, to Capt. Lucas, and I beg you to take measures to reinforce Sogaum with peons as soon as possible. It is not necessary that the company should wait till the peons shall arrive.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 2nd Oct. 1803.

Amrut Rao's vakeel has returned with a letter from his master, in which

* Lieut. Col. Woodington to the Officer commanding in Guzerat. Baroda, 21st Sept. 1803.

I have the honor to address you on the surrender of Powanghur by capitulation. After a breach had been effected in the wall of the inner fort, as also that another was almost practicable in a tower at the angle of the outer fort, the garrison offered to capitulate on the morning of the 17th, on condition of being protected in their persons and private property.

To these terms I agreed, on condition of immediately taking possession of the breach in the inner wall with a company of sepoys: they, however, tacked other stipulations to the capitulation, viz., that I should agree to pay them the arrears due from Scindiah, and that 2 of the commanders of the Guickwar cavalry with me (amounting to about 3000 horse) should sign the agreement. To these latter articles I would on no account agree; and it was not until 4 P.M., when they found, from our continuing to batter, that I would admit of no delay, that they agreed to the original terms, which were immediately carried into full effect by their evacuation of the fort and mountains, of which we took possession.

If this had not taken place, I had made the necessary arrangements for storming both breaches on the morning of the 18th, and I conceive that the garrison were intimidated from a knowledge, that, if they opposed us on our entering the breaches, their communication with the upper fort would be cut off, and they had no other way to escape than the road which led down by our battery. Could they have obtained possession of the upper fort or balla killa, at the top of the mountain, I am inclined to think it utterly impregnable.

I have left Capt. Cliffe of the Engineers to take a plan and view of the forts and works on the mountain, which, I doubt not, from his known abilities, will be ably executed. It is with the greatest pleasure that I embrace this opportunity of submitting for your notice the merits, zeal, and great exertions of all ranks on this service.

he consents to the treaty. The vakeel, however, has made a demand that means should be provided to pay 10,000 men, who are in Amrut Rao's service; or if that cannot be done, as Amrut Rao cannot remain in camp with a smaller force than his servant Goklah has, he should be permitted to go to Surat and reside there with his family. He proposes, in case he should be paid for the 10,000 men, to serve with the British army, and to send his family to Ahmednuggur: in case he should not, he will take his family with him. The object of this proposition is to get more money. The truth is that Amrut Rao has not half 10,000 men; but he wishes to be paid for that number without producing them at muster, and put the money in his pocket. Supposing that I were inclined to gratify him in this respect (and, in fact, provided I have the reputation of having 10,000 men, I think it but little important whether I have 5000 or 10,000), I really have not, and do not know how I can procure, the means of paying the money required. I have, therefore, written the memorandum of which I enclose a copy, which contains a summary of the arguments, demands, and answers brought forward on both sides on this question, and you will observe in this paper, that although Amrut Rao is deprived of all hope of touching more money, which is evidently his object, I have promised to take into pay the troops he has with him, without specifying numbers at all.

I have called upon the vakeel to give me the names of the sirdars, and the number of troops with each. I have told him that I shall muster them, and pay them according to the muster; and I intend that these 2000 or 3000 horse (and they are not more) shall be carried to account, as part of the 5000 to be paid by the British government, under the modification of the treaty of Bassein. I shall thus have 10,000 horse for the expense of paying 3000. As for Amrut Rao, it is certain that a great part of the object we had in view in bringing him in will fail, by his going away again to reside at Surat, or any other place excepting my camp. However, I do not think it will be any reason for breaking with him, or for resuming his allowance. In fact, till Amrut Rao and his party in the state are conciliated, and, in some degree, provided for, under the present arrangement of the Poonah government, the country will never settle, and we shall never have peace. By the pension to him, and by taking his followers into the Company's pay at present, we shall make a good stride towards a settlement. I think, however, that it would be better if I could keep Amrut Rao in camp, and I shall firmly resist the construction which he has put upon that article of the agreement; and before I allow him to depart, I shall insist upon our coming to a distinct understanding upon some points, on which there may be a difference. The first of them is to know what country he does and what he does not possess. I shall insist upon reckoning among his possessions, and carrying to account, the revenues of all the districts of which he keeps the tannahs. If he chooses to give up the tannahs to the Peshwah, the revenues of such districts will be made good to him.

The next is his forwarding the interests of the Company and the Peshwah. Upon this point I shall give in a memorial, in which I shall detail the particulars of his conduct towards the Peshwah, since he promised

me that he would cease all acts of hostility against him, and all communication with his enemies. I shall point out to him the relative situations of himself and his brother; and I shall inform him that a repetition of the acts carried on in his name, for the last 6 months, notwithstanding his promise in that letter, will be considered a breach of the engagement, and will absolve us from the necessity of performing our parts of it. After that I shall allow him to depart, with a stipulation, however, that he is to take into the Company's territories only a certain number of men, and that he is to conform to the laws of the place in which he may reside.

You will have observed by my subsequent letters, that I doubted the practicability of doing any thing with Canojee. But it would be very desirable to relieve the troops in Guzerat from the local war, and to carry them forward to offensive operations; particularly now that the enemy appear to intend to turn all their force upon Bengal.

My accounts are, that Holkar and all his army are north of the Nerbudda (they were so on the 22nd and 23rd), and that after the Dessarah he intended to move to the Rajpoot countries. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have gone off, in the greatest hurry and confusion, to Burham-poor. Col. Harcourt writes to me on the 15th, that he expected to leave Jaggernaut on the 17th, and to be at Cuttack on the 24th or 25th. I have sent off one detachment of sick and wounded, and I shall send another on the day after to-morrow, when the doolies return.

The D.A.G. to Officer comm. 2nd batt. 8th regt. N.I. Camp at Assye, 2nd Oct. 1803.

In consequence of various detachments being required from the garrison of Ahmednuggur, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has thought it necessary to reinforce it, at present, with 3 companies of the 2nd batt. 8th regt.; and he accordingly desires that you will, immediately on receipt of this letter, make such a detachment, and direct the officer commanding it, who must be junior to Capt. Lucas, to march without delay to Ahmednuggur, and place himself under the orders of the officer commanding there.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 3rd Oct. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 30th Sept., and I proceed to give answers to the several points to which it relates.

1stly, I do not see any reason why the British government should not assist the Peshwah in taking possession of Savanore, and this service shall certainly be performed at some time or other. Gen. Campbell's corps will be the proper body of troops to be employed upon it; and when the proper time comes, I will write a suggestion to Gen. Campbell upon the subject. But you know that this is the time when all the Marhatta armies take the field; and before I suggest to Gen. Campbell to move from

G O. •

3rd Oct. 1803.

A committee to assemble in the lines of the 78th regt., at 4 o'clock this afternoon, to survey the public camels, equipage, and the doolies in the use of that corps, to ascertain the repairs required, and to estimate the materials necessary for that purpose. The commissary of stores will have to execute those repairs agreeably to the report of the committee. (This committee to consist of the D. Q. M. G., and 2 quarter masters of corps.)

A committee to assemble at the park, at 5 o'clock this afternoon, to survey a quantity of military stores reported to be unserviceable, which will be laid before them by the commissary of stores. (The committee to consist of the commanding officer of artillery, and 2 officers of that corps.)

his present position, or to occupy his attention with any local subjects, I should wish to see what effect the victory of the 23rd Sept. will have upon the southern chiefs, what will be their probable occupation during the campaign, and particularly what line Holkar will take. In the mean time, the Peshwah may prepare for us a memorandum, stating what he wishes to have done, of what places he wishes to have possession, whom he wishes to appoint his soubah or amildar, and he might collect the troops necessary to take and keep possession of the districts for him. I beg, however, that he may be informed that I hope he will not forget Goklah's claim upon Noolgoond, &c., or Appah Dessaye's upon the two places granted him as serinjaumy.

2ndly, I will not mention to any body that Savanore is restored to the Peshwah's government.

3rdly, I wrote a letter to Malcolm the other day, that I sent to you, in which I stated an intention to entertain the horse now in Amrut Rao's service, as part of the 5000 horse to be paid by the Company. I conceive that the Peshwah can make no objection to this arrangement, as one horse-man must be the same to him as another. I have no objection to Vittell Seo Deo being the commander of this body of horse; but I conclude that he is to join this camp: I imagined it was the Peshwah's intention that that chief should command a body of horse, to be stationed in the neighbourhood of Poonah.

4thly, You are already in possession of my opinion respecting Oolpar. Vittell Seo Deo must have that district, and that immediately: but I think it would be very desirable to prevail upon him to engage to treat for an equivalent, to be given to him at the end of the war; or, at least, to enter into such engagements regarding the communication through his district, the passage of provisions, &c., to the town of Surat, as will make the cession as little inconvenient as possible to that town. I think that Mr. Duncan's proposal, respecting the possession of Panwell or Bassein, ought not to be made at present: it would only tend to create jealousy; and as Mr. Duncan would insist upon taking immediate possession, the cession would create a breeze in the Koukan, which would be very unpleasant at the present moment.

I enclose the list of the killed and wounded, which was forgotten.

While talking with the Peshwah and his ministers, about the four points contained in your letter, it might be proper to take that opportunity of pointing out to them the position in which his Highness has found himself from the exertions of the British troops, and the readiness which he saw we all had to improve his interests, and to forward them whenever it was consistent with other public objects. You might then throw in a word respecting Amrut Rao, and say how anxious I am respecting his reconciliation with his brother; from a thorough conviction that, till they should be reconciled, the Peshwah's government will not settle, and he will still be liable to be disturbed by the intrigues of the disaffected.

I mention this subject now, because, in a conversation I had yesterday with Amrut Rao's vakeel, he mentioned that Amrut Rao had possession of Poonadur, (the first time, by the bye, that he ever acknowledged that he had it,) and, in discoursing upon the advantages of the reconciliation to

all parties, he pointed out the great one it would be to the Peshwah to get this fort immediately, which, he remarked, I could take from him whenever I pleased. He said that Amrut Rao would give up this fort, if I wished it, provided the Peshwah would desist from his attacks upon Sungumnair, and would make some arrangement respecting a fort in the ghauts, to which they both have a claim.

It occurred to me, that the object of the discourse was to find out whether I would assist the Peshwah in taking Poonadur; and, as Amrut Rao is not yet come in, I thought it best to conceal my intentions on this subject. I therefore answered generally, that I must consider Amrut Rao in the light of a subject, and the Peshwah as his sovereign; that there were so many points of dispute between them, it was impossible for me to pretend to settle them, unless both parties were cordially inclined to be reconciled; that it was necessary that Amrut Rao, as the subject, should begin to show his dutiful inclinations by coming into the British camp, and by conducting himself in the manner he had engaged to do by treaty; that, after a time, I might possibly be able to reconcile the Peshwah, and that then all these questions would be easily decided, and settled for ever, under the guarantee of the British government. I think, however, that I shall be able to get the fort of Poonadur from Amrut Rao when he comes in. Indeed, I shall oblige him to give it up, now his vakeel has acknowledged that he has possession of it. But I think that the Peshwah might be induced to make some concession, in order to obtain immediately so great an object.

I wish that you would sound the ministers upon this point. I believe I omitted to mention to you, that it is reported in the enemy's camp that Jadoon Rao is dead of the wounds he received in the action of the 23rd Sept. He was missing for 2 or 3 days, was then brought in wounded, and is now reported to be dead.

P. S. I am tolerably supplied, although in a desert, in which the enemy have been so long. Some of Ragojee Bhoonslah's brinjaries have joined me, to the number of 1500 bullocks; 1000 more will be in to-morrow; and I have given cowle to 6000 who have promised to come in; they are at a distance of about 20 coss from hence. If I get them, I shall indeed be in very great style.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 3rd Oct. 1803.

I enclose a certificate of another horse lost by an officer acting as adjutant of the 1st of the 8th. The adjutant of this corps was sick absent. I have also to mention that Lieut. Davie was wounded.

The enemy have continued their retreat. It is reported that they have separated; but I am not quite certain that this report is well founded. If they have really separated, it is in consequence of some political difference; as, if their object had been to carry on distinct operations, they would have remained together, and would have detached forces to carry them into execution.

The first division of wounded are lodged in safety in the fort of Adjunttee. I wish that I had been able to have put them in a better place; but I can do nothing with the Nizam's killadars.

I have been lately well supplied, although in this desert and exhausted country. Some of Ragojee Bhoonslah's brinjarries, to the amount of 1500, have come in and sold their loads in camp; 1000 more are coming in to-morrow; and I have given cowle to 6000 more, who say they are only 20 coss distant. If I get these in, I shall be very easy about my supplies of dry grain; indeed, at all events, a detachment which I have formed under Capt. Baynes, and which plies between the Godavery and camp, will keep me free from want.

Capt. Beauman has applied to me to receive Brigadier's allowances, as commanding officer of artillery. Capt. Tomkins drew this allowance before; and I acknowledge that I am very anxious to give it to Capt. Beauman, as it is impossible for any officer to have done his duty better than he has. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether you have any objection. I also hope to receive your orders respecting the increase of the allowances of the officers in charge of departments with me, as they have now all the responsibility.

You will have observed that we have sustained a great loss in artillery, as well as in every other species of troops, and they cannot be so easily replaced. It occurs to me, that the best mode of reinforcing us will be to order forward immediately the detachment of artillery at Hyderabad; and to order those at Hyderabad to be relieved as soon as possible from the Mount, where I am happy to see that you have got a numerous body of artillery. It is true that, in the intermediate time between the march of the detachment from Hyderabad, and the arrival of the detachment from the Mount, the corps at Hyderabad will be without artillerymen. But I acknowledge that I think, under present circumstances, the corps at Hyderabad are not likely to want artillerymen for some time. If you should approve of this plan, may I request you will order that it may be carried into execution; and that the artillerymen who are at Hyderabad may march to Dharore, reporting their progress occasionally to me?

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 3rd Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 2nd; the intelligence it conveys is very interesting, but it is impossible at present to find out the real intentions of the Chiefs. I suspect that they are only laying out to forage in front of Burhampoor, while they shall re-equip their infantry. I was afraid at one time that they were all going, with Holkar, towards Bengal. Holkar is, I understand, with his whole army, north of the Nerbudda, and was on the point of marching towards the Rajpoot countries. It is possible that the two parties may have separated, either upon a difference of opinion, or in consequence of an intention to carry on operations separately.

At all events, you have done right to halt, till we see what their intentions are, and till my wounded are in security. Col. Lang lodged the first party of wounded in Adjutec yesterday, and the second party will go off on the day after to-morrow. After that I shall march. Cattle are more convenient and better food for the Europeans than sheep; and I recommend that you should have as many as you can get. I do not want any at present. I enclose a piece of news which I have received, respect-

ing which I have no doubt, although I have received no official confirmation of it.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp, 50 miles N. of Aurungabad, 3rd Oct. 1803.

I wrote to you on the 17th Sept., and since that time I have completely defeated the enemy, and have taken from them 98 pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, &c. I enclose a copy of my letter to the Governor General on this subject, which will give you an idea of the action.

I have little to add thereto, excepting to tell you, that Scindiah's French infantry were far better than Tippoo's, his artillery excellent, and his ordnance so good, and so well equipped, that it answers for our service. We never could use Tippoo's. Our loss is great, but the action, I believe, was the most severe that ever was fought in this country; and I believe such a quantity of cannon and such advantages have seldom been gained by any single victory in any part of the world.

The enemy had 1200 men killed on the field of battle, and I suppose about 4 times that number wounded. They plundered one another after the action, and many of their troops have deserted; the whole have fled to Burhampoor, about 80 miles from hence, in the greatest confusion.

I lost 2 horses. Diomed (Col. Aston's horse, who has carried me in so many campaigns) piked, and another horse shot under me. Almost all the staff had their horses either killed or wounded, or were struck in some place or other.

In the enclosed letter, I only report 90 pieces of cannon taken; but when I dispatched it, I did not know the extent of our gains. In fact, I believe we took 102, but we destroyed some, and there is a mistake respecting the number. I know there are 98.

Holkar has hitherto taken no part in the war, and I fancy that he will now remain neutral. I intend to move forward immediately. I have been detained hitherto by the difficulty of providing a secure place for my wounded soldiers; but I have got one at last. Col. Stevenson, with the Nizam's army, is pushing the enemy forward. I am well supplied with every thing. I have already got some of the enemy's supplies, and I have great hopes that I shall get more.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Young.

Camp at Assye, 3rd Oct. 1803.

In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, communicated by a letter from his secretary, under date of the 5th of April last, to the Commissary of grain and provisions (a certified copy whereof was transmitted by Major Robertson to you on the 4th of July), the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley authorises you to allow the bullock owners in the grain department a wastage, at the rate of one seer and a half of rice per bag per month, whether marching or stationary, for the month of July, in which you received the order, and in future. This authority is given upon Major Robertson's written application for it, although in possession of the Commander in Chief's own orders on the subject as above stated.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 4th Oct. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 3rd. I shall send orders to the hospital to receive the 12 men of the 94th regt.

The doolies returned this morning, and I shall move myself with the

2nd division of sick on the day after to-morrow. I must halt, however, on the 7th, in order to get up another supply by Capt. Baynes; and I shall then descend the ghaut. Col. Lang shall take on the doolies belonging to the 94th regt. The dooley boys did not get their provisions, but they appear well satisfied with the treatment they have received. I could not give to them, without also giving provisions to my own dooley boys; and that I could not do, as I have literally no dry grain, excepting what comes in from the country to the bazaar.

I shall send to Adjuttee 300 18-pounder shot; and I shall take on from hence 2000 12-pounder shot. I wish that you would send bullocks and gunny bags to Adjuttee to take on the 18-pounder shot. As we shall certainly have a siege at Asseerghur, and probably another at Gawilghur, it is absolutely necessary that we should have this shot. I shall also send a large quantity of 6-pounder shot to Adjuttee; but this may remain there, as neither of us, I believe, will want it. We ought to have 3 companies of infantry at Adjuttee, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give them from your corps. There is one company at Adjuttee belonging to Lang's battalion; but you might possibly find it more convenient to make up this garrison by detachments from different corps.

I have sent 5 companies of Col. Lang's corps to the Godavery with 40 of the captured guns. They will be back, I imagine, about the 7th.

In respect to the prize agency, I rather wish not at all to interfere in that matter, as I saw Gen. Harris in such a scrape with government formerly upon the subject of prize money, principally because he had authorised the appointment of prize agents, who, after all, have done more harm than good; and I know that government are punctilious, and very properly so, upon this subject of prize money.

When we took Ahmednuggur there was some property of which it was necessary to order the immediate disposal; and I ordered that Capt. Frazer of the 8th, and Capt. Fowler of the artillery, whom I understood that the officers intended to elect as their prize agents, should take charge and dispose of it. Capt. Fowler is dead, and Capt. Frazer is the only person now in charge. I have referred the question regarding this property to the Governor General; and I have recommended that he should take upon himself to give it to the troops as prize, as he did in the case of Seringapatam. I should conceive that the subsidiary force are as well entitled to share in the prize of Ahmednuggur, and in the guns taken at Assye, as the troops who were actually present; and I think that the Governor General will be of the same opinion. I do not think that their right can be made better by the appointment of prize agents, or that they will get any thing by paying those agents a part of their prize. It is my opinion, therefore, and also my wish, that no agent should be appointed* by the subsidiary force until something is taken of which an agent* can take charge; and then it will be easy to give orders that officers may state whom they wish to be appointed to take charge of any of the enemy's property that may be taken. In the mean time I shall most probably receive the Governor General's orders, regulating the whole question.

I think you have made a mistake respecting your star pagodas. In every place there must be some standard coin which regulates all others, the

nominal value of which must be fixed, and which in fact regulates all payments, &c. The star pagoda is a coin of the government of Fort St. George, and accordingly the pay of every individual under that government is regulated and counted by the number of star pagodas he receives.

It frequently happens that, in the bazaar, the star pagoda exchanges for 4 rupees, and at other times for not more than 3, and in my camp at present not 3. But when I have issued star pagodas as pay to the army, I have issued them uniformly as the Company's money, at the Company's rate of exchange. The rates of exchange of other coins may indeed be altered according to circumstances and situation; but I conceive that when we pay the troops in star pagodas, which is the Company's coin, we must give them no more than the number of star pagodas to which they are entitled by the orders of government, be the exchange what it may. This rule may appear hard upon some occasions, it is true; but the adherence to it is not half so inconvenient under any difficulties, as the departure from it would be in many instances which I could point out.

I wish you not to go too far forward. Your news about Holkar is very good, and I hope it is true.

The D.A.G. to the Officer commg., Ahmednuggur.

4th Oct. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has been informed by the resident at Poonah that 100 carriage bullocks, purchased on account of the Company, left Poonah on the 30th ult., laden with rice, consigned to Lieut. Carfrae, garrison storekeeper. The General desires that the rice may be taken into store, and 100 bags be filled with salt and sent on to camp upon the above bullocks.

If the detachment ordered to Goondy, to bring up the captured guns, has not marched when the bullocks arrive, they are to accompany it to Goondy, and are to be delivered over to the charge of the officer commanding there. If that detachment has marched, the salt must be sent on with a party of recovered Europeans and Natives, which are coming up from Poonah.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp, 5th Oct. 1803.

Col. Close has forwarded to me a copy of your letter to him of the 21st Sept., in which I observe that you are about to move towards the Kalahabootra ghaut. Long before this time you will have learned that the Nizam's territories are in no danger; the enemy who threatened them are entirely defeated, and have fled to the river Taptee.

It is possible also that Mr. Piele may have apprized you that the dewan of Mysore has received intelligence that the Putwurdun sirdars are collecting troops, and you may have been induced to return to the westward.

Even if Purneah's intelligence be correct, which I am inclined to doubt, I do not think that those sirdars are collecting troops with a view to disturb the Company's possessions. However, in my opinion, the western countries are more likely to be disturbed than the eastern; and, accordingly, I take the liberty of recommending that you should resume your position about Moodgul.

I have this day received a letter from Gen. Stuart, dated 22nd Sept., in answer to one which I wrote to him on the 8th; in which he states that he has reconsidered the question of the propriety of drawing your corps to Hyderabad, and he is entirely of opinion that it ought to make the western frontier its more immediate object. He will be more certain of this

opinion when he shall hear that the enemy's army, which threatened the Nizam's territories, was beaten on the 23rd Sept.

It is scarcely necessary that I should apologize for making this suggestion, and I am sure that you will attribute it to my wish for the general good; and you may be certain that I should not presume to make it, if I did not possess information of the enemy's movements, which it is not possible that you can have.

To Capt.-Lieut. Browne.

5th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 29th Sept., and I would with pleasure consent to your joining the army; but I wish that you would first complete all the carriages for the garrison of Ahmednuggur, and any other work that you may have in hand. I think it will also be desirable that the wheels which you have made for the carriages in this division should be forwarded to Ahmednuggur, where Capt. Fisher must keep them under cover from the effects of the sun. After that you might move to Ahmednuggur, and take the opportunity of the first convoy going to the Godavery, to proceed to Goondy, where there is a company of the 2nd of the 3rd; and thence you will have frequent opportunities of coming on with Capt. Baynes's detachment, which goes backwards and forwards with supplies between Goondy and the army. All our platform carts and bullocks ought to be brought away from Poonah to Ahmednuggur.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 5th Oct. 1803.

I enclose a letter from Henry, which I wish you to send by the first opportunity. If a ship should sail immediately, let the letter go by her, and let me know when the overland dispatch will go, that I may write by that opportunity.

A kind of proposal has come to negotiate. Ballojee Koonger and a Krooman have written to desire that Capt. Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram may be sent to Scindiah's camp to re-establish the old relations of peace. I have answered that I have nothing to propose to Scindiah, and therefore that it is not necessary that I should send an officer to him; but that, if he has any thing to propose to me, he may send a sirdar here, who will be received and treated well.

I hope to have the papers ready copied to send to Mr. Duncan tomorrow, when you will see them.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 5th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to inform you, that Amrut Rao's vakeel arrived in camp some days ago, bringing with him his employer's consent to abide by the treaty which I have made with him: at the same time, he brought forward a demand, that measures should be adopted to provide funds for the payment of 10,000 men, who were with Amrut Rao; and he intimated that Amrut Rao could not remain in camp, unless in the command of that number of men, to be paid by the British government.

I at first explained to the vakeel, that Amrut Rao, having omitted to join me according to the stipulation of the treaty, inserted at his (the

vakeel's) express desire, the treaty might now be considered void ; and at all events, that the British government must be considered at liberty to execute it, or not, as they might think proper ; and that I was astonished that, instead of giving any reason for the breach of the principal stipulation, they should come forward with a fresh demand, which could be supposed to be founded on the treaty, only by forcing the construction of the 4th and 5th articles.

The vakeel then explained, that the reason for which Amrut Rao had omitted to join, was, that Muraba Furnavees had died at the moment at which he ought to have marched ; the ceremonies usual upon such occasions had detained him for some time, that he had then heard I had not halted at Aurungabad, and that the enemy's pindarries were in that country.

An argument then ensued upon the subject of the demand of payment for 10,000 horse, the detail of which your Excellency will find in the enclosed translation of a memorandum upon the subject, which I delivered to the vakeel on the following day. In respect to the excuse made by Amrut Rao's vakeel for not joining, it is certainly true that Muraba Furnavees died at the period stated, and that I did not halt at Aurungabad. But I do not attribute Amrut Rao's omission to join to these events : it is to be attributed to the usual shuffling and timid conduct of a Marhatta, in every important transaction of his life.

The demand for the pay for 10,000 men is only an attempt to get more money. Amrut Rao has not really 3000 men in his service ; but he has made the demand for 10,000, under the 5th article of the treaty, and a notion that I should not order that the men might be mustered. To pay Amrut Rao in this manner would be ridiculous ; but supposing it were necessary, I have not the means.

Considering the success which has attended the British arms in this quarter lately, I rather imagine that Amrut Rao will be satisfied with the proposition contained in the enclosed memorandum, and that he will join ; but if he should persist in expressing his desire to quit camp, and proceed to Surat, I propose to consent to that step. In consequence of it we shall fail in obtaining some of the advantages which I had in view when I made the treaty ; but I conceive that, till some settlement is made with Amrut Rao, the government of the Peshwah will not gain strength ; and, therefore, I am of opinion that the degree of security for his conduct which will be derived from his residence within the Company's territories is an object ; and preferable to his living, as at present, in rebellion against the Peshwah's government, and giving encouragement to his Highness' discontented subjects.

I propose that the troops which I have consented to take into the Company's service shall be considered as part of the 5000 to be paid by the Company, under the modification of the treaty of Bassein. As Amrut Rao will have nothing to do with them, the Peshwah can have no objection to this measure.

Memorandum.

30th Sept. 1803.

An engagement was made by Major Gen. Wellesley, to Amrut Rao,

under which Amrut Rao was to enjoy a revenue of 7 lacs of rupees *per annum*, and he was to join Major Gen. Wellesley's army. Amrut Rao has consented to the arrangements contained in the engagement.

His vakeel, Prubbaukur Bellall, has, however, come forward with a proposition, that means should be provided for the payment of an army of 10,000 men, which Amrut Rao has with him, which proposition it is now necessary to discuss. It is founded upon the 4th and 5th articles of the treaty: by the first of which, an engagement is entered into, that a provision shall be made for the adherents of Amrut Rao; and in the last, it is expressed, that the greater the number of troops Amrut Rao shall bring with him to Major Gen. Wellesley's camp, the better.

The intention of the 4th article was to secure a provision for Muraba Furnavees, and other persons of that description, adherents of Amrut Rao; and that engagement will be strictly fulfilled.

In respect to the 5th article, Prubbaukur Bellall must recollect, that in the last year Amrut Rao had no troops whatever; that lately, when Major Gen. Wellesley arrived at Poonah, Amrut Rao had but a small party, less than 2000 men; and that upon more than one occasion Major Gen. Wellesley has pointed out to Prubbaukur Bellall the inconsistency of Amrut Rao's increasing the number of his troops, when he was not able to pay those troops already in his service.

The 5th article of the treaty, therefore, cannot be construed to apply to more than 2000 men at most.

But Prubbaukur Bellall contends that these men are old adherents of Amrut Rao's, and he is obliged to see that they are provided for. Adherents, none of which are more than of a year's standing, and some of which are not of 6 months' standing, cannot be considered as ancient servants; but at all events, under the notion that they are the old servants of the Peshwah's family and government, and that they are now desirous to serve their master with fidelity, Major Gen. Wellesley is willing to take them into the service, to give them their monthly pay during the war, and to endeavor to prevail upon the Peshwah to receive them into favor, and to restore to them their lands as soon as it shall be concluded; and in order to carry this proposition into effect, he has called upon Prubbaukur Bellall to produce a list of the names of the sirdars, with accounts of the number of their troops. Prubbaukur Bellall objects to this proposition, on the ground that it is necessary that Amrut Rao, who is a man of high rank, should have with him a considerable body of men, under his immediate command, who are always to remain with him, although to serve with the British army, and to be paid by the British government. Major Gen. Wellesley cannot discern the necessity that Amrut Rao should have 10,000 men as an appendage to his rank. At all events, the General is sensible that the British government would never consent to incur the expense of maintaining 10,000 men as an appendage to the rank of any man, although they are willing to entertain men for service.

It is also to be observed, that the 7 lacs of rupees agreed to be given to Amrut Rao by the 1st article are for the support of his rank, and for the payment of his personal expenses; the demand for the support of 10,000 men for the same purpose is, therefore, entirely inadmissible.

Major Gen. Wellesley, therefore, cannot consent to adopt this proposition, although he is willing to entertain in the service, and pay the troops of any sirdar attached to Amrut Rao; and when the war is concluded, he will recommend to the Peshwah that such sirdar may be restored to his lost lands, under the Poonah governor.

To Ballojee Koonger.

5th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter [its contents recapitulated]. When Col. Collins was the British Resident in the camp of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, you were there in the character of vakeel on the part of the Peshwah: it is probable, therefore, that you were not so well acquainted with what passed at the durbar of that Chief as you are at present, when you write in the character of one of the Maharajah's ministers;* if you had been, you would not have written that Col. Collins had quitted the camp without apprising the Maharajah of his intentions, or going through the customary forms.

For above 2 months, Col. Collins was employed in vain endeavors to induce the Maharajah to comply with the just requisitions of the British government; and he repeatedly, both verbally and in writing, apprised the Maharajah and his ministers, and the Rajah of Berar, that he should be obliged to quit the camp if they did not comply with those just requisitions. The object of those requisitions was, that the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should separate and should withdraw from the frontier of his Highness the Nabob Nizam the large armies which they had assembled avowedly for the purpose of invading his Highness's territory, after they had declared their intentions were pacific. But supposing that there might have been a mistake respecting the verbal communication of Col. Collins, which is very improbable, there could have been none respecting those in writing, or respecting my letters to the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar, in which, in the most friendly terms, I urged the adoption of a measure which would have been honorable to all parties, and which would have ensured the peace of India.

I refer you to the papers upon this subject, which you will doubtless find in the duffer. You now desire that I should send Capt. Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram to the camp of the Maharajah, agreeably to the desire of the Nabob Moein ool Moolk, who says that, by God's grace, every thing between the governments may be settled. I am not acquainted with the Nabob Moein ool Moolk, or in what character, or by whose authority, he writes: nor does it appear that these gentlemen would be received by the Maharajah, even if I had any propositions to make, and should be inclined to send them: but I have no proposition to make to the Maharajah, and therefore must decline to send Capt. Johnson and the Rajah Mohiput Ram, as you have desired. The Maharajah has many sirdars in his service, and if he or the Rajah of Berar has any proposition to make to me, he may

* Ballojee Koonger was originally dispatched by his Highness the Peshwah from Bassein to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of explaining to that Chieftain the nature of the engagements concluded between the Peshwah and the British Government; but, with the accustomed versatility and treachery of a Marhatta politician, Ballojee Koonger has subsequently attached himself to the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.—*The Governor General's Dispatch to the Secret Committee, 1st Nov. 1803.*

select one of them to convey it. Any person whom the Maharajah may think proper to send shall be treated with the respect and attention due to his rank; and I shall lose no time in taking into consideration the wishes of the Maharajah which he may communicate.

To the Nabob Moein ool Moolk.

5th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter [its contents recapitulated]: you do not inform me by authority from whom, or at whose desire you have written to me, nor do I recollect to have heard your name among those of the confidential servants of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; you will therefore excuse my declining to give any answer whatever to the proposition which you have thought proper to write to me.

Ballojee Koonger is, I know, an old servant of the Maharajah, and is, I am informed, at present one of his ministers: I have, therefore, written him a full answer to the proposition which is contained in your letter and his; and I must refer you, and those who employed you to write to me, to the letter which I have written to Ballojee Koonger.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 5th Oct. 1803.

I have received yours of the 1st inst. The Peshwah shall have 6 guns: 40 are gone to Ahmednuggur; and I shall order six 6-pounders to be sent to the Peshwah, which I will request you to present to him. It will be some time, however, before they arrive at Poonah, and in the mean while you will do well to keep the Bombay guns.

I enclose a letter which I have written to Gen. Campbell, which may probably bring him back to the westward. I propose also to write to Piele, to quiet Purneah's apprehensions. I shall give orders that all parties may in future march by Poonah. It was an unfortunate business at Ahmednuggur.

A proposition has come in from Ballojee Koonger, that I should send Capt. Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram to hear certain propositions* tending to establish peace. The object of this proposition is probably to revive the spirits of the enemy's army, by showing that we have an agent in their camp, and are desirous of peace. I propose, therefore, to decline sending those persons to their camp, on the ground that I have no proposition to make to them; but shall intimate that, if they have any propositions to make to me, they may send a sirdar, who shall be treated with due

* The Governor General to the Court of Directors.

1st Nov. 1803.

The Governor General in Council entirely approves the judgment and prudence manifested by Major Gen. Wellesley, in refusing to comply with the request of the enemy, as announced in his dispatch of the 6th Oct., and is satisfied that the duplicity and debased art of the Marhatta councils would have perverted the acquiescence of Major Gen. Wellesley, in this insidious proposition, to the purpose of impairing the reputation of our arms and power.

The Governor General in Council, however, is inclined to believe that the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the confederate Chieftains have received such a check, as must compel them to abstain from the prosecution of their inordinate designs; and we, therefore, expect to receive early intelligence of the disposition of the confederate Chieftains to dispatch directly from their respective authorities, to the British camp, an embassy duly authorized to negotiate the terms of peace, conformably to Major Gen. Wellesley's proposition.

respect and attention. Thus I shall turn the tables upon them; and it may be depended upon, that when once their army shall know that they have begun to treat for peace, they will not be very ready to fight.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 6th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose translations of papers received yesterday from the enemy's camp, and translations of my answers to them. I likewise enclose translations of papers received by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to which reference is made in those addressed to Col. Stevenson and myself. Col. Stevenson wrote an answer to those which he received, that he had referred them to me, and that he had no authority to correspond with any body. I have not learnt whether Rajah Mohiput Ram has returned any answer to those letters addressed to him.

It is impossible to say whether the object in making the proposition contained in the enclosed papers was really to commence a negotiation for peace; or to raise the spirits of the enemy's troops, by showing a British officer in his camp, respecting whom it would be industriously reported that he had come to sue for peace. I rather believe that they had both objects in view, as Capt. Johnson, the Persian interpreter to the commanding officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, whom they have expressed a wish to see, is an officer much respected by the Natives, particularly by Salabut Khan, who has been heretofore connected in friendship with the Rajah of Berar; and it is probable that the enemy would not have particularly desired his attendance, if they had not intended to commence a negotiation for peace. However, the desire that he should go there is expressed in so extraordinary a manner, and as there is no mention made of the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar for writing at all; and above all, as I am convinced that the presence of a British officer in the enemy's camp at the present moment would tend to raise the spirits of their troops, and to keep their army together, I have thought it proper to decline to send one.

In my answer to Ballojee Koonger, I have thought it necessary to explain once more the cause for which Col. Collins quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, as your Excellency will observe that he alludes to the manner in which he quitted it, in his letter to me; and I know that the enemy have been very busy in circulating reports on that subject among the servants of the allied governments, equally distant from the truth, and prejudicial to the British government. In refusing to send a British officer to the enemy's camp, I have deemed it proper to point out the

G. O.

Camp, Waukory, 6th Oct. 1803.

The remainder of the wounded men to be sent into Adjuttee to-morrow morning. The superintending surgeon is to make the necessary arrangements, and the allotment of the carriage for that purpose. The 1st batt. 4th regt. and 1st batt. 8th regt. to furnish each a native dresser to be sent into the hospital at Adjuttee. 16 supernumerary tents, now with the 74th, are to be sent, with a proportion of lascars and bamboo coolies, into Adjuttee to-morrow, and to be distributed among the sick of all corps by the officer commanding. They are still to be kept on the returns and drawn for by the 74th. Officers commanding Native corps will order back from Adjuttee all their tents above the proportion of 1 to every 30 men left in hospital there. Carriage, lascars, &c., to be left with the tents.

mode in which they might open a negotiation for peace, if they wished it; upon which I have only to observe, that if they should send here a sirdar, the exertions of their troops hereafter will be but trifling.

By the last accounts I had of the enemy's movements, they had left the remains of their infantry brigades in the neighbourhood of Burhampoor, and had marched with cavalry only, or, if accompanied by infantry, by only a small body, to the westward, and with an intention of passing through the Casserbarry ghaut. They were in great distress, and the price of grain in their camp one seer for a rupee. Their situation will not be improved by proceeding in that direction; and I rather suspect that this movement has been made with a view to divert our attention from Burhampoor and the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Waukory, 7th Oct. 1803.

I take the liberty of addressing you again in favor of an officer belonging to a regiment in the division of the army under my command. In case you should think it proper to promote Major Kennedy to the Lieut. Colonelcy of the 19th dragoons, you may be induced to promote the eldest Captain, Fortnam, to the majority of that corps. Capt. Cathcart, who is the next captain, was wounded in the last action. He has served in the 19th for many years, in the first and second Mysore wars, and upon all the different occasions in which the 19th dragoons have distinguished themselves since the year 1799. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your favor for the second majority of the regiment, which is still vacant.

Since the action of the 23rd, the enemy have retired in much confusion to the Taptee. The infantry corps went to Burhampoor, and the cavalry made one or two marches to the westward; with an intention, as it was stated, of entering again the Nizam's territories, by the Casserbarry ghaut, near Aurungabad. I suspect that this report has been circulated with a view to draw away our attention from Burhampoor, and the territories of the Rajah of Berar. I have been much embarrassed by the difficulties of establishing an hospital for my wounded men. The Nizam's officers will not admit us into the forts which have any strength; and at last I have been obliged to place them at Adjunttee, a place of inferior strength, and upon the extreme frontier. However, I think they will be in security; the last of them have gone in this day, and I am now at liberty to resume my operations.

I beg leave to congratulate your Excellency upon the success of your campaign, and the prosperous state of affairs to the northward. I have seen official accounts of your operations only as far as the 30th Aug., but the private accounts of soucars of Jynaghur have been sent to me from Surat, of as late a date as the 19th Sept.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 7th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum I have received from Capt. Baynes, who is employed in the command of a detachment giving convoy to bullocks carrying grain from the countries south of the river Godavery to camp, and back again empty, in which he details the names of some

places in the Nizam's territories, where duties were levied upon grain for the army, on the passage through them.

I imagine that the levy of those duties is contrary to treaty ; at all events, it is a great impediment to the service, and I suspect, from the exorbitancy of that in particular levied at Collum, which in ordinary times must amount to one eighth of the value of the article carried, they have been laid on only to derive an advantage from the consumption of the British troops in this quarter. I am concerned to be under the necessity of troubling you so often with complaints of the conduct of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will take measures for remedying the evil to which I have above alluded.

Instructions for the Officer commanding the 2 companies of the 4th brigade, ordered as an escort with the wounded men and stores to Adjuttee.

7th Oct. 1803.

After seeing the wounded men, &c., lodged in Adjuttee, he will, with Major Gilmore's assistance, have the doolies belonging to the 94th regt. separated from those belonging to this division, and one of the companies must return with the latter to camp this morning.

The other company will halt at Adjuttee to-night, and march the next morning, with the doolies of the 94th, for Jamnair, in order to deliver them over to their corps. Capt. Johnson will furnish a guide. The company will probably be met, on the road between Adjuttee and Jamnair, by a party from Col. Stevenson's camp, and will either proceed on with that party or return to Adjuttee immediately, according to such orders as Col. Stevenson may have sent, or as circumstances may render necessary for the security of the doolies and both parties of troops.

If the company from hence proceeds all the way to Jamnair, the officer commanding it will receive further orders from Col. Stevenson.

If only one European officer be detached for this detachment, he is to proceed with the company which escorts the doolies of the 94th regt. to-morrow.

Further orders will be sent to Adjuttee regarding that company.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Adjuttee, 8th Oct. 1803.

I have just returned from seeing my wounded men ; they are tolerably comfortable, and I hope safe in the fort ; but I wish they were at a greater distance from the frontier, instead of being upon the boundary, and on the high road by which every body enters the Nizam's territories from Hindustan. However, I have done the best I can for them, and have secured them as far as is in my power. You will see by my correspondence with Major Kirkpatrick, that the Soubah's killadars have behaved shamefully ill.

Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, after making two marches to the westward along the Taptee, have turned to the southward, and, it is said, intend to pass the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them the greatest part of their horse, some infantry, and some guns, which they got out of Burhampoor. They have sent into that place the remains of the campons. It is possible that this movement may be intended to draw my attention away from Burhampoor and Asseerghur ; and they may return to the northward upon finding that I do not follow them. On the other hand, these things called allied governments are in such a state of deplorable weakness, they depend so entirely on us for the defence of their territories, and their power is so feeble over their own servants, who have so much connexion with, and even dependence on the enemy, that I have not

means to move forward, at once, upon Asseerghur with my whole force; although I know that if I could take that step with safety, it would put an end to the war. But not one of the Soubah's forts is sufficiently garrisoned. He has not a soldier in the country, excepting those belonging to the Company; and his killadars and amildars would readily pay the money they may have just to be allowed to sit quietly in their forts and towns. As for the Peshwah, he has possession of his palace at Poonah, and nothing more, and he spends the little money he receives either upon the Bramins or upon women, rather than give any to his troops, or even to his menial servants.

The consequence, then, of my proceeding to the northward with my whole force might be, that the enemy would get possession, or levy contributions upon some important place belonging to the Nizam; or they might move down upon Poonah itself. They would certainly stop our supplies, and the consequence of such a movement might thus be fatal to us. In this manner does the radical weakness of these governments operate against us.

I have therefore determined to return to the southward, and to send Col. Stevenson to Burhampoor. No accident can happen to his corps, as 2 out of 3 of the campoos are, I am told, entirely destroyed; such of the men as were not either killed or wounded in the action having thrown away their arms in the retreat and disbanded. It is said that there remain 2 battalions of Begum Sumroo's campoo, which were not engaged, having been on guard at the quarters of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. However, supposing that there should be more than are supposed to remain, still no accident can happen to Col. Stevenson; and if Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should return to the northward, I shall follow them. Col.

Camp, Adjuttee, 8th Oct 1803

G. M. O.

50 pioneers to be sent into the fort, immediately, in order to clean it out: 20 pioneers to be this day attached to the hospital, according to the orders of the 30th ult. The remainder of the pioneers will be employed at work which the engineer will point out.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that officers, excepting those commanding corps, and those whose duty it may be, will not go into the hospital, as the crowds that go there only tend to disturb the wounded men. Orders have been given at the gates that no soldiers or sepoys may be admitted in the hospital, excepting those of the latter sent in to work, and such men as may have passes from the commanding officer.

Commanding officers will therefore give passes to such men as may be desirous of seeing their relations, or as they may wish to send into the hospital.

The wounded men are much distressed by the sun in the buildings which they occupy; and Major Gen. Wellesley will be much obliged to commanding officers of corps if they will order as many shades as possible to be made by the men of their corps, with the boughs of trees, &c. &c.: they should be of the size of 12 feet square. Officers commanding Native corps will send into the hospital 1 careful non-commissioned officer, or steady man, and under his command each corps of infantry 12, each corps of cavalry 6, sepoy boys. They are to assist the Native troops in drawing their provisions, &c., and otherwise attend to and take care of them.

8th Oct. 1803.

G. O.

The paymaster will send into Adjuttee the sum of 10,000 star pagodas for the disbursement of that station, and he will entertain a writer and shroff for it.

The general invaliding, pensioning, and discharging committee for this division will assemble as soon as the regimental committees have finished their proceedings. Commanding officers are therefore requested to hold their committees to-day, while the men in hospital may be examined.

The commissary of grain will send into Adjuttee 1000 bags of rice, for the use of the subsidiary force, and 200 in addition to those formerly ordered for the sick and garrison.

Stevenson is already equipped for a siege. I have had proposals from Cashee Rao Holkar; but as Jeswunt Rao Holkar is, I am told, most laudably employed in levying a contribution upon Ougein, I do not think it prudent to have any thing to do with Cashee Rao.

I wish you would let me know, at an early period, what progress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. This is important, because our engagements with them must have a great effect on the negotiations for peace. By the by, does the Governor General know that the peshcush, paid by the Rajpoots, does not belong to Scindiah only, but to the Peshwah and the Holkar family? Of every rupee paid, 6 annas belong to the Peshwah, 5 to Scindiah, and 5 to Holkar. It is true that, for these many years past, Scindiah has collected and applied the whole to his own use: but he has lately consented to allow Holkar to collect his own share and half the Peshwah's; and I understand that the dispute between these Chiefs, and the cause of Holkar not joining the confederates, is that Holkar claimed the right to collect all the peshcush for the number of years that Scindiah had received the whole. He refused to join, unless Scindiah acquiesced in the exercise of this right, or paid him the sum of money which he ought to have received, as peshcush, from the Rajpoots, for the number of years that Scindiah had collected the whole. If this story be true, and I believe it is, the protection that we shall afford to the Rajpoots may involve us with Holkar. However, on the other hand, should Holkar be really inclined to remain at peace with the English, which I think he is, we may be able to satisfy him upon that point.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Adjuttee, 8th Oct. 1803.

Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have made one or two long stretches to the southward, and it is said intend to pass through the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them the greater part of their horse, some infantry and guns, but how many of the latter I cannot tell.

Our allies are deplorably weak on every point; and as we depend for our supplies on the security of the countries south of the Godavery, it will not answer even to risk that security by throwing my whole force forward in an offensive operation against Burhampoor and Asseerghur; I therefore propose to return to the southward myself, and to send Col. Stevenson forward upon the Taptee. If our allies were in any degree of strength, a movement of our whole force upon Asseerghur, and then upon Gawilghur and Nagpoor, would put an end to the war; but under the present circumstances I must be satisfied with something less brilliant.

Col. Stevenson will be in no danger at Burhampoor, as it is said that two of the campoos are entirely destroyed. Two battalions of the Begum's campoo escaped: they were not engaged, having been on guard at Scindiah's and the Rajah of Berar's quarters. However, supposing that there are more even than is reported, no accident can happen to Col. Stevenson.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Adjuttee, 8th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to transmit the copy of a letter and its enclosure which I have written to his Excellency the Governor General.

My wounded are all lodged here. They are comfortably situated, and I hope will be safe; but I acknowledge that I wish they were farther removed from the extreme frontier, and from the high road from Hindustan. Scindiah and the Rajah have made two long marches to the southward, and, it is said, intend to pass through the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them almost all their horse and some infantry, with guns, which they brought out of Burhampoor, but I cannot say how many of the latter.

I intend to move to the southward myself, as I cannot trust to chance all the Nizam's weak posts, our supplies, &c. Col. Stevenson will move upon Burhampoor. I do not think that his corps will run any risk forwards, as all the horse is down to the southward, and it is said that the defeated campoos have disbanded. There are only 2 or about 3 battalions remaining, which were not in the engagement, having been on guard at Scindiah's and the Rajah of Berar's quarters.

Col. Stevenson is equipped for a siege. The wounded are doing well. I think about half of the men in the 74th will be fit for service again. They have 200 rank and file now in the ranks.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Adjunttee, 8th Oct. 1803.

That plan which, in my opinion, promises the greatest and most speedy success, is to carry on offensive operations against the enemy's territories; and it would certainly produce a peace, if the things called governments, which depend upon us, would do any thing for themselves, or were not in a state of most deplorable weakness. But it is well known that they depend entirely upon us, and yet they thwart us in every instance. Not one of the Nizam's places is sufficiently garrisoned; and as for the Peshwah, he possesses his palace at Poonah, and no more. While we should be carrying on our operations at Asseerghur, it would not be very pleasant to have the enemy levying contributions on the Nizam's places, or sitting down before Poonah itself. I am therefore decidedly of opinion, that we must guard against these plans, as well as move upon Burhampoor. Accordingly I shall go to the southward, and I shall beg of you to move upon Burhampoor.

You are aware of the result of my action with the enemy, and I have only to warn you against having any thing to do with them, if you should find them very strong in guns.

Col. Lang, with 5 companies of his corps, will leave this on his return to you to-morrow; the other 5 companies are gone to the Godavery, with 40 of the captured guns, and will not be here for 2 or 3 days. Lieut. Col. Lang will take with him 2000 of your brinjaries, who came up yesterday with Capt. Baynes.

I shall leave 1000 bullocks' loads of rice for you in the fort of Adjunttee. I would send bullocks with them, only that I want cattle, and it appears that you do not. I recommend the following objects to your attention:

1st; Either to beat or drive back any infantry that may be at or near Burhampoor.

2nd; Levy a contribution on Burhampoor.

3rd; Reconnaître Asseerghur, and if it holds out any prospect of success, lay siege to it; if it does not, move to your right upon Gawilghur, and lay siege to that place.

4th; Levy a contribution upon Nagpoor.

If you should be able to raise any contributions, put their amount into the treasury; and I shall recommend to government that they may be given to the troops as prize money. The same must be done with any property found in Asseerghur or Gawilghur.

It is probable that some of the officers (the British officers in particular) in Scindiah's service may be induced to quit it. I shall, this evening, (if I can get it copied, if not, to-morrow morning,) send you the copies of a proclamation, which offers to them a provision under the British government, on quitting the service. The same is likewise offered in another proclamation, of which I will send you a copy, to the Natives of the Company's territories in Scindiah's service. I shall add to the whole a proclamation from myself; and I request you to take an opportunity of conveying these papers, or copies of them, to the officers at Burhampoor.

In case Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar return to the northward, depend upon it that I shall follow them closely. In my opinion, no plan will succeed entirely, excepting that which I have above sketched out. It is possible that your march to Burhampoor may induce them to return; but I am convinced that the march of both of us to the northward would have very bad consequences, and possibly might be fatal to us. Each of our corps, as now composed, is strong enough for the enemy, when their force is divided. To take away the cavalry from both, and join the infantry of both together, would expose that infantry to be insulted by a few pindarries, and would be the cause of much distress.

The plan which I had thought of would have answered, if they had had horse only. The corps which I proposed to equip would have been able to prevent the execution of any enterprise of importance by horse. But as they have infantry and guns, and we do not know how many, there must be something stronger for the defensive; and if any thing stronger than what I proposed be sent, it must be a complete division.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp, 30 miles N. of Aurungabad, 10th Oct. 1803.

Siddajee Rao Nimbilkur (commonly called Appah Dessaye) has mentioned to me that the Talloor polygar has seized the district of Moorgoor, and others belonging to him, which are situated between the rivers Mal-poorba and Gutpurba, to the westward of Manowly; and that he has even threatened the fort of Manowly itself. Appah Dessaye is apprehensive that he may succeed against this fort, as the son of the killadar is in the polygar's possession, having been taken at Moorgoor. I have written to the polygar to request him to desist from his operations against Appah.

G. O.

9th Oct. 1803.

The following extract from General Orders by the Officer commanding in chief at Bombay, 2nd Sept., 1803, is published for the information of this division of the army; and Capt. Nicolls, having arrived in camp, will join the 78th regt. accordingly:

'Capt. Jasper Nicolls will be pleased to proceed and do duty with H. M. 78th regt., serving under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley.'

Dessaye, who is with this division; and I have told him that you would fall on him, if he did not attend to what I said. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to make inquiries regarding the transactions of this man, and write to him to desist from his operations against Appah Dessaye. If it should not interfere with other objects, you might possibly find it convenient to cut up this fellow's force, in case he should not do as you desire him. However, this is a case of extremity which it is very desirable to avoid, even at the expense of some loss to Appah Dessaye; as the consequence would certainly be, that my communications with the southern countries would be stopped.

I have made some marches to the southward, as Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have shown an intention of entering the Nizam's territories by the Casserbarry ghaut; but I think that this movement of mine, and that of Col. Stevenson to the northward, will induce them to return.

I have just received your public letter of the 30th Sept. I concluded that you had a key to the cipher, and I now suppose that you have applied to Gen. Stuart for one. It would be attended with too much risk for me to attempt to send the cipher by the tappall.

P. S. I have given Appah Dessaye a note to you on the same subject as this letter.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 30 miles N. of Aurungabad, 10th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received

G. M. O.

10th Oct 1803

As there is plenty of other forage on the ground, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that none of the straw which is stacked, or cut and laid on the ground, may be taken; and commanding officers are requested to post sentries over such grain as may be in or near their lines.

G. O.

Birkenholey, 10th Oct. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley has received a report from Capt. O'Donnell of the 1st regt. of cavalry, from which it appears that, being on his march from Ahmednuggur to join the division of the army under the command of Major Gen. Campbell, with a company of the 1st batt. 12th regt., under Lieut. Morgan and the supernumerary non-commissioned officers heretofore belonging to the corps in camp, and lately drafted into the extra battalions, he was attacked by a body of horse and of peons, of such numbers as to induce Capt. O'Donnell to think it necessary to take post in the village of Korget Coraygaum. Here the attack was renewed upon this party with additional violence, and Capt. O'Donnell, finding that his post was a bad one, and at all events too large for his party, barricaded and otherwise strengthened such parts of it as he was of opinion he could defend. He there remained with his small party without throwing away his ammunition, excepting when he could do it with effect in judicious sallies, in three of which he killed a number of the enemy far exceeding that of his party, which remained in security till it was relieved from Ahmednuggur, at the distance of about 40 miles.

Major Gen. Wellesley returns his thanks to Capt. O'Donnell and Lieut. Bryant of the 1st regt. of cavalry, and to Lieut. Morgan and the company of the 1st batt. 12th regt. under his command, for their conduct upon this occasion. He has been particular in detailing the circumstances of this affair in General Orders, in order that all officers may know the advantage which, with a small party of men, they may take even of the most ruinous village, to protect themselves and the parties of troops under their command.

To the division of the army under his command, it was scarcely necessary for Major Gen. Wellesley to point out, that a small body of infantry that keeps its order, and reserves its fire, has but little to fear from cavalry. But in case any officer in charge of a party should be obliged from circumstances to take post, he may see, in the example set by Capt. O'Donnell, the advantages he can take of the numerous fortified villages in this country, the credit he can gain, and the service he can render, by thus defending himself.

Major Gen. Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander in Chief his sense of the conduct of Capt. O'Donnell, and of the party under his command.

from Capt. O'Donnell, of the 1st regt. of cavalry, in which he gives a detailed account of an affair of no very great importance; but in which the detachment of troops under his command appear to have conducted themselves in an exemplary manner. I likewise enclose the copy of an order, which I have issued to the troops under my command upon this occasion.

The party that attacked Capt. O'Donnell are a banditti, which infest the frontiers of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of his Highness the Peshwah, and are formidable from their number and boldness. It does not appear that they belong to any particular chief, although it is said that they belong to the late killadar of Ahmednuggur; but I have reason to believe that this person discharged all his troops, and that he joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah in camp.

As there is no established authority, or even an acknowledged boundary, on any part of the frontier, and the killadars, and other officers on both sides, have been in the habit of carrying on private wars against each other, I am induced to believe that they have encouraged this banditti, for the purposes of their own wars. While I was on the frontier, of course their operations ceased; but they have now recommenced them, and I suspect that they are too strong for their former employers.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have continued to march to the southward, towards the Casserbarry ghaut, with nearly all their cavalry, and a small body of infantry, with guns, which joined them from Burhampoor. It is reported in camp, that they intend to pass through the Casserbarry ghaut to the southward, as there is nothing to oppose them in the territories of the Peshwah, and but little in those of the Soubah of the Deccan.

I have thought it proper to move to the southward with my division, and I am now at no great distance from Aurungabad. Col. Stevenson, with his division, will march to the northward; and I think it probable that, when the confederates learn the direction of his march, and that I have come to the southward, which may prevent the execution of any design they may have formed, they will return again towards the Taptee.

It is unfortunate that I should have been obliged to return to the southward, as I think that, by carrying our whole force to the Taptee, we should bring about a peace on advantageous terms. But there are many weak points in the territories of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan, all of which would be exposed to risk, and we might lose by this operation more than we should gain.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 30 miles N. of Aurungabad, 10th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose translations of letters which I have received from Cashee Rao Holkar, and the translation of my answer to one of Cashee Rao's agents. Koosh Haul, the Arab, did not come on farther than Col. Stevenson's camp; and Dogul Sing, the other agent, had but little to say, except that Cashee Rao Holkar was in great distress at Jehanabad, near Burhampoor, and was apprehensive that Dowlut Rao Scindiah intended to shut him up in the fort of Asseerghur. This man had so little to urge in favour of Cashee Rao Holkar, that I am inclined to suspect that he is not his agent, but one employed by some other person,

possibly Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to discover whether the British government had any intention to interfere in the concerns of the Holkar family. As Jeswunt Rao Holkar has hitherto kept aloof from the other confederated Marhatta Chiefs, and as, at all events, I doubt whether we should derive any advantage from the assistance of Cashee Rao Holkar, which I imagine that we can command at any time, I have thought it best to decline to have any thing to do with him at present.

To Cashee Rao Holkar.

As Col. Collins is gone to Hyderabad, and as I am charged by his Excellency the Governor General with the direction of the affairs of the British government in this quarter, I have opened your letter, and have listened to the verbal communications of Dogul Sing.

The British government is not at war with the branches of your family with whom you are at variance; and that being the case, it is inconsistent with the principles by which its conduct is always guided to interfere in the concerns of your family. When attacked, the British government adopts every method, allowed by the law of nations, to defend itself and annoy its enemies; but, till it is attacked, it does not interfere in the concerns of others.

[For Capt. Baynes (omitted Memorandum), 10th Oct. 1803, see Addenda, p. 1460.]

The D.A.G. to Capt. O'Donnell.

Binkenholey, 10th Oct. 1803.

I had the honor to receive your letters of the 4th, and lost no time in laying them before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who has issued the G. O. in consequence, which you will see published in Ahmednuggur immediately after the receipt of this letter. I have requested Capt. Lucas to give you the original order after he has published it (as I have many copies to circulate); and I have the pleasure to add, that copies of your letter and the order have been forwarded to the Governor General; and that a copy of your letter has also been sent to the Commander in Chief, with Major Gen. Wellesley's report on the occasion. He will soon have it in his power to order the company of the 12th to join its corps, when you can proceed to your regiment, otherwise he would have complied with your request to be permitted to join this division.

There is some reason to think that the drafts which were sent to you at Konget Coraýgaum did not behave to your satisfaction. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will make him a particular report of the names, and corps to which they belong, of any of the men who may have behaved ill, and he will recommend to the Commander in Chief that they may be reduced to privates, if non-commissioned officers, and returned to the former corps; and that such examples may be made of them, if commissioned officers, as the circumstances may appear to require, which he will lay before the Commander in Chief.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 11th Oct. 1803.

1. I have received letters from Lieut. Col. Colman, by which I learn that we are not to expect any further supply of grain from Panwell.

2. I had the honor of addressing you on the 20th Jan. last, and requested that 600 garces of rice might be collected at Bombay for the use of the army, then about to march to Poonah, under the command of Gen. Stuart; and I have reason to believe that Gen. Stuart requested that even a larger quantity of rice might be prepared.

3. Since that time, owing to a variety of causes, but principally on account of the great mortality among the cattle which accompanied me from Mysore, I have not been able to take away the quantity of rice which I

requested you to have prepared; and some of it has, with my knowledge, been issued to the troops forming part of the garrison of Bombay: still however, I had hoped that I might find a supply of rice at Bombay, to the full amount of the 600 garces.

4. I have now to inform you, that there is every reason to apprehend a great scarcity of all kinds of grain in this country in the next season, and there should not be a famine. Whatever may be the result of the military operations, therefore, it is certain that the troops which will be stationed in this country will require grain from Bombay.

5. On this ground, I most anxiously recommend that a communication should be opened immediately between the government of Bombay and the collectors in Canara upon this subject, in order that early measures may be adopted to secure, for the consumption of the troops, the surplus produce of that fertile province. The quantity which ought to be provided for this purpose only ought to be 600 garces.

6. I wrote to the collectors in Canara upon the subject, and as I have several memorandums upon the mode in which the rice countries in Mysore, those of Bullum particularly, influenced the state of the markets in Canara, I wrote to the assistant with the Resident at Mysore to request him to correspond with the collectors in Canara, and so to arrange with the government of Mysore as that the market in Canara may be kept full, at the same time that the supplies for the army, which still come from Mysore, may not be discontinued.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 11th Oct. 1803.

I return the letter from Major Shawe, which contains some very interesting intelligence. I think the attack of Allyghur the most dashing service that has been performed for some time. I hope that Gen. Lake will not stay long at Delhi. You will have heard that a body of Perron's horse have struck an unpleasant blow at Shekoabad in the Doab; and as I have lost sight of Holkar, I am much afraid that he also is gone towards the Bengal territories. He and all his troops are certainly on the other side of the Nerbudda: the last accounts I had of him stated that he was plundering Ougein, which is hardly credible. It is now said that he is gone far to the northward.

I am within one march of Aurungabad. The enemy have not yet passed the Casserbarry ghaut. The majority of my intelligence hircarrahs have either deserted or have been taken, and 4 days have elapsed since I heard from their camp; but they were then on their road to that ghaut, and, as far as I can learn, 40 miles from it.

G. O.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 11th Oct. 1803.

It is to be considered as a standing order, that no corn which has been cut down is to be taken by the troops for forage, unless in cases of necessity, which are to be first reported; and guards are to be placed over what may be in or near the camp, by the nearest corps, immediately on coming to the ground.

Lieut. Col. Griffin having failed to perform his part of the contract for the carriage of the sick of the battalions which have been under his command since this division of the army marched from Seringapatam in Feb. last, the allowance granted by government for the carriage of the sick of the 2nd batt. 18th regt., at present commanded by that officer, is to cease from the day on which that corps arrived at Poona.

The stoppage of the supplies from Bombay is very unpleasant. I wrote to Mr. Duncan upon the subject. Indeed, our prospect, if the war continues, is not very favorable. The crops have failed every where, and there will certainly be a famine in this country next year. I learn from the intercepted letters from Hindustan, that their prospects are even worse than ours.

Goklah is coming here this evening; I understand, to complain that the pay his men receive is not sufficient. However, I have sent him a message to inform him that if he mentions to me one syllable about pay or money in his proposed visit, I shall quit the tent; as I before informed him that I had, and would have nothing to do with his pay, excepting to give him regularly the money which the Peshwah had desired he should have.

I wish that the Peshwah would settle with his own sirdars, and take this trouble off my hands, in which I have certainly as much business already as I can well manage. I think that Goklah has no reason to complain: he gets his money regularly, which does not happen to any other Marhatta party in India: he has nothing to do, forage is plentiful, and he does not pay for it; and grain is at this moment, and, with very few exceptions, has always been, at the price which it bore at Poonah when we were there. I understand that he has already discharged 500 of his people, and he talks of discharging more. I wish that you would let me know how many he ought to have; and I shall inform him that I propose to recommend to the Peshwah that a proportionate reduction should be made from his pay for every man he discharges. But not only does the Peshwah throw upon me a business with which I ought to have no concern whatever, but he counteracts the execution of that business as much as he can. Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, notwithstanding his insolence to me, which is perfectly well known to all their chiefs, has been sent to the southern countries by the Peshwah, to take possession of certain districts, among others of Noorgoond and Noolgoond from Goklah.

A letter has been written by Sirjee Rao Ghautky, who is now, I see by the ackbar, in high favor and great confidence, to Appah Dessaye, to communicate to him the Peshwah's orders that he should relinquish possession of Manowly and Anantapoor, a district which he holds near the Kistna. These districts are to be given to Ball Kishen Gungurdhur. I should not care one pin about all these transactions, of which, from your situation at the durbar, you must have a knowledge, if they were not the cause of immediate complaints and reference to me, from the sirdars serving with the British troops under a treaty, and who the Peshwah most solemnly promised should be satisfied in every respect. I attribute the Peshwah's conduct in regard to Ball Kishen Gungurdhur to something worse than ignorance. Considering the manner in which that chief behaved to me, and his being employed again to seize the districts belonging to the chiefs serving with his army, it cannot tend to secure the credit of the British government in the Peshwah's durbar. I shall be obliged to you if you will send me six pairs of intelligence hircarrahs, besides those sent lately to Mr. Elphinstone.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 11th Oct. 1803.

I arrived here this morning, and I do not hear that the enemy have come through the ghaut. I think it most probable that they have returned to the northward; and if that should be the case, I shall also return immediately. If you find that they do return, and the whole of their cavalry and infantry join, you will do well to refrain from attacking them till I shall reinforce you.

I enclose another proclamation, and news from Bengal. I recommend that you should at once send copies of these proclamations, and of this news, to be delivered into the hands of one of the English officers. It is impossible for them to leave their camp, till you shall come very near them. Send them particularly the order about Mr. Lucan.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Phoolmurry, N of Aurungabad, 11th Oct. 1803.

I agree in opinion with you regarding our defensive operations. But none of that kind will answer long, unless mixed with a little offensive. I have made a dash down here upon a defensive principle; the enemy, with all their horse, and some infantry and guns, which they have drawn out of Burhampoor, having threatened to pass the southward, by the Casserbarry ghaut. But it is only a threat, and I believe I have stopped them already. At the same time, I have taken advantage of the terror created by our late success, to push forward Col. Stevenson upon Burhampoor, and even Asseerghur, if the beaten campoos, which are refitting there, should retreat to the Nerbudda, which I think they will. These two movements must relieve the Peshwah and the Nizam from the invasion; and I think it possible that they may bring propositions for peace.

I do not understand, and do not much like Gen. Lake's march to Delhi: after taking Allyghur, I think it takes him too much out of the way, leaves exposed the Company's Dooab, and delays the junction with the Rajpoots. I think that he ought to have detached a reinforcement to the corps covering Rampoor, which corps should then have gone upon Delhi, and to have made his arrangements for crossing the Jumna; and while those were preparing, to have given chase to the pindarries who have performed the feat at Shekoabad. However, these are only speculations, not founded upon any facts of which I have a knowledge.

I have lost sight of Holkar entirely. My last accounts of him were that he was gone to plunder Ougein. It has been said since, that he is gone to the northward. I dread his invasion of Bengal. What happened at Shekoabad shows that there are but few soldiers there besides the Commander in Chief.

P.S. You will see a letter from Cashee Rao Holkar, and my answer, which I have sent to Mr. Duncan. Also a letter upon the subject of rice. We shall certainly have a famine here.

[The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes, 11th Oct. 1803, see Addenda, p. 1460.]

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct. 1803.

I have reason to believe that the enemy have not come through the ghaut; and it is possible that they will now return to attack you, with all the force they can bring. Your first object will of course be to beat the campoos, before the cavalry under Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar can

join; or to drive them across the Taptee, and to such a distance, as that they cannot come back so quickly as to join with the cavalry in an attack upon you, before I can reinforce you. If, however, they should be able to join before you can attack the campoos, you must decide what line you will adopt. There are three lines of operation to be adopted: to attack the enemy, to stand his attack, or to draw off towards me.

In respect to the first, it is impossible to say what quantity of cannon they may have collected at Burhampoor; or what their real force may now be. I recommend that you should adopt this with caution, and only in case of necessity.

In respect to the second, it may possibly be worse than the first; as, unless you intrench your position, which I should recommend, if you adopt this line, your inferiority of cannon will tell against you still more than it would in the case of your attacking the enemy.

In regard to the third, it might be attended with risk, and even loss, excepting in this case. When I shall descend the ghaut, which I shall on the 4th, after leaving this, you might make two marches towards me, which would bring us within one march of each other. Till they are prepared for their attack, which, as they are very slow, will take some time, they will not stay nearer to you than at the distance of two marches; and supposing them to be able to make two in one day, I shall have joined you before they can do you any mischief.

Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access; for which the banks of the numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have intrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being but half disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground.

There is another mode of avoiding an action, which is, to keep constantly in motion; but unless you come towards me, that would not answer. For my part, I am of opinion, that after the beating they received on the 23rd Sept., they are not likely to stand for a second; and they will all retire with precipitation. But the Natives of this country are rashness personified; and I acknowledge that I should not like to see again such a loss as I sustained on the 23rd Sept., even if attended by such a gain. Therefore, I suggest to you what occurs to me on the subject of the different modes, either of bringing on, or declining the action which it is possible, although by no means probable, that they intend to fight. I shall march the moment I hear that they have moved to the northward. I have many people out for intelligence. Your hircarra, however, who brought the

account that it was reported in their camp on the 7th that I had come this way, was premature, as I did not show any inclination to do so till the 9th.

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct. 1803.

The crops have failed in this country this year, so that there is every reason to expect a great scarcity, if not a famine. This evil will also be felt at Bombay; indeed, I imagine that it is felt already, as the Governor of Bombay has found it necessary to stop the supplies of grain for the army, to provide for the wants of the settlement, notwithstanding that the grain he has laid in store at my request in January last, to guard against want.

I have recommended that he should fill granaries from Canara; and I have given notice to the collectors in Canara of the probable call upon the surplus produce of the countries under their management, and have recommended that they should stop the exportation till they shall hear from Mr. Duncan on the subject.

As the scarcity extends even to Guzerat, and will prevail in all parts of Hindustan, it is not improbable but that the call upon the resources of Canara will be very large; and it is most probable that very heavy demands upon the grain resources of Mysore, for the supply of Canara, will be made at a very early period. I have requested the collectors in Canara to communicate with you upon this subject; and I proceed to give you my opinion how far you ought to encourage the export to Canara of the grain (rice particularly) in Mysore. Canara is a fruitful country, but the people there are all traders; and the common practice is to export all their produce, each man keeping in his own store what he thinks will answer for himself and family. There is commonly, therefore, a scarcity in that province annually; and we are obliged to provide for the subsistence of the troops at the end of the year, by having grain in store, which is very rare in other countries; and there is not such a thing in the whole country as a grain bazaar.

The dealings of a people such as those in Canara are limited only by the demand, and by the means of supplying it. In this year there is no doubt whatever that the demand on Canara will be very great; and if due encouragement is given to the inhabitants of the rice countries in Mysore, the means of supplying it will be very great likewise. But that encouragement must be attended with many regulations. Your object should be: 1st; to keep your own markets well supplied, so that you may have no scarcity in Mysore: 2ndly; to keep them so full as to be able, with care, to fill the brinjaries whose bullocks are still in the country, in order that you still might have it in your power to supply the army. You will see from this the necessity of regulating, strictly, the exportation to Canara, that you should have the means of knowing constantly the exact quantity of grain exported, and may have it in your power to stop the drain whenever you may find it expedient. You may depend upon it, that if you had ten times the quantity of grain in Mysore that you have, there would be a demand for it in Canara, in the course of the next year; and therefore it will be necessary to connect, with due encouragement to the exportation,

great vigilance that it does not create distress in Mysore, and does not deprive you of the means of assisting your friends in this quarter by the brinjaries.

The enemy, after having fled in great confusion towards the Taptee, and lodged the remainder of their infantry at Burhampoor, upon that river, have come out with all their horse, and a small body of infantry, with guns, and have made a march or two to the southward; apparently, and, as it was given out, with an intention of passing through the Casserbarry ghaut, which is about 40 miles s. w. from Aurungabad. I have sent Col. Stevenson to levy a contribution in Burhampoor, and to attack the fort of Asseerghur, if he can; and I have come down 3 marches to the southward, towards Aurungabad, to stop the execution of this new plan, in which I have succeeded.

I think the Marhattas must be nearly tired of this war; we have been about 2 months engaged, and literally they have not yet entered what might be called the Nizam's territories. Along the frontiers half the villages belong to the Nizam, and half to the Marhattas, and to these alone they have done injury, but to none of the regular territory.

To J. Ravenshaw, Esq.

Camp at Phoelmurry, 12th Oct. 1803.

I am concerned to inform you, that there is great reason to apprehend a scarcity of grain, if not a famine, in this part of the country, in the ensuing season; and it will be necessary to draw from Bombay a great part of the grain which will be consumed by the troops in the field. It is also apprehended that the scarcity will be felt at Bombay, and the government of that settlement has already found it necessary to stop the supplies for the army; although the grain now there was laid in at my request in January last, with a view to guard against want by the troops. I have written to Mr. Duncan upon the subject of this probable want; and I have requested him to give directions that a correspondence might immediately be opened with you, in order to procure from the countries under your management their surplus produce, for the use of the troops in the field. The quantity which I have requested Mr. Duncan to provide for the consumption of the next year is 600 garces; and I give you this early notice of the want, in order that you may take such measures as you may deem necessary to stop the exportation. I have reason to believe that the crop in Mysore this year is a good one. I have written to the Sec. of the Resident in Mysore, to request him to communicate with you upon this subject; so that, by his influence with the government in Mysore, the markets in Canara may be kept full, notwithstanding the call there will be for the grain, not only in this quarter, but most probably for the use of the troops in Guzerat, where likewise I understand that the crops have failed entirely.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.

Phoelmurry, 12th Oct. 1803.

As there are still a number of horse reported to be collected to the left of the road by which the detachment of 3 companies will return from Goondy with the captured guns, who might give some annoyance to the convoy, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will detach 2 more companies from Ahmednuggur to meet the others the day that you shall learn that they have

arrived at Teesgaum, to ensure their getting safe into Ahmednuggur. Apply to Capt. Graham for his horse to go with these companies.

The General also requests that you will have 1000 of the new empty gunny bags, received from Poonah, ready packed up, to be carried either on bullocks or coolies, and sent by the first opportunity to Aurungabad, to be delivered over to Major Palmer, of the Soubah's service, for the use of the subsidiary force.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th Oct. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th inst., enclosing extracts of a letter from the Military board, upon which the Hon. the Governor in Council has desired to have my sentiments.

In answer to the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the letter from the Military board, I am concerned to inform you that Capt. Mackay, the officer alluded to, was killed in the action of the 23rd Sept. It was unfortunate that I was not at first apprised of the precise objections to Capt. Mackay's accounts, because I could, by the return of post, have transmitted the declaration on honor required from him by the regulations of the Bombay government.

All I can now say on the subject is, that, as far as it is possible for one man to answer for another, I will answer for Capt. Mackay, that the money laid out on account of the government of Bombay was honestly and fairly laid out for the public service, and that Capt. Mackay derived from it no benefit whatever. Indeed, a great proportion of the expenditure charged in his accounts was not incurred personally by him. It is principally for the purchase of bullocks, on which duty I employed Natives in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, and others sent to me by Major Malcolm from Poonah; and it is but justice to Capt. Mackay to say, that the bullocks purchased by him did not cost near the sum that those cost which were supplied by these Natives. Some also were sent by the servants of the Nizam's government, which were very dear.

While writing upon this subject, I request to know whether the Hon. the Governor in Council will make to the late Capt. Mackay an allowance of 4 rupees for every bullock purchased on account of the government of Bombay, which is given to officers on the Bombay establishment who make those purchases? Capt. Mackay applied to me on this subject before he was killed: but, having matters of more importance to attend to, I omitted to bring it before government.

I have already stated the reasons for which the muster rolls of the drivers were not sent, which I conclude are satisfactory to the Hon. the Governor in Council. In respect to the desertion of the followers, I have to observe on the remarks of the Military board, that as the followers sent from Bombay are paid in every instance one third more than the same description of followers serving with this army, and in many instances twice the sum, it might be expected that they would feel most sensibly the benefits of their situation; that they would adhere to the service; and that those belonging to the eastern parts of India would desert. However, the contrary is the fact; and I think it will be found, on reference to the correspondence of officers commanding detachments, composed entirely of troops belonging to the government of Bombay, that the complaint of the desertion of the followers is general, and not confined only to this army.

I have already, under date of the 11th inst., addressed the government upon the subject of supplies of rice.

I can give no other answer to the 5th paragraph of the letter from the Sec. of the Military board, excepting that, if the harvest in this part of the country had been tolerably good, I should not have been obliged to request that preparations might be made at Bombay, to so large an amount, to supply the probable wants of the troops in this country in the next year.

The supplies at Poonah and Ahmednuggur are now fully equal to what I had ever in contemplation to establish at those places; but in proportion as the subsistence of the troops is drawn, particularly from the latter, the store ought to be replenished; and this can only be done from Bombay. I have also to mention, that in case I should be able to drive the enemy entirely out of the Deccan, or to carry the operations of the troops, as I wish, into Berar, it will be necessary to establish depôts still nearer than at Ahmednuggur, the supplies for which can be drawn only from Bombay.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 13th Oct. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th inst., in which you have enclosed the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry on the conduct of Capt. Bates, of the 65th regt., in retiring from Bardoly in the month of July last.

2. From a perusal of these proceedings, of which I enclose extracts, it is my opinion that the following facts are established:

1st; That Capt. Bates withdrew his detachment from Bardoly in consequence of orders from Lieut. Col. Anderson and Col. —, his commanding officer.

2ndly; That he left his tents behind him because he had no means of carrying them off the ground: the coolies who had carried the ammunition having deserted, he was obliged to employ the tent bullocks to carry ammunition.

3rdly; That Capt. Bates had informed the commanding officer at Surat of the desertion of his coolies 2 or 3 days previous to his march, and that information was received.

3. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that great injustice has been done to Capt. Bates by Col. —; and that if any body is to be blamed because the tents belonging to Capt. Bates's detachment were left at Bardoly, he is the person, for having omitted to make arrangements to bring in those tents, when he ordered Capt. Bates to march to Surat, an order which that officer must have obeyed at his peril.

4. I therefore most anxiously recommend that ample justice should be done to Capt. Bates; and that if the Hon. the Governor in Council should agree in opinion with me upon this subject, he should give orders that a copy of this letter should be published in orders by the commanding officer in Guzerat.

5. When making extracts from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which tend, in my opinion, to establish the facts stated in the second paragraph of this letter, I have thought it proper to make others which, in my opinion, ought to meet the eye of the Hon. the Governor in Council.

6. The detachment of European troops under Capt. Bates, some of which had not been 6 months in India, when only one march from Surat, were not supplied with their regular provisions. It appears that the Committee were not unapprised of this fact, and that the complaints of the troops were loud, and that they were becoming sickly in consequence of the want of provisions.

7. This want appears fully established; and as it could not have occurred in such a situation unless some person was in fault, I hope that the Hon. the Governor in Council will mark with his decided disapprobation the person who has been guilty of a neglect of duty in this instance.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th Oct. 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th Sept., and I am glad to find that you are getting on in a manner so satisfactory to yourself. I certainly approved of your instructions, as involving all the material points at issue between the government at Bombay and me; and I believe you will experience no inconvenience from the paragraphs to which you particularly object. In fact, it is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the Native Princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword; and it follows, that if these political agents have no authority over the military, they have no power whatever. The Natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the Residents would lose their influence over their councils. It may be argued, if that is the case, the military Commanding officer ought to be the Resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say, that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive government; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning upon this subject is, that the British government in India is a phenomenon; and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded. There is nothing in the instructions to you which does not exist at this moment at Hyderabad, and would not have existed at Poonah, if the subsidiary force had ever been established at that place; and as far as I am acquainted with Major Walker, I will venture to say that he will act with you cordially for the good of the service.

I am glad that you intend to attack Canojee. Move upon him with the utmost celerity as soon as you can, and attack him, whatever may be his numbers. We must get rid of that domestic war in Guzerat, before we can expect to derive any advantage to the general cause from the troops in that province. If you had not Canojee upon your hands, I should, long before now, have requested you to move upon Ougein. Take care that, in establishing your frontier, you do not interfere with Holkar. He has not, hitherto, committed hostilities against us, and I have cautiously avoided to touch upon him. I wish you to bear this in mind.

I ought to have written you an account of our action on the 23rd Sept.;

but I really had not time, and I knew that Major Walker or you would receive the particulars from Mr. Duncan. It was the most severe battle that I have ever seen, or that, I believe, has been fought in India. The enemy's cannonade was terrible, but the result shows what a small number of British troops can do. If it had not been for a mistake of the piquets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner, also, we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did.

We took either 98 or 101 pieces of cannon on the field of battle, besides others lost on the road by the enemy, and, I believe, all their ammunition. Since the action they have fled to Burhampoor, where they left the remains of the defeated infantry. They brought out 2 or 3 fresh corps of infantry, with guns, and made first a march or two to the westward, along the Taptee; they then turned to the southward, and threatened to pass to the southward through the Casserbarry ghaut.

I consequently moved to Phoolmurry to meet them again, and I have sent Col. Stevenson to Burhampoor. I think that he will drive the defeated infantry into Hindustan; and possibly the cavalry, with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, will follow them; at all events, these movements must stop their southern trip.

You must be the best judge what ought to be done for the defence of Surat. I should be afraid that these detached redoubts would be weak, and that the men in them might be exposed to the want of water, &c. If the castle is in a commanding situation, by far the best mode would be to repair it, and raise a second defence for the defence of the town wall. If the Company have these places, and are at war, they must incur the expense of defending them.

In one of Mr. Duncan's letters, I think he said that there was a position near Surat, for a small body of troops, which defended the only avenue to the place. If that is the case, I would recommend that the position should be strengthened, and that the town should have nothing in it except the second defence. However, at present there is little probability of Surat being molested.

You must have many depôts of provisions besides Baroach and Surat. Mr. Duncan misunderstood that part of my letter to him respecting the depôts. He thought that the places mentioned were to be supplied with provisions only for their garrisons; whereas I intended that they should be depôts for the corps in the field, to be used in case the line of operations should take them towards these places.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th Oct. 1803.

I received a letter yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, the person whom I sent to Holkar. He had not been able to get on to that chief, as the country was much overrun by Scindiah's pindarries, and he says that Holkar is gone to the northward to Boondy and Kota. He sends me a copy of a letter which he had received from Holkar on the 6th of this

month, in which Holkar desires him to join with the troops of a chief who was about to march from the Taptee. Kawder Nawaz Khan was, however, unable to join this chief, on account of the pindarries and thieves, who literally swarm in the countries bordering on the Taptee and Nerbudda. He says that the hircarrahs who brought Holkar's letter told him they had left that chief on his march towards Boondy, at a place 20 coss north from Ougein. I have recalled Kawder Nawaz Khan; and I have written a letter to Holkar, in which I have informed him that I have so done, as I find that his army has gone to a considerable distance; and as the enemy's pindarries infest the country between Kawder Nawaz Khan and his army, it is therefore impossible for him to join. I think it would not answer to allow the person sent on this mission to remain any longer in the place and state in which he has been for the last two months; and indeed, at all events, it is necessary to bring him back, in order to supply him again with money, of which he is in great want. I have therefore desired him to join Col. Stevenson's camp.

I think that Gen. Lake's capture of Allyghur is one of the most extraordinary feats that I have heard of in this country. I never attacked a fort that I did not attempt the same thing, viz., to blow open the gates, but I have never succeeded. I have always taken them by escalade, which appears to have been impossible in this instance. I hope soon to hear that the General has again returned from Delhi. We must watch Holkar closely. His sudden march to the northward shows no good intention; and it may be depended upon that he will enter into the war, if he should see a prospect of advantage. Holkar has now a stake in India, which depends upon the existence of his reputation as a soldier; and I think that he will not venture to risk it, by crossing the Jumna or the Ganges, and being on the same side of these rivers with Gen. Lake. But how is your province of Bahar defended? That, in my opinion, will be the point to which he will direct his march, in case he should enter into the war.

The rain, which usually falls in this country in the months of Sept. and Oct., has, in this year, entirely failed; the consequence will be a great scarcity of grain, and, there is every reason to apprehend, a famine. This is a bad prospect for us. The same misfortune is apprehended at Bombay, and Mr. Duncan has accordingly stopped the supplies of rice for the army, in order to feed the settlement; although the grain which he now issues to the latter was laid in for the use of the former, at my suggestion, made so long ago as the month of January last. However, I have a tolerable store for the fighting men in Ahmednuggur; and I have written to the collectors in Canara, and have requested Mr. Duncan to commence a correspondence with those gentlemen, in order to secure for the army the surplus produce of that fertile province. The enemy have not yet passed the Casserbarry ghaut: I believe that my movement to this quarter has stopped them; and there is a chance that Col. Stevenson will drive the infantry entirely out of the Deccan. Kawder Nawaz Khan writes me that the enemy's cavalry are deserting; some of them pass daily through the place in which he is, and they say that the army is in great distress for food.

P.S. I wish I could hear what progress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. It is possible that Holkar may have gone to Boondy to act as a check upon them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Phoolmurry, 14th Oct. 1803.

I enclose a letter which I have written to the Sec. of government at Bombay, respecting Capt. Bates, from the perusal of which, you will observe that Capt. Bates did what he was ordered, and could not avoid what happened. I likewise enclose an extract of a letter which I have written to Major Shawe, in which you will see an account of the intelligence which I received yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, also my opinion respecting Holkar's designs.

It is possible, however, that Holkar may have gone to Boondy only to keep in check the Rajpoots, on whom he has claims, and with whom the Governor General has opened a negotiation. But he ought to be watched closely. Send Malcolm this last paper.

There is some intrigue going on at Poonah, through the medium of Sirjee Rao Ghautky. I have had intelligence of it from two or three quarters: he certainly is a dangerous fellow, and ought to be sent away.

Appah Dessaye writes to desire that Neelkund Rao Scindiah and Jolebah Goorparah, two fellows in his service, may be sent from Poonah to join him. He says that they are intriguing against him, and they are the cause of the attack which has been lately made upon this country and the fort of Manowly, by the polygar of Talloor, in which the Rajah of Kola poor and some other rascals are concerned. I have written to Gen. Campbell upon the subject; but it would be as well if the Peshwah were to give a hint upon it to the Rajah of Kolapoor, and I shall write him a letter also. I believe I told you that Sirjee Rao Ghautky has written, as he said, by the Peshwah's orders, to Appah Dessaye to give up the fort of Manowly. I desired Appah Dessaye to tell him to mind his own business; and that, if any body should venture to attack that fort, the English would defend it.

There is no understanding these Marhatta intrigues. The Peshwah and his government always appear to be concerned as individuals against his subjects, instead of as the head of the government.

Goklah also appears very uneasy respecting Noorgoond. He was here again the night before last upon the subject; and I should not be at all surprised if, in consequence of the intrigues at Poonah, both Goklah and Appah Dessaye were to desire to go off to their own countries.

To the Governor of Ceylon.

Camp, 14th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 9th Sept., and should be happy to avail myself of any opportunity to be of service to your government. But I did not take any of the Arab troops prisoners who were opposed to the troops under my command at Ahmednuggur; those who defended the pettah having been, with the killadar, driven out; and the troops who defended the fort having made a capitulation, under which they were allowed to evacuate it: I have therefore no Arabs in my possession. If I had, I should take the liberty of suggesting to you my doubts of the propriety

of employing them on the island of Ceylon. They are undoubtedly the bravest of all the troops that I have yet seen in the service of the Native powers, and they defend the posts intrusted to their charge with determined valor: but I have never seen them in the field, and I believe that they do not serve willingly except in garrison. They are a high-spirited people, and are by no means amenable to discipline and order, which it is absolutely necessary should prevail in our camps and forts; and I believe that it has happened more than once in India, that they have mutinied, even when well treated, and have been the cause of terror to their employers. I do not know exactly what pay they receive in general; but as they are esteemed good troops throughout the Marhatta empire, particularly for the defence of posts, I conclude that they receive more than double the sum which you propose to pay them, as the common pay allowed to a Marhatta chief for his infantry is 10 rupees *per mensem*.

They would certainly refuse to serve under European officers, or any person, excepting those belonging to their own tribe and nation. When these inconveniences came to be felt, you would be desirous to send them from the island; and you might find it necessary first to subdue them; and, while that operation would be going on, some of them might escape and join your natural enemies on the island. I shall, notwithstanding these objections to the Arabs, make it my business to find out at what rate of pay they can be hired, and whether they will serve in the field; and more particularly respecting their character, when I shall have the honor of addressing you again.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th Oct. 1803.

I find that the enemy were still at Maryapoor on the 10th. I have not heard of their movements since that day.

Kawder Nawaz Khan's letter was in Kanaree, which is the cipher used between him and me. I have ordered him to endeavor to join you: he is much distressed for money; and I shall be obliged to you if you will contrive to send him some to Lusoor, a place belonging to a Patan, by name Gujar Khan. If you can send him only a few hundred rupees, you will render him a great service.

Whether you get a contribution from Burhampoor or not, I think you will do well to bring away with you all the principal shroffs and soucars, by way of reprisal for the injuries of that kind done by the enemy to the Soubah's country. If they should hesitate about giving you a contribution, possibly a shell or two from your 12 pounders, having in them a bit of quick match, besides the fuse, and a threat to give them up to a general plunder, would accelerate their decision.

I wish that you would fit out a detachment, such as that which I have under Capt. Baynes, to keep your camp supplied. If you do not, you may depend upon it you will be in want. I have not a third of the number of bullocks that you have; but, by means of this detachment, I have been tolerably well supplied.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th Oct. 1803.

1. In addition to the other difficulties I experience in this country upon

the subject on which I have troubled you at different times, the people attached to my camp experience one of considerable magnitude in taking gold coins in the Soubah's country. The people are willing to take them, but at a very depreciated rate of exchange; in some instances, at the rate of one half, at others of two thirds of their value, and at that rate I am under the necessity of issuing them to the troops.

2. The consequence is, that the price of every article is much increased; and in many instances the dealers have returned without loads, rather than submit to this extortion of the inhabitants, and thereby distress is occasioned in camp.

3. It is not possible to avoid the issue of these gold coins to the troops. Very lately, Gen. Stuart sent to Col. Stevenson and me 6 lacs of pagodas in gold coins of different descriptions, and I really believe that at this moment there is not a rupee in the camp of either.

4. Under these circumstances, I shall be much obliged to you if you will request the Soubah's ministers to issue proclamations as soon as possible, requiring the people of the country to receive these gold coins in payment of articles required for the camp of the British troops, and holding forth engagements that those coins will be received in payment of the revenue at the same rate of exchange.

5. I have the honor to enclose the nerrick of the rates at which the coins are issued to the troops.

Rate at which the undermentioned coins are issued to the troops:

	R.	A.	P.
Star pagodas	3	8	0
Behaudhy, or Hydry, or Rajah's pagodas	3	12	1
Porto Novo, or Feringhy Pet pagodas	3	0	0
Gold fanams, $3\frac{1}{2}$ per	1	0	0
Bombay gold mohurs	15	0	0
Hydri, or Behaudhy or Rajah's gold mohurs	16	0	0

N.B. These are the coins principally in circulation at present; and if they should be received in the country at the rates specified above, no inconvenience will be felt. But, besides these coins, there are a variety of others in circulation, upon all of which there is a loss.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 15th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 30th Sept. and 2nd inst. It is very probable that you will do nothing with Canojee by negotiating. I suggested the means only because I observed that he was extremely weak in troops, and was absolutely destitute of money, and that he could procure none. At the same time, the few troops he has were likely to keep in employment all our troops in Guzerat, during the most precious time of the campaign, and thus divert them from the prosecution of the general war, to domestic purposes. If you should negotiate, I anxiously hope that you will not stop your operations on that account: that mode will never answer any good purpose.

It is heart-breaking to see the state of the 65th. I foretold to Mr. Duncan the consequence of sending that corps to Surat at that season, and afterwards putting them in the field without any means necessary to secure even their existence, much less their comfort, during the monsoon.

I have had no report regarding the deserters of the 75th regt. Your account of the manner in which the troops are treated at Baroda is very unpleasant. It is positively contrary to all rules, diminishes the respect for the troops, and their sense of their own character, to allow them to run after palanquins and horses, and ought not to be permitted. However, the subject is a very delicate one at Baroda: I will take an opportunity of bringing it before Mr. Duncan, who alone can apply a remedy.

I suspect that you will not find the Patans of much use; however, a few of them can do you no harm, and they may be the means of opening the communication with their friends on the frontier.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 15th Oct. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th. It gives me great pleasure to have it in my power to do any thing to gratify Azimool Oomrah, and, accordingly, I request that you will be so kind as to return to him the enclosed letters, and beg of him to intercede with the Soubah of the Deccan for the killadar of Dowlutabad.

2. It will be proper, however, to take this opportunity of impressing the mind of this killadar with the necessity which exists that he should have full confidence in the British officers, that he should treat as friends the British troops, and that he should obey the orders which he may receive from Rajah Mohiput Ram.

3. On the other hand, I declare that I have no intention whatever to make use of the fort of Dowlutabad, excepting on occasions which may be absolutely necessary to forward the service, in which the interests of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan are more involved than are those of the British government.

G. O.

Camp at Poonhmurry, 15th Oct. 1803.

The sentences passed on Mahomed Isack and Sheek David, sepoy in the 1st batt. 10th regt., and Mahomed Reza, sepoy in the 1st batt. 2nd regt., published in the orders of yesterday, are to be carried into execution this afternoon.

The line to be under arms at half past 5 o'clock; the cavalry mounted, and formed on the right of the infantry. A guard of a subaltern officer and 20 men from each corps of infantry in camp (except the 74th), under a captain, will parade at the tent where the prisoners are confined at 4 o'clock, when the provost will deliver them over to the guard, and the captain of it will march them from the right of the cavalry to the left of the infantry in slow time, and back again to the place appointed for the execution of Sheek David, in front of the 1st batt. 10th regt. The music and drummers and fifers of corps will play the dead march as the prisoners pass.

The provost-serjeant will accompany the prisoners with his guard. An execution party, consisting of 1 havildar, 1 naig, and 4 sepoy of the 1st batt. 10th regt., and 2 sepoy from each of the other Native corps in camp, to parade at the place of execution at 4 o'clock this afternoon.

As soon as the prisoners shall arrive at the place of execution, a gun will be fired from the park as a signal for the time when commanding officers of corps will give orders that the extract from G. O. containing the sentences awarded to the prisoners, and this order, may be read to their corps.

A second gun will be fired when the captain of the guard will deliver the prisoner Sheek David over to the serjeant, and he will carry the sentence awarded to him into execution, according to orders which he will receive through the D. A. G. During the execution of Sheek David, the prisoners Mahomed Isack and Mahomed Reza are to remain in charge of the captain of the guard; they are afterwards to be sent to their respective corps in charge of the details from them composing a part of that guard; when the commanding officers of those corps will cause the sentences passed upon them to be put into execution. Upon firing a third gun, all the other corps, and the captain's guard, will be dismissed.

4. I have the honor to enclose another memorandum which I received yesterday from Capt. Baynes, on the subject of difficulties experienced by the brinjarries; and I shall be obliged to you if you will urge the ministers to give orders that the grievances complained of may be redressed.

5. I shall take an early opportunity of forwarding to Rajah Mohiput Ram and Rajah Sookroodoor the letters directed to them.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 15th Oct. 1803.

I have received intelligence from more than one quarter that a car-koon, by name Ballojee Punt, or Babajee Punt, has been sent from the enemy's camp to Poonah. He has with him 10 or 15 horse. It will be well to watch this fellow, and ascertain the object of his mission. It is said, also, a Frenchman is gone to Poonah, but that I doubt. Be so kind as to send the enclosed to the Rajah of Kolapoor.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 15th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 11th.

I beg you to give 1000 rupees to Ram Rao, and another 1000 among the peons and cavalry, as a reward for their services. With respect to the remainder, I wish to have a particular account of everything taken. If it should turn out to be of that kind of which I have the disposal, I shall do so; if not, I shall refer the matter to government. You will do well to keep the papers you mention, as well as Madajee Scindiah's seal, upon the subject of which I shall address the Governor General. I wish that you would lose no time in raising your horse: nothing but a body of them will keep the country in tranquillity, and secure our communication with Ahmednuggur, which is now in a very unpleasant state, and requires constant guards and escorts.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 15th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 8th, and I am glad to see that you and I agree in opinion respecting Amrut Rao. I have heard nothing of him lately. I have received from Col. Murray a sad account of the state of the troops in Guzerat. The 65th regt., which arrived in India about 6 months ago, 400 strong, has now only 280 in the field; and the 86th about 500; the Native corps none more than that number, and some only 200. I foretold to Mr. Duncan the consequence of putting the 65th regt. in the field during the monsoon, without any one comfort necessary to their existence. However, there was some reason for not employing Col. Watson; and the 75th, the seasoned corps, was kept in garrison, and the 65th, the new corps, sent to the field, and we now feel the consequences. But Col. Murray has mentioned another circumstance to me, which certainly requires a remedy, but to which nobody can attempt to apply one, except Mr. Duncan himself. The Rajah, the minister, and the Resident at Baroda, have guards so exceedingly strong, as to run away with the whole garrison. There is, besides, only a gate guard of 60 men; and, in consequence of the number on duty, the men now on those guards will not be relieved at all until Col. Murray quits the field. This is note-

riously ruinous to discipline, and must, in the end, operate to the prejudice of those very persons for whose safety these strong guards have been established. It would be much better to find out the number of sentries each party required, and give him a guard in proportion to that number, viz., 3 men for every post, and to have those men relieved daily, if possible, by the garrison; if not possible, then weekly.

Another circumstance mentioned to me by Col. Murray is, that the Rajah, the minister, and the Resident, have more than half of their guards running after them on foot, when they go out, whether in a palanquin, or on horseback. It is very obvious that the consequence of this is, that all respect for troops used in this manner must be at an end; and that those troops must lose all respect for themselves. It is, therefore, very desirable that this practice, which does not prevail elsewhere, should be stopped at Baroda. You will be surprised when I tell you that Purneah never has with him a Company's sepoy, excepting, possibly, an orderly from me; and that, as for the Rajah at Mysore, he has at Mysore one company of Native infantry, who do the duty of that place and the Rajah's palace, and never move from it. I wish that you would try what you can do with Mr. Duncan upon this subject. I think that the present weakness of the garrison of Baroda, and the want of all the troops that is possible for field service, might be used as an argument with the Rajah to decrease his guard to the number required for his sentries, and to relieve it daily, which measure would of itself put an end to the use of the Company's sepoys as sowarry.

I believe I have intrusted you with a more difficult negotiation than you have ever had in your diplomatic career; but I am convinced that you will see the necessity of putting an end to this practice, and this appears a favorable opportunity to attempt it.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 16 miles N. of Phoolmurry, 16th Oct. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd inst. In my opinion, the best way of sending me the money which you intend for my use would be from Gen. Campbell's division, by the route of Meritch to Poonah, and thence to Ahmednuggur; from whence I can contrive to bring it forward. It might come on bullocks lightly loaded, with a large proportion of specie.

I wish, however, to apprise you that some of the gold coins lately sent to us with Major Hill are almost useless. The rupees of any kind pass best in this country, although I know that the gold coins are most convenient for carriage. But the loss is immense upon every species of gold coin, excepting Behaudry, or Hydry, or Madras pagodas. The Porto Novo pagodas, in particular, of which I have at this moment above a lac, cannot be passed at all. I have written to Major Kirkpatrick upon the subject, but I despair of a remedy. The money from Canara, in case there should be any, might be embarked at Goa, and sent to Bombay, addressed to me; otherwise, not improbably it may be seized there.

As I perceive an inclination among the polygars between the Malpoorba and the Gutpurba to create disturbances, it is possible that the communication by that route may be impeded; and I much doubt the security of

any other along the frontier of the Nizam and the Marhattas. In that case it may be necessary to send the money which may be collected at Gen. Campbell's camp to Goa, there to be embarked; or to Hyderabad, or to Beeder, avoiding the frontier, and thence to Dharore, from which place I can bring it forward.

I received intelligence last night that Scindiah was, on the 13th, still at the station which he had taken up on the road to the Casserbarry ghaut; but he had detached Gopal Bhow and other sirdars, with some cavalry, to the northward, on that day. I am convinced, therefore, that he has no intention of coming to the southward; and I have marched, this morning, towards Adjuntee.

Since my arrival here, a man has come in whom I had sent to examine the Untoor ghaut; and he brings a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar made a movement to the northward on the 14th: however, this is not so clearly ascertained. I shall be within reach of Col. Stevenson before the enemy can attempt any thing upon him, supposing them to intend it, after what has already happened. But, by all accounts, they are sadly disorganized. However, it is impossible to say whether they may be able to equip another corps of infantry at Burhampoor; and, although I doubt whether our loss would have been much less than it was on the 23rd Sept., supposing both divisions to have been engaged, I should not much like, upon any speculations of my own, to run the risk of such another loss, by engaging the enemy's whole army of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, with one of our divisions only, supposing them to be able and inclined to engage with us. Col. Stevenson knows my sentiments upon this subject, and has directions to guide his conduct accordingly.

I have lately received a letter from Kawder Nawaz Khan. He was still at Lussoor; but Holkar had written to him a letter that he received on the 6th Oct., in which he pressed him to come on; and desired him to join a sirdar who was about to march from the Taptee to join Holkar's army, north of the Nerbudda. The country bordering on the Taptee swarms with pindarries and thieves of all descriptions, and Kawder Nawaz Khan was unable to move. The hircarra who delivered Holkar's letter told Kawder Nawaz Khan that he had left him in full march to Boondy and Kota, and that he was 20 coss north from Ougein. Boondy belongs to one of the Rajpoot Rajahs, upon all of whom Holkar has claims, with the Peshwah and Scindiah. It is possible, therefore, that he is gone only to realize these claims. On the other hand, he may intend to co-operate with the confederates in Hindustan.

At all events, I have not thought it proper to leave Kawder Nawaz Khan any longer in the disagreeable situation in which he is at Lussoor; and I have ordered him to join Col. Stevenson, if he possibly can. I have written to Holkar to apprise him, that, as he was gone to such a distance, and the country was so completely overrun by pindarries and thieves, I had recalled Kawder Nawaz Khan.

Amrut Rao's vakeel told me that Holkar and Scindiah had not yet agreed. It appears that Scindiah has, for many years, collected and applied to his own use the whole of the peshcush paid by the Rajpoots; and Holkar now claims, not only to collect his own share, and half the Pesh-

wah's in future, which Scindiah has offered, but the whole peshcush for the same number of years that the whole has been collected by Scindiah. It is impossible to say whether this or any other story told by a Marhatta is true; but Holkar's march to the northward, of which I have no doubt, may be possibly made with a view to realize this claim, at least, in this year, in which Scindiah is engaged with us. If this is the case, nothing can be more fortunate.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 16 miles N. of Phoolmurry, 16th Oct. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th inst.

2. It is but justice to you to express, that I am perfectly sensible that you have done every thing in your power to induce the servants of the Soubah's government to attend to my requisitions for the public service; but whether they are unaccustomed to obey the orders of any person, or whether they have a particular objection to receive orders from an European officer, it is very certain that they do not attend to me; and, therefore, I most anxiously recommend that one of the sirdars in the Soubah's service should have power over all persons under the Soubah's government in this part of the country.

3. I believe Salabut Khan to be a man of the first rank, consequence, and family at present serving with the Soubah's troops; and Col. Stevenson has always mentioned him with respect and regard. But it does not appear that he is trusted by, and that he enjoys the confidence of, the government to the same degree as Rajah Mohiput Ram. The latter, also, is more accustomed to business than the former, who trusts the management even of the business he has at present to Fatty Jung Khan.

4. Under these circumstances, I should recommend Rajah Mohiput Ram to be the person vested with this authority by the Soubah's government. But if Salabut Khan, or any other sirdar, either with the army or at Hyderabad, should be preferred by his Highness, I shall be ready to co-operate with such person for the general good.

5. I agree in opinion with you, that it would be very inconvenient for his Highness to join his army on the frontier in person; and, for the reasons you mention, the measure ought not to be proposed to him. I suggested it only as an alternative, that the armies might enjoy the resources of the country in case it should not be possible to prevail upon his Highness to trust any of his sirdars with sufficient powers over the killadars and others in this part of the country, to bring forward those resources.

6. I think it will be advisable to send forward the 5 lacs of rupees alluded to in the seventh paragraph of your letter of the 8th, and any rice, &c., for which you may have carriage, to Dharore, as you have proposed.

7. My letters to his Excellency the Governor General will have apprised you of my march towards Aurungabad, and of my reasons for moving in that direction. If the enemy ever intended to pass to the

G. A. O.

Camp, 16th Oct. 1803.

Some guns will be fired and fireworks let off in Goklah's camp this night.

southward by the Casserbarry ghaut, they have now relinquished that intention; as I heard, in the course of last night, that on the 13th a part of their cavalry had moved to the northward. I consequently marched towards Adjuttee from Phoolmurry this morning, and I have since received accounts from persons whom I had sent to examine the Untoor ghaut, from which I think there is reason to believe that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar made a march in a northerly direction on the 14th.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Pahllood, 17th Oct. 1803.

1. I am concerned to have to inform you that 30 of the dooley bearers attached to the 78th regt. deserted on the night before last, and 100 last night: I am, therefore, under the necessity of requesting that measures may be taken to obtain at Bombay at least 250 dooley bearers for the service of that regiment.

2. As I observe in a late letter from government to the Military board, upon the subject of the desertion of the camp followers hired at Bombay, that the Hon. the Governor in Council is of opinion that this practice among that class of people had been very unusual, I am apprehensive that the degree to which it has prevailed among those hired at Bombay only, in this camp, may be attributed to improper interference in the management of them, or to the extraordinary hardships under which they labor.

3. The Hon. the Governor in Council will have observed, by the orders which I formerly transmitted for his confirmation, that I left the Bombay establishment exactly as I found it, under the management of the officers appointed by the regulations of the Bombay government to superintend it. The dooley bearers attached to the 78th regt., in particular, have always been under the surgeon of that regiment, and employed solely in carrying the sick of the corps, although all the other dooley bearers with the army, in the pay of the public, whether from Mysore or the Carnatic, are under charge of the Staff Surgeon, and are applicable to the general service as they may be required.

4. Indeed, I was anxious to prevent their too frequent communication, as the former receive ten and a half rupees *per mensem*, and the latter only seven; and I was apprehensive that those who received least pay, and did most work, would desert.

5. Besides the dooley bearers attached to the 78th regt., their watermen have gone also; and I believe every private follower in the regiment raised at Bombay.

6. As our operations have been carried on in countries entirely exhausted, and as the season has been very unfavourable, the price of grain has been high: but the average price has not been higher than at Poonah, when the army was in the neighbourhood of that city; and I have the satisfaction to reflect, that, although certainly dear, grain has always been plentiful. If its high price was likely to occasion desertion, it is probable that it would occasion it among that class of people who have the lowest, rather than among those who have the highest pay.

7. I believe, therefore, that this distressing desertion of the followers hired at Bombay is to be attributed rather to the nature of the people, to the ease with which they have it in their power to return thither, and to

the fact that, however numerous the desertions, the police of Bombay have not the power of applying a remedy.

8. I have not had much experience of the service in this part of India; but wherever I have seen the Bombay troops employed, whether in this quarter or on the coast, complaints have always been sent of the desertion of their followers; and I believe that, upon a reference to the letters received from officers commanding escorts or detachments in this part of India, since the beginning of April last, it will be found that not one has marched and performed the service on which he was sent, without making a complaint of the desertion of his public followers.

The D.A.G. to Major Palmer, Aurungabad.

Camp at Pahllood, 17th Oct. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has marched again to the northward, and will be at Adjuttee to-morrow. He has heard from the enemy's camp of the day before yesterday, when their main body was still about Parola and Nagyasser. He does not imagine that they have now any intention of ascending the Casserbarry ghaut; but, lest they should make the attempt, either in force or by small parties, he requests that you will urge the Soubahdar of Aurungabad to destroy the pass, either by cutting down trees in it if there be any, building barriers to be defended by a few peons, or in any other manner that the nature of the ghaut may render practicable.

The General begs you will continue to communicate any intelligence that you may obtain of the enemy's motions or intentions, both by tappall and by hircarrahs.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 18th Oct. 1803.

I shall not write by the overland dispatch. I have written in duplicate by Bombay and Madras, and I have not time to write another letter this day.

I have had another oblique offer to treat for peace. The papers on the subject will go to Bombay as soon as they can be copied.

I have returned to the northward, as I find that the enemy have made movements in that direction. They are certainly not going to the southward.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Adjuttee, 18th Oct. 1803.

1. As the season for reaping the harvest is now approaching, I wish to draw your attention to the state of the magazines of grain in the forts on the frontier of his Highness the Soubah.

2. It is very difficult to get any account of what those magazines contain; and the accounts which I have received are imperfect, and so indistinct, that I am not certain at this moment whether it is intended to

G. O.

Adjuttee, 18th Oct. 1803.

The detachment to march to-morrow morning by the right. The brigade of cavalry and the 3rd batt. Native infantry of the 4th brigade, without their guns, are to proceed by a road leading to Ferdapoor.

The 78th regt., with its guns, and the 5th brigade, followed by the guns of the cavalry, and Native corps of the 4th brigade, to proceed by a road leading down direct to Ferdapoor. The park wheel carriages in the provision and store departments, and the magazine, to follow those guns; the other departments and baggage may go by either road.

The cavalry and 4th brigades will halt 3 hours at Ferdapoor to cover the baggage, &c., which may come down that road, and will then march on to Ferdapoor, leaving a battalion of sepoys to come up in rear of the baggage.

The rear guard will proceed by the direct road to Ferdapoor.

The guns, &c., of the cavalry and Native corps in the 4th brigade will join on the arrival of the corps in the camp at Ferdapoor.

express the value of the grain each magazine contains, counted in rupees, or a certain number of measures, or what those measures are: they were given to me at the moment when Rajah Sookroodoor was about to march with Col. Stevenson's division, and I had no opportunity of having from him a personal explanation, and I have never received an answer to the letter which I wrote to him upon this subject.

3. I am therefore of opinion that there is some reason for concealing from the officers of the British government the real state of these magazines.

4. That state, however, becomes every day more important: there is great reason to apprehend a scarcity, if not a famine, in the next season, in the countries north of the Godavery; and in Hindustan particularly it is said that the crops have failed entirely. Measures ought to be immediately adopted, therefore, to find out the real state of the grain magazines at Dowlutabad, Puttun, Dharore, and all the smaller forts to the northward in particular, and to have them filled with jowarry wheat and chinna, if they should not be so already.

5. There appears to be no doubt but that under the treaty the Soubah is obliged to fill his magazines with grain; and it is certainly intended that the British troops should have the use of the grain which the magazines contain. But, excepting a small quantity which Col. Stevenson received from Dowlutabad, we have got none; and from the difficulties we have experienced, even in approaching the forts, I think it probable that the Soubah's servants do not understand that the contents are intended for the use of the British troops.

6. Under these circumstances, and considering that a great expense will attend the filling of the magazines, that the Soubah is supposed to be fond of money, and that he has already shown some indisposition towards the British government, it is a question which I wish you to decide, whether these magazines shall be filled at the expense of the British government, or at that of the government of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

7. At all events, it appears to me to be proper that you should have an explanation upon the subject with the minister, and that you should ascertain his sentiments. The first point to be ascertained is the real state of the magazines, and whether it is understood that they are resources for the use of the British troops, and by what means their contents are to be procured. The next point to be ascertained is, whether his Highness is willing to replenish the magazines at the present moment.

8. If there should be any doubt upon this subject, or whether the contents of the magazines were considered as resources for the use of the British troops, it will become necessary that they should be filled on account of the British Government; and I shall be obliged to you if you will urge the minister to give the necessary orders to the killadars and amildars, and if you will settle with him the mode in which the grain is to be paid for, whether to the government at Hyderabad, or to the amildars in the countries in which it is collected, that in which the quantities are to be ascertained, and that in which the grain is to be drawn from the magazines by the British troops.

9. If the grain laid into the different forts is considered a resource for the British troops, I understand it is to be paid for in proportion as it is drawn out.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Colman, Poonah.

Camp, 18th Oct. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to request that you will detach 3 companies of sepoy, with abundance of ammunition, to the village of Chickorie, near Poonadur, with orders to protect the tappall runners from the Ramooshies, and to keep up the communication between Poonah and Meritch until tappall runners are laid upon the road by the Bhore ghaut and Baramootty, which Lieut. Frissell will report to you, when the General requests that you will recall the detachment of sepoy.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Vesey.

Camp at Adjuntee, 18th Oct. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to acquaint you that he has this evening received information that a party of the enemy's horse has entered the country to the eastward by the Dewal ghaut. He has not yet ascertained the truth of the report, nor the number of horse said to have come into the country; but he requests that you will proceed with every degree of caution, keeping your convoy well collected, &c. &c.

To Mirza Wahed Bey.

Camp, 19th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 10th Oct., written to Capt. Johnson, in which you say it is written in the presence and by desire of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I never heard and know nothing of any letter written by Col. Collins from the top of the ghauts. I have already written fully to Ballojee Koonger on the subject of sending a sirdar to the camp of the Maharajah, and I still entertain the same sentiments that I did when I wrote that letter.

The desire of the British government to remain at peace with the Maharajah cannot be doubted; and I repeat what I said to Ballojee Koonger, that, if the Maharajah had complied with the reasonable requisition which I made to him to withdraw his troops from the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, the peace of India would have been insured. But the Maharajah listened to the advice of evil counsellors; and the consequence is, that he is involved in a war with his oldest and most faithful allies.

If the Maharajah has any proposition to make to me, let him send here a sirdar. Whatever that proposition may be, it shall be attended to and answered with respect. In regard to the designs entertained in the Maharajah's camp, and the threats which you communicate in your letter, I have to observe, that it does not become you to write them, and I shall certainly not throw away my time by noticing them.

The D.A.G. to Major Palmer.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 19th Oct. 1803.

I enclose a Persian letter from the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley to the killadar

G. M. O.

19th Oct. 1803.

All the men off duty of the 1st batt. 2nd regt., and 1st batt. 4th regt., to be employed to-day as a working party, in assisting the guns in the park, and wheel carriages in the store and provision department, down the Adjuntee pass.

G. O.

Camp, Ferdapoor, 19th Oct. 1803.

The following establishment is allowed, from the 1st Sept. last, for the department of agent for hired bullocks with this division of the army: 1 head writer, 30 star pagodas per month; 2 second ditto, 20 each; 1 head conicopoly, 20; 5 assistant ditto at 6 each; 2 peons, 3 each; stationery and candles, 40; total, 176.

of Aurungabad, and a translation of it for your information. The General begs that you will urge the killadar to comply with the request to receive Amrut Rao's family into Aurungabad, and to accommodate them with suitable houses; and also that you will forward the killadar's answer, by tappall, to Adjuttee.

To the Military Paymaster Gen., Fort St. George.

20th Oct. 1803.

I have been furnished, from the Pay office at Seringapatam, with copies of your letters to the Paymaster of that place, under date the 1st and 3rd Oct.; by which I observe that you have disallowed his taking up certain bills drawn upon you by the Paymaster of this division of the army in favor of people in camp, who have their families or their commercial agents residing at Seringapatam.

This division of the army was originally fitted out at Seringapatam, and many merchants of property were induced to accompany it. It became necessary for them to make remittances to their agents there, for new purchases of supplies, which were of the greatest importance to the troops. They had no correspondents in Madras, and, if they had, could not have got their money remitted from thence to Seringapatam till after a considerable lapse of time, and probably at much expense. I therefore authorised Mr. Gordon to take up the bills drawn upon you, as stated in the letters of the 14th April and 26th May, of which copies have been sent you.

Mr. Gordon wrote for answer, that he would take up all bills of that kind that might be presented, without requiring a special order for each; and accordingly money to a considerable amount has been paid into the treasury here by the Mysore dealers, and by some military men, for bills on your office, which Mr. Gordon has taken up regularly; and has thereby not only filled our treasury, and brought forward fresh supplies to the army for the time past, but has also established such a confidence among the dealers as promises to ensure a continuance of their exertions, in future, in bringing forward supplies, which increase daily in importance to the troops, in proportion to the difficulties in bringing them forward.

I conceive, that carrying your orders to the Paymaster of Seringapatam into execution, at present, would be attended with serious bad consequences to this division of the army, and I am hopeful that you will be induced to suspend them; but if the rules of your office are too strict to allow of your doing so, I beg that you will, as soon as may be convenient, submit the subject to the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council.

I am so anxious that no interruption of the payment of these bills may become known, that I have written to Capt. Quin to take them all up on my private credit.

I endeavored to avoid any infringement upon the regulations of government for the conduct of the public officers in this respect, by requesting the Resident in Mysore to lodge a sum of money with the Paymaster at Seringapatam, to the amount whereof the Paymaster in camp might draw upon him; but the Resident found it inconvenient to do this.

I have been very solicitous to avoid infringing any of the established regulations of government in the conduct of the service established here; although it is very obvious that they could not have been framed with a view for service in these distant countries, particularly the regulations

for the conduct of the pay department. As a proof of this solicitude, I have to mention that I have orders and authority from the Governor General to draw bills upon every station in India, which I have not exercised in respect to Seringapatam, because I was unwilling to depart from the established regulations, in a case for which I understood from Mr. Gordon that the regulations had provided.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 21st Oct. 1803.

I return your brother's letter, and I will write to him. At present I am not well able to do any thing, having had a smart attack of fever for these last two days, but I am better this day.

Stevenson took possession of Burhampoor on the 16th.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 21st Oct. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 9th, 14th, and 15th, and I will endeavor to reply to them, although weak from the effects of a fever, which I have had for the last 2 days.

I never imagined that Bundelcund was in the hands of the Peshwah, and I concluded that our government must take possession of that province either by force, or in consequence of the influence which it had acquired there. That becomes still more necessary, as the only shadow of influence which the Peshwah has is through the carkoon of the late Aly Behauder. As that province must be taken possession of by a British force, in consequence of British influence, and as I do not see any reason to apprehend that our force will fail in taking possession, or to believe that the policy of government will induce them to delay to attempt it, and all this must have been foreseen and known by the Governor General at the time that he consented to the modification of the treaty of Bassein, under which we are to have Bundelcund, I do not think there is any necessity for delaying the cession of Oolpar, merely on account of the defects of the instrument by which the Peshwah has conveyed to the British government the province of Bundelcund.

Indeed, these defects show an unusual honesty in the Peshwah's government; for if they had wished to have deceived us, they might have addressed their orders to amildars, sirsoubahs, &c., instead of the carkoon of the late Aly Behauder.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think that Oolpar ought to be ceded immediately to Vittell Seo Deo. I am sorry to observe that that chief will not accommodate with us at all: however, it might be well to give him a hint that the British government, after the favor shown to him, will not submit to his being the object of that favor to the prejudice of the city of Surat; and that if his amildars and people do not accommodate with the gentlemen of Surat for the benefit of the city, the place will be taken from him.

The Peshwah is too bad: it is really discreditable for the British government to have anything to say to him. There is no going on, unless thieves are punished, whoever they may be, or by whomsoever they may be employed. These thieves at Ahmednuggur were plundering in our districts, and I shall send orders that they may be hanged.

By the tappalls come in last night, I see that our intercourse with the southern countries is re-established. The letter which I have written to the killadar of Poonadur, and the posting the companies on the road, may keep it up, and I should wish it to continue by the direct road, if possible. Indeed, in point of security, I do not think much would be gained by altering the direction, as the road through the Bhore ghaut, as well as every other road in this blessed country, is infested by thieves, and certainly much would be lost, in point of time. Besides, it is discreditable to have even our tappalls interrupted or removed by such a set of rascals. Therefore, although I wish the runners to be posted on the Bhore ghaut and Baramooty roads, I wish the tappalls still to continue to run by the direct road, and not to be sent by the circuitous route, unless it should be absolutely necessary. I request you to give directions upon this subject to Mr. Frissell.

I am obliged to you for Mr. Stewart's report. I have sent orders to Poonah that he may enjoy the benefits held forth in the Governor General's proclamation of the 29th Aug.

The only brigade that escaped on the 23rd was part of Begum Sumroo's. They were with the baggage, and got off in safety. I knew this on the day of action, and saw them go off. There may also have been one battalion of Pohlman's with the baggage, but I am not certain of that. Dorsan was certainly killed, and the bodies of other Europeans, who did not belong to us, were seen.

Your sepoy's joined me, and I detained them in case I should find it necessary to attack the place, of which they were able to give a description. One of them was taken sick, and they are at present both absent on leave, but Barclay knows where they are.

Stevenson took possession of Burhampoor without opposition on the 16th, and he was going the next day to look at Asseerghur. By the last accounts the enemy were still about Parola. They have made another offer of peace, in the same style with the last, which has been answered in the same manner; and Col. Lang met Col. Collins's news writer in the road between this and Eedlabad, with letters for me, which he said contained propositions for peace. This man is arrived in Col. Stevenson's camp, but he has not produced these letters, although he certainly has them.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Quin.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 21st Oct. 1803.

Your letters of the 6th and 7th inst. arrived last night. The stoppage of payment at your office of the bills lately granted to Seringapatam people would be attended with the very worst consequences to this army; and the General has written to the Military Paymaster Gen. either to recall his orders to you on that head, or to submit the matter to government. In the mean time he requests that the bills may be honored as usual, *on his credit*.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Colman, Poonah.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 21st Oct. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you the accompanying copy of his proclamation of the 8th inst., fixing the places to which the officers, &c., in the service of the Mahratta states might repair, who should be desirous of availing themselves of the proclamation of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, dated 29th Aug. last. The General has not a copy of that

proclamation at hand just now, and begs that you will apply to Lieut. Col. Close for one.

He requests that you will ascertain from Mr. Stewart, who has quitted the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and repaired to Poonah, what his allowances were in that Chief's service, and forward an account thereof for the General's information and orders. In the mean time he authorises you to order an advance of cash to be made to Mr. Stewart, for his present expenses, if he requires it. He begs that Mr. Stewart will remain at Poonah for the present; but if he should be desirous to reside at any other place, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that he will state his wishes, and they shall be complied with, if possible.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 22nd Oct. 1803.

I enclose a long letter for your brother. It contains my real opinion, and is, I think, that which any well judging man must entertain on the subject. Seal the letter, and send it to him.

I had no fever yesterday, or last night, but I am still very weak. I have no news for you. The enemy appear to be in the utmost distress and confusion, and not to know what step to take. It is said that they have quarrelled, and that Scindiah is gone by one road and Ragojee by another, both towards Berar. Nothing can be more fortunate than this, if it be true.

I agree entirely in opinion with you regarding the pensions to Gholam Aly's son and his family; but as the expense of all the pensions is defrayed by the Rajah of Mysore, ought not the proposition from you and government to be, that you should be permitted to recommend to the Rajah's government to give a pension of that amount to the family of the late Gholam Aly? The pensions were thrown upon the Rajah as so many incumbrances upon the revenues of Mysore, which were evidently occasioned by the settlement of the government in his family; but I think it may have an awkward appearance, and may be a bad precedent, for the Company's government to make any addition to these incumbrances, although the British Resident may, with great propriety, and ought in this instance to, recommend that one should be made. Thank you for the Army List.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 22nd Oct. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 17th. If you cannot get the horse at the lower price, you must of course give a higher; but certainly 25 rupees a month, regularly paid, is more than is given by any Marhatta chief.

If an attack should be made on Chumargoonda, you may make a requisition on Capt. Lucas to send a detachment to relieve that post; but let it be sufficiently strong and respectable in cannon, to insure the completion of the service; and let the detachment return as soon as they shall have relieved that place.

I wish to have from you a particular report on the subject of the thieves sent into our district by Vittojee Naig. They must be kept in confinement in the mean time, as I think that I shall be obliged to order them to be hanged.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Ferlapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

I have a report from an hircarra, which I believe to be true, that Col.

Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur on the 21st, upon which I beg leave to congratulate you. Scindiah certainly intended to interrupt his operations, and he moved as far as Ahoonah on the Taptee. He has been there 2 or 3 days, and halted only when he heard I had come down the ghauts. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and it is said is gone towards Chandore, to pass through that ghaut to the southward. This report may be circulated, or he may have gone by that road in order to draw me after him, and to leave Scindiah at liberty to carry into execution his designs against Col. Stevenson. However, as soon as I shall be certain that Col. Stevenson has taken Asseerghur, I shall re-ascend the ghauts, if I find that Ragojee Bhonslah has really passed through by Chandore, as I see by Col. Stevenson's letter of the 19th that the infantry of the camposos cannot recover from the effects of the battle of Assye; and Col. Stevenson is fully equal to undertake any thing against Scindiah's cavalry only. I have desired the Colonel not to give up his operations against Asseerghur, if he should not have got possession, as I have equipments for a siege; and even if guns should fail, we will try if we cannot blow it up.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the wounded officers and men are doing remarkably well. Some of the former, and many of the latter, have returned to their duty.

I have not heard from Bengal since the 16th, or from Col. Harcourt since he took Jaggernaut. It is reported here that something unpleasant has happened to the latter. Col. Murray is getting on in Guzerat much better than I could have expected, with very defective means. The 65th regt., which landed at Bombay in May last 900 strong, exclusive of 2 companies which have been destroyed in Ceylon, have now only 100 men for duty. This corps has been ruined from the want of common care to give them the necessary food and cover when they were sent to the field, and by putting them into unhealthy barracks at Surat; by which 2 regts., the 75th and 84th, had been before destroyed.

Col. Murray was not far from Godra on the 7th of this month, and he expected to be able either to drive off or to engage the rebel Canojee immediately. He was on good terms with all the Bheel Rajahs. Godra is not, I believe, 100 miles from Ougein.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

The hircarrah who carried the packet in which the enclosed letter was included reported that Col. Stevenson had got possession of the fort of Asseerghur; and as he had no letter for me, and none of the letters for gentlemen in this camp mentioned in the capture of the place, I took the liberty of opening the enclosed, as it was of importance that I should have an early knowledge of the real state of the case. The enclosed does not contain the wished for intelligence; but the hircarrah who carried it said

G. O.

Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

Until further orders, whenever the *general* or long roll beats, the paymaster's guard is to be reinforced by a havildar, naig, and 12 sepoys, who will be employed in guarding the treasure carried on bullocks; and as soon as this treasure shall be laid down at the pay office after a march, this reinforcement of the guard will again join its corps.

as follows : That he had been two nights and one day upon his road, and that we had possession of the fort before he came away. Upon being asked whether he had seen our flag flying on the fort, he said he had.

After the perusal of the letter to Gen. Stuart, it occurred to me that the hircarrah might have seen our flag flying, and our troops in possession of the pettah, and not of the fort : I therefore questioned him upon this point, and he said that he had seen the flag in the pettah only ; and he gave an accurate account of the manner in which the troops had got possession of that part of the place, but he still persisted that we had got possession of the fort itself. I then desired him to say whether he had seen our troops in it ; and he gave the following as an account on which I might depend : That he was with Rajah Mohiput Ram at Burhampoor on the 21st ; that he heard the Rajah read a letter from Salabut Khan, stating that we had got possession of Asseerghur ; that he heard the orders given for firing a Royal salute at Burhampoor, on that occasion ; and heard Rajah Mohiput Ram send a message by another hircarrah to the British officer in command at Burhampoor, to apprise him of the intelligence.

I have been thus particular in giving you all the details of this hircarrah's report, in order that you may form your own opinion of its truth or falsehood. I believe it to be true. Scindiah certainly moved to the northward, with an intention to disturb Col. Stevenson's operations, as I suspected. He arrived at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, 2 days ago, where he heard of my arrival at the bottom of the ghauts ; and he was still at that place yesterday. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and it is said is gone towards Chandore, most probably with a view to draw me to the southward, that Scindiah might have an opportunity of impeding Col. Stevenson's operations. If I find it to be really the case that Col. Stevenson has taken Asseerghur, I shall reascend the ghaut, as I see that the enemy's infantry cannot recover from the effects of the battle of Assye ; and as for their cavalry, they are very incapable of doing any of us much mischief. I think it possible that when the Rajah of Berar shall hear of the capture of Asseerghur, he will endeavour to reach his own country, by marching to the southward of Aurungabad, particularly if he should have come through the Chandore ghaut.

By letters from Col. Murray, from Guzerat, I observe that he was getting on much better than I could have expected, with very deficient means. He was 10 coss from Godra on the 7th ; he had all the country Rajahs on his side, and I think it probable that he will either have driven off or have beaten the rebel Canojee. At all events, Godra is not above 100 miles from Ougein, which, if Asseerghur be taken, is Scindiah's only possession.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

I have derived great satisfaction from the perusal of your letters of the 4th and 7th, and I assure you that you are getting on much better than I could have expected with your defective means. I think that Canojee will not engage in an action with you, but he will retire : you must then guide yourself according to the circumstances of the country, the state of your supplies and resources, and of your force compared with that of the

enemy, whether you will move upon Ougein. It is not possible for me, at this distance from the scene, to do more than give you a general outline, and to communicate to you the information I have of the enemy's actual force. To beat or drive away Canojee must be your first object; the security of Guzerat your next.

If there were not in that quarter a number of little, low objects which are always in view with the Native governments, and which the British influence in that quarter rather encourages and promotes than discourages, I should think it very possible to connect the security of Guzerat with an invasion of Ougein. However, I have not sufficient information upon the subject, and I must leave the decision to yourself.

Scindiah was levying a new brigade at Ougein; he has there besides, I believe, 2 or 3 battalions of Filose's corps. Besides this, I learn from Col. Stevenson that the beaten infantry has gone that way from Asseerghur; 16 of their European officers and sergeants have come over to the Colonel; and he says that they are entirely ruined by the battle of the 23rd Sept., and never can be formed into corps again. Holkar certainly went in the beginning of this month to Boondy and Kota, far to the northward. Scindiah had 2 brigades of infantry to the northward of the Nerbudda besides Filose's, and the one to be newly raised: but I believe that they went to the Rajpoot's countries; and, at all events, their European officers have left them. Ougein is a large city, surrounded by a wall, in a ruinous state in many places. Communicate with Major Walker upon the subject of all your treaties with the Bheels and other rajahs, in order that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements with them and Anund Rao respectively. In regard to your revenue concerns, I approve entirely of your settling the country as you go on, as I know that it is the only mode of securing and of having a tranquil rear. But the Bombay government have thrown into Major Walker's hands the revenue management of all the districts conquered from Scindiah, and it will be necessary that you should make them over to him. This will save you a great deal of detailed trouble; and, as Major Walker must have good revenue servants, it may be a beneficial arrangement for your military operations.

I have received an hirearrah report, which I believe, that Col. Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st. He certainly got possession of Barhampoor, without opposition, on the 15th. Scindiah is at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, about 50 miles from hence. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and is gone towards Chandore, with what view I do not know. As Scindiah, however, intended to impede Col. Stevenson's operations at Asseerghur, and I came down this ghaut to stop him, it is possible that they may be separated, and the Rajah may move more south, in order to draw me off again, and leave Scindiah at liberty to act against Col. Stevenson. I wrote yesterday about Capt. Bates.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 23rd Oct. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 18th. I have no reason to suspect Goklah of disaffection. Like every other Marhatta, he wants money. Poonah is the focus of his intrigues, and he is worked upon by the reports which come from thence. If we could establish any thing like a cordial

communication or a solid community of interest with the Peshwah which would be apparent to the world, or if we could even know what the Peshwah is about, or what is going on at his durbar, in the first case, there would be an end of these intrigues; and, in the second, they would give us no anxiety, and we should be able with one word to calm that of our friends. But we know more of what passes in the durbar of the enemy than we do of what passes in that of the Peshwah. There is no doubt whatever of the communication between the enemy and the southern chiefs, and that the former are moving heaven and earth to prevail upon the latter to act against us. Our victories and successes, and the disposition of our troops to the southward, have kept them in check hitherto, and they will continue to have that effect. But would it not be advisable to employ agents to observe the councils and intentions of these chiefs, and to spend money and exert ourselves for this purpose? The Marhattas have been famous for corruption, but we have never touched them upon that point.

Mulwa Dada has not 500 men, instead of 5000; and if Capt. Graham would only exert himself to raise the peons I ordered two months ago, he would drive out in one day the rascals who have kept us in hot water in that district ever since I left it, merely because Capt. Graham began upon a principle of employing small detachments of infantry against them, ill formed in every respect, which were obliged to retreat. I have ordered a detachment out against Chumargoonda, which will relieve that place; but I must give you notice that one-eighth of the disasters of which you have heard from Capt. Graham need not be believed. The worst article of intelligence in your letter is the stoppage of the supply of money for bills on Bombay. I have desired Bellingham to send you blank bills drawn at short dates, which I hope will produce it again. But if they do not, we must give the game up almost immediately as lost; for, without money, I cannot carry on the war.

In return for your bad news, I have the pleasure to inform you that I have reason to believe that Col. Stevenson took possession of the fort of Asseerghur on the 21st. He writes on the 19th, that the infantry which had collected between that place and Burhampoor was gone off towards the Nerbudda. Sixteen of the European officers, serjeants, &c., had come in to him on the terms of the proclamation, among whom were Col. Dupont, Capt. Mercier, and Capt. Mann. The Colonel says the infantry had been so completely destroyed, that they never could be collected again in corps, or be of any use to Scindiah. Scindiah has come as far as Aboonah, and intended to make an effort to relieve Asseerghur. But he halted when he heard that I had come down the ghaut, and he was still at Aboonah yesterday. Ragojee has separated from him, and, it is said, is gone towards Chandore, to pass to the southward through that ghaut. This report is circulated, I imagine, to induce me to return to the southward, and leave Scindiah at liberty to pursue his plans against Col. Stevenson, or he may pass the ghaut with that view. However, I shall hold my ground till I am certain that we have Asseerghur, and then possibly I may ascend the ghaut again, and wait till I see what are decidedly Ragojee's plans.

To the Adj. Gen., Fort St. George.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to transmit the proceedings of the Native General Court Martial, assembled by my order in this division of the army, and to inform you that I confirmed the sentences passed on Sheek David, private of the 1st of the 10th, agreeably to particular authority from the Commander in Chief, and all the other sentences, in terms of my warrant. I caused those passed upon Mahomed Izack and Sheek David, privates in the 1st of the 10th, and Mahomed Reza, private in the 2nd of the 12th, to be carried into execution on the 12th inst.; and I have sent orders to Col. Colman, commanding at Poonah, to see the sentence passed on Sheek Hussein, private in the 2nd of the 18th, who had marched with his corps, carried into execution there.

It was my intention to have pardoned all these prisoners, but some recent desertions in this camp obliged me to cause the sentences passed upon them to be put in force.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Colman, Poonah.

23rd Oct. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you extracts from the proceedings of the General Court Martial which assembled at Poonah on the 5th of Sept. last, whereof Major Wm. East is President; containing the confirmed sentences passed by the Court upon ——— and ———, private soldiers in H. M.'s 81th regt.

The General requests that you will order the General Court Martial to re-assemble, in order that the confirmed sentences may be pronounced in open Court in presence of the prisoners. After which he authorises you to publish the extract from the proceedings of the General Court Martial to the troops at Poonah, and to order the execution of the sentences to take place on the following day: in which he begs that you will proceed in the usual manner, until the moment of ordering the execution of the prisoner ———, when he desires that you will announce a pardon to him and ———; and afterwards to publish the accompanying extract of G. O., adding the date to it: certificates of the sentences having been read in open Court to the prisoners will be required to accompany the proceedings of the General Court Martial to the office of the Adj. Gen. of the army.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Graham.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

The General has received a report from a jemidar, stationed at Rackisbaum, that a man employed by you, named ———, had sent a karkoon, with 50 peons, to Rackisbaum, with orders to take possession of that place and of 22 villages dependent upon it, as belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; that the present manager alleged that the town and district belonged to the Peshwah, and was given in jaghire to the Beeneewallah, for whom he would hold it. The 50 peons, on this, loaded, and lighted their matches, and the townsmen did the same, when the jemidar succeeded in preserving the peace for the time. The General requests that you will give the strictest orders to all the people employed by you not to interfere with any town or village without your own particular instructions to take possession of it by name, lest they should involve you in disputes with the Soubah's or the Peshwah's government. And the General would be very glad if you could make it convenient to take a tour round your district to ascertain, in the first place, what belongs to it, and what does not.

Major Dallas has written to you to send some money to a party of his battalion left at Moorun in charge of some rice. The General has desired me to send you the enclosed letter for the havildar commanding the party (containing orders for his leaving the rice in charge of the aumil of Moorun), and coming up to Ahmednuggur, and so on to camp; and to request that you will forward it, along with the money, on Major Dallas's account.

Capt. Vesey has joined us safe. I have paid your hircarrahs, who accompanied him. We have a report that Col. Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur on the 21st, and the good folks among us are praying even that it may be true.

The D.A.G. to Major Palmer.

23rd Oct. 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 20th inst., and have laid them before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley.

As Amrut Rao is under engagements by treaty with the British government, and has applied for accommodation for his family in the city of Aurungabad, still the General does not think it prudent to trust in his way so small a force as you can spare to shut up the Casserbarry ghaut until he has taken some decided step, proving his adherence to the engagements entered into with the British government; such as sending his family into Aurungabad, or joining this division; and the General begs that you will accordingly defer making any such detachment.

Some of Captain Vesey's bazaar men, who had purchased grain to the amount of 200 rupees in the village of Pattie, about 1½ coss beyond Binkenholey, were followed by some men from that village, attacked a little way from it, plundered of their grain, and one of the bazaar men had his arm almost cut off.

The General makes it a rule to protect the dealers following the army, and would send some sepoy from camp to seize and bring to him the head man of the village of Pattie; but he thinks that the fellow, knowing what had been done by his people, would take the alarm at seeing our sepoy coming to his village, and would make off: he therefore begs that you will detach a party of your troops to seize the head man of Pattie and bring him into this camp.

Hircarrahs have reported that Col. Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st inst.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th Oct. 1803.

I received last night your letter of the 21st, and I sincerely congratulate you on your success against Asseerghur. My letter of yesterday will have apprised you that I had received a report of it, to which I gave credit. The first object of your attention must now be to establish a garrison in Asseerghur. Possibly 300 men of the Company's troops, and a small detail of artillery, with a careful non-commissioned officer, and 400 or 500 of Rajah Mohiput Ram's infantry, would be a very sufficient garrison. Throw into the post a sufficient quantity of provisions for these troops; and desire one of your officers of artillery to see that the most useful guns on the works are properly arranged, and provided with the necessary quantity of ammunition. I conclude that the granaries in Asseerghur are already well stored: if they should be so, I recommend that you should not take the grain in the fort for the purpose of filling your bags for your supply on your expedition into Berar if you can get grain in the country, or in Burhampoor: as in case it should be necessary hereafter to push our operations into Hindustan, the dépôt at Asseerghur will be very useful to us.

In respect to Burhampoor, after you shall have levied a contribution on it, I mean that it should be given over to Rajah Mohiput Ram. The British troops may be withdrawn from it, and a garrison of the Soubah's infantry established there. I mean that the country depending upon Burhampoor and Asseerghur should be delivered to the charge of Rajah Mohiput Ram, for the Soubah of the Deccan. I will request you to speak

G. A. O.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th Oct. 1803.

The detachment to march to-morrow morning by the right, the new piquets of infantry to form the advance. The brigades of infantry to follow with their guns; and each corps of Native infantry will have two companies, at such places in the pass as Capt. Beauman will point out, to assist the park and wheel carriages with the store and provision department.

The cavalry, and old piquets of infantry, will not strike their tents until the line of infantry, the park, magazine, and grain departments are through the pass, when they will follow in the above order. The Mysore cavalry, and the Marhatta cavalry, are to march by the Ferdapoor pass.

to him upon this subject; and desire him to make his arrangements for placing his tannahs in the different villages[•] belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for establishing in the country the government of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and for collecting the revenues.

I take this opportunity of sending you the letters from the minister to Rajahs Mohiput Ram and Sookroodoor, by which the latter is displaced; and if I should have leisure, I shall this day write a letter to Rajah Mohiput Ram, to recommend to him moderation in the exercise of his powers. As soon as the officers appointed by you shall have ascertained the amount of the property in the fort, let me have an account of it, and I will recommend to government that it may be given to the troops as prize. All these arrangements will take up some days; and I do not think that to be regretted. In fact, we have run the length of our tether against Scindiah. He has nothing more to lose in the Deccan; and your presence for a few days at Burhampoor will give countenance to Mohiput Ram, and will enable him to settle the country more completely than he would have it otherwise in his power to do.

My letter of yesterday will have apprised you of my wish that you should, if possible, reinforce yourself in ordnance and ammunition from Asseerghur, preparatory to the siege of Gawilghur. That place is not so strong, it is said, as Asseerghur; but as it is the great hold of the Rajah of Berar's government, as it contains all he possesses, and as it is more than probable it is garrisoned by good troops, well paid, you must not expect to get possession in the manner in which you have got possession of Asseerghur. You will, therefore, see the necessity of being well equipped. As soon as you shall have completed the arrangements above alluded to, you might begin your march towards Gawilghur, as you propose, by Mulcapoor. While you are carrying on this operation, I shall keep an eye on the enemy, in the same manner as I have done since you have been at Burhampoor and Asseerghur; and prevent them, if possible, from invading our own territories, or from interrupting you.

Tell Rajah Mohiput Ram that the letter addressed to him was opened by accident.

I wish that you would tell the officers of Scindiah's corps that they are to reside at Poonah, unless they have a wish to reside elsewhere; and you might send them to my camp, from whence I will forward them to the southward.

All your medicines are arrived. You must send an escort for them, which will not be inconvenient to you, while you are making your arrangements at Burhampoor. If you want money I will send some at the same time. The officers above mentioned can come with this guard. It is said here that you found at Assye an account book of Lieut. Steward, which proves that he was in camp on the 22nd Sept.: I wish you would let me know if that be true.

To Rajah Mohiput Ram.

Camp, 24th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter, and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success against Asseerghur. I had already written to Col. Stevenson to request that he would place a garrison in Asseerghur to secure the place;

and that he would give you over the country, and desire you to establish therein the government of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, to take possession of the tannahs and districts, place in them sufficient garrisons, collect the revenues, and do every thing in your power for the benefit and protection of the people. It is my intention that the Soubah's authority alone should prevail in those districts, as a division of the government must occasion weakness and confusion. Hereafter it will be easy for the Company's government, and that of his Highness, to settle the accounts of the revenues, and the share which is to belong to each party.

I have sent to Col. Stevenson, to be delivered to you, an order from the Soubah, by which you are put in charge of the whole of his Highness' western frontier, and in the command of his troops; upon which I congratulate you. In the exercise of the important duty confided to you by this order, as well as of that which you will have to perform in the districts under Asseerghur and Burhampoor, I recommend to you moderation and justice in all your proceedings. Intermixed with those under your charge, there are several districts and villages belonging to the Peshwah, and others to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Peshwah is now his Highness' ally, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar is not his enemy. You must act with justice towards them, and not on any account interfere with them. You must take care to entertain and keep up a sufficient force, particularly in the districts belonging to Asseerghur. This is a time of war, and the resources of the country can be preserved only by having in it a sufficient force. To endeavor to collect a large revenue would be useless, and would most probably eventually occasion loss.

In respect to Wahed Beg, tell him that I desire he will give you the letter addressed to you, and either bring or send the letters addressed to me which he brought from the Maharajah's camp, and which he showed to Col. Lang. If he does not do that, you will do well to seize him, and send him here to me, as he has gone to you with no good purpose.

I have already acquainted Ballojee Koonger in writing that I have always been desirous of peace, and that if the Maharajah had any thing to propose to me, and should think proper to send here a sirdar, he should be treated with respect and attention, and should have a distinct answer. I have desired Col. Stevenson to levy a contribution on Burhampoor, in which I request you to assist him.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th Oct. 1803.

1. I enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to peruse and forward. You will observe that the report which I communicated to you yesterday was well founded.

2. You will see by the enclosed letter, that I am of opinion that negotiations for peace will soon be opened by both the confederated Chiefs. It is very desirable, therefore, that I should be furnished, if possible, at an early period, with an account of the districts, of which the revenues are collected in part by his Highness the Soubah, and in part by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, respectively; the value of those districts, and the amount collected by each party.

3. If a negotiation should be commenced, it would be very convenient, and would preclude delays and intrigues, if one person only were to negotiate for the allied governments; and I should endeavor to carry it on upon this footing. But if his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan could be prevailed upon to give me powers, such as those I hold from the British government, it would prevent delay, and obviate all objections.

4. I should wish, however, that his Highness would let me know with what person he is desirous that I should consult for the benefit of his interests.

5. I have to observe upon this subject that, under the treaty of defensive alliance, the Soubah is entitled to an equal share with the Hon. Company of any benefit that may be derived from a war; and, therefore, it is not probable that he will derive any very great advantage from having a person more likely than a British officer to attend to his interest in the negotiation for peace.

But, supposing he should have such a person, and that there should be a difference of opinion between that person and the negotiator, on the part of the British government, under the same treaty his Highness is bound to attend to the counsels of the British government, in his intercourse with foreign powers; and it is probable that his Highness would be obliged to give up this point for which the person charged with his separate interest in the negotiation might have contended.

In quoting this treaty of defensive alliance, I write from memory, as I have not a copy of it.

6. It would appear, therefore, that for his Highness to name such a person would tend only to create delay and intrigues, and would answer the purpose of the enemy more than it would that of the allied governments.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th Oct. 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that Col. Stevenson took possession of the city of Burhampoor, without opposition, on the 16th inst. He marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, took possession of the pettah on the 18th, opened a battery against the fort on the 20th, and obtained possession of it on the morning of the 21st. I have not yet received a detailed account of the manner in which Col. Stevenson obtained possession of this important fortress, or whether he sustained any loss in the attack of the pettah on the 18th, or of the fort.

After I had arrived at Phoolmurry, about 16 miles north from Aurungabad, I found that the enemy did not advance to the southward, as I had been informed they first intended; and in the night of the 15th I received a particular account of the disposition of their troops, baggage, &c., which convinced me that they intended to interrupt Col. Stevenson's operations at Asseerghur.

I therefore marched on the 16th to the northward, and descended the ghaut on the 19th. Scindiah had moved to the northward, but he halted as soon as he found I had returned; and he was yesterday at Ahoonah on the Taptee. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and, it is said, has gone towards Chandore. I suspect that the report has been circulated

with a view to draw me to the southward again; but as Col. Stevenson has got possession of Asseerghur, and is fully equal to any thing that can be sent against him, it is my intention to re-ascend the ghaut immediately. Sixteen officers and serjeants belonging to the camposos have joined Col. Stevenson under your Excellency's proclamation of 29th Aug. I will hereafter send a list of the names, and an account of the pay each is to receive. The infantry retired towards the Nerbudda when Col. Stevenson approached Burhampoor, and by all accounts it is completely destroyed and disorganized. It is impossible to form it into corps again, and it is not probable that it will ever be of any service to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

I have directed Col. Stevenson to leave a garrison in Asseerghur, and to deliver the districts depending upon that fortress to the charge of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan. Your Excellency will observe that this is the last of the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the Deccan; and the operations of the troops will now be directed against those of the Rajah of Berar.

By reports which I have received from Col. Murray, I observe that he was likely to be at Godra about the 9th or 10th inst., which place is on the road to, and, I imagine, not more than 100 miles distant from Ougein. But as the troops in that part of India are incomplete in numbers, and remarkably unhealthy, the 65th regt. in particular having only 100 men fit for duty, although they had 900 when they arrived at Bombay in May last, I fear that Col. Murray's corps is not sufficiently strong to advance upon Ougein. Besides this deficiency of strength, the existence of the domestic war in Guzerat against Canojee, which might be fatal to Col. Murray if he should advance, unless he should be so fortunate as first to defeat Canojee, must prevent this desirable movement, even if, by the recovery of the health of his troops, Col. Murray should become sufficiently strong.

On the other hand, an attack upon Ougein from this quarter would leave the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam exposed, and would render it necessary to defer, or possibly to forego altogether, the attack which I propose to make on the territories of the Rajah of Berar, which is, in my opinion, the most likely to produce a peace.

Since I forwarded to your Excellency the copies of my correspondence with Ballojee Koonger on the subject of peace, I have received various messages and letters through different channels on the same subject, but all written or delivered by persons not having any official character, and unauthorized, which are not deserving of your Excellency's notice, and, therefore, I do not transmit copies of them. I have uniformly referred them to the answer which I wrote to Ballojee Koonger. It is reported that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have quarrelled; that the latter intends to endeavor to obtain a peace through the mediation of Amrut Rao, and the former through that of the Peshwah, or by secret negotiation. Excepting that these Chiefs have separated their armies, I have no reason to believe that they have quarrelled, and I can give your Excellency no information to enable you to form a judgment of the truth of the remainder of the report. I think it probable, however, that negotiations for peace will soon be commenced by both those Chiefs. I can

only assure your Excellency that I shall not suffer them to be carried on in any channel in which the result can be influenced or the conclusion delayed.

The D.A.G. to Major Palmer.

24th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 21st, and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received further information of the Rajah of Berar having ascended the Caserbarry ghaut, and he desires me to inform you that he will march immediately for Aurangabad. He requests you will communicate this to the Subah, and prevail on him to send information of the approach of the army to the aumils of Puttun, Bheer, and every other fortified place, with orders to defend themselves, if attacked, to the last extremity, and not to pay any contributions. He may assure all such as may behave in such a pusillanimous manner as to pay money to this army, that the General will hang them up before their town gates.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Adjuttee, 25th Oct. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th inst. and its enclosures.

2. When I had the honor last to address you, by desire of Lieut. Gen. Stuart, upon the subject of the supplies to be furnished by Bombay for the use of the troops about to march from the Toombuddra to Poonah, I calculated them for the whole army which was assembled at Hurryhur, under the command of his Excellency in the month of March, but for a limited period of time, and for a state of operations far within that on which the troops under my command have since been employed.

3. I was aware that Gen. Stuart had made a requisition for a still larger supply, for the use of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, which I had not included in my calculation.

4. My address of the 11th inst. was intended to recall these circumstances to your recollection, to point out to you that I had reason to expect a supply of rice at Bombay to the amount of 600 garces; that I had no other resource; and that, consequently, I hoped you would give orders that the supply might not be discontinued, and that it might be replenished from Canara.

5. In the letter which I have had the honor to receive from you, it appears that the statement in my letter of the 11th is erroneous, and that I have received the quantity of rice which I expected: I do not deny that it has been received by the troops, all of whom are placed under my command; but not by those for whom it was calculated, and whom I must have had in contemplation when I wrote that I had not yet received 600 garces of rice.

6. Upon this occasion those troops may be classed in 3 divisions: 1st, those serving in the territories to the northward: 2ndly, the division which marched to Poonah under Col. Murray, and is now commanded by Lieut. Col. Colman: 3rdly, the division of troops under my immediate command.

Mem.

25th Oct. 1803.

Mrs. Maxwell having made it a particular request that the prayer book of the late Lieut. Col. Maxwell might be preserved for her, Major Kennedy will be very happy to have it restored by any person who may have purchased it at Lieut. Col. Maxwell's sale.

A bamboo, belonging to a private tent, may be had at Capt. Barclay's tent.

7. In respect to the troops serving to the northward, I never could include them in my calculation of supplies required for those serving in this quarter. Indeed, I never imagined that it could be necessary that they should be supplied from Bombay, as the scene of their service has the reputation of being the most plentiful spot in India. At all events, supposing it to be necessary to supply them from Bombay, their food could not be called an extraordinary call upon the resources of that presidency, as it must have been supplied at all events if I had never appeared in this country. Their supply, therefore, in my opinion, ought not to be included in the 600 garces respecting which I had the honor of addressing you.

8. When I was approaching Poonah, I had the honor of addressing you respecting the arrangement to be made for the food of the troops under the command of Col. Murray; and in answer to my letter upon that subject, I was informed that it was not necessary that I should make any arrangements for their subsistence, and that every thing that was necessary should be done by the government of Bombay. These troops likewise subsisted on the resources of Bombay before I arrived at Poonah; and in making a calculation of the extraordinary call upon those resources, it was not to be expected that I should include their consumption: in my opinion, therefore, the consumption of the troops of this division ought not to be included in the 600 garces.

9. It is true that the stores from which that division and those which the division of troops under my immediate command have been fed have been received; but the accounts of the issues from those stores have been kept separate, and it will not be difficult to ascertain what quantity has been issued to the troops of Col. Murray's or Col. Colman's brigade.

10. The remainder of the grain sent to Panwell, which has been the consumption of this division of the army, and forms the store at Ahmednuggur, or the store at Poonah (although that is applicable solely to the consumption of the brigade under Col. Colman), is what ought properly to be carried to account against the 600 garces upon which I calculated.

11. I have the same objection to the account of the salt meat and spirits, said to have been received on my requisition, that I have to the account of the rice: a great proportion of the former, and the greatest proportion of the latter, have been consumed by Col. Colman's brigade. However, I should have made a further requisition for measures to be taken to provide larger quantities of salt provisions and spirits, if I had imagined there could have been any want of them, when I made the first requisition in January last; as I mentioned in the 2nd paragraph of this letter, although I provided for a larger body of troops, I had not in contemplation operations of such extent or duration.

12. I beg leave to allude, in this place, to the enclosure, No. 4, in your letter, being an account of the number of bullocks which have been sent from Bombay for the service of the army above the ghauts. I have not received one of the 10,351 bullocks specified in that return, excepting 1000 carriage bullocks which were received from Col. Murray's corps when I marched from Poonah. I am not aware of the number that have been received for the pontoon establishment.

13. In respect to our future demands, in my opinion I ought to have

4000 bullock bags of 144 lbs. each, in each of the months of November and December; and I imagine that when the deductions which I have above specified have been made from the consumption, more than that quantity will remain of the 600 garces.

14. In the next year, if Col. Colman's brigade is to be included, provision ought to be made to supply 1000 garces instead of 600, for which I wrote in my letter of the 11th. I cannot include the troops in the territories to the northward, as I can make no calculation of their consumption.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Adjunttee, 25th Oct. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th inst., in which you have enclosed copies of your dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General.

2. These contain intelligence of a most important and delicate nature. It is obvious that his Highness the Soubah is not aware of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British government. In fact his government could not stand, and would not have stood one day without the powerful support which it has received.

3. The war in which the British government is engaged is in support of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Marhatta Chiefs to remove from his Highness' territories the large armies which they had collected for the purpose of invading them. The remote cause may be supposed to be the treaty of Bassein; but however desirable in other respects to the British government that treaty might have been, the completion of it was a most essential object with a view to the security of the Nizam, and his Highness derives the advantage of that treaty at this moment.

4. In the war thus entered into for his Highness' interests, in which the greatest exertions have been made by the British government, and the most complete success has attended them, his Highness has not calculated how far the terms of the treaty with the British government are to bind him. I do not recollect the terms of the treaty, but the principle and spirit of it is, protection on the part of the British government, which his Highness has received, and co-operation and assistance to the fullest extent on that of his Highness. Without quibbling upon words, it would not be difficult to show that, in such a war as this, the admittance into his Highness' forts of our small detachments and convoys is an essential assistance, which his Highness is bound even by the terms of the treaty to give.

5. However, considering the coolness which exists between his Highness and his minister, and the declared sentiments of his Highness at the time at which he was partially reconciled to him, it is my opinion that it will be useless to make any representation to his Highness at present upon the subject either of his declaration upon that occasion, or of his erroneous conception of his engagement under the treaty of defensive alliance. For the same reason, I think that it would be prudent to defer to come to any explanation with his Highness upon the subject to which I drew your attention in my letters of the 18th and 24th inst.

6. It appears to me that his Highness' mind is irritated, and that he has

no notion of his real situation, or his true interests. The agitation of the topics above alluded to, however desirable, will only increase this irritation, may be the cause of the adoption of some violent step respecting the minister, and will certainly answer no good purpose. In time, his Highness will perceive the candor and honor of the British government in all its transactions; and the delivery of the territory depending upon Asseerghur and Burhampoor to the officers of his Highness' government will be a striking proof of those qualities, as well as of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British government.

7. I must endeavor to work through the war without the assistance of his magazines; and in case of negotiations for peace, to bring them to a successful conclusion, notwithstanding the intrigues which I anticipate.

8. The Rajah of Berar has passed through the ghauts, and was near the Godavery. I have therefore returned to the southward, and have apprised the killadars of my movements, in order that they may hold out. I have gone so far as to threaten them, in case they should pay any contribution that he may attempt to levy before I can reach him.

To Col. Stevenson.

25th Oct. 1803.

The march of the Rajah of Berar to the southward, and the fear that I may be detained to the southward for some time, during which all this country would be exposed to Scindiah, make it necessary that we should revise our plan in some degree. Accordingly, I wish you for the present to watch Scindiah, and to prevent him from undertaking any thing of consequence, or doing any material mischief, till I can give the other a turn to the northward, when all will be safe. You may, in the mean time, make all your arrangements for the Berar expedition, all your inquiries respecting roads, distances, &c. &c., upon which you shall certainly go as soon as I shall have brought up the Rajah: this I may possibly do in a few days. I leave with Capt. Scott, for you, 75,000 pagodas, in various gold coins, and 25,000 pagodas in silver, the whole 30 bullock loads; and I leave all the medicines for your corps, 54 bullock loads. You will do well to send an escort and carriage for that money and medicines.

The D.A.G. to Major Palmer.

Adjutee, 25th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 21st and 22nd inst., reporting the arrival of the Rajah of Berar above the ghauts, and his progress afterwards.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to repeat to you his intention to march direct to Aurangabad, if the motions of the above Chief should render that necessary; and his request that you will urge the Soubah to encourage all the killadars and aumils, particularly those of Puttum and Bheer, to resist any attempts of the Rajah upon their forts and towns, by holding out the certain prospect of speedy relief to them by this army.

The D.A.G. to Ensign Fowler.

Camp at Adjutee, 25th Oct. 1803.

I have only just now received your letter of the 17th inst. Capt. Baynes is at Goondy, one march from Rackisbaum, by the last accounts from him. If you can learn that he is at that place, or within a march of you in any direction, when you receive this letter, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will march immediately and join him; unless you should have information of the enemy being in the neighbourhood, in which case you will take some strong position at Rackisbaum, and defend yourself till further orders.

If you find that Capt. Baynes has proceeded too far for you to overtake him in one march, you will send him a report of your situation, and wait his orders.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.

Camp at Adjunttee, 25th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 21st, from Goondy. Capt. Seton arrived at Dharore on the 16th, and an officer, with a large sum of money, was expected to arrive there on the next day; so that the letters forwarded to him on the 19th will no doubt bring them both time enough to march with you from Goondy.

Ensign Fowler marched from Ahmednuggur, with recovered men and some stores, on the 18th, for Rackisbaum, where he would halt for orders. He has been directed to join you, if you are at Goondy, or within a march of him when he receives the letter; and to report himself to you, and wait your orders, if you have proceeded farther than he can overtake you in one march. In this latter case the General wishes you would halt for him, if you think that circumstances will allow you; apprise him that you move on, if you cannot halt for him.

The Rajah of Berar and Baba Phurkiah ascended the Casserbarry ghaut on the 19th, and have directed their march towards Toka. The General returned to this place to-day, in consequence of the above movement; and will proceed without halting towards Aurungabad, till further information of the enemy's motions may render it necessary to change his route. You may accordingly proceed towards the city till you hear further from me, unless the enemy arrive in your way, when you should take post at Rackisbaum, or in any other strong village, and expect assistance.

I wrote you already that Col. Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur on the 21st. I now enclose you the news of a pretty battle at Dellhi. If you think Lieut. Barrett's remaining at Goondy not essentially necessary for the future collection of supplies, the General would be glad that you ordered him up to Rackisbaum, by which the tappall runs, and which is nearer to Ahmednuggur. In this case he may discharge the boatmen, and give the boats in charge to the head man of the village opposite to Goondy. I enclose a letter for Capt. Seton.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Pahllood, 26th Oct. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th, upon the

G. M. O.

Camp at Pahllood, 26th Oct. 1803.

The 5th brigade to furnish 1 jemidar, and 20 non-commissioned officers and rank and file, as a guard to some grain dealers arrived in the neighbourhood of camp.

G. O.

26th Oct. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley has received information from H. E. the Commander in Chief, that the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George has been pleased, on H. E.'s recommendation, to order, till the conclusion of the war with the Marhatta confederates, the continuance of the payments on family certificates to the families of the Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sepoys who have gloriously fallen, or may hereafter fall in battle, or who may have died, or may hereafter die, of their wounds. Rolls of the names and rank of those Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates who have fallen in battle or died of their wounds are to be made out forthwith, signed by the adjutant, and countersigned by the commanding officers, and to be sent to the A.G.'s office with the monthly returns, and in duplicate to the office of the military secretary of the Governor of Fort St. George.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that officers commanding corps will explain this order particularly to the troops under their command, and that they will take this opportunity of again pointing out to the Native troops the anxious concern of the Government which they are serving, and of their superiors, to adopt every measure which can alleviate the distress of their families.

In order to insure the early advantage of this attention on the part of government to the objects of it, Major Gen. Wellesley desires that officers commanding troops of Native cavalry, companies of Native infantry, gun lascars, and pioneers, and officers in charge of hospitals, will, on this day, send to paymasters to whom such officers may have given notice of casualties, such as are described in the first paragraph, a copy of this order certified by himself, together with a list of the names of the officers or men of his troop or company, or under his charge, who were killed in action or died of their wounds, having opposite the name of each the name of the person to whom the payment is to be continued, under the orders of the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council.

subject of the repairs of the fort of Baroach. In my opinion, all that is necessary at present is to repair the breach, and any other parts of the wall that may require it, in order to make the place a secure hold; and to put in a serviceable state the buildings which are necessary to give effectual cover to the garrison and hospital. Every thing else may be deferred to a future period.

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

Camp at Pahllood, 26th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 14th, and I am obliged to you for having sent my horse. The Nabob of Savanore may be permitted to reside in Mysore; but as, between ourselves, the Company are not now to have possession of the Savanore revenue, I do not see any necessity for giving him any more money.

I shall request Col. Close to urge the Peshwah to provide for him permanently, and I shall urge Goklah not to interfere with the arrangements which the Peshwah may make for the Nabob. I have desired that the 500 pagodas may be repaid to Bistnapah. It would be a proper trick to prevail upon Purneah to send our money 800 or 900 miles for us, and then to make him stand to the losses to which its transportation might be liable.

I learn from Bistnapah that Purneah has some thoughts of sending him the horse which he may raise according to the directions from government. The greater number I have of these troops, the better I shall be pleased; but I rather believe that it is the intention of government that these now to be raised should serve in the defence of Mysore; and I think that, before you allow them to be sent to me, you will do well to take the opinion of government upon that subject. I have written to Col. Close respecting the thieves who robbed Bistnapah's party. I think they ought to be hanged; some at Sungoly on the Gutpurba, and others on the Kistna, and one or two at Hurryhur: if Col. Close agrees in opinion, I shall order the escorts for them, and that they may be executed accordingly.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Pahllood, 26th Oct. 1803.

In my opinion, Purneah's thieves ought to be hanged. There is no other way of putting a stop to these robberies; and I am not quite certain that it would not be best to send 6 to be hanged at Sungoly, 2 at Goorgherry, and 2 at the post on the Kistna, and the remainder at Hurryhur. If you agree in opinion on this subject, I will give orders that the thieves may be escorted and executed accordingly. Colman should keep his post at present: hereafter, when I shall have brought up the Rajah of Berar, I will write respecting the attack you have proposed. I am moving to the southward with all expedition.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Pahllood, 26th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 4th, and Sydenham's report of the campaign to the northward, up to the 17th Sept. Every thing appears to prosper, and I hope we shall soon bring the war to a conclusion. Since the battle of Assye, I have been like a man who fights with one hand and

defends himself with the other. With Col. Stevenson's corps I have acted offensively, and have taken Asseerghur; and with my own, I have covered his operations, and defended the territories of the Nizam and the Peshwah. In doing this, I have made some terrible marches, but I have been remarkably fortunate: first, in stopping the enemy when they intended to pass to the southward, through the Casserbarry ghaut; and afterwards, by a rapid march to the northward, in stopping Scindiah, when he was moving to interrupt Col. Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur, in which he would otherwise have undoubtedly succeeded. I moved up the ghaut as soon as Col. Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur; and I think that, in a day or two, I shall turn Ragojee Bhoonslah, who has passed through to the southward. At all events, I am in time to prevent him doing any mischief.

I think that we are in great style to be able to act on the offensive at all in this quarter; but it is only done by the celerity of our movements, and by acting on the offensive or defensive with either corps, according to their situation, and that of the enemy.

Sydenham's account of Scindiah's force is tolerably correct. We understand, however, that Pohlman's brigade of 8 battalions was called the 1st, which was destroyed on the 23rd Sept.: the 2 other brigades in that action are not accounted for by Sydenham; they were 4 battalions of Begum Sumroo, and 4 battalions of Dupont. The latter was formerly Filose's, and was entirely destroyed by Holkar, in the action at Ougein. It was raised at Poonah, and was not under Perron's command.

Doudernaigue's brigade, the 4th, of 6 battalions; and Brownrigg's, as the 5th, of 4 or 5 battalions, are in Hindustan; I believe, at present, in the Rajpoot countries.

According to Sydenham's and this account, these are the only 2 brigades that have not been engaged, and are not destroyed; excepting, possibly, one or two battalions of Begum Sumroo's, and one of Pohlman's, which were sent off with the baggage at the commencement of the battle of Assye. Besides these, I understand that some of the troops of Dupont's brigade, and some belonging to a brigade, now raising, are at Ougein.

How unfortunate it is that we have not Guzerat in style! If we had, I should immediately have a corps from that province on the back either of Scindiah's troops on the Taptee, or of his brigade in the Rajpoot countries; and thus put an end to the war by one blow. You will see that we shake at Hyderabad: but Heshmut Jung, with all his faults, certainly manages that durbar well; and I have written to him to suggest that he should, for the present, desist from all teasing remonstrances upon trifling objects, and endeavor to convince the Nizam that a sense of his true interests, as well as the spirit of his treaty with the Company, should lead him to co-operate heartily in the common cause.

I saw your brother yesterday, and he is doing well: indeed, all the wounded officers and men are fast recovering.

P. S. Pray do not forget to send us money round to Bombay, as that Presidency is in great distress. That is the only want which I now fear; for I believe I have settled the rice concern, but that very settlement creates a want of money.

The D.A.G. to Major Palmer.

Camp at Fahllood, 26th Oct. 1803.

Your hircarrahs have delivered the duplicate of your letter of the 24th. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley will be at Binkenholey to-morrow morning with the army, and will be glad to receive your latest accounts of the enemy's motions and situation. He begs you will encourage every person to hold out on the certainty of speedy relief. The General also requests that you will give the Soubah of Aurungabad the accompanying copies of a proclamation by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, to be circulated in the city, and sent to the principal towns under the Soubah's management.

To Col. Murray.

Phoolmurry, 28th Oct. 1803.

I lose not a moment to apprise you that I have received intelligence that Scindiah has returned across the Taptee, and it is said that he is going up the Sindwah ghaut, and then across the Nerbudda to Ougein. We have taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur, and Scindiah has lately been deserted by vast numbers of his horse. His infantry are entirely destroyed, that is to say, those corps which were engaged at Assye. I am now employed in driving out the Rajah of Berar, who has come into the southward upon a predatory excursion. Col. Stevenson is watching Scindiah to the northward. As soon as I shall have got rid of the Rajah of Berar, I shall take up Col. Stevenson's place, and send him into Berar to besiege Gawilghur and lay hold of Nagpoor. We cannot venture into Hindustan till I shall thus have secured our right flank.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

LONDON :
Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES and Sons,
Stamford Street.



